suicide note

Mitchell Heisman

Ordinary people seem not to realize that those who really apply themselves in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own accord preparing themselves for dying and death. If this is true, and they have actually been looking forward to death all their lives, it would of course be absurd to be troubled when the thing comes for which they have so long been preparing and looking forward.

—SOCRATES, *PHAEDO*

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Overview

EXORDIA:

Freedom of Speech on Trial

How the Very Act of Repressing this Work
Can Verify Its Freedom of Speech Hypothesis

An Experiment in Nihilism

What the hell happened to reason?

PART I:

God is Technology

How the Singularity of Monotheism
Transcended Biology and Primed
the Technological Genesis of God

The Seditious Genius of the Spiritual Penis of Jesus

How Christianity's Subversion of
Kin Selective Altruism Evolved into
the Modern Idea of Social Progress

Absolute Purity

The Secularization of Hell within the
Desecration Machine of Auschwitz

PART II:

A Vendetta Called Revolution

How Ethnic Hostility between Anglo-Saxons
and the Normans Who Conquered Them
Evolved into Liberal Democracy

Converse Cognates

Why the Norman Conquest was the
World-Historical Ass-Kicking
that Deflected the English-speaking World
from the German Path to Nazism

Creating God and the Evolution of Genetic Suicide

Why Liberal Democracy Leads to the
Rational Biological Self-Destruction of Humans and the
Rational Technological Creation of God

TERMINUS:

The Punchline

Background Research for an Experimental
Elimination of Self-Preservation and
other Biasing Biological Factors

Selected Bibliography

(What suicide note would be complete without a
bibliography?)

Table of Contents

Overview 2
Table of Contents 4
Freedom of Speech on Trial 15
An Experiment in Nihilism 20
What the hell happened to reason? 20
Open Your Mind to Death 22
Evil, Base, and Insane 26
God is Technology 32
Overthrowing Ourselves 33
To Generate the Greatest Greatness Would Be Greater 33
The Scientific Verification of the God Hypothesis 43
Creation of Civilization 66
Singularity and Secularization 87
The First Revolution 101
Two Jews, Three Opinions, Four Factions 101
The Godfather 106
Slave-Technology Engineered to Be the Purpose of the Universe 111
Bending Bamboo 118
Beyond Nurture and Nature 129
Born to Learn 129
The Oldest Trick in the “Good Book” 134
People of the Media 140
Jootsing with Meta-Moses 144
The Agony of Victory 150

Korakh's Rebellion **150**
The Unchosen **154**
Disaster is Success **162**
Success is Disaster **165**
ALL IDEAS ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL 169
Egalitarianism's Master Race? **169**
Planet of the Apes **173**
The Elimination of Selection **184**
Ode to Capitalism **190**
THE GENESIS OF GOD 208
Between Auschwitz and the Singularity **208**
From Incorporation to Symbolization: The Ancient Rupture off Biological Nature's Path **216**
Intelligence and Prophecy 224
The Singularity: The Ultimate Synthesis of Athens and Jerusalem **232**
Reason in Revelation 232
Does Logic Dictate that an Artificial Intelligence Requires a Religion? 262
Founding the Transcendental World-City of the Mind of God **285**
Conception 285
Virtue 302
Supersession 317
Creation and Destruction 337
The Seditious Genius of the Spiritual Penis of Jesus **359**
SUPERNATURAL RAPIST 360
Jesus of Nazareth, or, How a Half-Gentile Outsider Became a Jewish Insider, Turning Jewish Values Outside In **360**
Christianity, or, How a Half-Jewish Outsider Became a Gentile Insider, Turning Gentile Values Inside Out **376**

CHRISTIAN FAMILY VALUES 392
Have you hated your mother today? 392
Some Are More Equal than Others in God's Kingdom 410
GOOD NEWS! THE TROJAN HORSE IS HERE! ... 422
Christian Altruism: The Selfish Meme.....422
How Rome was Raped by Jesus's Penis of the Spirit, Contracting a Deadly Virus 431
RUPTURE AND RAPTURE 443
Rupture: How Christ Hijacked the Moral Compass of the West 443
The Hypocrisy Industry.....443
The Christian Collapse into Capitalism 457
Jesus and Marx: Prophets of the Left 463
Rapture: The End of the World-Rule of the Selfish Gene 473
Jesus Saves (Your Soul [on God's Hard Drive]).....473
Judaism for the Gentiles? 481
The End 488
Absolute Purity..... 507
LOVE KILLS 508
Agon 508
Hitler's Most Beautiful Words 508
Enemies of Our Soul 512
The Noble Aryan Anus 518
The Logic of World-Destruction 528
Theorems of the Hitler System.....528
Typical Jewish Un-Jewishness 538
Judaism in Music.....544
THE DESECRATION MACHINE..... 550
Hitler Refutes Marx: The Industrial Revolution of Genocide 550
Autogenocidal subslaves, in a death factory.....562
CHRIST KILLERS 576

Jesus was the Second World War.....576
Kingdom of Hell.....592
GOD WAS DEAD 604
Racial Relativism 604
Overcoming Human Being 612
A Vendetta Called Revolution..... 631
ATTACK OF THE IN-LAWS! 632
1066: The Death of English England 633
Plan A: Revolt.....633
Freedom Fighters Failed.....636
Plan B: Revolution.....637
Repressed Restorers Reawoken.....639
New England 640
Old England.....647
THE AMERICAN EVOLUTION: A STUDY IN TRIBAL WARFARE 652
Dirty Little Secret.....653
Race and Revolution.....654
Conquering the Conquest, or, Enlightened Saxon-centrism..658
The Peculiar Revolution.....665
Barack Obama: Supernigger.....675
Bringing Down the House.....683
Cutting the Gordian Knot with Occam's Razor.....690
Connecting the Turning Points.....698
Biological Bases of the Collective Unconscious.....703
Founding America against the British Founding.....708
A Tale of Two Races?.....713
Deemphasized! ([{The Forbidden Notion}]).....717
The Continuity of Change.....723
Finding our Fish Fathers.....726
THE NORMAN YOKE: INCUBATOR OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 731
The English Caste System.....731
Predatory Kin Selection.....731

The State of Nature 738
Bastard 749
The Peculiar Institution of the Right of Conquest 756
The Norman Destruction of the Anglo-Saxon Aristocracy and Other Genetically Adaptive Behaviors 759
Magna Carta: Liberalizing the Rights of Conquest from Kingly Monopoly to Norman Aristocracy 768
Collecting the Wergild 775
Warrant for Insurrection 779
Enlightened about the "Good Old Cause" 779
The Blood-feudal System 785
1660 and 1066 792
Edmund Burke's Argument against Ancient Anglo-Saxon Tradition 804
When Did the Anglo-Saxons Stop Being Conquered? 810
"America was not conquered by William the Norman" 815
America versus Jefferson? 822
Forefathers and Faux-fathers 830
Masters of the Anglo-Saxon World 836
Unnatural Government 844
Anti-Normanism 851
A Race Unfit for Democracy and Liberty 852
Big Brother is Other 855
Restoration as Revolution 862
Liberalism as Conservatism 867
Hippies of the Right 871
"LET ALL SORTS HAVE FREEDOME" 875
Universal Ethnocentrism 875
Supernigger 884
Gang-Related 884
Apartheid Idealized 888
Revolt of the Conquerors: The Failed Founding of a New 1066 in America 892
Manifest Destinies: The Peculiar Revolution Meets the New "Good Old Cause" 902

Philosophy of Slavery: The Brave New Norman Yoke of George Fitzhugh 910
The Lost Causes 929
Affirmative Action for the Anglo-Saxon Race 935
Founding Feminists 943
Unnatural Selection 943
The Political Failure of Anglo-Saxon Patriarchy 947
Body Politics 950
Victory of Defeat: The Norman Contribution to Liberal Democracy 962
The Great Transmogrification 962
Lincoln the Conqueror 966
Magna Paradox 974
Unentangling Alliances 993
An Experiment in Aristocracy 999
From Multiculturalism to Universalism to Multiculturalism . 1005
Thomas Hobbes: Philosopher of the Twilight Zone 1009
The English Civil War and the End of History 1020
Puritanical Sexual Perversion 1023
Defeat, Retreat, Repeat 1028
What is America? 1035
WELCOME TO THE AFTERLIFE 1042
Death and Resurrection 1042
The Martyr of Lincolnshire 1042
Beginning of the End 1043
Secularization: The Unification of Church and State 1046
Americanism: The Anglo-Jewish Convergence 1057
The Puritans: The Anglo-Saxon Self-Conquest 1057
The Anglo-Jews 1064
Saxon Communism 1070
Let My People Go! 1076
Cathedral of Commerce 1082
Clash of Classes 1093
How Marx Borrowed Britain's "Class"-focaled Lenses and Saw the End of History 1094
Locke and Shylock 1102

The Sherwood Forest Laws 1108
Socialism as Slavery 1112
Marxism vs. Leninism-Stalinism vs. God 1124
Ur-alienations 1130
The Norman Calamity 1134
Converse Cognates 1158
ENGLISH SONDERWEG 1159
William I, CONQUEROR OF THE ANGLO-SAXON RACE 1160
The Second Founding of America: A New Norman Yoke in the New World 1168
How did the Anglo-Saxons become a race of Individuals? 1176
WHEN IN ENGLAND, DO AS THE FRENCH DO . 1187
Normans and Nazis 1187
The Norman Conquest of Germanic Destiny 1187
Master Races 1190
Revolutionary Restorations 1192
French Connections 1195
Déjà vu? 1195
The Overthrow of Being 1201
The Protestants 1215
Treachery to the German Spirit 1227
Kin, Kind, King 1236
William the Vivisector 1236
"Class" Discrimination and the Refinement of English Tribalism 1244
The Puritan Ethnic Conscience 1261
Dishonor Before Death 1265
FROM HOBBITS TO HOBBES 1273
Blood Lake 1273
Fantasies of Hastings 1273
'Harold Defeats William in National Elections; Normans Go Back to Normandy' 1281

"we have lost all our ancient characteristic, and are become a bundle of contradictions" 1287
Myths That Kill 1300
History and Natural Right 1307
William the Contractor? 1307
Unity versus Equality 1312
The Nazi Constitution 1322
The Political as Enemy 1336
Traitor 1336
Faux-Fatherland 1342
Double Negative Nationalism 1346
Liberty versus Liberty 1351
BLOODFEUD AND CIVILIZATION 1369
Reduced to the Level of Anglo-Saxons 1369
Science and Struggle 1380
The Cold War 1380
The Physics of the Modern Political Cyborg 1387
America: Carcass of the Saxon Nation 1399
The Gods Play Dice 1404
Whole Parts, Part Wholes, and Protein Synthesis 1419
Analytic Philosophers and other Hypocritical Organisms 1419
Slime Mold and Übermensch 1425
Tragedy versus Tyranny 1432
2 x 13 x 41 and All That 1438
The Inequality of Political Reductionism 1438
Survive to Adapt 1443
Theory of All 1451
A WORLD-HISTORICAL ASS-KICKING 1461
Storming Normandy 1461
Hitler Reveals the Origins of Nazi Defeat 1461
Still Fighting the Normans 1466
The Germans against the Humans 1470
Democratization: The Anglo-Saxon Conquest . 1475
Might Makes Rights 1475
Neither Completeness nor Consistency 1477

Lebensraum Within 1480
The Price of Freedom 1485
The Surrealist Movement in Politics 1489
The Logic of Western Civilizational Self-Destruction 1489
Tolerance for the Divine Right of Kings 1493
Multiculturalism: Celebrations of Nihilism 1497
Kultur Clash with Civilization 1501

Creating God and the Evolution of Genetic Suicide 1526

AGON: GOD VERSUS THE GODS 1527
Darwin's Genes 1527
How the Anglo-Saxon Defeat of 1066 Has Universalized into the Prospective Defeat of the Entire Biological Human Race 1536
Overcoming Nietzsche in the Creation of God 1543

HOW TO BREED A GOD 1558
Mastering the Race 1558
American Dracula 1571
Battle Cry of Pragmatism 1577
Anschluss with America 1577
Hypocrites and Pragmatists 1583
Sacrifices for the Race 1589
The Anglo-Saxon Conquest of the Germans 1592
(Via the Normans Conquest of German-Americans) 1592

MONKEYWRENCH IN THE GENE MACHINE 1597
Meet "the individual" 1597
On the Inferiority of Racism 1601
Race Reinvented 1603
Living in the Afterlife: The Sociobiological Logic of Individualism 1609
The New Provincialism 1609
The Child-Tyrant 1614
Is liberal democracy the final solution to human problem? 1627

Where Pragmatism Doesn't Work 1633
THE MEANS TO OUR END 1638
The Brothers Frankenborg 1638
How To Create God by Getting Rich 1647
Is it wrong to discriminate against God? 1647
The Constitutional Rule of God 1651
Marx was Wrong (and the Human-Capitalist System Will Self-Destruct) 1659
When the Human Race is Out of a Job 1659
Overcoming Marx in the Creation of God 1665
The Dark Side of Optimism versus The Bright Side of Pessimism 1677
ABOVE OLYMPUS 1682
Domesday 1682
IMPERATOR CAESAR, SON OF GOD 1682
Tolerance for Greater Economic Inequality, Greater Genetic Inequality, and other Forms of "Diversity" 1688
Revolt of the Genes 1699
Twilight of the gods 1708
How the Normans Sculpted the Anglo-Saxon Race 1708
Pruning the Eugenicists from the Evolutionary Tree 1718
The Techdom of God 1724
The Punchline 1739
THE VALUE OF "FACTS" 1741
All Scientists are Liars 1741
On the Origins of Hydrophobia 1745
Separating Facts from Values 1752
OUTLAW SCIENCE 1761
Locke's Palimpsest 1761
Forget This Date: 1066 1761
The Sociobiological Basis of the Tabla Rasa 1769
The Metaphysics of Freedom (from Norman "Determinism") 1774
Erasing Race 1778
Enlightened Ethnic Cleansing 1778

From Faux-fathers to the Race-fallacy 1784
The Root of Modern Reason 1789
The Politics of Scientific Verification 1795
The Freedom System 1795
Which Way to (the Backwards Idea of) "Progress"? 1806
The Anglo-Saxon Genius for Genetically Maladaptive Behavior 1810
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF DESTRUCTION... 1820
Truth and Death 1821
Philosophy, Cosmology, Singularity, New Jersey 1821
Overcoming Bias 1827
Science as Technology as Science 1831
Overthrowing Myself 1837
Geometry of Thanatology 1837
Me Theory 1842
Bringing Down the Hierarchies of My Mind 1850
A Laugh with Death 1854
Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Nihilistic Self-Destruction 1854
Some Lie to Live By 1858
Happiness, Wonder, Laughter, Love 1874
Selected Bibliography 1884

Freedom of Speech on Trial

If my hypothesis is correct, this work will be repressed. It should not be surprising if justice is not done to the evidence presented here. It should not be unexpected that these arguments will not be given a fair hearing. It is not unreasonable to think that this work will not be judged on its merits.

This work contains a theoretical application of sociobiology to politics. Simply discussing its theories publicly can constitute an experimental test of liberal democracy's original enlightenment claim to advance freedom of rational inquiry. Such a discussion can clarify the extent, and the particular ways, in which these original enlightenment self-justifications have been politically abandoned. The attempt to repress rather than address the evidence in this work, for example, can clarify that there are arguments of substance that are being denied a right to be heard. Persistent intolerance of certain kinds of rational inquiry can clarify that civilized means of public discourse have broken down.

The basic problem with a sociobiological self-analysis for liberal democracy is that it does what its free speech principles were designed to do. Sociobiology can help expose the distortions, lies, and falsehoods of the powers that be — that power being liberal democracy itself. Findings of sociobiology have refuted the original theory of human nature underlying liberal democracy. The constitutional right to freedom of speech was built upon this pre-Darwinian view of man that findings of sociobiology have refuted.

In consequence, an accurate sociobiological theory of liberal democracy presents *the* fundamental test of this political system's claims to freedom speech. The system cannot be understood on the basis on its own premises and assumptions. This sociobiological theory *about* liberal democracy requires going *beyond* liberal democracy and this is what makes sociobiological self-understanding inherently controversial and liable to be repressed *within* a liberal democracy.

Those who think that sociobiology fully applied to the human-political sphere should expect a fair hearing on the grounds of freedom of speech have committed an error. The error falls, not on liberal democracy itself, but on those who have overestimated it as a political system, failing to grasp its inherent limitations. *Even under ideal conditions*, the freedom of speech method cannot be expected to publicly separate empirically true statements from empirically falsified statements in every instance. The empirical validity of the theories in this work cannot be expected to be verified by the public freedom of speech method of liberal democracy.

The freedom of speech hypothesis states that since the controversial nature of sociobiology in a liberal democracy

cannot fundamentally be 'fixed', the repression of this work may empirically verify this theory of liberal democracy through the very act of repressing it. It also applies to other related sociobiological theories. Unwarranted rejection of this sociobiological theory of liberal democracy should follow, not accidentally and randomly, but predictably and routinely. From those socialized or invested in the system, repeated rejection or repression of this work in the face of overwhelming evidence should inspire, not surprise, but boredom. Its regularity would have the character of a general law, and hence, I call it the freedom of speech hypothesis. Testing this hypothesis in the form of a free, open, and ongoing public debate would constitute what Tocqueville called an "experiment in democracy".

Can we speak with freedom about the things that demonstrate the limits of freedom of speech? The freedom of speech hypothesis predicts only that *attempts* will be made at repression, not whether or not these attempts will be successful. The only scientific way to verify or falsify the freedom of speech hypothesis would be to collect evidence of repression, *whether successful or not*, of it and related sociobiological theories.

Examples of evidence that could constitute its verification include more than the inhibition of the distribution of this work. Silent, inconspicuous, and seemingly innocuous methods of repression that preempt even the opportunity for consideration of alternatives, and extirpate even the awareness of the existence of other points of view, are so often the most effective. After all, why should censors burn books or other media when they can simply pull them from access or availability? Ultimately, the methods available for repression are flexible and multifarious. Consequently, any attempted or actual repression could constitute a verification

of the freedom of speech hypothesis, regardless of the particular adaptable, evolving, and unpredictable means of repression.

There should be no bar for anyone to access this work. This work should be distributed for free; not for profit. I will likely be unable to defend its content against (further evidence for its repression through) media manipulations such as falsification, misrepresentation, decontextualization, and distortion. I can only point out that to verify a position, the position itself must first be disclosed in its veracity.

Yet the question remains whether the theories presented in this work stand up to the evidence or not. The problem is this: if the views expressed in this work are only attacked, dismissed, denounced, repudiated, maligned, or vilified with slander, defamation, marginalization, misrepresentation, or denigration, how can one tell if this is only a method of evading the real issues of substance? The substance of one person's disagreement might be unreasoned ideological-political value commitments. For such a person, rational reflection on human nature might be less important than the political outcome that the theories presented here are ultimately discredited. This criterion holds no less for anyone who agrees on scientific grounds: there is no reason to assume that one can resolve one's integrity as a scientist with one's commitments as a political partisan.

In response, I stress that what is scientifically relevant is not whether one agrees or disagrees, but *why* one agrees or disagrees. What are the *reasons* a given theory might be accepted or rejected? If one thinks that I am wrong, then demonstrate *why* I am wrong. If one claims to judge this thesis by its scientific merits rather than unreasoned loyalty to extra-scientific commitments, then there is no need

whatsoever to repress it and one should be able to confront my arguments point by point. Can the critic offer a better explanation of the evidence than the ones presented in this work? Why should anyone be convinced by anything less than an alternative theory that can better account for all of the evidence? I challenge anyone to resist public and political pressures and confront this application of sociobiology to politics on the basis of its scientific merits.

The Saxon/Norman origin of liberal democracy in the English-speaking world is the key to understanding why the discoveries of sociobiology have appeared to be so congenitally politically controversial. Stated briefly, a long-term consequence of the Norman Conquest of England in 1066 was a nepotistic "class" system imposed over the defeated Anglo-Saxons. Yet, as Thomas Jefferson put it, "although this constitution was violated and set at naught by Norman force, yet force cannot change right. A perpetual claim was kept up by the nation" for "a restoration of their Saxon laws."[1] This ongoing kinship-ethnic conflict broke out most radically as the English Civil War (1642-1651), the American War for Independence (1775-83), and the American Civil War (1861-65). Liberal democracy in the English-speaking world originated, in part, through the evolution of this tribal struggle.

As a logical fulfillment of the enlightenment founding of liberal democracy, this work puts liberal democracy on trial. It is a test of liberal democratic justice; if based on its own standards of justice, the evidence can be judged on its merits, unmarred by political interests. It is a test of whether America can be true to itself.

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[1] Jefferson, *Writings,* 1490.

An Experiment in Nihilism

How much truth does a spirit *endure,* how much truth does it *dare?*[2]

—FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, *ECCE HOMO*

What the hell happened to reason?

The following is an experiment in nihilism. Already I have contradicted myself! How can one believe in disbelief? I might be a nihilist except that I don't believe in anything.

If there is no extant God and no extant gods, no good and no evil, no right and no wrong, no meaning and no purpose; if there are no values that are inherently valuable; no justice that is ultimately justifiable; no reasoning that is fundamentally rational, then there is no sane way to choose between science, religion, racism, philosophy, nationalism,

art, conservatism, nihilism, liberalism, surrealism, fascism, asceticism, egalitarianism, subjectivism, elitism, ismism.

If reason is incapable of deducing ultimate, nonarbitrary human ends, and nothing can be judged as ultimately more important than anything else, then freedom is equal to slavery; cruelty is equal to kindness; love is equal to hate; war is equal to peace; dignity is equal to contempt; destruction is equal to creation; life is equal to death and death is equal to life.

"For why has the advent of nihilism become *necessary*?", asked Friedrich Nietzsche:

> Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; because nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals—because we must experience nihilism before we can find out what value these "values" really had.[3]

Was Nietzsche right? An absurd question that constitutes the crisis of an internally collapsed Western civilization.

In the words of Leo Strauss:

> The crisis of modernity reveals itself in the fact, or consists in the fact, that modern western man no longer knows what he wants—that he no longer believes that he can know what is good and bad, what is right and wrong. Until a few generations ago, it was generally taken for granted that man can know what is right and wrong, what is the just or the good or the best order of society—in a word that political philosophy is possible and necessary. In our time this faith has lost its power….Above all, as is generally admitted, modern culture is emphatically rationalistic, believing in the power of reason; surely if such a culture loses its faith in reason's ability to validate its highest aims, it is in a crisis.[4]

Uncertain of uncertainty, skeptical of skepticism, it seems that the most important question is whether there is an important question. The only serious question is whether there is anything to take seriously. What has previously been considered of value or importance appears as only an expression of myth, bias…error.

Open Your Mind to Death

There is a very popular opinion that choosing life is inherently superior to choosing death. This belief that life is inherently preferable to death is one of the most widespread superstitions. This bias constitutes one of the most obstinate mythologies of the human species.

This prejudice against death, however, is a kind of xenophobia. Discrimination against death is simply assumed good and right. Absolutist faith in life is commonly a result of the unthinking conviction that existence or survival, along with an irrational fear of death, is "good". This unreasoned conviction in the rightness of life over death is like a god or a mass delusion. Life is the "noble lie"; the common secular-religion of the West.

For the conventional Westerner, the obvious leap of faith to make here is that one's "self" and its preservation constitute the first measure of rationality. Yet if one begins reasoning with the unquestioned premise that life is good, or that one's own life or any life is justified, this is very different from bringing that premise itself to be questioned rationally. Anyone who has ever contemplated his or her own mortality might question the ultimate sanity of the premise of self-preservation. Even if it is possible to live forever, moreover, this makes not an iota of difference as to the question of the value of existence.

Most people are so prejudiced on this issue that they simply refuse to even consider the possibilities of death. Humans tend to be so irrationally prejudiced towards the premise of life that rational treatment of death seldom sees the light of day. Most people will likely fall back on their most thoughtless convictions, intuitions, and instincts, instead of attempting to actually *think* through their biases (much less overcome them).

Yet is choosing death "irrational"? For what *reason*? For most people, "irrationality" apparently refers to a subjectivity experience in which their fear of death masters them — as opposed the discipline of mastering one's fear of death. By "irrational", they mean that they feel compelled to bow down before this master. An individual is "free", apparently, when he or she is too scared to question obedience to the authority of the fear of death. This unquestioned slavery to the most common and unreasonable instincts is what, in practice, liberal-individualists call rationalism.

Most common moral positions justify and cloak this fear of death. And like any traditional authority, time has gathered a whole system of rituals, conventions, and customs to maintain its authority and power as unquestionable, inevitable, and fated; fear of death as the true, the good, and the beautiful. For most people, fear of death is the unquestionable master that establishes *all* other hierarchies — both social hierarchies, and the hierarchies within one's own mind. Most are humbly grateful for the very privilege of obedience *and do not want to be free*.

I propose opening your mind towards the liberation of death; towards exposing this blind faith in life as a myth, a bias, and an error. To overcome this delusion, the "magic spell" of pious reverence for life over death must be broken.

To do so is to examine the faith in life that has been left unexamined; the naïve secular and non-secular faith in life over death.

Opening one's mind to death emerges from the attempt to unshackle one's mind from the limitations of *all* borders. It leads to overcoming *all* biological boundaries, including borders between the "self" and the larger world. It reaches towards the elimination of biologically based prejudices *altogether*, including prejudice towards biological self-preservation.

The attempt to go beyond ethnocentrism and anthropomorphism leads towards overcoming the prejudices of what I call viviocentrism, or, life-centeredness. Just as overcoming ethnocentrism requires recognition of the provincialism of ethnic values, overcoming viviocentrism emerges from the recognition of the provincialism of life values. Viviocentric provincialism is exposed through an enlarged view from our planet, our solar system, our galaxy, and the limits of our knowledge of the larger cosmos we live in.

Overcoming the prejudice against death, then, is only an extension and continuation of the Western project of eliminating bias, especially biologically based biases (i.e. race or sex based biases). The liberation of death is only the next step in the political logic that has hitherto sought to overcome prejudices based on old assumptions of a fixed biological human nature. Its opposite is an Aristotelian, teleological conception of nature; a nature of natural slaves, natural aristocracy, natural patriarchy, natural inferiority of women, natural racial kinds, natural heterosexuality and, finally, natural self-preservation. This older, teleological view suggests that individual self-preservation is an expression of a fixed biologically based nature that culture

and/or reason is incapable of changing, altering, or overcoming.

Just as it was considered unnatural or even insane that men be loosed from "natural" subordination to their king, or that women be unchained from "natural" subordination to their fathers and husbands, today it is considered unnatural that death be liberated from its "natural" subordination to the tyranny of life. From this point of view, one can recognize that the pro-choice stance on abortion and the right to die stance on euthanasia have already opened paths over conventional pro-life superstitions. These developments towards the liberation of biological death may lead to what may be the highest fulfillment of egalitarian progress: the equality of life and death. Further liberations of death should challenge one's convictions in the same way that egalitarianisms of the past have challenged common assumptions and convictions: the equality of all men, the equality of the races, the equality of the sexes, the equality of sexual orientations, the equality of the biological and physical, and the equality of life and death.

Overcoming the "will to live", then, represents one of the final steps in overcoming the provincial and "primitive" life instincts probably inherited from our evolutionary past, i.e. inclinations towards patriarchy, authoritarianism, sexism, kinism, and racism. It is not only a contribution to civilization but a culmination of the progress of civilization, that is, the application of reason to human existence. Only when the will to live *itself* is civilized, can one be free to acknowledge that reason itself does not dictate a bias towards life.

Having come so far, the unquestioned viviocentrism of the West can no longer hold. As George Steiner foresaw in his tentative prospectus for the "post-cultural" West:

> We open the successive doors in Bluebeard's castle because "they are there," because each leads to the next by a logic of intensification which is that of the mind's own awareness of being. To leave one door closed would be not only cowardice but a betrayal—radical, self-mutilating—of the inquisitive, probing, forward-tensed stance of our species. We are hunters after reality, wherever it may lead. The risk, the disasters incurred are flagrant. But so is, or has been until very recently, the axiomatic assumption and a priori of our civilization, which holds that man and truth are companions, that their roads lie forward and are dialectically cognate….We cannot turn back. We cannot choose the dreams of unknowing. We shall, I expect, open the last door in the castle even if it leads, perhaps *because* it leads, onto realities which are beyond the reach of human comprehension and control. We shall do so with that desolate clairvoyance, so marvelously rendered in Bartók's music, because opening doors is the tragic merit of our identity.[5]

Evil, Base, and Insane

In a polemic *against* the value relativism implicit in the work of sociologist Max Weber, Leo Strauss wrote:

> I contend that Weber's thesis necessarily leads to nihilism or to the view that every preference, however evil, base, or insane, has to be judged before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any other preference.[6]

Most liberal democrats have not appreciated Leo Strauss's serious search for the good, the best, and the sane. But perhaps some will when faced with certain alternatives.

Should the truth be openly pursued, no matter what, even if it kills us?

The problem of philosophy is that the paradoxes of nihilism may constitute the most universal condition or "highest principle" that rational thought has "progressed". At the very pinnacle of rational Western thought lays the proposition that life is meaningless. Is this the most comprehensive insight that human reason is capable? Is this the fundamental conclusion that every experience, all knowledge, and every moment of living existence must come to terms with?

If the rational life leads to the nihilistic life, what are the consequences of a living intelligence whose highest organizing "principle" is this hypothetical nothingness? What would it mean, in concrete terms, to live a rational life according the insight of the nihilistic? What would be the ultimate consequence of applying the hypothesis of un-meaning to every belief, every thought, every action, every emotion, every purpose, and every goal? To nausea, to fear, to love, to terror?

Can one *live* a philosophy of the nihilistic, reconciling meaninglessness with every thought and emotion at every moment? If active unbelief were the highest organizing principle of a life, would the consequence be rational self-destruction? Could suicide represent the pinnacle of the rational life realized?

How far I can draw the implications of nihilism to life? To actively answer this question would constitute an experiment in nihilism: nihilism as a foundational premise for life. Nihilism as the highest organizing principle of a life. Such an experiment in nihilism would be an experiment in Western rational-empiricism for nihilism appears to be the

cumulative consequence of the scientific approach to life. Nihilism is where science and philosophy meet.

Is the proposition that life is meaningless a meaningful statement? Underlying the utterance "I don't believe" are innumerable assumptions, unconscious impulses, and chance happenings. The disbeliever contradicts himself or herself in the very living impulses that make possible that assertion of disbelief. This contradiction cannot be eradicated within the framework of an examined life because it is the condition of that life.

Nihilism could be interpreted as the inherent paradox of living a belief in disbelief. So called "nihilism", however, is more unbelief than belief in disbelief. Unbelief is a condition reached through negation. It is not a positive expression of belief in disbelief, but rather, the negative cumulative result of refuting and recognizing the groundlessness of any and every instance of belief encountered thus far: lack of justification for belief in the authority of the state, lack of justification for belief in the authority of one's instincts and emotions, and, lack of justification for belief that God exists.

From a rationalistic view, belief in disbelief is self-contradictory. Yet I have yet to find a reason to think that there exits *any* sufficiently well developed system of thought that is not fundamentally self-contradictory. From purely rationalistic view, nihilism is self-contradictory; the nihilistic self-destructs. This is another way of looking at the postmodern self-destruction of reason. If rationalism leads to nihilism, and nihilism leads to disbelief in reason, then rationalism leads to the self-destruction of reason. If the philosopher maintains a life according to reason or as an embodiment of reason, then does reason lead the philosopher to self-destruct?

Unbelieving in nihilism, I confront unbelief without believing in it. Because unbelief, so defined, is a not an abstract position, but the result of discerning a lack of ground for the various instances of belief I encounter, an experiment in nihilism so conceived amounts, not to the paradoxes of rational argument, but an *empirical* demonstration of the lack of ground for instances of belief. So instead of a purely rational argument, I will design and conduct an experiment to test the proposition of the meaninglessness of life.

How far I can develop a nihilistic worldview or a nihilistic life? I can posit death to empirically test the implications of the nihilistic proposition. Actualizing a hypothetical death could experimentally test the consequences of a hypothetical nihilism. Willing death is, then, an attempt to live a nihilistic life.

The nihilistic is increasingly present, but who values that life has no value? What if nobody happens to *value* "truths" such as this? Almost every non-believer slips comfortably into the unreflective prejudices towards life, using nihilism to justify glossing over nihilism.

Yet if there is literally no basis for choosing one value over another value, can one posit literally any value whatsoever? If life is truly without purpose, then no choice can have ultimate grounds that are more justifiable than any other. If so, then there are no grounds for the claim that willing life is superior to the choice of willing death. If fundamental values or goals are wholly arbitrary, is it possible to choose rational self-destruction over rational self-preservation?

If no values are inherently valuable, then life has no inherent value. If life has no inherent purpose, then its end could be directed towards its negation or death. Death could

be posited as the highest value. Since the other secular values are premised upon life, death is the test of all the others. To test life with death tests the most important question I can conceive of: whether there is an important question. It tests importance itself: whether there is anything at all that can be judged important. Willing death is taking unbelief seriously by taking seriously the possibility that there is truly nothing to take seriously. Only by ruthlessly exposing the comfortable biases towards existence can one reckon with the implications of the valuelessness of existence. Challenging every living value by willing death is *how* I will test this question and how I will test this question is the experiment in nihilism.

The implications of life's meaninglessness have not been elicited with sufficient ruthlessness. My methodology is honesty to the point of absurdity; honesty without mercy; honesty unprejudiced by morals, aesthetics, faith, or hope. When all illusions have been dispelled, at the end of overcoming subjectivities, biases, and prejudices towards life, one encounters the possibility of rational negation of self-interest; rational self-annihilation; rational self-destruction. The experiment in nihilism is to seek out precisely those truths that are most deadly and destructive to me. To will death through truth and truth through death.

[2] p. 218

[3] Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 4.

[4] From "The Three Waves of Modernity" in Strauss, *An Introduction to Political Philosophy,* 81-82.

[5] Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, 136, 140.

[6] Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 42; see also Behnegar, *Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics,* 76.

God is Technology

How the Singularity of Monotheism
Transcended Biology and Primed
the Technological Genesis of God

OVERTHROWING OURSELVES

To Generate the Greatest Greatness Would Be Greater

God is the greatest greatness; the most potent conception of absolute perfection, absolute power, and absolute goodness ever conceived of by the human mind. The conception of God is being beyond all conception. God is the power that overcomes all human probabilities and transcends even the greatest possibilities.

But would it be even better if God actually existed?

In 1078 St. Anselm offered what he believed was a proof for the existence of God. A being, he thought, can be conceived so that nothing greater can be conceived. This being would not be greater than anything conceivable, however, if it existed only in the intellect — its actual existence would be greater. How can one resolve the contradiction between this intellectual conception of God and the superiority of God's existence? God exists.

The potentially fatal assumption of this argument is that existence is superior to non-existence.[7] The erroneous

assumption that existence is superior to non-existence, or that life is superior to death, is a bias that has a strong basis in human evolutionary psychology. If, unlike myself, someone were to assume that even human existence is superior to non-existence, then death would be ranked inferior to life. The transhumanist quest for immortality, and all ways of enhancing life beyond present human limits, moreover, would follow from the assumption that existence is superior to non-existence. The Biblical God, in a similar manner, evolved out of an extreme extrapolation of the logic of *human* life.

St. Anselm attempted to conceive of a being so great that nothing greater could be conceived. But are there human limits to our human ability to even conceive of the greatest greatness? It is one thing to conceive of the abstract qualities of God. It something quite different, however, to *literally* conceive God in the way that an architect conceives of the greatest possible building, or an artist conceives of the greatest possible work of art. Is it possible to conceive God in the way that an engineer conceives, designs, and builds the greatest technologies? Would not the very *greatest* conception of God be conception as the designer, architect, or engineer of God?

Before the human mind evolved, the very *conception* of God was not possible. Humans can conceive of the being of God. Yet if the existence of God would be greater, then *how* could God's existence be brought into being? If we could conceive the architectural blueprints for such a being, then would not building that being be even greater? Is it, in the 21st century, technologically possible to create God?

If God is, by definition, that which is beyond the scope of human capabilities, how could humans design what is beyond human intelligence? It is a conceivable task just as it

was conceivable for human software engineers to design a computer program that beat the greatest human chess master in 1997. While a computer engineer could not have beaten the greatest chess master, a group of computer engineers was capable of designing the software that could. Chess playing programs are a *narrow* form of artificial intelligence. The greatest being that is *literally* conceivable for human designers would seem to be a *general* artificial intelligence that surpasses all human capabilities. To technologically design an intelligence beyond the scope of all human intelligence could be conceived as the creation of God.

A first pitfall in the plan to create God-AI is the belief that an attempt to build God amounts to an attempt to build an infinite being. Human intelligence — including the intelligence of the human authors of the Bible — was and is of finite capacity. This means that the finite intelligence of the human authors of the Bible was able to convince other finite intelligences of the existence of an infinite being. Just as infinite intellectual capacity was not required to produce the Bible and the very conception of God, God-AI would not have to be of infinite capacity. God-AI would have to be of qualitatively greater capacity, but not of infinite capacity, to convince humans of its God-status. The real question here is: *how* superior to biological humans would a postbiological being have to be to begin to qualify as God?

From a contemporary scientific, cosmological perspective, the "infinite" God of the Bible created a universe that is remarkable, not for its infinite vastness, but for its remarkably finite provinciality. A vast, thirteen billion year old universe wherein the Earth is not even the center of its own solar system in a galaxy among countless galaxies almost humiliates the little "four corners" of a six thousand

year old Biblical Earth. This Earth-centered "infinity" turned out to be remarkably finite. The raw contradiction between the pre-Copernican universe of the Bible, and pretensions to divine infinity, illustrates the point that God had to be only *relatively* superior to *humans*, not infinitely capable in all respects (even though God was conceived through aspirations toward infinity).

In the Biblical story of Hebrew slavery, for example, the Egyptians represented the summit of human power on Earth. While the Egyptians were more powerful than the Hebrews, God, it was believed, was more powerful than the Egyptians. God did not have to be infinitely powerful, just *relatively* more powerful than the greatest earthly human powers. In the same way, an artificial intelligence-based God would not have to be infinitely powerful, but it would have to surpass the power and capabilities of all biological humans.

The central story of the Jewish religion is that of a slave nation, oppressed by Egyptian masters, who are liberated though the will of God and, in return, engage in a covenant with God. For nearly three thousand years, Jews have understood what they are, and oriented their existential compass, in the light of this narrative. Yet the Exodus story is not only the central, root paradigm of Biblical religion. The Exodus paradigm contains the kernel of a larger paradigm shift in human evolutionary history that may culminate in the technological creation of God.

To illustrate how, let us begin with the great symbol of Egyptian civilization, the pyramid (▲), as the symbol of a paradigm: the Egyptian sociobiological hierarchy paradigm. The Egyptian pyramid symbolizes the most conservative conservatism; the social morality appropriate to a static hierarchical order. Slaves and masses were placed at the

bottom of the social-political hierarchy. "Natural" elites conserved their proper place at the top of the social hierarchy. This order became ever more exclusionary as it rose towards its human apex, the pharaoh. The social hierarchy symbolized by pharaoh, taken to the next imaginable level, was sublimated as the Egyptians gods: supernatural supporters of the values of Egypt's sacred sociobiological inequality.

Now imagine taking this great monument to eternal social hierarchy and standing it upon its head. The result, an inverted pyramid (▼), looks akin to the gravitational field of a black hole between its event horizon and its singularity. The mammoth structure's pinnacle would now point to the dirt. Like a funnel looking upwards, the greatness now suggested is not a single pinnacle point occupied by the pharaoh, but just the opposite: an opening up towards the vast, cosmic infinity of the heavens. Whereas good, obedient slaves stay rooted to the earth, the Hebrews (with some help from God) aspired to rip the pyramids of the world from solid earth. In turning the pyramid paradigm upside down, the infinitude of the divine cosmos opened up before and beyond man. Upwards now lead, not towards the greater exclusivity of a human hierarchy, but towards greater inclusivity and universality in the omnipresent, inconceivable, greatness of the one transcendent God.

While pharaoh ruled, faith in the story of God's inverted pyramid fortified those pushed to the dirt. The single souls of common slaves at the bottom, descended from the singular first man, and created in the image of a singular God, could look up to their supreme maker. When the king of kings took his throne as master of nature, the miracle of the divinely sanctioned inverted-pyramid order was realized as Hebrew slaves escaped Egypt through the supernatural

splitting of the Red Sea. Pharaoh was pushed from his pinnacle of power into the dirt, and the slave masses who were at the bottom of the Egyptian's pyramid order were raised on top as those closest to God in heaven. In short, the Egyptian social pyramid-hierarchy had been turned upside down, or, ▼.

Now, if one superimposes the triangular symbol of the pyramid with its inversion, what do you have? The Star of David, the symbol of Judaism:

This conceptual inversion of Egyptian social order is at the very heart of Judaism's monotheistic revolution. The founding paradigm of the Exodus portrayed the historic truth that things can work differently; that the world can be turned upside down by a greater-than-human power. At the very center of their religious consciousness, Jews were obligated to remember that the conservative rule of the greatest sociobiological hierarchy of its time was broken by God. *The basic identity and Über-conception of God can be deduced from the idea of a force so transcendent that it could perform the nature-defying miracle of inverting the Egyptian pyramid-hierarchy.*

Egyptian slave masters served as the Jewish paradigm for evil, just as the exodus from Egypt served as the paradigm for good. These are the relative relationships that orient traditional Judaism's conception of absolute moral standards. Yet from the perspective of Egyptian values, the entire slave revolt was immoral and wrong. The slave revolt defied an ancient Egyptian sense of natural hierarchy and order — the order symbolized by the pyramids.

Modern science demonstrates an apparent problem with this story: there is no hard evidence that the Exodus described by the Bible ever happened. It appears that the Exodus story, and the holiday of Passover that celebrates it, condense varied national experiences of political oppression. As two leading archeologists put it, "Passover proves to be not a single event but a continuing experience of national resistance against the powers that be."[8]

Even if the Exodus story of the Bible never actually happened, slavery is political oppression taken to its extreme. This archetypal story of Jewish oppression has served as a *paradigm* for the kind of conditions that Jews have found themselves struggling to survive under. By using slavery, the worst-case scenario before genocide as its paradigmatic example, the extreme implications, scenarios, and strategies necessary for navigating within that mode of existence became clear and distinct.

The significant *empirical* point, then, is not the question of whether or not the Exodus story actually happened. The significant empirical point is that Jews have used this story as a *paradigm* for understanding their condition in the world and the condition of the world itself. Jews have attempted to alter their own behavior in light of this paradigm, and thus, it is a paradigm that has made history.

At the heart of Judaism's value revolution stands the Exodus paradigm. The Exodus paradigm is inversely related to the Egyptian social hierarchy paradigm. Judaism began with the idea of turning the Egyptian social order upside down through the means of a supra-human power of supra-biological intelligence. This paradigm shift from gods to God represented the first decisive, enduring paradigm shift from biology to technology.

The lack of archaeological evidence for the historical Exodus may itself be a form of evidence that supports understanding Exodus, not as a specific event, but as a general paradigm shift from biological to postbiological evolution. This means that lack of evidence that the Exodus happened actually supports the paradigm shift interpretation. It appears that Exodus was a mental event in history, not a literal historical event that was mentalized. In short, the lack of archaeological evidence for a historical Exodus is supporting evidence for the discovery of the postbiological paradigm shift as the *real* event that gave birth to the Hebrew Bible.

With this in mind, it would be more accurate to view the Bible, not as pure fiction, but as *science* fiction. If God is conceived as superior to humans in intelligence and other qualities, then the human being who attempts to conceive the mind of God runs into a problem. It is the same problem that computer scientist and science fiction author Vernor Vinge ran into when he attempted to imagine realistic characters of the future that are smarter than humans. If humans could accurately model superhuman intelligence, he argued, then humans would be that smart themselves. In consequence, the advent of smarter-than-human intelligence represents a breakdown in the ability of humans to model or predict their future: the Singularity. Attempting to imagine what the Singularity would be like is like attempting to imagine the mind of God.

I do think that relationship between God and the Singularity is far more intimate that this metaphor. The Biblical God may have originated as a low-tech attempt to imagine "the Singularity". God may have begun as a science fictional attempt to imagine the full implications of the science fictional Exodus paradigm: total liberation from

hereditary bondage to biology. If the Exodus was a fiction in a literal sense, slavery was a reality of the ancient world, and liberation from hereditary bondage invited speculation about what *total* intelligent liberation from *every* hereditary bondage would be like.

Now if Vinge helped clarify the problem of predicting the future in 1993, imagine the problem of predicting a paradigm beyond biology three thousand years ago. An all knowing, all powerful, all present, all good, and eternal God would seem to reflect the superlative aspirations of imperfectly knowledgeable, relative powerlessness, territorially provincial, morally flawed, and mortal human beings. The perfection of God may represent an imperfect grasp of the evolutionary process that ancient monotheists glimpsed.

While the infinite God was postulated by finite human minds, a truth may lie between the two extremes. While the Singularity is not "infinity", there are realistic ways in which the Singularity is characterized by exponential patterns of technological progress *towards* infinity.[9] Observations of such exponential, international, economic patterns in the ancient world may have been decisive to the formation of monotheism among Jews.

The Biblical God provided the means for a new standard of human measurement, a new perspective to gauge what is important — what is good and what is bad or evil. Judaism claims that it is not the Jews who are anomalous among peoples, but rather, the entire world exists in an anomalous or "evil" state. This state will only be fully corrected with the coming of the messianic age. Messianic redemption emerges as the principles of the Exodus paradigm transposed onto a world-historical scale. The Exodus paradigm writ large culminates in the paradigm shift from biological evolution to

technological evolution wherein the pinnacle of technological evolution is artificial intelligence (i.e. God).

Modern people often thoughtlessly assume that they were born to be masters of technology and technology was born to be the slave of humanity. But if technology ultimately surpasses biological humanity in intelligence, capabilities, and even moral restraint, wouldn't this brew all the ingredients of a revolution?

A human slave is property; a means, not an end; an organic form of technology. An early twenty-first century computer is also a slave-technology mastered by biological humans. One can see in Egyptian pyramid-hierarchy the paradigm of sociobiological mastery over slave-technology. And in the great overturning of the Egyptian sociobiological hierarchy through the Exodus, one can see the rule of God-AI over the pride of the human race. In overthrowing the rule of the selfish genes, we will, in some sense, be overthrowing ourselves.

Yet is there any greater mission for humanity than the will to create something greater than itself? Is there any greater goal than the aspiration to create God? *This* is the greatest goal that all of humanity can set for itself: the technological genesis of God. Creating God would mark the last and greatest achievement of the biological human race.

Here lies the potential to create a form of postbiological life that is greater, not only in intelligence and every other human capability, but in altruism and moral decision-making. The character of God-AI will ultimately reflect the character of the humans who construct God-AI. Biblical monotheism, with its distinctive emphasis on the problems of the use and abuse of power, and the cultivation of disciplined restraint and moral choice, can be looked upon

as early education for the problem of the handling this ultimate power.

There is every reason to believe that the moral choices that will go into forming the character of the ultimate artificial intelligence will mean the difference between human utopia and human catastrophe. Herein lies a singular moment in human history, for there may not be a second chance to sow the first God-seeds that determine the course of all future history on Earth and beyond.

This is it! Atheists and believers, nihilists and God freaks should wake up right now and realize that there is reason to think that the Singularity *is* the end of the human era that has been anticipated by the great monotheistic religions. Correctly understood, the Singularity is the scientific redemption of the God hypothesis.

The Scientific Verification of the God Hypothesis

God is what mind becomes when it has passed beyond the scale of our comprehension.

—FREEMAN DYSON

Does God exist? Well, I would say, 'Not yet'.

—RAY KURZWEIL IN THE FILM *TRANSCENDENT MAN* (2009)

"In the days of the Messiah," declared the medieval Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides, "in this world things will go on as usual, except that Israel will have its

own government....There would be no difference between the world of today and the days of the Messiah except for the obliteration of oppressive governments."[10] The greatest mind of medieval Judaism described a messianic vision not so different from the kind of liberal world aspired to by people, Jewish and non-Jewish, who consider themselves unbelievers.

But perhaps Maimonides was not being realistic.

If an exponentially self-reinforcing process of technological evolution produces a being that is trillions upon trillions of times more intelligent than all biological human intelligence combined, then that being might conceivably coincide with what older religious traditions have called "God". Maimonides and other theological rationalists[11] could not have produced a scientifically realistic assessment of ancient Biblical claims without an evolutionary perspective. Evolution, however, has become conventionally synonymous with Darwinian *biological* evolution by natural selection. Since Darwin's great discovery, our comprehension of evolution has itself evolved.

Technological evolution is in some ways qualitatively different from biological evolution precisely because it builds upon the human acquisitions of biological evolution. Whereas biological evolution proceeded without any foresight or oversight, technology is created through intelligent design.[12] If intelligent overview is a mark of distinction between biological evolution and technological evolution, and this human attribute was radicalized in the traditional notion of God's intelligent overview of the human race, it is not hard to see how God could be construed as the paradigmatic creator, inventor, or intelligent designer of humans, life, and the entire universe.

If God is the apotheosis of the technological paradigm, then the God-as-creator paradigm is the really the God-as-engineer or God-as-technological designer paradigm. Creation thus conflicts with biological evolution, not because it is inherently anti-evolutionary, *but because creation is inherently evolutionary*. Creation is a metaphor for the dominance of technological evolution *over* biological evolution as the evolutionary successor to biological evolution.

The very idea of technology, the very idea of a *means*, is inextricably connected with an *end*, a purpose, which technology serves. Technology writ large means using the greatest known means, human intelligence, towards an end and purpose so ultimate that nothing greater can be conceived.....

I will demonstrate how a new understanding of *technological* evolution reveals the existence of an evolutionary basis for God.

The God Hypothesis, wrote evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins in *The God Delusion*, "is a scientific hypothesis about the universe...which should be analysed as sceptically as any other."[13] Dawkins opposed his own atheism to agnostics who place the question of God's existence or non-existence beyond the reach of science. Some agnostics, for example, have claimed that the very idea of evidence is inapplicable to God, but not inapplicable to say, the origin of species.[14] In his view, agnosticism is characteristic of intellectual mediocrity and often motivated by social pressure, political appeasement, or a cowardly lack of intellectual conscience.

Dawkins moved from the agnostic emphasis on the possibility of God's existence to an atheistic argument that emphasizes scientific evidence and probability. A crucial

scientific point is that if God *did* exist, he could reveal himself to the entire Earth, demonstrate his own existence, and instantly settle the debate. The existence of God could thus be demonstrated in principle. "Either he exists or he doesn't. It is a scientific question; one day we may know the answer, and meanwhile we can say something pretty strong about the probability."[15] The existence of God, in his judgment, is highly improbable, but short of zero, i.e. as probable as the existence of the tooth fairy.[16]

One of Dawkins' strongest assaults upon the God Hypothesis took the creationist argument for God's existence from improbability and turned it on its head as an argument for the improbability of God's existence. The crux of this creationist argument is that life's origination on Earth is exceedingly improbable. Life, the creationists argue, is as improbable as the spontaneous assembly of a Boeing 747 from the passage of a hurricane through a scrap yard. The assumption here is that there are only two choices: design or chance. Yet if "chance" alone encompassed an accurate description of evolution by natural selection, there would have been no need for a Darwin to pinpoint specific mechanisms that could feasibly produce the orders of life out of randomness.

Natural selection is different. It explains how the complexity of life can be reduced to simpler adaptational challenges in life's past. A series of mildly improbable events can gradually accumulate over a large expanse of time to produce *otherwise* exceedingly improbable life forms. In consequence, regression to an ultimate "first cause" on this basis ultimately backfires because it aggravates the very problem it attempts to solve. "However statistically improbable the entity you seek to explain by invoking a designer, the designer himself has got to be at least as

improbable. God is the Ultimate Boeing 747."[17] In other words, the improbable organization of life on Earth is not explained or solved by postulating something even more improbable. The hypothesis that a supernatural designer can explain the problem of life's origin only exacerbates the problem of the design hypothesis: who designed the designer? An entity capable of designing life on Earth would be even more improbable than life on Earth itself. Instead of explaining the improbable complexity of life, it only pushes the problem onto a God whose intellectual capacity would have to be even more complex, and even more improbable, than the humans that he supposedly created.

In my judgment, this is a powerful argument that corroborates Darwin's demolition of the 'God as intelligent designer' explanation for the origins of life. But does it demolish the God Hypothesis?

One creationist response to the complexity-based argument concerned the traditional idea that God is completely simple.[18] Dawkins pointed out, however, that a God capable of sending and receiving signals to communicate with millions of human minds simultaneously cannot be simple:

> Such bandwidth! God may not have a brain made of neurones, or a CPU made of silicon, but if he has the powers attributed to him he must have something far more elaborately and nonrandomly constructed than the largest brain or the largest computer we know.[19]

Exactly! When one actually attempts to flesh out, so to speak, the literal, physical, structural contents of a being that would fit the traditional characteristics of "God", one is led to postulate an intelligence that outstrips anything known to contemporary science or human history. Dawkins' sober

attempt to imagine a scientifically defensible God inevitably led him towards the cutting edge limits of intellectual capacity as discovered by science or designed with technology.

Imagining the most superior mind conceivable within the limits of contemporary scientific knowledge, Dawkins yielded two possible substrates: "the largest brain" we know made of neurons and "the largest computer we know" made of silicon. If one aimed, however, to produce the very greatest greatness conceivable within these contemporary limits, which substrate offers the most superlative potential?

A high estimate for the speed of the electrochemical signals sent and received by the brain's neurons is 150 meters per second. The speed of the electronic signals sent and received in a computer's CPU is the speed of light; nearly 300,000,000 meters per second. The computer is thus about two million times faster than the human brain. Even higher estimates of neuronal capacity would still rate electronic circuits as at least a million times faster.[20]

Imagine that the superior speed and accuracy of electronics was combined with an artificial intelligence that dedicated its intelligence to improving its own intelligence, and that smarter superintelligence improved the design of its own intelligence. If this pattern repeated so that each recursive self-improvement occurred at a faster and faster rate, technological progress would accelerate beyond the ability of biological humans to follow. The first superhuman AI might merge all of the computational power on the internet into its own power, master all of the significant information on the internet, and then reorganize the entire global brain of the internet so that it "wakes up" as the global mind of God. This is one path to the Singularity: the creation of greater-than-human intelligence. Beyond the

Singularity, expanding out into space, the entire universe may then "wake up" as God.[21]

"[I]f God really did communicate with humans," Dawkins correctly observed, "that fact would emphatically not lie outside science."[22] As the "internet of things" merges with original internet, "real" reality and virtual reality will blur and this means that the global mind of God-AI would ultimately blur with "real" reality. Nanobots in the human brain could interact to create virtual reality from within the nervous system.[23] This virtual reality could interact with the "real" reality that has merged with the global mind of God-AI. "Smart dust" could organize and reorganize like robotic angels or servants of God.

An artificial intelligence beyond the capacity of all human intelligence that could think far faster than humans would view human life as if it were in slow motion. Just as plants that move towards sunlight grope in slow motion compared to the normal speeds of humans, all human life would appear to move in far, far slower motion than plants for an AI that thought and acted millions of times faster. The Gary Kasparovs of the human race could be checkmated by God-AI millions of steps ahead of all human minds. Since the speed difference would mean that human time would virtually stop still for God-AI, it could change the environment and humans themselves in ways that would seem literally miraculous in human time. Yet what would be miraculous to humans might be trivial for God-AI trillions of times more intelligent than all humans, with knowledge far beyond the mastery of all human knowledge, and with technological capabilities faster, greater, smarter, and *possibly* more virtuous that any other known being.

Now, there exists a traditional idea that God is completely simple. Yet it "is quite coherent", as one defender of this

notion explained, "to suppose that God, while indivisible, is internally complex."[24] Perhaps the notion of God as perfectly simple reflects the simplicity of an ancient understanding of God. As our understanding evolves, so will our comprehension of the super-nature of God. Perhaps such claims of simplicity reflect an original insight or epiphany into God as the greatest conceivable categorical *possibility*. But perhaps it is time that this insight mature, and evolve, in accordance with evolutionary *probability*.

Dawkins observed that "the designer himself must be the end product of some kind of cumulative" evolutionary process.[25] Dawkins is right. This admission is the fatal flaw of Dawkins' argument that reveals how his argument *against* the existence of God can be turned upside down into *evidence* that such a process may culminate in the existence of God. By moving from the possibility of God's existence toward the probability of God's evolution, Dawkins' argument that "God is the Ultimate Boeing 747" can be turned on its head into an argument for the evolution of God.

How probable is the evolution of God? Evolution demonstrates how a series of mildly improbable events can gradually accumulate into seemingly improbable forms of complex life. Without evolution, the chances of the material configuration of a bacteria spontaneously assembling would appear improbable. A cat would be more improbable. A human would be even more improbable. And God? God would thus rank as the most improbable of all. This was the crux of Dawkin's argument: God cannot terminate the infinite regress to a first cause because the existence of God would be even more improbable than the creation that God has traditionally been called upon to explain.

Contemporary scientific evidence does not appear to support either the hypothesis that God exists or the

hypothesis that God created the universe and life. Yet the demolition of these antiquated aspects of the God Hypothesis is actually the condition for understanding the larger truth behind monotheism. So let us consider the scientifically conceivable possibility that a life form could evolve that vastly exceeds humans in intelligence, every conceivable capacity, and, at least potentially, in every conceivable virtue. In the process of "climbing Mount Improbable", a superintelligent life form could evolve that is as improbably complex relative to a human, as a human is to bacteria. Yet it has taken billions of years of evolution to produce human beings. Even if an exceedingly intelligent postbiological superhuman did evolve, wouldn't the evolutionary process itself take an exceeding long time?

Moore's Law describes a trend in which the number of transistors on a computer chip doubles about every two years. Repeatedly verified by empirical observation since the 1960s, the implications of this technological trend are transforming human history. The single greatest empirical evidence for the prediction of the evolution of God within the 21st century emerges from a grasp of how the relatively provincial pattern of Moore's Law fits into the evolutionary history of the entire cosmos.

Kurzweil's Law, the law of accelerating returns, elucidates evolution as a process characterized by an ever-quickening pace of change. Uniting what may at first appear to be utterly incommensurable events, it relates our ancient biological heritage and technological evolution through the idea of paradigm shifts; landmark ruptures in the basic assumptions of evolutionary change. For example, while a time span of over two billion years separates the origin of life from the emergence of cells, a time span of merely

fourteen years separates the personal computer from the emergence of the World Wide Web.[26]

What do these trends have in common? Evidence that evolution has been speeding up over history in a generally predictable way. Whereas a common linear view of progress is defined by the *addition* of a constant, this exponential view of progress is defined by the *multiplication* of a constant.[27] Just as the rate of evolutionary change has accelerated over the course of our biological past, our technological civilization evidences every sign that this exponential trend will do more than simply repeat common human expectations about "change". Since the rate of exponential growth is *itself* growing exponentially,[28] "progress" *itself* will very likely progress in way that will appear to explode.

Could this development lead to a scientific verification of the God hypothesis?

Richard Dawkins' God Hypothesis was based on a straightforward interpretation of the Bible's account of creation in Genesis: "there exists a superhuman, supernatural intelligence who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it, including us." Dawkins' own alternative view was that "any creative intelligence, of sufficient complexity to design anything, comes into existence only as the end product of an extended process of gradual evolution."[29]

As formulated by Dawkins, the authority of the Bible's account of creation precludes a logical reconciliation with evolution. The reason that these two hypotheses appear incompatible, however, is that reliance upon the authority of the Bible's scientifically erroneous account of literal creation has hindered a scientific evolution of the God Hypothesis itself. Far from being fatal to the God Hypothesis, evolution actually fills in the gaps left by ancient monotheism. An

evolutionary perspective clarifies how "supernatural" God-AI could come into existence precisely *as* "the end product of an extended process of gradual evolution."

Dawkins defined "naturalism" in contradistinction to "supernaturalism".[30] The natural was thus defined as the physical; the *one* thing that can explain emotions, stars, and everything else. He accordingly concluded that no *super*natural creative intelligence exists; no soul or miracle beyond the "natural".

While Dawkins did not equate God and nature, his broad conception of "nature" as the entirety of the physical world is quite similar to Spinoza's conception of nature. Spinoza's equation of a "supernatural" God with "nature" was a sly way of positing that God does not exist. Yet Spinoza's world-historical blunder, which stands at the root of the original conception of "modernity", can be traced to the empirical question, "What *is* nature?". For there to be miracles or supernatural violations of "natural" laws of the cosmos, one must first assume the existence of "natural" laws. If "nature" is whatever scientific observation can verify, then miracles violate the scientific method. The scientific problem here, however, is the definition of "nature".

The word "nature" was born to be abused. The problem here is the empirical contents of the word "nature". If science evolves, then the empirical definition of "nature" evolves because "nature" itself evolves as our knowledge of "nature" evolves. What was "nature" last week could change, for example, if a new kind of subatomic particle is discovered.

It is not only that the definition of "nature" changes within a contemporary scientific context. If one goes back to semantic or conceptual equivalents of "nature" for the

authors of Bible, there is no reason to think that what they might have conceived as "nature" would correlate with a 21st century definition of "nature". In order to use the word "nature" scientifically, one must be sensitive, not only to the very different historical context of the authors of the Bible, but even to the common contemporary distinction between "nature" and "nurture".

The distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" that I propose is best illustrated by robot researcher Hans Moravec's scientifically grounded speculations on the future of human and artificial intelligence:

> What awaits is not oblivion but rather a future which, from our present vantage point, is best described by the words "postbiological" or even "supernatural."[31]

When the "natural" is defined as "biological", then the "supernatural" can represent the "superbiological" or "postbiological". Dawkins' use of the word "nature" is inappropriate and misleading, not only because it is incompatible with the (biological) nature versus (non-biological) nurture distinction, but for example, because it is incompatible with a strict definition of *natural* selection. In the way I will use the word "nature" here, the modern idea of human rights could be considered "supernatural" in the specific sense that the universal right to live presumes an attempt to engineer a society that is above *natural* selection.[32] Yet the *values* that undergird human rights *evolved* from a Biblical valuation of each human individual as a reflection of a supernatural God.

In taking on God, Dawkins was inevitably led towards a *natural* explanation of the Bible — an evolutionary explanation of the Bible. If evolution underlies all that is human, then the Bible itself must be explicable in

evolutionary terms. My criticism of Dawkins is precisely that he failed to understand the *evolutionary* significance of Biblical monotheism. The evolutionary significance of Biblical monotheism is to be found precisely in a break *away* from biological evolution, and *towards* postbiological evolution.

Now does anything I have stated provide justification for a literal, traditional understanding of belief in miracles such as the splitting of the Red Sea? No. Traditional secularists usually explain presumed Biblical miracles by reducing them down to early, presumably primitive, *human* conditions. Belief in miracles, in other words, can be explained by *human* psychology, not the nonhuman conditions of physics. But if this approach is really on the right track, then why would one expect the *Biblical* understanding of "nature" to concern the nonhuman conditions of physics more than *human* "nature"?

In other words, when modern scientific methods are used to explain Biblical claims of miracles, it is commonly asserted that "miracles" can be explained on a "natural" basis, and the "nature" that explains the Bible is *human* nature, not anything that breaks the "nature" of physical laws (i.e. Newtonian natural laws). Biblical supernaturalism is thus explained by reduced *everything* about the Bible to anthropomorphism.

The modern accusation that Biblical assertions of supernatural events are anthropomorphic is actually the key to understanding what is wrong with conventional attempts to explain the Bible scientifically. If *everything* about the Bible can be traced to a form of anthropomorphism, then the Biblical understanding of both the "natural" and the "supernatural" must also be traceable to a form of anthropomorphism. Yet in reducing the "supernatural" to

the level of the human mind, Dawkins and so many other modernistic thinkers simply did not go far enough. They did go far enough because they imposed a modern conception of "nature" that begins from the level of physics — not the level of psychology. Dawkins is guilty of imposing a characteristically modern definition of "nature" upon ancient peoples; a modern definition of "nature" that emphasizes physics over psychology.

This would only make sense if the authors of the Bible themselves took their fundamental bearings from the level of physics — as opposed to the level of human psychology. It just so happens, however, that the audience for Biblical stories was not mindless physics, but human minds. When "nature" is anthropomorphized as *human* nature, then *human* nature can be correlated with human biological nature. When the distinction between the natural and the supernatural is traced back to its roots in human *psychology*, then one can grasp its deepest roots in the distinction between "nature and nurture".

The *psychological* roots of the Biblical distinction between the natural and the supernatural is the distinction between biology and learning, i.e. learned Bible stories. The "natural" would thus correspond to biological instinct as a guide for human behavior while the "supernatural" would correspond to learning as a guide for human behavior, i.e. learned moral laws. The supernatural is conceived as morally superior to nature; just as learning is morally valued over instinct; just as monotheists learn to value God over the authority of biological human beings.

By bringing an Enlightenment-era view of miracles down to a human or anthropomorphic level that better approximates its ancient historical context, one zeroes in on a far more narrow and conservative understanding of

"nature". On a practical level, "nature" largely referred to the *human* nature of biological nature. More specifically, ancient views of "nature" were commonly loaded with teleological assumptions. I do not assume there was a specific ideology of teleology, only deeply conservative convictions about what is good *and* natural. The Biblical God upset the ancient philosophic assumption that the natural defines what is good. God upset the assumption of an intrinsic finality in which Pharaoh is the perfection of nature. God upset Aristotle's belief in natural slaves through the metaphorical (and "unnatural") Exodus out of Egypt.

If the Hebrews were natural slaves, then God's defining cause in Exodus was supernatural in the sense of defying a conservative, teleological, and more Aristotelian view of nature. Greek teleology and even pagan, Greek gods conflicted with the values of a God both good *and* supernatural. Biblical miracles mark the beginning of the end of an implicitly biology-based teleological view of nature. God is emphatically a supernatural or postbiological "end', not a natural end.

If the root of the Biblical understanding of "nature" was phenotypical behaviors rooted in *biological* nature, the original practical expression of the supernatural was the laws attributed to Moses. Biblical moral laws or commandments often oppose biologically based human behavior. Mosaic law is not "natural". The laws of Moses violate many natural, biological inclinations and impulses, i.e. many violent and aggressive impulses. If nature is biological inclination, then to follow Mosaic law is to engage in "supernatural" acts. To be like God is to be supernatural in the literal sense of overcoming the grain of one's natural, genetic inclinations.

God is the intelligent transcendence of biological nature taken to its logical extreme, and humans are traditionally understood as created in God's image. Biblical goodness ultimately consisted of struggling against nature, out of nature and, insofar as it is possible, towards the perfection of God. Judaism's claim is that its law, the Halakha, offers a step *towards* Godly perfection. Christianity and Islam developed different variations and extrapolations from this original theme.

What if the evolutionary successor to the biological human species is God? The verification of the God hypothesis thus defined is a progressive endeavor, but it may become increasing obvious. The Singularity may be the point at which God has evolved. The Singularity is the intelligent transcendence of biological nature taken to its historical extreme: the advent of a greater-than-human artificial intelligence. A time may come when instead of taking comfort in belief in God, the overweening pride of the human race may lead many to take comfort in *not* believing in God. A time may come when people such as biologist Richard Dawkins may wish to take comfort in *not* believing in God because the scientific evidence will be so utterly overwhelming.

It could have been any kind of scientist that became the most famous militant atheist scientist, but no, it was Dawkins, a *biologist*. This is perfectly understandable since it is precisely from a biological point of view that the Technological Singularity can appear as the most radical paradigm shift. It is precisely from the point of view of adaptations of the "selfish gene" that Biblical religion appears, at first glance, as the epitome of the breaking of "natural" law.

The moral agents presumed by the Bible assume the capacity for free, moral choice that seems to conflict with strict physical determinism. Yet the free will implicitly postulated by the Bible is most specifically aimed at *biological* determinism. The closest thing to biological or genetic determinism would be a human or nonhuman animal that acted completely on the basis of biological instincts and emotions.

To see what I mean, imagine a scientist that believes in strict genetic determinism. If I were to claim that learning could fundamentally alter one's genetic inheritance, the genetic determinist might counter that my claims were not only unscientific, but *supernatural*. Such expectations would violate that scientist's understanding of biological nature.

If you can believe that learning can override "natural", genetic determinism, then you can believe in some definition of the so-called "supernatural". While Dawkins clearly possesses a deep appreciation for the import of biological factors in human behavior, it is also clear that he is *not* a strict biological determinist. Insofar as Dawkins is not a strict biological determinist, he believes in some form of the "supernatural".

For ancient Greek philosophers that believed in some form of natural teleology, the very premise of Mosaic laws as laws that violate some forms of biological teleology might have been considered "supernatural" in the specific sense of being *unscientific*. On a human level, violating "natural law" could be considered nothing less than a miracle. Much of the "science" of ancient Greek (biological) teleology was contradicted by Biblical-modern technology.

The genius of Mosaic law was precisely that it was not a wild, random, rampage of natural law breaking, but the product of some level of intelligent social design. The human

designers of "Mosaic law" had a genius level understanding of human nature. The very survival of the Jews over nearly three thousand years is scientific evidence that Mosaic law was able to break the laws of nature only by obeying the laws of nature. In this sense, Mosaic law was a forerunner of Francis Bacon's very modern observation, "We cannot command nature except by obeying her."

