>>194170It's difficult to talk about because it is a very complicated set of subjects. There is a great deal of nuance to be had, and it's easy to be distracted by tangents on related topics. I can try, though
Much of human history follows a certain pattern: a region is reasonably densely inhabited by an existing civilization. An outside tribe or nation conquers them. The leader of the conquering tribe distributes the land of the conquered area to the soldiers who fought for him as a payment for the conquest, but also for their continued support of the leader. With the passage of time, the descendants of the soldiers become the nobility of the country, with an obligation to fight for the king, and the original inhabitants of the land become a peasant or serf class with less political power and fewer rights, but without necessarily an obligation to fight. The most obvious an extreme example of this is ancient Sparta, with its warrior citizenry class and the indigenous helot class, but this is also the history of France, or Norman England, or spain and portugal after the reconquista, or of brandenburg, silesia, Hungary, Prussia, the Livionian states (Lativa and Estonia), Finland, most of Indian civilization, and so many other states.
The essential point is that in the classical as well as the medieval world, a majority of societies could be divided into "those who fight," a nobility that is only a small portion of the population, and a class of "those who work" who are a plurality of the population, but are not necessarily obligated to fight. Generally, those who fight have more privileges (and especially more wealth) than those who do not, so there is an inequality in the population where those who fight are higher than those who do not. So what justifies this inequality? Just about every possible answer that could be given has, from better blood of the nobility, better upbringing and education, greater intelligence, greater virtue, divine order, and reciprocal obligations of the classes. But the essential points are these: The few fight, and the few must be an expression of
quality and usually need to justify their position
somehow.
Then came the modern era. To me, the modern era begins with the writings of one man: Niccolo Machiavelli. Machiavelli helped oust the ruling elite of Florence and establish a republic, and was a part of the Republic's government. But the Republic was defeated by Spanish troops, who reestablished the old ruling party. Machiavelli wrote his
Prince while in captivity. In that work and his
Discourses on Livy, he explores the questions "Why was the Roman Republic able to last as long as it did? Why did it so consistently win wars, and why did it finally fall?" The answer he came to was the Popular Army. By a "Popular" army, I mean an organization of society wherein the largest class of people have an obligation to fight in wars on behalf of the society. This contrasts against Noble armies, where a privileged or landed class fights, or a mercenary army, or the use of foreign auxiliary forces. It was Rome's use of the Popular Army, he argues, that gave the proletariats so much power within the Republic, and forced the ruling elite to give them reciprocal benefits. This army was large and it was easier for the Romans to replace their losses than it was for their enemies, which gave them an advantage in war. And then Machiavelli argues that the singular change in the Roman Republic that ultimately lead to its downfall was when it expanded in the campaign against the Samnites. The distance to march was greater than could allow the army to return in time for the harvest season, thus meaning that the soldiers of the army could not be the local farmers of the republic, ultimately forcing the existence of a professional army where the soldiers received their pay from - and owed their loyalty to - their generals, and this lead to the collapse of the Republic. And thus is at least the philosophical birth of the Popular army in modern political thought.
A popular army is intended to do two things. First and most importantly, a popular army is intended to give more political power to "the many," with the theory that an armed citizenry is a freer citizenry. But it is also intended to be a stronger army, with the theory that a larger army will tend to beat a smaller army. A popular army can replace its losses. When France loses ten thousand nobles and the king of Burgandy in Argincourt, it is a disaster. When France loses a half million of its best soldiers in an invasion of Russia, it simply drafts an entirely new army. There's also the theory that popular armies improve the discipline, patriotism, and virtue of the common citizenry, but that's an entire tangent.
Whereas a noble army relies on a theory of quality and difference as the fundamental philosophical justification for the inequality of the society that supports it, a popular army does not. Rather, the theory behind a popular army is that the many, the plebian class of the society,
ought to dominate it by shear virtue of its number. Quantity over quality. It is based on a theory of human equality, that the nobles do
not possess an intrinsic or earned superiority over those who work. Machiavelli's justification for equality was that everyone is in need. Hobbes' justification is that everyone can be killed. Whatever the justification, that is the theory.
I haven't even gotten to the wars of the French Revolution yet, holy hell