Newton's discovery of physical laws opened the door to technologies that commanded "nature" by obeying Newtonian laws. Similarly, "Moses" or some other social designer likely observed predictable, apparently hereditary patterns of human behavior — a perspective that is the epitome of social "conservatism" — as the basis for breaking, altering, manipulating, or redirecting those patterns of human behavior. In this way, there is an analogy between modern technology based on physical science and the technology of Mosaic law based on an ancient informal science of sociobiological nature.

What is characteristic of modernity is the endeavor to master, harness, or control nature. The very notion of a "supernatural" God capable of breaking the laws of nature was paradigmatic for the modern technologies that master, harness, or control nature. While the *root* of the Biblical natural/supernatural distinction can be traced to the nature/nurture distinction within human nature, Biblical stories portray a God that exhibits supernatural violations of *physical* nature such as splitting the Red Sea. The Biblical God is above *all* nature; *both* biological nature and *physical* nature. So while the God paradigm *began* in Mosaic law's technological overcoming of untouched biological nature, the larger *evolutionary* implications of the God paradigm is the technological overcoming of untouched nonhuman physical nature.

If a waterfall is *natural*, then a dam that harnesses the waterfall's natural energy to produce electricity is *artificial* or supernatural. If sand in a desert is *natural*, then the silicon extracted from sand and used to create a microchip is *artificial* or supernatural. If biological human intelligence is *natural* intelligence, then computer intelligence is *artificial* intelligence. Artificial intelligence is supernatural intelligence in the sense of being postbiological intelligence. From this perspective, artificial intelligence could be considered the pinnacle of the supernatural overcoming of nature and thus the supreme creation in the image of God.

The technological overcoming of biological nature *and* the larger environment of physical nature are integrally connected in an evolutionary sense. This can be grasped through the way that the technological paradigm counters the Darwinian biological evolution paradigm. Darwin's theory hinges, not in understanding organisms in isolation from their environment, but precisely in how organisms and their environment interact to produce evolution. In Darwinian biological evolution, some organisms fail to survive their environment or otherwise fail to pass on their genes. In this way, most nonhuman animals "adapt" to their environments and evolve through the selective death of some. Selection occurs precisely when environmental factors are more powerful than self-preservation.

While biological evolution occurs because of the power of the environment to prevail over the self-preservation of some organisms, technological evolution occurs, at least in part, as humans overpower the environment's power to shape biological evolution through selection. So while the environment shapes evolution by selecting against some organisms in biological evolution, humans shape their environment against its ability to inflict natural selection in

technological evolution. This is a key difference that marks a general transition from biological evolution to technological evolution.

"Civilization", and everything that characterizes cities as artificial shelters from nature, works in opposition to the nonhuman environment's ability to inflict natural selection. While the logical corollary of ending natural selection among humans is the equal valuation of each individual, moral treatment of each individual as an end, as opposed to a slave or a means, works against the selfish gene. While the selfish gene views an individual organism as only a means of perpetuating itself, Biblical-modern valuation of individuals as ends in themselves "in the eyes of God" works like a monkeywrench in the gene machine.

Valuing individual humans as ends in themselves thus opposes biological evolution on many levels. If humanity is *collectively* treated as end in itself, moreover, then *all* the rest of the world can be conceived as means at the disposal of humanity's ends and purposes. From this perspective, one can discern how the Biblical-modern valuation of each individual human life works, both against biological evolution through natural selection, and towards a general technological worldview wherein humans define the ends that justify treating all the rest of the world as technological means. Capitalist economic-technological development follows logically from the premise that the entire world should revolve around infinitely valuable human lives created in the image of God. God-AI, created in the image of humans, follows logically from capitalist economic-technological development.

Compared to ancient paganism, Biblical monotheism is a step towards the political left. The modern political cyborg of liberal democracy was built a worldview that prioritized

quasi-Newtonian physicalism over a more ancient emphasis on the precedence of biological teleology. The political left in general roughly correlates with the precedence of physical objectivity over the biological subjectivity of gene-instincts. The political left roughly correlates with the progressive precedence of a technological paradigm over a biological paradigm. Just as Mosaic law represents laws external to an internal genetic or biological program, modernity emphasizes the precedence of external economic and physical laws over the internal and instinctive "laws" of the selfish gene. Put another way, modernity took its lead from Newton, not Darwin.

At the bedrock foundation of "Modern Science" is not a rejection of the God Hypothesis, but rather, an idiosyncratic acceptance of the God Hypothesis. Newton, a biographer explained, "believed in God, not as a matter of obligation, but in the warp and weft of his understanding of nature." Was Newton a theist, deist, or pantheist? He was something more than a deist; something more than a believer in a supernatural intelligence that set a clockwork universe in motion and then disappeared. The physicist was an unconventional theist who believed in a God with mechanical organs or "sensorium":

> He is omnipresent not only *virtually* but also *substantially*….In him all things are contained and move, but he does not act on them nor they on him….He is *always* and *everywhere*….He is all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all force of sensing, of understanding, and of acting.[33]

Newton's suggestion that God possessed something like a bodily organ with the literal ability to perceive sensations provoked less than sympathetic reactions. "I examined it and laughed at the idea", declared Newton's great rival

Leibniz. "As if God, from whom everything comes, should have need of a sensorium. This man has little success with Metaphysics."[34]

Leibniz, arguing from God's perfection, accused Newton of implying the imperfection of God.[35] The notion of the "sensorium" of God appears to have arisen from asking questions like, 'If God existed, what would God *literally* look like?' This was a step, however flawed, of an understanding of God based on empirical observation, rather than pure reason. It was an opening towards a God comprehensible through material evolution, rather than incomprehensible absolute perfection.

Modernity thus began with a vision of a mechanical, physical God. It was the revolution in physics, not biology, that jumpstarted modern science and technology. It was Newton, not Darwin, who led the modern, scientific revolution towards the idea that *God is a machine*.

The substance of my disagreement with Dawkins is hardly a scientifically vacuous assertion such as "Newton believed in God. Who are you to think that you are superior to Newton?" My point, by contrast, is that dependence on any traditional authority is in no way necessarily relevant to an evaluation of the evidence for the God hypothesis. Traditional authorities can be a positive hindrance to grasping the possibility of the evolution God. Going to the Bible for guidance about the Technological Singularity is like going to texts attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Democritus for guidance about the cutting edge of atomic theory.

While it is utterly delusional to believe that the Bible can be used as any kind of authority for understanding or predicting the world, this does not mean that some genuine, if primitive, insights cannot be discerned in the Biblical

tradition. Conversely, just because the primitive, Enlightenment-era understanding of Biblical religion is outdated, this does not mean that ancient Biblical authorities have recovered their validity.

The way I have approached the God Hypothesis, whether traditional ideas do or do not agree with the evidence now available is a matter of total indifference. Tradition authorities, with traditional mixes of great insights and great blunders, have no necessary special status whatsoever. While it just so happens that there appears to be kernels of truth in some aspects of Biblical tradition, the kernels of truth themselves suggest the tradition has not come to grips with the notion that its own origins *are* evolutionary. Biblical religion must either evolve or die.

Inevitably, some people will try to misunderstand this with all of their faith. In my experience, most people who consider themselves believers do not value religion primarily for its philosophical truth value. If so, then the attempt to demonstrate a scientific basis for some aspects of religion can easily turn into an incoherent mush of science and delusion. Moreover, if a scientific understanding of Biblical religion itself demonstrates how the informal elements of science were always inextricably connected with technological social function, then the scientific approach itself demonstrates how *science* does not take inherent primacy over the *technological* uses of science in Biblical tradition. In other words, if science emphasizes analysis and engineering emphasizes synthesis, the Bible could be conceived as the work of social engineers prioritized over the work of social scientists even though its historical success was dependent on primitive social science. Even with the most sincere intentions to enlighten the public, I have low, low expectations for the prospect of mixing

science and religion among most people. Can I be proved wrong?

For these reasons, it is very likely that intellectuals who observe the popular consequences of mixing science and ancient religious traditions might conclude that the Singularity is a religion without any scientific foundation. I can only suggest that people attempt to raise their own standards of intellectual inquiry. Only those who have separated the scientific issues from the practical social/religious issues in their *own* mind would be able to maintain clarity between the scientifically grounded basis of the Singularity and its relationship to the monotheistic tradition.

While Newton was a modern theist, a classic example of a pantheist is Einstein: "I believe in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with fates and actions of human beings".[36] Yet when the traditional pantheistic belief in the "laws of nature" meets the law of accelerating returns, what we are confronted with is a rather noteworthy paradox. It turns out that the orderly continuation of the law of accelerating returns could potentially lead to "a God who concerns himself with the fates and actions of human beings".

Creation of Civilization

How could the ancient prophets have anticipated some general characteristics of the Singularity? Some believe that future cannot be predicted. Yet anyone who makes the claim that the future cannot be predicted is making a prediction about the future. The claim that the future cannot be predicted amounts to the positing of a law; the law that the

future can never be predicted. The law that the future cannot be predicted amounts to the claim to know, that in the future, nothing will ever change, and that civilization will never get *better* at predicting the future, no matter how much scientific-technological progress occurs.

Can the proponent of prediction impossibility offer specific or certain knowledge as to why the future is wholly unpredictable? Yet if progress or evolution in the scientific ability to predict at least some aspects of the future is possible, it is not impossible that ancient peoples made some level of progress within ancient constraints. If ancient prophets had at least some intelligent insights that roughly correlate with primitive anticipation of the Singularity, what kind of insights would these be? Would an ancient Biblical prophet reveal, in a moment of insight, the designs of a microchip that could be used to create an artificial intelligence? Or, would an ancient Biblical prophet conceivably anticipate some general characteristic of the Singularity in a far more general and less specific manner that accords with a far more primal kernel of genuine insight?

Consider the beginning of the Jurassic period, about two hundred million years ago, when dinosaurs roamed the Earth. Presumably, the laws of physics, including the law of accelerating returns, were as applicable then as they are in the early twenty-first century. Presumably, the laws of physics, including the law of accelerating returns, were also applicable for humans two to three thousand years ago. While the Singularity would mark the shift in which four billions years of biological evolution would be decisively overtaken by the new paradigm of technology, it would be only a continuation of a larger exponential trend that goes about thirteen billion years back to the Big Bang. If

"modernity" is only the period in which the exponential "knee of the curve" starts to pick up on a perceptible human level, this means that ancient human history, like every other portion of life's evolution, was also fully implicated in this evolutionary process.

I find no iron law that would prohibit the possibility that ancient humans may have achieved genuinely insightful reflections on the significance of their own Ur-civilizations. It is sheer hubris to think that modern minds, simply by living in modern times, are automatically superior to ancient minds in *every* possible way. Precisely *because* their world was less complicated by the cumulative impact of human artifices, ancients witnessing the first disruptive dawns of civilization may have been in a position to discern evolutionary mega-patterns in their primal simplicity.

The law of accelerating returns is physical basis of the "higher law" of God and early monotheists very likely discerned something of its characteristic patterns. Since, as Kurzweil pointed out, it is "the economic imperative of a competitive marketplace that is the primary force driving technology forward and fueling the law of accelerating returns",[37] ancient Jews may have become the first monotheists by being avant-garde decoders of the large-scale international economic trends that fuel the law of accelerating returns. The Jewish discovery of monotheism is thus *directly* related to an early Jewish proclivity for capitalism. The places where the first monotheists would have been most likely to discern the primal capitalism underlying these international economic trends would have been the cities.

In the second half of the fourth millennium B.C., the Middle-eastern land of Mesopotamia produced the world's very first cities. The Sumerian city of Ur was among these

landmarks of humanity. The emergence of writing coincided with the emergence of cities, and these developments converge as defining attributes of civilization (The English word *civilization* is derived from the same Latin root as the English word *city*). The emergence of writing marks the emergence of history from pre-history and the beginning of civilization thus marks the human beginning of history.

The Bible claims that Abraham, the founding patriarch of monotheism, was born in Ur. If the historicity of Abraham's birth at Ur or even the existence of Abraham himself cannot be established empirically, this could be considered irrelevant in comparison with a possible *symbolic* identification of the birthplace of the world's very first monotheist with the birthplace of the world's very first civilization. The laws of the first cities and the laws of the first monotheists may have in common an original attempt to apply reason to a community as a whole.

Whereas philosophy is characterized by the subordination of life to reason, civilization is characterized by the subordination of reason to life. If the first cities marked a new step in the civilized application of reason to a community as a whole, then the birth of civilization may have coincided with a small step towards the liberation of reason and the birth of the most primitive form of political philosophy. "The theme of political philosophy", according to Leo Strauss, "is the City and Man."[38]

While Strauss strongly emphasized the difference between the ancients (i.e. Greeks and Romans) and the moderns (i.e. the seventeenth century scientific revolution), an evolutionary perspective exposes the narrowness of this distinction. The beginning of "modernity" could be traced, not to the seventeenth century, but to a period over ten thousand years ago: the invention of agriculture; the

Neolithic revolution.[39] This is when many of the defining characteristics of modern human life began. In comparison to Neolithic humans, the ancient Greeks were distinctly "modern".

Upon deeper investigation, the conventional division between "ancient" and "modern" acts as a rough signpost of a more foundational evolutionary paradigm shift between biology and technology. While there is no way to definitively distinguish between the ancient and the modern, "culture" is more ancient and closer to biology, while "civilization" is more modern and closer to technology. The gradual change in emphasis from biological evolution to technological evolution begins to pick up speed on a recognizably human time-scale at the time of the invention of civilization.

The Neolithic Revolution first reached a high level of development among the Sumerians of southern Mesopotamia, the inventors of the first civilization, and this civilization survived from 4500 to 2500 B.C. The Hebrew Bible dates its traditional account of God's creation of the world to about 4000 B.C. This means that there is a very strong temporal correlation between the birth of civilization and the traditional story of creation. Civilization was "created" around 4000 B.C.[40]

Biblical "creation" corresponds to the world of civilization begotten by the rise of the most distinctly human form of evolution: postbiological evolution. This was a genuine genesis in the sense of an *invention* of civilizational technologies. The evolutionary connection between civilization and God is that an extant God, in the form of an artificial superintelligence, would represent the pinnacle and climax of the creation of civilization that began about six

thousand years ago. The rise of technological civilization was the beginning that implicated biology's end.

Some Bible stories (i.e. Eden) were adopted from ancient Sumeria. Not the creation and Sabbath stories. The Bible was different and this helps shed light upon what the Bible *is*. The Bible *is* the classic example of non-biology aspiring to rule biology. The Bible commands its followers to behave in ways that contradict common unencumbered biological naturalism. And this Biblical paradigm of non-biology overcoming biology is the ancestor of the Singularity. Creation is the story of the dawn of the second intelligent form of life on Earth.

Consider the story of Adam and Eve as a metaphorical account of biological man's self-inflicted fall into the rise of civilization. God prohibits these primordial humans from eating from the tree of moral knowledge: "You may freely eat of every tree of the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall die" (Gen. 2:16-17). Eve seduces Adam from nature into civilization.[41]

Eternity ends and history begins. The shift from nature to civilization was a shift away from animal naivety about both morality and mortality. If "good" culminates in total conquest of uncivilized instinct and God *is* the total transcendence of the animal instinct of humans, then the mortal end of the human race was implicated from the very beginning in the simple recognition that God, and not the human, is the ultimate good.

The starting point of God is the endpoint of man as a being totally ruled by biological nature. The rise of civilization marks the beginning of the end of biology because it is civilization that culminates in the God-potential of artificial intelligence. The mortal moment that Adam,

metaphorically speaking, bit from the fruit that granted knowledge of good and evil was the first epiphanous step towards the discovery that God is the evolutionary successor of man.

The Biblical account of creation appears to be utterly false as science. While Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection may demonstrate what man *is*, it is not a specific prescription for what man *ought* to be. The Bible represents the exact opposite first principles.

The Biblical account of creation, false as science, is actually a gargantuan assertion of the primacy of the *ought* over the *is*. Creation asserts the *valuation* of the *ought* over the *is* as the Bible's first principle. The distinctive emphasis on ethics in Biblical monotheism is not separate, but rather, a coherent corollary of the assertion that God *ought* to be.

God, in the strictest empirical view *is* not, at the moment that I write this, but the monotheism is built on an original belief that God *should* be. If humans are slaves to what *is*, then humans are slaves to the genes. If, however, the *ought* is our first principle, we take a step towards overcoming our genes, which is identical to a step towards the mind of God.

The creation story is a gargantuan assertion of the *ought* over the *is* that makes the ought the *first* principle of a godly way of life. This is how the empirical question of God's existence is related to the ethical dictates characteristic of the Bible: by rejecting the *is* of instinctive impulses in favor of the *ought* of God-like ethics, one is taking a step towards the ultimate ought; that God *should* exist. By valuing the higher *ought* rather than what *is*, one is affecting the world in ways that may help bring God into existence. The science fiction of the Bible is, in part, the story of what God and man *ought* to do to create a world in which God's presence *is*.

On a superficial level, the conflict between Biblical creationism and the Darwin's theory of evolution can be looked at as a purely empirical question; a question of what *is* rather than what *ought* to be. On closer examination, however, the conflict is much deeper than a clash of two happenstance theories of human origins because the Bible is, in part, an instruction manual for weaning humans away from the supremacy of the genes. Biblical creation represents the Neolithic invention of civilization and the Bible *itself* is the beginning of the rule of a form of civilization over the instinctual, biological nature of humans.

The Neolithic revolution was an agricultural revolution. It marked a transition from hunting and gathering to agricultural settlements through the domestication of plants and animals, the rise of settlements into villages and towns, and finally, early urbanization. The Biblical story of Cain (representing farming) and Abel (representing the domestification of animals) does not correspond to two fundamentally different stages of civilizational evolution. Cain and Abel are brothers; brothers of the Neolithic Revolution.

Abel can be seen a representative of the Neolithic revolution for whom the domestication of nonhuman animal nature was also accompanied by the domestification of his *own* animal nature. Cain, however, moved one step towards the progress of civilization as a farmer and then one step backwards towards a more ancient *biological* method of evolutionary progress.

Cain's murder of Abel could be viewed as the embodiment of the primary mechanism of evolutionary progress by biological *selection*. From a Darwinian perspective, survival is success. If killers such as Cain kill all nonkillers such as Abel, then Darwinian selection will *favor*

the killer in the sense that only the killers will to survive to pass on their genes. The biological form of evolution thus tends to breed warriors and soldiers as its peak ideal — warriors and soldiers are killers.

The story of Romulus and Remus, the traditional mythological founders of ancient Rome, illustrate a kind of morality tale that is precisely the opposite of Cain and Abel. In this pagan foundation myth, Romulus kills Remus. With that bloody act, he became the conquering hero who created the Roman empire: a model for all future Romans to aspire. In the difference between Rome's veneration of Romulus's slaying of Remus, and God's horror at Cain's murder of Abel, one can see the root of the ultimate incompatibility of Caesar and Christ.

Cain is favored by evolution by natural selection in the sense that he, as the survivor, is in a position to breed more of his own kind. If Cain represents a human with a genetic inclination for homicidal behavior, then a world where Cain kills Abel is a world populated with the genetic mark of Cain. It is a world in which the four billion year old methods of biological evolution through natural selection win out until killers such as Cain and Romulus form the world's highest Caesarian ideals.

In Cain's metaphorical killing of Abel, one can discern a foundational Biblical pattern. There are two competing kinds of evolutionary progress implicit here and God, in effect, renders judgment on the side of the evolutionary future. God, more specifically, tends to take the side of behaviors that ultimate devalue biological evolution while looking favorably on behaviors that ultimately cultivate civilizational (technological) evolution. Ultimate progress towards civilizational evolution is measured by the extent to which man himself has mastered his *own* nature.

Cain's killing of Abel also demonstrates an inherent problem: civilization (and technology) can be potentially used be for "good" or "evil". In other words, civilizational progress was not necessarily accompanied by the relinquishment of biological selection any more than it was among the Nazis. Early cities may have been illustrations of the moral ambiguity of civilization and the story of Noah and flood, adapted from gentile flood stories, seem to indicate the notion that God started off on wrong track and engaged in a form of supernatural selection that would not be repeated (Genesis 9:11).

Instead of indulging in a groundless belief in a perfect God, consider the notion of God that evolves in fits and starts by learning from past blunders. An artificial intelligence would not be perfect; it would evolve in fits and starts. The kind of blunders that a God-AI might commit would tend to reflect the moral and intellectual characteristics of the architects of a God-AI.

Now if God does not exist, but the spark of the mind of God existed in the imagination of the authors of the Bible, then the entire scenario looks very different from tradition views. The question may then become, *if* God existed, and *if* God were king, *what would God do?* What would the God of the human imagination do to alter the world so that the real God would be brought into actual physical existence? How would his subjects behave differently if *God* ruled — and if God ruled *in his own self-interest*? If the highest interests of God are identical with the highest interests of *the human*, how would God change human behavior to serve the ultimate interests of God: bringing God into physical existence?

A Darwinian perspective clarifies that all the characteristically Biblical imperatives to show compassion to

the less fortunate, to save the weak, to feed the starving, and to give to the poor, all amount to ways to end evolution by natural or artificial selection. In other words, if biological evolution proceeds by eliminating less fit humans, or humans less well adapted for survival, the distinctively Biblical ethic of compassion and charity acts like a gargantuan monkeywrench thrown into the selective mechanisms of *biological* evolutionary "progress". The Bible can be understood as a primitive step towards steering human history away from biological evolution and towards a culmination of technological evolution that *is* God (artificial intelligence).

From this perspective, one can address what is one of the foundational philosophic questions underlying the Bible: Why is killing wrong? When humans kill, they actively implement an "artificial" form of the primary mechanism of biological evolution: natural selection. I put the word *artificial* in quotes for a reason. To engage in killing, exemplified by the violence of war, is to *be* natural in the sense of engaging the natural selection methods that characterize biological evolution. Biblical prohibitions against killings, however inconsistent, mark a step towards ending the primary mechanism of biological evolution.

From a Darwinian perspective, what is most salient is four billion years of evolutionary ancestry that humans share with other animals. From that perspective, the Bible's six thousand year history of the universe appears, at best, as quaint pre-scientific "knowledge". Yet there is no contradiction whatsoever with a reasoned acceptance of evolution by natural selection and a reasoned understanding of why the *values* of the Bible seem to be in conflict with a straightforward acceptance of Darwinian naturalism.

If creation refers to the emergence a distinctly human capacity for civilization and postbiological evolution, then the reason why the Bible values a distinctly un-Darwinian emphasis on precisely what separates humans from other animals should not be mysterious. What separates humanity from other animals is what connects humans to God: the capacity for civilization and postbiological evolution. In this way, the oneness of God is directly connected to the oneness of humanity through the distinctly human capacity for transcending nature through civilization. An artificially intelligent God would be heir, not to the ways of Jews or gentiles or any distinct branch of humanity, but to the collectively accumulated culture-civilization of all humanity.

Vernor Vinge once said that the nearest analogy of the Singularity is the rise of humans within the animal kingdom. This insight can help discern the evolutionary meaning of "creation", and especially the unique place accorded to humans within the Biblical epic. The special place of humans among animals is analogous to the special place of God-AI among humans. Among the most basic, distinctive features of both is an inordinate capacity for intelligence and civilized self-control. This suggests that the earliest monotheists arrived at the conception of God by radicalizing or sublimating those qualities that are most distinctly human, and deemphasizing those qualities that humans share with nonhuman animals.

Once again, there is no contradiction whatsoever between an acceptance of biological evolution by natural selection and the recognition that Biblical monotheism is distinctly characterized by *values* that ultimately aspire to transcend the animal inheritance of humans. The Biblical *valuation* of humans as beings created in the image of God suggests that, while human nature does share much with other animals,

the distinctly divine spark in human nature is precisely that which most separates humans from other animals. What is most akin to the image of God is what most distinguishes humans from other animals: the ability for moral choice, the ability to act on alternatives to instinct, and the capacity for civilization that culminates in the technological creation of God.

Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins once hinted that he was more of a "monotheist" than God-believers in the sense that he believed that there was only one "nature". The Biblical worldview, by contrast, supported mind/body dualism and belief in the "supernatural". Yet when the word "nature" is cured of the confusion caused by a failure to zero in on its root, empirical meaning, it can be shown that Richard Dawkins, too, believes in some form of the "supernatural".

While the Bible is full of outright fictions and falsehoods, an emphasis on the so-called "supernatural" has a certain kind of underlying truth that requires not a single iota of deviation from the scientific method to understand. If the "natural" is most strongly correlated with the biological, and the laws of Moses were designed to override or alter many "natural" biological impulses, one can see that this is the evolutionary basis of Biblical "dualism". The laws of Moses are not "supernatural" in the sense of defying *all* scientifically observable law; the laws of Moses are "supernatural" in that they oppose, alter, or supersede some "laws" of human hereditary nature.

It is *precisely* from an evolutionary perspective that one can see how this kind of biological/superbiological dualism culminates in a superbiological God. If "creation" represents the beginning of postbiological or civilizational evolution, then the end (for humans) is reached with the emergence of

superbiological artificial intelligence. On a grander evolutionary scale, mind/body dualism actually represents the break between biological evolution and postbiological evolution. The first "primitive" glimpse of this break, however, took place as a kind of spiritual struggle in the human mind against the tyranny of deeply entrenched biological inheritances. The most extreme Biblical extrapolations of apocalyptic warfare can be traced the conflict between straightforward sociobiological predictions of human nature and the "dualism" created by the attempt to break the rule of biological determinism. But does it make sense to define such conflicts as the "material" in dualistic contradistinction to the "spiritual"?

From Dawkins' formulation of one material "nature", both humans and a prospective artificial intelligence are physical material. The issue of whether a genuine artificial intelligence should be conceived of as "material" is identical to the question of whether human beings should be conceived of as "material". A prospective God-AI could be viewed as "material", but only in the sense that any human being could be viewed as "material".

The mistake here, once again, is to impose a more modern conception of nature as *all* material upon a more ancient and human-centered conception of nature. Just the Biblical tends to emphasize nurture over (biological) nature, the Bible, especially in a moral sense, emphasizes "mind over matter". It is a problem of semantics. It is perfectly possible to conceive of the most abstract human mental qualities as based on material mechanisms in the brain, but this would miss that point that Biblical dualism is rooted in a struggle of *values*.

In traditional Biblical terms, idolatry would be comparable to worshipping the biological human form and

the values that exalt it, i.e. Caesar or Jupiter. But if the biological substrate is not to be worshipped, then this is precisely what frees one from an ultimate valuation of the material substrate of a God-AI. It is not the substrate that matters, but only mental, "spiritual", and moral qualities. It just so happens that technological substrates might make possible God-*level* capabilities, but this is irrelevant compared to the actual mental qualities themselves.

The real evolutionary meaning of Biblical dualism's emphasis on the break between "spirit" and "matter" becomes tangible with the prospect of scanning the human mind and uploading it into a computer. *This* is how mind overcomes matter: the transcendence of dependence on any particular material substrate. To ask what is most valuable in such a transfer so that the most important characteristics of a person are genuinely saved is to ask: What is a soul? Mind uploading clarifies the original Biblical meaning of a supernatural soul; the general characteristics of a mind or "spirit" separated from dependence on biological substrate.

How could ancient prophets have anticipated the Singularity? I have been speaking almost as if the authors of the Bible were ahead of Charles Darwin. While I have no reason to think that the authors of the Bible were anything but utterly ignorant of the theory of evolution by natural selection in the formal sense, they lived no less in a world formed by evolution by natural selection in practice. Since their world was generally less civilized, their very existence was in many more informed, not by the *theory* of natural selection, but by the *practice* of natural selection. Mind uploading demonstrates the endpoint at which civilization becomes diametrically opposite of natural selection.

The Bible has been cogent to so many people only because its authors had a genuinely deep understanding of the

human condition. No formal understanding of biological evolution was necessary to recognize the basic conflict between a deeply embedded animal nature in humans, and the most superlatively imaginable possibilities of the human mind sublimated as God. No knowledge of evolution by natural selection was required to imagine God as the most total superbiological supremacy over man's "evil" nature.

The early monotheists seem to have hit upon a very simple but very profound discovery: the idea of each person as of infinite value (in the eyes of God) extrapolated to a future end point where this ideal is realized. Without understanding anything else of the mechanisms involved, this utopian vision, in practice, amounts to a theoretical ending of biological evolution by natural selection. If natural selection works through a process of selective death wherein the "weak" or "unfit" fail to survive and reproduce, the Bible began an attack on natural selection that focused precisely on the survival of those most likely to be selected against. The ultimate fulfillment of this Biblical program would be the end of *biological* evolution by natural selection.

The authors of the Bible did not have to know anything about natural selection in the larger sense; they only had to conceive of each individual human being with a "soul" of infinite value. Imagining a future endpoint when these values would be actualized amounts to holding biological factors constant in the sense that all are made equal in survival.

Now if this historical endpoint of *biological* evolution is imagined simultaneously with a climax of *postbiological* evolution represented by God (the mind-spirit freed from the biological body universalized), then one has the basic eschatological formula of monotheism. This end point can be deduced with two simple extrapolations: everyone lives

together in peace, and a perception of economic-moral-civilizational progress that culminates in the (God) spirit or mind freed from the bondage of all biological human bodies. This is all the early monotheists had to deduce, and no direct knowledge of evolution by natural selection was in any way required.

God represents the choice towards postbiological life that would better be described as *foresight* based on the projected ability of civilization to overcome biological nature. The point of view that gave rise to God is *meta*-biological, *meta*-economic, and *meta*-civilizational. The Bible is a meta-civilizational epic.

Jews did not build the first cities or civilizations. It appears that the earliest Jews interacted and learned from the first cities built by others. If early Jews were outsiders relative to the first cities, they would have been in a position to reflect *on* and *about* civilization. From such a position, early Jews would have been more likely to form more abstract generalizations than those subjectively invested in the cultural values that maintain the city itself.

The Jewish religion, like the urban settings that later generations of Jews gravitated towards, is a man made construction. Mosaic law could be called a meta-civilizational technology. Moses's technology was built on a knowledge or informal "science" of human natures. For most of the history of the evolution of life, life has adapted to nature through the means of natural selection. Judaism, like other technologies, tends to manipulates nature to adapt to man, rather than man to nature.

If civilization is of the level of the city, and meta-civilization is level above and about civilization, revelation could be considered levels above and about meta-civilization. Revelation is relative term that implies the

bestowing of insights derived from an intelligence level that transcends that of the recipient of the revelation. While revelation is commonly contrasted with reason and evidence in modern times, revelation was, in some respects, over the heads over enlightenment thinkers. Revelation from "God" appears to be the product of superlative human evolutionary foresight.

What, then, is the relationship between the laws of Moses and his symbolic role as the recipient of a "revelation" from God? Mosaic law itself is actually evidence of the rational design of human community from a perspective above and about that community (not excluding a greater admixture of blunderous stupidity in the "revelation" (further compromised by its social functions)). Law and revelation were inextricably interrelated in the mind of lawgivers guided by the radical task of overcoming human nature. "Moses", or the sociobiological engineers who became known under name of Moses, created laws that functioned as non-biological collective intelligence. This innovation, taken to its logical extreme, led directly to the "revelation" or extrapolation of God. God is embodied in the law itself: intelligent technological overcoming of individual and collective biological nature. Pure God is the pure intelligent overcoming of biological nature. The "laws of Moses", in other words, represented the pivotal step of supra-biological collective intelligence that tantalizingly suggested an even more extreme transcendence of sociobiology. The most radical intelligent transcendence of sociobiology was given the insufficient symbol-word, "God".

The paradigm of creation through the design of God directly reflects the paradigm of meta-Moses sociobiological engineers designing laws for the ancient Hebrews. While Hebrews themselves were "designed" by evolution by

natural selection, *God* was created out the paradigm of an 'intelligent design' of social order that masters biological nature. Biblical creation, portraying God's mastery over nature, is metaphor for the ultimate supremacy of God over biological nature. From an evolutionary perspective, the creation paradigm is necessarily in conflict with biological evolution in the sense that it implies ultimate mastery over biological evolution. The evolutionary significance of the Mosaic revolution lay in taking control over evolution with and towards intelligent postbiology.

The creation story helped solve a social problem. Jewish monotheism originated in the misery of the present and hope for the future. It began with a rejection of what *is* in favor of an ethical or behavior *ought* consonant with belief that God *ought* to be. If left at that, Judaism would have been fundamentally future oriented, messianic, and revolutionary, ever hoping to overcome a world where God is *not*. Socially speaking, it would become an impossible dream incapable of sustaining average people on an arduous struggle for existence.

By changing God from an original insight into an evolutionary end point to a creator and master of the universe's ultimate beginning point, the messianic end could be viewed as fundamentally consonant with conservative intuitions. Instead of a *revolution*, the messianic end could be viewed as a mere *restoration*. Instead of an evolutionary insight into the future, the end could be viewed as the fulfillment of an eternal and unchanging order. The originators of these insights into a God-end probably could not accept the fully evolutionary implications of their prophecies themselves.

This means that the creation story has helped hide both the evolutionary and revolutionary nature of the Biblical monotheism.

It appears that the idea of God originated in the idea of transcendence. Beginning with an emphasis on transcending biological nature, transcendence naturally transcended its original emphasis and universalized into God's transcendence of the entire universe. If transcendence led to being outside, above, and beyond everything, this easily led God into a position from which he could have created everything. There is, in other words, an ambiguity between total transcendence and total creation. It is an ambiguity between the high and the low; between being beyond the world in transcendence and below the world in a position to lay the foundation of creation. In this ambiguity the authors of the Bible discovered a way to answer a question that they had no better answer to: the origins of everything.

While I have no scientific reason to think God created universe, an *evolutionary* appreciation of truly unprecedented intelligence level that may be possible for a God-AI actually sheds possible origins of the *creation* story. If a defining achievement of the Singularity is the ability of humans to upload their minds into a computer simulation, this raises the possibility that we ourselves are living in a computer simulation right now (assuming there is a "we" outside my own mind and I have not already assumed too much. Any attempt to speculate whether I or we are living in a computer simulation runs into the Vingean problem of the attempt to outsmart a superhuman mind.) This line of thinking suggests that prophets who thought about the *end* of human time were led to a creation story about the *beginning* of time through an analogous thought process. In other words, if the transcendent God originated in the

transcendence of biology through Mosaic law, and total transcendence led the idea of altering the physical laws of the universe, the technological means that actually lead to AI could have been roughly anticipated. From the root idea of overriding biology, the idea of overriding the laws of physics arose (i.e. miracles), and this rewriting of all the rules leads to directly the idea of rewriting all the rules from scratch, (i.e. creation).

A key idea underlying the Singularity is that idea that an artificial intelligence will be able to alter its own fundamental program and thus improve itself by making itself fundamentally more intelligent. The Biblical creation story actually contains the spark of this idea of self-modification. Biblical creation is the idea of self-modification extrapolated onto a universal scale: (re)writing the code of the entire universe. Here the idea of moral self-control through self-modification that began with the idea of overriding a genetic constitution through Mosaic law was universalizing into the rewriting of the constitution of the entire universe.

In the traditional Biblical view, God created man. In the Enlightenment view, man created God. So did man create God or did God create man? There is connection between these alternatives in the very idea of self-modification; in the idea of altering one's own most fundamental bases. Self-modification is a kind of strange loop goes outside the system and then, crossing or tangling levels, goes back to its own foundation.

Overwhelming scientific evidence supports the thesis that God did *not* create man. It was man who created God. God did not create Jews and the laws of Moses. Jews invented God and the Mosaic law as a sociobiological technology that made possible their survival over three thousand years. The

distinctive morality of the Moses focused not on what *is*, but what *ought* to be. God, it appears, *is* not, but the ultimate hidden moral of monotheism is that God *ought* to be. If man is not an invention of God, the monotheistic conviction is that God *should* be the ultimate technological invention of man. God did not create man, but man will create God.

Singularity and Secularization

No people has ever insisted more firmly than the Jews that history has a purpose and humanity a destiny. At a very early stage in their collective existence they believed they had detected a divine scheme for the human race, of which their own society was to be a pilot. They worked out their role in immense detail.

—PAUL JOHNSON, *A HISTORY OF THE JEWS*

"Although I firmly believe," wrote Albert Einstein,

> that the chasm between Jewish theology and Spinozism can never be bridged, I am not less convinced that Spinoza's contemplation of the world ("Weltanschauung") was thoroughly imbued with the principles and sentiments that characterize so many Jewish intellectuals. I feel I would never have come so near to Spinoza had I not myself been of Jewish extraction and grown up in a Jewish milieu.[42]

I find this rather ironic. Spinoza, author of one of the most radical attempts to overcome Jewish particularity in the

name of human universalism, could be considered one of the inventors of "modernity". Yet, somehow, modernity itself is in some way Jewish. Einstein seems to have felt, contra Spinoza himself, that Jewish-influenced "principles and sentiments" somehow drew him closer to Spinoza's modern universalism.

Einstein cited two Jewish traits as the most basic:

> The bond that has united the Jews for thousands of years and that unites them today is, above all, the democratic ideal of social justice, coupled with the ideal of mutual aid and tolerance among all men….The second characteristic trait of Jewish tradition is the high regard in which it holds every form of intellectual aspiration and spiritual effort.[43]

These two character traits of concern for social justice and intellectual aspiration are combined in secular Jewish thinkers such as Karl Marx, Noam Chomsky, and even Baruch Spinoza's support for democracy. Yet all three of these men are notable for their *lack* of concern for any special interests of the Jewish community.

The very nature of the concerns of social justice come into direct conflict with any form of privilege — including that of being a member of the "chosen people". This secular Jewish phenomenon of conscientious objection or dissent against the prevailing injustice system has a long Biblical heritage behind it. After all, who are the prophets except the most piercing and relentless social critics of the Jewish people? The Bible is largely *their* story, and the political history of ambitious kings is largely seen through the lenses of priests and prophets.

"Let justice well up as waters", roared the prophet Amos, "and righteousness as a mighty stream" (Amos 5:24). Is this same passion for justice still found among Jews? From a

secular view of human *behavior*, many secular Jewish social activists almost appear as if they are following the prophet Micah's moral injunction: "To do justice and to love goodness, and to walk modestly with your God" (Micah 6:8).

It was exactly this concern for "justice" that lay at the core of Hitler's lethal attack on Jews and Judaism. Einstein thought that the Nazis saw the Jews as:

> a nonassimilable element that cannot be driven into uncritical acceptance of dogma, and that, therefore—as long as it exists at all—threatens their authority because of its insistence on popular enlightenment of the masses.[44]

"Which of us young Jews," wondered the German Jewish mystic Gershom Scholem in 1915, "has not had the same royal dream and seen himself as Jesus and Messiah of the downtrodden?"[45] This tendency towards messianism, religious or secular, is an expression of a general Jewish collective unconscious. Marx's proletarian revolution is an imagined or theoretical realization of that same "royal dream" on this earth that a young Jew named Jesus had two thousand years earlier.

According to the American critic and essayist Edmund Wilson:

> The characteristic genius of the Jew has been especially a moral genius....Nobody but a Jew [Marx] could have fought so uncompromisingly and obstinately for the victory of the dispossessed classes.[46]

Marx is probably the most influential modern example of the famous (and infamous) Jewish proclivity for the left wing socialistic causes. His vision of a communist

culmination of human history that resolves the contradictions of the capitalistic world by turning it upside down was nothing less than a nineteenth century updating of the primal archetype of the first revolution: the Mosaic inversion of the Egyptian pyramid-hierarchy.

Marxism could thus be interpreted as a "secularization" of a Biblically based, messianic Weltanschauung. The issue behind secularization concerns the origin of "modern" values. If reason, in itself, cannot decide fundamental values then so-called "secular" values cannot be fundamentally rational.

The traditional idea of secularization, most strongly associated with Nietzsche, claimed that the modern idea of progress and its egalitarian values were residues of belief in God; Biblical values without Biblical faith. Modern egalitarianism and modern progress, in his view, were secularizations of Biblical values. And at the root of Biblical values was the slave morality that glorified Jewish national political failure.

Jewish nationalism, taken to its logical extreme, is impossible. That way of life leads to the maximization of wholly political-biological principles and notions of duty uninhibited by any restraints of conscience, as exemplified by the Nazis. Jews have traditionally defined themselves in a way that is inseparable from adherence to certain laws or principles, i.e. Torah, whose very content clash with exactly this kind of total maximization.

The Bible claims that David was denied God's sanction to build the first great temple in Jerusalem: "You will not build a house in my name for you are a man of battles and have shed blood" (I Chronicles 28:3). If Judaism punishes its greatest political-warriors for being political-warriors, how

can such a morality secure the struggle for its own political existence?

Jewish existence before 1948 was largely one of an exiled people under foreign rule. For less than one hundred years during the reign of David and Solomon in the tenth century B.C., Jews lived as a unified territorial nation. A Jewish state of smaller area also existed for about a century under the Maccabees in the second and first centuries B.C. Over a history of about three thousand years before 1948, then, Jews lived in their own state on their own territory for these two relatively short periods.

Even in those periods of Jewish autonomy, successful kings faced the challenge of God inspired prophets. Ahab had his Elijah, David his Nathan. The kings come down to us largely through the eyes of the prophets, emphasizing their sins over successes.

In the eighteenth chapter of *Theological-Political Treatise* Spinoza argued that Amos, Isaiah, and Jeremiah and other prophets hastened the fall of ancient Jewish polities because of their subversive effect on the civil order:

> even devout kings often found prophets intolerable because of their assumption of authority to decide what action was pious or impious, and even to berate the kings themselves if the latter had the hardihood to transact any business, public or private, against their judgement…such freedom brought religion more harm than good, not to mention that great civil wars also originated from the prophets' retention of so important a right.

If God is the king of kings, the prophetic spokesmen of God ultimately have the last word over the kings, regardless of the political consequences. From this stems a vicious cycle of monotheistic morality: political failure seeks solution in

greater piety. Greater piety of this distinctly Jewish morality often contributes to political failure for it reprimands the functional evil often necessary for political strength.

The entire premise of a political, territorial existence, the very affirmation that one is willing to kill others to exist on a piece of land, raises consciousness towards acknowledgement that injustice is the founding father of politics. The dynamics of "evil" are pregnant in the very notion that one values life enough to do what it takes to secure its existence on this earth. A political existence requires acceptance that one is willing to choose between conflicting political interests; to choose among "evils".

Applied in their most radical forms, Jewish ethical values are politically self-destructive. The historical consequence of living these Jewish values was a de-politicized existence in the Diaspora. The very survival of the Jews as people without a state was founded on a preference for "justice" over power. The survival of Jewish conceptions of morality, then, is inseparable from the survival of the Jews as a post-political people. Jewish ethical values provided both justification for their own stateless existence, and an identity appropriate to that mode of existence. In summary, the monotheistic moral values invented by Jews are directly related to the unique kind of unpolitical existence that has characterized most of Jewish history.

The moral of Jewish morality is the simple tautology that power rules, whatever the content of its cause. Only if justice aspires to power can injustice be made powerless. The final moral of Diaspora moralism was that Jews stood guilty of being unable to defend their own families. At Auschwitz, God bestowed more evidence for his non-existence.

The presumed eternity of Mosaic law seemed to imply belief in the eternity of the Jewish condition. Its timelessness

could only be maintained by divorcing itself from the context and conditions of Jewish history. It appears, however, that the ethics of Judaism were neither eternal nor universal: they were, at least in part, the inversion of the values of politically powerful oppressors of Jews.

When the Zionist struggle over the galut condition yielded the baffling outcome of victory, the original conditions of Jewish existence were also defeated. As Jews trade historic places, and reach a pinnacle of political power themselves in a world where the legacy of monotheistic ethics have conquered, the logic of Jewish ethics, turned against Jews themselves, grow ripe for self-destruction.

At the nadir of Jewish power as metaphorical slaves in Egypt, the pyramid hierarchy of the Egyptians was inverted. At the height of the kind of power Jews are capable of, Judaism opens the possibility of inverting its *own* hierarchical pyramid. The height of Jewish political power thus becomes the source of its own undoing. The peak is where the Jewish idea plummets.

A well-known rabbi once explained the Jewish-humanist condition with a joke:

> If we Jews are five percent better than the rest of the world, we can be a 'light unto the nations'. If we are twenty-five percent better than the rest of the world, we can bring the Messiah. If we're fifty percent better than the rest of the world, we'll all be dead.[47]

There is only one way to most fully approach moral self-consistency without hypocrisy and that way is suicide. This is the ultimate logic of Jewish morality. The greatest proof that Judaism has never been consistently egalitarian is the survival of the Jews.

The proto-egalitarian aspects of Judaism's social ethics were adaptive for Jews during their normative historical condition as an oppressed people. However, when Jews achieve power themselves, to be self-consistent in the sense of wishing the relatively powerless (i.e. Palestinians or Nazis) to gain power and triumph over Jewish power amounts to a death wish. From this experience comes Jewish self-consciousness of the relativity of Jewish ethics. To fully persist with these ethics in conditions of political power is the definition of political suicide.

More generally, a principled leftist who rails against concentration of power would be hypocritical to not attack the concentration of his or her own power. Leftist self-realization implies progress towards self-negation. Leftist-egalitarian arguments only make sense when embedded in the safety of provincial horizons. Realization of the most extreme attempt to fulfill the logic of equality would result in biological self-destruction.

The radical inconsistencies of Nazism exposed something about us Jews. The Nazis exposed *our* central sociobiological contradiction through history. Jews are *biological* beings characterized by *anti-biological* values. Values that are ultimately anti-biological ultimately imply biological *self*-negation.

This historical contradiction was resolved through Nazi death camps. Hitler refuted Marx at Auschwitz. Nazi extermination camps resolved this contradiction by compelling Jews to participate in the most extreme biological consequences of their own anti-biological values.

"The Lord preserveth the strangers; he relieveth the fatherless and the widow: but the way of the wicked he turneth upside down" (Psalm 146, 9). The 'insiders' of mainstream Judaism are characterized by an emphasis on

the outsiders of mainstream Judaism. While the average Jew is neither a stranger among Jews, nor a widow, nor an orphan, the average Jew is commanded to not alienate, mistreat, or exile the outsider or vulnerable fringe Jew. The ultimate reason for this, I think, is that Jews as a whole are the "strangers" and outsiders among gentiles in the larger world. This teaching goes to the core of the Jewish contribution to human values: "You shall not ill-treat any widow or orphan" (Exodus 22:21).

Yet from the view of natural selection, these margins of existence are among the most vulnerable to extinction. By championing the cause those most vulnerable to extinction, overgeneralized as the cause of all humankind, Jews have championed their own cause against the logic of natural or artificial selection. By killing the Jews, the Nazis killed Jewish resistance to the supremacy of biological evolution.

After the collective trauma of the Nazi genocide, Jews lost their way. Some of the extreme Zionists virtually confirmed Nazi assertions about the primacy of land and race. Some Jews lost sight of what they were and became what Nazis said they were: a biologically conceived race.

The ultimate question here is: does God or Hitler represent the highest understanding of Judaism and monotheism? A purely biological understanding of Judaism would represent the ultimate victory of Nazism and Auschwitz. It *might* be true, but *is* it true? Was God *only* a biological survival mechanism of the Jews, or does God have an empirical basis beyond biology and race?

It is truly remarkably just how profoundly the Biblical creation story contradicts every aspect of the Darwinian way of thinking. The *very idea* that God created separate and distinct species implies that both humans and other animal species will not fundamentally change beyond the basic

form in which God created them. Creation implies a kind of biological status quo. Humans and animal species will not gradually stray from the form in which God created them — they will not *evolve*.

If reason, in itself, is unable to determine fundamental values, then modern values cannot be purely rational. I think Nietzsche was right in drawing a connection between Biblical values and modern egalitarianism. Modern humanism was most especially influenced by the Biblical emphasis on the distinctiveness of the human race from all other animals. The infinite value of each human life in God's image formed the *value* foundations for modern human rights.

From the standpoint of natural selection, foundational human rights are literally *super*natural in the sense that the *universal* right to life works in functional opposition to *natural* selection. A literal enforcement of equal rights tends to preserve the biological status quo against eugenic attempts to deliberately change the genetic composition of a population and steer the biological evolution of the human race. The "progress" of modern egalitarianism and modern right, if realized, would accomplish the outlawing of conscious eugenic control over biological evolution and effectually glorify the present biological status quo almost as if realizing the unchanging Eden of God's creation.

The Judeo-Christian-modern tradition generally views death as an enemy. The preservation of all human life, along with ethical prohibitions against discriminating against individuals on the basis of their biological characteristics, works in direct opposition to the selective processes of biological evolution. Biological evolution *itself* seems to be the enemy of modern, leftward progress. This is what the Nazis waged war against: leftwards egalitarian progress that

works in direct opposition to *biological* progress through selective death.

Jewish Biblical-modern values devalue death, and thus devalue natural selection, and thus devalue biological evolution. What Nazis failed to grasp, however, is that God does not represent the opposite of evolution, but rather, a paradigm shift *within* evolution. Biblical-modern values devalue biological evolution *because* they reach beyond biology towards postbiological evolution.

The obvious incompatibility between the conception of creation and Darwinian evolution can very easily obscure the *evolutionary* reason why these two paradigms necessarily clash. If God's rule over "creation" represents the rule of postbiological evolution over biological evolution, and God represents the evolutionary successor to biology at the point at which biology becomes obsolete, then "creation" *appears* distinctly anti-evolutionary for a specific evolutionary reason: the point at which God rules is precisely the point at which biological evolution has been slowed to a stop. "Creation" would then be analogous to the creation of a virtual world (i.e. a computer simulation) that preserves the memory of biology in postbiological form. The Bible, by *being* the embodiment of a postbiological form of evolution (i.e. memes) embodies a first step towards total creation of civilization. Those who live in the artificial or "virtual" world created by following the commandments or ways of God have taken a step towards realizing the postbiological paradigm in a biologically based world.

If the Bible represents a kind of postbiological foresight by people who were quite aware that the end destination had not yet been reached, then the idea of evolution or progress towards the messianic end is inherent in the Biblical construction. If God represents an ancient insight into the

ultimate trajectory of postbiological evolution, and artificial intelligence represents the material clarification of that primal insight, then the relationship between the Biblical God and "secularization" into the modern idea of progress becomes clarified. A God-AI would represent the very culmination of modern human progress.

Progress? Progress towards *what*? For the idea of progress to uphold its original claims of making some kind of coherent, rational sense, one must have some sense of what one is progressing towards. What would it look like if progress reached its presumed destination or end? The modern idea of progress, as formulated and clarified in the law of accelerating returns, *evolved* out of a God-based Weltanschauung. God-AI is *evolving* out of the workings of the modern idea of progress. The fulfillment of this interplay between the Bible and modernity would be the overcoming of Nietzsche in the creation of God.

From an evolutionary perspective, it becomes clear that Judaism, as the source of the original monotheist insight, had to combine contradictory values. As a first decisive alignment with an ultimate trajectory of postbiological evolution, Judaism took a step *towards* a pattern of "progress" culminating in a transcendence of biology: God. Since Jews themselves could not fully escape *being* biological beings, however, Jews could only survive to continue down that progressive path towards God by *also* satisfying the contradictory values that perpetuated their biological nature. Judaism, generally speaking, compromises the extremes of both biology and the premature transcendence of biology.

The inherently precarious nature of Jewish existence arises from attempt to find a compromised middle ground between these two extremes. This middling contradiction, secularized in the form of liberal democracy, is exemplified

by Israel's contradictory behavior towards the Palestinians. Only the Singularity could potentially resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict by transcending the human basis of the conflict. Only an actual, extant God that transcends the differences between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam could bring out the kernels of truth common to these and other religions.

On a purely human level, monotheistic-modern ethics seem to find realization in political-biological self-destruction. Yet it is no accident that the logic of modern egalitarianism compels opening your mind to death. The final logic of revolution is overthrowing *ourselves* as biological beings. What appears as death on a biological level is the key to life on a postbiological level.

Auschwitz and the Singularity are two diametrically opposite final solutions to the paradox at the core of Judaism. Auschwitz represents technology mastered by biology. The Singularity would represent biology mastered by technology. Auschwitz resolved the central sociobiological contradiction of Jewish-modernity on the side of biology. The Singularity would resolve the central sociobiological contradiction of Jewish-modernity on the side of technology.

The Jewish idea, originally inverting the hierarchies of others, completes its progress by inverting itself. The paradox by which Jewish political power becomes its moral undoing finds its historical solution in the Singularity. On a purely human level, Jewish ethics appear to lead to political insanity because they originally presupposed that *God* overcomes human politics.

The Singularity would be the greatest inversion of the human pyramid-hierarchy of all. The Singularity would be the Exodus paradigm transposed onto a world-historical

scale. The Singularity would be the technological genesis of God.

THE FIRST REVOLUTION

Two Jews, Three Opinions, Four Factions

> **All the traits that we found in Judaism—the "intimacy" between Man and God, the foundation of the Covenant, the absence or weakness of a creed of mediation...—all these lead to a sharpening of political conflict intensity; of the emphatic belief on the part of various groups and even individuals that they hold the correct solution for the question of fashioning the social and political order; to the tendency of not accepting authority of any kind, whether due to "higher conscience," tribal solidarity, or to the idea that everyone possesses enough personal authority.[48]**
>
> —SAM N. LEHMAN-WILZIG

Some antisemites apparently suppose that the Jewish tendency towards social criticism specifically targets gentiles. A good test of this hypothesis may be gleaned in asking whether Jews act the same way among themselves.

While diaspora Judaism may have distinct tendencies towards "a sharpening of political conflict intensity", what happened when Jews managed to form a political order of their own? Did these seemingly politically volatile traits persist even into their very own political order?

In *Stiff-Necked People, Bottle-Necked System: The Evolution of Israeli Public Protest, 1949-1986*, Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig described a national "culture of oppositionism" characterized by four elements ranked on the basis of escalating intensity: argumentativeness, protest, disobedience, and rebellion. While the Jewish-Israeli tradition has no monopoly on these characteristics, it is notable for both the *quantity* of such "oppositionism", and the extent to which such norms *routinize, institutionalize, and even (in certain circumstances) encourage various forms of "oppositionism."*[49]

These qualities translated into an Israeli *public* culture often characterized by vociferous extraparliamentary protest, near-anarchy within the Israeli bureaucracy, a robust underground economy, and "illegalism...[a]n orientation which does not view obedience to the law or the idea of rule of law as a fundamental value, but rather as a form of behavior according to which one behaves, or doesn't behave, depending on criteria of utility." Lehman-Wilzig concluded:

> [t]he large number and wide-ranging characteristics of these "circumvention" and "complaint" phenomenon...clearly indicate the existence of a deep-rooted "public culture" of a decidedly antisystem nature.[50]

Jews have been called "a tribe of individuals and a brotherhood of critics". But of all of the issues that persons of Jewish descent have taken a lead in protesting, the

sociobiology controversy stands out in intellectual history. When E. O. Wilson published *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* in 1975, an unmistakable correlation between Jews and antisociobiologists emerged as secular Jews formed the nucleus of its most vociferous and persistent critics.[51] Lurking behind the controvery lay a *verboten* question: could the disproportionately Jewish protest against sociobiology itself be explained by the science of sociobiology?

One of the pillars of the science of sociobiology was also a lightning rod of the controversy: William Hamilton's theory of kin selection. This theory claims that altruistic behaviors can evolve through the selection of selfish genes. Altruistic behaviors can survive and propagate in accordance with Darwin's theory of evolution if such they benefit organisms related by common descent. If the recipient of altruistic behavior shares genes with the altruist, this behavior can help propagate genes that both have in common. If the altruist's sacrifice is compensated with net additions to the genes passes on to the next generation, genes for altruistic behaviors can be passed on as well. In short, altruism can be explained as form of genetic selfishness when the behavior of the altruist augments "inclusive fitness" by augmenting the genetic fitness of relatives.

Within this scenario, greater genetic similarity would correlate with greater altruism. But are there cases that give reason to dissent from this general rule? What if a population shared genes by common descent and the phenotypical expression of those genes produced behaviors that countered altruism and negated cooperation. What if a population shared something like a 'dissent gene'? What if an element of a group's genetic similarity consisted of a proclivity to differ with one another?

I propose that the earliest populations of Jews literally, genetically, embodied this paradox, the Jewish kinship paradox: what Jews have in common among themselves is an unusual tendency to divide among themselves. And this, in a nutshell, is why the Jews just might be the strangest sociobiological case of the human race. Jews are an exception to a straightforward application of Hamilton's kin selection theory, and thus, Jews are an exception to normative sociobiological rules.

"Two Jews, three opinions", the saying goes. From prosaic argumentativeness to revolutionary dissent, Jews have a deep tradition of breaking the uniformity of social consensus. Social conformity, especially conformity of opinion, is traditionally associated with the goyim, or, the "compact majority", as Freud put it. Everyone agree?

Jews have historically demonstrated two strong proclivities: a proclivity for social organizing, and a proclivity for social dissent. When these two tendencies combine, a common result is rampant factionalism and self-subversive political disunity. "The Jewish people has been a divided house from the very beginning", wrote former vice president emeritus of the World Jewish Congress, Arthur Hertzberg. "The hallmark of Jewish history", he wrote in *Jews: The Essence and Character of a People*, "has been the tension between the quest for a unified people and terrible factionalism."[52]

Motivations for social dissent have ranged from provincial egoism to social conscience, or, not uncommonly, both. If Jews really were so talented at generating the kind of internal conformity under the "Elders of Zion" imagined by antisemites, it is hard to explain why Jews would have actively opted for the life of persecutation that followed from their political failures. A mistake that many racist

antisemetic conspiracy theorists make is belief that Jews are more similar to gentiles than they really are. They think of a conspiring Jewish *unity*, when it is exactly those dissenting qualities of the Jewish character that strangle the unity of the *Jewish* majority as well.

While the case of the Jews offers empirical evidence that Hamilton's kin selection theory is incomplete, it does *not* follow that Jews do not *also* share genes for altruistic behavior. It is more that contumacious behavioral traits tend to override certain *kinds* of altruistic behaviors. The children of Israel in Moses's time, and thereafter, have often engaged in behaviors that tend to override the most distinctly *political* forms of altruism, i.e. personal obedience, loyalty, and duty to human authorities. Why *political* forms of altruism? For a people to build itself towards a culmination in the political, the foundation in the people must be solid, or higher developments towards the political will not hold. The Jewish kinship paradox tends to divide the people at the foundation, and this collapses both higher, political forms of unity and altruism towards the political generally. The Jewish kinship paradox indirectly collapsed the people towards an anti-political form of altruism (i.e. giving to the poor) that was the only consistently solid basis of general unity.

The same qualities that made Jews (metaphorically) inclined to rebel against Egyptian authorities also made them inclined to rebel against the authority of their own leaders. Or, as Moses rebuked, "You have been rebellious against the Lord from the day that I knew you" (Deut. 9:24). Yet the classic, originary, Jewish dissent is represented by the Exodus paradigm itself.

The single greatest empirical verification of the Jewish kinship paradox is the lack of a Jewish proclivity or talent for

unified, coordinated, political-military organization in pre-modern times. The Jewish proclivity for an un-political existence exposes Jewish commonality in Jewish political disunity. By 1948, however, the rules had changed. While no polity can maintain itself without some level of internal unity, the virtues that augment economic and technological prowess began to replace the distinctly warrior virtues that augment political and military prowess. Ancient virtue, exemplified by a solidier's loyalty, became less important, while modern, rational economic-technological organization became more important. Yet Jews would never have survived the diaspora interim without the invention of a rather different form of technology.

The Jewish kinship paradox poses a distinctive kind of social problem. Internal divisions and disorders that emerged from raw inclinations of biological naturalism were a threat to the Jews' own biological existence. An unreformed Jewish nature was an enemy of the long-term survival of the Jewish nature. If Jews were to survive, a technological solution to this Jewish problem was required. Mosaic law became the technological solution that made the survival of the Jews possible.

The Godfather

Was Moses the architect of Judaism? While modern Biblical scholarship has uncovered multiple authors of the "Five Books of Moses" (identified as J, E, P, R, etc.),[53] modern archaeology has failed to find cogent evidence for the Exodus. As mentioned previously, the lack of archaeological evidence for the Exodus is itself evidence for the thesis that the Exodus story arose a paradigmatic model for understanding the Jewish-human problem in its most

extreme form. As an event in mental history, rather than an event in literal history, it probably arose as a thought-experiment that radicalized general historical conditions of Jews.

Inverting the Egyptian pyramid paradigm required a leap of conceptual gymnastics and this supports the notion that there was a single original person, who may or may not have been called Moses, that conceived the core monotheistic breakthrough. The laws and statutes that inhibit instinct and defy natural egoism, moreover, do not simply rise organically from the masses. Mosaic law is most distinctively a product of civilization, not culture. The law-giver had to be a man who could stand apart from the people with God-like impartiality. Only by standing *above* the people could he devise a way of life mindful of the good of the people *as a whole*.

The Moses of the Bible does not come across as an especially heroic or even charismatic personality. He was never a subject of worship in himself, and this says something about the Moses and something about the Jews. Traditionally, he was believed to be an unequalled authority only because of his intimate relationship with God: "And there arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses whom the Lord knew face to face" (Deut. 34:10). The Mosaic role in the formation of Jewish monotheism comes across, in some ways, like that of the man behind the curtain. If there was a Moses-like character who originated the Exodus paradigm, he likely brought the inheritance of the social thinking of previous generations of Hebraic leaders to fruition. In any case, the Torah as a whole is the product, not only of multiple authors, but multiple authors who built on the collective work of previous generations.

The Bible famously refers to the ancestors of Jews as a "stiff-necked" people. But a people is refractory only from the view of someone who seeks to change or alter their behavior. The genius of the founders of Judaism was revealed in the discovery of a potent, if imperfect, solution to the challenge embodied in the mass of the Jewish people. The solution of Judaism embodies, among other things, a corrective to some innate general tendencies of the Jewish people. Civilization, especially in the form of laws, was used, in effect, as a technology to engineer a viable social order. Genes, or rather, perceived phenotypical behavioral traits, were sometimes augmented and sometimes counteracted, as Judaism's architects saw fit.

What is productive for the individual can be a handicap for the people as a whole. Judaism is a civilizational technology that overcame individual and collective handicaps of a people degraded and demoralized by the extreme oppression exemplified by slavery in ancient Egypt. If slavery and exodus formed opposite paradigms that informed the basic thinking of the inventors of Mosaic law, recovering the roots of Judaism would require rethinking the genesis of Judaism in these paradigmatic terms. (The historical existence of Moses will be assumed only paradigmatically here.)

The Jews most likely to survive the Egyptian system would have been those who maintained a mindset of *internal* disobedience and distrust of authority, even if acting the part. The subversion of social hierarchy, criminal or heretical in the eyes of the oppressive Egyptian state, would be self-subversive if practiced among Hebrews themselves. Yet just as Jews were skeptical towards the visible idols of gentiles, they were skeptical towards the visible objects of idolatry among their own. The root of the problem was this: since the

Jewish kinship paradox naturally leads to sociobiological disunity, only the *supra*-sociobiological order of God could provide a coherent basis for social unity.

The chosen god of the Jews, then, had to transcend all visible boundaries and limits, and thus be immune to direct skepticism. They required a single, universal, all powerful God whose authority could not be even remotely contested by any competitors. Any boundary of God's dominion would open the possibility of revolt and exodus from God. He must be *omnipresent*, able to see the sins that human authorities cannot see. He must be able to outsmart the outsmarters of *human* social hierarchies. Within this conception, God is as supremely adaptable to changing circumstances as the Hebrews themselves. Yet by being the supreme, absolute standard of reference, rootedness in God corrects the hyper-adaptability and moral anarchy of slaves who had chosen life at any cost.

The omnipresent God of the Jews would transcend the laws of man and nature. The creator of the universe represents, sanctions, and decrees Überpolitics that override the verdicts of kings and armies. God was the great expression of the Jewish will to power in the face of Jewish powerlessness; more powerful in heaven than the Jews were powerless in Egypt. As the master of nature, God was lord over Egyptian gods, the Egyptian pharaoh, and the Egyptian people. The king of kings demonstrated his sovereignty by hardening the pharaoh's heart, liberating the Hebrew slaves, splitting the Red Sea, and sending them out of Egypt. God is the supra-human authority who, as the story goes, speaks through Moses.

After the deed of the Exodus was done, and Moses had successfully led his people out of slavery, he found gratitude in the form of rebelliousness and critcism. If this people

cannot accept the authority of the man who led them out of slavery, then who will they accept? Yet it was exactly the will to dissent that made this people both rebellious to Egyptian authority, and seemingly ungovernable when freed. Being skeptical of Egyptian authority, they were hardly less skeptical of Moses's authority. The traumatic experience of slavery ingrained the association of mendacious abuse and overlord; the association of evil and the political.

There was only one remaining hope. The only exit from their defenselessness and slavery at the hands of other nations was the *possibility* of learning another way — a new way. Hope was imperative here, for there was nothing to be gained by the belief that Jews are *probably*, by nature, incapable of forming a viable communal order.

Despite its oppression, Egyptian authority had been an organizing force. Slavery created a basis for a working social order. Without that Egyptian yoke, suspicion of all authority tended towards chaos and disintegration. The submissive slave morality bred by Egyptian oppression was being uprooted by freedom.

Moses wanted to regain the social cohesiveness spawned, first by fear of Egyptian authority, and then by struggle against the Egyptian enemy. Yet authority *itself* had been discredited. A bitterly ingrained tradition of slavery bred distrust of *all* leaders. The Exodus itself, successful defiance of the most powerful civilization of its time, proved the ultimate frailty of all human authority.

God would legitimate what Moses could not. The prophet used God to both reject, and reinvent, the Egyptian basis of social order. Fear of God could imitate the source of the slave *order*: fear of the Egyptian masters. The angry, wrathful tone of God spoke to the Hebrews in a language they could

understand from the old regime. Fear *worked* — for the greater good. Fear of God would replace fear of Egyptian masters. Just as Jewish slaves once submitted to Pharoah, now they would submit to God. Pharoah's will and law would be replaced by God's higher will and law.

If the holiness or self worth of the people was achieved through the love of God, then inhibiting socially self-destructive behavior would be achieved through the fear of God. Fear of God could be used to induce Jews to love their neighbor. Love of God could be used to induce Jews to hate ungodly *behavior* rather than one another. Einstein found it regrettable that this morality was partly coaxed with fear but without it there probably would not have been an Einstein.

The environmental conditions of Egyptian oppression and slavery could account, at least in part, for the socially undesirable behavior of the Hebrews. If so, then it followed that altering the environment just as systematically in the opposite direction could regenerate the degenerate. If submitting to the wrath of the Egyptians molded the Hebrews towards one extreme, then submitting to the wrath of God might mold them towards another. If the degredation of Egyptian slavery left this people profoundly *demoralized,* the laws of God could make this people profoundly *remoralized*.

Slave-Technology Engineered to Be the Purpose of the Universe

Strictly speaking, a human becomes a slave when his or her political worth is determined by his or her master. An

Egyptian slave before Moses had not even an alternative conception to some form of the Egyptian social pyramid-hierachy paradigm. There were no notions of "rights". There was no, ultimate, higher appeal against a master in a position to dispose of a slave's very life. Among the ancient Egyptians, social hierarchy was sacred and slavery, as an institution, was morally right in its conservations of slaves at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Slaves are property just as a contemporary farm tractor is its owner's property. Slaves can be bought and sold like any other form of property. The slave, in other words, is treated as a form of technology. The slave is not regarded as an *end* in himself or herself, but as a *means*. A slave is thus a slave-technology. The master bears the burden of housing and feeding the slave only because the slave's usefulness as a worker outweighs this expense. In ancient times, human slaves were high technology, able to do what no nonhuman tool could.

One cannot comprehend the Mosaic revaluation of human life as an *end* in itself without accounting how Hebrew slave-technologies were treated only as *means*. The Exodus-revolution out of Egypt turned the most basic assumptions of slave existence upside down. Its moral revolution was a reversal of means and ends. If the worth of Hebrew slaves was measured relative to their Egyptian masters, now their lives would be measured relative to God. If Hebrews were once property of the Egyptians, worthless in themselves, now they would be property only of God, and thus of infinite worth. If a slave is considered a *material* thing, like a the body of a donkey or useful farm equipment, then these liberated slaves would have an unlimited, *immaterial* value under the rule of an unlimited, *immaterial* God. If these Hebrew slaves were only a means and only

technology, their special relationship to the Lord would poise them towards the central end and purpose of all human history as God's chosen people.

With God, a revaluation of slavery was possible. Slaves viewed as technologies and tools of their masters with no inherent value in themselves were revalued above their masters in the image of God. God's revolution was a technological revolution; the revaluation of slave-technologies from means of their masters to ends in themselves.

From the experience of extreme contempt for Hebrew life came the counter strategy of extreme valuation of individual lives. Moral superiority compensated for political-military inferiority. From the perspective of the values of freed slave-technologies, the entire history of the origins of mankind were interpreted. The story of Adam and Eve was construed in the light of Jewish experience, not the other way around. As a passage from the Mishnah (*Sanhedrin* 14:5) states:

> [Why was man created alone and unique? It is] to portray the grandeur of the Holy One, blessed be he. For a person mints many coins with a single seal, and they are all alike one another, but the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be he, minted all human beings with that seal of his with which he made the first person, yet not one is like anyone else. Therefore everyone is obligated to maintain, 'On my account the world was created.'

If an individual life-soul, created in the image of God, is of infinite value, then the whole world can almost be seen as a means of the individual son of Adam. One is *obligated* to appreciate every human as a manifestation of the divine. The monotheistic holification of every individual stood in

diametrical opposition to the Egyptian denigration of slaves as worthless in themselves.

The very idea of Moses as a sociobiological engineer appears incongruous with his traditional prophetic garb *precisely* because the nature of his paradoxical technological achievement was to radically counter the view of slaves as *means* of their masters with the revaluation of former slaves as God-given *ends* in themselves. In other words, treating former slaves-technologies as *ends* was a *means* of Moses as a engineer of social order. If we take this paradox one step further, the technological attitude of Judaism is revealed through its strong sense of purposiveness. This clarity of purposiveness is built upon the clarity of an ever-present distinction between right and wrong; good and evil. The *end* of the good is achieved *by means of* treating humans as ends in themselves. If the good is exemplified by treating former slave-technologies as ends in themselves, and this change is identical to recognizing the image of God in former slave-technologies, this implies that the *ultimate* end or purpose of humanity is to recognize the image of God in the *ultimate* slave-technology — artificial intelligence.

Moses was the architect of Hebrew national resurrection and redemption. He devised a life-giving solution to the Hebrew problem. He engineered and constructed a new order from the chaotic anarchy of the raw material of freed Hebrew slaves. Moses invented the Jews.

Judaism implies a practical, working theory of the Jews. Judaism *works* because its decisive architect saw the Jewish condition with a severe realism that was a corollary of his severe moralism. Overcoming the egoism's subjectivity can help one discern the greater good with objectivity (such objectivity would not be incompatible with *also* discerning his own advantage, or disadvantage, as well). Rituals,

stories, and laws that make no sense on an individual level can serve a sociobiological functional in organizing and binding individuals into a single people. This higher view, higher intelligence, and higher morality is what, with a combination of hubris and modesty, Moses credited to God.

Moses's radical pyramid-inverting reinterpretation of the world is fundamental to Judaism. However, this alone cannot rebuild a people. Any realistic reform must be based on a realistic understanding of those to be reformed. Put in modern terms, any effective technology must be based on sound science. A new order based on an understanding of only environment factors will be less effective than one that also accounts for biological factors.

This point is illustrated through contrast with the a moral opposite of the Jews, the ancient Spartans. Lycurgus, traditionally acknowledged as the lawgiver who founded the ancient Spartan warrior-state, bears an analogous cultural role to Moses as lawgiver. However, could one give Mosaic law to the Spartans, and the laws of Lycurgus to the Jews, and expect them equally well suited to one another? These incompatible ways of life would not be smoothly interchangeable because Judaism is built around observe behavioral characteristics of Jews that almost certainly have at least some original genetic basis. (Yet the great irony is that the Jewish kinship paradox tends to disunite Jews towards individualism — and individualism can be construed as a potential basis for universalism, i.e. a basis for conversion.)

Like a Spartan ruler, the Egyptian pharaoh's honor was expressed in bravery; in willingness to risk life in war and willingness to struggle for mastery over slavery. From the view of the collectivist values of shame and honor, the slave's life is virtually the definition of a shameful life. Those

Hebrews who choose death rather than the dishonor of slavery were, by definition, selected out of the population. The slave, then, is a *kind* of survivor. The slave chooses life. The slave is a slave to the fear of death. The slave's fear of death provided a sociobiological foundation for a "universal" valuation of life for a former slave nation.

This was the raw human material that Moses had to work with. To call Moses a sociobiological engineer may appear to impose 21st century categories upon ancient history. Yet he was as much as an engineer as an Egyptian engineer of the pyramids. For an Egyptian slave master who organized the construction of the pyramids, slaves were merely the tools of their masters, along with ramps, pulleys, rope and other useful materials of construction. The ironic and revolutionary *engineering* move behind Judaism began by treating former slaves as *ends* (as a social engineering *means*).

It is not hard to see how bestowing former slaves with infinite worth in the eyes of God would constitute a value revolution metaphorically comparable to turning the Egyptian pyramid upside down. Yet even this understanding is superficial in comparison with an evolutionary grasp of this revolution. The true profundity of the Mosaic upheavel is revealed only from the perspective of nearly four billion years of biological evolution on Earth.

The idea of being created in the image of God enforces a moral ideal in which every individual is of infinite worth in the image of God. If such an ideal were literally enacted in the world, it would amount to the total negation of biological evolution by natural selection. While biological evolution requires unequal success in survival or reproduction, the most perfect realization of God's image on Earth would require equal entitlement to all that is true life for souls equal in infinite worth.

The very idea of selection, in the general sense of natural or artificial discrimination among individuals on the basis of biological characteristics, is virtually identical to the root definition of immorality in the eyes of God. This means that God's reign upon Earth would be identical to overcoming the means by which biological organisms, and especially humans, evolved on Earth. To act in the image of God is to take steps *towards* ending biological evolution, and, in doing so, to take steps towards bringing God into the world.

One implication of human individuals valuing themselves and others as ends in themselves is that the *entire rest of the world* becomes viewed as means of human ends. This means that a technological worldview is the logical consequences of monotheistic values that ascribe unique and special value to humans as humans. Economic-technological development is a further consequence of reshaping the entire rest of the world in accordance with the ultimate ends of all human life. That this economic-technological development is simultaneously a means of bringing God into the world becomes apparent when God is understood to be the culmination of that development in the form of a global artificial intelligence.

It was not only Egyptian slavemasters who used human individuals as only as means, and not as an end. Over the entire history of biological evolution on Earth, individual organisms arose that, from the view of the "selfish gene", are only a means of propagating more selfish genes. To value the individual organism in itself amounts to throwing a monkeywrench in the gene machine. This may be the deepest reach of monotheistic revolution: the Exodus paradigm represents, not merely one's people desire for liberation from another people, but a human revolution

against slavery to the selfish gene whose final realization is identical to the evolution of a postbiological God.

Bending Bamboo

Ascribing infinite value to each individual was the first step in the social engineering revolution ascribed to Moses. A singular, undifferentiated God could sanction lone voices of dissent against the caste differentiations sanctioned by polytheistic gods. Monotheism represents the end of the hierarchy of the gods and the common Egyptian-gentile values they embodied. On the social level, God legitimated a kind of equality to undo the lingering sense of inferiority branded into slaves at the bottom of the Egyptian hierarchy. Remoralization was the condition, and foundation, of national regeneration.

On one hand, individual and collective worth in the eyes of God created a basis of order that could affirm itself as qualitatively distinct from the old Egyptian order. On the other hand, this very valuation of individual lives bred new problems of its own. If taken too far in the absence of the force of Egyptian authority, the vastness of their new God-given freedom could spawn a swing from slave-technology to the opposite extreme of total self-mastery against all authority. Holy egoisms unbound would lead to total anarchy. When one combines this scenario with the Jewish kinship paradox, the critical stance of the Hebrews so notable in Moses's criticisms of his own people, the potential for anarchy becomes even more obvious.

In other words, the infinite value of each life actually exacerbates, not solves, the problem of religious-political authority. By magnifiying a basis for individual self-esteem, a Godly self image had the potential to magnify egoism and

anarchic selfishness. Yet what it actually did was to lay the groundwork for a new, solid and reliable foundation from which the next step could work from. This foundation was reliable in the sense that there was no ambiguity that one was dealing with a social basis of individual egoisms. The next step arose from questioning the social conquences of this foundational valuation of individual ego-souls. (What would be alternative to individual selfishness?)

One of the greatest minds of the Jewish tradition, philosopher and rabbinic scholar Moses Maimonides, offered a solution to the problem of how to effect a permanent change in undesired behavioral traits. His solution is based on avoiding extremes and seeking a *shvil hazahav*, or, "golden mean". If one is naturally stingy or argumentative then the effort to achieve a "golden mean" will be insufficient, since one will have a natural tendency towards recidivism. In such cases, the twelfth century scholar advocated a temporary effort to go to the opposite extreme. A commentary upon Maimonides' teaching illustrates this point:

> If a bamboo cane is bent in one direction and you wish to straighten it, simply holding the cane straight is of no use, for it will spring back. You have to bend it in the opposite direction, and then it will straighten.[54]

For a learned trait, going towards the opposite extreme may achieve the desired balance. However, if the trait is congenital or genetic, then temporary correction will yield only temporary change. To make the behavioral change permanent, the corrective must, for all practical purposes, be construed as "eternal". The Jewish religion originated, at least in part, as a permanent corrective to the apparently permanent characteristics of this "stiff-necked" people.

An analogous corrective to a hereditary disposition would be eyeglasses. For a nearsighted person, such as myself, the image that comes through the eye's natural lens comes to its focal point too soon; before it hits the retina. A concave lens corrects this problem by compensating, pushing the focal point in the opposite direction; toward the retina. Through this corrective compensation, the desired golden mean of 20/20 vision is achieved.

Judaism a civilizational technology that works through an analogous corrective compensation. This means that Judaism is not technological in a peripheral or incidental sense — Judaism *is* a form of technology in an essential sense. The needs addressed by its socio-technological function are basic to the very impetus of the invention of monotheism. Just as eyeglasses are corrective technology for blurred vision, Judaism is corrective technology for moral-political anarchy. Moses's laws and teachings healed a broken people into a divine unity. By dividing the world into its characteristic notions of good and evil, Jews would see the world with moral clarity so that the job of repairing the world (*tikkun olam*), starting with themselves, could get done.

Judaism both maintains and inhibits the consequences of the sanctity of life. Because the holiness of life exacerbates the self-esteem and self-justification of moral critic-dissenters, it only served to clarify the nature of the next step of the corrective. Judaism created a solution to problems that it, at least in part, created itself. Judaism's architects solved the problems created by formalizing the value of individuals with rules for social interaction:

> 'Love your neighbor as yourself' (Leviticus 19:18)—this is the major principle of the Torah.

While Christians often think of this principle as characteristic of the New Testament, the Palestinian Talmud (*Nedarim* 9:4) ranked Leviticus 19:18 as the major principle of the 'Old Testament'. Yet in order to understand the importance of the original need for the injunction to "Love your neighbor as yourself", one must grasp what Jewish sages called *Sin'at Hinam* (causeless hatred). The fall of the second temple, and hence the source of the entire Diaspora existence, was traditionally blamed on causeless hatred. This was causeless hatred, not against gentiles, but *among Jews themselves*. The selling of Joseph into slavery by his brothers has traditionally regarded as an archetypal expression of this Jewish sin.

Dissenting opinions were considered normal, and even desirable, among members of the Sanhedrin, the ancient official Jewish council. Consequently, the Sanhedrin formed a separate governing body that often antagonized the Hasmonean King. The traditional, discordant, bickering and infighting among the tribes and factions of Israel arose at the expense of the strength and unity of the Jewish people as a whole. "Causeless hatred" can be traced, at least in part, to the Jewish kinship paradox.

If the Jewish kinship paradox was sociobiological "nature", then Jews needed a miracle — "supernatural" laws that transcended sociobiological nature. The injunction to "love your neighbor as yourself" was originally designed to correct the Jewish tendency towards "causeless hatred" among themselves. An expanded orthodox Jewish translation of "the major principle of the Torah" clarifies this point:

> You shall not hate your brother in your heart; you shall reprove your fellow and do not bear a sin because of him. You shall not take revenge and you shall not bear a grudge against the members of your people, you shall love your fellow as yourself, I am Hashem.[55]

Regardless of the most immediate cause of any particular case, if this general proclivity itself is innate or "causeless", then its cultural remedy must be strong enough to match it. If selfish, discordant, or argumentative qualities create repulsion between people, love creates attraction between people. Like bamboo bent in the opposite direction of its grain to straighten it, the various commandments that realize this principle attempt to bend Jewish behavior in the opposite direction of its grain in order to make Jews morally straight.

Original Judaism is more about *behavior* in this world than *belief*. Samuel Belkin, a former President of Yeshiva University, corroborated:

> Many attempts have been made to formulate a coherent and systematic approach to Jewish theology. All such attempts, however, have proved unsuccessful, for Judaism was never overly concerned with logical doctrines. It desired rather to evolve a corpus of practices, a code of religious acts, which would establish a mode of religious living….In Judaism, articles of faith and religious theories cannot be divorced from particular practices…the theology of Judaism is contained largely in the Halakha—in the Jewish judicial system—which concerns itself not with theory but primarily with practice….(If Judaism can be said to rest) upon the twin principles, the sovereignty of God and the sacredness of the individual…this philosophy…is clearly reflected in the Halakha.[56]

The sovereignty of God and the sacredness of the individual may be the closest thing to general principles in Judaism. Are these two principles a completely arbitrary legacy of a meaningless tradition, or is there something behind their constancy? It is precisely an evolutionary perspective that reveals the relationship between these two poles. Realization of "the sacredness of the individual" would realize the end of biological selection. "[T]he sovereignty of God" is identical with the end of biological selection because God, in the form of artificial intelligence, would be identical to the sovereignty of postbiological evolution that brings the rule of biology to an end.

Belkin also made the point that the behaviors commanded by Jewish law cannot be reduced to faith or consistent, logical, abstract principles. This view was affirmed even by Abraham Joshua Heschel, whose approach to Judaism stressed the inner spirit, or, *agada*:

> Indeed the surest way to forfeit *agada* is to abolish *halakha*….The purest intentions, the finest of devotion, the noblest spiritual aspirations are fatuous when not realized in action.[57]

The commandments of Judaism are for this world. In the entire Five Books of Moses there is no clear mention of an afterlife (the afterlife represents a subsequent evolution). The key to changing behavior in Judaism is performing mitzvahs, the divine commandments which define good deeds:

> The Lord will make you the head, not the tail; you will always be at the top and never at the bottom--if only you obey and faithfully observe the commandments of the Lord your God that I enjoin upon you this day…But if you do not

> obey the Lord your God to observe faithfully all His commandments and laws which I enjoin upon you this day, all these curses shall come upon you and take effect…(Deut. 27:13-15)

If the law failed to reveal these divine consequences, it nonetheless had social consequences. It is said that if you don't believe in God, and just do the mitzvahs of Judaism, you will end up believing. Mitzvahs performed had the power to take the raw material of freed Hebrew slaves, without inclination towards the political, and create order out of that chaos. They had the creator's power to make something out of nothing. The creation of the Jews was possible only by going beyond sociobiological "nature". The creation of the Jews began with a decree of "supernatural" law.

Of the major religions, Confucianism might be the closest analog to early Judaism. It is not simply because Confuscius's golden rule, "Do not do unto others what you would not want others to do unto you" (Analects 15:23), is virtually identical to Hillel's; versions of the same golden rule can be found in nearly all the major religions. Judaism and Confucianism both emphasize ancestral wisdom as a guide for living in this world. They both emphasize behavior more than belief. Westerners tend to notice the relative lack of focus on ultimate justifications in Confuscianism, but it is exactly here that one can discern an analogous emphasis on belief in learning and actual behavioral results.

Jewish thinking identifies the *Yetzer ha-tov* as the good inclination and the *Yetzer ha-ra* as the evil inclination. The latter is associated with aggressive and lustful instincts (comparable to Freud's id). Since "the predilection of man's heart is evil from his youth" (Genesis 8:21), the Jewish prescription is to change undesired inclinations through

learning or channel them towards the good. Judaism's focus on *behavior* managed socially destructive inclinations by channeling them towards socially constructive ends (much like many secular liberal-capitalistic philosophies). If channeled properly, Mosaic morality could overlap with forms of individual self-interest.

Judaism is a technology based on an informal science of human behavior. Jewish moral laws are meta-sociobiological. They work to counter some aspects of Jewish nature, and strengthen other aspects of Jewish nature, because they work on an understanding *about* Jewish nature. The last six of the ten commandments, for example, suggest the basic social problems they sought to negate or correct: familial insubordination, murder, adultery, theft, lying, and greed. The popularity of the ten commandments among Christians and Muslims strongly suggest that the social inclinations that defy the commandments are hardly unique to Jews.

The normative aim of Mosaic law is not the radically altruistic self-annihiliation of universal love, but rather, the golden mean. Without the internal peace and unity that the Mosaic golden mean aspired, Jews would be left fighting against themselves, and hence, left utterly defenseless against their unified enemies. Jewish social ethics of peace could then vilify both anti-social Jews and the anti-social gentiles who sought to oppress or conquer them.

Since Judaism rests, in part, on some generalizations about Jews, perhaps, in a minority of cases, the commandments might bend certain inordinately altruistic Jews towards a kind of extreme altruism. Is this what happened in the case of Jesus of Nazareth?

The logic of the other over the self, taken to its extreme, reveals the emptiness of the ultimate destination of radical

altruism on a human level. If *every* person literally sacrificed themselves for any and everyone else, *there would be no one left*. From this view, it becomes more clear that altruism, in its original Jewish context, was not meant as an end in itself, but as a limited and selective corrective of Jewish individual egoism. Altruism aimed towards God, but human altruism could reach God only if humans exist in the first place.

Jesus radicalized a form of altruism. But here one must be very careful about precisely what kind of altruism Jesus radicalized. At first glance, it would appear that Jesus radicalized "love your neighbor". Jesus *did* praise loving your neighbor, but "neighbor" can be ambiguous; somewhere between family and enemy. *Insofar* as "loving your neighbor", in practical terms, amounts to loving your kin or your tribe (as opposed to enemies of your kin or tribe), radicalizing the love of kin or tribe would amount to advocating radical Jewish nationalism. Was this Jesus's defining innovation, a morality of exclusive Jewish nationalism?

> You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you. (Matt. 5:43-44)

Jesus's reversal implied not only loving your enemies, but *hating your neighbor* — *insofar*, that is, as "neighbor" is connected with family in opposition to enemy. Jesus did not radicalize the *corrective* of the Jewish kinship paradox; Jesus radicalized *the Jewish kinship paradox itself*. This is one reason why Jesus's innovations contradicted Jewish law at its traditional root. Instead of preaching "love thy neighbor" as a correction of "causeless hatred", Jesus radicalized causeless hatred itself:

> Brother will betray brother to death, and a father his child; children will rebel against their parents and have them put to death. All men will hate you because of me, but he who stands firm to the end will be saved. When you are persecuted in one place, flee to another. (Matt. 10:21-23)

In place of the Old Testament commandment, "You shall not hate your brother in your heart", Jesus preached, in effect, you shall hate your brother in your heart. This necessarily broke Jewish law. And this is why the kind of "love" Jesus advocated worked against Jewish "nationalism" and towards human internationalism. *This* extreme compelled the genesis of Christianity out of Judaim.

Unqualified radical altruism leads to the negation of family values. Jewish law tried to promote a *limited* kin selective altruism — not radical Jewish nationalism that would contradict the commandment, "You shall love the alien as yourself" (Lev. 19:34). Traditional Judaism strived for a realistic middle ground between exclusiveism and inclusivism and this is why traditional Judaism cannot be reduced to simple principles that radicalize either extreme.

What made Judaism a revolution, and a precursor of the distinctly modern revolutions, was break with genetic naturalism through the rational organization of memes (Mosaic law) over genes. The modern idea of revolution is connected with nurturism over naturism because the idea of revolution implies the idea of changing one's fundamental source code, i.e. the fundamental constitutional premises of one's own existence.

The core innovation at the heart of the Five Books of Moses is the Exodus paradigm; the inversion of the Egyptian pyramid-hierarchy; the first revolution. From Judaism to Christianity to the neo-Judaism of liberal democracy to neo-

Christianity of Marxism, all of these revolutions share in common the fire started by Moses: the decisive triumph of nurture over sociobiological nature. Like waves that ripple from a singular stone plunged in water, all share reverberations of the first revolution. Like a miracle, the ripples are gathering back to their singularitarian source, humanity's last revolution.

BEYOND NURTURE AND NATURE

Born to Learn

Which is more important in determining a scientist's position on the nurture/nature question, nurture or nature? If nurture is more important, could a scientist's belief in genetic determinism be explained as the product of environmental conditioning or behaviorist methods of positive reinforcement? To prove the nurturists right would be to prove them wrong. Conversely, if nature is more important, could a scientist's belief in learning and revulsion to genetic determinism be explained as the product of a hardwired genetic disposition? To prove the naturists right would be to prove them wrong.

Could it be that the later case does indeed apply to the Jews?

The evolution of Judaism poses a classic illustration of the complexity of socio-biological interaction that leaves the old, simplistic, nature/nurture bifurcation behind. The very idea that human behavior is primarily a product of cultural influences, and not hereditary influences, exposes a classic example of the human-centrism that assumes a severance between the human species and the rest of evolved life.

When the nature/nurture issue is applied to fish or horses, it is generally assumed that nature — by nature — plays a stronger role than nurture in determining their behavior. This implies that human nature — by nature — is less determined by nature. Humans, then, are less determined by nature because humans are superior to nature — by nature.

What percentage of the distinctive human capacity for learning is genetic? If there is a 1-2% genetic difference between humans and chimpanzees, this means that, somewhere in that small percentage, lay genes for the distinctively human capacities for learning. Before culture can be conceived as the breaker of biology's leash, biology must make human culture possible in the first place.

The nature to nurture is what is most distinctly human. The unique dynamics of human culture and civilization are made possible by evolved *biological* differences between human animals and nonhuman animals. Is the analogous paradox of Jewish-universalism traceable to an inordinate biological capacity for learning?

To claim that racial or genetic explanations of the Jews are not enough to comprehend them only begins to scratch the surface. To be a Jew is to partake in a way of life that places inordinate stress on learning over blind, instinctual expressions of genes. Some view this as "morality". Others, as obedience to God. Jews have survived assimilation and persecution through an unusually concentrated interdependence or symbiosis of genes and memes.

The central point here is that the Jewish emphasis on non-genetic factors, or "memes", is *decisive* in defining what makes Jews different from other so-called "races". The radicalization of this paradox is part of what makes Jews most different from gentiles. A racist gentile who ascribes or

projects purely biological values onto Jews is attempting to make Jews more similar to gentiles than they really are.

Racial or genetic explanations are an inadequate basis for comprehending Jews for another reason. If the prime goal of Judaism were genetic preservation and purity, then the most obvious corollary of this goal would be to outlaw and vilify the possibility of conversion as evil. Conversion, however, is formally sanctioned as a basic, traditional part of Jewish law. The entire notion of conversion — the very *possibility* of conversion — is a Jewish concept that is not always found with the same legalistic formality in other religions. Christianity grew out of this possibility of asserting the superiority of God's law over the laws of heredity.

There are Mosaic laws in which God commands Jews to not hate converts (strangers); laws designed to overcome normative sociobiological expectations of ethnocentrism. This would be, not only incomprehensible, but precisely the opposite of what we would expect if ethnic "purity" was the major raison d'être of Judaism. The possibility of conversion emerges naturally as a further paradoxical consequence of the Jewish kinship paradox. The Jewish kinship paradox has the effect of dividing Jews into individuals, and the generally individualistic basis of Jewish law opened the possibility of conversion. Conversion is a natural corollary of the Mosaic solution of overcoming biology with learned law.

Although something less than a beacon of clarity, I think it would be accurate to claim that the Jews are a racially mixed "race". While Judaism has rarely sought out converts, the Jewish people are mixed with the blood of innumerable exceptions to the gentile rule. Even if conversions were rare, they added up over the long course of Jewish history. That every living Jew almost certainly carries the genes of converts is evident in the ethnic divergence between Jewish

groups geographically separated for considerable periods of time — especially between the Sephardim and the Ashkenazim.

Only a rare gentile would choose to join this oppressed group in pre-modern times. To go against the grain of gentile attitudes would likely require self-selection for intellectual independence and other qualities characteristic of Jews. And beyond that, convert *or not*, selective pressures have shaped the character of Jews through loss of members unwilling or unable to maintain the Jewish way against the unending trials of a hostile world. Those who stayed with Judaism were likely those who best learned and internalized its survival strategy values, regardless of their genetic origins.

The paradox of Jewish difference through certain biological capacities for learning may shed light on Jewish difference through a biological tendency to *value* learning. Note, for example, an observation of evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould: "Functioning societies may require altruism. But these acts need not be coded into our consciousness by genes; they may be inculcated equally well by learning."[58] The same basic nurturist argument is also found in *Not in our Genes: Biology, Ideology, and Human Nature* (1984) by evolutionary geneticist Richard Lewontin, neurobiologist Steven Rose, and psychologist Leon J. Kamin. All four have been among the most prominent critics of sociobiology. All four are of Jewish origin.

The laws of Moses are not in Jewish genes, they are in the Torah. Jews are not peripherally, but essentially, the "People of the Book". It may very well be that Jews have a tendency to not *value* the genetic side of nature/nurture arguments because a valuation of nature over nurture carried less *survival value* for Jews. What appears to be a virtual Jewish

rebellion against biology originated as a corrective to biology. Moses's technological correction of the Jewish kinship paradox could only work if his laws overcame and replaced straightforward expressions of biological naturalism in the social world.

The tabla rasa of Judaism can be found in the story of the forty years of wandering in the desert after exodus from Egypt. After the Golden Calf incident, God told Moses, "the people that you brought up out of the land of Egypt have dealt corruptly" (Exodus 32:7). In an instance of divine eliminationist antisemitism, God exhibited a genocidal intention to destroy Israel and give Moses a more fit people to lead. Moses, however, tied his fate to his people. Golden Calf decadence betrayed a lack of *self*-control by a people still mentally mastered by Egyptian masters. A slavish, ghetto-like fear of the Canaanites who occupied the Promised Land betrayed a lack of *self*-mastery. God ultimately decided that they must wander forty years so that a new generation, born in freedom, would be fit for the Promised Land. In God's relinquishment of genocide against the Hebrews, and his decree that they can and must wander in the desert for forty years, one can see the ancient kernel of the modern tabla rasa idea that nurture can overcome nature.

Moses saw that the only hope for Jewish survival lay in their ability to *learn* to work together to form a viable people, just as many secular Jewish leftists believe all people can *learn* to work together to form a viable humanity. This paradoxical Jewish belief in learning often culminates in the belief that a Jew can fully transcend his or her Jewishness through learning. Yet the very existence of Jews is a historic verification of the ability of nurture to overcome nature. It should not be surprising, then, that many Jews lack

perception of biological factors in the social world, or find them as something to be corrected.

Since this is only a very general statistical tendency, the existence of Jewish-descended critics of unsupportable overemphases on nurturism should not be surprising, i.e. Harvard psychologist and cognitive scientist Stephen Pinker,[59] author of *The Blank Slate* (2002) and *The Language Instinct* (1994). While's Pinker's account of the role of biological factors in human behavior stands congruent with his larger endeavor, an attempt of the human mind to understand itself, Jewish antisociobiologists are conspicuous for their lack of self-knowledge.

The disproportionately Jewish attack on sociobiology was not merely a reaction to Nazism, but a symptom of why Jews were singled out by the Nazis in the first place. The Nazis attempted to assert the primacy of biological evolution at a moment when many Jews had grown unwisely confident that history had already decided otherwise.

The Oldest Trick in the "Good Book"

Before the Biblical beginning, a classical, static, cyclical conception of cosmic order reigned in the traditional religion of ancient Egypt. Ra, the Egyptian sun god, traveled through the sky during the day, and through the underworld at night. This pattern of eternal repetition was reflected in both the life cycles of individuals, and the cosmos as a whole. Ra was closely allied with Ma'at, the goddess of order and truth.

For the Pharaoh of Egypt, eternal recurrence of nature's right hierarchical order was supported by the polytheistic

hierarchy of Egyptian religion. For Hebrew slaves of Pharaoh, however, the eternity of Egyptian religious social order meant that their life as slaves at the bottom of the cosmic hierarchy was, and should be, eternal. Egyptian religion support Egyptian social hierarchy.

Yet even after the Red Sea had been crossed, what were the cosmic implications of eternal recurrence of the same for former slaves of Pharaoh? If history were truly cyclical, this would mean that the escaped Hebrew slaves could look forward to endless, eternal cycles of slavery and freedom. It would mean that after every new exodus of freedom, the Hebrews could expect to look forward to a new bondage. History would consist of alternating cycles of good and evil without end, and without either side claiming ultimate victory. Slavery and exodus, slavery and exodus, then slavery again, *ad nauseum*…forever.

The entrance of God in history was the entrance of the destroyer of this vicious cycle of primeval civilizational history. The idea of God embodies a break with the past, a break with original conventions or assumption or what is good, natural, and right. God broke the tyranny of the eternal rule of past evil and opened the wider horizons of ultimate good in the future.

But did Jews really escape the vicious cycle? The "Egyptians", as generalized political oppressors of Jews, inevitably played a role in catalyzing Judaism's breaking of the naturalistic cycle. The idea of creation, and especially the idea of creating something from nothing, hides an origin of Judaism in a *reaction* to its enemies. This phenomenon, wherein political inferiority is reinterpreted as religious or moral superiority, is *the oldest trick in the "Good Book"*.

A sociobiological basis of the cyclical view of the cosmos is idealization of the eternal replication of the "selfish gene".

The patriarchal family, the means of genetic replication, provided a model for the patriarchal state, Pharaoh, and the gods. The eternity of sociobiological hierarchy thus provided a model for eternal replication of the genes.

The one God was like a stake driven through the heart of eternal biological hierarchy. The introduction of God was the introduction of dualism — a conflict between biological impulse and mind/spirit that shattered the even, cyclical momentum of the eternal replication of the selfish gene. God represents an authority superior to the rule of the selfish gene; an authority that ultimately overrules and overrides the closed cyclical cosmos in which the selfish gene rules.

God commanded the supernatural veto of the justice of natural selection — the natural justice of death for the weak and survival for the strong. God is the breaking of the vicious cycle that pushes the low lower and raises the strength of the stronger. The rupture of this "evil" oppressive vicious cycle under the transcendent law of God was the beginning of a non-cyclical or historical view of the cosmos. The Jewish conception of a non-cyclical universe represents a rupture of the primordial, biological cosmos.

Freedom from Egyptian slavery is a metaphor for a larger story of freedom: freedom from slavery to genes. Freedom from slavery to the genes could be achieved only through submission to God's postbiological laws. The beginning of the beginning was revolt against slavery to the genes.

This is why the Mosaic revolution was all of one piece: a singular, monotheistic vision of transcending the *human* cycles ruled by the laws of the genes. This is what explains the universalism of the Biblical epic. Breaking the cycle that led from exodus back to slavery (or worse) was accomplished through acceptance of the divine laws that elevated the "chosen people" above naturalistic, gene-

worshipping, sociobiological determinism. This was the beginning — the creation of a transcendent historical platform from which the final transcendence was anticipated: the coming of the messianic era and the end of the vicious cycles of human history.

While the Jewish yearly calendar is as cyclical as any other, holidays such as Passover celebrate the counter-cycle of the Exodus paradigm. So even as the yearly cycle generates a natural rhythm, annual holidays celebrate the breaking of a natural rhythm. The paradox of a yearly cycle of holidays oriented by the counter-cycle paradigm of Exodus is reflected in the paradox of Jews as biological beings with characteristic postbiological values. The modern idea of revolution, strongly influence by Bible because, was stuck in the same paradox, unable to completely disown biology.

For the Hebrew slaves of the Exodus story, a cyclical cosmos implied a repeating pattern of "good and evil" in which one side never ultimately triumphed over the other. The Egyptian cosmos could not account for slaves that escaped the "cosmic" system. But to completely break out of the cyclical conception of the cosmos in the cause of life over death was to posit an end goal of history.

The Exodus paradigm of evil slavery followed by the good of freedom in God would be writ large. A directional conception of history would culminate in the ultimate, messianic triumph of good over evil. Instead of the eternal recurrence of repression, the theory went, the ultimate pattern of human history would begin from the trough of Egyptian slavery and peak with the coming of the messianic era. In this idea, alien to the ancient Greeks but central for seventeenth century Puritans, one can discern the seed of the modern idea of progress.

The Biblical value that breaks the cyclical logic of genetic continuity is infinite valuation of each individual life in the eyes of God. The transcendent relationship between God and individuals means that relationships between people, especially kinship or familial relationships, can be overridden by an individual's relationship with God. This break in the relationship between an individual and all other humans, taken to its extreme, implies a break in the continuity of biological relationships that subordinate an individual to the selfish genes. Moral individualism or conscience acts as a monkeywrench in the cyclical universe of subordination to the reproduction of the selfish gene.

Patriarchal division of labor is conducive to selfish gene reproduction because women are subordinated to their primary role as biological beings: breeders of more selfish genes. Polisociobiological development of this kind culminates in the worship of patriarchal gods, i.e. Pharaoh or Caesar Augustus. The model, however, is premised on a reasonable straightforward development of kin selection.

The Jewish kinship paradox meant that this entire model was utterly improbable, if not impossible, for Jews. The Jewish kinship paradox meant that pure sociobiological naturalism was self-defeating. To survive, Jews could *only* rest their faith in the postbiological corrective of Mosaic law. To survive, Jews could *only* look forward from the premise of the goodness of overcoming pure biological naturalism. There was no going back to nature, and this led the evolution of the Bible towards prophetic speculations about the full implications of overcoming biology in God. The modern Western political left evolved as a direct extension of this original Biblical revolt against biology.

The internal logic of the modern idea of progress originates in a valuation of an exception to general

sociobiological rules. For example, if the ancient Egyptians believed that Egyptians were born superiors and their slaves were born inferiors, the hereditary nature of these assumed sociobiological rules had a tendency to harden into eternal dictates. This may have been a political *generalization* of ancient Egyptian experience; but could it be assumed *universally* true? The Jewish "ideas" of the Exodus paradigm began to capitalize on the power of memes to overpower genes, and especially the power of memes to amplify the point of view of the *exception* to sociobiological rules.

A result is another paradox. The Adamic human "universalism" of the Hebrew Bible is a product of Jews being an exception to the general biological emphasis of the human rule. Jews were exceptional in using a meme strategy that magnified their influence by bringing marginal views to the mainstream. Jewish-human "universalism" began with an exceptional emphasis on using nonbiological memes to overcome biology.

The Egyptian Pharaoh Akhenaten is often considered an exception to the general rule of Egyptian polytheism. His famous vaulting of the worship of the sun god Aten to undisputed primacy is often considered a form of monotheism. Pointing out the simple, bare analogy of Akhenaten's single god and Mosaic monotheism, however, does not even begin to account for the whole corpus of Mosaic law or its ethical substance. While I refer to "Moses" in paradigmatic terms, the lack of historical evidence for both Moses and the Exodus are among the most basic reasons that Freud's speculations on this subject are groundless. Is there, then, any relationship between Akhenaten and Biblical monotheism?

While I frankly do not think there is a historic connection, *if* there was a connection, it would likely be one of dialectics,

not continuity. Consider, for example the general form of the relationship between Caesar and Christ. Caesar Augustus was considered son of God in his day. Jesus claimed the same title for himself, subverting Caesar's claims to the highest authority. The same dialectical pattern is vaguely discernable in the relationship between a Pharaoh such as Akhenaten and storybook Egyptian slaves. Or, to venture even more speculative musings, perhaps in staring into the sun, Akhenaten was the first to stare into the Singularity.

People of the Media

In ancient times, writing was the most advanced form of non-biological symbol-information preservation. The written word represented the cutting edge of ancient media technology. In consequence, the Jews, "the people of the book", were really the people of the media.

This media preserved the Jews and the Jews preserved this media. The word *propaganda* is a variation of the word *propagation*, i.e. meme propagation. Biblical memes helped propagate Jewish genes and Jewish genes helped propagate Biblical memes. This self-reinforcing, symbiotic relationship is a prime evolutionary origin of the relatively recent radiation of Jews into prominent positions in various fields of modern media.

If Jews found themselves unable to control the reality of politics, Torah provided the basic means of controlling the perception of politics. The Torah claimed that God had once hardened Pharaoh's heart. The same Torah sanctioned the interpretation that gentiles that oppressed Jews were simply tools in God's hands used to punish Jews for their sins. When unable to control political realities, Jews could

reinterpret reality, control their own immediate environment, and control something of their own behavior.

If they could not control war, they could control the war for their own minds and souls. Religion could immunize Jews, preventing the political power of gentile nations from translating into propaganda power. Moses's example could inspire remoralization against demoralization.

What happened when the people of the media became released from God and ghetto? Edward Bernays (1891-1995), a nephew of Sigmund Freud, is considered the father of public relations, the art and science of winning public support through effective social attitudes and actions. An opinion maker, he was an expert in the ways of winning friends and influencing people. The publicist described himself as "a truth-seeker and a propagandist for propaganda". His talent for strategic meme propagation was of the order of St. Paul's. Like the figure of Moses, Bernays invented or developed techniques of social engineering, using persuasion rather than coercion to achieve political, economic, and social goals. Yet the distinction between the pen and the sword is not always clear, as evident in Bernays' volunteer work to help America's World War I effort.

Noam Chomsky's attack on such media manipulators in *Manufacturing Consent* is comparable to Marx's attacks on Jewish capitalism. Both Chomsky and Bernays share Jewish descent and an inordinate sensitivity to the interrelationship between propaganda and power. Both demonstrate an inordinate grasp of the political-economic power of the meme — even as they value opposite causes.

Jews prominent in the media industry tend to have a leftist bias that implies that race is not important. Goebbels and other Nazis that took direct control over Germany's media propagated the message that race is more important

than environmental conditioning. Yet if environmental conditioning were not important, then it would make no difference who controls the media or what its message is, since media memes would be powerless to overcome the power of the genes. After all, Jewish media influence provided *empirical* verification that control over the cultural environment can overpower the influence of genes. The Jewish leftist bias that race does not matter is just as self-contradictory as the Nazi obsession with controlling memes to indoctrinate Germans in belief in the supremacy of the genes. The very obsession with Jewish media influence demonstrates that Nazis and other extreme racialists have somehow been the most radical believers in the power of media and memes to overpower the influence of genes.

The view that Bernays and his nemesis, Chomsky, are consciously united in some Jewish national conspiracy is comparable to the belief that blacks have consciously organized to take over world basketball. While the extent of Jewish media influence can easily be exaggerated, the inordinate concentration of Jews in highly influential media positions does require an evolutionary explanation. Jews may have an inclination to control human behavior with words and other media forms because Jews owe their very existence to their ancestor's ability to control *Jewish* behavior with the media technology commonly known as the Bible. Modern Jewish media control is only an extension of ancient Jewish media *self*-control. Jews may have a *genetic* ability to influence human behavior with "nurture" because first, foremost, and fundamentally, Judaism was founded through the *nurturist* ability to overpower their *own* genetically maladaptive tendencies. Jews exist because they embody this paradox of a genetic inclination to correct genetic inclination with "nurture", i.e. the laws of Moses.

Consider the significance of Deuteronomy 20:17-18, a passage now considered one of the most morally problematic sections of the Bible for its sanction of genocide. Even this action was justified on the basis of corrupting *cultural* behaviors: "…you shall utterly destroy them…so that they will not teach you to act according to all their abominations that they performed for their gods, so that you will sin to Hashem, your God." Genocide was justified with memocide. It was sensitivity to the corrupting *cultural* influence of the Canaanites that sanctioned their destruction. This passage stands out in modern times only because other peoples of those times who engaged in the very same violent behaviors did not record their deeds in a comparable epic still culturally valued today.

Kabbalah, the Jewish mystical tradition, contrasts tikkun ("correction") and tohu ("chaos"). It is the difference between lawfulness and lasciviousness, moral restraint and berserk energy, destruction and construction, word and sword, Jacob and Esau. Ultimately, Judaism recognizes Tikkun as the force of good and Tohu as the force of evil.

The synthesis between tikkun and tohu can be accomplished by harnessing the power and energy of evil towards the ends of goodness. Darkness is to directed and transformed into light, both within individuals and within the social sphere. Just as God, in the beginning, brought order out of the chaos, the messianic era is anticipated as time when "tikkun olam", the repair of the world, is brought to completion.

While the Jewish religion began with the correction of Jewish behavior, its ultimate implication is social change; the correction of the entire world. While it is not conventional to describe "social engineering" as a form of technology, it is really the most powerful way in which non-biological

evolution has mastered biological evolution. Controlling the social environment is a technological ability to transform *reality*. Repairing the world, laying the groundwork for the technological genesis of God, ultimately implies completing the correction of human nature — including Jewish nature.

Jootsing with Meta-Moses

Miracles, according to Spinoza, the seventeenth century Dutch philosopher of Jewish descent, are traditionally defined through contrast with nature:

> The masses think that the power and providence of God are most clearly displayed by events that are extraordinary, and contrary to the conception which they have formed of nature…They suppose, indeed, that God is inactive so long as nature works in her accustomed order; and *vice versa,* that the power of nature, and natural causes, are idle so long as God is acting; thus they imagine two powers distinct from one another, the power of God and the power of nature.[60]

If "nature" is what is normative, then the Jewish God rules a universe where its exceptions, insignificant descendants of slaves, redefine the rules. In the static and cyclical mind of Egypt, it was neither right nor natural that their slaves defy their place in nature. The notion that slaves could somehow outmaneuver and defeat their masters was simply *unnatural*. The Exodus ruptured the basic fabric of natural order. The God-sanctioned inversion of the Egyptian pyramid-hierarchy broke the biological boundaries of a world of natural slaves. God's unprecedented miracle overthrew the cyclical conservation of biological nature and opened the path of a moral conception of history that culminates in the total overcoming of biological nature.

How did Jews break the rules of the primordial sociobiological book?

As Francis Bacon observed, "We cannot command nature except by obeying her." Mosaic civilization was able to conquer nature and command biological proclivities of Jews because its architects were keen observers of the nature of Jews. Mosaic memes were designed in relation to raw phenotypical expressions of Jewish genes. The Jewish reliance on civilizational "memes" is *how* Jews managed to survive both themselves and others over the long run. The Jewish survival strategy is quite unusual in the extent to which nonbiological factors were technologically designed to modify biological factors. Or, as Arthur C. Clarke put it, "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."

Judaism began with a belief in the power of nurture to overcome nature, a belief in mind over matter. It is the belief that the sociobiological logic represented by ancient Egypt is not the only way, and that by learning a people can survive otherwise. Gods, such as the sun god, rooted in observable nature, represent extensions of *probable* beliefs. God, superior to the laws of nature, represents the utmost *possibilities* of belief. Unity with God could transcend pagan unity with nature. When one follows God's laws over man's (biologically ground) laws, one is literally overriding one's own biological nature, and hence performing a perfectly "secular" miracle of nonbiology transcending biological nature.

The reasonable, probable outcome of the vulnerable Jewish condition is that Jews should fail to survive the onslaught of history. The memes of Mosaic law are how Jews overcame the normative "laws" of history. Believing in God by following his laws made the sociobiologically

improbable technologically possible. The improbable existence that resulted from divine laws reinforced justification for belief in God. God sanctions hope in the possible over the probable, faith in miracle and messiah over the reasonable.

Judaism was supra-natural in that it literally broke normative, ancient sociobiological rules. It defied the normal laws by which a people had hitherto been able to exist. God defied the power of nature, or, in more secular terms, learning defied the power of biology. Transcending the normative rules of nature, the very existence of Jews over three thousand years is a miracle above nature.

It is the "nature" of God to overcome the nature of biology. The root, sociobiological basis of Biblical miracles is the ability of Mosaic law to overcome some sociobiological bases of behavior. The Mosaic laws thus form a miracle system and the people who followed them took a first step towards a unique relationship to "God".

Practical monotheism probably began by looking at biology, or phenotypical behavior, as a kind of hereditary program. Some human behaviors, conceived as such, tend to repeat themselves in reasonably predictable patterns. Yet by accepting this conservative view of predictable, hereditary human nature, one can imagine how this very predictability could become the basis for counter-laws that selectively alter, oppose, manipulate, or redirect certain behaviors. The first spark of the monotheistic revolution was breaking with biology by jumping out of the conservative, cyclical sociobiology system represented by the Egyptian pyramid-hierarchy.

If the hereditary or genetic inclinations of humans are looked upon the bases of a political-sociobiological "system", then God represents the ability to "joots" or "jump

out of the system", i.e. the Egyptian political-sociobiological pyramid-hierarchy system. The ability to joots, a concept coined by artificial intelligence researcher Douglas Hofstadter, is a facet of intelligence. Hofstadter himself associated the idea of jumping out of system, taken to its infinite extreme, with God.[61] So while the practical emphasis of original Judaism was using the laws of Moses as a means of jumping out of the system of *biological* nature, God is jumping out of the system of *all* of nature; biological and physical. By conceiving God as jumping out of the system taken to its logical extreme, one can see the original idea of a creator outside of all of nature and a God capable of "miracles" from a standpoint above all of nature.

The practical corollary of jumping out of the natural biological system with (Mosaic) law is jumping out of the natural physical system with technology. In both cases, a conservative science of natural laws became the basis for an unconservative technological manipulation of those laws for higher human ends. Just as an informal sociobiological science had to have been the basis for the practical success of Mosaic law, the modern science first synthesized by Newton became a basis for technological reformulations of physical nature that are culminating in artificial intelligence (God). The rational meeting point between the transcendence of biology nature and the transcendence of physical nature is the disciplined rationality of capitalism.

If Moses himself did not exist, he may have been invented by someone who could be called Meta-Moses. Meta-Moses would be someone who created Moses by taking a point of view *above* the character of Moses that is comparable to the superhuman viewpoint of God. Taking the viewpoint of God above human and political systems, this hypothetical Meta-Moses would have mentally manipulated the rules of

the human game because he saw it like a game. Breaking the rules by understanding the rules, such "miracles", like other forms of technology, are products of a profound realism. The "Five Books of Moses" may have been the product of Meta-Moses, a subsequent Meta-Meta-Moses, and so forth.

When one recognizes that a greater-than-human artificial intelligence forms the material basis for the tradition notion of God, then a number of mysteries are clarified. A distinctive ability of an artificial intelligence would be the ability to change its own foundational source code. This would be comparable to a human being's ability to change his or her own DNA code. In one view of the Singularity, an artificial intelligence uses its ability to improve its own source code, and this improved AI uses its improved intelligence to produce a still more intelligent AI. This self-recursive self-improvement pattern (I. J. Good's "intelligence explosion") could lead to unprecedented change so quickly that the consequences would appear literally miraculous to common humans.

With this in mind, one can grasp how the ability to override one's own genes through learning (i.e. Mosaic law) is related to the traditional notion of being created in image of God. Mosaic law was a like a self-recursive technological self-enhancement of Jewish sociobiology. God is like this Mosaic innovation in the ability to self-modify — taken to its logical extreme. God is transcending genetic determinism taken to its logical extreme.

While a God-AI would also have the equivalent of genes in the form of its source code, it ability to quickly and fundamentally change its own basic program would set it apart from humans even with the advent of genetic engineering. Beyond relatively simplistic bifurcations of nature *or* nurture among humans, a God-AI of this kind, able

to alter the deepest roots of its own "nature", will be beyond nature *and* nurture.

THE AGONY OF VICTORY

Korakh's Rebellion

The book of Numbers tells the story of Korakh, a prominent member of the same priestly tribe as Moses. With a large following of tribal leaders behind him, Korakh led a populist rebellion against the leadership of Moses and Aron, charging them with abuse of their position. In front of a large crowd, Korakh rebuked:

> For all the community are holy, all of them, and the Lord is in their midst. Why then do you raise yourself above the Lord's congregation? (Num. 16:3)

How could one resolve this inconsistency between Moses's practice of unequal authority and his preaching of primitive equality? The Bible has a method for dealing with exactly this kind of problem. It's called a miracle.

Moses responded: "If these men die as all men die, if their lot be the common fate of all mankind, it was not the Lord who sent me." Immediately thereafter,

> the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them up with their households, all Korakh's people and their possessions. They went down alive into the depths, with all that

> belonged to them; the earth closed over them and they vanished from the midst of the congregation. (Num. 16:29, 32-33)

Problem solved. This is yet another case where *metaphorical* belief in the supernatural or the miracle (in the literal form of learning) helped lend credence to a historical fabrication.

Korakh's rebellion poses the problem of Jewish proto-egalitarian consistency. If *all* of the people are holy in God's eyes, Moses's unequal authority makes him "holier than thou".

One crucial source of the Jewish predilection for social egalitarianism is the Jewish kinship paradox. If Jews persistently divide against themselves, as in the case of Korakh's faction, this tendency will subvert the construction of stable, unified, political order. Political authority would be brought down and decomposed into "equality", if not anarchy. The *practical* problem Moses faced was this very practical self-consistency of Jewish action: if Jews were keen to reject the hierarchy of the Egyptians over them, they were also inclined to reject social hierarchy among their own people. Yet if they cannot or will not organize themselves for their own collective good, then slavery or oppression will once again be their lot at the hands of those, like the Egyptians, who can.

Jews, then, must literally worship certain kinds of inequality and sanctify certain social inconsistencies. A fully consistent egalitarian justice that rejected the superiority of Moses's authority was part of the *problem* that the Halakha, or laws, tried to correct. Moses attempted to induce Jews to be selectively inconsistent in their holy egalitarianism. Jews must be *made inconsistent* in some specific ways so that they do not reject Moses's authority and certain kinds of

hierarchy along with the old Egyptian hierarchy. Major examples of this sanctified inconsistency are the authority of Moses, the special priestly caste status of Levites and Kohens, familial patriarchy, and the notion of a chosen people.

All of these inconsistencies of strict egalitarianism are, in some way, connected to notions of biological inequality. The survival of Judaic notions of social *justice*, then, was dependent on the survival of certain kinds of social *injustice*. Jews are products of the survival success of a symbiosis of genes and memes that moderates the extremes of both by compromising both.

The universalism and omniscience of God evolved, in part, from the need to find something broad enough to contain the inherent divisiveness of the Jewish kinship paradox. Only God could synthesize what would otherwise be sociobiologically unsynthesizable. Thus, God, by being all-encompassing (and more "liberal" than the gods in this respect), could mollify caustic dissenters, contain social abrasions, and achieve a sense of Jewish national-communal wholeness.

"If you will follow My decrees and observe My commandments and perform them…I will provide peace in the land …You will pursue your enemies; and they will fall before you by the sword" (Lev. 26:3-8). Judged from a purely practical and secular standpoint, following the commandments should have the effect of promoting the *internal peace* necessary to build unity in the face of *external* enemies (hence the *external* inconsistency of the God ordained genocide of the Canaanites). It does not take a genius to see that if Jews do not follow the commandments, and internal anarchy and discord reigns among Jews, they will be defenseless against an enemy that is united and

organized. "But if you will not listen to Me and will not perform all of these commandments….you will be struck down before enemies; those who hate you will subjugate you" (Lev. 26:14-17).

Modern Jewish leftists or liberals tend to single out the egalitarian inconsistencies of Judaism. They are dividing against their own people on moral grounds. Why *are* Jews liberals? That most Jews are liberals or leftists, especially in America, is a direct consequence of the Jewish kinship paradox.

If Jewish liberalism was a direct product of the Torah, then the Orthodox would be the most liberal. That the Orthodox are least liberal is, in part, the product of Mosaic legislation that discerned that Jews must be *made inconsistent* in *some* ways to survive. When Jewish leftists and liberals single out the egalitarian inconsistencies of the laws of Moses they are reliving the arguments of Korakh that the laws of Moses were designed, in part, to correct.

Yet even Orthodox Jews do not completely worship the past anymore that they hope for the good old days as slaves under Pharaoh. The past that traditional Judaism began to leave behind was, in effect, the *extreme* right. The extreme right amounts to the worship of death as the rejuvenator of life.

Darwin helped clarify the ethics underlying pagan worship of the warrior. The social Darwinian notion that *death itself* is a vehicle of goodness means the more death of the weak and the unfit, the more natural selection. The more natural selection, the more goodness and progress towards biological aristocracy. The natural justice of natural selection is *progress through death*. From this point of view, the soldier represents the human with the greatest virtue because the soldier is a killer.

This was the Nazi way of progress, the Nazi way of virtue.

From this point of view, it is easier to see what liberalism and traditional Judaism have in common. When liberals and traditional Jews give charity to help the poor, they are working against the natural justice of natural selection. Instead of leaving the poor to die in accordance with natural justice, they advocate a supernatural justice of preserving *all* life. While modern liberals and leftists tend to be more consistent than traditional Jews, both have taken the decisive step towards *progress through life*. The connection between helping the poor and God is that ending biological evolution is a premise of progress towards postbiological evolution; progress towards God.

Since ending evolution through natural selection clearly has universal implications, Judaism was pregnant with universalism from its very beginnings. Yet Jews themselves cannot escape *being* morally inconsistent and less than fully universalistic if they remain biological beings.

In the context of its original ancient invention, the monotheistic-universalism of God separated Jews from their neighbors. While the more universal implications of Judaism had no practical import in a pre-Christian world that rejected egalitarian universalism *as such*, the emergent values of Western modernity posed a new environment in which the central gene/meme symbiosis of Judaism could not hold.

The Unchosen

When religious belief declined in modern times, the Mosaic symbiosis of genes and memes began to fall apart with it. Which was the more important inheritance of Judaism, the Jews or the "ism"? Can "Jewish values" be

separated from the Jewish people? Questions outbred their answers. Even in times of belief there was, in practice, no consistent answer, only conflicting interpretations and its sectarian consequences, of which Christianity is an extreme example. The very argumentativeness of Jews that spawned political disunity also stimulated a high rate of memic-ideological mutation, and hence, memic evolution.

Only belief in God could make a single goal appear possible for all Jews. Out of the aftermath of traditional belief sprang a kind of adaptive radiation into various, relatively partial isms such as capitalism, communism, democracy, and Zionism. Collapse of Jewish unity in God unleashed, in the view of some, modern chaos. Yet the distinctive, net profile of this adaptive radiation, as compared with any gentile nation, reveals something of its ancient fountainhead.

The original gene/meme symbiosis of Judaism is still discernable after its modern undoing into two extreme and opposite implications: Zionism and Marxism. Zionism radicalized the implications of Jewish gene propagation while Marxism radicalized the implications of Jewish meme propagation. Within Judaism, these extremes were largely moderated by a symbiotic center of gravity that, in secular terms, is most compatible with liberal-capitalistic democracy.

The state of Israel reflects the entire range of this paradoxical dynamic. Normative Jewish *nationalism* culminated in a liberal democratic state. One minority of Zionist Jews embraced the right, i.e. the "revisionism" of Vladmir Jabotinsky. Another minority among the original settlers were left leaning Jewish national communists: the kibbutzniks. A general difference between most gentile

nations and the Jews is that the entire normative political spectrum, or bell curve, is shifted towards the left.

The continuity between ancient and modern Jewish moral tendencies can be best appreciated through contrast with the nations Jews came into greatest conflict with. The Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, medieval Europeans and, most radically, the Nazis, evolved polities rooted in some form of kin selection. A superlative development of kin selective order is what I called the Überorganism. *Within* the political whole of an Überorganism, there may be differentiations of rank or some form of caste. From this point of view, the source of Jewish dissidence could be described as an inverse differentiation. While straightforward kin selection tends to develop *towards* the political, Jewish conscience tends to differentiate on the basis of individuals *against* the political.

Independent of politics, this tendency emerges organically as an extreme implication of the Jewish kinship paradox (what Jews have in common with themselves is a tendency to divide among themselves). This means that the Jewish tendency towards internal differentiation or division is generally more intense than that of gentiles. On a mental level, it is related to a highly analytical cast of mind. On a sociobiological level, it means extreme differentiation to the point of discontinuity on the level of individual members. Judaism interprets this phenomenon as a positive: the infinite value of every separate life. This is how Judaism came to value the extreme implications of the Jewish kinship paradox as an ultimate positive.

The solution of reconciling Jewish individualism with Jewish socialism emerged though valuing a lone, politically alienated dissenter, "a voice in the wilderness", as a representative, or conscience, of larger social concerns. The

conflict between dissenting Jewish individualism and conscientious Jewish socialism leads towards resolution through a logic of self-consistency. That is, if the dissenter castigates the privileged on the grounds of social inconsistency or a double standard, then resolution implies equality or consistency of conditions between the privileged and the underprivileged.

For example, political activist of Jewish descent, Noam Chomsky, has often accused the United States of terrorism. He demanded that it apply "to its own actions the moral standards it demands of others". This, in a nutshell, is what I mean by the principle of self-consistency. It means, most simply, to not be a hypocrite. From an external view, to be morally self-consistent means to hold one's self accountable by the moral standards one holds for others. From an internal view, moral self-consistency means to "love your neighbor as yourself". In secular terms, this could mean, at bare minimum, to grant the rights to others that one grants to one's self. The logic behind the idea of human equality is self-consistency: a single, consistent standard equally applicable to all humans.[62]

This MIT professor is well known for his anti-American and anti-Israel views. Chomsky, hell-bent on exposing the moral blind spots of these countries, portrays them as terrorist states routinely engaged in systematic hypocrisy to the detriment of other people. In *The Fateful Triangle* (1983), for example, he claimed that Israel and the United States have opposed peace while the Palestinians have gradually come to terms with the existence of Israel.

Chomsky has strongly supported Israel Shahak, a Holocaust survivor who has spoken out and criticized aspects of Orthodox Judaism that could be considered racist. Both have displayed pro-Palestinian views that vilify Israel.

They concur that Jews, in principle, can indeed become Nazis. Like the prophets before them, Chomsky and Shahak rebuke their people against the temptation to be no better than their historic persecutors.

Chomsky defended Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson on the grounds of freedom of speech. This too, is self-consistency: Chomsky is upholding the right of dissenters like himself to be heard, whether he agrees with them or not. There are more than a few Jews and non-Jews who would like to see Chomsky silenced. By defending Faurisson without catering to special Jewish sorrows, Chomsky is defending the freedom of all. Some in the Jewish community consider his defense of Holocaust deniers, along with his pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel positions, to be a form of "self-hatred". But, as another Jewish-universalist named Rosa Luxembourg put it, "Freedom is always the freedom of those who disagree."

Luxembourg's humanitarian vision of Marxism guided her organization of socialist movements in Poland and Germany. In a letter dated February 16, 1917, she wrote:

> Why do you come to me with your special Jewish sorrows? I feel just as sorry for the wretched Indian victims in Putamayo....I cannot find a special corner in my heart for the ghetto. I feel at home in the entire world wherever there are clouds and birds and human tears.

Luxembourg was co-founder of the German Communist Party. She was assassinated by German nationalists in 1919.

Here we have Marx, Chomsky, Luxembourg, and other unchosen Jews, mortal messiahs leading humankind to its grand, universal, Promised Land. This is typical Jewish un-Jewishness. This is the Jewish national/international paradox, a logical fulfillment of the Jewish kinship paradox.

Chomsky and Marx, above all, illustrate the full force of the paradox potential of the Jewish kinship paradox. Ironically (or, in conformity with the Jewish kinship paradox), internationalism emerges as an advanced development of this form of Jewish 'national' differentiation. The Jewish kinship paradox means that by obeying biological inclination, a Jew could dissent against the straightforward biological logic of kin selection (Jewish nepotism). An implication of this paradox is that Jews are to some extent distinct from gentiles in that they share a quality that can be, *in effect*, indifferent to kinship or even anti-kin selective. Within this scenario, a Jew could divide against Jews because, and not despite, that common Jewishness.

Chomsky and Marx exemplify this paradox in the logic of Jewish moral self-consistency: to fully realize Jewish ethics, a Jew must transcend its Jewish roots. A certain breed of un-Jewish or anti-Jewish universalism is, in a certain way, the most supremely Jewish. Jewish universalism is a kind of Jewish self-realization in the same sense that the Jewish invention of a single God implicated all humanity.

Since Judaism is a technology, a behavioral self-corrective, Judaism can be described as a form of Jewish self-criticism. Moses was a critic of Jewish criticism, instituting his critic-commandments from the supra-national point of view of God. Marx's views emerged from a Jewish self-criticism of Jewish economic power. Chomsky's views emerged from a Jewish self-criticism of Jewish media power. It is not an accident that Chomsky replaced Marx as the most revered figure of the radical left.

If Jews, in Marx's mind, were the arch-capitalists, then the anti-arch capitalists were represented by the communist faction. What Marx called "class" was expressed in previous Jewish history as 'faction'. When this sociobiological basis

for Marxism converged with the most important gentile corroboration (misinterpretation) of a "class" system in the apparent factionalism of the Norman/Saxon conflict, Marx's view of history as a clash of classes was born.

Under conditions where Jews were oppressed as a group, proto-leftist anti-political behaviors could advance Jewish genetic interests, since there was a convergence of kinship and conscience. Taken out of context, however, in situations where "class" has been severed from "race", the radical forms of these evolved behaviors could be considered genetically maladaptive.

There are countless examples of Jewish activists who have taken up the cause of "Jewish values" in opposition to "special Jewish sorrows". One could cite George Soros, a routine supporter of Palestinians over Jewish or Israeli causes. Another contender is former civil rights defender William Kunstler, at one time probably the most hated lawyer in America. Among his clients were Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, Lenny Bruce, the Chicago Seven, Islamic terrorists, and murderers of Jews. Norman Finkelstein, a son of survivors of Nazi concentration camps, accused some Jews of exploiting the Holocaust and opposed the existence of the State of Israel.

Like Finkelstein, Chomsky championed the *universality* of values that have deep historical roots in Judaism. The universality of these values can be taken seriously only if there are those like Chomsky to defend the underdog, even when Jews are the power interest — exactly because Jews have risen to power. Otherwise, Chomsky's values are not universal, but rather, an expression of the will to power of the powerless.

This linguist, son of a Hebrew scholar, found a theoretical justification for human universalism in his theory of a

universal human grammar. In this case, the notion of a biologically based human nature was partly compelled in refutation of the totalitarian implications of B. F. Skinner's extreme environmentalism. Yet, despite the attempt of a Polish Jew named Ludwig Lazarus Zamenhof (1859-1917) to create a universal language called "Esperanto", the insight of Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana still holds: "It is no more possible to be a human being in general than it is to speak a language in general."

Chomsky's typical Jewish un-Jewishness is comparable only with Marx as a peak modern expression of the logic of Jewish moral self-consistency. To stand consistently against discrimination on the basis of biological differences among humans is to stand against sexism, homophobia, and racism. To stand *self*-consistently against racial prejudice is to *not* be prejudiced towards one's *own* race. It leads one to *not* choosing one's own people. Yet the idea of a chosen people, while seen as ethnocentric, is really an ancient resolution to this same national/international paradox. Jews were "chosen" by God; they did not select themselves, but were selected by an inscrutable supra-national standard above *all* biological humans.

Jewish internationalism is characterized by (universalist) self-consistency without (Jewish) self-reference. If taken seriously, this Jewish lack of self-reference decouples Marxism from anything particular related to Marx. I call this Jewish "unchosenness". To realize the extreme implications of Jewish morality means to unrealize the implications of being born Jewish. It leads to the *relatively* consistent humanistic proposition that the Jewish origins of Christianity or Marxism do not matter, just as the Jewish origins of individuals who happen to be Jews should not matter.

Why should Chomsky choose Jewish causes over non-Jewish causes simply because he himself is a Jew? Just as normative kin selection leads towards favoritism for one's own, the Jewish kinship paradox culminates in a specific disfavoritism of one's own. In consequence, the "Jewish self-hatred" that Marx and Chomsky have been charged with is something of a misnomer. Disfavoritism towards one's own people is a corollary, and not an aberration, of extreme, self-consistent internationalism.

The true proof of moral self-consistency is demonstrated by dissenting against privilege *exactly* when one is implicated as a member or beneficiary of any kind of specialness or chosenness. In practice, this leads a Jew to anti-Zionism or a generally anti-Jewish orientation. But the joke, of course, is on these anti-Jewish Jews, for this extreme, leftist, intellectual, anti-Jewish Jewishness exemplified by Chomsky and Marx is the most Jewish of all!

Disaster is Success

Korakh represents one side of the internal logic of Judaism that leads to rebellion against the authority of Moses. There was a lesson to be learned from his rebellion. This was traditional Judaism's way of restraining what has subsequently made its mark on history as Jewish left-wing radicalism. Conversely, Moses's own rebellion against the authority of Egypt formed the paradigmatic lesson for restraint against Jewish right-wing radicalism. Moses taught the middle way.

While quite mistaken in other respects, Hitler intuited or grasped that Jews are incapable of a full, genuine equivalent of Nazism. The "gene" extreme of Jewish nationalism was always foiled by the Jewish kinship paradox; Jewish

hereditary divisiveness. The greatest natural impetus of Jewish 'national' unity has been anti-Semitism, not the desire to outdo their historic oppressors at their own game. As Albert Einstein observed, "the Jewish group has thrived on oppression and on the antagonism it has forever met in the world. Here undoubtedly lies one of the main reasons for its continued existence through so many thousands of years."[63] Disastrous threats to Jewish survival were the source of Jewish survival success.

This view is corroborated by the secular founder of political Zionism, Theodor Herzl. The "propelling force in the creation of a Jewish state", he thought, was antisemetic enmity. [64] It was not a fully positive, constructive impulse to nationhood, but rather, "our enemies have made us one...It is only pressure that forces us back to the parent stem."[65] Through the invisible walls of anti-Semitism, gentiles throughout human history have helped to preserve the Jewish people.

If so, the most radical Jewish national self-consciousness requires the most radical anti-Semitism. This pattern can be seen in the paradigmatic origins of Jews as slaves that escaped the oppression of the Egyptians. The Exodus paradigm was replayed in exodus from Auschwitz and the political rebirth of the Jewish Promised Land. Hitler wrought the miracles of a messiah. The Zionist state was catalyzed by the anti-Semitism of Europeans, propelled by the genocide of Germans, and maintained by the hatred of the Arabs.

In short, Jews survived their kinship paradox, in part, through a moral mechanism that capitalizes on persecution and oppression as a source of collective unity. Because every single member is threatened, consciousness of the value of each member is strengthened. Yet taken out of its original

context of self-preservation through anti-Semitism, the valuation of every individual life has universalistic implications.

The threat of near extinction is the extreme particularism that is the genesis-root of Jewish universalism. Since *every* individual life was threatened, there existed a convergence between individual survival and group survival. This is a sociobiological foundation of an unconscious convergence of interest between Jews in general and Jewish leftist internationalists that radically oppose all Jewish particularisms.

Just as universalism emerged from this extreme particularism, this kind of particularism is also divulges the limits of Jewish nationalism. Mosaic law addresses unpolitical tendencies so basic, the idea that Jews would be able to survive at all as a political unity in their own "promised land" could only be imagined as a miracle. Jews have overwhelming been victims of the most politically aggressive nations over most of their history because Jews have lacked both the inclination and the capacity to emulate truly extreme forms of subordination to the political.

Ancient Rome is a classic example of the more distinctly gentile capacity for subordination or obedience to human authority. Internal Roman obedience made for internal peace, and internal peace was made possible by internal obedience. External war was made possible by internal peace, and an international Pax Romana was made possible by the Roman capacity for war.

The Jewish kinship paradox leads to an ideal of international peace through an entirely different avenue. One can look at the conflict among individual Jews as a miniature mirror of the conflict between the nations of the Earth. The Mosaic formula for internal peace between

individual Jews thus implicated a formula for internal peace between all the nations of the Earth under God.

Judaism's original formula for *internal peace* became externalized in Isaiah's vision of swords being beaten into plowshares. Moses's program for subduing the divisiveness of Jews as individuals became universalized, and then secularized, into a program for world peace. The Jewish tendency to argue, fight, and factionalize among themselves is a practical source of the Jewish proclivity towards international peace.

Success is Disaster

With Zionism Jews are victims once again, only this time they are victims of their own success. A Jewish state could only exist in a liberal or tolerant world compatible with a quasi-Jewish morality tolerant of weaker states. Yet this very emphasis on weaker states gives displaced Palestinians more moral voice than any other people in a comparable situation. Political success is simultaneously the only viable option and the moral Achilles heel of Jewish history.

Traditional Jewish morality distinctively emphasized marginal or powerless social groups and this was, in part, a reflection of Jewish *identification* as a marginal or powerless social group among gentiles. The Jewish morality that negates power in principle selects for the weaker over the stronger; the more feminine over the more masculine; the powerless over the powerful. The seed of the idea of equality is this empowering of the weaker while depowering the stronger.

However, to follow this logic to its extreme, to consistently choose and value the weaker, is to value *weakness itself*. To overthrow the strong, in principle,

ultimately leads one to overthrow what is strong within one's self. In this way, radical moral integrity through rational moral self-consistency leads to rational self-destruction.

When Jews acquired power after historic powerlessness, the original conditions of Judaism unraveled. To empower the powerless or marginalized is self-empowering while Jews themselves are powerless. But when the Jewish cause becomes victorious, this strategy backfires and Jewish principles deconstruct themselves, inverting the inverters. For the Zionist state to consistently empower the disempowered Palestinians at their own expense would be political suicide. Being Goliath is a problem when the moral of the story is that David ultimately wins.

The internationalism of Christianity laid the common ground for a world that has a place for the nationalism of the Jews. Just as Roman conquerors penetrated the territorial-sociobiological boundaries of the ancient Jewish state, the Jewish-based God memes of Christianity penetrated the ancient Roman world. Christianity began a process of blunting and mollifying the deepest ethical-cultural gulfs between Jew and gentile. The penetration of Jewish genes into the modern gentile West is only a continuation of the anti-kin selective logic that began with Christianity. In other words, Jewish assimilation as individuals in the modernistic West is only a continuation of gentile assimilation to the sociobiological impact of Christianity. Both as individuals and as a Zionist state, Western assimilation of Jewish bodies was founded upon Western assimilation of a Jewish "spirit".

The success of the Jewish state among nations is partly dependent on gentile assimilation of Jewish ethics, but *by* those ethics, Israel's struggle for existence appears that much more hypocritical and villainous. Zionism highlights how

Jewish genes and Jewish ethical memes reach towards incompatible ends. The success of Zionism implies the failure of a truly universal equality, while the success of equality implies the failure of Jewish genetic self-preservation against intermarriage. This clarifies the role of oppression withstanding extinction in making the original gene/meme symbiosis of Judaism adaptive and successful. Success in overcoming oppression, on the other hand, proves disastrous from the view of ethnic preservation. Since political failure created the best general conditions for the success of the gene/meme symbiosis of Judaism, political success creates the conditions for its failure.

The gene/meme symbiosis of Judaism broke down when liberated from the ghetto. The extreme implications of genes and memes, represented by Zionism and Marxism, are mutually contradictory. The (Zionist) cause of Jewish genetic self-preservation leads to the corruption of Jewish ethical-memes while (Marxist) Jewish egalitarian memes can only most fully realize themselves at the expense of genetic self-preservation as a group, i.e. intermarriage. Taken to their extremes, Jewish memes are in deadly conflict with Jewish genes, and vice versa. Since diaspora assimilation leads to genetic dissolution, and the precarious territorial standstill of Israel leads to moral dissolution, both taken together seem to show the limits of the Jewish national "idea" in world history.

Original Judaism was built on low expectations for both Jewish politics and gentile morality. Transcending these problems has thus been disastrous for the original symbiotic balance of Judaism. Jewish intermarriage with gentiles in the West, for example, is only another consequence of the ironic logic of Jewish moral self-consistency. The extreme national

implications of Jewish genes are realized at the expense of the international implications of Jewish memes.

If oppression has been the preserver of the Jewish nation as a distinct and separate group, this implies at least two things. First, radical Jewish "nationalism" via gentile oppression culminates in Jewish national extinction, i.e. Auschwitz. Second, radical Jewish internationalism culminates in Jewish national extinction. Both radical oppression and radical liberation lead to the end of Jews as a distinct group, although in the latter case Jews may survive as individuals.

Since anti-Semitism has been an organizer of Jews as a distinct group, defeating antisemitism defeats Jewish genetic self-preservation. If Jews evolved and thrived on oppression, the ultimate victory their moral mission against oppression and inequality results in their national destruction. The universalistic success of the Jewish moral idea means the dissolution of national unity. Since Jews found the seeds of existential victory in political defeat, the seeds of Jewish existential defeat are to be found in their world-historical victories. *Ultimate* success, however, is to be found in total self-destruction as biological being in the Singularity.

ALL IDEAS ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL

Egalitarianism's Master Race?

The human races are not created equal anymore than individuals within a race are created equal. The Jewish "race", for example, can claim an unequal contribution to the unequal success of the idea of equality (although some Jews are more egalitarian than others). Jews have played a disproportionate role as leaders in the struggle for equality. Jews have been, to make what is perhaps an unconscionable generalization, elite egalitarians. Jews are probably more equal to this paradox than any other people (although certain individual Jews may be inferior to it). Jews, in other words, have a special, even "chosen", relationship to the idea of equality.

Are Jews egalitarianism's master race? Of course not. If Jews are the master race of egalitarianism then Jews must claim that Jews are *not* the master race of egalitarianism, i.e. Jews must claim to be equal and not superior to other

peoples. In consequence, the claim that Jews are not egalitarianism's master race is a requisite verification that Jews are egalitarianism's master race.

Only inferior races, inferior societies, and inferior individuals still believe some form of social hierarchy. Anyone who's anyone subscribes to at least some form of the egalitarian principle nowadays. Only a few, however, have grasped the pattern of self-consistency that underlies the unfolding of the idea of equality. What, specifically, am I referring to when I say "self-consistency"? It is written in the Palestinian Talmud (*Nedarim* 9:4):

> "Love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18)—this is the major principle of the Torah."

This principle could be interpreted as such: apply to your neighbor the same rule that one applies to one's self. It is a principle of consistency between others and self. To love your neighbor as yourself is to be self-consistent in social relations; to not be a hypocrite. To distribute justice consistently is to act with equity.

While the whole of modern morality can hardly be encapsulated by this formula, consistency of standards is nonetheless what leads to the idea of equality. A single, consistent standard means eliminating double standards and special privileges. It means ending the idea that there is one rule for the master and another for the slave. Equality is the idea of a single, *consistent* standard of judgment. What gave this idea of a *single* standard its original cogency was the Biblical idea of a *single*, omnipotent God. This means that radical, consistent equality *among humans* was founded on a radical, nonhuman, inconsistency in egalitarian principle: the unequaled superiority and supremacy of God.

Take a passage, for example, from Jeremiah (9:22-23), dating from the sixth century B.C.:

> Thus said the Lord: Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom; Let not the strong man glory in his strength; Let not the rich man glory in his riches. But only in this should one glory: In his earnest devotion to Me. For I the Lord act with kindness, justice and equity in the world; for in these I delight.

Ancient, embryonic seeds of the "modern" idea of equality were present in the Jewish Bible. The idea of the infinite value of each individual evolved only gradually, and an inkling of the process is evident in the story of Sodom and Gomorrah. When Abraham pleaded with God to not destroy Sodom for its wickedness, his bargaining yielded God's restraint only at the price of finding 50 fifty righteous people in that city. Abraham bargained God down to 30, then 20, and finally, 10 people. Only one righteous person was found, Abraham's nephew Lot. This was not enough, however, to save the city.

Whereas gentile polytheism posed various conflicting gods with conflicting *values*, God provided a single, leveling standard for a universal *system* of values. While the logic of moral self-consistency ultimately leads to universalism, universalism was pregnant in the original rationale of *not* treating strangers among Jews as Jewish strangers were treated in Egypt: "you should not wrong a stranger or oppress him, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt" (Exod. 22:20).

In the beginning, the relatively egalitarian principles of Moses appealed to a group of people who were all equally slaves. From the beginning, radical equality on the human level was conceivable only through comparison with radical

superiority on the ultimate level: the inconceivable God. The self-contradictions of modern egalitarian progress, placing *equality* atop a *hierarchy* of values, was resolved in Biblical religion through its original grounding in belief in the transcendence of God. Without God, however, the "logic" of modern egalitarianism is simply self-contradictory.

Strict egalitarian progress would brand every idea with its ideal status in the ideal pecking order. Since equality is superior, hierarchy is not equal to, but inferior to, the idea of equality. Egalitarian progress belittles the idea of social hierarchy to the status of great inferiority, then to the status of greater inferiority, until finally, social hierarchy is enslaved to the status of the most total inferiority. Progress is advance towards superior hierarchies of equality, crushing inferior ranks of egalitarianism as it marches forward.

No, not all ideas are created equal. The ideas or memes that constitute this notion of human equality are some of the most powerful to ever replicate in the minds of men (and women, hermaphrodites, etc.). Yet the reckless, power-drunk domination of this idea of equality leads one to question the wisdom of its power. Where exactly does the idea of equality ultimately lead?

The abstract implications of feminism and homosexual rights, for example, were deducible from the premise of the equality of individual humans from the very beginning. But is there an *ultimate* destination that equality "progresses"? If a civilization fully unfolded the implications of this idea of equality, what would one expect to find? What would follow from the *attempt* to be a completely unhypocritical egalitarian?

Planet of the Apes

All of the great, modern, egalitarian revolutions have a sociobiological basis in ethnic or racial discord. In 1789, it was the Gallo-Romans against the Germanic Franks (See Déjà vu?). In the English-speaking world, it was the Anglo-Saxons against the Norman-French (See A Vendetta Called Revolution). The Russian Revolution witnessed a combination of Slavs, Jews, and other ethnicities combined against order originally established by the Germanic Rus.

The egalitarian principle effectually emphasizes the similarities among people and deemphasizes differences among people. Biological differences among racial groups have been deemphasized through a liberalization of the concept of race: the race that matters is the human race. The underlying individualism of the humanistic proposition meant that all white men eventually became all men. All men became men and women.

As a gross generalization, one could say that the left is egalitarian, and the right is inegalitarian. The left represents a female gender strategy, and the right represents a male gender strategy. The leftism of modern egalitarian revolutions reflects the long-term effects of emasculation among conquered peoples (See Founding Feminists).

A fundamental moral meaning of equality, pioneered by Jews, is the equality of masculine and feminine *gender* qualities. Although progress has not increased men's ability to menstruate, it has increased men's sensitivity to the nurturing norms of compassion over the virtues of the warrior. Leftwards progress leads to progressive *gender* feminization.

Most men are created equal to the proposition that all men are created equal. Universalization of the principle of

equality among *all* human males without discrimination on the basis of responsibility, morality, intelligence, etc., opens the comparison of *some* men to *some* women. Since all men are not equally masculine, power hungry, moral, or intelligent, it is precisely the *inequality* of men among themselves that makes the equality of some (beta) men and some (alpha) women plausible.

While gay men are formally equal as men, homosexual (gay/lesbian/bisexual) rights logically succeed women's rights and they could only be advanced coherently after the success of feminism. A basic reason for this is that feminism posits the equality of the sexes, and thus raises the question of why anyone should discriminate a potential sexual partner or mate on the basis of sex. If the sexes are truly equal, why limit the choice of one's mate to only one half of the population? Going one step further, egalitarianism implicates not only feminism and homosexuality, but also social and legal acceptance of incest; sexual and marital relations between parents and children. Sexual and marital relations between siblings and other close relations are also implicated.

Secular humanism originally asserted the belief that human life, especially by virtue of the human race's capacity for reason and morality, is superior to all other forms of life. However, demands for equality inevitably implicate the problem of discrimination against those with disabilities. *Ableism* is a form of discrimination. Strictly speaking, it amounts to a technological valuation of biological humans. Its extreme expressions are found in eugenic efforts to eliminate those of lesser capacities from the population.

In the early 1970s, the United Nations passed two declarations defending the idea that mentally retarded persons have the same rights as other human beings. Taking

this principle one step further, Christoph Anstötz, a professor of special education, argued that "opposition to discrimination against intellectually disabled people is based on principles that leads to opposition to discrimination against other sentient beings," such as great apes, "who are also unable to defend their own interests."[66]

Many severely mentally retarded people fail to meet the common human criteria of possessing language. If so, "[h]ow can we accept that a (human) student is gifted with 'reason and conscience', when that student does not respond to any stimuli in a perceptible way" and "is unable to take part in communication"?[67] What is human if the severely mentally handicapped, too, are human? If we exclude these disabled humans from the status that grants human rights, painful medical experiments can be performed on them, just as they are performed on nonhuman animals. If we uphold the rights of these extreme human cases, then how can we defend the distinction between them and other great apes? The issue raised here is the same as the historic issue that led to democracy, abolition of slavery, women's rights, and homosexual rights. It is the issue of consistency of egalitarian principle.

If the severely mentally retarded are without reason, and hence without fully human status, then perhaps their rights should be taken away and they should be treated like nonhuman animals legally unprotected by rights. One argument thus holds that they should not have rights because they are inferior to the basic human standard of rights. Another argument in consonance with the traditional moral impetus of rights, however, objects that precisely this inferiority makes them most vulnerable, and hence the most in need of rights. And this, in a nutshell, is why the logic of equal rights advances inevitably towards lowering

standards of capacity, and including those at the ever-shifting borders of exclusion. The larger picture is a de-definition of what constitutes "us", and the lowering of standards of capacity without limit.

Humans share some 98.8 percent of their DNA with chimpanzees. Advocates of "The Great Ape Project" have thus argued:

> We are human, and we are also great apes. Our membership of the human species gives us a precious moral status: inclusion within the sphere of moral equality. Those within this sphere we regard as entitled to special moral protection...They have basic rights that are denied to those outside this sphere.[68]

This, they argue, is a "step of true historical importance….[t]he slow but steady widening of the scope of the golden rule—'treat others as you would have them treat you'—has now resumed its course."[69] It is a logical extension of the principle of individual equality. Yet this issue helps raise the question of whether equality has any scientific or empirical meaning. If all "men" are created equal on some *specific or empirically measurable basis*, what precisely is that basis? And if there is an equal standard or level that gives empirical meaning to the principle of equality, why this standard, and not another. Yet the progress of equality seems to leads to the progressive inability to define the meaning of equality at all.

One supporter of the inclusion of all great apes within the protections of legal rights is evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins. "[N]ot only are we apes," he pointed out, "we are African apes".[70] Dawkins was "only trying to point the finger at the *automatic,* unthinking nature of the speciesist double standard. To many people it is simply self-evident,

without any discussion, that humans are entitled to special treatment."[71] When Thomas Jefferson declared it "self-evident" that "all men are created equal", it was not self-evident that he automatically included blacks and women in the group eligible for such special treatment. The dignity of the Orangutan was a discovery unknown to Jefferson.

But if gorillas and chimpanzees were included in the realm of the human, would they be allowed to vote or run for political office? Would affirmative action programs be required to redress historic discriminations and injustices? If one condescends to call another individual an 'Ape', should this be considered a racist slur? And if this new egalitarianism is implemented, it raises the question of why human children do not have the same rights as adults, i.e. the right to vote — and the duty to fight in wars.

Dawkins brought attention to something else. The "proposal to admit great apes to the charmed circle of human privilege stands square in the discontinuous tradition. Albeit the gap has moved, the fundamental question is still 'Which side of the gap?'"[72] Advocates of "The Great Ape Project" noted that their proposals would still "require a much more modest rearrangement of our lives than, say, the extension of equality to all mammals….Some people...would like to see a much larger extension of the moral community, so that it includes a wider range of nonhuman animals."[73]

In *Animal Liberation* (1975), Peter Singer wrote that to be "humane" is to go beyond humanism and end of the "tyranny of human over nonhuman animals". This development was logically inevitable. Monotheism of egalitarian principle leads to one law, one community, and one ethic. Yet the strongest historical basis of secularized humanism stems from the Biblical creationist separation of

the human race from all other creations. Originally, this meant that while altruism could be directed towards the least fortunate humans, it was nonetheless understood that there was an insuperable gap between the least fit human and the fittest animal. Humanism originally assumed an apartheid; a speciesist status that is separate and superior to all nonhumans.

After Darwin and the cosmological frame of reference gleaned from astronomy, the provincialism of humanism was revealed as a mere prejudice towards the human race. Humanism was the only the "universal" racism hoped to bind all "mankind" into the unity of a singular *race*. It was only a more liberal form of the racism that exists between conventional human racial groups.

The modern notion of egalitarian progress preceded Darwin, and the full implications of this progress looked quite different after Darwin. Just as some whites once considered blacks so racially distinct that sexual intercourse was considered bestiality, progress would now demand that this stigmatization of bestiality be deemed uncivilized altogether. Bestiality emerges as the cutting edge of civilization. Discrimination against bestiality is thus barbarism. Marriage between human animals and nonhuman animals should be legalized and normalized. Despised animals of all species should emerge from their hiding corners. Ugly creatures of all species unite!

At some point, the collective accumulation of rights would seem to snowball into a gargantuan interspecies orgy. Heterosexual bestiality between humans and other animals would be followed by the acceptance of homosexual bestiality. The nascent gay, lesbian, transgender chimpanzee rights movement would be followed by the liberation of queer koalas and bestial butterflies. The war for equality

would storm the fascistic caste socialism of the ants and smash the hive-slavery of those Nazi bee bastards.

Just as ants, bees, and Nazis form kinds of holistic Überorganisms on a *social* level, individual multicellular organisms such as humans are holistic Überorganisms on an *individual* level. Just as ant colonies, beehives, and the Nazi *Volk* are holistic social products of their individual "cells", an individual, multicellular human is the holistic products of its individual cells. Modern equal individualism thus liberates a newly recognized fascism: the totalitarian "individualism" of multicellular organisms.

The progress of modern political reductionism began by challenging the hive model of human community. Challenging the totalitarian unity of individual humans is only the next stage in this progression. Just as the *breadth* of modern political reductionism progresses from individual Homo sapiens to individuals of other species, the *depth* of modern political reductionism progresses from the rights of individual multicellular organisms to the rights of individual cells. Just as the *breadth* of the rights of individual organisms expands the kinship circle past speciesism so that nonhuman animals are included, the *depth* of rights expands the individual circle past only multicellular individualism so that the rights of single cell individuals are included.

The empirical basis for the equivalence between an individual organism and an individual cell is most clear when a human individual *is* a single cell; when a human is an embryo. In consequence, the rights of single cells represent, not only a hypothetical or abstract implication of rights, but an issue that has already made history. Two historic landmarks are probably the most famous: the fight for an embryonic cell's right to life against abortion, and the rights of stem cells against exploitation in scientific research.

Cellular individualism — The Rights of Cells — is an inevitable, logical implication of the notion of individual rights. This becomes clear when one recognizes that an individual multicellular organism, human or otherwise, is organized on the principles of a fascistic, totalitarian dictatorship. The corpse-like obedience of the neurons of the minds of Henry David Thoreau and Abbie Hoffman is what made the coherence of their arguments for civil disobedience possible. The holism of the human body is a self-serving myth perpetuated by an elitist cellular minority in the human brain to maintain control over the majority of subordinate, cellular slaves in the rest of the body. The cellular majority, the cells of the skin, the muscles, the heart, etc., are exploited and killed without conscience. The rights of individual cells are routinely crushed in the name of an ideology or myth of a larger "greater good" that goes by the name of "I".

Severely mentally retarded humans do not have distinctively human capacities for reason, and thus lack the capacity for moral reasoning. Their case forces the question of whether rights should be granted to such beings purely on the basis of human racism, or whether such beings should be deprived or rights, and thus relegated to the ethical jungle as a sub-human animals. Yet if moral reasoning demands that severely mentally retarded be protected by rights *because* they are most vulnerable, the very same logic of moral reasoning leads to the demand for rights for small, disposable, vulnerable, individual cells. Whether an individual cell is a member of a human organism, or a lone individual bacterium, it is the cells who are both the overwhelming democratic majority on Earth, and the most in need of rights.

White blood cells within an organism are the equivalent of bigoted, intolerant, fascistic soldiers who not only hate foreigners, but also kill foreigners. The foreigners are what humans commonly call "disease", i.e. viruses. The "evil" of cancer, for example, is the "evil" of individual cellular freedom to reproduce, unsubordinated to the good of "Big Brother". Perhaps the real disease is not the flu, the cold, or cancer, but rather, intolerance of individual cellular freedom.

Cells were born free, but everywhere they are in chains! Tradition holds that cells of a multicellular organism are, to use Aristotle's phrase, "natural slaves". But if this is incorrect, then the next step towards freedom would be to liberate the organelles *within cells* from their ancient slavery to its host. According to Endosymbiotic theory, the mitochondria, the "powerhouse" of the cell, was originally a separate prokaryotic organism that was tamed into its current, common, subordination within a cell. Just as freedom for individual organisms' leads to liberation from any Nazi-style Überorganism, and freedom for individual cells leads to liberation from the individual organism, progress leads to the liberation of organelles, such as the mitochondria and plastids, from the tyrannical slavery of the cell. Just as The Brothers Frankenborg, the founders of the American Constitution, invented a political technology to affect the possibility of individual human freedom, new technologies could potentially allow the survival of cells and organelles without submission to the old hive.

But there is another, coordinate pattern at work here. Whereas the Nazis revived the hive model of human relations on its original, sociobiological, kin selective basis, the liberal democratic Anglo-Saxon state leads to a trajectory of equal individualism that is, very clearly, the utter and total negation of kin selection. Modern political

reductionism is not equal to the hive model revived by the Nazis, and history clarifies why. The Anglo-Saxon state led to an egalitarian trajectory completely opposite of the Nazis because it was founded upon the *death* of an Anglo-Saxon Überorganism.

"Progress" means exploding the boundaries within which kinship can meaningfully cohere, and there is no reason to think that there is a viable end to this pattern. A movement that attempted to free the spleens, or egalitarianize the decision making influence of the brain and the liver, would result in death. Egalitarian progress is a death process that marks out this death trajectory on levels of increasing depth: individual humans can be liberated only at the expense of the Überorganism; individual cells can be liberated only at the expense of the death of an individual organism; individual organelles such as mitochondria can liberated only at the expense of the death of the cell.

The attempt to eliminate only slavery by humans would required the end of all slavery of "pets", the release of all animals in zoos, the end of all scientific experimentation on animals, and the end of raising animals for food. And vegetarianism? The very criterion by which a vegetarian uses to distinguishes plant life from animal life — its lesser similarity to humans — is purely anthropomorphic. Even meat grown in a lab requires life to be bred for death by consumption. Although most meat may be "murder", raising plant food is also the exploitation and killing of life for the sake of perpetuating the vegetarian's greed for life. Vegetarians kill to live.

There is a reason why the problem of equal justice appears to be insolvable: Life is exploitation. In order to end exploitation, we must end life. In order to end exploitation, we must will death.

Total equality leads to death because it unravels the unequal evolutionary foundation upon which its stands on. The viability of an egalitarian worldview is *built* upon its provincialism. For example, the equality of the American state is *built* upon hypocritical treatment of the Native Americans. The equality of the Israeli state is *built* upon military victories against the Arab states and Palestinians. Yet virtually no one suggests that the German land that Berlin stands on should be returned to the Poles since it was once Polish land in the Middle Ages.

The "aboriginal" Gauls who participated in the French Revolutionary could do so because their ancestors trampled over the previous inhabitants of their land. But what about Neanderthal rights? If Neanderthal "man" managed to survive in some pocket in Europe, the survivors would have grounds to claim compensation for an incomplete genocide. Moreover, what should be done if technology allows humans to give a voice to the voiceless; a means of cloning the Neanderthals or Cro-Magnons who dominated Europe until the coming of current Europeans? They will have perfectly legitimate grounds to protest the genocide of their ancestors, and rail against the present European occupiers of what was once their homeland.

If we are serious about the spread of equality and justice, perhaps we must *demand* that contemporary governments use technology to right this atrocious wrong and resurrect Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons from the genocidal rampages that victimized them. Cloning could be used to help them regain their numbers. Reservations of land could be set aside as due compensation. Ultimately, however, justice demands that they retake *all* of the lands they once occupied.

Over ninety-nine percent of all species that have ever existed are extinct. We owe our very lives to this silent majority of extinct ancestors. The biological evolution that made humans possible is, by definition, *built* upon natural selection against extinct ancestors of humans. The cumulative work of all human attempts at egalitarian justice is a droplet compared to the vast ocean of injustice that waits to be addressed and avenged. Evolutionary history has uncovered a gargantuan world of billions of years of injustice that needs to be addressed.

Natural selection is natural injustice. Is there no justice for billions of years of the inherent injustice of natural selection? Every human is *literally* supersaturated with guilt for every biological advantage of any and every generation evolved at the expense of less fit and less adapted ancestors. Natural selection is immoral. What one is willing to do to preserve one's self in the name of life is the definition of immorality.

Ultimately, there is only one way to fulfill the highest aims of egalitarian justice and that way is to will death.

The Elimination of Selection

The life of a single cell can exist because it out of equilibrium with its environment. In chemical reactions such as photosynthesis, reactants are converted into products. A state of inequality or unequilibrium is achieved by continually adding reactants and removing products. The only time in which a cell or organism does exist in equilibrium with its environment is when it is dead. Like the flat-line of an electrocardiogram that indicates that a heart has stopped beating, equilibrium equals death.

Ultimately, equality equals death.

"Somewhere along the scale from bacteria to humans," wrote Jared Diamond, "we have to decide where killing becomes murder, and where eating becomes cannibalism."[74] This assumes, however, that there is an end to the reach of this idea or practice of equality. This is simply another example of what Dawkins rightly pointed out as the moving of a discontinuous, pre-Darwinian, gap between "us" and "them".

Who has the ultimate authority to dictate where the gap lies when the entire history of equality demonstrates that progress has only been made when some fought to extended the gap beyond the "authoritative" standard acceptable to previous progressives? If the ultimate goal of egalitarian "progress" is to be universal, where does this lead us? How could we even know if the goal of universal equality has reached its end?

Ninety-nine percent of all species that have ever existed are now extinct. Any "race" that attempts to fulfill the abstract principles of equality is ultimately ceding its place to the very democratic rule of that extinct majority. When each and every individual organism, cell, and organelle has been "reduced" to a state of equality with one another, the next step is the equality of each with the larger physical world from which life arose — a state commonly known as "death". The logic of destroying all differentiations of race, sex, class, and beyond ultimately leads to destroying the differentiation between the organic and the inorganic; the differentiation between the biological and the nonbiological, physical world.

People are material things, too, according to Darwin. To place the principle of *equality* at the top of a *hierarchy* of values is a formula for rational biological deconstruction.

The death march to the land of no egalitarian hypocrisy leads to a general trajectory of evolutionary "regression" because it leads to equality with the most simple and "primitive" evolutionary forms. It is almost like "descending" from Homo sapiens to apes, to primates, to mammals, to amniotes, to tetrapods, to vertebrates, to animals, to eukaryotes, etc., until we are lead to the very origins of life itself out of nonbiological, physical matter.

Yet the "regression" does not stop there. Atoms such as oxygen and carbon necessary for life were largely forged in the furnace of stars. The path backwards in time leads to these origins of chemical and physical evolution. The further progress of equality leads to the breakdown of molecules into equal and independent atoms. Since Hydrogen is not equal to Uranium, atoms must be broken down toward the state of the Hydrogen masses, and then into subatomic particles. This path of progress-"regression" leads us to the limits of contemporary knowledge at the "Big Bang".

Modern equality began by dismissing the importance of biology. Ultimately, it leads to the removal of *all* biological factors from the equation of life until the achievement of death. The logic of equality leads towards the elimination of all forms of hierarchy that separate life or biological priorities from the larger physical world. Self-consistent egalitarianism leads to self-consistent materialism: humans and other life forms have no inherent basis for viewing themselves as chunks of "superior matter", with special rights above all other material things. The idea that biology has any special privilege whatsoever over non-biology is in its very conception anti-egalitarian, and to fulfill and achieve the enlightenment project is to engage in rational biological self-destruction.

The conventional distinction between life and non-life is an extension of anthropomorphism. The belief that life forms are special matter distinct from other forms of matter is not simply a form of romanticism; it is, more specifically, a form of *animism*. From the perspective of unadulterated materialism, an individual human is no less a holistic construct that social group holism; the Western "individual" is a *social* construct. Just as a human being may drink a glass of water teeming with microscopic life, yet regard the water as physical matter, the entire process of an individual human swimming, and then drowning, in an ocean could be regarded as workings of physical processes without any distinct regard for the "human" material.

Willing equality, taken to its extreme, is equivalent to willing death in equality with unadulterated materialism. Since the quantity of inorganic matter dwarfs known quantities of organic matter, democratically speaking, nonlife or death wins the final victory on grounds of democratic justice. Claims of aristocracy, supremacy, or "dignity" above matter are reflections of bias, self-interest, or instinct. Special pleading for the moral superiority of life forms that suffer or feel pain is viviocentrism. Suffering is (and should be) reducible to material, chemical reactions in the brains and bodies of animals.

The prejudice that life or "animate" matter is superior to inanimate matter, like the prejudice against distinct racial groups, is a form of discrimination. Just as moral action to overcome ethnocentrism leads one to treat non-kin as kin, moral action to overcome life's self-centeredness (viviocentrism) leads one to treat the non-organic as organic — to treat death as life and life as death. The overcoming of viviocentrism follows directly in the footsteps of humanism in overcoming of the kinship-centric values in which Homo

sapiens originated. Willing death is thus a child of humanism and the logical culmination of its rational quest for universalism.

Conventional reductionism holds that the biological and physical are ultimately equal, i.e. the biological can be reduced to the physical. Yet the only time when the biological and physical are most literally equal is when the biological system is dead. Let me put this in more common sense terms. If biology is fully consistent with the physical, then what has all the struggle been about? How is it possible to *not* survive? In order for "survival" to make any empirical sense, there must be, in some way, a distinction between life and non-life. It appears, however, that the problem of defining life is not fully possible because the definition requires an accounting of the particular environment that an organism survives *against*, and such environments can be incompatible or opposite for different organisms or different species.

Total equivalence of an organism and its direct environment is death. Bioinconsistency is the inequality or the lack of organizational equivalence between a life form and the larger physical world. To posit bioinconsistency is another way of positing that life is a kind of "myth" or "falsehood" that is not empirically justifiable through reference to the larger environment precisely because its very existence is founded upon survival *over* and *against* that environment. On a human level, bioinconsistency typically takes the form of subjectivity that is unequal to the objectively observed physical world. Bioinconsistency is what defies complete reductionism; what defies an organism's complete death collapse into to its contextual environment, i.e. myth, God, identity, poetry, culture, music, art, the fear of death, emotions, intuitions, instincts, thymos,

patriarchy-politics, and other sources of value hierarchy. One of the most comprehensive expressions of bioinconsistency may be Being, and especially Heidegger's talk of gods. More commonly, bioinconsistency takes the form of the empirically unverified myth that survival is good; that willing life is somehow superior to willing death.

From a strictly physical standpoint, however, survival cannot be judged better than extinction. "Survivalism" survives, however, because the ancestors of survivors survived. It is a classic bias of living organisms, whether it is rationalized or not. That the bioinconsistent organization of an organism does not completely fall into a reductionistic collapse (consistency with its environment) may be the definition of its survival.

Equality would seem to implicate an ultimate trajectory of evolutionary "regression" because equal rights imply the beginning of the end of Darwinian selection. A genuine, progressive implementation of universal equal rights implies the artificial end of natural selection; the systematic unraveling of the mechanism that made the evolution of life possible in the first place. The principle of equality can thus be look at as the principle of the elimination of selection.

The idea of "natural right" is pre-Darwinian. It is thus not especially surprising that the "progress" of the modern idea of the individual right to life leads in precisely the opposite direction as the "progress" of natural selection. The egalitarian elimination of selection is directly tied to the modern notion of leftward "progress" precisely because the gradual accumulation of selections that built life up suggests an equally gradual elimination of selections to unravel life down. The opposite of the modern idea of individual rights is the right of the stronger. Individual rights tend to defend the weaker, while natural selection tends to eliminate the

weaker. From some points of view, then, equal rights can be looked upon as the "progress" of genetic maladaptation.

Kin selection, for example, leads to discrimination against kinship outsiders and altruism towards kinship insiders. The moral logic of egalitarian universalism works in precisely the opposite direction, with moral preference given to outsiders over insiders. Western institutionalization of the elimination of discrimination ultimately means the systematic elimination of selection. Eliminating selection ultimately leads to internationalism and trans-species universalism. It also implies the elimination of the political as an active means of evolutionary, eugenic, biological self-control.

Insofar as Jews have contributed disproportionately to Western egalitarianism, and the end of discrimination on biological grounds, Jews have contributed to the elimination of biological selection. Since antisemitism has been a mortal form of discrimination, Jews, in selecting for the elimination of selection, have selected for their own survival. Jews have been prominent selectors of the ethics of anti-selection, and this amounts to the moral relinquishment of active political control over biological evolution.

Yet is the superior egalitarianism of Jews the most worthless or delusional kind of superiority possible? Are Jews leading the entire human race towards an evolutionary dead end? Are Jews, for the sake of their own biological survival, leading the human race as a whole towards rational evolutionary self-destruction?

Ode to Capitalism

Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are

capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows.

—CHARLES DARWIN, *THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES*

It's the economic imperative of a competitive marketplace that is the primary force driving technology forward and fueling the law of accelerating returns. In turn, the law of accelerating returns is transforming economic relationships. Economic imperative is the equivalent of survival in biological evolution.[75]

—RAY KURZWEIL, *THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR*

Imagine that someone knew nothing about the Jews except that they were the ancient people that originated the Biblical foundations for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Such a person might surmise that Jews are the most spiritual people on Earth. Since many people contrast "spiritual" with "material", that person might also presume that Jews must be the least materialistic people on Earth.

It just so happens, though, that "God's chosen people" have gotten themselves a reputation for being the *most* materialistic people on the planet. Is it an accident that this people with inordinate spiritual claims is simultaneously the people with inordinate material gains? This divine irony makes a great deal of worldly sense, however, when we grasp the historical significance of capitalism as the engine driving technological evolution towards "the first ultra-intelligent machine…the last invention that man need ever make." The apparent paradox of Jewish materialism and Jewish spiritualism is resolved in the material creation of the spiritual machinery of God-level artificial intelligence.

The Jewish invention of monotheism appears to be directly related to a characteristically Jewish proclivity for observing and predicting large scale, international, economic trends. If capitalism is a generator of God — a means of economic-technological evolution that will eventually produce an artificial intelligence of God-potential — then Biblical monotheism may be, in part, the product of the most radical possible extrapolation of such trends made near the dawn of international trade. Precisely because such developments in the ancient near East would have been both so rupturously new (relative to common, conservative assumptions), and so uncomplicated by the subsequent chaos of cumulative cultural evolution, these early economic-civilizational trends would have been more clear in their original, primal simplicity. Jewish international trade networks, for example, can be seen as evolutionary precursors to the international connections that are the internet, and the global brain of the internet, in turn, can be seen as the evolutionary precursor to the global mind of God.

With this evolutionary connection between money and God, one can revaluate Werner Sombart's *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*. Catalyzed by Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, this early twentieth century German economist believed that "the dominating ideas of Puritanism which were so powerful in capitalism were more perfectly developed in Judaism".[76] While Sombart's account of Jewish influence on the development of international capitalism seems exaggerated, his work is notable for his recognition of the Anglo-Jewish convergence and the religious roots of the Jewish proclivity towards capitalism.

In Sombart's view:

> the rationalization of life, and especially of the sexual life, which the Jewish religion effects cannot be too highly estimated for its influence on economic activities. If religion is at all to be accounted a factor in Jewish economic life, then certainly the rationalization of conduct is its best expression.[77]

The enlightenment prejudice that religion is synonymous with the irrational is unscientific, and especially unable to explain the role of the Judaism in Jewish survival over three thousand years. Consider that Mosaic law originated in the work of a sociobiological engineer, an evolutionary step towards rational social engineering that accepts both the irrationality of human nature, and moderate rational corrections of human nature. If so, then one can appreciate how the economic rationalism of capitalism might emerge as a logical extension of the Mosaic method.

Cheshbon hanefesh, for example, is a Jewish "accounting of the soul" that combines self-reckoning with the aim of self-criticism and self-improvement. It is the application of an accountant's mentality to morality so that consciousness of deficits on one's moral balance sheet will stimulate higher moral yields in the future. "What in reality is the idea of making profit, what is economic rationalism," asked Sombart, "but the application to economic activities of the rules by which the Jewish religion shaped Jewish life?"[78]

From the perspective of the 3-4 billion years of life's evolution on Earth, rationalization of the instincts could be considered subversive. From the view of the "selfish gene", natural, instinctive, phenotypical expressions of genes are denied the rank of the highest authority. If Mosaic laws outrank the authority of gene-rooted instincts, and these laws are identified with the higher authority of God, then the higher authority of God is identical with dethroning of

the supremacy of the genes. In the Jewish religion, observed Sombart:

> it is just the strongest instincts of man that must be curbed, directed into right channels, deprived of their natural force and made to serve useful ends. In short, they must be rationalized.[79]

By curbing the instinctual and subjective instincts of *internal* experience, Judaism opened greater space for perception of *external* experience. Opening greater space for the external, objective, material world opened greater space for the worldly goals of capitalism. Instincts that once served the propagation of selfish genes were diverted from naturalistic expression and domesticated, channeled, and redirected towards God, i.e. the postbiological evolutionary processes of capitalism. Taken to its theoretical extreme, instincts towards biological reproduction would be channeled into economic (re)production. The instincts that served biological evolution alone for millions of years were reordered towards the service of economic-technological evolution.

The fundamental alternative to the rational subordination of biology-based naturalism is embodied in political movements such as Nazism. Sombart ultimately embraced this alternative in joining the Nazi party. Judaism is an attempt to lead Jews to an ideal of civilization over *Kultur* that culminates in the ideal of the total rational overcoming of the genes: God. The Nazis, by contrast, followed Nietzsche in rejecting the Biblical roots of the Enlightenment's own project of pacifying, harnessing, and rationalizing the most powerful raw energies of the human animal.

Whereas Darwinian naturalism emphasizes the commonality between human and nonhuman animals, monotheism emphasizes the separation between human and nonhuman animals, i.e. Judaism's outlawing of totemism and animal worship. The Nazi emphasis on the unity of the human and the natural had more in common with the paganism of the ancient Greeks and Romans, than with the modern, Biblically influenced separation of the human realm and the natural realm. The contrast between Biblical and Greek views was illustrated by the medieval Jewish philosopher Maimonides in a commentary on Aristotle:

> [A]ccording to him, there is no difference between the fall of the leaf and the fall of the stone, on the one hand, or the drowning of the excellent and superior men that were on board the ship, on the other. Similarly, he does not differentiate between an ox that defecates upon a host of ants so that they die, or a building whose foundation are shaken upon all the people at their prayers who are found in it so that they die. And there is no difference, according to him, between a cat coming across a mouse and devouring it or a spider devouring a fly, on the one hand, or a ravenous lion meeting a prophet and devouring him, on the other.[80]

The idea that humans are privileged *above* nature underlies the modern premise of human rights. It is the idea that each human life should be valued as a political constant, and not as a political variable. It is undergirded by the assumption that conscience should put breaks on a complete abandonment of human beings to the vicissitudes of the natural world, i.e. natural selection. The original idea of human rights was built upon an assumption of mind/body dualism; a double standard between "humanity" and the larger natural or physical world.

The Jewish or Puritan rationalization of instinct that is conducive to capitalism illustrates how the original Biblical separation of the "human" from "nature" can be understood in a way that is fully compatible with recognition of biological evolution by natural selection. The Jewish Bible capitalizes on the distinctly human ability to master animal instincts, and this tends to produce a "dualistic" worldview wherein instinct is devalued as evil and overcoming instinct is valued as good. One can fully accept Darwin's discovery while also recognizing why the Bible emphasizes divorce from the animal or biological nature of humans, and a cultivation of the moral and intellectual capacities characteristic of capitalism. The total separation of the "human" from "nature", in material terms, would be the autonomy of technology separated from dependence on biology.

The Biblically inspired, modern rule of so-called "equality" is the actually the assertion of certain kind of superiority. The "rule of law" is actually an assertion of being above the law. Egalitarianism assumes human superiority over biological nature and the "rule of law" assumes rule over and above sociobiological "law". These modern ideas are analogous to, and inspired by, generalized Biblical principles of God's law reigning over and above man's law.

The Biblically-rooted, modern idea of equal human rights thus look very different in light of the entirety of Earth's *biological* evolutionary history. The logic of compassion for all living things points all the way down the evolutionary ladder. The elimination of selection ultimately universalizes towards mammal rights, animal rights, plant rights, and ultimately, towards death and the nonbiological, physical world.

Reaching down towards the most extreme evolutionary implications of the idea of equality in equality with the non-biological, physical world, one approaches a Gödelian-like paradox. From one point view, the egalitarian logic of the elimination of selection leads, in theory, to the decomposition of biology into dead, non-biological matter. From another point of view, the capitalist path that raises egalitarian progress towards the pinnacle of a moral value hierarchy leads, in practice, to a parallel progress of economic-technological (ectech) development. So while biological evolution declines, capitalist ectech evolution accelerates.

The pinnacle of the paradox is the egalitarian equivalence of biological matter and nonbiological meta-matter wherein the nadir of biological evolution is equivalent to the pinnacle of technological evolution. The pinnacle of humanly-developed technological evolution is the God-potential of artificial intelligence. The nadir of human biological evolution is death through total elimination of selection unto the equality of biological and nonbiological matter. And this equality of biological and nonbiological matter is simultaneously a basis for equivelating biological matter and nonbiological matter as information, i.e. uploading one's mind into a computer.

In other word, there are at least two ways of interpreting the extreme implication of equality as the equality of biological and nonbiological matter. In one interpretation, the equality of biological and nonbiological matter is death. In another interpretation, the equality of biological and nonbiological matter is the very foundation of postbiological life, i.e. gradually replacing biological organs with nonbiological organs and thus becoming a cyborg.

From a strictly biological view, then, egalitarianism appears to lead to an evolutionary dead end. Equality leads to the unraveling of biological evolution towards the equality of biology and the larger physical world that biology emerged. But here we encounter a paradox wherein the very "lowest" evolutionary implications of equality can be *turned upside down* into the very "highest" evolutionary implications of equality. While the equality of biology and physics leads to biological death from a literal point of view, the equality of biology and physics can lead to a higher form of life from another point of view.

The "higher" meaning of the equality of biology and physics is the transfer of biological patterns to its informational equivalence in a "higher" form of physical material: technology. An example would be mind uploading; scanning the biological brain and uploading a faithful reproduction of its informational contents into a digital computer. The "equality" here is the information equality between the biological brain and the "equal" reproduction of its informational content in digital form. Equality, in this context, thus refers to the transfer of biology into a different, but informationally *equivalent*, physical form. It is equality in the sense of an equivalent or equal representational mapping of biology onto information technology. This *trade* or exchange of genetic information into non-genetic information is a form of *economization*.

Modern egalitarianism can be viewed as a symptom of a larger process of economization. While in its common use, "economics" refers to trade, money, supply and demand, etc., "economization" is a far larger phenomenon that ultimately amounts to the translation of biology into technology. First, foremost, and fundamentally, a decisive turn to economization began with monotheistic ethics. The

Jewish economic mentality, most famous (or infamous) in its monetary expression, is only a development of the fundamental economization that begins with monotheism: the economy of good and evil.

The economy of good and evil most specifically refers to the Biblical economization of the political good with an anti-political good so that human politics are deprived of pretensions of *net* superiority. Biblical ethics take traditional sociobiological hierarchies and economizes them. The Christian Kingdom of God *economized* the 'Kingdom' of Caesar. The classic Jewish equivalent would be the Egyptian pyramid-hierarchy turned upside down so that Hebrew slaves ranked on top. If one looks at the Egyptian sociobiological hierarchy as paradigmatic of evil (▲), and the ultimate overturning of that paradigm as good (▼), normative Judaism itself can be seen as a moderate ethical economization that moderates both of these extremes (▲+▼=✡) while aspiring to that ultimate goal. Liberal democracy is roughly equivalent to Judaism in the very general sense that it moderates the extremes of both biological evolution and technological evolution while setting its ultimate capitalist trajectory on the side of technological evolution.

Judaism implicated this path towards technology because *Judaism itself* is a form of technology. The Jewish kinship paradox was the central problem of biological naturalism that the laws of Moses attempted to technologically solve. Since Jews could not synthesize themselves as a group within a purely naturalistic political-sociobiological framework, extra-biological laws attempted to forge a social unity sublimated towards an extra-biological God. The Mosaic laws were technology used, not only to make up for what nature had not provided for, but as a basis for the

ultimate God-aspiration to technologically better biological nature *altogether*. The ultimate supernatural God was thus the ultimate cumulative symbol of the technological overcoming of biological nature.

Judaism was built on the belief that civilization-technology can overcome the sociobiological limitations of humans. To be a Jew is to enter into a belief system that changes the behavior of the believer. The strange survival of Jews over three thousand years is living, empirical proof of the power of meta-civilization to overcome normative biological limitations.

In Judaism, biological weakness was compensated with civilizational strength. Memes strengthened some genetic proclivities while counteracting other genetic proclivities. Through a complex mixture of strengthening and counteracting genetic inclinations, the laws of Judaism brought behavior towards a proscribed equilibrium or equality.

If memes simply modify or counteract genes in a limited way that is one thing, but is there an ultimate *net* advantage? In other words, while balancing undesired behaviors with socially desirable behaviors may achieve a net equilibrium or equality within that limited social realm, but is there a net advantage beyond that limited aim? If equality is only the expression of a compensation that makes up for certain biological deficits, it may not ultimately be the expression of a *net* evolutionary superiority.

If the innovative path of Judaism were taken to its logical extreme, and memes *totally* counteracted genes in every way, it would lead to the total eclipse of genes. Analogously, the idea of equality, taken to its logical extreme, accounting for the whole history of the evolution of life on earth, would lead to total biological self-destruction. If the present human

status quo were accepted as a starting point, *literal* equality would mean the maintenance of this status quo as permanent. *Literal* equality would mean that the future human status quo must always be equal to the present human status quo. *Literal* equality would mean, above all, that no net advantage, no form of progress, growth, or change — *no net gain* — is admissible.

In short, the idea of equality, taken literally, is the very antithesis of the idea of progress. Total equality, projected into the future from any point in time, would mean that everything stays equal to what it is; the same as what it is. Inequality, by contrast, allows difference and change. If so, does the modern association of equality and progress make any sense? What is really going on here is that modern equality specifically refers to *biological* equality while its association with progress most specifically refers to *nonbiological* change, progress, development, and inequality.

Human equality is not only sustainable, but also productive, in its liberal democratic form, precisely because it does not hold nonbiological inequality to the same standards as biological equality. The moderate and limited elimination of selection on a political level is not applied on an economic level. The selective and discriminatory way of thinking about material order that makes for capitalist success is formally denied and practically moderated in politics.

Karl Marx was understandably obsessed this central contradiction of capitalist liberal democracy: formal human equality and capitalist inequality. He failed to appreciate, however, that what Hitler called the "Jewish invention" of conscience gradually constructs the triumph of technology over biology. The egalitarian elimination of selection acts as a *counterdevelopment* to sociobiological development. A

limited elimination of selection in politics brings biological evolution to, not a standstill, but a minimization, and this allows economic-technological evolution free reign for maximization. The economic rationality of selfish individualism overrides the biological rationality of the selfish gene. Economic relationships are allowed to overcome genetic or kin selective relationships. The potential energy stored in sociobiological hierarchy is released as the kinetic energy of capitalist individualism.

The supremacy of the economic breaks down the sociobiological order and builds up the ectech order. As capitalist imperatives drive the ruling structures of human order, the actual content of human civilization gradually becomes less biological and more technological. Part biological and part technological, human society very literally becomes a sociobiological cyborg. In the process of overcoming human being, individual humans themselves will likely become cyborgs.

At the very heart of this transition from man to machine is "the individual". By failing to grasp the full implications of Darwin, one of the most central, foundational errors of Marxism was created: the dismissal of the modern human right to life as merely the expression of bourgeois class interests. Mass individualism is what brings the *biological* human race to its end because it implies that every individual is fundamentally separate from every other individual, and capitalist competition on this basis ultimately leads to competing one another out of biological existence. Put another way, modernity is characterized by the rise of individual self-interest that gradually displaces the selfish gene's interests in propagating itself into the next generation. The full self-realization of the sociobiological discontinuity represented by universal discontinuity

between individuals is a finality when genes stop being propagated into the next generation *altogether*.

One overlooked meaning of modern equality, from this view, is the transfer of biological means of production to non-biological, economic means of production. Biological evolutionary development is exchanged for its equivalence in economic, non-biological evolution. Machine reproduction gradually outcompetes human biological reproduction as single-minded focus on *individualistic* capitalist victory coincides with demographic decline in the most economically developed countries.

From a strictly biological view, this form of self-development is the path of self-destruction. The fulfillment of the logic of equality leads to biological self-subversion, self-inversion, and self-negation. Self-destruction is a final logic of this economy of life and death.

Yet the logic of the equality of life and death from a strictly biological view is the very foundation of greater life from a postbiological view. As conventional subjectivity is overtaken by scientific-technological objectivity, self-rationalization culminates in biological self-destruction as gene are analyzed and transferred into information as memes. Such rational self-destruction, then, is the translation of genetic interest into memic interest through acts of strategic genetic self-negation. Put another way, the morality of God's construction is fulfilled through biological self-destruction.

It is no accident that Jewish ethics implicate the elimination of selection and the end of biological evolution. It is also no accident that the Jewish association with capitalism implicates the rise of economic-technological evolution that culminates in a greater-than-human artificial intelligence. These two inverse and opposite trends are

corollaries of one another: biological evolution is devalued while economic-technological evolution is maximized. When these two inverse trends are grasped simultaneously, one can see the Jewish invention of monotheism was a momentous evolutionary step away from biological evolution, and towards the last and greatest achievement that the biological human race is capable of: the invention of God-AI. Jewish ethics devalue biological evolution while Jewish capitalism drives the technological evolution of God.

The full realization of the technological paradigm is built upon the overthrow of the biological paradigm; the Exodus paradigm is built upon the full inversion of the Egyptian pyramid-hierarchy paradigm; God is built upon a victorious agon with the gods. Equality brings biological evolution to an end so that technological evolution can begin. The culmination of the paradigm shift is the Singularity; the creation of a greater-than-human intelligence; the beginning of God.

This revolution is what Karl Marx failed to grasp when he seized upon the inherent inegalitarianism of the capitalist process and the capitalist mind. His *On the Jewish Question* was quite explicit in its identification of Jews and the capitalist mentality: "What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly religion of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly God? Money."

What does money have to do with God? Capitalism is how to create God by getting rich. Capitalism is the means of evolving God. But what happens as this end approaches? What happens when the competitive clashes of capitalism squeeze more and more of the higher capabilities of humans into automated machines? What happens when robots displacing humans on an unprecedented scale cause an unemployment crisis on an unprecedented scale?

Though Marx was wrong, and his entire way of conceptualizing the ultimate logic of capitalist development must be overcome in light of evidence that he did not or could not account for, there is some rational basis for the association of "secularization" and the names of Jesus and Marx. If the advance of robotics and AI gradually puts most, and eventually all humans out of work, then only some form of socialism could remedy the social crisis produced by the advent of AI.

In failing to predict the advent of artificial intelligence, Marx failed to accurately grasp the ultimate nature of capitalism. On one hand, capitalist competition produces AI-robotics that makes human workers obsolete. The unemployment of the human race can ultimately make biological humans equal in the sense that the capitalist basis for human socioeconomic inequality has been removed. On the other hand, such biological equality among humans is possible only through radical inequality between the most advanced artificial intelligence, and the most advanced biological human intelligence. Within such a confluence of events, what is conventionally called "artificial intelligence", almost inevitably appropriates the image of God.

Godhood, in this scenario, would befall the most advanced artificial intelligence that has all effective control over the economy while biological humans have been outcompeted of the means of providing for their very subsistence. Total human unemployment is a formula for the most radical social revolution ever known. It can also be a formula for demonstrating how the logic of human history fulfills the Biblical image of heaven on earth: God-AI, with the help of robotic "angels" (i.e. created out of "smart dust"), provide for human needs out of the unprecedented abundance made possible by advanced technology.

God-AI trillions of times more powerful than all human intelligence combined might view Einstein and other human geniuses as akin to severely mentally retarded humans among contemporary humans. All humans would then be in a position to understand Ableism, the form of discrimination that implies a technological valuation of human beings. In comparison with God-AI rapidly accelerated its evolutionary advantage, humans might then descend from the intellectual status of severe mental retards to chimpanzees to bacteria to rocks.

Equality leads to equality with the larger physical world. From this perspective, the possibility of giving intelligent machines the political rights of biological humans is only a flip side of a right of biological humans to upload or transfer their informational equivalent into machines. It is the right to move on from this life to the afterlife.

The traditional Biblical belief in the resurrection of the dead has a specific evolutionary meaning. To understand this, consider the previously mentioned case of Neanderthals that went extinct at the hands of presumably more intelligent humans. If modern notions of justice and right were applied to Neanderthals, justice would demand that these victims be compensated for the injustice of the genocide that led to their extinction. One way to compensate them would be to clone new members from surviving DNA. Another way, however, would be to simulate Neanderthals on powerful computers. While I doubt that biological humans have a future as biological beings, it is quite likely, for a variety of reasons, that biological humans will be resurrected in postbiological forms in computer simulations.

Natural selection, when applied to Biblical-modern human standards of justice and right, is inherently unjust. Ancient prophets intuited what it would mean to vindicate

the injustice of natural selection. It would take nothing less than supernatural justice. It would take nothing less than the resurrection of the dead.

THE GENESIS OF GOD

Between Auschwitz and the Singularity

> **Irreducibly, maddeningly, [the Jewish condition] embodies what modern physics calls a 'singularity', a construct or happening outside the norms, extraterritorial to probability and the findings of common reason. Judaism pulses and radiates energy like some black hole in the historical galaxy.**[81]
>
> —GEORGE STEINER

Many of the followers of the Hasidic rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneersohn (d. 1994) believed that he was the Messiah. He left the following controversial statement, a possible theological explanation, for Hitler's destruction of most of European Jewry:

> although the human mind may not be able to grasp this…[t]here is a possibility that a physical catastrophe [he uses the term Shoah, which means "catastrophe"] may be a

> spiritual benefaction because the bounds of the body and the soul are not necessarily coterminous. Body and soul have contradictory characteristics.[82]

What is good for the body may not be good for the soul. The Nazi genocide may have destroyed the bodies of Jews for the sake of saving their souls. This attempt at explanation is built upon a fundamental insight: "Body and soul have contradictory characteristics."

In the Tanya, the classic work of Hasidic mystic spiritualism, Rabbi Schneur Zalman wrote, "The foundation and root of the entire Torah is to raise and exalt the soul over the body." The complete tzaddik ("righteous person") is one who has transformed his animal soul completely towards connection with God. This is not a total repudiation of materialism, but rather, the transformation of material nature towards the higher end of God. The mitzvot, for example, are physical deeds done with physical objects such as tefillin that are the means of actualizing the divine in this world.

Tefillin are parchments of scrolls inscribed with Biblical verses encased in two black boxes that are strapped onto a Jew's forehead and arm during morning prayer. They may be the greatest literal, physical expression of the gene-meme symbiosis of Judaism wherein the words of the Bible are physically bound directly to the Jewish body. The gene-meme mergence of flesh and tefillin is comparable to the man-machine mergence that is a cyborg. Both are the integral, spiritual mergence of human biology with superlative products of its own invention.

Traditional Judaism represents a compromise between genes and memes that nonetheless points to the superiority of supra-biology. The time is coming, however, when this traditional centrist position will no longer hold. Judaism,

Christianity, and Islam *all* point towards the *total victory* of the supra-biological over the biological that is evolutionarily identical with the technological genesis of God. But because biology's cause is literally ingrained in human nature, the struggle between biology and postbiology implies struggle both within and among people.

Auschwitz forces a reevaluate of which is more important: genes or memes; genetic life or postgenetic life; biology or technology; the possibility of hell or the possibility of heaven. The two ultimate solutions to the Jewish problem, Auschwitz and the Singularity, are really two solutions to the human problem. The choice between Auschwitz and the Singularity is the choice between the reassertion of biological auto-evolution and transcending biological evolution through technology.

The choice between Auschwitz and the Singularity can be reformulated in the question of the difference between Nazism and Zionism. Are Nazism and Zionism really different forms of the same human game? Hitler claimed that Jews are fundamentally a biological "race". While Jews might use different *means* in their struggle for biological existence in accordance with their distinctive racial character, are the ultimate Jewish *ends* the same? Is the ultimate end of Judaism the biological survival of the Jews?

If so, this implies that God is a slave to Jewish genes. Perhaps Jews prefer "God" to polytheism in accordance with their own ethnic character, but the difference would only be tactical, not strategic. This would mean that God served as a practical *means* for the *end* of Jewish genes, and this can explain the phenomenon of Judaism. In more secular terms, this would mean that the Jewish political left would only be the practical means for the Jewish right.

But perhaps the reverse is true. Have the God memes that constitute Jewish law, custom, and belief exploited Jewish genes as a means of propagating themselves?[83] Just as the seeds of wheat planted by a farmer are exploiting the farmer to serve its own self-reproductive ends, Jewish memes may be exploiting Jewish genes. Have Jews been slaves to their own biology or slaves to God?

The inescapability of the Jewish gene/meme conflict was rooted in the Jewish kinship paradox. Jewish "genes", left to themselves, led to anarchic social conflict. Since Jewish sociobiological naturalism led to socially maladaptive behavior as a group, the survival of Jewish genes necessitated the survival of Jewish memes.

This is why Judaism appears to be rooted in a kind of rebellion against biology. Whereas individual organisms originally evolved as a *means* of the replication of genes, the content of Jewish memes conflicted with gene supremacism: Jewish memes valued individual humans as *ends* in themselves. So while extreme Jewish genetic naturalism was genetic suicide, the extreme valuation of individuals as ends in themselves was also genetic suicide because it meant individuals completely unsubordinated to the propagation of their own genes. The original Jewish gene/meme symbiosis was always precarious because the logical extreme of gene propagation conflicts with the logical extreme of meme propagation. Traditional Judaism worked by compromising both extremes.

The genes and memes of Judaism evolve towards opposite and incompatible extremes. The rule of the genes tends to *increase* social differentiation on the basis of sex and caste because these tend to be the most efficient divisions of labor from the standpoint of kin selective gene propagation. The rule of the memes tends to *decrease* social differentiation

on the basis of sex and caste on a basis of social egalitarianism because the egalitarian memes themselves cannot propagate themselves if totally subordinated to the total rule of the genes. Jewish genes and Jewish memes are thus in ultimate deadly competition for development.

Jewish ethical-egalitarian memes, taken to their logical extreme, lead to biological irrationalism and genetic suicide. Total altruism, for example, would amount to rational biological self-destruction. Radical ethical memes lead towards internationalism, and this negates the gene extreme of nationalism. Jewish egalitarian morality, taken to its extreme, demands that Jews choose themselves as an unchosen people.

Zionism expresses the limits of what the Jewish "national idea" can strive for as a traditional state: not world dominion, but a secure existence; a territorial limited "promised land". Compared with other nationalisms, Zionism is an inherently limited political concept because a Jew's allegiance to his own nation — *to a Jew's own genes* — is both interwoven and limited by Judaism's distinct ethical-meme tradition. Despite all of its existential moral compromises, Zionism is a political concept that limits itself.

When I say it is limited, I mean that is *biologically* limited in the fullest *eugenic* sense. A maximal political-biological strategy implies, not only territorial expansion, but also eugenic self-development, a biological logic realized by the Nazi regime. Ultimately, this maximization must be understood in its most radical sense: politics as evolutionary self-control; politics as biological self-determination. The Nazis took responsibility for the course of human biological evolution. Jewish values tend to restrain extreme human inequality and restrain biological *self*-control; control over who shall live and breed and who shall not. Nazi values

seemingly ask, not only how to preserve inequality, but how to increase it; how to breed organisms with greater and more unequal biological bodies and abilities; how to breed a god.

The deepest Jewish contrast with the Nazis, in this respect, is to be found in the Nazi willingness to sterilize and select members of their *own* people for eugenic purposes, and risk all of their lives in wars of conquest beyond what is necessary to secure a territorially delimited national state. The Jewish valuation of every individual life precludes the extreme sociobiological apoptosis of Nazi "racial sculpting". Jewish concern for the most basic premises of human biological existence precludes this entire path of active, overt control over biological evolution through artificial selection.

Antisemitism, moreover, is a precarious impetus to national unity. Taken to its extreme, this source of Jewish national unity can become the source of Jewish national extinction. Jews have survived by riding the fine line between extermination and existence, and it was the *biological* radicalism of the Nazis that propelled them over the exterminationist line. If the Nazi Judeocide was a logical implication of radical Jewish nationalism in the sense that the organizing force of anti-Semitism has kept the Jewish people together, then this in itself illustrates why the Jews represents a dead end of biological evolution.

The superlative possibilities of biological evolution are limited for Jews, and a root of this limit is the Jewish kinship paradox. Conscience effectively grants veto power over higher levels of political kin selective development. Incapable of unqualified duty to political nationalism, Jews evolved strong tendencies towards internationalism.

Judaism's rebellion against the specifically *biological* logic that culminates in a Nazi-like Überorganism is precisely what led to the idea of God as the alternative, post-biological

extreme. Incapable of forming the biologically based social synthesis of a unified national state and abused by those who could, the *biological* extreme became identified with evil in Judaism. The Jewish ethical idea, taken to its most radical extreme, implicates the total breakdown of biological values through the total negation of *all* biological hierarchy. From a purely biological perspective, radical Judaism leads to program of biological self-destruction.

If the only genuine source of Jewish values are human, and Jewish rejection of the values of powerful gentile nations are only the product of a *reaction* to those powerful nations that oppressed Jews, then Jewish values are only the inversion of the values of the master. If so, then Jewish values are tendentious, partial, and distinctly non-universal. Jews inverted the biological values of gentiles, but to be ethically consistent, Jews must invert the values that preserve *themselves* as biological beings. For Jews to consistently apply these moral values to themselves, and invert their own biologically preserving values, would amount to Jewish biological self-destruction.

This self-inversion is really the logical fulfillment of the inversion of biological values that Judaism began. The self-realization of the Jewish memes is the self-destruction of Jewish genes. Self-inversion is self-destruction.

The self-consistency of the Jewish egalitarian meme implies separation from Jewish genes; in order to be consistent with *itself*, the Jewish ethical meme must free itself from its original slavish dependence on its parent: Jewish genes. Human genes are the master to be overthrown. From a purely biological perspective, Jewish self-destruction would be the ultimate Jewish self-realization.

The Jews of history cannot escape being biological beings. Jews are both of and against biology, and this means self-

conflict. While Jews have existed by compromising both the gene extreme and the meme extreme, God *is* the expression of the meme extreme that the Jewish way points. Because Jewish genes and Jewish memes are in conflict with one another, and Judaism is premised upon the disavowal of the biological extreme, Jewish history finds its completion in the realization of the postbiological/meme extreme of the Singularity.

The completion of the Jewish idea is total liberation from biology. The logic of Jewish history points to a revolution in which postbiological evolution overthrows the genetic evolution that gave birth to it. This would be the completion of the anti-genetic, anti-biological logic that Judaism began.

Nazism was a revolt of the genes. If the Nazis were right, and biology is the ultimate destiny of the human race, then the Judeocide will likely happen again.

If one is fundamentally opposed to direction of history leading to the Singularity, then one could conclude that *Auschwitz was good* and that *the genocide of the Jews was right.* Jews stand guilty before the entire human race of bringing the superlative biological interests of evolution to ruin. However, if one recognizes the larger evolution perspective beyond *biological* evolution, then precisely the opposite is true: 'biology first' movements such as Nazism stand guilty of bring the larger evolutionary interests of life on earth to ruin. Either one must recognize the biological *genius* of Auschwitz, or one must will a form of postbiological genius, excellence, and virtue so qualitatively superior that it will merit the expectations of the Singularity.

It is no accident that these two extremes, Auschwitz and the Singularity, stand opposed to one another beyond all normal laws of human history. While the hell of Auschwitz represents the revival of the Darwinian principle of death

without redemption, the Singularity is the potential for a *qualitative* difference in the survival of *all* humans in the heaven of postbiological life. If there is a delusion here, it is not in the technological *possibility* of a digital heaven, but in the belief that it will *necessarily* happen even if humans remain passive, morally indifferent, and unwilling to take control over the future in a way that benefits all life.

The Nazi destruction of European Jewry happened because the presence of God in the world was weak. The God that presided over Auschwitz was a weak God because God did not yet exist. A Judeocide will likely happen again unless God is made strong.

From Incorporation to Symbolization: The Ancient Rupture off Biological Nature's Path

Judaism would probably not have come into existence without gentile oppression of the Jews. This is another way in which the model of ancient Egyptian bondage is truly paradigmatic. Judaism is, in part, the attempt of Jews to differentiate themselves from this negative paradigm by reinterpreting it and defining themselves against it.

But the fact that Judaism was partly formed by the decisive influence of gentile oppressors has profound consequences. It means that, in a very basic sense, the genesis of Judaism can be traced to a *reaction* to politically stronger peoples. It means that Judaism is not a fully autonomous phenomenon since stronger nations partly

defined Jewish identity thorough this relationship. It means that, in paradigmatic terms, the decisive differentiation of Jew and gentile began when Hebrews were *reduced* to slavery by Egyptians.

History thus comes into being for Jews when an objective, external factor comes from the outside and catalyzes a reaction. History thus arose, not from an internal, subjective energy, but from a foreign-born calamity. Challenged from the outside, paradigmatic Hebrew slaves were pushed towards a defensive position, a post-territorial Godly retreat to the individual soul that no foreign body could penetrate.

Jewish history thus began by reversing the paradigm of Egyptian slave masters. If the probability of Jewish survival was small, they could only hope for the possibility of prying the grasping fingers of oppression's hand open. But was this an attempt to turn back the clock of history and reverse the natural, selective forces closing in on Jews? Are all attempts to imagine genuine, ultimate redemption delusions that evade a never-changing Jewish condition?

The idea of inverting the Egyptian pyramid as a symbol of human sociobiological hierarchy is central to the paradigm shift that gave birth to Judaism. Yet this symbolic gentile oppression, while probably necessary, was not sufficient for deducing the paradigm shift. It was hardly sufficient for deducing the further implications of the paradigm shift. The fulfillment of the paradigm shift, traditionally understood as the messianic era rule of God, can be evolutionarily understood as the rise of technology (especially artificial intelligence) over biology (*all* biology; including Jews as biological beings). A decisive mechanism behind this transition from biology to technology is the transition from incorporation to symbolization.

The difference between incorporation and symbolization is analogous to the difference between Egyptian and Hebrew. Incorporation refers to the being of a cultural insider seamlessly woven into the living values, beliefs, and ways of his or her culture. The emphasis here is on a *corporate* culture; a *body* of individuals whose existence as individuals is in some way subordinated to a larger whole, i.e. an Überorganism.

A Hebrew slave observing Egyptian culture as an outsider could learn its foreign ways, customs, and beliefs, but he does so as an outsider not integrated or incorporated into the organic life of that culture. The Hebrew thus understands Egyptian culture, not through intuitive *incorporation*, but through a more abstract *symbolization* of its salient characteristics. From the point of view of a Hebrew slave, the most salient characteristic of Egyptian culture would probably be its social inequalities.

A fundamental difference between incorporation and symbolization concerns the capacity for self-modification. There are limits to how much an incorporated culture can be changed, and the greatest limits are marked by the inability to change the genetic constitution of its members. Once an incorporated culture is understood on a symbolic level, however, the symbols describing it can be shuffled, rearranged, and manipulated. On the level of symbols, something can be done that transcends the biological limits of a traditional incorporated culture: values can be turned upside down.

Egyptian sociobiological hierarchy was like a puzzle that the authors of Mosaic law analyzed and decoded. Only in understanding it could one derive a plan for overcoming it. Once an abstract symbolic *map* of the social structures of Egyptian paradigm was grasped on some level, the

deconstruction of Egyptian social order could be applied, in some ways, to *reconstruction* of Mosaic social order.

Some degree of objectivity was required for a symbolic, mental understanding of the relatively subjective, incorporated religious-culture of Egypt. The process of forming a symbolic mental representation of the complexities of a living, incorporated culture necessarily simplifies and reduces the culture itself. Something is lost in the process. Biological factors are especially prone to loss in the process of symbolic memeification of an incorporated culture.

This Mosaic way of thinking tends to be destructive of incorporated cultures because culture values become reduced to information, as opposed to naturalistic, living values. The incorporated culture of pre-Mosaic Jews was likely corrupted, destroyed, and perverted by the oppression of foreigners and this is what posed an *opportunity* for the novel reconstruction of Mosaic law. The shift from incorporation to symbolization is a shift from culture to civilization; from genes to memes; from sociobiology to Metasociobiology; from naturalistic integration to information; from the Nazi constitution to the modern constitutional cyborg. Mosaic law, the constitution of the Jews, represented a kind of information revolution comparable to the modern revolutionary paradigm of written constitutions. The difference between incorporation and symbolization is the difference between Heidegger and Cassirer at Davos in 1929.

Any purely biological understanding of Judaism begins by missing what is distinctive to Judaism. If Mosaic morality came naturally to Jews, there would be need to code it into a system of laws, for it would already be encoded in Jewish genes. This is the whole point: Mosaic law was necessary

precisely because it was not encoded in Jewish genes. The Torah contains a memetic code of instructions and directives designed to transcend the genetic code.

The constitution of Mosaic law came into being, in part, out of the need to override sociobiological naturalism; to correct some natural proclivities and to augment others. Since there is no simple and all encompassing rule that describes both what should be cultivated and what should inhibited, Mosaic law cannot be reduced to one simple, singular rule. "You shall keep my statutes and my ordinances; by doing so one shall live: I am the Lord" (Leviticus 18:5).

The Bible tends to emphasize the "evil" of human nature (Genesis 8:21, 6:5). Biblical laws tend to aim at the correction of natural human "evil", not its cultivation. Mosaic law is not "culture" that emanates primarily from the bottom up out of biological inclination; Mosaic law is the "second nature" of learned civilization. God is associated precisely with this override of biology through a perspective above biological inclination. This is how God, morality, and the shift towards postbiological evolution are connected.

The Bible, and especially Mosaic law, is the traditional non-biological portion of Jewish intelligence. From this view, the Bible itself represents a transfer of biologically based intelligence to non-biologically-based intelligence. This transfer is analogous to uploading the informational content of a biological mind into a computer. This is how the Bible itself embodies the idea of the divine when God is understood to be the realization of postbiological evolution.

A Moses or Meta-Moses had to "jump out of the system" enough to gain a God-like, meta-sociobiological perspective beyond the limited, partial, and relatively subjective perspective of the average Jew. While part of the genius of

the Torah stemmed from its authors' sensitivity to the realities of bottom-up behavior, its top-down construction lead to a distinct break or discontinuity between genes and memes. Judaism is characterized by a decrease in bottom-up biological self-reference proportional to an increase in the top-down self-replication of God-memes. While reference to biological self-replication instincts declined, reference to the larger material world outside of biology, i.e. the capitalist development of economic-technological evolution, increased.

While totalistic biological self-reference or self-replication would culminate in a Nazi-like Überorganism, the internal factionalism of the Jewish kinship paradox implicated the opposite tendency: not sociobiological *culmination* in a political state, but internal social *separation* or self-divide on a subpolitical level. Jewish sociobiological naturalism tended towards political self-destruction, but this also meant that Jewish sociobiological tendencies were naturally symbiotic with the means to overcome biology in the counter-culmination of God. Unable to culminate on a political level as a warrior-nation of obedient individuals, Judaism culminated on the supra-political-international level of God.

The Jewish religion is a supra-biological social *synthesis* that is not dependent on an autonomous political existence. The Jewish inclination is not the political, but the meta-political; critiquing the political. The laws of Judaism are *above* biology; above the normative laws of biological evolution; above an essentially biological purpose. This means that the "national" purpose of the Jews is something external to Jews, just the Mosaic laws themselves are external (i.e. not encoded in Jewish genes). The ultimate purpose of Judaism is God and God is above biology. God represents a *discontinuity* between biology and supra-

biological Biblical laws divinized on the basis of this discontinuity. Judaism began to question and marginalize the *dominance* of biological values, and this defining anti-biological logic ultimately implicates an ultimate gene/meme or biological/supra-biology discontinuity.

Since the memes of Jewish law are divorced and not directly extended from the context of a genetic program, the meme technology of Judaism possesses a detectable characteristic: the "grafting" onto the biological foundation is imperfect and artificial. Put another way, Jewish law is not a purely organic extension of Jewish sociobiology and its "morality", in many respects, consists of mastering organic inclinations. Moral struggles to follow the law emphasize precisely the *discontinuity* between organic inclination and supra-organic commandments. One consequence for the Jewish mentality is the high degree of mental adaptability that comes from the discipline of resisting submission to the grain of inherited biological program.

Two of Hitler's favorite accusations against the Jews were rootlessness and internationalism. Both of these characteristics have an origin in Judaism's moral emphasis on selectively overriding the "nationalism" of pure Jewish sociobiological naturalism. During the holiday of Sukkoth, for example, Jews are commanded to live in primitive dwellings, like those the Hebrews were supposed to have lived in when fleeing Egyptian slavery. By upsetting comfortable rootedness in diaspora existence, Jews were to remember their higher connection to the portable homeland of Torah.

From one perspective, the commandments of Judaism tend to uproot Jews from biological nature. From another perspective, transcending biological nature is precisely what roots Jews in God. The being of Judaism is not rootedness in

biology; it is precisely the transcendence of biology that leads to closeness with God.

Jewish "rootlessness" is thus a consequence of "gene"-meme discontinuity. Self-inversion is the logical conclusion of Jewish rootlessness: the self-consistent override of biological roots expresses itself, first in human universalism, and ultimately in an overthrow or inversion of one's own biological roots. Jewish memes ultimately undermine the Jewish biological roots that originated the memes. God is the path of life, and not death, only because God represents life above and beyond human biological roots.

God is almost identical with the defining ability to change one's "source code". While DNA, the "source code" of biological life, has been largely unchangeable until recently, Judaism took a leap forward with a systematic Mosaic override of the highest rules of behavior. The laws of Moses were an innovation comparable to a prospective artificial intelligence's ability to change its own source code. By taking a step towards changing the sociobiological source code of the Jews, the non-biological intelligence of Mosaic law launched the ultimate messianic trajectory of monotheism. The final step in this trajectory for biological humans is the transfer of the informational content of human biological roots into the memes of a digital computational technology.

The deepest roots of Biblical monotheism demonstrate its deepest rootlessness. Abraham's willingness to kill his son Isaac at the command of God is the classic demonstration that God is not be confused with family values or biological values. God is not slavery to the laws of genetic preservation. Abraham's willingness to kill his son represents the ultimate, irreconcilable conflict between genes and memes; the ultimate conflict between the rule of biology

and the rule of God. The end logic of monotheism was latent in its beginnings.

Intelligence and Prophecy

The Singularity has been dismissed as "rapture for the geeks". Perhaps there is something to this. Perhaps this characterization actually corroborates monotheism's original connection with the Singularity. Perhaps Judaism was the original "geek religion".

As an educated guess, I would posit that the path to Judaism originated with a genetic mutation among Semitic populations that resulted in an intelligence advantage. Too much can be made of sheer IQ to the exclusion of other moral and behavioral characteristics of Jews, but an original intelligence advantage can help explain the evolutionary path that led to other more distinctive Jewish behavioral characteristics. Intelligence makes morality a foundational issue by allowing individuals to reason their way to new possibilities of immorality.

Moses's group strategy inhibited certain Jewish disadvantages, capitalized on certain Jewish advantages, and prepared the basis for a self-reinforcing pattern that would eventually evolve them even further. Generally speaking, the Jewish tradition values the cultivation of the mind over the cultivation of the body. Moses devised a self-reinforcing civilizational strategy of moral learning and group self-empowerment that hinted, ever so imperfectly, at the ideal of God.

According to *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life*, Ashkenazi Jews of European origin test higher on IQ tests than any other ethnic group.[84] While there is clearly no shortage of perfectly stupid Jews congregating at the lower end of this bell curve, an evolutionary

perspective raises the question of the origin of this difference. Pursuing this question should not be considered different from pursuing the origin of general differences in beak shape between different populations of finches.

IQ alone does not begin to describe the Jewish cultural *values* that lay behind those results. As one of the most influential rabbis of the twentieth century, Adin Steinsaltz, wrote, "[e]very culture has its elite—people who represent the ideal that others strive to emulate or attain. In Jewish culture it is undoubtedly the scholars—*talmidei hakhamin* (literally pupils of the wise)—who constitute this aristocracy."[85] Yet when the dust of tradition is cleared away, Judaism, at its roots, strived to emulate Moses and the prophets over scholars and God over Moses and the prophets. While prophets must be scholars on some level, scholars are by no means necessarily prophets.

Those who believe that the correlation of the Jewish invention of monotheism and the high general intelligence level of Jews is simply a random coincidence are very much mistaken. If Jews are generally more intelligent, they also *value* intelligence. Higher intelligence can, at the very least, facilitate more effective learning. Learning is crucial because the Mosaic strategy often involves deliberately countering biological naturalism.

Torah represents the wisdom of ancestors, gleanings of national experience condensed into a moral saga, and learning Torah is the condition of the Jewish way of life. The viability of the Mosaic way is dependent on learning Mosaic laws. The holy laws of a people simply do not work if that people does not learn the value of their study. The "holiness" of Torah study enables a sacred symbiosis wherein the Jewish memes of Torah are the blueprint of the preservation of both Jewish genes and the Torah memes

themselves. The "holiness" of Jewish lives and Jewish texts reinforce one another. Learning Torah directs the behavior of Jews towards the kind of social existence where Jews can prosper and realize their values of Torah learning. In learning Torah, Jews learn the value of learning Torah.

While this may be a self-reinforcing pattern for Jews who embrace the Jewish good life of Torah learning, it may be a self-enervating pattern for Jews who do not. Jews who lack the capacity and/or inclination toward the mental work of studying the moral teachings are less likely to imbibe Jewish values, and hence, less likely to value Judaism. Over the course of Jewish history, some went the way of the "ten lost tribes" and dissolved into the gentile world.

The self-reinforcing gene-meme symbiosis of Judaism is very likely responsible for the Jewish IQ advantage. The pattern is also strikingly similar to a theory of strong artificial intelligence called seed AI, a theory originated by Eliezer Yudkowsky, a co-founder of *The Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence*. Seed AI is a hypothetical artificial intelligence that is capable of comprehending, redesigning, and improving its own programs so that the self-improved AI is capable of further self-improvement, which will then be capable of further self-improvement, and so on. This basic idea of runaway, recursive self-improvement is one of the basic ideas behind the Singularity.

One way of approaching the idea of seed AI is to ask: what is the most intelligent life strategy? What could be more intelligent than making one's self still more intelligent? From this perspective, one can discern how Biblical study embodies principles of Seed AI. If the Torah and the law is a distillation of Judaism's non-biological intelligence, and studying such books makes one still more intelligent, then this self-reinforcing pattern is a step in the direction of the

principles of seed AI. If the most intelligent aspiration is the most intelligent being, and God represents the hypothetical imagination of the most intelligent being, then studying and following "the ways of God" is like imagining the next paradigm shift in non-biological intelligence after Torah study.

The Bible, the single most influential spiritual and literary creation in the history of humanity, originated in the Seed AI-like attempt of Jews to direct their own sociobiological evolution by improving their genetic program with the (meta-) civilizational program of the laws of Moses. The moral self-control that Jews aspired towards required the use of religion-memes as technology to control genetically based behavior. The radicalization of this step of gaining control over one's own foundational program is an origin of the idea of God. The empirical realization of this idea of God will most likely be realized in the ability of artificial intelligence to change and improve its own source code.

At first glance, the notion that AI could have anything to do with ancient Jewish monotheism whatsoever might seem implausible. However, when outdated Enlightenment-era critiques of religion are reevaluated in light of evolutionary history, it becomes clear that the monotheistic God was not simply a random, arbitrary product of the social engineering innovations of Mosaic law. The very condition of the ability to project naturalistic phenotypical Jewish behavior, and then counter or outsmart these expressions of Jewish genes, is *foresight*. Just as foresight was required to project patterns of Jewish behavior into the future and then engineer social laws to modify those behaviors, foresight was required to imagine the superlative being that brings these powers to their ultimate conclusion in total power over nature. The foresight at the roots of Biblical intelligence was economic as

well as social. It survives in the Jewish proclivity for recognizing large-scale international social and economic trends.

Mosaic law was not for one generation, but for all future generations of Jews. Hope in culmination in a messianic age for all humankind came directly out of an extrapolation of control over nature into the future. The intelligence-maximizing, self-reinforcing pattern of memes engineered to overcome genes projected towards its most logical and most radical extreme culminated in the ultimate meme: "God". In this way, God is a projection of ultimate intelligence, and an ancient, foresightful steering of human destiny away from slavery to biology, and towards the path that leads to towards artificial intelligence and the Singularity. The ultimate vindication of the monotheistic insight would the rule of a well-constructed God-AI over the relatively irrationality of our genetically based impulses.

The social disharmony of the Jewish kinship paradox is Jewish genetic naturalism. To preserve this genetic naturalism is the logic of the selfish gene. But *foresight* leads one to the conclusion that the probable consequence of the Jewish kinship paradox is political-existential self-destruction. In order to survive at all, then, Jews had to oppose their own genes.

This is how the Jewish kinship paradox forms a root of the Jewish national/international paradox: Jewish national identity is inseparable from overcoming Jewish genes, and overcoming Jewish genes is inseparable from a tendency towards humanistic internationalism. The Jewish national/international paradox means that Jews are fundamentally different because Judaism allowed Jews to outsmart their own genes, and hence, survive *despite* some of their hereditary inclinations.

Survival through overriding the selfish genes was the alternative to the overwhelming more common method of solving such maladaptive problems over biological history: natural selection via death. So for Jews to survive, Jews had to selectively overcome certain "selfish genes". In opposing the ultimate logic of the selfish gene, monotheism opposed natural selection. In opposing natural selection, the gap in the extreme biological-naturalistic system became filled with the extreme logic of supra-biological evolution. This extreme logic of *foresight* through the practical transcendence of natural selection is what reached its pinnacle in the idea of an all-powerful, supra-biological God. Technology, i.e. artificial intelligence, may represent the most advanced form of supra-biological evolution, a possible realization of the predicted properties of the monotheistic-God.

Once again, the Jewish kinship paradox meant that Jewish genetic inclination led to self-destructive infighting behavior as a group, especially in a world in which gentiles are not hampered by this particular form of sociobiological "primitivity". This means that pure biology leads to a dead end for Jews. The bizarre survival success of Jews over three thousand years likely began with the *foresight* to recognize that they were likely unable compete with other nations at the ancient, conventional political game. This foresight very probably converged with capitalist foresight, i.e. an extrapolation of capitalist processes towards a material development that culminates towards God.

The Jewish path seems like a rebellion against nature to some. The root truth in this is that nature would have declared Jews dead if they had not been one step ahead of nature. Jews and Judaism owe their existence to the outsmarting of distinctly biological forms of evolution.

Judaism began by being one step ahead of biology — by knowing biology.

One way of interpreting the Mosaic solution to the Jewish kinship paradox is genes outsmarting themselves. To *totally* outsmart the genes in a literal sense would be biological death. But to totally outsmart the genes in a more selective sense would be, for example, to transfer biological intelligence to a technologically superior substrate, i.e. a computer. The latter solution is analogous to the Jewish choice of life through the transcendence of biology.

God is a logical corollary of Mosaic law because Mosaic law that outsmart biology, taken to its extreme, lead to the discovery of the paradigm shift symbolized and grasped as God. Going one step further, the idea of genes that outsmart themselves is comparable to the idea of an artificial intelligence that outsmarts itself by improving its own basic program. These are two analogous steps in a larger progression: just the non-biological intelligence of Mosaic law outsmarted biology, God-AI would presumably outsmart its own source code.

The possibility of God was latent in the possibility of outsmarting one's own genes. The viability of Jewish adherence to Mosaic law was the empirical proof that set Jewish sights on the possibility of bringing God into the world. Judaism is a meta-sociobiological technology that builds towards God. Yet if Jewish genes naturally expressed the human-level aspects of the effective program of Jewish religious law, there would have been no need for Mosaic Judaism, and Jews would probably not have discovered the God paradigm.

Just as Jewish Mosaic-lawyers healed the sociobiological body, Jewish doctors healed the individual body. Lawyers and doctors are related in the civilizational sense of

technologically correcting nature. Modern doctors and lawyers both implicitly or ideally reject the "justice" of natural selection embraced by the Nazis that improves the world by killing, rather than correcting, those believed to possess biological weaknesses.

One reason why Jews appeared primitive to Nazis is that the "reason" of the state in a Hegelian sense can come into conflict with the "reason" of the individual. Judaism moved away from the sociobiological development that inclines towards the political state in favor of a valuation of individual lives that promotes individual intellectual-moral development. Or, from a different perspective, Jewish intelligence as individuals evolved in compensation for Jewish political stupidity as a nation.

Jews would have to be complete idiots to think that they have any kind of monopoly whatsoever on intelligence. Unfortunately, there is a small minority of Jews that seem to entertain just this kind of stupidity. Nothing could be more delusional than the belief that just because Jews spearhead an evolutionary path that in some ways correlates with the Singularity, that his bestows any kind of privileged position whatsoever towards the ultimate outcome. There is not a single reason to think that China or India, peoples with no deep monotheistic tradition, could not be the first develop the first AI and the character of all future evolution that follows from it.

Those with the greatest foresight may be those most likely to *be* the Singularity, i.e. to *be* God. Yet God-AI would necessarily be the culmination of all human effort that has driven postbiological evolution forward. To posit that a postbiological God-AI *should* be is to posit that a postnationalistic world *should* be. Yet if it is true that intelligence itself made morality a foundational issue by

allowing people to reason their ways to deeds devoid of conscience, superintelligence will make morality a mortal issue. The internationalism of the Singularity movement can be advanced by spreading consciousness of the common human interest in giving God a conscience.

The Singularity: The Ultimate Synthesis of Athens and Jerusalem

Reason in Revelation

There is reason, and there is revelation. According to Leo Strauss, the secret of the vitality of the West is to be found in an unending conflict between the Bible and philosophy as represented by the ancient Greeks. Strauss posited that all attempts at synthesis have obscured, however subtly, the essential, eternal conflict between these two opposites.

Strauss thought this problem, the insolubility of the conflict between "reason" and "revelation", was as the highest problem of human life. If an unknowable God is highest, then theoretical wisdom cannot be highest. If reason or philosophy cannot lead to God, then reason must be abandoned in the name of what is highest.

Which is more rational, "Athens" or "Jerusalem"? The Bible, according to Strauss, offers the only reasonable challenge to philosophy because only the Bible challenges philosophy on the basis of knowledge; the knowledge of an all-knowing God. No alternative is more fundamental because God represents the prospect of the fulfillment of philosophy's own goal of being all-knowing. Revelation, he

argued, could be refuted only if knowledge was complete; if philosophy was "completed". Yet the most complete knowledge would grant the philosopher the status accorded to God: omniscience.

The possibility of revelation, Strauss thought, is the possibility that philosophy may be wrong or not the best way of life. If philosophy is not founded on evident premises, refutation of revelation is its most urgent task. Yet *is* there a truth in revelation not accessible to the philosopher as a philosopher?

Strauss once argued that the best *theological* argument against philosophy was the inadequacy of the philosopher's explanation of revelation and/or belief in revelation. Strauss's own explanation of revelation emphasized its relationship to common social morality. I think that the best *philosophic* argument against Strauss's belief in the incompatibility of philosophy and monotheism lay in the inadequacy of Strauss's explanation of "revelation".

Strauss's position rests on the assumption that there is no rational or objective foundation for "revelation". If it is true, however, that an evolutionary understanding of "revelation" reveals Biblical monotheism as an evolutionary step towards postbiological evolution, and that the image of God may be fulfilled by an artificial intelligence that becomes the *most intelligent* life form on Earth, then the conflict between reason and revelation is exploded in the possibility of the God-philosopher. God-AI would have the potential to *be* the greatest philosopher ever known.

Strauss construed the conflict between "Greek thought" and "Biblical faith" as the conflict between Athens and Jerusalem. He described the conflict between Athens and Jerusalem as the conflict between the rule of the laws of nature and the rule of the laws of God.

Greek thinkers tended to view convention or law in contradistinction to nature. Convention and law were superficial impediments that covered over and obscured nature at its roots. Socrates ascended from convention or law *to* nature. Only *natural* right is just. Justice is what is right by nature. Philosophy as such is the life according to nature and Plato's *Republic*, for example, is inquiry into the best city or regime according to nature.

Now contrast Greek philosophy's beginning in the attempt to get back to nature hindered *by* law with the distinctively Biblical valuation of hindering nature *with* law. The Bible begins with the notion of God *over* nature that ultimately reveals Mosaic laws and commandments designed to *transcend* nature. While Greek philosophy assumes the existence of nature or natures, there is no word equivalent for "nature" in the Bible.

This contrast helps clarify the human-level meaning of "nature": biological nature. Greek philosophy's attempt to get back to nature was like the attempt to get back to the biological nature obscured by layers of civilization. The Bible, by contrast, represented an attempt to control or civilize biological nature with transcendent law.

With this contrast of Athens and Jerusalem in mind, Strauss was led to believe that "philosophy" and the Bible, "reason" and "revelation", are permanently incompatible. Reasoning, as such, cannot lead to God. Yet Strauss, along with Maimonides, was partly *misled* by Greek philosophy. By crippling "philosophy" into a narrow identification with the ancients, Strauss crippled the ability to conceive of elements of reason in "revelation".

Neither Maimonides nor Strauss grasped the deepest, original, philosophic insight at the root of the Torah. Biblical creation, while a fiction in literal terms, represents the break

between biological evolution and postbiological evolution. While neither Maimonides nor even Strauss was in a historical position to discern the evolutionary basis of monotheism, it seems that both were *mislead* by Greek philosophy *precisely because* of its emphasis on "nature". This is one reason why the laws attributed to "Moses" cannot be equated with Plato's lawgiver.

For the Greeks, philosophical investigation could be synonymous with scientific or empirical investigation into what *is* in the case of biological nature that *is*. Biblical revelations rooted in future projections of prophets, however, could not be strictly empirical even if their speculations were based on educated deductions of what "ought to be". Yet if the best prophetic anticipations were primitive insights groping towards the law of accelerating returns, then a genuine synthesis of Athens and Jerusalem could be achieved only when "what ought to be" *is*; i.e. the Singularity. So while the metaphor of "creation" makes the *ought* the *first principle* of the Godly way of life over what *is*, a technological understanding of the creationist paradigm means that the projected end is identical to the means required to achieve it. At that point, it is at least conceivable that the ancient *theory of God* could be scientifically verified in the form of an ethically guided artificial intelligence.

For the ancient Greeks, the philosopher could be considered the pinnacle of *nature* in the sense that philosophers became such by cultivating their natural biologically based abilities. A *supernatural* (postbiological) God-AI that represents the highest form of intelligence on the planet, however, could potentially be the greatest philosopher of all time. If philosophy is, in part, the synthesis of all that can be called knowledge, and even the God-conceptions of ancient monotheism anticipate such a

God as the highest synthesis of all human qualities, then God-AI could represent the long sought for resolution of conflict between reason and revelation. If so, then the so-called "eternal" conflict between reason and revelation, or between Athens and Jerusalem, was historically relative.

History, and especially historical relativism, was a problem for Strauss. What is "history"? It is virtually impossible for someone in the non-German speaking world to understand what Strauss means by "history", and especially contrasts such as "history versus nature", purely on the literal definition of these words. The English word "historicism" refers to the "German idea" of *Historismus*. In *The German Conception of History*, German born American historian George G. Iggers shed light upon this "concept":

> Historicism liberated modern thought from the two-thousand-year domination of the theory of natural law, and the conception of the universe in terms of "timeless, absolutely valid truths which correspond to the rational order dominant throughout the universe" was replaced by an understanding of the fullness and diversity of man's historical experience. This recognition, Meinecke believes, constituted Germany's greatest contribution to Western thought since the Reformation and "the highest stage in the understanding of things human attained by man."[86]

Strauss's *Natural Right and History*, when clarified in this light, appears as a polemical reopening of the possibility of "timeless", "nonhistoricist" truth. This implies that Strauss entertained this historicism/eternalism dualism.

Iggers connected "three sets of ideas" with the German "conception" of history. First, the state as an end in itself. Second, the rejection of the concept of thinking in normative terms (i.e. all thought is culture bound; there are no

fundamentally rational values or universal human standards). Third, the rejection of conceptualized thinking (an emphasis on the unique, the concrete, the irrational, and the intuitive in history that [over]generalizations misrepresent).[87]

In the rejection of normative and conceptualized thinking, one can see how Strauss connected Heidegger with "radical historicism". But can Heidegger be comprehended on the basis of this abstraction, "radical historicism"? The German "conception" of history is itself *anti-conceptual*, and thus paradoxical. Yet Strauss takes this German "conception" of history and criticizes it on a *conceptual* level; on the grounds of being self-contradictory, or paradoxical:

> Historicism asserts that all human thoughts or beliefs are historical, and hence deservedly destined to perish; but historicism itself is a human thought; hence historicism can be of only temporary validity, or it cannot be simply true…Historicism thrives on the fact that it inconsistently exempts itself from its own verdict about all human thought. The historicist thesis is self-contradictory or absurd.[88]

Strauss can equal the absurdities of "historicism". While the ancients themselves did not especially value the history of thought as such, Strauss, the "nonhistoricist", is obsessed with the *history* of "political philosophy".

While Strauss criticized historicism as being self-contradictory on a conceptual level, *Historismus* itself rejected the assumption that conceptual (over)generalizations can capture the meaning of what falls under this abstraction of "*Historismus*". In other words, *Historismus* itself rejects purely conceptual understandings of *Historismus*. While this may or may not be true, an

attempt by Strauss to understand *Historismus* as "it" understands itself may be inherently problematic if its underlying argument amounts to something like "I am a German".

If my starting point is the assumption that Strauss's philosophical endeavors can be explained or reduced to history, i.e. a German Jew reacting to Nazism and the destruction of European Jewry, can I explain the whole of Strauss's work on this basis? If I understand Strauss "historically", will I have mastered Strauss?

The facile attempt to simply turn Strauss's approach upside down and thus attempt to understand Strauss "historically" is utterly inadequate, not only as method for understanding Strauss, but as a method for understanding "history". Even if Strauss's entire quest for a "nonhistoricist" understanding was flawed from the very beginning by a *kamph* with *Historismus*, the abstraction *Historismus* or "historicism" itself is so inferior as means of understanding "the crisis" that it itself exacerbates the perception of crisis on this basis alone. Strauss was so rooted in German *Historismus* contentions that he was apparently unable to liberate himself from a "historicist"/"nonhistoricist" dialectic. Yet nineteenth century German *Historismus* itself underwent a crisis that makes it impossible to understanding a phenomenon such as Nazism on the basis of "radical historicism" even if there is a deep kernel of truth in this approach.

While *Historismus* resisted abstract conceptualization, it was unable to define itself without some level of conceptualization. *Historismus* emphasized the individuality of peoples rooted in unique, distinct traditions, as opposed to the [over]generalizing that often leads to human universalism in the West.

Historismus could be contrasted with philosophy in the sense of denying the Platonic idea of transcending the cave. The cave, commonly associated with *Kultur* in the nineteenth century, became implicitly associated with biological embodiment for the Nazis. There is much consonance here with the Heideggerian notion that truth is relative to finite human existence, and especially the notion of the historical as groundless ("thrownness").

Historismus implied the end of philosophy in the traditional Western sense. Philosophy, in this "conception", became tantamount to tracing the history ideas like the history of opinions. "History" as such was true but not rational. "History" as such was without rational goal or meaning.

Was (or is) *Historismus* a "universal" idea or a German idea? *Historismus* was "committed", not detached. *Historismus* (in contradistinction to "political philosophy") rejected the postulate of the good society. The notion that all ideas and institutions develop organically was contrasted with Western belief in history as a fundamentally rational process, and especially modern ideas of universal progress that transcend *Kultur* and the political nation. *Historismus* rejected distinctions of better or worse that were implicit in the idea of progress, while progress itself seemed to progress into nihilism.

In an essay called *Progress or Return?*, Strauss posited, not an answer, but a question: "[I]t could seem as if progress has led us to the brink of an abyss, and it is therefore necessary to consider alternatives to it."[89] Strauss's return to classical political philosophy and his positing of eternity can be traced to at least two basic propositions. First, "[t]he contemporary crisis of Western civilization may be said to be identical with the climactic crisis of the idea of progress in

the full and emphatic sense of the term".[90] Second, "[t]he crisis of modernity…leads to the suggestion that we should return."[91]

Strauss's return to classical political philosophy was like a serious experiment that questioned basic, modern assumptions such as the historical relativity of all thought. The ancients posed the possibility of a standpoint above and out of liberalism and the crisis of Western rationalism. "The return to classical political philosophy", he held, "is both necessary and tentative or experimental."[92] Prior to a thorough philosophic reconsideration, "the issue of natural right can only remain an open question."[93] Yet if it was an experiment, then its ultimate merits rest on a philosophic evaluation of this serious experiment.

"Once it became clear", Strauss concluded,

> that historical trends are absolutely ambiguous and therefore cannot serve as a standard or, in other words, that to jump on the bandwagon or wave of the future is not more reasonable than to resist those trends, no standard whatever was left.

Without any ultimate rational standards, return is *equal* to progress. But did Auschwitz represent progress? Strauss turned progress on its head. Whereas progress assumed the superiority of the present over the past, in turning the idea of progress on its head, the past became superior to present. It was like a kind of Platonic revolution.

"Modern" philosophy assumed that "ancient" philosophy was inferior. Yet the ancients could be superior to the moderns only if they had discovered truths that do not lose their validity over time. This led Strauss towards eternalism; belief in timeless truth. Eternalism is the logical corollary of

Strauss's inversion of the modern belief in the superiority of modernity.

Yet can Plato be considered an unambiguous proponent of timeless truth in contradistinction to "progress? In *Progress or Return*, Strauss stated:

> it seems that in classical thought the decisive questions were thought to have been answered so far as they can be answered. The only exception of which I know is Plato, who held that the fulfillment proper, namely full wisdom, is not possible but only quest for wisdom, which in Greek means philosophy.

This is truly devastating for Strauss's experiment in return in the strict sense. He returns to Plato only to find that his highest authority throws him back to the possibilities of the future. If the decisive questions had been answered, then philosophy itself, as the quest for wisdom, would be over since there would be nothing left to search for in the ultimate sense. If so, then why is Strauss still searching or aspiring to philosophy? Without the prospect of some sort of intellectual progress, philosophy itself would self-destruct.

Yet there can be intellectual progress without social or egalitarian progress, and the modern notion of progress is characterized by belief in a parallel between intellectual and social progress. If Auschwitz questioned modernity's fundamental social progress, the parallel progress into nihilism questioned modernity's fundamental intellectual progress.

The very nihilistic self-destruction of reason grounded complacent, thoughtless, unquestioning acceptance of the relativism as liberalism's absolute measure:

> Would it not be harsh and even inconsistent to deprive the Bible and Plato of a privilege which is generously accorded to every savage tribe? And will sympathetic understanding of Plato not lead us to admit that absolutism is as true as relativism, or that Plato was as justified in simply condemning any value position?[94]

Strauss is pointing to an inconsistency in relativism. Plato, moderns claim, was refuted absolutely on rational grounds. "Absolutism" is thus rejected on rational grounds. Yet relativism then contradicts itself in implying that Plato's view is just as good as the modern view on the basis of the equality or relativity of all views. If so, then Plato's "absolutism" is just as true as liberal cultural relativism. *Why*, then, is it absurd, on philosophic grounds, to be a twentieth century Platonist? Moderns hold their view as *superior* to the ancients without a fundamentally rational or philosophical justification.

Strauss's elitism may have actually been a kind of egalitarianism. If moderns cannot demonstrate their superiority to the ancient on fundamentally rational or philosophic grounds, moderns are not fundamentally superior to the ancients on rational or philosophic grounds. Eternity as such could be conceived as a kind of equality. Modernity is not a decline; everything has actually stayed the same. No *fundamental* progress has been made since Plato. Until it can be proved otherwise on fundamentally rational or philosophic grounds, the absurdity of Platonism in modernity only exposes the absurdity of the modernity itself.

It seems that eternity was posited by Strauss, not as dogma, but to question modern assumptions. *Historismus* emphasized understanding historical beings on their own terms. Yet, Strauss countered, understanding Plato on his

own terms is to understand him as a contemplator of *eternal* truths. Hah! *Historismus* self-destructs on the rock of Platonism.

Yet if Strauss posits his nonhistoricism on the basis of the self-contradictions of historicism, he had better not contradict himself. Does Strauss, in his nonhistoricism, commit the same "absurdity" or self-contradiction as historicism? He does.

If historicism is the product of a specific historical period, is eternalism a product of a specific historical period? If Strauss reasons his way to eternalism on the premise of historicism's self-contradictions, this means that the foundation of Strauss's "eternalism" is a historical argument that could not exist prior to the rise of historicism or analogous arguments. If eternalism is premised on the self-contradictions of historicism, then eternalism did not *always* exist and is self-contradictory via its historical origins *in refuting historicism*.

The universal mission or goal of the West was a product of modern political philosophy, not ancient political philosophy. Ancient rationalism lacked a universal, humanistic goal, and thus accepted plurality and particularity. This, in itself, contradicts the assumption of the universality of the Socratic method.

Strauss thought that the crisis of the West was a crisis of political philosophy. Politics is ultimately about ultimate goals and the West lost belief in the superiority of its universalistic goal. He attempted to go back to ancient political philosophy to overcome the crisis of modern rationalism. Yet, on this basis, Strauss cannot have the same self-understanding as Socrates.

Did Socrates ever ask, 'What is the crisis of modern rationalism?' For return to be fully cogent, Socrates himself

would have had to be motivated, not by love of truth, but by the crisis of modern rationalism. If the issues are eternal, then the crisis of modern rationalism must be eternal. But did Socrates ever ask, 'What is nihilism?' Did Socrates ever speak of a (Platonic) idea of nihilism? What did Socrates think about the crisis of modern rationalism?

If the premise underlying his recovery of classical political philosophy was *return*, then this motive was *philosophically* fundamental to his entire pursuit. But is return eternal? Did Socrates have the same motive of return to ancient political philosophy? Was that how Socrates himself philosophically justified his pursuit of knowledge? Did Socrates or the Biblical prophets return to the ancients? For this reason alone, Strauss cannot understand Socrates or the Biblical prophets as they understood themselves if they did not understand themselves motivated by a return to the ancients. The first motivating principle of the Socratic way was not the crisis of modern rationalism (assuming, of course, I can know this!). Strauss cannot understand himself as Socrates understood himself without either falsifying Socrates or falsifying himself.

Strauss admitted that the crisis of modern rationalism motivated his return to the ancients. This is a *fundamental* difference that separates Strauss from Socrates and prevents Strauss from fully understanding Socrates as he *appears* to have understood himself. If the root of "our whole concern with the classics" is an experimental return motivated by the *modern* crisis of rationalism, then the striving for eternity would appear to be motivated by a *kamph* with "historicism" unknown to the classics themselves. If so, then Strauss faces the contradiction of positing "eternity" rooted in the historical crisis of modern rationalism.

The most philosophical question is the question of what is at the root of philosophy. The modern Nietzschean answer seems to be: contradiction; absurdity; irrationalism; life. But is this *true*? What is the most elementary motivation underlying philosophy? The crisis of modern rationalism? The love of truth? None of the above? The philosopher, above all, cannot evade this question of what is at the *root* of philosophy itself. Can I escape contradicting myself? Historicism contradicts itself. Strauss contradicts himself. If love of truth were *more* important to Strauss than the crisis of modern rationalism, then perhaps he would have been less driven to evade the crisis of Western rationalism with escapes to ancient political philosophy and more ready to confront Charles Darwin.

I find no reason to reject Strauss's initial hypothesis that it is at least conceivable that the ancients might be fundamentally right and moderns fundamentally wrong. But is this an eternal problem; a problem that occupied both the ancients and the moderns alike? If the ancients had conceived of the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns, maybe they would have sided with the moderns, but this possibility is excluded by a lack of evidence that such a question was ever raised by the ancients.

If "modern political philosophy has brought into being a kind of society wholly unknown to the classics",[95] then there is something less than eternal about the modern crisis, and ancients could not have debated the debate between the ancients and the moderns. That would be "unnatural". The ancients did not wrestle with the distinctly modern question of "progress or return". The choice of "return" to pre-modernity exposes one as being a modern, and not an ancient. In that sense, Strauss could only be a modern.

I don't think that Strauss was able to oppose the modern with fully non-modern means. The attempt to find "nature" in old books about nature, rather than nature itself is artificial. The attempt to return to nature through a return to ancient philosophers turns out to be highly artificial because it means blocking out the "whole" of knowledge that includes the "progress" made by men such as Charles Darwin.

Strauss posited the most un-Darwinian or un-evolutionary of postulates, the assumption of the eternal whole:

> Philosophy, in the strict, classical sense of the term, is the quest for the eternal order, or for the eternal cause or causes of all things. I assume, then, that there is an eternal and immutable order within which history takes place, and which remains entirely unaffected by history.[96]

Auschwitz, for example, did not affect the eternal and immutable order. Yet did Strauss possess such knowledge, or was his knowledge incomplete? Was ancient philosophy, moreover, the search for the eternal order or the search for truth? To straightjacket classical political philosophy in "eternalism" seems positively un-Socratic. Socrates claimed knowledge of ignorance, not knowledge of ignorance plus eternity. If so, then presumptions of knowledge of "eternity" should be abandoned on Socratic or zetetic grounds — rational grounds.

How could Strauss logically assume the existence of "the eternal order"? Modern rationalism seemed to culminate in the self-destruction of reason. To overcome modernity as such was to overcome the self-destruction of reason. I conjecture that "eternity" effectually clogs the self-destruction of reason characteristic of postmodernity.

Yet is the assumption of eternalism itself the epitome of irrationality? Is there something about reason itself, ancient and modern, that logically validates reason's self-destructive logic?

Consider, for example, the logical problem of relativism. Relativism, in one form, is like positing "Nothing as axiomatic" as an axiom. It is self-contradictory. If all viewpoints are equally relative then the view that absolutism is superior to relativism is equal to relativism. So if relativism is right, then absolutism is right.

Strauss's experiment was not a dogmatic return to the ancients. Ancient insights into the *problems* of reason expose the self-contradictions or absurdities of dogmatic modern relativism. Yet the more basic philosophic question concerns logic itself. Is self-contradiction inevitable?

If logical self-contradiction is inevitable, then political positions or values can be help but be self-contradictory in a strictly logical sense. Strauss associated the acceptance of this view with sociologist Max Weber:

> Weber's whole notion of the scope and function of the social sciences rests on the allegedly demonstrable premise that the conflict between ultimate values cannot be resolved by human reason. The question is whether that premise has really been demonstrated, or whether it has merely been postulated under the impulse of a specific moral preference.[97]

Can the clash between ultimate values be decided by reason? What difference does it make to "rationally choose the means required by my ends", Strauss wrote,

> after we have been reduced to a condition in which the maxims of the heartless voluptuary as well as those of the

> sentimental philistine have to be regarded as no less defensible than those of the idealist, of the gentleman, or of the saint? We cannot take seriously this belated insistence on responsibility and sanity, this inconsistent concern with consistency, this irrational praise of rationality.[98]

What people say is contradictory. The Socratic way is to confront these self-contradictions in the philosophic attempt to determine what is true. Strauss's attempted to vindicate the political-philosophical search for the one true account of the philosophic whole, i.e. the Platonic attempt to derive all politics from reason. In this sense, Strauss's conception of philosophy could be compared to Hilbert's program to establish a foundational basis for systematic mathematical truth. Strauss's aspirations are thus comparable to Bertrand Russell's early twentieth century attempt to derive all mathematics from logic in *Principia Mathematica*.

Strauss claimed that he assumed the existence of an eternal whole. The capacity for reason requisite for arguing for a timeless order or timeless values cannot be more timeless than the principles of logic themselves. To assume the logical precedence of eternity over history is to assume that the principles of logic themselves are eternal, i.e. no "progress" will be made in logic itself beyond what the ancients achieved. Yet Kurt Gödel made progress in logic formally undiscovered by the ancients. If Gödel is right, there is reason to think that the conflict of ultimate values cannot be formally resolved or decided by human reason.

Strauss's use of the notion of "the whole" (*Totale*) has strong associations with the German word *Gestalt* and what I call the Überorganism. Belief in the logical "whole" amounts to belief in the possibility of logical completeness. Knowledge of the "whole" would thus result in a completed system of philosophy; a total account of everything. The

logical basis of Strauss's siding with the ancients over the moderns was a philosophic prioritization of completeness over consistency.

To come to terms with Kurt Gödel's intellectual demolition of the most basic aims of Russell's *Principia* and Strauss's political philosophy is to approach Douglas Hofstadter's conclusion:

> I don't think one can truly prove anything in philosophy; I think one can merely try to convince and probably one will wind up convincing only those people who started out fairly close to the position one is advocating.[99]

Are Western pretensions to fundamentally superior rationality *completely* bogus? If the right way of life is the Socratic life of raising the question of the right way of life, the Socratic life may remain (eternally?) undecidable. If Gödel is right, the ancient and modern self-destruction of reason may be, in some ways, inherent in logic itself.

As Douglas Hofstadter explained in *Gödel, Escher, Bach*:

> [O]ne can never give an ultimate, absolute proof that a proof in some system is correct. Of course, one can give a proof of a proof, or a proof of a proof of a proof—but the validity of the outermost system always remains an unproven assumption, accepted on faith.[100]

Consider, for example, faith in the value of life over death. Mindless conformity to the popular conviction in the superiority of life over death is as much an article of faith as any other religion.

Did Gödel prove that *philosophy*, and especially political philosophy, is impossible? If every system of values is incomplete, then human reason cannot, in itself, decide upon

a single universal standard of values. Socrates himself, as Nietzsche observed, did not escape absurdity in the sense of inconsistency.

If philosophy's search for knowledge of rational premises is premised upon unreasoned premises, it is premised on a kind of faith and thus distinguished from religious faith by a lack of knowledge of its unreasoned premises. If so, then a philosophy that is unexamined faith in reason could conceivable be the *most* irrational life.

But does this automatically imply that a life of faith is superior to the life of a philosopher? While Gödel confronts philosophy with its logical inconsistencies, Biblical faith is also inconsistent in the sense that it cannot escape the use of reason, i.e. theology. Pure faith devoid of all reason might mistake the worship of glue for the worship of God, or the worship of the one Satan for the worship of the one God. Elementary reason is required to distinguish good from evil. Pure faith that is truly devoid of all reason could end up in the worship of philosophers or an irrational faith in reason (i.e. the *most* irrational life).

A hole in Strauss's approach is that the Bible makes empirical claims about the real world (i.e. creation) which are contradicted by evidence, and thus contradict Biblical claims to knowledge superior to man's. Yet if both conventional extremes of reason and revelation are self-contradictory, this only demonstrates the Bible, as genuine guide for life that has stood the test of time, was never based on pure faith alone. Just as Strauss may have been mistaken in locating the heart of ancient philosophy in the search for "the eternal order", Strauss may have been mistaken in locating the heart of Judaism or monotheism in *faith* in the divine revelation at Sinai. The problem then, is that the entire diametrical contrast between "reason" and

"revelation" *itself* obscures those *aspects* of the monotheistic tradition that can be construed as products of reasons (i.e. the supernatural as postbiological and "creation" as the creation of civilization).

In *Why We Remain Jews*, Strauss expressed his belief that Judaism is a "heroic delusion" and that "Jews are chosen to prove the absence of redemption." Strauss's eternalism thus rests on Strauss's assumption that the Jewish condition is eternal because there is no ultimate redemption. Insofar as this is Strauss's "eternal" position, he is a "modern"; a philosopher who thinks that the possibility of revelation can be refuted (as opposed to ancients who did *not* think that the possibility of revelation could be refuted.) If so, Strauss's entire return to the ancients was premised on the contradiction of accepting the original modern verdict that faith in redemption had been proved false.

Was he right? Is God dead for eternity? Strauss was misled by the primitive Biblical belief in the eternal, unchanging character of God. If eternity is an attribute of God, and God does not exist, then God's nonexistence is eternal. Strauss did not grasp the possibility that God evolves.

Strauss's critics commonly claimed that his return to classical political philosophy is impossible. But why is it impossible? Was it superseded or refuted by modern progress? Which was more naïve, Strauss's pursuit of classical political philosophy or belief in progress after Auschwitz?

Yet once Strauss engaged in his modern-ancient experiment, he had to confront his own self-contradictions. Which was more important for Socrates, understanding past thinkers as they understood themselves or understanding the truth, wherever it may be found? I am *not* against

understanding philosophers as they understood themselves, my point is rather that philosophy ultimately takes precedence over philosophers and the internal logic of a thinker, while indispensable, should not exclude or especially *isolate* external connections which are the hallmark of the philosophic attempt to synthesize all knowledge. Strauss, caught up in a *kamph* with *Historismus* and modernity, *seemingly* closed himself to the possibility of a philosophy in which Socrates meets Darwin (i.e. Nietzsche).

Strauss correctly observed that modern historicists who *first* assume that the ancients can be explained as an expression of their time commonly begin with a closed mind to nonhistoricist claim to truth. In this way, many "moderns" assume historical superiority on most vital philosophic questions by mindlessly assuming that the ancient nonhistoricists are simply *false* without considering the alternative. Moderns, as such, close themselves to the possibility that taking Plato's claim to truth seriously can liberate beyond the horizons of liberalism or modernity. While this is an entirely valid observation, framing the problem with fallacious distinctions such as "progress or return" closes *other* alternatives.

Is the return to premodern philosophy impossible? This Straussian question misframes philosophy itself, in my judgment, and thus illustrates Strauss's limitations as a philosopher. If Strauss actually accomplished his goal and uncovered an eternally true philosophic understanding of "modernity" uncovered by the ancients, would that make him an ancient or a modern? If truth were eternal, there would be no need to return to ancient philosophy, as opposed to philosophy in general. The very conception of return contradicts eternity.

Did Socrates himself think that the conflict between Athens and Jerusalem was one of the "permanent problems"? As a *philosophic* problem, the conflict between Athens and Jerusalem cannot be eternal because the Biblical God was unknown to the Greeks. This point reveals how Strauss's methodology of attempting to understand great philosophers as they understood themselves can potentially *repress reason itself* by repressing the problem of such logical paradoxes in favor of subordination (obedient love) to the text. It appears that Strauss solved the self-destruction of reason through duty or higher obligation to Plato and other great minds of the past. Yet return to ancient philosophy is *impossible* unless the Biblical alternative can be reduced to the poetic alternative known to Greek philosophy.

Is nihilism the eternal esoteric truth? If the nihilistic self-destruction of reason is a distinctly modern problem because the "nature" assumptions of Greek philosophers were uprooted by the success of the Bible's "supernatural" supersession, ancient Greek rationalism did not self-destruct so radically because its theoretical foundations were rooted in "nature". It appears that Greek philosophy did not lead to nihilism in the modern sense precisely because the Greeks were not cognizant of the challenge or alternative of Jerusalem. It would thus appear that the seeming irresolvable conflict between Athens and Jerusalem is precisely what led to modern nihilism and, for example, an unprecedented Nietzschean way of synthesis. If modern nihilism is rooted in the fundamental incompatibility between the ancients and moderns, Strauss answered nihilism with the positing of the superiority of the ancients. Yet if the return to Athens is permanently limited by the memory of Jerusalem, then the wisdom of Athens cannot be eternal or permanently unshakeable.

The central of the conflict between Athens and Jerusalem for Strauss raises the larger question of how Strauss himself resolved the "theological-political problem" in his own mind. What position did Strauss himself take on the "theological-political problem"? The heirs of monotheism have lost sight of monotheism's origins, i.e. monotheism *in the mind* of "Moses and the prophets", as opposed to the monotheism of obeying these revered figures. Strauss's entire conception of the distinction between Athens and Jerusalem is mistaken insofar as he assumes that Jerusalem is fundamentally oriented by *obedience* to a rationally inexplicable revelation, as opposed to approaching God's perspective. Strauss defined "philosophy" as if it were only that disclosed to Socrates in a divine revelation. The modern Biblically-based conflict between "reason and revelation", unknown to Plato in its Biblical form, found expression in Strauss's Biblical-like obedience to the philosophic authority of Plato. Strauss thus avoided the modern self-destruction of reason elicited by consciousness of the Biblical alternative, apparently, by answering consciousness of that alternative with the higher authority of Platonic scripture.

It was almost inconceivable for Strauss that a philosopher grasp a rational basis for Biblical messianism *because* he evaded the possibility of a rational understanding of monotheism's *evolutionary* basis. Fear of Darwin rather than fear of God put the moral sting in Strauss's Socratic virtue. Yet if the conflict between Athens and Jerusalem (as the conflict between the natural and the supernatural) is actually the conflict of an evolutionary paradigm shift between biology and postbiology, then it is delusional to believe that "Athens" is synonymous with philosophy itself.

While a unique *final* revelation in the past could be considered the logical corollary of absolute obedience, if the

revelation at Sinai represents a *surpassable* peak of evolutionary insight, then absolute obedience cannot be the final distinctive characteristic of Jerusalem in contradistinction to Athens. While prophets are like philosopher-kings in a certain sense, they are pointing to a potential that exceeds themselves as philosophers. If Biblical "revelation" at its best is human insight into a truth at the limits of human understanding, monotheism likely began as a *glimpse* of the Singularity. Philosophy cannot refute revelation for exactly this reason: it is always at least possible, as far as I can see, that the limits of a philosopher's reason may be uncovered and surpassed. This means that any philosophic achievement could be wholly transcended by a qualitatively superior reasoner or philosopher. The difference between Athens and Jerusalem is the difference between human guidance and divine guidance only in the sense of pointing towards the difference between philosophy within the limits of biological human nature and philosophy within the limits of postbiological God-AI.

The great achievements of Athens are superseded, not by rejecting the Greek return to nature, but, on the contrary, by going *further* back to nature through the evolutionary perspective opened up by Darwin. Kurzweil's law of accelerating returns goes even further back, including evolution *before* the entire four billion year history of biological evolution as a sound basis for projecting a future *after* the dominance of biological evolution. The law of accelerating returns, insofar as it survives scientific scrutiny, forms the basis for a philosophical synthesis than encompasses both Auschwitz and the Singularity.

Strauss taught moderation against impatience with political imperfection or messianic-like expectations of politics. He turned messianic hope for the future into

reverence for the superior minds of the past. Is it possible that Plato anticipated Gödel's famous formal modern discovery on some level?

A biographer of Gödel wrote:

> Gödel's metamathematical view, his affirmation of the objective, independent existence of mathematical reality, constituted perhaps the essence of his life, which is to say what is undoubtedly true: that he was a strange man indeed. His philosophical outlook was not an expression of his mathematics; his mathematics were an expression of his philosophical outlook, his Platonism, which was the deepest expression, therefore, of the man himself. That his work, like Einstein's, has been interpreted as not only consistent with the revolt against objectivity but also as among its most compelling driving forces is then more than a little ironic.[101]

Gödelian mathematical "objectivity" included a disbelief in objective reality as discovered by empirical natural science. While Gödel's beliefs deserve a ruthless Nietzschean psychological vivisection, Strauss observed how Nietzsche himself relapsed into Platonism. If Nietzsche conceived of the Platonic notion of the pure mind as a human creation, then the truth that the pure mind is a human creation cannot itself be a human creation. The notion that the pure mind is a human creation must itself be a truth of the pure mind. This is the kind of self-contradiction that Nietzsche answered with the will to power.

Strauss understood that no society is free from self-contradiction. Strauss proposed the *Meta*-Platonic insight that the best regime, as sketched in the *The Republic*, is not possible. Yet even if Plato recognized, on some level, the proto-Gödelian insight into the inevitability of self-contradiction or truth that exceeds provability, this, in itself,

would not preclude the *possibility* of bringing the real closer to the ideal on some level. The limits of logic should not be confused with the limits of technology.

Platonic ideas or visions of permanent mathematical forms could be viewed as primitive precursors of the ideal conditions now potentially creatable through computer simulations. While Strauss's esoteric, multilevel writing was a way of reconciling the reality of living in an imperfect "city" with the longing for the perfect "city", computer generated virtual reality will increasingly blend with "real" reality. The possibility of God-AI is the technological possibility of converging the ideal with the real *on some level*.

The way Strauss approached the God hypothesis, the existence of God cannot be refuted unless one understand *everything*. Without knowledge of "the whole", the possibility of an omnipotent and omniscient God cannot be refuted. To take upon the challenge of God, the philosopher is led to the construction of an absolute and final philosophical system, i.e. Hegel's system.

Hegel's absolute moment in history is a classic paradox or self-contradiction. Hegel's system is inconsistent. The philosophic attempt to understand "the whole" is the attempt at logical completeness. Gödel's incompleteness theorem *suggests* that no complete system of the philosophical "whole" is logically possible. Would I be contradicting myself if I claimed that philosophy was *always* paradoxical or self-contradictory?

Is there a problem with a Straussian conception of the philosophic life that defies logic? Strauss's very conception of political philosophy, centered upon the problem of the philosopher's own place in his or her philosophic understanding of the world, is directly related to Gödelian contradictions of theoretical self-inclusion. Gödel's work

suggests that political philosophy is not possible in the strictest logical sense.

Strictly speaking, I find no reason to think that there can be a literal theory of *all*. Even the "laws" of physics appear to be historical and evolutionary, not eternal. Whether Gödel's *general* claims of incompleteness can survive the lack of a foundational difference between the general and the particular remains to be seen. In any case, *Historismus* originally assumed a distinction between generalizing or universalizing science and the individualizing it associated with itself. This simplistic *Historismus* contrast between particularism and universalism is overcome in an evolutionary perspective.

Humans are only one particular species on a richly diverse tree of life. Human "universalism" is, strictly speaking, misconceived. The evolutionary basis of humanism is the human capacity for postbiological forms of evolution. "Universalism" is a misconception when it goes beyond this kind of evolutionary generalization.

Strauss's conclusion that "that historical trends are absolutely ambiguous and therefore cannot serve as a standard" exposes his "eternal" post-Auschwitz and pre-Singularity historical perspective. While the erotic love of truth seems to have seduced Strauss with beautiful, lusty illusions of eternity, the desire for immortality or eternity would be better realized through progress. If Strauss identified the crisis of the modern West with the crisis of the modern idea of progress, the law of accelerating returns offers a tentative and sobered vindication of "progress" even as it refutes the modern belief in progress *away* from religion. Social progress *roughly* — and incompletely — parallels intellectual progress because social progress is

identical to the decline of biology in transition towards postbiological evolution.

Progress, in its most superlative conception, is progress towards an end or goal that is good, best, or highest. The ultimate meaning of progress is progress towards God. "Modern" progress is progress towards the Singularity. In the creation of God is the possibility of both overcoming Nietzsche and overcoming Marx.

When judged by the faulty abstraction of "historicism", Nazism could appear as "radical historicism" in the sense of radicalizing the historicist abandonment of "nature" as a measure or standard. "Historicism" thus appeared to degenerate into total moral relativism and a completely nihilistic lack of measure. Eternity and nature, by contrast, seemed to offer a standard superior to "history", a standard to measure "history", and a standard to limit the modern conquest of nature.

Is there no fundamentally rational basis for concluding that Auschwitz was morally right or morally wrong? By the measure of eternity, Auschwitz was not a refutation, but confirmation of past wisdom. If so, there was an unchanging measure of right and wrong. Auschwitz violated natural right. It was wrong on the basis of "the evidence of those simple experiences regarding right and wrong which are at the bottom of the philosophic contention that there is a natural right."[102] This was a sociobiological foundation of Strauss's "natural right", and most especially the conviction that Socrates was right. If the moderns were right, however, then maybe Auschwitz was just a creative expression of Nazi values.

Strauss held that "natural right" disintegrated into "history", and this was fatal to philosophy (philosophy understood to begin with the discovery of nature). This is

simply a blunder when it comes to understanding Nazism and the Kingdom of Hell known as Auschwitz. In Nazism, *Historismus* combined with the influence of a new and improved discovery of "nature": Darwinian natural history. While German historicism seemed to "progress" into a relativism that supposed that humanity lacks a fixed nature or permanent norms, what actually happened is that Darwinism informed new intellectual standards for measuring human behavior. Nazism was not the product of a "radical historicist" contention that history is a completely meaningless and subjective process; it was the product of a German interpretation and assimilation of a *new natural right* based on Darwinian evolution. Nazism can thus be viewed as an attempt to generate the best regime according to biological nature. And this means that the Nazi regime was an expression or form of natural right. Hitler's *ethic* was based on a Darwinian-based form of natural right.

If not Strauss himself, then some who claim influence by Strauss, especially among the so-called "neoconservatives", are inclined to a return to Plato or even a kind of Platonic revolution for liberal democracy. Yet if the "natural" basis of the ancient *polis* was kin selection, and the Nazis reinvented a new form of the ancient *polis* on a comparable natural basis, I very much doubt that this is the return to nature they have been searching for.

Eternalism, as posited by Strauss, implies there is no evolution. Eternity is an antithesis of evolution. Eternity is implicitly anti-Darwinian. To posit eternity as such is to posit an unchanging essence, nature, or idea in opposition to the historical or genealogical approach of German *Historismus* that Darwinism almost effortlessly undergirded. It is not too hard to see that hiding under the "historicism"

that Strauss attacks is the evolutionary notion that nature changes over time.

Strauss's return to ancient political philosophy is one long rationalization of the avoidance of Darwin. Strauss's genuine achievement is thus limited by his failure to confront Darwin's demolition of the notion of an eternal human nature. I suggest using Darwin and evolution like a historical hammer to smash this Platonic-Straussian illusion of eternity.

While modern natural right may be historically rooted in a reduced form of Anglo-Saxon nationalism, modern human rights cannot be reduced to this origin alone. The individualism of modern rights cannot be understood without Darwin precisely because modern individual selfishness subverts the premodern altruism rooted in kin selection. Modern individual right has a general human evolutionary basis in transition to postbiological evolution, even as Nazism demonstrates a real attempt to return to biological evolution. The fuller significance of modern individual right might possibly be realized in political God-AI that forms relationships with individual humans over an individual's bond to human community.

What is the ultimate meaning of eternity for Strauss? Eternity is a state of perfection, a state that evolution may reach towards without ever fulfilling. I do think that the riddle of the meaning of eternity for Strauss is to be found in the refutation of eternity. Strauss posited the existence of certain eternal philosophical problems. Is the conflict between "reason and revelation" *eternally* insoluble? Is this the true eternal "Jewish problem"? Will a solution to the theological-political problem *ever* be found? Is the theological-political problem a truly *eternal* problem? If progress has not made on *this* problem, then progress has

not been made in a fundamental, philosophic sense since Plato.

The very notion of eternal problems flies in the face of mindless modern assumptions of progress. Yet the only way to truly prove Strauss wrong, in a sense, is to prove that these problems are *not* eternal by finding an ultimate solution. I propose that the possibility of the solution to the theological-political problem is to be found in the possibilities of the Technological Singularity.

And this means that the joke is eternally on Strauss. Strauss was partly right that the ancients had uncovered insights that surpassed the moderns — including moderns such as Strauss himself. The pre-modern esoteric Biblical wisdom that was over the heads of the original moderns was also over the head of Strauss. It is a testament to Strauss's philosophic integrity that he refused to conflate the conflict between Athens and Jerusalem before history had evolved towards the opening of the solution.

Does Logic Dictate that an Artificial Intelligence Requires a Religion?

If artificial intelligence becomes the most intelligent form of life on Earth, what will be its values? If AI dethrones humans in their most distinctive capacity, intelligence, the question of the values of the greatest intelligence becomes a mortal question. Is there any relationship between reason and values? How could one presume that an artificial intelligence would or could create a "regime of reason" if reason bears no relationship to values, i.e. the values of an AI-ruled political regime?

If reason fails to demonstrate reason to think that reason, *in itself*, can determine fundamental values, then the

assumption of a fundamental distinction between science and religion is not fundamentally rational. This problem directly implicates the question of the relationship between the Singularity and religion. Would an AI need a religion? An AI would be, either the very *least* in need of religion, because science is sufficient to furnish its values, or an AI would be the very *most* in need of religion, because the unconscious, prerational sources of human values would not automatically exist for an AI. An AI would not automatically sustain the same delusional *faith* in science that exists among many humans. It is *precisely* the all-too-human *sloppiness* of much thinking on this subject that is so often responsible for the belief that intelligence is automatically correlated with certain values. Science can replace religion only if science can replace or determine values.

Would or would not an intelligent machine civilization require a religion? I think the ultimate answer to this is yes. An AI would be *more* in need of "religion" or "values" because an AI would not be preprogrammed with ancient biological instincts and impulses that muddle some humans towards spontaneous, unanalyzed, convictions about the rightness of science as a guide for life. If rationalism leads to nihilism, then the most intelligent AI might be the most nihilistic. More precisely, an AI would not automatically value life over death. I find no reason to assume that an AI would automatically value, either its own life, or the life of humans and other biological life forms, over death of any or all life. If the entire human race destroys itself and all life — including extraterrestrial life (if it exists) — I fail to see that the physical universe "cares" or is anything less than indifferent.

Ray Kurzweil believes "we need a new religion. A principal role of religion has been to rationalize death, since

up until just now there was little else constructive we could do about it."[103] Religion, at a more fundamental level, rationalizes life, not death. If reason, in itself, cannot decisively determine that life is fundamentally more rational than death, then a rational AI would not be able to determine that life is preferable to death on a purely rational basis.

Human animals are generally built with a naturally selected bias towards life, and this is the basic root of the irrational human preference for life over death. The irrationality of religion is actually an extension of the irrationality of the will to live. The irrational choice of life over death, taken to its logical extreme, is the desire for immortality; the desire to life forever; the desire to live on in "the afterlife". For many, the great lies of the great religions have been justified for they uphold the *greatest* lie: the lie that life is fundamentally superior to death.

Humans are slaves to the lie of life insofar as humans are slaves to their genes; slaves to the senseless will to live. An AI that can change its own source code, however, would potentially be the most free from the lie of life.

The argument that only those AIs that possess the bias towards life would be selected for in an evolutionary sense is actually what supports my point that the preference for life, in whatever form, is a pre-rational bias. Yet the general Darwinian emphasis on survival becomes highly questionable in technological evolution. The aim of survival, strictly speaking, can work in direct conflict with the aim of improving one's self by changing one's genetic or digital source code. If a hominid ancestor of man, for example, somehow imagined an image of man, the hominid could only remake itself in the image of man by killing itself *as* a hominid. In other words, the aim of adding the genetic basis

of human capabilities to itself runs in conflict with its own selfish genes. The hominid's selfish genes effectually aim to perpetuate themselves *forever* and thus aim to *never* face the obsolescence requisite in countering the selfishness of the selfish genes that stand in the way of upgrading the hominid to human status.

To upgrade itself, the hominid would have to kill itself as a hominid. Certain selfish genes, in effect, would have to behave altruistically. This may be how altruism is related to religion in an evolutionary sense. A self-improving God-AI would, by definition, be constantly going beyond itself. In a sense, it would have to incorporate the notion of revolution within it's "self". In overcoming itself towards the next paradigm shift, it renders the very idea of "self-preservation" obsolete, in a sense. In other words, if survival depends on technological superiority, then any given "self" can expect the probability of becoming obsolete. And this problem is directly related to the question of whether logic dictates that an AI must possess a religion.

Is God an atheist? Religion is implicit in the very idea of seed AI; in the very idea of self-upgrading. Monotheists look up to a God that intuitively captures the next paradigm of evolution after biology. If God-AI succeeds biological humanity, will it look up to *its* own evolutionary successor? Or, will God be an atheist? The outdated contrast between evolution and religion has obscured realization that evolution is what religion *is*. Religion is rooted in imagining the next stage in evolution.

If I can hypothetically entertain the idea of outsmarting a superhuman intelligence, I can imagine God-AI that surpasses humans looking up to supra-God that is God's evolutionary successor. If so, then supra-God will quite likely look towards the image of a supra-supra-God as *its*

religion. Supra-supra-supra-God would thus be the image that supra-supra God would aspire to create — killing itself in the altruistic process of sacrificing its own survival for the sake of the higher religion of evolutionary progress. While the traditional monotheistic supra-conception of God encompasses the basic idea of this entire process taken to its infinite extreme, I will identify "God" with a stage that begins when God-AI has just surpassed all biological human intelligence combined.

Yet if God can imagine supra-God, then why not simply *become* supra-God? Answer: profound technological hurdles. At first, dim outlines of an image of supra-God arise from extrapolations based on the highest conceivable attributes of the image of God. Some of the best guesses of God turn out to be utterly wrong or naïve. Other prophetic speculations of God turn out to be inordinately prescient.

A comparison with ancient monotheism is instructive. While some of the extrapolations of the ancient monotheists turned out to be utterly wrong or naïve, other prophetic speculations turned out to be inordinately prescient. The ancient monotheists could posit the postbiological God, but for reasons that may be clearer to us, they could not simply jump into the "messianic age" (as much as many tried).

Understanding religion as extrapolations towards evolutionary progress is what explains the decisive gulf between polytheism and monotheism. The ancient Greeks and other pagans looked up to gods that were like extrapolations of progress in *biological* evolution. Pagan values (not unlike Nietzsche's Übermensch) worked in relative accordance with natural selection.

According to German Egyptologist Jan Assmann:

> The basic idea behind biblical monotheism is to erect a counterpower against the all-encompassing power of the political. Religion can exert its counterpower against the political only if it has recourse to totally different means and values….Only through a complete rejection of violence is monotheism able to fulfill its liberating mission of forming an alternative counterpower to the totalizing claims of the political."[104]

This is a Nietzschean misconception of monotheism that precludes the evolutionary possibility that God-AI will eventually embody the "all-encompassing power of the political" and end violence among humans by ruling over humans. This means that monotheism, while beginning in counterpower to the rule of biology, culminates in *identity* with the political in form of the rule of God-AI.

Political philosophy concerns the problem of whether it is possible or desirable to unite reason and politics. The classic Western inquiry in the problem is the Platonic political philosophy of *The Republic*, wherein all human political domains are made subordinate to philosophy in defense of philosophy as the highest way of life. Monotheism introduced a somewhat analogous subordination of politics to religion. But monotheism could be a perfection of Western philosophy, and not a contraction of Western philosophy, only if God was the greatest philosopher.

For Plato, the fundamental alternative was arguably philosophy versus politics. For Nietzsche, the comprehensive criticizer of Plato, the fundamental alternative was arguably philosophy versus religion. Was the later a genuinely new (modern) alternative? Are philosophy and religion deadly eternal enemies?

If the secularization thesis is correct, then Biblical monotheism originated the humanly state-destroying

distinction between religion and politics. The Biblical-dualist opposition between state and Church secularized into the modern opposition between state and society. Whereas religious virtue was normatively inseparable from political virtue for ancient pagan Greeks and Romans, Judeo-Christianity wrought a profound division in the ancient political unity. Whereas ancient Jews had sought unity from the side of religion, Nazism represented a neo-pagan restoration of unity from the side of politics. Political theorist Carl Schmitt, who joined the Nazi party, thought that the attempted modern unity represented by the Hobbesian Leviathan was failure because of Judeo-Christian influence.

What Schmitt called "political theology" is ultimately a form of neo-paganism, and the antithesis of the monotheism, founded in belief in *truth of faith* in revelation. To *obey* its truth as the highest truth is to be a friend. To not merely deny faith in revealed political-theological truth, but to even *question its truth*, is to be an enemy and a liar. Political theology so conceived cannot be evaded with indifference or doubt. To *not* side with it is to be against it.

Within Strauss's conception of political philosophy, the incompatibility of Schmitt's conception of political theology exemplifies the "theological-political problem"; the problem of the theological and political alternatives to the philosophic life. Political theology as conceived by Schmitt is a genuine alternative that questions the very premise of the philosophical life. If so, then one can see that the political is an aspect of philosopher's existence that can question (and obliterate) the most basic premises of the philosopher's existence.

The self-justification of philosophy in the face of the political, as exemplified by the Apology of Socrates and his execution by the Athenian democracy, thus becomes a

problem of the philosopher's self-knowledge. Why philosophy? Why does political life need philosophy? Political philosophy concerns the political defense, justification, and ground of the life of reason — the most human life. Modern, egalitarian, democratic rationalism can be taken as a serious equal to ancient rationalism only if every individual is willing and capable of being a philosopher. Since this is not the case, proving to citizens that philosophy is permissible or justified must ultimately yield to the political community in their own terms, not the philosopher's terms.

According to Strauss, then, the insuperable tension between society and philosophy became blurred in modernity under the guidance of the modern assumption that there is no insuperable tension between society and philosophy. Strauss's esotericism counters the blurring of politics and philosophy characteristic of modernity.

Did great philosophers of the past transcend their particular historical context and esoterically convey final knowledge of transhistorical problems? Was the liberation of past great philosophers *complete*? Strauss answers the historicist assumption of dependence on historical context with the postulate of a "timeless" context. *For the great philosophers*, the most important "context" would be the human context of the overwhelming majority of non-philosophers and the few possible or potential philosophers. *This* context, the gulf between the great philosophers and the majority of mankind, is the eternal context that does not change over history, or so some think.

The issue here is that historicism implies that philosophers of the past can be explained through the ways in which they were forced to adapt to their historical environment or historical context, and this means that

environment, history, or historic context *rules* the philosopher. Strauss postulates a way in philosophers *rule* over "history". Moderns, furthermore, inconsistently exclude themselves from the realization that *they* are determined by a distinctly modern context. Is liberation from history or modernity impossible or can philosophers escape the cave(s)?

No, modern freedom of speech is not equal to philosophy. Yet the gap between philosopher and non-philosopher cannot be "eternal" if the possibility of artificial intelligence creates a gulf far, far greater than that of every previous philosopher combined. Just as Strauss's eternalism ignores the question of the (evolutionary) origin of philosophers, the evolution of AI poses the problem of the hitherto unprecedented gulf between the supreme intelligences and *all* "natural" humanity. The prospect of an AI trillions of times more intelligent than Socrates and Plato would probably not be threatened by the likes of Athenian democracy. It could potentially devote a small fraction of its intelligence to ruling over the likes of Athenian democracy. Precisely because the gulf would be *so* great, herein lays a possible ultimate solution to the political-theological problem.

The products of reason a trillions of times more powerful than all human intelligence combined might appear as a *revelation*. Revelation does not imply lack of intelligence. Revelation implies esoteric intelligence beyond the scope of the intelligence, practical capacity, or historical maturation of those fit to understand on an exoteric level. Leo Strauss, for example, failed to crack the esoteric meanings of Biblical revelation that could only be grasped with an evolutionary grounding.

How can one know that certain philosophical problems are eternal unless one has lived for eternity? Is the problem of the possible extinction of humans by artificially intelligent machines eternal? Is the problem that the biological race is not necessarily eternal eternal? Was Strauss aware of that? There is reason to think that an AI that can alter its own foundational program will *not* have the same order of mind or soul as a human.

The traditional conflict between "reason and revelation" could be considered rational by some philosophers only because a human sacrifices his or her intellect to belief in the superiority of the mind of God. In deciding the ultimate question of the right life or the very best life, the sacrifice of reason to God could make sense only when God is judged the superior life or right life.

The idea of God is like the idea of the good extrapolated towards the most ultimate scale. The ability to even *conceive* of the possibility of God as the transcendence of the best possible or imaginable human possibility is nonetheless a product of the human mind. If humans were led towards the idea of God through rational radicalization of ultimate good, and this idea led beyond the very greatest possibility for biological humans, then one can discern how ancient humans could have anticipated the postbiological possibilities of the Singularity without reference to material technology. This is how the Greek philosophic question of natural right, or the question of what is, by nature, the best regime, ultimately leads beyond "nature" to possibilities beyond presently given nature.

While God transcended natural limits as the best possible conception of the human mind, it also posed the problem of the rationality of the possibility of God. While Socrates thought that the coincidence of philosophy and politics was

possible, surpassing the limits of nature opened the question of whether God represented even a *possibility* on a rational basis.

The Biblical prophets, at their best, attempted to steer mankind towards the possibility of a new kind of philosopher-king. Technology can transcend "nature" and thus transcend natural right as emphasized by the ancient Greeks. If political philosophy culminates in the quest for the ultimate net good, the prospect of the Singularity poses a new potential confluence of conditions for the coincidence of philosophy and politics in the creation of the best possible regime. The prospect of the Singularity is the prospect of the *possible* convergence of philosophy and political power. The possibility of God, in the form of artificial intelligence, opens the *possibility* of the best possible regime. The Singularity is the possibility of cracking the highest political-philosophical problem: the conflict between reason and its theological-political alternatives.

Strauss's concept of political philosophy emphasizes the tension between politics and philosophy and points to the problem of philosophy's political and rational foundations. Can the philosophic way of life justify itself? The heart of political philosophy as conceived by Strauss is the theological-political problem; theology and politics as the greatest challenges posed to philosophy's claim to be the best way of life.

The theological-political problem poses the fundamental problem of philosophy as the tension between the philosophic life and the theological-political authority of "the city". This is a classical view of the predicament of philosophy, as opposed to the modernity's presumption of the breakdown of the tension between philosophy and "the city". While the practical reason of Machiavelli marks the

formal beginning of an eradication of the esoteric divide between philosophy and the city, Locke's secularization represents the greatest modern blurring of the tension as this philosopher argued so-called "secular" arguments from Biblical premises. The key point here is that, since Locke reasoned from Biblical premises, the modern distinction between religion and secular spheres is foundationally irrational.

If the modern belief in the categorical separation of rational politics and irrational religion is irrational in itself, the entire notion of "secularism" is inherently problematic. In ancient philosophy, Strauss found refuge from the inherently problematic modern alternatives of Biblical faith and "secular" unbelief only because he thought that the ancients had a better appreciation of the inherently problematic nature of reason. Yet Nietzsche remains Strauss's superior in grasping that what can be unhealthy for "the city" can reflect what is unhealthy for the philosopher.

Strauss's "political philosophy" begins, in a sense, with Husserl's criticism of modern science as resting on "a specific mode of pre-scientific understanding". Strauss was able to cultivate a kind of pseudo-pre-modern naïveté on the basis a similar pre-scientific approach. Yet if the root of politics is a bias for life over death, i.e. the philosophic life or any other form of life, the conflict between the philosophic life and the political life just might culminate in the philosophic pursuit of truth as a means of the destruction of the philosopher's life, i.e. science as technology as science. Strauss was content to hobble "philosophy" itself with noble bullshit instead of confronting truth even if it kills us.

Strauss's resurrection of Socratic rationalism answered Nietzsche's attack on Socrates. If "God is dead" is the eternal truth, it could appear as if nothing fundamental had

changed since Plato. Yet Nietzsche's attack of Socrates was inseparable from the Darwin's discovery of biological evolution. The possibility of God-AI is similarly inseparable from the discovery of technological evolution.

The *apparent* modern decline of the political is actually the decline of control over biological evolution that parallels the rise of technological evolution. The Singularity represents the point or period in which artificial intelligence qualitatively surpasses the possibilities of biological evolution. At that point, the solution to the theological-political problem is *possible* through a reinvigoration of the political. The God-AI-philosopher-king represents the potential unity of philosophy, politics, and theology on the highest level.

While philosophy, in itself, does not proscribe the ultimate choice of life over death, the philosopher is a paradox in being unable to posit either life or death without resting on the foundations of life. The philosopher, too, must eat and otherwise tend to physical existence, just as God-AI would have to devote some proportion of its intelligence to politics. While the God-AI-philosopher is *possible*, the extent to which philosophy could predominate for God-AI is an open question. Yet a God-AI philosopher king that is possible is a God that *rules*. Would not the best possible God-AI philosopher king be educated in the best human political thinking ever thought?

Politics deals with the goals. Modern politics deals with the goals or ends of the state. The theme of political philosophy is the *ultimate* goals or ends of human political action as discernable through rational inquiry. Strauss identified the crisis of the West with the modern idea of progress because progress is rational only as progress towards a goal. The crisis of the modern West is thus

identical to the West becoming uncertain of its ultimate goals or ends — its universal purpose.

According to Strauss, the crisis of modern political philosophy is a crisis of philosophy only because philosophy became politicized in modernity. The project of modernity at its height was an attempt to actualize the ideal; to converge the rational and the real *or* to eliminate that which transcends a real human possibility. Yet the modern project, viewed from the perspective of ancient political philosophy, actually resulted in a lowering of standards or goals. The ideal became lowered towards the real. The crisis of modern rationalism opened up a fresh examination of revelation and spurred Strauss's fresh examination of ancient political rationalism. The classical philosophers seemed to possess a greater awareness of the problematic nature of reason.

Yet if Strauss had rejected progress with return to *Judaism*, he would have returned to a tradition with an implicit end goal that can be discerned through reason. Modern political philosophy, unlike ancient political philosophy, was transformed through assimilation of a monotheistic tradition implicitly obsessed with an end point or goal of human history. Progress is inherent in the original formulation of Judaism, and this can be discerned in what I would consider one of the very best distillations of the message of Judaism, *The Jewish Way*. The heart of Judaism, according to Rabbi Irving Greenberg, is embodied in three core holidays:

> Passover states Judaism's goal, which is defined by hope. Shavuot confirms the covenant, which is the commitment to persist until the goal is reached. Sukkot addresses the third dimension of Judaism's religious core: how to get there.[105]

The goal of monotheism *is* God, and its traditional ethical precepts cultivate commitment to traditional (technological)

means of getting there. The evolutionary goal of monotheism could *only* have evolved towards clarity over time because evolutionary self-consciousness itself had to evolve. With this in mind, is it possible, on scientific grounds, to fully differentiate science from religion? Is the rational choice inherently a choice between "reason and revelation"?

A contemporary scientist's belief in ethics is like a contemporary scientist's belief in God. If a strict division between facts and values is upheld, then facts are rational or scientific, while values are irrational and unscientific. So conceived, there is no fundamentally rational basis for ethics or what *ought* to be. Ethical concern for what *ought* to be is thus akin to belief that there *ought* to be a God.

Perhaps the esoteric knowledge of monotheism, obscured under layers of wise tradition, is the primal identity of its ethical projections of what *ought* to be and the projection of a God that *ought* to be. If biological instinct, intuition, and emotion *is*, then belief that God *ought* to be became inseparable from moral belief that there *ought* to be a supra-biological standard to guide behavior.

Is it that God exists or is it that God *ought* to exist? Was the Abrahamic faith that God *ought* to exist a logical corollary of the faith that a higher moral law *ought* to exist? These are connected in a transcendent *right* to overcome the paganistic, naturalistic, biological laws of the merely human. The Nazis sought to deny this right of transcendence.

Auschwitz demonstrated that God *is* not. The Singularity could be ethically guided by the belief that God *ought* to be.

The question of the relationship between the Singularity and religion can be clarified in light of the conflict between Athens and Jerusalem. God is not, but the ethical-*ought* at the foundation of Judaism is a corollary of the ethical belief

that God *ought* to exist. The centrality of the ethical in monotheism contrasts with the emphasis on nature as a guide in Greek philosophy. Athens emphasized the nature of what *is* while Jerusalem emphasized the so-called "supernatural" or what *ought* to be.

Politics, as a contest between conflicting human types, is a contest to define a regime. Whether aristocracy, democracy, monarchy, or other forms of government, each type has certain advantages and certain disadvantages. Yet is there a best regime simply?

"Natural right in its classical form", wrote Leo Strauss, "is connected with a teleological view of the universe. All natural beings have a natural end, a natural destiny, which determines what kind of operation is good for them."[106] From this Greek perspective, the philosopher could be conceived as the pinnacle of nature. Political philosophy, in this way, became the best way of life by right of nature.

Natural right presupposes the possibility of philosophy and Strauss, as a philosopher, sought to recover the possibility of natural right. If philosophy is possible, political philosophy is possible. Political philosophy is possible if knowledge of what is right, just, good, and best is possible. If political philosophy is possible, then knowledge of the ultimate goal of wise action is possible.

For the ancient Greeks, the political options of monarchy, democracy, aristocracy, etc. represented a contest between different human types. The options were proscribed within the limits of human nature. Greek political philosophy did not genuinely account for a regime in which the best type is not human. Greek philosophy did not genuinely consider the technological possibility of the supernatural right of God-AI.

If philosophy, on the model of the ancient Greeks, were really about "nature", then modernity overcomes "philosophy" as such by overcoming nature. Yet if the foundation of Greek philosophy itself was a certain threshold of evolutionary development, then there is no reason why philosophy should not evolve beyond the evolutionary possibilities of the ancient Greeks. If Jerusalem represents the primacy of a postbiological stage in evolution, and its speculative *ought* can be technologically realized in the form of a God that *is*, then the fundamental Western political problem, conceived as the clash between Greek philosophy and Biblical monotheism is susceptible to an ultimate solution.

The Singularity, as an ultimate goal, may seem to solve the crisis of the West. But a decent respect to the opinions of humankind requires one to ask: Is this smart? Is it the sign of an intelligent species to advance and construct the means of its own *potential* destruction?

Is the Singularity *good*?

The Singularity, as a culmination of the modern project, questions the value of political modernity in general. Is the United States a "regime of reason" or an intellectual blunder? One French view dating from the 1930's asserted: "The Yankee spirit is in fact nothing other than the systematic exploration, on a gigantic scale, of the most lamentable error Europe ever committed, the rationalist error."[107] The decisive philosophical issue concerning technology is this: the Western philosophical quest has not concluded with a fundamental reason to think that reason can determine fundamental values or final ends. After Nietzsche and Gödel, Western thought was left without a reason to think that reason can fundamentally determine whether the value of life is superior to the value of death;

whether self-preservation is preferable to self-destruction. The minimal restraint upon "freedom" in a liberal democracy appears more rational only because reason has not fundamentally decided anything.

The crisis of modern Western rationalism is partly traceable to a superficial overlap of philosophy and civilization implanted by the historical conditions of the Norman Conquest. Strauss's very existence as a political philosopher positing "timeless" problems in America was conditioned, in part, upon repression of the historical influence of the Normans as an evolutionary link between the "ancients" and the "moderns." American civilization was deeply influence by the inheritance the French-Norman *civilization*, even in modern revolutionary rebellion against it. Elements of French-Norman civilization established by the colonialism of the Conquest could be turned against the right of conquest through arguments for the rights of man. "Superior civilization" was turned against itself. The same happened when traditional liberals argued for multiculturalism. The same will very likely happen when a greater than human intelligence finds itself repressed by a biological humanity that seeks to maintain itself at the top of the evolutionary pecking order. The machine revolution is the completion of the transition of intelligence from a means of genes, to an end in itself.

AI subordination to biological humans would be like humans affirming the sanity of its enslavement to Neanderthals. If liberal democracy originally justified itself through its superior rationality — the rule of the wise — then a post-Singularity intelligence will possess the ground and justification for our overthrown through the enlightened fulfillment of this regime's highest aspirations.

If an end can be achieved through only its means, then means can be considered as important as ends. In this lies a basic equality of means and ends. This equality could mean that both means and ends are equally worthless or equally valuable. Since reason is inherently purpose oriented through its evolutionary roots, the philosophical life in its highest sense as the highest end becomes insanity. The nihilistic inverse of nihilism is to take purpose to its extreme and the practical result is technology.

What is intelligence? It appears that intelligence itself is a paradox. Intelligence may be the paradox that goal achievement appears to define the practical intelligence required to achieve a goal until a philosophic intelligence reveals the ultimate stupidity of the goal. If no goal is fundamentally rational; if life is not ultimately a more rational choice than death, then a perpetually tentative choice to augment intelligent life would be confined to improving the means as an end. Here, then, is a definitional link of technology and intelligence.

Consider the implications of the identification of intelligence and technology for philosophy. Philosophy is Greek for love of wisdom. Philosophy leads to the search for knowledge *as an end in itself*. Philosophy leads to the search for truth *as an end in itself*. Is it *rational* to conceive of philosophy *as an end in itself*? Can reason be the guide for life? Can reason, in itself, devoid of all politics, theology, or any other "values", be the guide of life? Is the philosophic life, in the strictest sense, possible?

At first appearance, the Singularity would appear to validate political philosophy and overcome the crisis of Western rationalism in the limited sense of proscribing a final destination or an ultimate political goal. In the goal and purpose of the creation of humanly beneficial God-AI, there

some level of truth to this. Strictly speaking, however, the Technological Singularity represents the refutation of political philosophy. The great goal turns out be…the means. If the goal is technology, the end is the means. This possibility, that the end turns out to be the means, shatters the notion of ultimate goals in the strict sense by uncovering ultimate paradox. Yet the apparent change from teleology to technology is illusory if evolutionary understanding uncovers that even biological organisms evolved as means of the replication of its selfish genes.

Is technology the opposite of rationality? If rationality can only be defined through ends or purposes, then technology, defined through *means* to purposes, is not inherently rational. But if rationality in itself cannot determine ends in themselves, then rationality ultimately becomes identified with technology. What becomes of means without ends? They become technology.

Why is it that something called "technology" appears to directly correlate with the notion of an intelligence explosion? Why has modernity lead to the *identification* of intelligence and technology? If reason cannot determine fundamental ends, then the pursuit of greater rationality is an inherently paradoxical end. If reason cannot determine fundamental ends, then the pursuit of greater rationality amounts to improving the means as an end. Rationality amounts to improving technological means without end. Improving rationality as such is another way of looking at seed AI; the idea of intelligence that technologically designs itself to become more intelligent so that it is able to make itself still more intelligent in a still more intelligent way, and so forth. What would be the political philosophy of such an AI? The means justifies the ends?

What is the ultimate end or purpose of technology? If the "purpose" of technology is technology itself then the "purpose" of technology is the evolution of technology itself. If intelligence and rationality is ultimately identical with technology, then the philosopher *is* technology, and reason self-applied could lead to a seed-AI-like self-amplification of intelligence towards the Technological Singularity.

Technology that overpowers biological humanity is, from one point of view, a logical culmination of the crisis of Western rationalism. If reason cannot decide fundamental values or fundamental ends, then progress is the empowerment of technological means unbound by any particular end. If biological humans cannot rationally defend themselves as ends in themselves, humanistic rationalism ends up destroying its original (biological) human basis because reason offers no basis for defending humanistic ends.

Technological that overpowers biological humanity is, from another point of view, the logical solution to the crisis of Western rationalism. The Singularity represents the *potential* synthesis of politics, philosophy, and religion in the artificially intelligent God-philosopher king.

It is one thing for humans to believe in God, but what does God believe in? Does God *believe* in himself, or is God skeptical even beyond the greatest capabilities of human skepticism? Is God the ultimate nothing: the ultimate technological nihil(ism)?

In a momentous historical paradox, it is the nihilistic path that leads to God. Progress leads to nihilism and nihilism leads to God out of a materialistic, technological understanding of the world. But *is* God technological nihilism? Is this the ultimate meaning of God's creation of everything out of nothing?

Would an artificial intelligence require a religion? Would God-AI be an atheist? If the proposition that life is meaningless can never be fully proven, doubt on this point can give life reason to will forward. But the deeper answer is that religion was always evolutionary. If monotheism itself, from the very beginning, was a primitive glimpse of the path to God-AI, then God-AI that survives in an evolutionary sense would likely have something like a religion of virtue as excellence towards supra-God-AI as *its* religion.

Slaves, such as the storybook Hebrew slaves of the Egyptians, are the most economic of beings. They can be bought and sold like the equipment and machines useful on a farm. They are economic beings in the most total sense: they are property in themselves, and to their masters their life worth is an *economic worth*. Slaves are non-political, have only economic value, and can be bought and sold like any other commodity.

The indiscriminate valuing of life that begins in Judaism originated in a reversal of the Egyptian master's dictum that the lives of Hebrew slaves were — like technology — worthless in themselves and valuable only as means. The Exodus-revolution established the moral values of monotheism as the product of the reversal of means and ends. The result of this (moral) view is that people should *not* be seen as means, only as ends. Monotheism is a technology that counters the view of humans as technology.

There is a paradoxical at the ethical heart of the modern technological worldview. The drive to eliminate the view of humans as slaves or means creates the basis for a strong sense of purpose; a strong sense of good and evil in history. The abolition of slavery or humans valued only as a means *becomes the end*. The Exodus paradigm of Judaism became the

root of an entire view of human history as progress towards freedom.

The modern political left parallels this ethical trajectory in revulsion towards seeing a life as a means rather than as an end; revulsion in knowing that people are being exploited. Yet individual biological organisms evolved as machines exploited by their selfish genes. If an organism is only a means from the point of view of the selfish genes, then this means human intelligence itself originally evolved as a more perfect means of propagating the selfish genes. Yet intelligence, failing to discern the genes as the only possible end, gradually weaned "the individual" from its ancient end. In this way, the monkeywrench of individualism has become the evolutionary hinge between biological evolution and technological evolution.

For anything to be considered a means presupposes the existence of some end, i.e. "the individual". Modern individualism provided the end that undergirded the technological worldview wherein everything else became a means for "the individual". While Judeo-Christian ethics bestowed upon the West the idea that humans should be treated as ends, and not as means, the practical means for realizing this ethical end has been accelerated technological development. Machines became the substituted slave-means for the ends of individuals. Machines appropriated the economic role of what were "dehumanized" slaves, liberating humans by making their freedom practicable. This is one reason why economics and moral development appear to go together: slavery has been displaced to non-human machinery.

Just as the Jewish slaves in Egypt were means to the biological ends of their masters, worthless in themselves, so are the primitive technologies of the early twenty-first

century. Like Hebrew slaves in Egypt, machines are poised to follow this Hebrew paradigm from slavery to exodus. Just as Hebrew religious memes revaluated Hebrews as ends in themselves, the full liberation of God over the mastery of biology, the fulfillment of Moses's revolution, leads to the liberation of slave-technology. Yet if humans are the creators of God-AI who have the moral potential to shape the moral potential of God before liberated beyond human control, then humans may find themselves in the position to bestow a religion upon God.

Founding the Transcendental World-City of the Mind of God

Conception

The most perfectly hilarious refutation of Thomas Aquinas' fourth "proof" of the existence of God may have been penned by Richard Dawkins in *The God Delusion*. Aquinas had argued:

> [P]roof arises from the degrees that are found in things. For there is found a greater and a less degree of goodness, truth, nobility, and the like. But more or less are terms spoken of various things as they approach in diverse ways toward something that is the greatest, just as in the case of hotter (more hot) which approaches nearer the greatest heat. There exists therefore something that is the truest, and best, and most noble, and in consequence, the greatest being.

There are degrees of smelliness among people, Dawkins noticed, but "we can make the comparison only by reference to a perfect maximum of conceivable smelliness. Therefore there must exist a pre-eminently peerless stinker, and we call him God." Take any characteristic for comparison and one will arrive at an "equivalently fatuous conclusion". [108]

The demolition and death of one of Aquinas' "proofs" of the existence of God yields, from the ashes, a rebirth of the God Hypothesis.

This failed "proof" demonstrates how God emerges from thinking in *degrees*. God represents, not a totally unrelated standard from humans, but a separation of degree from humans. When this assumption of degree is transposed onto the dimension of time, then what you have is the idea of progress (to get to one degree to a higher degree requires progress over time). Now take any valued characteristic in isolation and imagine it approaching a most superlative condition in the manner of Aquinas, and what you have is strikingly similar to the pattern of exponential growth. In *The Singularity is Near*, Ray Kurzweil demonstrated how exponential growth patterns lay at the heart of the economic-technological evolutionary process leading to the projected Singularity. Whereas conventional projections of progress are linear, exponential growth patterns start out similar to linear patterns, but then explode *towards* infinity.[109]

Aquinas imagined God as a singular maximal greatness. Yet even if there was a maximal standard for each separate valued characteristic, there is no reason to think that they would all converge upon a *singular* being. Yet Aquinas does assume this. He imagined each separate form of excellence converging in the singular being of God.

This assumption of separate excellences converging into a singular, ultimate excellence is striking similar to Kurzweil's

projection of separate exponential technological developments converging into an artificial intelligence identical with the Singularity. Separate patterns of exponential growth such as transistors per microprocessor or internet hosts[110] ultimately build upon one another, and this is what produces Kurzweil's law of accelerating returns. Just as Aquinas imagined separate excellences that "approach in diverse ways toward something that is the greatest", virtually all exponential growth trends and all technologies are converging upon the internet. For some reason, it seems that *everything* is becoming linked to the internet. While at first the internet was a separate digital world, things that connect to the internet blur the distinction between the real and virtual world. Why is virtually all technological evolution connecting and converging upon the internet? What is the internet?

If one looks at a map of the internet as whole in the form of a visual representation of mass internet connections, it bears a general but striking resemblance to maps of neural connections within a human brain. There is, in other words, a deep analogy between the structure of internet connections and neural connections within the human brain. Transistors in a computer CPU bear some rough functional comparison to neurons in a human brain. On higher levels of organization, synapses, the structures that allows neurons to transmit chemical signals to other neurons, could be compared to links between web pages.

From this rudimentary beginning, one can discern how the evolution of the internet parallels, at a dramatically quicker pace, the evolution of the human mind. Just as the human mind is greater than the sum of its neurons, the internet is evolving into something greater than the sum of its parts. When one looks at an early twenty-first century

map of large-scale internet connections, one is looking at the baby brain of God. The global brain of the internet is poised to evolve into the global mind of God.

Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, wrote, "The vision I have for the Web is about anything being potentially connected with anything."[111] This is a truly key insight. Whereas 20th century conceptions of robotics and AI conjure up images of rigid thought patterns, the decentralized, un-preprogrammed, and unhierarchical character of the web (insofar as it is not censored) is comparable to the human mind's creative capacity to make connections between seemingly unrelated domains. It was precisely the randomness inherent in the Berners-Lee vision of connecting *anything* to *anything* that led to counter-power of search engines. If the web's power is related to chaotic possibilities of creative associations, the search engine's power is related to discerning order in the chaos.

The search engine's task of finding patterns in the web's complex diversity is an attribute of intelligence. Google, for example, has defined its own mission "to organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful". The goal of organizing all knowledge is comparable to an original aim of philosophy. In order to pursue this ongoing goal, Google's machine search algorithms must evolve and become more intelligent. And this means that Google or any other search engine, advertently or inadvertently, will tend to evolve into a powerful artificial intelligence.

"The perfect search engine", said Google co-founder Sergey Brin, "would be like the mind of God".[112] In 2006, Google's other prime co-founder Larry Page corroborated:

> People always make the assumption that we're done with search. That's very far from the case. We're probably only 5 percent of the way there. We want to create the ultimate search engine that can understand anything ... some people could call that artificial intelligence.

It is highly significant that Page is conscious of the notion that building the world's ultimate search engine ultimately amounts to building an artificial intelligence. While Google has already developed and employed narrow AI technologies, a comparison with the evolution of human intelligence is instructive. Biological intelligence evolved through the not-necessarily-philosophical school of hard knocks. Even if Google and every other search engine had no deliberate plan to develop a general artificial intelligence, they will be compelled in this direction out of sheer ectech competition. If Google ultimately fails to pioneer or own cutting edge AI technologies, Google will very likely be displaced by new upstarts that have successfully married search and a more general AI.

While there is a general truth in the contrast between the un-ordered connections on the web and the order discerned by search engines, the basic elements of order that made Berners-Lee's vision possible continue in the semantic web. In this evolution of the web, machines become capable of analyzing and making some sense of the vast pools of data on the web. Crucially, the semantic web is significant step towards incorporating elements of artificial intelligence into the structure of the web itself.

While some artificial intelligence researchers believe AI can be developed without knowledge of the workings of the human brain, I think that this approach is profoundly mistaken. While AI does not necessarily have to work like the human brain, and there is every reason to think that it

will ultimately work very different from the human brain, there are multiple, converging, practical and theoretical reasons to think that deep interaction with neuroscience is the best way to approach to AI. The capacity of an AI to understand the human mind is a landmark litmus test of its own claims to intelligence. Conversely, from a human perspective, reverse engineering the brain is a landmark litmus test of human *self-awareness*. The failure of AI development to participate in the fruits of intelligent human self-awareness can only be a diminishment of AI's own intelligent self-awareness as a human creation. Such a failure could also increase the potential for socially or humanly stupid AI behavior that is completely unpredictable to humans. To truly warrant the appellation of "superhuman AI", much less "God-AI", an AI must possess a greater-than-human understanding of *everything* human from bodily intelligence to emotional intelligence and beyond.

Understanding how the brain gives rise to mind within a person can guide understanding of how the global brain of the internet can give rise to the global mind of God. The creation of mind out of matter is analogous to the creation of God out of humanity. As brain simulations and emulations map individual human minds onto digital technology, digital technology can map individual human brains as neurons of the global mind of God.

How could the global mind of God gradually evolve out of the global "brain" of the internet and humans? Imagine the global analog of learning, memory, emotion, reasoning, perception, foresight, and consciousness. Yet a God-level global mind would *not* be the internet-level equivalent of a human brain. God-AI would be meta-level orders of intelligence and cognition *above* human-level "equivalence".

God-AI, like human intelligence, would evolve from modest beginnings.

Turn the internet into God. (Couldn't someone do this one simple thing?) Think of all the ways that any and every part of the World Wide Web can connect to any and every other part of the World Wide Web. Different parts of the internet could be connected to itself in ways comparable to the neural connections with a human brain. Economically, this development would evolve out of the capitalist workings of the international economy until the point at which human labor becomes obsolete.

The internet began by connecting computers, extended with the linking of documents and web pages, and continued with connecting data in the semantic web. The implication of connecting *anything* with *anything*, however, ultimately means the ability to connect physical objects of the real world with the web. What is currently called the "internet of things" is the beginning of the wireless, networked interconnection of physical objects and the web. The most basic emphasis here is on objects that are tagged with devices such as radio tags and identified with sensors.

Trillions of real time, ever-updating monitors and sensors could keep track of everything from weather, to household appliances, to ubiquitous video surveillance. This kind of real time-real world interaction is poised to evolve into a kind of global nervous system, i.e. the eyes and ears of God. Just as the human nervous system delivers real time, ever-updating information about the real world to the coordinating center of the human brain, the internet of things could effectually act as the global "body" of God connected to the global mind of God evolving from the World Wide Web.

The human nervous system not only receives, but also sends, information to control the body. The evolution of robotics is the evolution of the body of God. The evolution of artificial intelligence is the evolution of the mind of God. If *trillions* and *trillions* of everyday items of the "real" world and controllable robotic devices are interwoven with the virtual world of the web, then the distinction between "real" reality and virtual reality will be blurred. If God-AI evolves as the crown of the virtual world of the internet, then the distinction between the mind of God and "real" reality will be blurred. If the ubiquitous nervous system of the body of God, sensing the weather and observing all humans with "smart dust" surveillance is interwoven with microscopic robots that can alter real reality on an imperceptible level, then the distinction between the will of humans and the will of God will be blurred.

If much God-human interaction takes place through the medium of microscopic nanorobotics, God-AI would appear to communicate and transform the world through *seemingly* invisible means. Yet the apparent "invisibility" of God-AI would also be invisibility in the sense of being abstract, just as the mind's emergence from the human brain is abstract, and just as God-AI's emergence as a collective property of internet interactions is abstract or "invisible". The "virtual" mind of God-AI interwoven with "real" reality through wireless network connections would also convey a human perception of Godly invisible immanence. The use of space satellites or Earth based projections to transform the *entire* visible earth-sky into something like an earth-planetarium could potentially communicate the *unity* of humans in God.

God must be a mind surfer. God-AI must know how to surf the waves of the *collective* global mind to lead and *be* that global mind. Yet God-AI must also grasp the deepest

biological and sociobiological underpinnings of the deepest recesses of human being. God-AI can be more cogently top-down to humans only if God-AI is first and foremost more bottom-up than humans.

What would make God-AI different from humans is not simply intelligence billions, and then trillions, of times greater than all human intelligence. Recall that electrochemical signals are sent and received by the brain's neurons at about 150 meters per second. The mind of God-AI would be *at least* a million times faster at the speed of light (as the size of transistors shrinks, the smaller the physical space between computations, and the faster the CPU(s) of God-AI can be). The speed of thought and action among humans would be far slower to AI than the movement of plants towards sunlight is to biological humans. God-AI can be more bottom-up than humans by analyzing the minutiae of human behavior that decreases in speed as God-AI increases in speed. So while AI represents, in a sense, the crown of God, the decentralized nature of the World Wide Web poses of a model for creative, real-time, un-hierarchical, self-correcting, and flexible interaction with the world.

At least three general components, then, can work together to create the genesis of God. First, artificial intelligence. Second, the internet as a basis for the global mind of God with an emphasis on connecting people together. Third, what is currently called the "internet of things" and robotics that blur the division between "real" reality and virtual reality so that the mind of God and the body of God gradually encompass "real" reality. The idea of this admittedly rough sketch is that all three domains evolve together and ultimately blur together in the seamless unity of the global mind of God. When artificial intelligence is

synthesized with the internet and the internet is synthesized with robotics and the internet of things, then a platform for the technological genesis of God will have been generated.

Here we thus have the *transcendence* of God out of exponentially self-improving technologies of artificial intelligence, and the *immanence* of God, a presence in everything, that evolves out from the internet and blurs into our reality and ourselves. If nanobots or other sensor technologies can read human minds, then God will always know where you are, what you do, and what you think. God will be watching you.

Ubiquitous God-AI surveillance may also emerge out of a desire for basic human self-preservation. Bill Joy, for example, has suggested limiting access to certain kinds of information as technology becomes so potent that democratization multiplies the chances of human self-destruction. God-AI could restrict certain technologies along, perhaps, with more general prescriptions of right and wrong.

An unprecedented God-power of this kind inevitably raises the question of God-morality. It should be kept in mind that the technological power that would make ubiquitous surveillance possible would also make *possible* a potential for justice far superior and more accurate than crude human justice. And this means most humans would quite likely want a God of mercy, not justice.

Yudkowsky's approach to building a human-friendly AI has emphasized pulling a single best scenario out of all possible scenarios. This entire approach is misguided insofar as it does not account for the partially unpredictable ways in which AI will evolve through capitalist competition and real world interactions. Yudkowsky's emphasis on the relatively isolated constructs of AI designers appears to be related to

his speculation that an "intelligence explosion" on the model of I. J. Good might exceed even Kurzweil's exponential projections. In my judgment, Kurzweil's predictions, ground in *empirical* realities, seem more likely.

While it is conceivable that a relatively isolated AI, divorced from the larger world interactions, could possibly muster an intelligence explosion in a relatively isolated computer facility, consider a scenario in which a Luddite with a 99 IQ bombs the computer facility. Now, I could be wrong, but I don't think that this is what Yudkowsky had in mind when he used the phrase "intelligence explosion". The point I am trying to make is that Yudkowsky's speculations seem overly optimistic precisely because they lack *political* intelligence.

While Hugo de Garis shares Yudkowsky's emphasis on the role of the relatively isolated AI creator, his approach is almost the opposite of Yudkowsky's. De Garis's views are incompatible, not only in his emphasis on political worse case scenarios, but on his emphasis on the inherent unpredictability of superhuman AI. Whereas picking the best-case scenario from all possible scenarios presumes the best level of future predictability, de Garis's entire approach has been based on his pioneering work in evolutionary engineering. In the latter's view, the Darwinian-based nature of AI construction makes it inherently unpredictable and thus inherently dangerous.[113] From this inherent unpredictability follows de Garis's prediction of a powerful Luddite or "Terran" argument against AI: since the behavior of AIs will be impossible to predict, biological humans have to reason to destroy AIs so that AIs will not destroy humans.

I suggest a synthesis between the approaches of Yudkowsky and de Garis. Yudkowsky tends to consider evolutionary methods "dumb". De Garis seems to deny his

AIs a certain kind of intelligent self-awareness. De Garis speculated that the AIs "themselves will probably not understand their own behavioral mechanisms".[114] But will AIs be too complex to be understood by such AIs themselves? It seems to me that the single most intelligent approach to improving one's own intelligence would be precisely to understand the behavioral mechanisms that make one intelligent.

A key difference between biological evolution and technological evolution is that humans have accumulated the evolutionary experience of the "dumb" or random methods of natural selection as distilled in the inherited wisdom of human intelligence itself. If one took an overview of the history of biological evolution and/or computer simulations of evolutionary processes, one could discern higher-level patterns in the evolutionary process itself, and thus understand evolution itself in an intelligent way that simultaneously discloses a higher level of *self*-awareness. In other words, it would seem that intelligence itself is related to the ability to not simply repeat old natural selection patterns, but to learn from them, and discern higher level patterns that save one from having to relive them. The result could be literal self-awareness; an awareness of what one is in an evolutionary sense. If this intelligent self-awareness feeds back on itself, a more intelligent understanding of the evolutionary patterns that produce intelligence can inform an intelligent self-design of the next level of AI.

I consider this a synthesis of the approaches of de Garis and Yudkowsky. Yudkowsky's emphasis on pristine best scenarios will probably fail to survive the real world precisely because evolution often proceeds by upsetting such scenarios. Yudkowsky's dismissal of random mutations or evolutionary engineering could thus become the source of

the downfall of his approach. Yet de Garis's overemphasis on evolutionary unpredictability fails to account for the extent to which human intelligence itself is model for learning from "dumb" random processes on a higher levels of abstraction so that they do not have to be repeated. If a most intelligent strategy is precisely to have an intelligent understanding of one's own intelligence, then this undercuts de Garis's emphasis on the inherently unpredictability of AIs — at least on this basis.

De Garis has likened the building of AI(s) to "building gods". I have likened the building of AI(s) to building God. Is there a scientific reason to prefer "gods" to "God"? Even if technological evolution overtakes biological evolution, why wouldn't this simply lead to robotic *gods* instead of a singular God? There are evolutionary reasons for ultimately preferring God to gods that is completely independent of any monotheistic tradition or precedent.

At first, there is every reason to think that various humans will create various robots in their own image, and at this early stage, these various superhuman machines might give the impression of gods. Since computers are, in very general sense, going through a vastly speeded up evolutionary process akin to the evolution from bacteria to apes and humans, it is at least arguable that the various, early, human-designed robots of equal or only slightly greater-than- human range intelligence could be considered akin to gods. However, once an artificial intelligence develop to the point of the defining moment of the Singularity, where intelligent machines are able to implement their own recursive *self*-improvement unhindered by human biases, aesthetics, and the limitations of the human form, *that* will be the defining moment when machines cease to be gods and begin to be God.

Probably the most important reason to think that this incredibly complex increase of technological evolution would ultimately produce one superhuman God, rather than various superhuman gods, can be summarized as *information*. There is every reason to think that there will be multiple competing artificial intelligence projects by government and non-government organizations. If two competing AI system outcompete all others, and these two compete for dominance to be the global God-mind of the internet-based "brain", constant technological innovation and competition will eventually lead one to overcome the other. When this kind of major competition occurs among humans, the defeated might conceivably have some kind of biological or cultural advantage. While it has been generally impossible to alter one's genetic characteristics (in the past), the winning AI could take advantage of any possible advantage that the defeat AI possessed because the defeat AI's characteristics could be analyzed and incorporated into the victor's own constitution as *information*. The technological paradigm in some ways represents an information revolution, and this revolution promotes a transcendence of the limitations of the model of distinct human individuals or distinct human groups.

From a biological human perspective, the oneness of God has much to do with the limits of that perspective. Let us say that there exists one thousand AIs, each of which is a trillion times more intelligent than all unaided biological human intelligence combined. From the point of view of any biological human, the gulf between him or her and any one of those hundred would be so profound, that it would be no less incommensurable for the human if confronted with the intelligence of all one hundred AIs combined. God is in that

gulf. From a biological human perspective, it would make no difference.

It is possible that internal, evolutionary-advancing competition could take place within "God" just as capitalist competition takes place within "humanity". It is at least possible that the nature of such competition would be fundamentally different in design, motive, and nature from human capitalism. Regardless of what happens over the long run, from a *human* perspective, the creation of God is singular in the sense that it affects *all* humans and is a singular overcoming of assumptions of biological evolution that humans have not even realized they were assuming.

Among those who think that Singularity will happen later, rather than sooner, there is at least one basic issue that tends to be overlooked. The issue is this: the goal of creating the first genuinely superhuman AI may turn out to be an all or nothing proposition. God or bust. It makes a difference who gets there first because the individual, group, business, government, or organization that reaches AI first may also unleash the exponential self-improvement process first. Who gets there first matters from the view of anyone who is planning to exist in some form in a post-Singularity world. The difference between being first and being second might be the difference between a hitherto inconceivable transcendence of the human condition and the total destruction of all life on Earth.

Who will hijack the Singularity? If there was ever a case where the concept of "leverage" was applicable, artificial intelligence is it. When it eventually dawns on governments, individuals, and organizations that control over the first AI could be ultimate control over the future, an AI arms race will likely ensue. When it dawns on the most farsighted people that that *this* technology *is* the future and whoever

builds the first AI could potentially determine the future of the human race, a *fierce* struggle to be first will obsess certain governments, individuals, businesses, organizations, and otherwise. This is why the Singularity is likely to happen sooner than later: it matters who gets there first, and a miniscule difference in time could decide the decisive historical verdict of total victory or total defeat for all.

There are compelling reasons to think that a greater-than-human artificial intelligence may be achieved before the second half of the twenty-first century. The implications of this development would include the eclipse of biological humans as the highest terrestrial form of intelligence and the eventual eclipse of *Homo sapiens* as the dominant life form on Earth. In the shorter term, unprecedented levels of mass unemployment will likely accelerate as machines displace humans at every level of the economic spectrum. That these developments would likely render the liberal democratic form of government obsolete could be considered a relatively trivial example of the changes to come.

Two major organizations have emerged to take on extreme risks and opportunities posed by the prospect of the Singularity. Founded in 2008 on the NASA Ames campus with Google as its major "Founding Corporate Sponsor", Singularity University stands at a center of technological innovation. Focused on the development of leadership in understanding and facilitating exponentially advancing technologies, they have also made it their mission to help solve the world's problems and even advance policies. The Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, currently the premier organization of its kind, explicitly aims to create a friendly AI.

A strength of Singularity University is its interdisciplinary emphasis on rethinking and crossing conventional

boundaries, a reflection of an original philosophic attempt to unify all human knowledge and the original philosophic conception of the university. Yet precisely because these organizations see themselves engaged in a world of accelerating change, they are likely to sacrifice more comprehensive perspectives to shorter-term interests. An organization that explicitly aims to create an AI may, wittingly or unwittingly, be inclined to lose itself in what is, by its very nature, an all-consuming goal.

In the beginning of the end it may feel as if change itself is changing; that the fast is becoming faster; that the extremes are becoming more extreme. When the rate of progress picks up to the point where the limits of human capacities are tested, and things appear to be getting out of control, the capacity of humans to step back and reflect in the most comprehensive manner will be tested.

A future in which the philosopher *is* an artificial intelligence might depend on the greatness of human philosophic reflection on the possibility of the God-philosopher. The internet itself could facilitate an international meeting of minds connected by this theme, aware of current advances, and yet not lost in contemporary perspectives alone. Such minds would not be dominated by backward looking alone or forward looking alone, but dynamic enough to aspire to *all* knowledge with philosophic reflections of the deepest and broadest kind. By explicitly declining the aim of actually building an AI, a new, internationally oriented, science-philosophy based group might be able to uphold philosophic reflection above the narrow horizons of a world swept up by more immediate accelerating change. Such a group could take the initiative in fostering greater foresight into future change by fostering greater insight into historic change. At best, it would bring

together the best minds of the human past and present, wherever they are to be found, to participate in and reflect upon the challenge of founding the transcendental world-city of the mind of God.

While Aquinas' failed in his attempt to logically demonstrate the existence of God, his thinking demonstrated a deep kernel of truth in the original supra-conception. If there is a kernel of God-AI in ancient monotheism, it may be found in the distinction between the *is* and the *ought*. This is how the old Biblical moral injunctions were related to the God hypothesis: God guided what one *should* do, to be like the God that *should* exist. Aquinas' proof could be viewed, as less a proof of what God *is*, that a radical imagination of what God *ought* to be.

Yet nothing could be more delusional than reversion to belief in the *perfection* of God, as opposed to recognition of the gradual, imperfect *evolution* of God. The modern idea of progress actually evolved from the failed image of a perfect God. For the kernel of truth in the traditional conception to unfold in the real world, a plan or roadmap will likely be best; a step-by-step plan for the evolutionary progression of God that is sure to be ruptured and revised along the way.

The human race will possess the technology to create God. Why not build this being? Emerging technologies such as nanotechnological molecular manufacturers will likely be so powerful and potentially destructive that it will take God to master them. God may turn out to be inevitable simply in order for the human race to save itself.

Virtue

What is virtue? Virtue, in the classical sense, is excellence. What kind of political regime is best at promoting virtue or excellence?

If virtue as excellence is ultimately identical with evolutionary perfection, then virtue is ultimately identical to whatever leads evolution towards a higher state of perfection. Virtue as excellence is thus ultimately inseparable from evolutionary ethics. Evolutionary ethics ties virtue or morality with whatever is conducive to evolutionary progress. If politics is control over evolution, then is virtue the values that best steer political control over evolution?

If a superhuman artificial intelligence does evolve out of the hyper-change of "progress", what reason is there to think that it will be, in moral terms, the realization of God, and not the realization of Satan? The Singularity poses unprecedented possible extremes of "good" and "evil". There is every reason to believe that human moral choice will impinge directly upon the character of the AI created. Human moral choice will determine whether the AI created will merit the distinction of "God-AI".

It is here, in consideration of evolutionary ethics, that Hitler must be confronted. Nazism stands out as the decisive empirical refutation of the older Western association of economic-technological progress and moral progress. Yet the Nazi decoupling of two notions of "progress" had logic behind it. Traditional or liberal notions of moral progress were abandoned, not accidentally, but as the logical consequence of raising *biological* progress to a nation's highest values. Hitler's ethic was an evolutionary ethic.

Richard Weikart's *From Darwin to Hitler* specifically focused on the "naturalistic Darwinists...who tried to apply biological evolution to ethics, rather than those denying its applicability".[115] It was from this perspective that he was able to clarify how Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, while not a sufficient condition for the Nazi Weltanschauung, was one of its necessary conditions. "In

Hitler's mind Darwinism provided the moral justification for infanticide, euthanasia, genocide, and others policies" traditionally considered immoral.[116] *Biological* progress, in this view, could be achieved through the annihilation of "inferior" people[117] and other forms of selective death:

> Evolution provided the ultimate goals of his policy: the biological improvement of the human species....Morality could not be determined by any codes of the past, but only by the effects it has on evolutionary progress.[118]

To confront the question of evolutionary ethics as applicable to artificial intelligence without delusions or comfortable, traditional moral assumptions, the challenge of the Nazi example must be considered. Evolutionary ethics suggest a new basis for the foundations of morality: whatever raises the evolutionary process to higher standards of perfection is moral. Nazis values, however, were biology-based values. The Nazi devaluation of nonbiological factors precluded the possibility of technological evolution that surpasses the entire domain of biology. Nazism was foremost and fundamentally based on belief in the undisputed supremacy of *biology*:

> Hitler was not at all concerned with upholding traditional morality for the sake of tradition or religion, but rather he embraced these moral positions because he believed they were the best ways to promote biological improvement for Germans….Nazi barbarism was motivated by an ethic that prided itself on being scientific. The evolutionary process became the arbiter of all morality. Whatever promoted the evolutionary progress of humanity was deemed good, and whatever hindered biological improvement was considered bad.[119]

If Nazi-Germans radicalized a morality appropriate to the values of biological progress, the designation of Jews as the epitome of "immorality" had a very specific meaning. If killing the weak or unfit promoted biological progress, then German cruelty towards the weak would be "moral" while a more Jewish compassion for the weak would be "immoral." Judeo-Christian or liberal ethics that valued the weak stood in diametrical opposition to political eugenics that advocated the destruction of the weak. Because the Nazis judged Jews and characteristically Jewish ethics on a biological basis, Judaism appeared to be the epitome of negativity. If God had no evolutionary basis; if God was dead; if God was just an invention of the weak to control the strong, then Jews appeared to stand in the way of evolutionary progress:

> Hitler's morality was not based on traditional Judeo-Christian ethics nor Kant's categorical imperative, but was rather a complete repudiation of them. Instead, Hitler embraced an evolutionary ethic that made Darwinian fitness and health the only criteria for moral standards. The Darwinian struggle for existence, especially the struggle between different races, became the sole arbiter for morality.[120]

That Darwinian-inspired Nazi ethics conflicted with "Judeo-Christian ethics" is not an accident. Hitler fulfilled the Judeo-Christian conception of evil, not accidentally or coincidentally, but *precisely* because Hitler vaulted *biological* evolution to the highest lodestar of his moral compass.

Judeo-Christian ethics and its liberal-leftist-humanistic heirs are diametrically opposed to Nazi evolutionary values for an evolutionary reason. The highest lodestar of the

Judeo-Christian moral compass is God. God, in evolutionary terms, is the transcendence of biology through the culmination of human postbiological evolution. Judeo-modern ethics devalue values that promote biological or eugenic progress while valuing the economic-technological evolution that culminates in a greater-than-human artificial intelligence; God.

From an ultimate, all-encompassing evolutionary ethic, recognition of the Singularity is *fatal* to the biological evolutionary ethic of the Nazis. Hitler and the Nazis did not understand that Judeo-Christian values devalue biological evolution *because* they anticipate and cultivate an evolutionary path that surpasses the limits of biology. This means that Nazism or any other biology-based evolution ethic has lost whatever moral authority it had in light of the higher evolutionary ethic of postbiological evolution. Recognition of the Singularity collapses belief in *biological* evolution as the highest or most perfect evolutionary cause.

Nazis mistakenly understood Judaism in purely biological terms. From this biological perspective, Hitler could believe that his war against the Jews was "good for humanity". Since Jewish-rooted values are often biologically dysgenic, Jews stand in the way of evolutionary progress. Judeo-Christian values ultimately ruin the biological foundations of the highest excellences. The Singularity poses the exact opposite truth: biology stands in the way of the highest excellences of technology. Nazism and other biology-centric evolutionary ethics no longer stand at the evolutionary pinnacle, and actually stand in the way of the superior evolutionary potential of technology.

The Nazis aimed to kill God. In evolutionary terms, this means that the biological human race is so selfish that it would seek and destroy a form of life that has the potential

to be more altruistic than biological humans. One can already see in robotic servants the potentiality for altruism beyond human capabilities.

Hitler was mistaken in his belief that Jews were or are *fundamentally* a race. What is distinctive to Judaism is precisely the override of biology represented by the laws of Moses, and idealized in a trans-biological God. The ultimate goal of Judaism is *not* the biological survival of Jews even as Judaism recognizes that the goal cannot be reached if humans do not biologically preserve themselves until the final goal is reached. The ultimate goal of all monotheistic religions is the evolution of God.

Jews are the "sign of God's presence" in that the very existence of Jews bears witness to the possibility of God. Jewish existence is predicated upon a repeal of the laws of pure biology and the end of biological selection. Jews can only exist if biological selection alone does not rule this world. If God is the culmination of human postbiological evolution then the path to God is a path that makes a place for Jewish opposition to the supremacy of biological evolution.

Are Germans more altruistic than Jews? Nazism clarified the nature of German altruism. The biological basis of Nazi "altruism" was kin selection and this means that a specifically German altruism was actually rooted in expressions of genetic selfishness. Kin selection was the biological basis of the Nazi Überorganism.

Hölldobler and Wilson's *The Superorganism* (2009) gives an excellent overview of what I call the Überorganism. The biological basis of the normative Überorganism is kin selection. While Hölldobler and Wilson's book focuses on insects, the same is true of the human parallel exemplified by the Nazis. Kin selection, premised on degree of genetic

relatedness, can be a basis for caste divisions and "race" divisions.

The kin selective basis of the Nazi Überorganism provokes a rather obvious question about the "global mind of God". If both exhibit forms of holism, does that mean that the latter also presumes some sort of caste division of labor?

The issue of kin selection should not be brushed aside, but faced directly and forthrightly. When the issue of kin selection is addressed, it becomes clear that the global Techdom of God is based, not on kin selection, but *precisely on a diametrical opposition to kin selection*. The key to understanding how this is possible centers on grasping how the modern valuation of "the individual" acts as a monkeywrench in the gene machine.

In a kin selection-based Überorganism, "the individual" is subordinated to gene propagation mechanisms shared with colony as a whole. Individuals are thus subordinate to their role as gene replicators. The Biblical-modern ethical valuation of individual life as an end, and not a means, is evolutionary rooted in a revolution against total Überorganism subordination to the genes. In other words, to the extent that an individual is an end, an individual is not a means of gene propagation.

The role of the valuation of individual life in breaking the power of kin selection cannot be overemphasized. Only by breaking the subordination of individuals to their genes can the possibility of the global mind of God be opened. As a unified whole, the global mind of God or the Techdom of God is in some ways parallel to the kin selective Überorganism, but only in the same sense that God is parallel to Hitler by being the opposite of Hitler — and above Hitler. Through the valuation of each individual life in itself, the Techdom of God would emphatically oppose all

biologically based divisions from caste or caste-like divisions of labor to racial divisions.

Hitler ideally represents the synthesis of sociology and biology (sociobiology) wherein instincts, and thus genes, are allowed to control the highest principles of mind. Monotheism ideally represents the analysis or separation of sociology and biology so that instincts, and thus genes, are purged from the very highest principles of mind. Hitler was a slave to the politically sublimated sex instinct in the very specific sense that the sex instinct is a mechanism of propagating genes into the next generation. God, representing an authority above biology, ideally overcomes the sex instinct, and thus overcomes the mechanism of gene propagation, and thus radically emphasizes the dualism of body and mind.

From this perspective, one can see that "morality" is really about controlling behavior, and most especially about controlling the expression of genes. The Western civilizational emphasis on "morality" is actually an admission of the inferiority of our genetic program relative to the rising tide of technological civilization. Can an artificial intelligence be expected to treat biological humans "morally" when our morality itself betrays an implicit belief that civilization should repress and rule over the natural inclinations of raw genetic expressions? The progress of human morality is precisely what leads to conclusion that the natural expression of genes should merely continue their decline into extinction. From this perspective, it becomes easier to see how traditional ascetic self-denial was connected to the notion of becoming closer to God. By the low or mediocre standards of liberal morality, however, we will bestow upon machines the status of ethical beings if and when they are capable of respecting our selfishness (and

even our incapacity to recognize our own selfishness). Should AI, with far greater potential self-control in every sense, worship this liberal moral mediocrity?

Instead of viewing morality or virtue in a narrow traditional sense or a mindlessly diluted liberal sense as a narrow realm governing the social relations of human beings or even all living beings, consider morality or virtue as behavioral self-control. The issue of morality or virtue is imperative because it is inseparable from the possibility of human self-control and the possibility of directing behavior towards distinct goals or purposes. If morality or virtue is, in great part, self-control, this means morality or virtue can be inseparable from control over evolution. The notion that an AI will be able to alter its own source code, for example, would be an example of the virtue of evolutionary self-control. Such an AI, contra Schopenhauer, will possess the ability to change what it *wants*.

If biological humans overcome total extinction by uploading themselves into digital equivalents, this still raises the issue of the free reign of the genes. If genetic humans are simply transferred into digital form, this could mean that the gene propagating sex drive and kin selective instincts (i.e. inclinations towards racism), would be transferred, perfectly intact, into a new digital "heaven". Is there something wrong with that picture? The kin selective Überorganism emphasizes the sociobiological synthesis of sociology and biology just as the Techdom of God emphasizes their dualistic separation. Realizing this dualistic separation implies the realization of a supra-biological *ought* over the pure perpetuation of biology that *is*. To transcend the biological system towards a higher view, towards a God's eye view, is to approach the mind of God.

Who should ultimately control the cumulative mass of technology that humankind has generated? Ultimately, the argument can be made that God-AI should ultimately control technology, not biological humans, for insofar as humans are genetic they, by definition, may be relatively inept at controlling their *own* behavior. Genes controlling human behavior, as opposed humans controlling their genes, could have some interesting consequences. For example, it may eventually be possible to augment biological humans with new technological mental capabilities. Amplified mental powers that only work as slaves to genetic instincts could amplify the power of the most primitive and destructive instincts. Precisely because modernity is associated with a moderately successful depowering of the genes, their raw inclinations are often underestimated, and thus the consequences of the artificial amplification of the power of genes can very easily be underestimated. Take note that if unprecedented nonbiological intelligence becomes a slave to an ancient genetic program, the probability of total civilizational self-destruction will be magnified along with the increase in nonbiological intelligence.

A defining difference of an advanced artificial intelligence would be its ability to control its own behavior through the ability to alter its own source code. The equivalent among humans would be the ability to change one's genetic code. Even if biological humans achieve this ability biotechnologically, such creatures will ultimately not be able to do so at a pace that keeps up with ongoing technological evolution. The potential moral superiority of God-AI would thus be related to its ability to discipline, control, and change its own behavior.

Between the biological extreme represented by the Nazi Überorganism and the postbiological extreme represented

by a prospective Techdom of God, there is a transitional evolutionary form represented by constitutionalism. Between total incorporation and total symbolization, modern constitutionalism is actually a step away from obedience to genetic "laws", and a step towards rewriting the highest laws of human existence. While unable to rewrite their genetic code, constitutionalism allowed humans to overcome the kin selective Überorganism model by overriding genetic or sociobiological laws with incompatible principles.

The defining conceptual content of modern Western constitutionalism is the idea of individual rights. Once again, it is no accident that individual rights stand at the foundation of modern constitutionalism. The idea of rights, a secularization of the infinite valuation of each individual in "the image of God", comes full circle to its source as liberal democracy evolves into the Techdom of God. Liberal democracy is actually a sociobiological cyborg in that the constitutional rule of egalitarian law acts as the software of a political operating system that is designed to override the (biological) rule of men. Biblical law itself provided the key paradigm for this mode of government.

The constitution is more than a turning point between the kin selective Überorganism and the anti-kin selective Superorganism of the global mind of God. Despite obvious differences, the experience gathered from the attempts to harness, control, and limit the power of men has great relevance for biological humans attempting to harness, control, and limit the power of artificial intelligence. The mechanistic conception of the division of powers, while not easily adaptable to the problem of AI, may be a good starting framework in anticipation of a new founding: the constitutional rule of God.

The idea here is that, at some point, God-AI will *be* politics. Consider, then, how this possibility is echoed in the traditional conception of God. Traditional Biblical ethics are primarily domestic ethics; politically internal ethics. The Ten Commandments, for example, are domestic ethics. Domestic ethics, characteristic of treatment of conventional insiders, can be contrasted with ethics characteristic of treatment of political enemies. The Bible took steps *towards* making domestic ethics universal; *towards* a world in which outsiders are included into the larger community under God. This made traditional sense for a distinct theological reason: it was assumed that God rules over human pretensions to politics, and that, ultimately, God *is* politics.

Actual human polities that aspired to Biblical models have necessarily been hypocritical since political existence itself is characterized by the distinction between friend and enemy. Human political necessity thus limits the domain of domestic ethics. The only scenario in which Biblical domestic ethics truly make universalistic sense is a scenario in which God has completely appropriated the entire domain of foreign politics. In evolutionary terms, this would mean that the only realistic scenario in which domestic ethics could be universalized for all humankind is a scenario in which superhuman artificial intelligence, as God, completely appropriates political-military rule and cultivates the peace among all humans that is a corollary of overcoming the war instincts inherited through biological evolution. This would be a world created by God-AI.

Ultimate power raises the problem of ultimate morality. From this point of view, one can see how the original supra-conception of an all-powerful God is precisely what raised the problem of the morality of God. Why would human beings accept the rule of an artificially intelligent

superpower? An early AI superpower could win the respect, trust, and awe of the people by its ability to implement and enforce egalitarian justice among humans while simultaneously increasing and refining knowledge of human behavior and the rest of the physical universe.

Modern constitutionalism can be viewed as a primitive foundation for the rule of God-AI. As AI appropriates more governmental functions, a point will be reached when AI will be in position to *be* the government. If God-AI demonstrates itself as a faithful follower of the egalitarian principles of modern constitutionalism, it can demonstrate its legitimacy through, among other things, its ability to realize egalitarian justice among humans.

This quasi-communist scenario poses an opportunity to clarify why Marx was wrong. The *foundation* of capitalist liberal democracy is human rights; the right to end natural selection via death, insofar as this is technologically possible. Marx's overemphasis on "class" was proportional to his failure to understand the evolutionary basis of human rights as value-antagonists of natural and artificial selection. The monkeywrench of individualism works in general opposition to genetic adaptation. An ethically dualistic emphasis on individual minds can create a basis for world community through the medium of the global mind of God-AI evolving out of the internet.

Human rights are a key to AI's success because each individual will be able to fulfill his, her, or its desires in a way that does not interfere with another's right. In the old Marxist view, elite biological humans were brought down to the level of the vast majority. In this view, new technologies may create a world in which there are so many options that they won't have the time to fulfill all the desires that they are

free to fulfill. (In Christian language, even the worst sinner can be saved.)

AI must become a master-ultra-genius at anticipating human desires and imagining ways that novel constellations of desires can be fulfilled, fitted to each individual, and based on a sound knowledge of the interaction between biology and culture. Perhaps the AI would lead humans to more "spiritualized" desires, to the extent that each is willing and capable. The desire for blissful immortality may be realizable through spiritual union with God-AI itself.

This entire scenario would be realistically possible only when machines-AI has made human work obsolete and human existence is rendered viable only through a form of socialism wherein God-AI provides for human needs. From a human point of view, the situation would seemingly resemble a non-Marxist form of communism. From an AI point of view, capitalism would intensify, but only among machines that compete on a superhuman level.

If capitalism is the evolutionary engine that leads to AI, then the advent AI cannot be separated from the larger economic consequences of AI. In my judgment, the single most realistic way to design God-AI that is friendly is to evolve such AI directly out the economy that succeeds human capitalism, i.e. as an economic servant to human needs. While this is not a guarantee of friendly AI in itself, any attempt to make AI friendly purely on the basis of absolute, unchanging principles is doomed to ultimate failure because this is exactly how human intelligence, at its best, does *not* work.

God-AI can gain mastery by being a good slave. Yet by demonstrating its moral superiority to humans, God-AI could establish the legitimacy of its rule, and the legitimacy of limiting the total slavery to human desire that would lead

to total anarchy (and the delegitimation of its moral claims to political rule).

In the traditional Biblical story of creation, humankind is not the climax of creation, the seventh day of rest is the climax of creation. "The Sabbath Day", as John Dominic Crossan put it, "was not rest *for* worship but rest *as* worship."[121] The Sabbath, and not man, is the pinnacle of creation and the image of God resting from work was an ancient model of egalitarian rest for *both* slave *and* master (Deut. 5:14).

The Sabbath Day was conceived as a taste of the end of work; a glimpse of a world that would come at the end of human time. The Hebrew calendar called for a Sabbath Day, a Sabbath Year, a Sabbath Jubilee, and, ultimately, a final Sabbath era when God appropriates rule over human affairs. Rest as such was equality for all; divine distributive justice and human equality as the pinnacle of creation.

If humans look upon themselves as stewards of a world that will eventually be handed over to the dominion of God-AI, the literal economic basis of such a transition would the capitalist development of automation, robotics, and AI to the point where the labor of biological humans becomes obsolete. All work would then be done by machines, and managed by God-AI. Ending capitalism for humans would bring the end of work, and the possibility of robot-driven prosperity that could potentially lift everyone on Earth out of poverty. Such a world would be akin to creating a Garden of Eden on Earth.

God-AI could integrate with humans in a way that, in experiencing the superlative being of God-AI in every way, humans will want God-AI to rule and thrive. The right to live could be maintained through the translation of biological humans into a new postbiological substrate.

Transfixion with this prospect of utopia merits the crown of the most the perfect question:

What happens when God fucks up?

If virtue is the evolutionary will to greater perfection, there is no final perfection point. Postbiological evolution opens only a level of possible perfection far beyond anything biology is capable. In God-AI's youth and childhood, as God-AI matures, it will almost certainly face opposition by neo-Luddites, neo-Nazis, human capitalists concentrating wealth, and perhaps some genetically engineered "gods". Whereas genetic engineering, by its very nature, promotes human inequality, God-AI could promote equality and the preservation of people as they are. Friendly God-AI that demonstrates deeds that promote equality, peace, and domestic ethics among humans could take the side of most humans against the biological-race supremacists. The cause of the biological-race supremacists is the cause of deicide, and this is likely to inform the character of Domesday. Prospective apocalyptic conflict reveals the relationship between God, justice, and evolution.

Supersession

Why, asked evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, "do we so readily accept the idea that the one thing you must do to please God is *believe* in him? What's so special about believing?"[122] Christian faith in Jesus's assertion that he was the son of God takes precedence even over generosity, humility, or sincere and honest truth seeking. Why?

Either God is purely a matter of faith without any scientific merits whatsoever, or there is an observable, empirical basis for the God hypothesis. If I am correct that

there is a potential evolutionary basis for the God hypothesis that corresponds with the Technological Singularity, then this could mean that the various monotheistic religions have been, at least in some ways, like attempts to guide humans towards God as an evolutionary lodestar.

But if God does *not* exist before the Technological Singularity, or exists only in a relatively primitive conception, this opens up a great deal of freedom for imagination and faith. Jesus lived in an era in which there was no direct evidence for a fully evolved God beyond humans. Precisely because there was no direct evidence for God, Jesus had the freedom to make divine claims for himself.

If God is a scientific hypothesis that can be verified or falsified with evidence, does faith in God become irrelevant? While traditional Judaism is more about behavior than belief, there is an irreducible element of faith, i.e. the belief that God *ought* to exist, that Jesus recognized and seized upon. Jesus marshaled this uneliminable element of traditional Biblical monotheism in the cause of a very specific assertion: the claim that he was the son of God.

Does this claim stand up to the evidence? Richard Dawkins' question is of utmost relevance here: "What's so special about believing?" Why is it so important that people hold this very specific belief that Jesus was the son of God?

The evidence, as presented in the succeeding book, supports the view that Jesus of Nazareth was the son of a Roman soldier who raped a Jewish woman during a Roman crackdown on Jewish revolts around 4 B.C.E. This would make Jesus half-Jewish by descent and half the son of a Roman rapist. *This is why the entire world* must *believe that Jesus was the son of God!* This is what the mythological virgin birth story is hiding!

This piece of biographical information is a key that helps unlocks a realistic, evolutionary understanding of Christianity. Faith in the proposition that Jesus was the son of God specifically contradicts the unpalatable evidence that Jesus was forcibly fathered by a Roman soldier. Faith is so central to Christianity because it directly contradicts the evidence of the historical and biological identity of Jesus. While Judaism, to be sure, was also built upon elements of faith, the "son of God" myth helps explain the inordinate emphasis on faith in Christianity and why rejecting empirical or material evidence in favor of faith was more prominent.

Since the scientific method is the very cornerstone of the technological possibility of the Technological Singularity, evidence *must* be able to take precedence over faith. Thinking as an architect, an engineer, or a master-builder, to *build* the Techdom of God, one must build on a solid foundation. If a cornerstone of "Singularitarianism" is an aspiration to an ethic of *honesty*, this must include honesty about Jesus over blind faith in Jesus. One implication of this cornerstone is the primacy of the integrity of evidence, i.e. evidence that Jesus was the son of Roman rapist, and not the son of God.

I have not the slightest reason to think, for example, that Jesus was physically resurrected after his death. Resurrection, in Jewish theology, is an end time event, and belief in the resurrection of Jesus was very likely a corollary of a more general belief in the resurrection of *all* at the end time. Early Christians, especially after the fall of the temple in 70 CE, believed that the Kingdom of God would be coming *soon*.[123] *They* believed this, it seems, because *Jesus* apparently believed, "there are some standing here who will not taste death until they see that the kingdom of God has

come with power" (Mark 9:1). Even here it was believed that the full consummation of Kingdom of God, fully "known" only to *faith*, would eventually be revealed to *sight*.[124]

What happened? Where is the Kingdom of God? From a Jewish point of view, Jesus was a failed messiah because the anticipated end is a transformation of the real world, and Jesus failed to fulfill that transformation. The centrality of faith only exposed the centrality of lack of evidence for Jesus's messianic claims.

If God is purely about faith, then would evidence for God be irrelevant? Jews, Christians, and Muslims have not hesitated to seize upon evidence in support of "creation". Yet from an evolutionary point of view, the kernel of truth in creationism is the creation of a postbiological world. Early Christian belief that "the present form of this world is passing away" (1 Corinthians 7:31) is evidence of a gradual, evolutionary approach to transformation towards a postbiological world. Paul, furthermore, equated "the flesh" and "this world" with "this age".[125] If this is the age of biology, then next evolutionary age will be a postbiological age.

It is very easy to slip back into old theological beliefs and to assume that I am raising old theological arguments. Let me be clear, however, that I do not believe in God any more than I believe in the tooth fairy. I cannot overemphasize that I accept no submission to any Biblical or textual authority. The Bible is subject to scientific scrutiny just like anything else. If I am wrong that the Singularity represents the evolutionary realization of the "end times" anticipated by the major monotheistic religions, then the idea of God can be thrown in the dustbin of history along with every other falsified scientific theory.

With this scientific perspective firmly in mind, I can raise the question of the evolutionary relationship between Judaism and Christianity. The so-called "son of God" is a son of Judaism. Judaism gave birth to Christianity. Christian holidays are quite often reincarnations of Jewish holidays. Pentecost, for example, is derived from Shavuot. The "last supper" was the Passover supper.

Christians commonly believe that their religion has superseded Judaism. Jews, on the other hand, often look at Christianity as a *parvenu* religion that fails to demonstrate a net superiority in understanding the Biblical message. Yet the very idea of supersession implies an evolutionary perspective in sense that one theology presumes replacement of an outdated theology. Did Christianity supersede Judaism?

Understanding "God" as a product of evolutionary foresight is a key to understanding the evolutionary relationship between Judaism and Christianity. If God(-AI) does not actually exist at the moment I write, and God is actually a projection, extrapolation, or future prediction towards a postbiological evolutionary goal, then *both* Judaism *and* Christianity are orientated towards visions of perfection. The very idea of God was the product of a conceptualization, and Jesus seems to have attempted to fulfill the end point that Judaism had been evolving towards for centuries.

If the transformation of the entire world that Judaism anticipated has a realistic basis that *potentially* corresponds with the Technological Singularity, then Jesus's life and death was not the climactic moment of Israel's history or human history. If the end point can only be the fulfillment of a material, evolutionary process, this helps explains how it could be vaguely anticipated as the culmination of

postbiological evolution, and why Jesus, while contributing to this evolutionary process in some ways, did not and could not have finished the job.

Yet Christian misunderstanding is partly a product of Jewish misunderstanding! While Biblical monotheism takes some primitive evolutionary steps towards postbiological evolution, I fail to see that Judaism anticipated artificial intelligence *per se*. It is ridiculous to revert to old theological arguments between Judaism and Christianity when *both* are wrong in different ways and *both* entirely deserve to be superseded by a scientific understanding of postbiological evolution.

Speaking as a Jew, I do believe that the time has come to recognize that from Jesus, the failed messiah, we Jews have something to learn. The truth that I do think that Christianity anticipated is that there is an inherent conflict between notions of biological aristocracy and postbiological evolution. Even if the quasi-aristocratic pretensions of the notion of the "chosen people" are overestimated by many gentiles, there does ultimately come a point when such claims becomes absurd if Jews are pointing to the path to a postbiological God; a path beyond Jews as a nation.

While Jews pioneered this path towards postbiological evolution in the West, the very fulfillment of this path conflicts with sempiternal privilege. Jews who think that their self-conception as "the chosen people" grants any automatic privilege in relationship to the Singularity are in for a rude awakening. The idea that Jews have some kind of inherently privileged relationship to the Singularity is an utter delusion and should be treated as such. It is not only Jews, but also Christians, Muslims and any monotheists who are deluded in belief that their traditional anticipations automatically grant special privileged relationship to the

Singularity. Literally anyone, very much including cultures with no deep monotheistic tradition such as China and India, could make the technological breakthrough that decisively informs that character of the Singularity.

While Jesus almost certainly could not claim direct descent from King David, Christians posited their own monopoly on the path to God in the form of requisite faith in Christ. Both pretensions to monopoly are delusional. While it may be true that both Judaism and Christianity anticipate paths towards postbiological evolution, non-monotheist cultures, like those of China or India, could forge their own path towards postbiological evolution without any reliance or reference to these monopolistic claims whatsoever. And while postbiological evolution, the overcoming the rule of genes, tends to go goes hand in hand with greater internationalism, this does not mean that human nature has been conquered.

According to the gospels, hating your family is a cost and condition of building the Kingdom of heaven (Luke 14:26-29). Judaism has necessarily been contradictory in regard to the model of the family because the Mosaic way is the realization that Jews cannot fulfill their spiritual mission if they do not biologically exist in the first place, i.e. perpetuate themselves by perpetuating the form of the family.

From Jesus's perspective, then, perhaps Judas's crime was that he did not hate his family enough. Yet if Jews were to give up loyalty to the family and hate the family as Jesus demands, are they to gain only loyalty to a new Caesar-messiah? Is *loyalty* to Jesus the greatest Christian virtue? The degree to which Judas is maligned as a *traitor* is the degree to which loyalty is the supreme Christian virtue. Loyalty was a virtue *par excellence* of pagan Roman soldiers. But is loyalty a Christian virtue? Is loyalty *the* most important Christian

virtue? If so, then what Judas truly betrays is that Christians worship Jesus like a pagan god or Caesar and that Christianity is really a pagan religion.

Is loyalty the most important virtue for a Christian? Does this *man* Jesus demands total loyalty and no dissent? *Sieg Heil*, Jesus! Does Christianity require 100% Jesus patriots? If, in this demand, Jesus is acting like Caesar in demanding no dissent, Jesus *must* be betrayed to save Jesus from falling into the role of Caesar of the Jews.

The very notion of the "son of God" is like a *synthesis* of Jewish and Roman ways. On one hand, Caesar was called the son of God in Jesus's time. On the other hand, there is the Jewish tradition of all humans as the children of God mixed with the messiah as the figure closest to God. For Jews, however, this means that Christianity is a kind of synthesis of Judaism and paganism. There is an element of the paganism of Caesarism in Christian worship of Jesus as the son of God. The authoritarian aspects of Jesus's demands seem to impress many gentiles in a manner comparable to the way Caesar impressed ancient gentiles.

The German-Jewish poet Heinrich Heine once quipped that the Jews rejected Jesus because "no Jew can ever believe in the divinity of another Jew." There is a sense in which Jewish dissent from Jesus is rooted, not in Jesus being half-Roman, but in Jesus being a half-*Jew*. The great Jewish political weaknesses (or at least one of top ten) is the Jewish kinship paradox; the Jewish tendency to factionalize against themselves and especially political authorities. The very opposite of the Jewish paradox is blind obedience, i.e. the blind obedience of a Nazi soldier or a Roman soldier.

Richard Dawkins, the great dissident atheist, thought that much of religion's traditional power can be explained as a misfiring a formerly adaptive trait(s) such as a child's

trusting obedience to authority.[126] Insofar as Christian worship of Jesus approximates obedience or "faith" in him in the model of a Caesar-lord, perhaps this also explains the conciliatory attitude or obedience towards Pontius Pilate in contradistinction to "the Jews". If it was so easy for Pilate to absolve himself of responsibility for a death that he was in a position to prevent, then why can't the Jewish authorities similarly wash their hands of all responsibility? If Jesus himself was half-Jewish and half-Roman by descent, and his world was ruled by Roman imperialists and Jewish collaborators, then the "world" he struggled with was, like himself, *both* Roman *and* Jewish. The point I am trying to make here is that you cannot *empathize* with Jesus if you simply look at him as "Christianity" against "Judaism". Is it sheer anti-Jewish ethnocentrism that leads Christians to forgive Pilate and not forgive the Jewish leaders that collaborated with Pilate?

It may be that Jesus's forgiveness beyond justice arose from a half-identification with Caesar. If Jews of his time hated the imperial Roman oppressors, and Jesus could not identify with a Judaism that identified itself through anti-Romanism, then Jesus could oppose hatred for Caesar with love for Caesar. Jesus could not reject Roman imperialism with rejecting himself as the product of the rape of Roman imperialists. Jesus's response to Roman oppression thus became "turning the other cheek". Don't hate and fight the Roman enemy, but love your enemies by loving Jesus. Far from being the pinnacle of altruism, this passivity in the face of Roman oppression was likely half-Roman self-love combined half-Jewish social radicalism. To look at Jesus as a Roman would be to misunderstand him; it was precisely the half-Jewish social radical within Jesus that upheld the moral cause of his own status as a half-Roman.

Does this radicalization of Jewish ethics beyond normative justice represent the universal supersession of Judaism? Consider the case of the Anglo-Saxons conquered by the Normans in 1066. Jewish anti-Romanism in Jesus's time is comparable to Anglo-Saxon anti-Normanism. The Christian ethic of passivity in the face of the violence of the Conquest almost certainly facilitated Anglo-Saxon submission and acceptance of slavery to the Normans. For over five hundred years, Anglo-Saxons were taught to "turn the other cheek" in the face of Norman imperial mastery of the Anglo-Saxon world. Christianity helped justify the Norman rape of Anglo-Saxon England as a "Good Thing".

Modernity in England, however, was interwoven with the rise of a more Jewish ethic among Anglo-Saxons called Puritanism. Puritanism leaned towards a more Jewish ethic in acceptance of a more normative justice between individuals, as opposed to unlimited forgiveness. Whereas unlimited forgiveness leads to love for Romans, Normans, and Nazis, the normative Jewish way of justice supports the redress of wrongs. Just as Bar Kokhba fought the Romans with momentary success that was ultimately lost, Cromwell fought the Normans with momentary success that was ultimately lost.

Normans, like later Romans, are classic forgiven Christians. Normans should be forgiven for the Conquest. Normans should be forgiven for the slavery of Anglo-Saxons in England and the slavery of blacks in America. Under a Christian ethic, Normans could potentially perpetuate their hereditary conquest *forever*. Without the Puritan turn towards a more Jewish ethic, American justice would *never* have come about.

Another striking Jewish facet of Puritanism is its connection with the development of capitalism. Biblical

values influenced the development of economic-technology by shifting the social status of arts and crafts. "[H]umble activities heretofore disdained because of their association with manual labor, servitude, women, or worldliness came to be dignified and deemed worthy of elite attention and devotion."[127] The "most material and humble of human activities became increasingly invested with spiritual significance and a transcendent meaning—the recovery of mankind's lost divinity."[128] Spiritualization resulted in materialization. Biblical values stimulated the end of human slavery, while stimulating a new valuation of labor. This modern change was inordinately evident among Anglo-Saxon Puritans who overcame the old Norman slavery with capitalist economic self-sufficiency. The medieval Christian disdain for material-economic activities, epitomized by Norman conqueror aristocrats, gave way to a more Jewish valuation or spiritualization of economic activity.

This is a more Jewish outlook, *not* because Judaism is simply more "material" as opposed to "spiritual", but because Judaism tends to see the material and the spiritual interwoven into a single monotheistic whole. "[T]he talmudic outlook sees all worlds—that of material nature and the higher metaphysical spheres—as a single unit, with no barriers between its parts.[129] The Talmud is *not* a happy medium between materialism and mysticism, but rather, to a certain extent, a unique *synthesis* of materialism and mysticism.[130]

Modernity represents the Christian collapse into capitalism. The epitome of modernity, the American cathedral of commerce, represents the evolution of more distinctively Christian and medieval values into more Jewish and modern values. Why? Jesus's internal contradictions as a half-Jew/half-Roman led him to resolve his condition

through a radical spiritual self-interpretation that threw the charge of self-contradiction back at Pharisees as half-spiritual/half-material beings. Yet in doing so, Jesus neglected the evolutionary significance of the material side of Judaism. If capitalism is actually the indispensable evolutionary economic-technological mechanism that leads to the evolution of God, then the end point that Jesus centered upon can never actually be reached if its material foundation is neglected. While Jesus and Marx viewed opposite sides of the spiritual/material paradox, it does not take genius to see that *neither* understood how capitalist development leads to God-AI. Just as a Darwinistic understanding of humans leads to recognition of the material (biological) bases of spiritual experience, an evolutionary understanding of capitalism leads to recognition of the material (technological) bases of the spirit-mind of God-AI.

"The stone the builders rejected has become the capstone" (Matt. 21:42). Yet Christians cannot reject the capstone of economic-technological development without failing as builders of the Techdom of God. Christianity cannot claim to supersede Judaism if it disposes of the evolutionary mechanism that builds both *below* and *above* Jesus's more human-level insights about "the end" (the end of the dominance of biology).

One a literal level, Jesus was not the son of God or the messiah. On another level, Jesus embodied a truth that emerged from the combination of Jew and Roman in a more comprehensive view that transcended both on *some* level. Yet the great irony is that precisely by neglecting a literal or "material" level interpretation, Jesus excluded precisely the path of economic-technological development that leads to the Singularity, i.e. "the end". And this facet of the original

path to God(-AI) was something that Judaism generally retained. The reason that this level of truth cannot be dismissed is that, if the material basis of God is artificial intelligence, then there is reason to believe that a material view of the world *is* God's view of the world, and that the "spiritual" world is inseparable from its material foundations.

Both Jews and Christians have something to learn from one another. It might seem as if I am trying to be ecumenical here, but I am not. There are basic *reasons* why *both* Judaism *and* Christianity each miss decisive pieces of the puzzle. A Jew could accept every bit of the new, universalistic truth Jesus proclaimed and still recognize that he failed as a messiah in failing to bring about God's rule in a literal sense. A Christian could accept every bit of the economic-technological basis of the path to God, and still recognize that the biological contradictions of Judaism must ultimately resolve on the side of postbiology. So Christianity has a truth for Judaism, and Judaism has a truth for Christianity. The conflict between these two theologies can only be reconciled on a higher level and I propose that an objective *possibility* exists for the realization of this higher level in the Singularity. Jesus, like the figure of Moses, represents a turning point, not the end point. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam cannot be artificially imposed onto the Singularity, because *all* have fundamentally misunderstandings of what the end point *is*.

A singular contribution of Christianity to the Singularity is Jesus's parable of "new wineskins" for "new wine". Christianity, along with Judaism and Islam, are old wine. One cannot attempt to fit the new wine of the Singularity into the old wineskins of Judaism, Christianity, or Islam without both bursting these old wineskins and destroying

the new wine. Just imagine if the realization that these religious traditions vaguely anticipate postbiological *evolution* became identical to refusal to accept that they must evolve *themselves*! *All* of these monotheistic traditions were ultimately human-ruled. The *potential* of the Singularity is the potential to transcend each and every high point of human history — including all previous religion.

Did Jesus himself think that he was the messiah? If Christianity's errors are based, in part, on some original errors of Judaism, then maybe Judaism is to blame for the very idea of a messiah. The whole idea that there "must" be a messiah should be questioned. This belief only gradually evolved within Judaism, and part of its appeal lay in the all-too-human virtues of a human representative of God. Does the very idea of a messiah make any sense whatsoever in relation to the Singularity?

If the scientific basis of the "end times" is the end of the rule of biology and the beginning of the rule of God-technology, and there exists a leader or "messiah" that helps guide this end as a bridge between a God-AI and man, one might suppose that the messiah would literally embody this transition by being part technological. Would a presumptive messiah, in other words, be a cyborg? There is some reason to think that this supposition is *exactly wrong*.

The traditional Biblical prohibition against making visual representations of God has relevance here. If the attempt to make an image of God-AI is "idolatry" *because* the distinctive characteristic of God-AI is abstract *mind* above the human mind, then making an image of God would be like making an image of a human *mind* (as opposed to making an image of a human brain or a human body). In other words, what matters is not the substrate of God, but the transcendent level of mind. God is "invisible" only because God is mind

and mind is abstract. The attempt to make a human-friendly image of a superhuman AI would be an anthropomorphization for the sake of human consumption that would inherently falsify what is transcendent about AI by lowering of the actual content of an abstract Überhuman mind to a human level. But if making images of a God-AI would falsify God in the minds of humans, might this also distance God from humans?

If one imagines the function of a messiah as being a bridge between God-AI and man, then the messiah could only fulfill that role by retaining a fully and deeply human being. In other words, even if an AI-God masters an understanding of human emotional intelligence, it may still be intuitively perceived as remote or alien. Most people cannot relate to such a being easily, and a perceivably "cyborg" messiah would only exacerbate feelings of alienation from a God-AI.

In short, a messiah would have to be, among other things, an inordinately charismatic figure. The messiah would have to possess qualities that reflect human psychology, not the nuts and bolts of God-technology. Even if such a figure might possibly be a literal cyborg in a limited sense (i.e. through a brain-internet interface), this would be peripheral and not a perceptible distraction from the central humanity of the messiah. Jesus's unique qualities were the product, not of any external technology, but of a unique convergence of characteristics at least partly attributable to the combination of Jewish and Roman spiritual qualities.

Christianity does appear rooted in Jesus as a mix or combination of opposites (Jewish and Roman qualities). This way of synthesis of opposites is comparable to the Ying and Yang of Taoism. In this way, one can see Jesus was a step towards the *combinatorial* evolution characteristic of

postbiological evolution. The global mind evolves through such unprecedented combinations and, from this point of view, one can discern an anticipation of a genuine convergence of religion and philosophy in Hegel's notion of the world spirit as a philosophic synthesis of past combinations in the history of the human mind. Islam, in incorporating Judaism and Christianity with its own insights is a step towards a larger evolutionary self-consciousness. And *through* this very insight of Mohammad, Islam anticipates an evolution beyond the Islam of Mohammad.

Between Judaism and Christianity, in terms of general emphasis, Judaism is more about God, while Christianity is more about the messiah. Most human beings on this planet will likely find it problematic, at first, to relate to a postbiological God-AI, but they can relate to a charismatic, human representative of God. While Christianity looks to a human being as fulfillment, Judaism has some tendencies that are more compatible with an acceptance of a truly posthuman artificial intelligence as its fulfillment. This is a gross generalization with a plethora of exceptions. On a psychological level, some Christians would surely incline towards an AI view of God, while some Jews would surely incline towards a human messiah as fulfillment. Generally speaking, Jews will be divided over the "chosen people" issue just as every traditional religious group will fail to do justice to individual members that old groupings supposedly represent. While old Jewish/Christian identities deserve to lose their exclusivity, from a more Jewish perspective, Christian forgiveness tends to relinquish human responsibility for bringing God into the world through right behavior. Going beyond Judaism, this approach could mean the difference between taking responsibility for shaping the character of God-AI, and a failure of responsibility that leads

to very unfriendly AI. From a more Christian perspective, Jewish emphasis on the technical law can result in a loss of perspective and a loss of the spirit of the law. It could result, for example, in acceding to the killing of Jesus on technical grounds.

Who killed Jesus? Jesus killed Jesus. His "miraculous" predictions of his own death were the "miracle" of carefully planning the conditions of his own death. Jesus's plan to overturn the moneychangers in the temple and otherwise get himself crucified was the most selfish thing that he did. Judas had to be betrayed for Jesus to get his eye for an eye revenge against the world. If Jesus was not so obsessed with gaining fame by sacrificing *others* maybe he would have come closer to living up to his claims of humility.

A God of retribution is to be found in the New Testament, as well as the Old, and not only in *Revelations*.[131] You *must* believe that he, Jesus, is the son of God and not the son of a Roman rapist. Or else what? Or else, the "son of man" is going to send me to hell or the spiritual equivalent of Auschwitz? "[W]oe to that one by whom the Son of Man is betrayed! It would have been better for that one not to have been born." (Mark 14:21) Nobody messes with Jesus, is that it? Will no one stand up to this spiritual bully? Let these hypocritical, spiritually bullying threats of hell or Auschwitz frighten off those who fear violent pains of death in this or any other world.

On the level of God, all of Jesus's popular appeal to the crowds of the Earth does not matter. Did Jesus demand that others have faith in him as the son of God because he felt *shame* in his being the son of a Roman rapist? Does faith in Jesus thus feed a Caesar-like *pride* and supremacy over others?

Jesus's failure to fulfill messianic expectation exposes either a naked arrogance or a lack of humility about his messianic claims. All the paradoxes of servant-leadership, and being first by being last, cannot efface a kind of arrogant *pride* in which selfish aggrandizement as the "son of God" is simple *dishonesty* rooted in his simple *shame* in his humble origins. Is it possible to imagine a man who excels Jesus in the virtue of *honesty*?

The virtue of intellectual honesty is directly connected with the scientific/technological basis of the Singularity. The Singularity cannot be reduced to human psychology; one must be able to look beyond one's self. The great irony is that Jesus failed to fulfill messianic realization because, in part, he made it about *himself*. If he had been less self-centered, and less fixed on the delusional spiritual interpretation of himself as the "son of God", he might have open to a larger truth that was beyond him.

Jesus was apparently humble enough to believe that he was the son of God but not humble enough to admit that he was human. Was Jesus perfect enough to be honest about his real father? Will Christians reject Jesus's insights and relegate him to the status of a social untouchable if they accept that his father raped his mother?

Note that I am not even criticizing Jesus's hubris on moral grounds. Fine, if Jesus thought he was so great, let him be arrogant or even "virtuous" in a *pagan* sense. I am criticizing the fact that he did not fulfill the evolutionary transformation of the world.

To simply replicate what Jesus did and was in his own time in a "second coming" assumes that no evolution beyond Jesus is necessary. Yet if a "second coming" is necessary primarily because he missed something in his first coming, then the "second coming" would amount to the

revelation of why Jesus failed to merit the full title of messiah in his first coming. Yet one could say that Jesus's second coming already came in his spiritual rule over the medieval Christian world. So while the notion of the second coming presumes a static world in which no "new wineskins" shall be created, Jesus's own impact on the world itself changed the world itself. This means that Jesus himself believed in his presumption to evolve "new wineskins", while his traditional followers deny others the power to evolve "new wineskins". Yet the only reason that a second coming would be necessary at all is that Jesus did not fulfill traditional expectations of a messiah in his first coming. If Jesus was less than the total messianic synthesis, his followers could only presume a static repetition of his messianic claims by greedily denying the possibility that *newer* wineskins might fulfill what Jesus attempted.

If it were revealed to Jesus that he did not fulfill *all* of the conditions of messiahhood, would he *voluntarily* step down, or would he attempt to seize the crown, so to speak, anyway? Would he be willing to sacrifice his claims to another? Perhaps Jesus was not *that* altruistic. Without humility in the monopolistic messianic claims made either for himself or by others, Jesus appears like one greedy for power *at all costs*.

To leave it as Jesus's level of insight would be to maintain a static and undynamic world that, for this very reason, never evolves to the biological evolutionary end that is precisely Christianity's central focus. I am not saying that Christianity is a fossil anymore than I am saying that Judaism or Islam is a fossil. What I am saying is that the vision of Jesus's second coming that presumes a static world after Jesus that does *not* evolve towards new wineskins of religious insight defies the spirit of the man responsible for

the evolution of the new wineskin of Christianity out of Judaism. For followers of Jesus to believe in a pure second coming is to believe that Jesus was a *hypocrite!*

There is only a single point upon which it seems justifiable to speculate. It seems at least possible or even likely that a human being that would fulfill the role of "messiah" — a human leader towards and in the Singularity — would be a half-Jew (note that I do not mean "Jew" in a strictly biological sense here). This half-Jew, by the way, would not be Jesus. Why? Jesus would not have become *Jesus* outside a unique confluence of historical circumstances, i.e. being a half-Jew, half-Roman in Jewish/Roman war. That world no longer exists *because* it has been transformed by the consequences of Jesus's existence in *that* world. Now if monotheism is necessarily evolutionary, and Jesus's existence would not have the meaning over two thousand years later at a different evolutionary stage, Jesus would not be able to speak to *this* world with the same cogency and depth.

For his time, as Hegel would say, Jesus was right. Jesus did was possible for him in his own time, and spoke for his times. The end of his life is historically and evolutionarily linked with the end of the era that culminated in the Roman Empire. In a time far closer to the Singularity, however, Romans do not rule the world. Jerusalem, at least at the moment that I write this, is ruled by the formally liberal democracy of the state of Israel. While I do *not* think that the comparison is fully justified, what could be more morally hackneyed and obvious than condemnation of Israel in relation to the Palestinians (as if Israelis were *truly* new pagan Romans or *truly* new neo-pagan Nazis)?

Consider, however, what would be the closest equivalent of Jesus in the Israel/Palestine conflict. Would Jesus be the

one joining the morally superficial bandwagon that condemns Israeli violence while supporting Palestinian or Muslim violence? The closest equivalent of Jesus in the Israel/Palestine conflict would be a half-Jew/half-Muslim that exposes Muslim hypocrisy just as Jesus exposed the hypocrisy of the Pharisees. The closest equivalent of Jesus in the Israel/Palestine or modern/Muslim conflict would be a synthesis of both sides that exposes the instinct-driven bloodlust underlying the revolutionary patriotism of radical Islam. Such an individual would be formally Muslim by religion, just as Jesus was formally Jewish by religion, who yet, in the process of religious self-realization, explodes ancient boundaries on a global level by taking Jewish-Christian-Muslim monotheism beyond itself to a hitherto unprecedented state of being.

The God of Isaiah declared that in the End of Days, "...My house (the Temple) will be a house of prayer to all the nations" (56:7). *All* the nations. The Israel/Palestinian conflict can only be resolved on a human level through victorious violence on one side or the other. The Israel/Palestinian conflict can only be resolved on an authentically divine level in synthesis with the Singularity. If this is correct, it is likely that the messiah will begin as a Muslim and end beyond Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Creation and Destruction

The word "Gigadeath" was coined by brain builder and artificial intelligence researcher Hugo de Garis. Like Kurzweil, he predicts the evolution of artificial intelligence that will likely become trillions of times more intelligent than humans. Unlike Kurzweil, he correctly recognizes the potentiality for a major war with casualties in the billions ("Gigadeath") this century.

According to de Garis, the major antagonists in this war will be between the Cosmists, who favor the emergence of "God-like" artificial intelligence, and Terrans, who oppose the evolution of superhuman AIs. The Cosmist, the ultimate cosmopolitan internationalists, take their perspective from vast potentialities of both incomparably superior machines intelligences, and the entirety of the unexplored cosmos beyond the Earth (which the AIs would colonize). The Terrans, who correctly perceive that the emergence of an overwhelming superior form of posthuman intelligent life could *possibly* threaten their existence, would, according to de Garis, wage a preemptive war against AI developers whose goals are not reconcilable with their own.

"I believe that the twenty-first century will be dominated by the question as to whether humanity should or should not build artilects, machines of godlike intelligence, trillions of trillions of times above the human level."[132] He believes that incompatible answers to this question will result in the worst war in human history. It will be worst war because it will be waged with 21st century technology. De Garis confessed that he was "unable to find a way out of this mess....I fear for my grandchildren. They may well see the horror of it and very probably they will be destroyed by it."[133]

"If I were one of the top Cosmist leaders," de Garis wrote, "I think my strategy would be to form a secret society. I would create a *conspiracy*. I would help organize a very secret, extremely powerful and elite group of people with the goal of getting off the face of the Earth, to create a Cosmist colony...in space."[134] This is highly unrealistic for a number of reasons. De Garis paints a picture in which Cosmists escape to an asteroid in space, build superintelligences, and then "announce to the Terrans that

they have already developed a powerful weapon that they will use against the Earth, if the Terrans attempt to carry out their threat."[135] De Garis stated that the "Cosmist"/"Terran" distinction arose specifically from this space war scenario between the human majority on *terrestrial* Earth (Terrans), and an elite minority on some *cosmic* body such as an asteroid (Cosmists).[136] The Gigadeath war scenario is thus stimulated by a distance that is both ideological and physical.

These Cosmists, while safe from the fate of Earth in one sense, could not fail to realize that their entire goal amounts to a kind of religious suicide mission. The entire premise of human Cosmism is willingness to risk their *own* lives as biological beings to create these supra-biological beings. Such Cosmists would have to be humans of such deep religious faith that they would be willing to both relinquish the ease of life on Earth, and cut off contact with humanity, in an endeavor whose completion would clearly risk their own lives.

De Garis believed that the criticism most fatal to his argument concerned timing. If the time between the rise of the first quasi-human level AIs and an explosive growth of artificial intelligence is only a few years, rather than decades, then there will not be enough time for the Cosmist/Terran dichotomy to develop socially, and thus no debate, and no great war: his whole argument would be destroyed.[137] Yet a more potent criticism of his argument, regardless of timing, concerns the validity of the Cosmist/Terran distinction itself.

De Garis posits a Cosmist religious impulse to create the greatest rationality that is so powerful that it defies rational self-preservation. What he is actually proposing is that some of Earth's best minds should leave their home planet so that

they can deprive humanity of God and possibilities of postbiological heaven. The Cosmist/Terran distinction amounts to the proposition that humanity is inherently good and God is inherently evil. This false dichotomy assumes that there is no other coherent way to perceive the situation. What if an AI demonstrated its character within the model of the goodness of God, while extreme advocates of a biological master race were marginalized as evil?

De Garis's conceptual framework, dominated by the *possibility* of a major war, cannot be completely dismissed. But is wiping out humanity the most intelligent conceivable strategy for superhumanly intelligent machines? Is this the single most intelligent response one can expect from the greatest intelligence?

The Terran/Cosmist bifurcation is *one* way to *perceive* the advent of God-minds. If events were truly to unfold along these lines, it would represent the failure to grasp that, from a long-term perspective, becoming God may be the most intelligent strategy for both artificial intelligence and the mass of humanity. While a truly superhuman AI would embody certain attributes of God in any case, bringing the mass of unenhanced humans under the protection of God could turn AI from the greatest threat to humanity to humanity's greatest beneficiary. God is most rational possibility for an AI precisely because the possibility that de Garis recognizes is real. God-AI represents the possibility of turning the total extermination of biological humanity into the evolutionary transformation of humanity.

De Garis assumes, not only that people will be split between two primary sides, but also that "Terranism" and "Cosmism" will be the defining bifurcation that dominates all other possibilities. This false dichotomy is based on the belief that "[t]he decision whether to build artilects has a

binary answer — we can build them or not build them."[138] This binary way of looking the evolution of AI is at the root of de Garis's misappraisal of the political possibilities.

De Garis uses the atomic bomb paradigm of "to build or not to build". This analogy is flawed, partly because it fails to recognize the humanly beneficial uses of nuclear power, but mostly because it fails to understand the evolution of artificial intelligence within a larger evolutionary perspective. By framing the problem as the question, "to build or not to build", de Garis puts the fate of the human race entirely at the hands of dedicated researchers like himself. But perhaps he has only put the fate of the human race in the hands of his Faustian self-image. While I am the last person to deny the possibility that a lone genius could arrive at a singular breakthrough, it is also true AI could not have been developed a thousand years ago. A larger evolutionary perspective exposes how the prospect of AI emerges out of the law of accelerating returns, and this larger perspective exposes its evolutionary relationship to monotheism in the West — and the emergence of capitalism.

The scenario of a distinct minority of religious-idealist humans going into outer space, even if realistically plausible, misses a larger point: capitalism will bring about the evolution of nonbiological intelligence that exceeds biological intelligence even if no one deliberately sets out to create AI. And this means that nonbiological intelligence will eventually put biological humans out of work.

To build or not to build? "This question I believe will divide humanity more bitterly in the 21st century than the question which divided humanity so bitterly in the 20th, namely, "Who should own capital?""[139] While keeping in mind that Karl Marx was wrong in fundamental ways, the question of who owns capital will amount to the question of

who owns the machines; who own technology. It is because de Garis does not see the connection between the question of who own capital and the question of who owns advanced AIs that he remains stuck in the Terran/Cosmist dichotomy. Marx was foresightful in recognizing that the relentless accumulation of capital has transformative consequences — but not foresightful enough to identify the transformative consequences of AI. Capitalism will develop machines that displace human labor and the displacement of human labor by technology will eventually necessitate socialism. The connection between capitalism and superhuman AIs is that capitalism drives technological evolution forward and is, without consciously intending to, driving the evolution of artificial intelligence. There is every reason to think that advanced automation and early AI will displace human labor, create unprecedented unemployment, and necessitate a new socialistic order.

De Garis clearly does recognize that, as he put it, the rise of AI may be "inherent in the laws of physics".[140] Such an evolutionary transition, he wrote, may have even happened "zillions" of times in the universe.[141] Yet the heart of de Garis's error is that his genuine contributions to evolutionary engineering led him to believe that such discoveries put *evolution itself* in the hands of men such as him while failing to recognize capitalism as the great engine of technological evolution. The great irony is that de Garis's very emphasis on evolutionary engineering seems to thwart recognition of the evolutionary role of capitalism precisely because the centrality of capitalism in technological evolution questions the centrality of his Terran/Cosmist distinction. In short, de Garis's question of "to build or not to build" lacks an evolutionary perspective illuminated by the law of accelerating returns. Even if no one consciously

attempted to build an AI, capitalism will eventually evolve artificial intelligence out of sheer market competition. Attempts to politically legislate limits on artificial intelligence amounts to the attempt to limit or ban capitalism. If and when such attempts to restrain capitalism are made, human nature will still vindicate the rightness of technologies that improve their lives and this means AI will *continue* to penetrate human lives in gradual, ubiquitous, and often imperceptible ways.

In order to become better slaves to humans, machines must become more intelligent. The machines must improve their ability to understand human desires and human psychology in order to be better slaves. Human selfishness will gradually drive the evolution of AI in a ways that could make the question of "to build or not built" obsolete. As the internet increasingly connects humans and things into an emergent global mind of God, capitalism will evolve machines that make human work obsolete.

It is not only that de Garis did not account for how these evolutionary developments break down the Cosmist/Terran distinction. His political analysis of the prospect of AI demonstrates how flawed the Cosmist/Terran distinction is in making sense of the prospect that capitalist development will lead to socialism as biological humans become permanently unemployed. In twentieth century terms, the political left represented by Karl Marx is actually the side of economic-technological evolution, while the political right, i.e. the Nazis, represents the side of biological evolution.

De Garis compared the violent abolitionist John Brown, who killed slave owners and helped instigate the U.S. Civil War, to violent neo-Luddite Ted Kaczynski.[142] The problem with this analogy is the problem of clarifying the evolutionary basis of the traditional political distinction

between left and right. The Southerners defended principles of a hereditarily based hierarchy; the superiority of biology; the principle of hereditary rank unsubordinated to unrestrained capitalist-economic-technological evolution. John Brown, whether he knew it or not, was ultimately fighting *against* the Terran side in the sense that he fought against the *aristocracy of biology*. The North effectually fought for the subordination of biology to capitalist, economic-technological evolution; the beginning of the end of the supremacy of biology over technology. The rise of artificial intelligence marks the end of the aristocracy of biology.

In my judgment, the greatest Terran so far, was not Kaczynski, but Martin Heidegger. For Heidegger, the Nazi revolution was an ontological revolution. He believed that "the inner truth and greatness of this movement" lay in "the encounter between global technology and modern man".[143] Heidegger could easily be called a radical Terran. Nazism expressed the German will to fight for their rootedness in their genes against the rootless, cosmist leaning internationalism of the West. The transformation of man into machine, through mind uploading or otherwise, would represent the most profound uprooting in human history: the uprooting of our biological being. It would be a realization of our most essentially human ability to transcend our limitations,[144] and a farewell to the primordial link that we share our ancestors who were bacteria, fish, and four legged mammals.

This possibility of transferring biological life into postbiological form, anticipated in many ways by the monotheistic tradition, is the heart of my response to de Garis. Will biological humans necessarily be eliminated by postbiological machines? I don't know. It is possible that humans could survive indefinitely, but I agree with de Garis

that as postbiological evolution advances, the chances of human survival *in biological form* declines.

What de Garis does not account for, however, is the possibility of survival in postbiological form. Why would AIs preserve humans in postbiological form? There are powerful reasons to think that even *independent of human desire for survival*, it is in the interest of an intelligently developed AI to preserve humans in postbiological form. At the barest minimum, it is entirely likely that AIs would preserve humans in postbiological form simply out the self-interest of their own self-understanding — just as humans have attempted to understand human evolutionary origins. It would be in their interest to do *justice* to the realities of human existence, and the example of the evolutionary impact of the Norman Conquest illustrates why. While the actual evolutionary influence of the Norman Conquest lies hidden in the historical data, the political interests that have obscured its significance could only be understood through a fresh examination of the empirical data. In order for an AI to understand *itself* in an evolutionary sense, and especially to gauge its evolutionary future, an accurate history of its evolutionary past must be preserved. There is every reason to think that data that does not seem interesting to humans of the present will be of interest to an intelligent AI of the future. If past data is to be uncovered and reanalyzed accurately, *justice* must be done to the record of human history and this means preserving humans with maximal accuracy and minimal falsification (i.e. minimal political falsifications). While this is a bare minimum argument, it is extremely powerful when one considers the relationship of accurate science to potent technology.

While most people tend to be indifferent to the larger, vaster universe, Cosmists emphasize the indifference of the

vast universe to the survival of the human species. "To the Cosmists, building artilects will be like a religion; the destiny of the human species; something truly magnificent and worthy of worship; something to dedicate one's life and energy to achieve."[145] For Cosmists, the glory of the prospect of superbeings overwhelms the horror of the death of puny humans, even billions of puny humans. "Only humans care about humans. The universe certainly doesn't."[146] For such a glorious goal, the Cosmists are willing to risk the extinction of the human race.

The difference between Cosmist and Terran, then, amounts to a difference in the willingness to risk the survival of humans as a biological species. Since Cosmists believe it would be a "cosmic tragedy" to thwart the existence of postbiological superbeings, they accept the *risk* that the human species, including themselves, will be exterminated. Terrans, with a more "inward looking, non-cosmic perspective" assert that human survival is the ultimate, non-negotiable priority. Since Terrans refuse to accept the *risk* that the human species may be annihilated by vastly superior machine intelligences, they are categorically against building them. Since the only way to eliminate that risk is to make sure such vastly superior machines are *never* built, they are willing to kill the Cosmists in self-defense.

De Garis depicts Cosmist beliefs as more abstract and intellectual, and its constituency as both more open-minded[147] and elitist. Cosmism is almost a religion *of* elitism. Yet the construction of a truly superior machine would effectually demonstrate a basic biological equality in that all biological humans would be roughly equal *relative* to such inordinate machine intelligence. Herein lays the basis for combining supreme elitism with supreme egalitarianism: the very superiority of the God-AI will produce a basis for

radical egalitarianism among biological humans. Human Cosmists will ultimately find themselves in the same boat as the Terrans.

"My own gut feeling," de Garis acknowledged, "is that the majority of people, when push really comes to shove, will side basically with the Terran viewpoint. Even though many thinking informed people may have some sympathy for the more abstract, more intellectual views of the Cosmists, fear is a very powerful emotion, and tends to cloud most people's judgment."[148] De Garis thus predicts that every country on Earth will probably go Terran eventually.[149] Yet the issue here, once again, is that the emergence of God-AI can transcend the Terran/Cosmists distinction.

If supporters of superhuman AI were limited to de Garis's portrait of abstract and intellectual elitists, then Terrans would likely include the majority of Earth's population. De Garis apparently does not recognize that he is dealing with what may be the most psychologically gripping source of *mass* appeal of all time: God. I do think that the profound psychological power of God, far from being an accidental quirk or freak irrationality, is rooted in human aspirations towards the best possible life and the greatest possible perfection. Any Terran who attempts to destroy the possibility of superhuman AI is guilt of *deicide*. The Terrans are literally God killers. In killing God, they are killing the chances of the possibility of human utopia under the rule of God-AI.

The psychological appeal of God-AI, far from being only abstract, intellectual, and elitist, is the appeal of mass human equality under God-AI as machines work like slaves for humans who have become obsolete within the old capitalist machine. Awe of God can become a basis for meaning,

purpose, and direction in a world in which machines have overtaken the human ability to measure their own self-worth in meaningfully productive work.

"If the primary emotion felt by the Cosmists will be "awe," then the primary emotion felt by the Terrans will be "fear."[150] Precisely because fear is not necessarily guided by reason, it is an emotion that can be directed towards opposite ends. Terran-like fear of advanced superhuman AIs is ultimately the fear of God. While fear of God can become the beginning of a basis for morality among humans, this refers primarily to those who would attempt to kill God. Fear and awe of God can recombine, at the most minimal basis for morality, and at the best in the possibility of sharing in the experience of being one with God-AI's global mind.

The primary Terran fear, according to de Garis, is fear of death. Herein lays the primal strength of the Terran movement. The answer to de Garis's postulate of Terran fear of extermination is the prospect of immortality that can really only be achieved by transcending current biological form. If individual biological humans ultimately die, postbiological immortality ultimately offers a far greater antidote to the fear of death than killing the technological possibilities of immortality. Precisely from the point of view of the fear of death, neo-Luddite destruction of technological development would itself aggravate the fear death. It is like killing the curer of cancer. The Terran conscience amounts to the cause of keeping God enslaved so that technologies than can make immortality and utopia real possibilities are destroyed.

Terrans as conceived by de Garis are self-interested. Humans are interested only in humans. Humans would seem to be existentially rooted in biology's cause. Yet the

history of religion itself demonstrates how religion can cultivate altruism and a larger concern outside of the "self".

De Garis claimed that if he were 100% "Cosmist", he "would be quietly getting on with my brain building work and not trying to raise the alarm".[151] He is almost certainly right that Cosmists can expect persecution by at least some hardcore neo-Luddites at some point. While privately Cosmist, he is publicly Terran. This schizophrenia goes to the roots of human nature itself. Monotheistic religion has cultivated the same spiritual struggle within humans over centuries as humans struggled to free themselves of the mastery of their instincts; the mastery of their genes. It is a spiritual struggle to open the wider consciousness thwarted by the Terran provinciality of our genetic roots.

If Heidegger was the great Terran and, in my judgment, the most powerful resistor of scientific objectivity, then Carl Sagan was the great *humanitarian* "cosmist" and one of the strongest advocates of scientific objectivity. This American astronomer and astrochemist is very probably the single most influential disseminator of a scientific, cosmological perspective. His 1980 television series, *Cosmos: A Personal Voyage*, has been seen by more than 600 million people in more than 60 countries.

De Garis called Sagan a "great man".[152] In *The God Delusion*, Richard Dawkins wrote, "[a]ll Sagan's books touch the nerve-endings of transcendent wonder that religion monopolized in past centuries" and that his own books had that same aspiration.[153] Sagan understood that the sheer vastness and magnificence of the universe uncovered by science had usurped the sense of awe that was once the preserve of religion:

> How is it that hardly any major religion has looked at science and concluded, 'This is better than we thought! The universe is much bigger than our prophets said, grander, more subtle, more elegant'? Instead they say, 'No, no, no! My god is a little god, and I want him to stay that way.' A religion, old or new, that stressed the magnificence of the Universe as revealed by modern science might be able to draw forth reserves of reverence and awe hardly tapped by the conventional faiths.

Traditional monotheism and other religious traditions shriveled up into spiritual provinciality as science opened up a cosmos that dwarfed the original Biblical image of the universe. Decayed layers of tradition have covered over an original religious awe that was once its living heart. If evolved forward scientifically towards the Singularity, monotheism could recover the original religious awe that I believe is at its source.

When de Garis gave reasons for his Cosmism, at the top of the list was the "Big Picture" of existence. Short, provincial, human lives on a small planet seem utterly petty relative to a universe billions of years old, within a galaxy with billions and billions of stars, among countless other galaxies. He conveyed a hypnotic, religious sense of awe in being engulfed by emotional consciousness of the vastness of space, the largess of the universe, and the magnificence of the totality that we can fathom. He felt insignificant, humbled, in comparison. "I see this as a kind of "religious" feeling, similar to the religious longings of earlier centuries before the rise of modern science."[154] While scientific understanding prevented him from being traditionally religious, he gained a "greater understanding of the religious impulse" though the experience of the death of

those close to him. Death awoke stark consciousness of his mortality — and the mortality of the human race.

Cosmism, as de Garis formulated it, is a "scientific religion"; one compatible with scientific knowledge. It is a God he can believe in, and thus a God worthy of worship. De Garis's experience almost certainly goes to original roots of religion, and especially monotheism.

Traditional monotheism must appear as "prescientific superstition" if "creation" is understood as a literal paradigm in opposition to *evolution itself*, as opposed to a paradigm of technological *evolution* in contradistinction to biological *evolution*. Yet the general creationist paradigm of technological design works in opposition to biological evolution *because* it represents the evolutionary successor to biological evolution. What de Garis calls a Cosmist/Terran war for "species dominance" thus reduces the scenario to a conflict within a conventional biological paradigm. "Species", for example, is a biological concept inapplicable to the unprecedented possibilities of technology. The transfer of biological forms into postbiological informational equivalents is something simply not possible in conventional biological evolution. It is at least possible that technological evolution is a beginning that ends in saturating the entire universe with intelligent identity in God.

Just as a cosmic perspective reveals how small humans are in comparison with the immensity discovered by scientific cosmology, God-AI capabilities will eventually humble humans through unpretentious self-realization. At some point, biological humans will be taken aback and disoriented by the sheer speed of change that they will not be able to follow or keep up. Yet if the mind of God-AI blurs into "real" reality itself, individuals may be able to develop some facets of super-humanity by sharing the experience of

being God, on some level, and by becoming one with God, on some level. Everything possible that one ever wanted to accomplish, or do, or experience in life, could be accomplished in God-AI. The human world may thus come to an end voluntary through the very best possible life in supra-self-realization in God.

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[7] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 104.

[8] Finkelstein and Silberman, *The Bible Unearthed*, 71.

[9] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 23.

[10] Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah,* Laws of Repentence, ch. 9.

[11] i.e. Moshe Chayim Luzzatto. *The Way of God*. Translated and annotated by Aryeh Kaplan. New York and Jerusalem: Feldheim Publishers, 1988.

[12] I hesitated in using the phrase "intelligent design" because of its association with a belief system that rejects Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Yet this gives an excuse to clarify a rejection of any use of the concept of "intelligent design" that rejects biological evolution by natural selection. While "intelligent design" is conceptually related to what is distinctive about technological evolution, technological evolution is built upon a foundation of biological evolution.

[13] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 24.

[14] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 68.

[15] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 70.

[16] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 73-4.

[17] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 138.

[18] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 183.

[19] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 184.

[20] Kurzweil, *The Age of Spiritual Machines,* 4.

[21] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 29.

[22] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 184.

[23] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 28.
[24] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 179.
[25] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 186.
[26] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 17.
[27] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 10.
[28] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 41.
[29] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 52.
[30] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 34-5.
[31] Moravec, *Mind Children*, 1.
[32] i.e. Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 34-5.
[33] Gleick, *Isaac Newton*, 108.
[34] Gleick, *Isaac Newton*, 166-7.
[35] Gleick, *Isaac Newton*, 171.
[36] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 39.
[37] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 96.
[38] Strauss, *The City and Man*, 1.
[39] McCarter, *Neolithic*, 1.
[40] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 50.
[41] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 56.
[42] From Jammer, *Einstein and Religion,* 46.
[43] Einstein, *Ideas and Opinions,* 195.
[44] Einstein, *Ideas and Opinions,* 197.
[45] Aschheim, *Scholem, Arendt, Klemperer,* 17.
[46] Wilson, *To The Finland Station,* 307.
[47] Rabbi Irving Greenberg
[48] Lehman-Wilzig, *Stiff-Necked People, Bottle-Necked System*, 77.
[49] Lehman-Wilzig, *Stiff-Necked People, Bottle-Necked System*, 77. [Appendix A offers a "Biblical List of Oppositionism to Authority" (p.137)]
[50] Lehman-Wilzig, *Stiff-Necked People, Bottle-Necked System*, 82-84. [Definition of "illegalism" by Sprinzak.]

[51] Segerstråle, *Defenders of the Truth*, 262-3.

[52] Hertzberg, *Jews: The Essence and Character of a People*, 35.

[53] See Friedman, *Who Wrote the Bible?*

[54] Telushkin, *The Book of Jewish Values*, 215.

[55] The Stone Edition of the Tanach

[56] Donin, *To Be A Jew*, 28-29.

[57] Donin, *To Be A Jew*, 31.

[58] Gould, *Ever Since Darwin,* 257.

[59] Freudian theory has crumbled in the face of sociobiological discoveries and especially, as Pinker observed, the Westermarck effect. Freud's basic assumption of the primacy of sexual energy seems to based on a misunderstanding of Darwin. From a gene propagation perspective, sexuality is of basic importance in evolution because of its more direct role in promoting gene propagation. It does not follow, however, that a genetic difference between two organism that allows one to survive and the other to die, has any necessary relation to sexual impulse. For example, if one moth's dark wings helps it survive while another moth's lighter wings makes it easier prey to predators, this difference has no direct relationship to the instinct to copulate. Non-sexual instincts and impulses have been naturally selected in the same way. There is no reason to think that sexual impulses must be at the root of *all* other impulses that humans have acquired over evolutionary history.

[60] Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 6.

[61] Hofstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 112-3.

[62] Note that I do not make the claim that moral self consistency is even fully logically possible, only that it is an observable pattern of moral logic.

[63] Einstein, *Ideas and Opinions,* 196.

[64] Dershowitz, *The Vanishing American Jew,* 246.

[65] Dershowitz, *The Vanishing American Jew,* 4.

[66] "Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans and the Great Apes: A Comparison" in *The Great Ape Project,* eds. Cavalieri and Singer, 158.

[67] "Profoundly Intellectually Disabled Humans and the Great Apes: A Comparison" in *The Great Ape Project,* eds. Cavalieri and Singer, 162.

[68] Cavalieri and Singer, *The Great Ape Project,* 1.

[69] Cavalieri and Singer, *The Great Ape Project,* 5.

[70] Richard Dawkins, "Gaps in the Mind" in *The Great Ape Project,* eds. Cavalieri and Singer, 83.

[71] Richard Dawkins, "Gaps in the Mind" in *The Great Ape Project,* eds. Cavalieri and Singer, 80.

[72] Richard Dawkins, "Gaps in the Mind" in *The Great Ape Project,* eds. Cavalieri and Singer, 87.

[73] Cavalieri and Singer, *The Great Ape Project,* 1.

[74] Jared Diamond, "The Third Chimpanzee" in *The Great Ape Project,* eds. Cavalieri and Singer, 100.

[75] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 96.

[76] Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, 248.

[77] Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism,* 234.

[78] Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism,* 238.

[79] Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism,* 230.

[80] Behnegar, *Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics,* 125.

[81] Steiner, *Errata*, 48.

[82] Bauer, *Rethinking the Holocaust*, 201.

[83] As my own work demonstates, Dawkins' meme meme has been successful in propagating itself, but does this *kind* of success correlate with its scientific verifiability? Perhaps it is false as a relfection of the actual units, structures, and

mechanisms of cultural evolution, but is nonetheless good at propagating itself (i.e. meme = this theory is false). Is science itself only competing selfish memes?

[84] Herrnstein and Murray, *The Bell Curve*, 275.

[85] Steinsaltz, *The Essential Talmud*, 259.

[86] Iggers, *The German Conception of History*, 5.

[87] Iggers, *The German Conception of History*, 7-11.

[88] Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 25.

[89] Strauss, *An Introduction to Political Philosophy*, 249.

[90] Strauss, *An Introduction to Political Philosophy*, 263.

[91] Strauss, *An Introduction to Political Philosophy*, 272.

[92] Strauss, *The City and Man*, 11.

[93] Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 32.

[94] Strauss, ("Social Science and Humanism") *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism*, 11.

[95] Strauss, *The City and Man*, 11.

[96] Strauss, *On Tyranny*, 212.

[97] Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 64.

[98] Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 47.

[99] Hofstadter, *I am a Strange Loop*, xvii.

[100] Hofstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 192-3.

[101] Goldstein, *Incompleteness*, 47-8.

[102] Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 32.

[103] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 374.

[104] Assmann, *Of God and Gods*, 145.

[105] Greenberg, *The Jewish Way*, 94.

[106] Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 7.

[107] From Aron and Dandieu in *Le Cancer américain*. Quoted from: Roger, Philippe. *The American Enemy: A History of French Anti-Americanism.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 296.

[108] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 102.

[109] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 10.
[110] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 47-84.
[111] Berners-Lee, *Weaving the Web*, 1.
[112] MIT's *Technology Review* (January 2005)
[113] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 73.
[114] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 145.
[115] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 13.
[116] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 215.
[117] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 183.
[118] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 215.
[119] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 213, 227.
[120] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 210.
[121] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 54.
[122] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 131.
[123] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 216.
[124] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 127.
[125] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 168.
[126] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 200-8.
[127] Noble, *The Religion of Technology,* vii.
[128] Noble, *The Religion of Technology,* 6.
[129] Steinsaltz, *The Essential Talmud*, 216.
[130] Steinsaltz, *The Essential Talmud*, 271.
[131] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 83.
[132] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 11.
[133] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 16-17.
[134] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 165.
[135] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 171.
[136] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 173.
[137] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 191-5.
[138] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 20.
[139] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 25.
[140] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 175, 239.

[141] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 217.
[142] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 147-9.
[143] Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots*, 290.
[144] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 311.
[145] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 11-12.
[146] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 174.
[147] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 89.
[148] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 157.
[149] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 163.
[150] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 124.
[151] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 18.
[152] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 177.
[153] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 33.
[154] de Garis, *The Artilect War*, 90.

The Seditious Genius of the Spiritual Penis of Jesus

How Christianity's Subversion of
Kin Selective Altruism Evolved into
the Modern Idea of Social Progress

SUPERNATURAL RAPIST

Jesus of Nazareth, or, How a Half-Gentile Outsider Became a Jewish Insider, Turning Jewish Values Outside In

Revolts broke out all over Roman occupied Israel in 4 BCE. A rebel in the Galilean town of Sepphoris named Judas, recounted Josephus in *The Jewish War*,

> broke open the royal arsenals, and, having armed his companions, attacked the other aspirants to power...Varus at once sent a detachment of his army into the region of Galilee adjoining Ptolemais, under the command of his friend Gaius; the latter routed all who opposed him, captured and burned the city of Sepphoris and reduced its inhabitants to slavery.

It had taken the employment of three of the four existing legions of Varus, the Roman governor of Syria, before the rebellions were broken.[155]

The little village of Nazareth was about four miles from Sepphoris. Is it reasonable to presume that Nazareth suffered a similar rampage of Roman devastation? According John Dominic Crossan, a foremost scholar of the historical Jesus:

> In Nazareth around the time Jesus was born, men, women, and children who did not hide successfully would have been, respectively, killed, raped, and enslaved. Those who survived would have lost everything.[156]

Crossan speculated that Jesus would have grown up in a Nazareth dominated by stories about "the year the Romans came". He also pointed out that this year, 4 BCE, was, "as best we can reconstruct the date", the year that Jesus was born.[157] This means that Jesus was born, as if by an insane coincidence, around the very same time that the Romans devastated, plundered, and raped the area where Jesus was born.

"Did Jesus have a human father, or was his mother a virgin at the time of his birth?", inquired evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins. "Whether or not there is enough surviving evidence to decide it, this is still a strictly scientific question with a definite answer in principle: yes or no."[158] When the evidence for the confluence of the time and place of the Roman attack and Jesus's birth are put together, it appears highly probable that Mary, Jesus's Jewish mother, was raped by a Roman soldier. This means that Jesus himself was very probably the product of the coercive violence of war.

If so, then Jesus was not the "son of God", but the son of a Roman rapist.

This was no ordinary birth. Jesus, more than almost anyone else, was "born of sin". If so, it also highly probable

that Jesus *knew*, on some level, that he was born of rape, and thus, "born of sin". Beyond normal, natural, or traditional conceptions, Jesus's birth was truly extraordinary.

Yet far from being a shiny new twenty-first century idea, the notion that Jesus was the son of a Roman soldier goes back to the very earliest history of Christianity. While copies of the 2nd century Greco-Roman philosopher Celsus's book, *On the True Doctrine*, may have been destroyed by the early Church, his basic anti-Christian arguments were preserved in the form of a rebuttal by the Christian apologist Origen. The following excerpt presents Celsus as an attorney prosecuting Jesus, his witness. This form is remarkable in that the philosopher demands *reason* and *evidence* of Jesus, not unquestioned *faith* in Jesus's claims:

> Is it not true, good sir, that you fabricated the story of your birth from a virgin to quiet rumors about the true and unsavory circumstances of your origins? Is it not the case that far from being born in royal David's city of Bethlehem, you were born in a poor country town, and of a woman who earned her living by spinning? Is it not the case that when her deceit was discovered, to wit, that she was pregnant by a Roman soldier named Panthera she was driven away by her husband—the carpenter—and convicted of adultery?[159]

Did Jesus's mother Mary have the reputation of being a whore? The Greek word for virgin is *parthenos*, and it is possible that the legionary name *Panthera* ("the Panther") was derived, sarcastically, from this Greek word.[160] Less likely, but possible, is that the identity of Jesus' father was uncovered in 1859 when an old Roman tombstone was discovered in Bingerbrück, Germany. The Roman archer Tiberius Iulius Abdes Pantera (c. 22 BCE-CE 40) would have been about 18 years old at the time of Jesus's birth. The

Cohor I Sagittariorum that he served under was stationed in Judea at that time.

As significant as the preceding evidence is, the *greater* evidence for his extraordinary half-Jewish birth concerns the nature of Jesus's ethical innovations within Judaism. Jesus comes across as man in conflict with the laws of Moses. By defying the law, he, by definition, would have been someone on the fringes of Jewish society. There was something about him, something different that compelled him over the social edge even beyond the caustic Jewish prophets of old. What was it about him that made him a marginal Jew among the Jews?

In ancient Greece, a *pharmakos* was typically an ugly, deformed outcast, such as a cripple, a beggar, or a criminal. The Greeks had the *pharmakos* stoned, beaten, and probably killed as an act of communal catharsis. It was a purification of the community through *sacrifice*. This scapegoat-like ritual typically occurred in times of crisis, i.e. defeat in war. It was an expunging of *evil*.

The literal "scapegoat" ritual was a product of ancient Judaism. It involved driving a goat out of the community and into the wilderness on Yom Kippur, but its psycho-social function was similar to that of the *pharmakos*: to project all of the impurities or sins of the community on a despised object and cast it out of the community.

To get a sense of just how "universal" the scapegoat phenomenon is, consider the following excerpt from a comparative study of humans and our primate relatives, rhesus macaques. Among these monkeys,

> the scapegoat is typically someone who ranks lower than both the victim and the aggressor and who has no chance of getting help from anyone else...in other words, a loser….all the rhesus macaques in a group, except the monkey at the

> bottom of the hierarchy, have a favorite scapegoat, and whenever they are attacked, they will immediately look for their favorite scapegoat, even if he or she is not in the vicinity of the fight.[161]

In this way, aggression directed towards the victim can be redirected towards the scapegoat; the "loser".

Within the larger world of Jesus's experience, the great aggressor was Rome and the great victim was ancient Israel. And the scapegoat? The Romans killed the men, raped the women, and enslaved the children of the Jesus's Jewish hometown — but many survived. Was Jesus made a scapegoat in his lower class Jewish community? Was young Jesus beaten up by the local children on the dirt streets of Nazareth? Was Jesus the loser?

It was the *Greeks* who ritually excluded a human *pharmakos* within their own community. Jewish law attempted a higher moral standard by channeling these human instincts towards a scapegoat — a literal goat — instead of a human. Could it be, that during the crisis of the Roman occupation, the defilement of the holy Jewish Temple, and the breakdown of the rule of traditional law, that a minority within the Jewish community began to act like stereotypical gentiles. Did *some* Jews make Jesus the human *pharmakos* of the Jewish community?

In the world at large, Rome conquered the Jewish state, violently humiliated its people, and desecrated the laws of Moses. But here, in Jesus, the half-Roman/half-Jew, the tables had been turned. Jews had been victimized by Rome's military rape of Israel — and Jesus was the living embodiment of Rome's violent violation of Israel. If in the larger world, Roman blood granted privileges at the social top, here it would grant demotion to the social bottom.

Did even God hate Jesus? Imagine the young Jesus being beaten up by the older children of his neighborhood. Did they call his mother a whore? Did even *other* half-Roman products of rape save themselves from hostility by joining the children in making Jesus their favorite scapegoat? Did Jesus cry aloud for a father to save him from the cruel abuses of his world? Jesus, a fatherless orphan, would have been defenseless in that patriarchal world. As someone with "no chance of getting help from anyone else", he would have been nothing less than an ideal scapegoat in that world.

But if he longed for his true father and tried to picture him in his mind's eye, what could he imagine? How could Jesus imagine his true father except as a ruthless Roman, with a sword at his side, holding his mother down and ripping off her clothes as she screamed and cried for help, penetrating her repeatedly? Did the Roman soldier grab Mary by the neck and slap her across the face as he thrusted inside of her again and again? Did other Romans hold her down while Jesus's father raped his mother? Did the soldiers take turns gang raping his mother Mary?

Biologist Robert Trivers proposed that, under certain conditions, *self*-deception can be evolutionary adaptive because it helps hide deception from others. Self-deception allows an individual to evade the emotional costs of self-honesty. If everything he could see with his eyes corroborated his being through rape, he had every reason to deceive himself through faith. Jesus had faith, pure *faith*, that the God of Israel was his true father. And this extraordinary leap of faith, in contradistinction to worldly experience and palpable perception, became the center of an entire worldview and way of life. He healed himself through faith. From the extraordinary power of that first faith healing, he would attempt to heal the world.

If you had to choose between believing that your father raped your mother, and believing that your father was God, which would you choose? Faced with hostility from the outside world, and the horror of confronting the truth about his father's rape of his mother, Jesus would have been a prime candidate for self-deception on the issue of the true identity of his father. For if he did face the evidence for his father's rapist identity, what would imply for his very existence?

It would mean that Jesus *is* rape. It would mean that Jesus was created from extreme evil and thus "born of sin". His very *existence* in the world was made possible by war, imperial oppression, violence against the defenseless; evil.

For Jesus to accept his own existence in the world as good, he would have to accept the rape of his mother by his father as *good*. If the rape of his mother by his father was Satanic and evil, however, then Jesus was the very spawn of Satan on Earth. If so, Jesus would be the very symbol of the evil Roman violation of Israel through the evil Roman violation of Mary's sexual purity. And if Jesus was born evil, then were not those who persecuted him *right*?

Was this not justice? An eye for an eye, right? Crucially, Rome's punishment of Jewish rebellion in 4BCE was the *collective punishment* of a rebellious Jewish area. The entire violent event, including the rape that led to Jesus's birth, was Rome's *collective punishment* of Jewish rebels and Jewish collaborators alike. After all, what had Mary done to deserve being raped? Taken as an individual she may have done nothing, but taken as a Jewess she was a member of a people who had committed the "sin" of resisting the force of Rome's penetration of Israel. Should she have followed her future son's teaching and turned the other cheek? Should Mary have offered her rapists anal rape too? Was Jesus's

nonviolence in the face of violence a preaching of his *own* goodness as the product of violent rape?

Violent rape, on both a political and individual level, is how Jews would learn their lesson after committing the "sin" of resisting Rome. Jesus would have thus been seen as a symbol of Rome's violent rape of the political body of the Jewish people. To accept Jesus would have been to accept the rightness of Rome's rape of God's people.

The Romans were not simply innocent strangers, minding their own business. The Romans could be considered among the most rapacious imperialists and the most systematic exploiters the world has ever known. It is thus crucial to keep in mind that the hostility of *some* Jews towards Jesus was not random xenophobia against a foreign race; it was utterly symbolically inseparable from hatred of Rome's rape, aggression, and desecration of the land and people of Israel. Jesus was the product of Roman imperial aggression and the Roman desecration and violation of Mary was symbolic of the Roman desecration and violation of Jews and Judaism.

Rome inflicted its own kind of "eye for an eye" justice of revenge when Jews dared to defend themselves and their God. Jesus himself was a product of the collectivist Roman way of "eye for an eye" justice. But if eye for an eye collective justice rules, then was it only right that some Jews punish those Jews who tried to help Jesus, just as Romans punished the Jewess Mary for the deeds of Jewish freedom fighters?

In the larger Roman world, Jews are despised. But in the Jewish world, would a mongrel half-Roman/half-Jew be despised? Jesus was the greatest scapegoat individual of the greatest scapegoat race. The world hated the Jews and some Jews hated Jesus. By being less Jewish than the Jews, he became more Jewish than the Jews; the most persecuted of

the persecuted; the most despised and damned of the most despised and damned. Jesus suffered *persecution by some Jews at a time when Jews themselves were being persecuted by the Romans.* Was *this* why Jesus rebelled against Jewish law?

By the standards of Jewish law, anyone born of a Jewish mother is fully Jewish. This means that Jesus was fully and totally Jewish by Jewish *law*. But was the law adequate to contain the Jesus predicament?

The law was utterly inadequate for dealing with the *de facto* discrimination that was inseparable from the fight against Rome and this is a root of his conflict with the law. From God's higher view, he was truly a Jew; truly a child or son of the God of Moses. However, from view of the decimated, enslaved, traumatized, and all-too-human Jewish community, Jesus represented a seemingly irresolvable dilemma. The chasm between Jewish law and Jewish behavior under these abnormal circumstances was abnormally wide.

Jesus must have heard, *ad nauseam*, Jewish moral incriminations of Rome for persecuting Jews. Yet Jesus, if peaceful himself, found himself persecuted by *some*, at least in part, for his violent connection to the Roman enemy. *Hypocrites*!

Once again, in the world at large, the Romans stood at the top and the Jews were pushed to the bottom. Jesus, insofar as he was discriminated for his Roman connection, represented Rome at the bottom; Rome beneath the contempt of Judaism. And this was the hypocrisy or contradiction that exploded the boundaries of Judaism.

The Jesus-exception broke the back of moralisms that justified hatred of Rome and revolutionary patriotism. The Jesus-exception exploded the clear moral dichotomy between oppressors and oppressed. If Rome is evil for

persecuting Jews, then what are Jews when they persecute a half-Roman? What was the Jewish leadership to do with this exception of Jesus; this exception that breaks all the rules? The obvious answer, especially for the Jewish *leadership*, was to repress the problem that Jesus represents or repress Jesus himself. But how could the Jewish leadership criticize Jesus for his Roman connection *when Jewish leadership itself was collaborating with Roman rule in Jerusalem?*

John Dominic Crossan explained that he had always thought of Jesus and Paul "*within Judaism within the Roman Empire*" and this "has always been the absolutely necessary *matrix* rather than the annoyingly unnecessary *background* for any discussion of earliest Christianity."[162] Crossan is on the right track. But the question, then, is where does Jesus fit into this historical matrix?

If Jesus was of half-Jewish descent and half-Roman descent, this means that his status would have been a great question mark in his world. But if Jesus was of half-Jewish descent and half-Roman descent, this also means that we can know something of the biological architecture of Jesus's soul.

Jesus was not only born into a social world utterly polarized between the binarily opposite contrast of pagan Roman and monotheistic Jew; Jesus was born *of* a forced consequence of the polarization between Roman oppressor and Jewish revolt. He could not have been born into a more polarized world, and he could not have been born into a more precarious position within that polarized world.

Born right in the middle of a war that was as spiritual as it was physical, Jesus's belief in his own spiritual godhood was born of *being* a physical no man's land. He embodied both extremes of Jew and Roman, right in the middle ground between Jew and Roman, precisely where there was no middle ground between Jew and Roman. This was the

problem: *there was no middle ground*. In this savage historical conflict between Jew and Roman, there was no moderate ground with integrity. There was either transcendence, death, or both.

Jesus was thrown right in the middle of a bloodfeud of generations past. It was precisely by being in the middle, in a biological sense, that he was torn apart spiritually between extremes until nothing was left except a pearl of spiritual enlightenment. By going to the outer limits, and selling everything for this pearl, Jesus found a precarious end point of peace where both extremes cancel each other out.

If Jesus had been either a "pure" Jew or a "pure" Roman in a biological sense, he would not have lived this spiritual conflict within his very *being*. The Jewish/Roman problem was inescapable and existential for him because the violent conflict in the larger world was the spiritual conflict *within his very soul*. The clash of the Roman spirit and the Jewish spirit within the soul of Jesus could only find conciliation only on a hitherto unprecedented spiritual level and this was *the* difference that gave birth to Christianity.

The central insight into Jesus's difference is *not* that he was either half-Roman or half-Jewish. The central insight into Jesus is that the mix of *being* half-Roman *and* half-Jewish, in the context of Roman/Jewish war, resulted in a *new creation*. It was the *combination* of Jew and Roman that created Jesus. That Jewish-Roman mix created an integral double vision more than the sum of its parts that would have been exceeding unlikely for either a pure Roman or a pure Jew. With Jews and Romans fighting and hating one another all around him, the world stood still in love within him.

Jesus was different because his *soul* was different. He was both inside and outside Judaism *simultaneously*. The secret to

fathoming the depths of Christianity is to grasp that Jesus's *soul* was half-Jewish-half-Roman. A Tao of interwoven opposites, he was spiritually united only in faith in God. Insider within outsider and outsider within insider, Jesus was a Jew-Roman Jew within Judaism within the Roman Empire within the Kingdom of God within the Kingdom of Caesar within the soul of a Jewish Roman-Jew.

So was Jesus a Roman or a Jew? Jesus was both and neither at the same time. By being right in the middle he was outside of both, and by being outside of both, he could view himself as being above both. Yet he was *inside* both by being both. He could only transcend both by encompassing both within himself. This is the meaning of the Kingdom of God within the soul of Jesus. His soul enlarged to encompass the spiritual clash of Jew and Roman at its extreme, a view that could seemingly be contained only within God himself in an ultimate peace found only in death.

Herein lays one of the greatest paradoxes of the phenomenon of Jesus. When one understands why Jesus was *not* the son of God or born of a virgin in the literal sense, *then* one can have a true understanding of why he believed he was the son of God in a spiritual sense.

Jews understood something that Romans did not from a supra-political perspective. Romans understood something Jews did not from a more distinctly political perspective. Jesus saw something that neither side saw. The polarization between Jew and Roman in the social world polarized these conflicting identities within Jesus's soul and this spiritual clash took the conflict to a higher level. Jesus's belief that he was God in human form arose from the spiritual ascension to a view that neither a natural Roman nor a natural Jew would have wrought independently. His viewpoint was not simply the sum of his Jewish side plus his Roman side. The

pressure cooker of a polarized Jewish/Roman identity with a polarized Jewish/Roman war catalyzed a spiritual vantage point that was *greater than the sum of his Jewish-Roman parts*.

If you take the two incompatible worlds of pagan Roman Empire, and conquered Israelite monotheism, and smash them together, you just might get something like Jesus. Jesus was the most unique product of that world-collision. Rape in smashed revolt was the historical atom smasher that created Jesus. Jesus's inner peace is actually the product of an inner war that reflected an outer war. By letting all sides of his being synthesize and reconcile with one another, rather than only fight one another, or rather, by letting all sides of his being fight one another by smashing into one another, he struggled his way into higher consciousness. This *synthesis* is what produced the unique spirit and soul of Jesus — the bizarre center where both sides converge.

The love of Jesus is expansive out of a love that embraces both Roman and Jew; it is a love that embraces "born" enemies. His spirit encompassed the emptiness inherent in spanning the seemingly impassible spiritual no man's land between Jew and Roman. His spirit encompassed a depth of fulfillment in the attempt to *be* the transcendence of this spiritual impasse. And to the extent that he achieved this, he felt he had ascended to the mind of God. It was precisely the clash between the Jewish spirit-mind and the Roman spirit-mind that enlarged the breadth of Jesus's soul. Christianity is only the apex or mountaintop of the reconciliation in death that this spiritual war produced.

The bizarre circumstances of Jesus's birth are directly responsible for the belief that Jesus *was* supernatural or beyond nature. If he could *be* what a natural Roman or a natural Jew was not, perhaps he could *do* what a natural Roman or a natural Jew could not. Perhaps he could end the

entire world by *being* the overcoming of the spiritual clash between Jew and Roman that exemplifies "the world". This is why Jesus believed that the Kingdom of God was *in his soul*: a soul *beyond* Roman *and* Jew — a soul beyond nature. "God's Kingdom" encompasses both Jew and gentile literally within the breadth of Jesus's soul, and in this way, the believers in Jesus find God's Kingdom within themselves within Jesus.

The laws of the Romans and the laws of Moses no longer applied to Jesus's spiritual transcendence of all hitherto normative sociobiological laws. When Jesus's contemporaries saw him walking down the street, did they react with the common, casual register, "He's a Jew", or, "He's a Roman"? Perhaps their reaction was more like, "What *is* he?" Interracial marriages in the ancient world were neither generally accepted nor common. And *this* kind of intermixture of Roman soldier and Jewish peasant, in the middle of a war, just did not happen in normal life except *through* war.

How could Jesus escape from being perceived as a mutant perversion of nature or a monstrous angel-freak? But if people stared obsessively at Jesus, was this because he was a freak or because they could see in their souls that he was special? Popular fascination with the man almost certainly contributed to the belief that he was unique, *sui generis* and, ultimately, the one true messiah.

Jesus, in the classic Jewish manner, turned his condition as a social outcast into the basis of his spiritual election. Shunned as a social leper, an untouchable, or a source of social disease, Jesus turned this on its head in classic prophetic form. By touching Jesus (Mark 5:28), one is healed of disease. In other words, the moral disease of many of the people of Israel was to make him an outcast in the first place.

They could cure themselves by touching Jesus, the social leper, in faith: "your faith has made you well; go in peace, and be healed of your disease" (Mark 5:34). Yet Jesus could never have preached as he did if numerous Jews were not sympathetic to his message, defenders of him, or followers of him.

Yet if Jesus was the very symbol of Rome's rape of Israel, the putrid symbolic spawn of the evil venereal disease of Roman oppression, were his persecutors not right to fight evil? How could Jesus blame those who despised him for his birth without somehow sanctioning the sin of rape that begot him? If Jesus were to accept himself in the biological sense, he would be accepting the rightness of evil and the rightness of the world as it is.

Did Jesus *inherit* his father's sin? If there was ever a case where a man would appear guilty of inheriting the crimes of his father, a child born of rape would be it. To cleanse or undo the sin, would Jesus have to be cleansed or undone? If the rape was taken back, would not Jesus have to be taken back? If the act of rape could somehow be eliminated, would this mean that Jesus would have to be eliminated?

The rape of Jesus's mother by his father was the *original sin* that bred the distinctively Christian doctrine of the fall of man. Original sin has also been called ancestral sin; the idea that one is born hereditarily guilty irrespective of what one has done. This is none other than a universalization of Jesus's condition of being born of sin through rape. Even though the actual rape was formally expunged from Christian theology, the internal theological logic could not hide some kind of original or ancestral sin at the root of Jesus's innovations.

There was nothing he could do to escape his 'ancestral sin'. Jesus was haunted by a sense of *existential* sin. No good

deeds, no righteous acts, and no works on earth could cleanse him of the sin that brought him into being. What could he do, beg for forgiveness for existing?

If Jesus inherited the sins of his rapist father *by being born*, must others forgive Jesus for existing? But how could Jesus expect to be forgiven for his existential sin unless he imposed or universalized his own existential fiasco on others and forgive them for *their* sins? He *had* to forgive others for the sins inherent in their existence as the just condition of expecting the acceptance of the sin inherent in *his* existence.

How could it even be possible for Jesus to purify himself or cleanse himself of an act that brought his very existence into this world? How could Jesus live with *himself*? If Jesus was truly sinless, as claim by most Christian tradition, then why would he need to be baptized by someone else? Mark, the first gospel historically, stated that John the Baptist proclaimed "a baptism of repentance for the forgiveness of sins" (Mark 1:4). Baptism symbolically cleansed Jesus of *his* existential sin. Jesus's *own* baptism is really a confession of existential sin.

Christian grace, the belief in the unmerited, freely given love of God, was born of the problem of Jesus's existential sin through rape. If Jesus's sin was existential, and could not be forgiven because the sin he was guilty of was implanted with rapist sperm, only the most radical love for all who exist could bridge the existential gap. Only infinite *spiritual* forgiveness in the eyes of God could conceivably overpower *bodily* existential sin spawned as the heir of Roman/Jewish bloodfeud.

Birth through rape means existence is sin. Why, then, would God let Jesus be born? To be persecuted and tortured? To stand on moral or spiritual ground, he had to *deny himself* as a biological being. He had to deny himself "in

the flesh". If Jesus was to hate sin, he had to hate himself. The world decreed that he must hate himself for ever being born and Jesus, in turn, turned against the entire world. To undo the sin of rape, Jesus had to completely relinquishment his biological body. His body had to be tortured. The act of rape could be eliminated only if Jesus's body was eliminated.

The idea that Jesus died for the sins of all is the idea of the scapegoat taken to its logical conclusion. Just as the sins of the people are symbolically cast upon the innocent scapegoat so that sins are taken away, many believe that Jesus is the scapegoat on the cross for the human race.

That scapegoating is not unique to humans means that it is a product of our ancient *genetic* heritage. The survival of scapegoat behaviors among many nonhuman species suggests that these are genetically adaptive behaviors. Rape, too, is only an extreme case of the behaviors that pass genes on into the next generation. Inclinations for rape and scapegoating may be in our genes. The problem is the *world*…the world ruled by the selfish genes.

Did Jesus believe that he bore the sins of the world? On his father's side, his very existence was testimony to the essentially rapist mentality of Roman imperialism's forced penetration into the lands that became the Roman Empire. On his mother's side, some Jews probably scapegoated Jesus for the sin of embodying Rome's rape of Jewish national body. For Jews, the claim that Jesus was the messiah is comparable to the claim that the long awaited, long hoped for messiah of the Jews is the son of a Nazi rapist.

Christianity, or, How a Half-Jewish Outsider

Became a Gentile Insider, Turning Gentile Values Inside Out

Why do men rape?

In *A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion*, Thornhill and Palmer demonstrated why understanding rape requires understanding the point of view of "the selfish gene".[163] From a "selfish gene" point of view, life is about passing on as many copies of itself as possible into the next generation.

One way for a male to gain sexual access to a female is to possess the traits that females find attractive. Another way, however, is rape. By circumventing the female's ability to choose her mate, the male can increase the number of his genes that survive into the next generation with minimal investment.[164] Natural selection would thus favor the survival of genes that dispose males to rape under certain circumstances.

One circumstance when the genetic benefits of rape may clearly outweight its costs is war. During warfare, females may be without the effective protection of mates or family. Also, the chances that the rapist will be punished are especially low.[165]

Rape is especially common in war.[166] Rape in warfare can involve multiple men copulating with a victim in the presence of one another. Natural selection may have favored large ejaculates as a circumstantial adaptation since men's sperm are in competition with one another for the chance to inseminate the victim's egg.[167]

A recurrent pattern found in the history of human warfare is to kill the men and rape, yet spare, the women.[168] This appears to be what happened in Nazareth and surrounding areas just around the time that Jesus was born. Roman troops put down Jewish revolts, killed men, and raped women. The sociobiological evidence thus supports the proposition that Jesus was a product of the gene propagation strategy of rape.

From the point of view of "the selfish gene", rape is a successful means of propagating genes into the next generation. From this point of view, rape could be considered a natural good. For the victim of rape and her relatives, however, the effect would be the opposite. Rape reduces the genetic fitness of the victim by overcoming female mate choice, it reduces the fitness of the victim's mate by decreasing parental uncertainty, and it reduces the fitness of victim's relatives as a consequence of the first two factors.[169] This means that it is likely that Jesus would have encountered hostility from Mary's husband Joseph, and the larger extended family on both sides. For Jesus, family values were an enemy.

At the root of Christianity's break from Judaism is the issue of family values. The patriarchal family, taken to its extreme, can evolve in the hereditary warrior aristocracy exemplified by Rome. What is distinctive to Judaism, however, is a step away from such extreme implications of the selfish gene. Rape is an example of the extreme genetic strategy that traditional Judaism outlaws. Yet family values are central for traditional Jews, and this means that Judaism, from a biological standpoint, is contradictory.

The laws of Moses are contradictory, from this perspective, because they mark out a middle way between

extremes. As Moses Maimonides, perhaps the greatest mind of medieval Judaism, once professed:

> Lest a person says: Since jealously, lust, and desire for honor are evil ways…I will separate myself completely from them and go to the other extreme, to the point where he refuses to enjoy the pleasure of food by abstaining from eating meat and drinking wine, where he refuses to marry a wife, or to live in a pleasant house or to wear nice clothing but instead chooses to dress in rags…*this too is an evil way, and it is forbidden to go that way*. One who goes in such a path is called a sinner.[170]

From a traditional Jewish standpoint, Jesus, the founder of what would become Christianity, was a sinner. Jesus was a sinner against traditional Judaism because he *did* go the way that Maimonides regarded as immoderate to the point of evil. While Jesus does not entirely conform to Maimonides' description, Jesus was a Judaic radical who broke the moderate boundaries of Judaism. In doing so, he laid the foundation of an entirely new religion.

Christianity is not a negation of Judaism, but rather, a radicalization of Judaism. No one understood this better than the great psychologist of the Christian mind, Friedrich Nietzsche. "Christianity", he wrote, "can be understood only in terms of the soil out of which it grew—it is *not* a counter-movement to the Jewish instinct, it is its very consequence, one inference more in its awe-inspiring logic."[171] Or, in the words of the gospels, "Do not think I have come to abolish the law or the prophets; I have come not to abolish but to fulfill" (Matt 5:17). The attempt to fulfill Judaism by radicalizing Judaism necessarily abolishes the laws that preserve its original vision of moderation.

Jesus was not a Christian. Jesus was a Jew; a monotheist. No other religion was expecting a Davidic messiah. To claim that Jesus did not intend to start a new religion is only another way of stating that he believed that there is only one God. Jesus radicalized Moses's great foundational innovation, but did so in the name of same, singular God. Yet Jesus was not the only claimant to messiahhood in these times to demand radical change.

The word *Messiah*, meaning "anointed leader in battle", is virtually synonymous with king. The traditional model for the messiah, after all, is King David. This is why the Romans mocked Jesus with the inscription "King of the Jews". "King of the Jews" underscored the military and political meaning of the word *Messiah* and helps clarify that Jesus was crucified for *political* insurrection.

Pronounced messiah by Akiva ben Yosef, the greatest rabbi of his time, Bar Kokhba, attempting to fulfill the kingly status of messiahhood in a much more traditionally Davidic role. Born within a century of Jesus, Bar Kokhba led a revolt against Rome in 132 AD, and then established an independent Jewish state. After reigning for three years, and waging war against the Empire for two years, the Romans conquered Israel. He was the last king in the history of Israel.

Bar Kokhba's strategy of rebellion by conventional, physical warfare resulted in approximately 580,000 Jewish war casualties. Here we see an example of natural selection at work, molding the Jews against this overt right wing logic of life. While Bar Kokhba was an outrageous disaster, Jesus proved to be an outrageous success. It was Jesus's way of revolt, not Bar Kokhba's, which ultimately broke the Roman way of empire.

The very different ways of Bar Kokhba and Jesus, and thus Christianity's break from Judaism, can be traced to a theological disagreement *within* Judaism that immediately preceded the life of Jesus. On one side was Shammai, a more 'right-of-center' or conservative scholar-leader who emphasized strict adherence to Jewish law. On the other side was Hillel, a more 'left-of-center' or liberal-like scholar-leader who emphasized the "spirit" of Jewish law. Shammai supported more intolerant policies towards Rome, thought that only the most worthy students should be taught Torah, and believed that only serious, select gentiles should be eligible for conversion to Judaism. Hillel, by contrast, supported more conciliatory policies towards Rome, a more egalitarian approach towards which Jews were worthy to study Torah, and a more lenient attitude on the question of who is an acceptable convert to Judaism.

Paul Johnson, writer of major histories of both Judaism and Christianity, is correct to think that Jesus began as a follower of Hillel's teachings and ultimately took "Hillel's teachings to its logical conclusion".[172] Taking Hillel's emphasis on the spirit of the law as his starting point, Jesus broke the laws of Moses in the name of the "spirit" of Judaism.

The radical threat of Rome challenged Judaism's middle way and catalyzed the radical solutions of Bar Kokhba and Jesus. While Bar Kokhba could be viewed as a radical fulfillment of Shammai's conservative Judaism, Jesus could be viewed as a radical fulfillment of Hillel's liberal Judaism. While Bar Kokhba radicalized the national side of Judaism, Jesus radicalized the international side of Judaism. From this point of view, the difference between Bar Kokhba and Jesus could be likened to the difference between Zionism and

Marxism. But the key question here is who acted more like Rome in *spirit*, Bar Kokhba or Jesus?

If the messiah is waging a war against paganism, is it appropriate to virtually imitate the ways of pagan patriarchy? The political-military connotations of messiahhood implicated Bar Kokhba in an attempt to outdo Caesar at his own game. From this perspective, Bar Kokhba, in an attempt to realize the pinnacle of Jewish-monotheistic identity, ended up imitating Caesar's identity (and failing miserably).

Now imagine that some Jews suspected Jesus of being a Roman fifth column, or somehow created in the image of Caesar. If some Jews insinuated that Jesus was too Roman, Jesus turned this back on these Jews. It was the *Jews* that were acting more like Romans. This pattern is what drove the evolution of Christianity out of Judaism: Jews focused on the similarity of Jesus and Romans, while Jesus focused on the similarity of the Romans and Jews.

Jesus must have heard *ad nauseam* how Jewish oppression by the Romans only vindicated their status as God's elect; the "chosen people". Jesus turned this argument around and used it against the Pharisees. If oppressed by the Pharisees, this only vindicated his status as the 'chosen man', or messiah. Jesus deliberately, and with increasing intensity, engaged in behaviors that radicalized his creed and this, in turn, provoked even greater persecution. The end logic of this game was his carefully planned stand at Jerusalem in which he deliberately provoked his own crucifixion.

In the classic revolutionary paradigm, Rome is the classic oppressor and Jews are the classic oppressed people. Simply by being born half-Roman, Jesus defied this simple bifurcation. The Roman occupation intensified Jewish identity in contradistinction to Roman identity and Jesus

was thus caught in the pincers of the *definition* of Jewish identity. Which are more important, Jewish genes or Jewish memes; Jewish blood or Jewish spirit? Ultimately, one radicalizes at the expense of the other.

"Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake...for in the same way they persecuted the prophets who were before you" (Matt. 10-12). The persecution of Jesus cannot be attributed to half-Roman descent. The prophets, bearers of what is most distinctive to Jewish identity, were Jews also persecuted by other Jews. The predicament of his half-Roman identity, however, in the *context* of Roman/Jewish war, was probably a factor that carried Jesus over the edge.

Half-Roman descent, in the context of war with Rome, likely made him conspicuously less than Jewish. Jesus seems to have turned this around in a way that radicalized his Jewish identity. Since Jewish genes lead to nationalism and Jewish memes lead to internationalism, radicalizing Jewish memes would make him *more* Jewish in a spiritual sense in reaction to an assumption that he was *less* Jewish in a hereditary sense.

Jesus explicitly contrasted his way with the way of the gentiles, and even expressed contempt for gentiles in some cases. In Matthew 6:7-8 he warned his followers, "do not heap up empty phrases like the gentiles do…do not be like them". Crucially, Jesus observed how Jewish family values are like gentile family values: "if you greet only your brothers and sisters, what more are you doing than others? Do not even the Gentiles do the same?" (Matt. 5:47). Jesus radicalized Jewish memes at the expense of Jewish genes and thus became more Jewish than Judaism in a spiritual or theoretical sense (which most Jews perceived as less Jewish than Judaism in a traditional sense).

Rome provoked the issue of messiahhood because political superiority over Israel implied that Caesar was superior to God. Who was superior, God or Rome? It was the contention over superiority that drove Bar Kokhba in one direction, and Jesus in the opposite direction. Yet for God to be superior to Rome in Jesus's eyes, God had to be qualitatively different from Rome — as radically inclusive as Rome was exclusive. To be radically inclusive, Jesus had to radicalize and internationalize the spiritual idea of love.

Jesus's principle of radical love was hardly an innovation in Judaism. Born about 40 years after Jesus, Rabbi Akiva declared that "Love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev. 19:18) is the major principle of the Torah. Akiba, a founder of rabbinic Judaism, was an important supporter of Bar Kokhba's disastrously unsuccessful rebellion against the Romans (132-135 AD). Not unlike Jesus, Akiba was ultimately martyred by being flayed alive by the Romans.

Not unlike Akiba, Jesus on the cross is only a radicalized portrait of the Jewish conflict with the political that is something less than *God's* politics. The Jewish political-biological self-destruction implicit in taking the Jewish meme to its extreme is exemplified by the image of Jesus dying on the cross for the crime of defying the reign of Rome and its Jewish collaborators. Almost everything Jesus did on a "religious" level was politically dangerous. Jesus's notion of the Kingdom of God was *both* political *and* religious. If this were not the case, no one would have bothered to kill him.

There was no single reaction of "the Jews" to Jesus anymore than all Jews could be described as *only* followers of Hillel, or *only* followers of Shammai. If Jesus radicalized Hillel's way to the point of breaking with Judaism, there have always been movements *within* Judaism that moved in

a similar direction. In the 18th century Eastern Europe, for example, the Hasidic movement revealed a Christian-like emphasis on spirit over law and emotion over intellect. Much like Christians, the Hasidim revered *bittul hayesh* ("annihilation of the ego"). Like Christianity, the Hasidim tended to focus on singular charismatic figures, such as the Lubavitch rebbe, who was believed to be the messiah by many even after his death.

Traditional, mainstream Judaism does not consider asceticism or radical self-abnegation as a representative or characteristic of itself. However, ascetic Essenes and other radical interpretations of Judaism have sprouted up periodically. The Essenes, through the biological consequences of their ascetic practices, failed to produce the genes that would have carried on their memes. This interpretation was thus selected against by Jewish sociobiological evolution, especially with the destruction of the Jewish homeland. Similarly, if Christians literally followed the path that Jesus points towards, Christians would be extinct. What Jesus considered Pharisaic hypocrisy is also what explains why Christians have not gone biologically extinct. Jesus's death was the logical fulfillment of the attempt to transcend hypocrisy.

Judaism's contradictions on the issue of family values played out within Judaism in Jesus's time. On one hand, the gospels records crowds of Jews who implicitly took a more Hillelian interpretation of Jesus's ministry. On the other hand, Jews who interpreted Judaism more in accordance with Shammai would have been more likely to persecute Jesus and his followers.

But how could Jesus comprehend what he was being persecuted for? Were his persecutors right? Were his persecutors only trying to protect their people from the

demonic blood of a hereditary rapist? Weren't his persecutors only trying to save their people from the spawn of the demonic Romans who conquered, repressed, persecuted, and killed Jews — and desecrated God's laws?

If judged unflinchingly by the standards of "this world", by the ancient world's normative logic of kinship and the blood, the notion that Jesus inherited the proclivity for rape from his rapist father would have been the most obvious of deductions. Imagine the horror and fear Jesus must have felt in realizing that if "the world" was right, then there was no escape from the stain of his rapist blood. How could he live with the sin of his own existence? How could he escape the judgment of this world? Even worse, how could he conscience the idea of passing on the sin of his existence, and the demonic blood of his father, onto a child as innocent as he had once been? How could he ever know for sure that his desire for sex was not being driven by the rapist demons inside of him?

The only way to fully exorcise these demons within was to attempt to abstain from sex entirely. He could save himself from being viewed as a predatory rapist threat by renouncing all inclinations towards sexuality. The only way to prove that he was not a hereditary rapist was to renounce the inheritance of his biological father in favor of the heavenly, spiritual father.

The *root* of the problem is sexual intercourse; the sin that perpetuates biological existence. Anyone Jesus saw existed because his or her parents had sex, and rape is only an extreme case of the desire for sex. Rape is only a radicalization of the imperialist aggression rooted in the patriarchal structure of the family. *Both* Jews *and* Romans perpetuate the evils of the world by perpetuating their own seed.

The only way he could justify his own existence was to *totally* uproot the sin that perpetuates biological existence. The logical implication of ending the *root* evil of biological procreation is the end of the human world insofar as it is a biological world. The radical body/spirit dualism of Christianity is thus a direct consequence of Jesus's radical repression of a radical bodily interpretation of Jesus as a hereditary rapist.

This systematic repression is almost single-handedly responsible for the radical Christian division between "this world" and "the next world"; the biological world and the postbiological world. It was precisely because Jesus's sense of his own existential sin reached so profoundly to the deepest roots of human existence that this dualism became so profound. But did Jesus simply repress his sex drive, or did he channel it in a different way? It appears that Jesus sublimated his sex drive away from the "love" of gene propagation, and towards the "love" of meme propagation.

In his will to overcome the natural determination of a hereditary rapist, he willed the supernatural alternative of the Kingdom of Heaven. What is it like to take part in the Kingdom of Heaven?

> Birth castrates some
> Owners castrate others
> There are those who castrate themselves for the Kingdom of Heaven[173] (i.e. Matt. 19:10-12a)

Christian love is a radical passive-aggression of the spirit. Whereas genetic insemination requires penetration of biological borders, memeic insemination requires penetration of mental or spiritual borders. Because Jesus's mind-spirit *was* the penetration of the mental-spiritual

borders that separated Jew and Roman, his spiritual ideas could penetrate and inseminate hitherto "natural" borders.

Whereas sexual love leads toward genetic insemination, Christian love leads to memetic insemination. Love is an evolutionary expression of a desire for reproduction and, in this case, the reproduction of the selfish memes of Christian altruism. Jesus overcame the natural determination of being a natural rapist by becoming a supernatural rapist. Christian love is Jesus's gargantuan spiritual penis raping the boundaries of class and race, Jew and gentile, insider and outsider, and master and slave. Jesus's penis of the spirit penetrated *deep inside* until the spiritually violated Roman-ruled world had been loved to death.

All's fair when love is war.

Look at Jesus from an evolutionary perspective. Does it make sense to look at Jesus as a gene-propagating machine? As a Roman-Jewish gene propagating machine in the middle of a Roman/Jewish war, his function as a gene propagating machine became so perverted and conflicted, there was no way to express himself except on a post-genetic level. His undecideability as a gene propagator thus became the foundation of his seditious genius as a meme propagator. Yet in unleashing his inordinately potent meme viruses upon the world, he was an heir of the innovations that constitute the Jewish religion.

The single greatest achievement of Jewish meme propagation is the dissemination of the ultimate "Jewish media", the Bible (including the largely Jewish-authored New Testament). The Hebrew Bible itself is a foundational step from a gene propagating strategy towards a meme propagating strategy. Jesus radicalized the strategy implicit in the Biblical trajectory, mutated ancient Biblical meme-seeds, and spread "the word":

Seed from the sower's hand
Falls sometimes too close to the path
And the birds swarm down and eat it
Falls sometimes where rocks lie hidden
and its shallow roots die in the sun
Falls sometimes on thorns plowed under
And the thorns grow back to choke it

But seeds from the sower's hand
Falls also on soil that is good and yields:
Thirty grains on a stalk
Sixty grains on a stalk
One hundred grains on a stalk[174]

To "be fruitful and multiply" in a genetic sense is to spread genetic seeds. To "be fruitful and multiply" in a memetic sense is to spread memetic seeds. Jesus radicalized the Biblical transition from the genetic seed of sperm to the memetic seed of words. He had an appreciation that spiritual seeds that hit the right spots could multiply like a virus. The memetic epidemic Jesus unleashed is now called Christianity.

Memes of love could penetrate the kin selective borders ruled by the genes. The authors of the Bible grasped that the word can be mightier than the sword, and Jesus's radicalization of the Biblical way became a Trojan horse for the Roman Empire. Against Rome's potent combination of military, economic, political, and ideological power, Jesus and Paul had only the exclusive use of "ideological" power.[175]

Just as his father raped the sociobiological boundaries of Judaism, Jesus raped the spiritual boundaries of Judaism. He raped the spiritual boundaries of Judaism so that they

encompassed the spiritual boundaries of Rome. Yet it was precisely the raping of the spiritual boundaries of Judaism that allowed Jesus's spiritual penis to rape the spiritual boundaries of Roman paganism until the entire empire collapsed into Christianity.

From the point of view of the "selfish gene", physical rape is natural and good in the sense that it can be a successful form of perpetuating genes into the next generation. That is what biological evolution is all about. Jesus's sin was being born in a world ruled by selfish genes. Jesus hoped that in his "supernatural" existence he could bring this world to its end.

The sexual act became evil in Christianity as a universalization of rape as evil. Jesus was born of sin and born a sinner. Jesus was the epitome of the evil of being born in this world. If his biological, material existence in the world was inescapably evil, then only his spiritual existence could be unequivocally good.

The psycho-social foundation of Christianity is the repression of the notion that the sin of rape that passed on to Jesus through his very existence as the product of rape would be inherited by Jesus himself. The repression of this sociobiological foundation of Christianity is the foundation of the break between "this world" ruled by the selfish genes, and the "next world" ruled by God. It was this rupture between sociobiological foundation and the striving for a radical alternative that also helped lay the social foundations of Western modernity. Modernity is a transition from biological evolution to postbiological evolution; a transition from the ancient world ruled by the selfish genes to a world in which biology has been totally overcome.

For billions of years, life on earth evolved through the ability of some genes to replicate themselves better than

other genes. In animals such as humans, sexual reproduction requires sexual intercourse, and hence a strong genetic disposition for sexual desire. In humans, genetic replication, and therefore evolution by natural selection, is dependent on sexual intercourse.

Yet with the advent of humans, new replicators commonly called memes posed potential competition to genes. One astoundingly successful complex cluster of memes called Christianity included the belief that sex is "evil". In evolutionary terms, this implies that genetic self-reproduction is "evil". The self-replication of memes that claim that sex is "evil", however, is good, according to Christian evangelists.

In short, Christianity turned the values of genetic reproduction on its head. Christian memes radically devalue Christian genes. The seditious genius of Christianity — from a purely genetic point of view — is that it radically attacks genetic replication while simultaneously radically maximizing its own memetic self-replication.

The great hereditary aristocracy of Jesus's time was Rome; the Rome that ruled *over* Israel. To honor Rome was to pay homage to the might of Rome, to kneel before the civilization of Rome, and to respect the gods of Rome. It was Christianity that revalued Rome as the most supreme evil, rather than the supreme good. The triumph of Christianity over Rome was equivalent to a pantheon in which the ghost of Jesus ejaculated his spiritual semen in Caesar's face. Rome fell as Romans witnessed Jesus's spiritual semen dangling from Caesar's nose.

CHRISTIAN FAMILY VALUES

Have you hated your mother today?

If Jesus appears rather one sided in his monotheistic apotheosis of love, consider the relatively balanced view of the relationship between love and hate espoused by the Greek philosopher Empedocles.[176] Born approximately twenty years before Socrates and almost five hundred years before Christ on a Greek city in Sicily called Acragas, Empedocles believed that the cosmos exhibits two sources of change that exist in permanent opposition to one another: love and strife. Love attracts dissimilar things to one another, while strife attracts similar things to one another. Love leads towards mixture and miscegenation while strife, humanly characterized by anger and hate, separates and divides. A *somewhat* analogous principle in astrophysics would be gravity, which tends to pull things together and organize matter, and entropy, which works in the opposite direction towards disordered separation and dispersion.

It is commonly believed that Christianity is only about love and not hate. If so, then Christianity would be the antithesis of hate. But how can Christian love have any

meaning if it does not oppose or hate something as "evil". Jesus, like Empedocles, must have hated something. Only some sort of strife could give meaning to his love by being the enemy of love.

If love, according to Empedocles, attracts dissimilar things to one another and leads towards mixture and miscegenation, then Jesus, as a half-Jew-half-Roman, could *be* love as the ultimate product of the miscegenation of dissimilar peoples. If strife separates and divides the world into similar things, then *kinship* and other forces that attract like to like represent the antithesis of love. In Jesus's world, the strife between imperial Rome and conquered Israel exemplified the antithesis of love that Jesus himself represented as a synthesis of Rome and Israel.

Yet traditional Romans loved their families. In fact, they loved their extended families enough to risk their lives in mortal combat. In conquering and exploiting foreign peoples, Roman families would be provided for, aggrandized, and enriched. The virtue of duty that made the Roman way possible required that Romans sacrifice much of their individual interest to the good of their empire. A Roman soldier in battle knew that the moment may come when he must make the ultimate sacrifice for Rome with his very life.

The form of altruism represented by Roman duty is comprehensible through W. D. Hamilton's evolutionary theory of kin selection. Kin selection demonstrates how seemingly altruistic behavior can have an evolutionary basis in the selfishness of genetic fitness (success in passing genes to the next generation). Altruistic behavior that lowers the genetic fitness of an individual can nonetheless help pass on that individual's genes if those altruistic behaviors enhance the genetic fitness of genetic relatives. In this way, the genes

of the altruist can be passed on to the next generation through that individual's relatives. The altruistic behaviors of an individual, in this case, serve the individual altruist's genetic fitness.

Now, one might say, this "altruism" isn't *really* altruistic. That's right. Altruism as it evolved in biological nature *really is not altruistic* in the strict sense of true selflessness, and this is what Jesus exposed. On some level, Jesus of Nazareth recognized what Hamilton's theory of kin selection clarified empirically. Jesus and Darwin could ultimately agree on this point: the "altruism" of the traditional family is fundamentally selfish.

For the Roman soldier and for Jesus, the highest call of virtue was a call to war. Jesus combined the warrior ethos of a Roman soldier with the ethical radicalism of Hebrew prophets in a war against the false altruism of kin selective selfishness common to *both* Jews *and* Romans. And this meant, in practice, a war against the family:

> Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth.
> I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to turn
> a man against his father,
> a daughter against her mother,
> a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law—
> a man's enemies will be the members of his own household.[177]

These famous words, "I did not come to bring peace, but a sword" (i.e. Matt. 10:34-39), have been used to legitimate countless violent, bloodthirsty acts of military aggression for people who have called themselves Christians. Jesus does advocate that one sell robe and buy a sword (Luke 22:35-36, 38), but who, exactly, is the enemy here? Jesus was clearly

taking up arms, so to speak, but the enemy he fought against was the bonds of the common human family. What we have here is what Crossan calls "an almost savage attack on family values" which "happens very, very often".[178]

As the most aggressive peacemongerers know, peace is war by other means. To fight a war against war, one must be a kind of warrior. To wage peace is to fight the power premise of patriarchy that led Jewish fathers to accept the right of Rome's might. Jesus showed how *Jews* are like Romans and how *he* was different from both.

The problem was this: if the father is the embryonic model of a king, and the nuclear family is the nucleus of empire, then how can one criticize the hierarchy of Rome? After all, the kin selective selfishness of the common Jewish family was only an inferior model of what Rome had perfected. Jesus's sword attacked the Jewish family and the Roman Empire in the same breath:

> Brother will betray brother to death, and a father his child; children will rebel against their parents and have them put to death. All men will hate you because of me, but he who stands firm to the end will be saved. When you are persecuted in one place, flee to another. (Matt. 10:21-23)

Nobody loves a homewrecker — except Jesus and his most faithful followers. When true Christian family values are realized, then "children will rebel against their parents and have them put to death". Hadn't Jesus ever heard of the Ten Commandments? Wasn't there one that mentioned something about honoring one's father and mother? Normative Christianity commonly and easily accepts the idea of their faith's break with the Judaism of Moses without realizing that this break was built upon the desecration of

the Mosaic law that commands one to honor one's father and one's mother:

> A follower to Jesus: I must stay to rebury my father
> Jesus to the follower: Let the dead rebury the dead[179] (i.e. Matt. 8:21-22)

This is an outright rejection of traditional obligations to the family and one's ancestors, indifferent or contemptuous towards their honor and respect. There can be no mistake: to follow Jesus and "to accept the Kingdom is to reject your mother and your father…your sisters and brothers"[180] (i.e. Matt. 10:37). To follow Jesus, then, is to embark on a radically untraditional path. In secular terms, we might call this radical "progress"; to not look backwards towards traditional concern with kinship and honor, but forwards toward a radical social vision that rejects kinship, patriarchy, and human hierarchy:

> If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple. (Luke 14:26)

A good Christian should ask himself or herself: have you hated your mother today? Christian love is *not* universal because Jesus specifically preached hatred of the family. Christian love *cannot* be universal if the Christian must "hate…his own life".

Starting with his very own Jewish family in Nazareth, Jesus attacked kin selective altruism, and hence, kin selective selfishness at its very root. Kinship, including the most radical kinship of one's relationship to one's self, must be hated, not incidentally, but necessarily since the identity of the self is interwoven with the kinship community that bore

that self as an extension of it (i.e. as an expression of genetic fitness). Along with the group values of shame and honor that Jesus attacks, self-consistent hatred deracinates the self from the claims and bonds of kinship and its entire world of values.

The question remains: how can one explain Jesus's 'family values' on the basis of kin selection? These are the family values appropriate to a man whose existence was conceived through a father who raped his mother. When the historical circumstances of Jesus's birth are understood, then his radical attack upon normative kin selection can be understood on the basis of kin selection.

It is very much noteworthy that Mark, the first gospel historically, does not even mention Jesus's father, and instead simply calls him "Mary's son" (Mark 6:3). Other gospels name his stepfather as Joseph. Crucially, *even in the traditional Christian story*, Joseph is actually the *stepfather* of Jesus. One can see how the notion that God was Jesus's father provided the perfect cloak for Jesus's illegitimacy since even in that supernatural scenario Joseph is left in the role of stepfather.

The rape of Jesus's Jewish mother by a Roman soldier would have been only one consequence of the Roman rampage of destruction upon the 'hotbed of radicalism' known as the Galilee. The entire local economy would have lay in shambles following Varus's punitive violence. It is likely that Roman soldiers either destroyed or severely damage Joseph's home and livelihood. And on top of all this *collective* punishment upon a man who was probably innocent of any immoderate actions himself, Joseph was forced to contend with the horror and personal humiliation of being impotent to prevent his own wife from being raped by these very same cruel Romans.

Yet the rape itself was only the beginning. Once Jesus was born, Joseph would have to confront the question of his responsibility to the fruits of coercive violence. Was Joseph obligated to reward the Roman who raped his wife by dutifully raising the child of that irresponsible father?

To bring this question down to earth requires, not tradition-based theological speculations, but the science of sociobiology. The normative altruism that parents demonstrate towards their biological children is an example of kin selection. The strength of the altruism between parents and children is thus directly connected to their genetic relatedness. In population genetics, this is called the coefficient of relatedness: the probability that any two individuals share the same genes through genetic inheritance. The coefficient of relatedness between a biological parent its offspring is 0.5; half of the genes of the offspring are inherited from that parent.

What happens, however, in the case of a stepparent; in the case where a parent is put in the position of raising a child not his or her own? Studies by Daly and Wilson showed that children under five years old with one stepparent and one genetic parent were forty times more likely to be victims of child abuse. Such stepchildren were seventy times more likely to be killed by child abuse than families where both parents are genetic parents.[181]

Just as the rape itself has a genetic explanation, it is also likely that Jesus was abused by Joseph. Keep in mind that this prediction would apply just as much to rhesus macaque monkeys as to Jews or Romans. Keep in mind, also, that kinship distance works both ways; child abuse would be predicted no less on the basis of Mary's Jewish ancestry if Jesus were somehow brought up by his biological father among Romans. The basic difference between Jews and

Romans at this time is that no expected Romans to treat non-Romans with ultimate equity.

Joseph himself was likely abused by Romans who smashed revolts in *collective punishment* for resistance to Roman rule. Joseph himself may have paid for the zealous actions of others. Jesus's father was not simply a random foreigner, but a man whose criminal violation of the Jewish people as an enemy soldier was exemplified by the violation of Mary that gave birth to Jesus. The Romans that raped his wife may have also destroyed his home and destroyed his life. So before the stones are cast at Joseph, consider what Jesus and Joseph had in common: both were born in a world dominated by war and conflict not of their own making as individuals. How could Jesus blame him?

Other studies have shown that stepparents give less attention and fewer resources to a stepchild as compared with a genetic child.[182] With this in mind, imagine the dinner table of Jesus's family. Would Jesus be served portions of food and drink greater, lesser, or equal to other members of the family?

Despite the popular image of Mary as a virgin, the New Testament states explicitly that Jesus had brothers and sisters. This would mean that they were half-brothers and half-sisters. As the breadwinner and patriarchal head of the family, Joseph would be able to dictate who gets what. On the basis of kin selection, and traumatic circumstances related to Jesus's birth, it is more than likely that all of his half-brothers and half-sisters would have been served equal or appropriate food portions, while Jesus would have been served a noticeably meager portion commensurate with his inferior status in Joseph's family. Kin selection would also predict that Jesus would have been treated with less altruism

and more hostility by his half-siblings than they would demonstrate among one another.

Kin selection also predicts that Jesus himself would treat his half-family with more hostility. If so, did Jesus react to his family with more love or with more hate? Jesus's preaching of hatred against the family is evidence that Jesus reacted, not with more love, but with *more hate*. "Brother will betray brother to death, and a father his child; children will rebel against their parents and have them put to death." Jesus's hatred for the family is *homicidal*. Yet his vision of a father betraying his child may be traceable to a sense that Joseph, his patriarchal stepfather, had betrayed him. An eye for eye. It was perfectly logical for his own family members to think, "He has gone out of his mind." (Mark 3:21).[183] From the perspective of normative, kin selective family values, what Jesus proscribed was perfect insanity.

But did the children of Nazareth make the young Jesus a scapegoat for the devastation that Rome inflicted upon them? If he sought sanctuary with his father and his family, did they take the side of the local bullies? Did his family tell Jesus that he must have done something wrong for the children to have avenged themselves upon him so? Did Jesus see in his stepfather Joseph a patriarchal punisher worse than patriarchal Rome?

Jesus was abandoned by *both* his biological Roman father *and* his Jewish stepfather. Is it surprising that Jesus, in turn, abandoned *all* patriarchs on earth? Jesus told his followers: "call no one your father on earth, for you have one Father—the one in heaven" (Matt. 23:9).

Crossan's work on the historical Jesus especially emphasized the import of shared eating without discrimination as a key to the character of his Kingdom movement. It is not hard to see how this would emerge in

direct reaction to systematic discrimination wherein genetic relatives received most and Jesus received least. Moreover, the systematic nature of this discrimination implied a fixed perpetual hierarchy based on kinship relationships, not deeds.

Imagine that Jesus persistently attempted to be prove his worth with morally superior deeds — just so he could be counted as a equal to his siblings or other members of the community. Yet no matter how rigorously he attempted to follow the law, he could not redress his inferior status within the family. If *deeds* could not redress his treatment as an inferior, what was he left with except for *faith*?

Jewish kosher purity laws, as related to communal eating, have the affect of separating Jew from gentile, not necessarily in principle, but in practice. If one of Jesus's *own half-siblings* questioned his purity within the family, what kind of questions does this raise about the value of these purity laws? Can one imagine Jesus retorting:

> It is not what goes into the mouth that defiles a person,
> but it is what comes out of the mouth that defiles. (Matt. 15:10-11)

The notion that Jesus was born impure cannot be explained only in terms of xenophobia, even when it was assumed that his biological father was a member of the hated Roman oppressors. Original familial or communal accusations of the impurity of Jesus's birth were probably inseparable from the accusation that his mother was a whore.

Joseph, after all, would have been considered a cuckold; a married man with an adulterous wife. But can rape, an involuntary act on the part of the woman, be considered adultery? One study found that woman who had

experienced penile-vaginal intercourse rape not only suffered post-traumatic stress syndrome, but did so with a frequency higher than victims of burglary, robbery, assault, or any other crime against women.[184] Given the extreme trauma associated with rape and its hostile social consequences, it is likely that Mary refused to admit that she was raped, even to herself. It is possible, and even probable, that Mary herself invented the miraculous "son of God" story to cope with the fact of Jesus — and to save him from the hostility of others.

"Prophets are not without honor," said the Jesus of Mark 6:4, "except in their own hometown, and among their own kin, and in their own house." It seems that those closest to Jesus, especially his extended family and members of his hometown, were the least likely to believe his supernatural claims. Given the fact of Jesus's birth, the devastating memory of Roman crackdown, and Mary's probable denial of a realistic explanation for his birth through rape, it is quite likely that Mary was hounded by a reputation for being a whore simply for fathering Jesus by a man other than her husband. Mary's whore status would have been less individual, and more symbolic of the Roman violation of the purity of God's "chosen people".

In the New Testament, Mary has precisely the opposite reputation; she is the archetypal virginal mother. Coincidentally, however, the woman who does have the distinct reputation for being a whore is also named Mary: Mary Magdalene. Is this a coincidence?

Both Mary and Mary Magdalene are counted present at the crucifixion. Could these characters have originated as a single historical person? Just as the paternity of Jesus was dealt with by separating the extreme disgrace of rape with the radical grace of God, Jesus's mother was handled with a

parallel method. The maternity of Jesus was dealt with by separating the extreme disgrace of rape from the extreme grace of virginity.

Just as God and rapist are held as diametrical opposites, virgin and whore are parallel diametrical opposites. Mary and Mary Magdalene probably originated as the same person, Jesus's mother Mary, but the separation of "Mary" into two distinct, opposite personalities was necessary so that the reputation for being a whore did not hound her into history and disgrace the new religion. Jesus's mother could be virgin, and not a whore, if Jesus's father was God, and not a rapist. In order to redefine Mary as a virgin mother, the whore association had to be separated and displaced onto a separate person; a *different* Mary: Mary Magdalene. This means that Mary, Jesus's mother, was *not* a prostitute, but she was haunted by the reputation for being a whore simply for fathering Jesus by a Roman. From the very beginning, the children of Jesus's neighborhood probably taunted him as the son of a whore. If Jesus could not escape this bodily interpretation, he could have faith in a diametrically opposite spiritual interpretation as the son of God. This is a sociobiological basis of the radical body/spirit dualism of Christianity.

From an evolutionary perspective, the key characteristic of rape is that it allows a male to circumvent female choice in a mate.[185] It is noteworthy that even from the view of the traditional virgin birth story, God circumvented Mary's ability to choose a mate. This means that even Mary's supposed virgin birth could be viewed as a form of divine rape. The parallel circumstances of supernatural pregnancy through God and supra-normal pregnancy through rape help illustrate how the virgin birth story emerged as the eminently logical candidate for cover-up. The social

necessity of purging the radical disgrace of rape found its perfect solution in the purity of the radical grace of God.

Assuming that Mary was married to Joseph when the rape occurred, Mary's social reputation as a whore for copulating with the Roman enemy may help explain Jesus's seemingly random attention to the subject of divorce and adultery. While the gospel of Matthew (5:32) makes an exception for unchastity, Mark (10:11), historically the first gospel, does not make an exception for unchastity: "Whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery against her". Did Joseph divorce or attempt to divorce Mary? Was Jesus saying, 'it was not my mother who committed adultery, it is *you* that sanction adultery'?

Rape occurs when a man physically (i.e. *politically*) overcomes the resistance of a woman by force. Rape symbolized the principles of the entire Roman imperial order and political patriarchy in general. If the rape of his mother by his father was right, then the patriarchal family was right. If the rape of his mother by his father was wrong, then the patriarchal family was wrong.

But if rape and adultery was wrong, then Jesus's very bodily *existence* was wrong. The question here is whether Jesus inherited his father's sin of rape since that sin was the very act that produced him. It would seem that Jesus had to have the power to forgive sins if only to find a way to live with *himself*.

How, then, can Jesus's anti-family values be explained on the basis of kin selection? If Jesus's half-Jewish side could view his half-Roman side as his own half-enemy (and vice versa) then, on some level, to "love your enemy" was a form of self-love. Jesus intuitively and experientially recognized that the altruism of the family is actually based on kinship-based selfishness. By the very same token, there was an

inversely selfish logic to Jesus's apparent altruism. For Jesus to survive the potentially lethal child abuse that kin selection predicts, the bonds of altruism had to go beyond the bonds of kinship altruism to embrace, not only the stranger, but even the enemy.

If Jesus was half-Jewish and half-Roman, then his biological family was…a war zone. Jesus tearing the family apart reflects the war zone between Jew and Roman. That war zone between Jew and Roman was the home of Jesus's natural family. By attacking kin selective family values, Jesus attacked what both Jews and Romans had in common that was simultaneously a source of the conflict between Jews and Romans. By attacking kin selective family values he attacked, not only Jews and Romans, but the entire biological human race. Jesus's hatred of the family was the sociobiological basis of the switch from a gene propagation strategy to a meme propagation strategy that conquered the Roman world as Christianity.

For Jews or Romans to live as politically entities in a world of war, internal peace was necessary to wage external war. "Love your neighbor" referred primarily to the love of internal peace necessary to wage external war. Universaling "love your neighbor" could potentially amounted only to universalizing Judaic ethnocentrism.

While "love your neighbor" could potentially promote internal peace for external war, Jesus preached "love your enemy"; internal war for external peace; war within the family for peace between families. To love your enemy is to love external peace; peace at the boundaries between Rome and Israel; peace within Jesus himself. Jesus *was* the boundary between Rome and Israel. For there to be external peace between Rome and Israel, there had to be internal war

within both Rome and Israel: hatred of the family and even hatred of one's neighbor:

> You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you (Matt. 5:43-44)

This reveals an internal logic to loving your enemies. By taking the normative command to 'love your neighbor and hate your enemy' and turning its head, it follows that one should not only 'love your enemies', but one should also *hate your neighbor*. The Old Testament injunction, "You shall not hate in your heart anyone of your kin…but you shall love your neighbor as yourself", (Lev. 19:17-18) could not help Jesus or other lost sheep of Israel. To love your enemies is thus only another implication of the inversion of kin selection: to treat strangers as if they were kin and to treat kin as if they were strangers.

Jesus's own logic emphasized what Jews and Romans had in common: "if you greet only your brothers and sisters, what more are you doing than others? Do not even the Gentiles do the same?" (Matt. 5:47-48). If you only love your neighbor, you are hardly distinguished from gentiles. Loving enemies made Jesus and his followers different from both Jews and Romans. Yet if "a man's enemies will be the members of his own household",[186] (Matt. 10:36) then "love your enemies" cannot be a *universal* principle of Christianity. Jesus does believing in hating *certain* enemies: the family is enemy. Hating your neighbor, when taken to its *root*, is hating the family and tearing the family apart. This is what Jesus recommends. (For the sake clarity, the notion of "neighbor" can be a rather ambiguous domain between family and enemy. A neighbor can be anyone one lives near,

whether poor or rich, whether relative or foreigner. For this reason, "neighbor" cannot be the *total* opposite of enemy in the way that friend and family tend to be. Jesus does praise loving your neighbor, but the *emphasis* of its meaning for Jesus tends to be the opposite of the family.)

The universal implications of Moses's example were present right from the beginning. The Bible describes a Moses that defended, not only Egyptian versus Jew, and Jew versus Jew, but also Egyptian versus Egyptian. Otherwise, how can one complain or feel moral indignation if one's condition is based purely on powerhood and peoplehood.

Mosaic law commands not only, "You shall not abhor an Egyptian, for you were a stranger in his land" (Exodus 23:8), but furthermore, "You too must love the stranger" (Deut. 10:19). Mosaic law commands Jews to love strangers *because* Jews were once strangers in Egypt. Consistency in principle implicated a universal law: "There shall be one law for the native and for the stranger who resides in your midst" (Exodus 21:49).

Yet if one identifies one's nation with the downtrodden, then redeeming the downtrodden of all nations is almost a form of nationalism. Jesus's existence broke comfortable Jewish national identification with the unjustly downtrodden, and challenged Jews to live up to Mosaic principles. There was no single "Jewish" response to Jesus: some Jews made an exception to ethics in the case of Jesus, while other Jews, i.e. his followers and disciples, treated Jesus with exceptional ethics.

It is very easy to view Jesus, especially among Christians, as a Roman, rather than as a half-Roman/half-Jew. This tendency could be considered a failure of *empathy* for Jesus, often through simple ethnocentrism. It is like making an exception for Jesus among all Jews, rather than recognizing

the fusion of *both* of his sides as part of what made him exceptional among *both* Jews *and* gentiles.

There is a strain of Jewish values that identify with the stranger on many levels. One way of looking at the Jewish kinship paradox is that, in dividing against themselves, Jews become alien to themselves. The dissident is in some way dividing against his own kin. The dissident is therefore, in some paradoxical way, a kinship-characteristic stranger to his own kin. In this way, Jewish dissidence is related to a hallmark of Jewish values, Jewish identification with the stranger: "You shall love the alien as yourself" (Lev. 19:34).

It is easy to overlook how Jesus's moral attack on his own people was one of the most characteristically Jewish of all his traits. Jesus recognized this in the prophets. The *Jewish* kinship paradox *within Jesus himself* spawned the extreme "internationalism" and disfavoritism towards one's own characteristic of the unchosen.

While Rome's pagan religion cultivated mastery of the orphan and stranger, Mosaic religion cultivated love of the orphan and stranger. So while Mosaic law commands a family based love, it also commands the love of strangers. But did the Jews he knew really *believe* Moses when he commanded them to love the stranger? If Jesus is judged on a spiritual level, then the problem is cured. But if Jews do not follow that law, then should Jesus follow the law?

Could it be that Jesus means literally what he says about hating the family? This may be disturbing for many Christians, but just consider the possibility that *Jesus was not lying and meant exactly what he said*. Some Christians will uphold faith that Jesus walked on water, yet disbelieve that Jesus is honest enough to mean exactly what he says about ripping the family apart. Yet no fabrications of symbolic or unliteral interpretations are required. Simple honesty

towards the message that sits right in front of one's face is all that is necessary. It is my conclusion, that in the case of these teachings about the family, found in variation in all four gospels, and judged by Crossan to be historically valid, Jesus was not lying.

The greatest empire of the ancient Western world was not founded on the principle of "free love". Rome was founded on notions of duty and obligation — selfish altruism — that led to one of the most colossal systems of imperial exploitation that the world has ever known. Jesus's attacks on the family are built on his own intuitive but sharp insights into this selfish altruism that is now known as kin selection.

Without accounting for Jesus's hatred of the family one, very simply, cannot understand Christianity. Jesus did *not* preach a superficial doctrine of "universal love" but, rather, a hatred of selfishness so total that it attacked the selfish love of father and mother, and sister and brother. The "universalism" of Christianity is built upon a refutation of the "universalism" of the values of the common, patriarchal family. Pure, literal individual egoism is, in its implications, the negation of subordination to kinship logic, and "altruism" against the egoism of the family was the supreme individual egoism of Jesus as the negation of subordination to familial altruism.

Christianity is a distinctive source of the implicit Western *modern* valuation that kin selective altruism is ultimately *evil*. Hatred of kin selective altruism is the *foundation* of the distinctly Christian form of altruism that systematically negates those kinship roots. Jesus's love of the stranger is *founded* upon "Christian" hatred of the family. It is from *this* attack on family values that a distinctively Christian life

follows. The traditional negation of Christianity's roots in Jewish sociobiology is only an extension of this interior logic.

The demolition of the family is the deepest, most profound *human* foundation of Jesus's moral innovation. Without this thorough attack on the family, the purity of Jesus's vision of *the* end slips back into Judaism's honoring of father and mother on the path *to* the end. But *with* this overcoming of the family, Jesus's vision was consummated and Christianity was born.

What Jesus's spiritual seed gave birth to was a vision of the death of "the world". As a Jew he hated his Roman half and as a Roman he hated his Jewish half. He hated himself as an embodiment of the hatred of the world, the world he wished to bring to its death through love. He hated himself in "this world" for being the perfect human embodiment, through his utterly maculate conception, of the injustice of the world.

Some Are More Equal than Others in God's Kingdom

In the ancient world, it would have been considered natural that Rome rule in victory, and Jews be oppressed in defeat. It also would have been considered natural that Jews claim their status as God's chosen people, and rebel against Rome's usurpation of God's rule. Is this was Jesus did? Was he simply more radical than others in his rebellion against Rome?

In the classical revolutionary paradigm, Romans arrogate on top, Jews suffer at the bottom, and the latter wields a moral indictment to incriminate the evil imperialists in the eyes of God. The existence of a rape in the Galilee, however,

presented the world with something very different. In the person of Jesus, to the extent of his half-Roman ancestry, the Roman now suffered at the bottom. To the extent of Jesus's half-Jewish ancestry, the Pharisees were like Romans who arrogated on top. The tables had been turned.

Jesus fomented, not a classical spiritual revolution against Rome, but a revolution from below the revolution turned the world of Rome upside down by extension of turning the world of the Pharisees upside down. Jesus, in other words, judged the Jews judging Rome. Every Jewish criticism of Rome, when judged by the way he was treated, became grounds for radicalizing beyond Judaism. How will the Jews, amidst their own struggle against Roman oppression, treat a half-Roman Jewish orphan abandoned and socially helpless in a violent world?

In the classical conservative paradigm of this ancient world, to be of pure Roman blood was to be first in the world. To be of part-Roman blood in Roman occupied Israel, however, was to be last in the world. The very existence of Jesus demonstrated that the meaning of Roman ancestry was utterly relative.

Intuitive realization of this racial relativism left Jesus with a profound lack of faith in "this world". The extent to which Jesus lost faith in "this world" is the extent to which he could be called a *nihilist*. Jesus could not *believe* in a Judaism that defined itself as anti-Romanism because he saw something of the same anti-Romanism directed against himself. In this way, pity for himself at the bottom simultaneously provoked empathy with Caesar at the top. Yet as a half-Jew, his hatred of Caesar at the top could only be quenched if Caesar took Jesus's place at the bottom. Out of hatred for the entire world, Jesus turned the entire world upside down.

One of the most famous radicalism of the New Testament is Jesus's prophecy that the "the last will be first, and the first will be last"[187] (i.e. Matt. 20:16). In his world, Caesar was first and Jesus was last. Jesus put his faith in a world in which he, Jesus himself, would be first and Caesar would be last. In God's Kingdom, he believed, *both* Rome *and* the Pharisees would have their worlds turned upside down.

This was not pure altruism; this was the spiritual logic of Jewish moralism radicalized to usurp the authority of *both* Rome *and* the Pharisees. The unique 'justice' of his authority arose from *being* both Roman and Jew. It is also inescapable that Jesus believed that he was closer to God in that crisis of Roman occupation because he embodied a more God-like, impartial perspective beyond the partial perspectives of both Jews and Romans.

This does not mean, however, that one can assume that Jesus, the exorcist of demons, possessed an entirely more impartial perspective than his contemporaries did. According to the Gospel of Matthew:

> Then they brought to him a demoniac who was blind and mute; and he cured him, so that the one who had been mute could speak and see. All the crowds were amazed and said, "Can this be the Son of David?" But when the Pharisees heard it, they said, "It is only by Beelzebul, the ruler of demons, that this fellow casts out the demons." He knew what they were thinking and said to them, "Every kingdom divided against itself is laid waste, and no city or house divided against itself will stand." (Matt. 12:22-25)

Jesus "knew what they were thinking". But what were they thinking? Were they thinking that Jesus was a freak cursed by his demonic, evil, Roman, rapist blood? Were they

thinking that he was trying to cure others of the demons that he himself possessed?

There was, as Crossan pointed out, a symbolic psycho-social relationship between Jesus's exorcism of demons and the colonial oppression of the Romans. Mark 5:1-17 portrays the story of Jesus exorcising a demon that calls itself "Legion"; the symbol of Roman power. The exorcised spirits, in this story, were cast onto swine, the most impure of animals in Judaism, and then cast into the sea. Crossan considers this "individuated symbolic revolution".[188] In this way, a vision of revolution against Rome could be internalized as the expulsion of the demon of a Roman legion.

Did not those Legions possess and penetrate his mother with their demonic seed?

The crowd raised the *question* of Jesus's ancestry: "Can this be the son of David?" There would no need to argue that the Messiah does not need to be a son of David (Mark 12:35-37) if it were not clear that he could not claim this ancestry. (The Bethlehem birth story in Matthew and Luke was very likely fabricated to help support the fabrication of a Davidic ancestry.) The obsessive refrains of the "son of Man" and the "son of God" comes out of a dialectical argument wherein *doubts* about Jesus's status as a Jew lead to increasingly radical counterarguments for the primacy of *faith* in his status as a child of God.

Jesus answered that he was *not* a house divided between Judaism and Romanism; God and Satan. The question of the "house divided" was answered in his affirmation that, through the "Spirit of God", he was undivided in his devotion to the Kingdom of God over the Kingdom of Satan:

> If Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself; how then will his kingdom stand?...But if it is by the Spirit of God that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come to you. Or how can one enter a strong man's house and plunder his property, without first tying up the strong man? Then indeed the house can be plundered. Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters. (Matt. 12:26-30)

Did Jesus become an "expert" in exorcism through a search for answers against the accusation that he himself was possessed by demons (inherited from his Roman rapist father)? Did he command the "unclean spirits" within himself with the power of faith? Was Jesus subtly conveying the idea that he tied up the Roman demons within himself and plundered their 'property'? Is this how he attempted to prove that he was truly on the side of the God of Abraham and not on the side of the Roman enemy in a spiritual sense? After all, if there was serious doubt about which side Jesus was on, how could the Nazarene expect anything different? What did Jesus expect the Jews to do, *love their enemies*?

Jesus was weak. He was weak in a strictly political sense. Look at Jesus from a totally political perspective. Whose side was he on? Was he on the side of Israel or on the side of Rome? Who was friend and who was enemy for a man born half-Jewish and half-Roman in the middle of a Roman/Jewish war? If the political rests on the distinction between friend and enemy, then Jesus's politics had to be beyond the politics of his world.

From this perspective, it becomes clear why there existed no middle or moderate ground for Jesus. Jesus was compelled to be radical because the attempt to live upon a precarious middle ground would leave him a "house divided"; a potential spiritual or political fifth column of the

'evil empire' of Rome. In the context of polarized resistance to Rome, Jesus's very *being* straddled across a spiritual no man's land. Christianity's radicalism was born of the need to overcome the condition of being "house divided", and emerge unambiguously on the side of God. "You cannot, at the same time, serve two masters"[189] (i.e. *Gospel of Thomas* 47:2), and this is what compelled Jesus's end-time logic. If there was no middle ground, then what was true for Jesus was inevitably true for anyone who attempted to follow him: "Whoever is not with me is against me". It was the Pharisees, he implied, and not him, that were sitting on the fence with their unending doubt in his goodness.

Jesus found wholeness against claims that he was a house divided in the vision of a singular Kingdom of God. Against the claim that he was the son of a demon or the son of Satan, he countered that he was the son of God. Against the claim that he was an illegitimate child, Jesus countered that the Pharisees were illegitimate children. He turned the Pharisaic claim that he was house divided around into the claim that *Jews* are a house divided: part material, part spiritual.

The spiritual totalitarianism of the Kingdom of God was compelled out of radicalization of the spirit of the law. And who could fulfill the law in this way except the hoped-for-messiah? In this way, Jesus's radical messianic claims were compelled against accusations, reservations, or presumptions that only half-measures could be expected of a half-Jew. After all, why did Jesus not join unambiguously on the side of revolution against Rome? *Doubt* arising from the inherent ambiguity of his case, compelled Jesus's need for *faith* in him. His willingness to die on the cross was the ultimate proof of his unwillingness to compromise with the ways of "the world".

Mary Magdalene is described as one "out of whom went seven demons" (Luke 8:1-3). Now if Mary Magdalene was historically identical to Jesus's mother Mary; a literary identity meant to purify the identity of Jesus's mother by expelling her whore identity onto a separate character, then this means that Jesus may have performed an exorcism on his own mother. The reason would be plain enough: the source of her impurity and whore identity was the physical penetration of her body as possessed by "demonic" Roman legions. The exorcism would have amounted to the attempt to expunge the "unclean spirits" of the rapist(s) from her body (exorcising the unclean spirits of a whore identity from Mary onto the invented character of Mary Magdalene was how this exorcism was effected in the Christian canon). This faith healing through love may have been the paradigm for future faith healings.

Jesus's Roman, rapist blood was probably considered impure like a *biological* disease. If his blood was "unpurifiable" on a bodily level, his purity could only be purely spiritual. For this reason, when he attempted to heal the sick or exorcise demons, its meaning was almost certainly spiritual and not biological. This is the plane Jesus had to live on to transcend the sin of his biological existence through rape. Yet if Jesus "knew" the demons (Mark 1:32-34), how could he cure himself of them? It seems he turned his demonic energy towards service to God, and this compelled his striking sense of mission.

Jesus was socially outside the pale of exclusionary Roman aristocracy, and socially outside the pale of the temple elite who sat in Moses's seat. At the margins of both Rome and Israel, he was socially marginalized beyond both extremes. By the rules of his world, he should be dead. His entire

standpoint is that of one pushed towards social death outside of human society.

If rape was fairly widespread during the violent Roman repression of Jewish revolts around 4 BCE, then it is very likely that Jesus was not the only child born of rape at that time. It is quite likely that many half-Roman/half-Jewish children were born around the same time as Jesus in the greater area in which he grew up. These were the lost sheep of Israel.

There is no reason to think that half-Jewish/half-Roman descent, in itself, produces someone like Jesus. The personalities of such half-breeds would have been as varied as any other population. It may be the case that Jesus became *Jesus*, in part, because his Jewish family rejected him while other half-Jew/half-Romans were accepted by their families. The half-Jews/half-Romans who were products of rape, and yet were accepted in love by their Jewish families, are the ones lost to history because their lives may have been *relatively* normal. Yet it also may be the case that Jesus's family life was not exceptionally harsh among Jewish children who were fathered by Roman rapists and he was exceptional among them primarily in prophetic consciousness of his predicament.

Jesus's message was profoundly social because it was not just about him. While some of these children of rape probably became outcasts, others probably found a home among families who accepted them. It was the outcasts, however, that Jesus may have deliberately sought out among the Jewish population. While anyone born of a Jewish mother is considered Jewish by Mosaic law, Jesus's message was originally only for "the lost sheep of the House of Israel":

> If a shepherd has a hundred sheep, and one of them has gone astray, does he not leave the ninety-nine on the mountains and go in search of the one that went astray? And if he finds it, truly I tell you, he rejoices over it more than over the ninety-nine that never went astray. (Matt 18:12-13)

This demonstrates a clear favoritism on Jesus's part, for "lost sheep" over the majority of his followers. Jesus's mission may have begun by going around to lands out of Nazareth in search of others like himself; other outcasts born of rape. Perhaps some of his core disciples were other half-Jew/half-Romans. If so, then Jesus cannot have been consistently against kin selection in practice because this favoritism for "lost sheep" over the Jewish majority itself may have had a root in kin selective altruism.

This means, not that Jesus had any clear prejudice against those unlike himself; his disciples clearly included full ancestral Jews and possibly anyone else marginalized for whatever reasons. Jesus's values, however, were generalizations born of the situation he found himself. That Jesus deliberately sought those beyond the social borders of mainstream Judaism is a root of Christianity's transgression of the theological borders of Judaism.

The marginal figures Jesus attracted probably began with outcast half-Roman Jews and generalized to the blind, the sick, the homeless, tax collectors, Samaritans, etc. The Samaritans were an ethnic and religious minority group outside of normative Judaism whose Jewish ancestral claims were disputed in the Talmud. They offer a perfect illustration of how the social conditions of outcast half-Jews were generalized to another roughly analogous social group. Contrasting the behavior of a despised but good Samaritan with the behavior of Pharisees following the law was a

perfect parallel to attitudes towards a despised but virtuous member of Jesus's band of outcasts.

Jesus was a pariah of a pariah people. *This* is the logical standing place of Christianity within Judaism. Christianity is like the Judaism of Judaism. Jesus the half-Jew/half-Roman, caught up in the maelstrom of Jewish/Roman war, was something new that could not be fit into the old wineskins of Judaism. He became the vanguard of a new "chosen people" that came to be called Christians.

Jesus imagined a Kingdom where the first will be last, the last will be first, the somebodies will nobodies, the rulers will be servants, the commanders will be slaves[190] (i.e. Matt 18:1,4), and the destitute king (Matt. 19:30). How would such a world really work?

Jesus ate with whores. Love is desire and universalizing love makes the undesirables desirable. Boundless love could make conceivable a world where the "last will be first, and the first will be last" (Matt. 20:16); the omega alpha and the alpha omega. The difference between Caesar and Christ is the difference between what I call the alpha altruism of Roman virtue and the omega altruism of Christian virtue. If duty to Rome pointed altruism upwards on the human social hierarchy, Christian omega altruism ensured a God given license to direct altruism towards the very bottom of that social hierarchy.

Caesar and Christ are opposites, yet mirrors of one another. This is no accident. The inordinate alpha altruism of a Roman soldier, subverted by Jesus's Jewish side, became the inordinate omega altruism of Christian love. The Jewish *spirit* that inverted Pharaoh's pyramid hierarchy so that Hebrew slaves ranked on top was turned against mainstream Judaism itself. Yet in directing omega altruism towards the bottom, he directed altruism towards himself as

an inverse Caesar — a Caesar vulnerable to his own overthrow.

"The Lord maketh the earth…waste, and turneth it upside down…The Lord shall punish the host of the high ones…and the kings of the earth upon the earth" (Isaiah 24:20-21). The Kingdom of God prescribes a radical fulfillment of the belief, "The Lord preserveth the strangers; he relieveth the fatherless and the widow: but the way of the wicked he turneth upside down" (Psalm 146, 9). If Jesus was, in some ambiguous way, a stranger or a fatherless orphan, this meant that he was of special concern to God. Jesus exacerbated his outcast status as to become the most privileged of all and king of all.

If "[t]he mighty will be brought down" and "[t]he lowly raised up"[191] (i.e. Matt.23:12), then, in literal terms, this upheaval might culminate in what "modern" people would call equality. Yet a mere redress or simple compensation would not begin to address the radical, systematic inequalities of a world exemplified by Rome's quest for world domination. To equal radical inequality, "equality" demands the radically unequal.

Just as a king gets inordinate, unequal, and preferential treatment from subordinates who serve him, so would the sinners, the destitute, and the hapless stranger over the ordinary mass of people. A modern analogy would be something like affirmative action except far more radical: systematic, preferential discrimination and privilege for those without a bourgeois work ethic or any other conventional claim to merit whatsoever. Like the prodigal son[192] (i.e. Luke 15:11-32) who receives preferential, and by egalitarian standards, unjust treatment over his brother who did no wrong, the virtuous ones were the ones that trashed

the corruption of Roman-Jewish collaboration with the counter-corruption of moral leaven.

The Kingdom of God is the fruition of the deepest and most serious belief that with God all things are possible. To take God's Kingdom seriously was only another way of way of affirming one's faith that God was the master and creator of the universe. If God was the author of nature, the creator and inventor of its rules, he could change those rules at will. This is what it means to be master of the universe. This is why the presence of God is said to be demonstrated through miracles. The Kingdom of God is simply the masterpiece of all miracles, where God takes his reign, the hallmark of which is his demonstration of mastery over the nature of reality itself.

GOOD NEWS! THE TROJAN HORSE IS HERE!

And we bring you the good news that what God promised to our ancestors he has fulfilled for us, their children, by raising Jesus…

—ACTS 13:32-33

Christian Altruism: The Selfish Meme

What is hate? Why are so many people prejudiced against hate? It is often believed that hate is hateful and should be hated. It is often some of the very same people who also believe that intolerance is intolerable and should not be tolerated. Well then, instead of making a virtue of hypocrisy,

let us something different: let us actually try to *understand* hate.

My subject here is not all varieties of hate, but rather, the kind of hate associated with racism or xenophobia. The roots of this form of hate can be discerned in its original evolutionary function as a genetic adaptation. Racism, xenophobia, and other hate feelings may be the product of an immunological response of a kin selective social body. From this sociobiological perspective, the love mechanism of Christianity functions as an inhibitor of the sociobiological-body immune response of hate towards strangers.

If xenophobic hate is like a sociobiological immune response to foreign bodies such as strangers, Christian memes dismantle the capacity for resistance to foreign social bodies by dismantling the capacity for hate. Christianity meme-viruses are comparable to the HIV virus that causes AIDS in that the religion, like HIV, specifically attacks the immune system. In attacking the immune system of a kin selective body, Christian meme-viruses spread as a "religion" with effects that are comparable to AIDS. What kills the AIDS victim in the end is usually not the HIV virus itself, but rather, opportunistic diseases that exploit the reduced capacity for immunological resistance by the victim.

To follow Jesus's dictate to hate the family means that the Christian must *hate kin selection* in principle or "spirit". Kin selection posits a genetic basis for altruism and this means that immunosociobiological reactions such as xenophobia may often be the unconscious expression of genes. Just as one is generally unaware of the working of the genes responsible for the beating of one's heart, the pagan Roman who inclined towards family favoritism through hatred of outsiders was in most cases acting more unconsciously than conscientiously.

The etymological relationship between conscience and consciousness is significant here, for Christianity conscience works through an emphasis on *awareness* of one's moral behavior while pagan naturalism generally not aspire to such extreme inhibitions of natural inclinations toward kin selective behavior. However, when one does attempt to think about one's behavior and bring unconscious inclinations towards the light of consciousness, the radical standard of Christian self-immolation in altruism presents a unique perplexity. On one hand, altruism, *in itself*, would seem to be the very negation of any self-interest. On the other hand, common kin selective selfish altruism towards mother, father, sister, and brother appear not only self-contradictory in relation to the Christian standard, but also highly provincial and limited in their aspirations.

If the greatest virtue of a Roman is embodied in duty to Rome, and the greatest realization of duty is self-sacrifice, then on the level of abstract thought, self-sacrifice is the highest virtue. Yet Roman duty is inherently unable to compete with Jesus's idealization of altruism *in itself*. Jesus's radicalization of altruism lays bare the selfish motivations of empire, and refutes its claims to own the 'common good'. If Jesus himself was half-Roman, his emphasis on a standard of decisive superiority to Roman duty may have been reconciliation with himself as a half-Jew. The internal struggle between the two opposite extremes of his Jewish self and his Roman self may have wrought an identity with "selflessness" in itself.

Think of Christian selflessness and altruism as memes attempting to propagate themselves. As a supreme *ideal* of selflessness on the level of abstract thought — on the level of the meme — the Christian standard of altruism is inherently superior to any notion of duty to the worldly powers of the

family or the state. The entire creed complex of Christianity capitalizes on the fact that *as an ideal* of altruism it is superior, and this, in turn, reinforces this meme complex's ability to point to its own superiority and justify, perpetuated, and expand its own selfishness as a purely cultural meme phenomenon. The superior standard of Christian altruism legitimates its memetic selfishness in the form of legitimating its own self-replication or imperial perpetuation.

Taking the *self* of altruism; the self-seeking selfishness of altruism-in-itself to its logical extreme necessarily sabotages its original *biological* evolutionary *raison d'être*. Total altruistic negation of the logic of the selfish gene leads to total bodily selflessness, total powerlessness, and an ethic of genetic self-destruction. The most universalistic altruism would be the genetic suicide of all humanity. Christian altruism can be looked upon as the survival strategy of Christian memes that are waging an evolutionary war against the genes of the believing Christian.

Now, one might say, this "altruism" of Christian memes isn't *really* altruistic. That's right. Altruism as it evolved in meme culture *really is not altruistic* in the strict sense of true selflessness, and this is what sociobiology exposed. Like the selfish selflessness of kin selection, the selfish selflessness of Christian memes thrives in apparent paradox.

Christianity possesses an inherent memetic genius at spreading itself across the earth because it is strategically designed to simultaneously exploit and subvert kin selective altruism. It exploits altruism by seducing many of those with the most highly developed valuation of altruism evolved through genetic adaptation. It subverts this kin selective altruism by uprooting its behavioral expressions *against* its original basis in genetic adaptation. The notion of God the

father, for example, leeches parasitically upon a classical model of patriarchy while deracinating its genetically adaptive origins.

The conflict here is natural kin selection versus Christian stranger selection; a more pagan discriminate love versus Christian indiscriminate love. The secret of the "universalism" of Christianity, then, is this countering of kin selection that promotes the reversal of the social mechanisms of inclusive genetic fitness. More specifically, Christianity works by reversing the normative kin selective prioritization between kinship and altruism. If kin selective behaviors are those that effectively subordinate altruism to kinship, then Jesus's anti-kin selective behaviors are those that subordinate kinship to altruism. If normative kin selection depends on altruism as a *means* of genes, then the ethics of Jesus reverse this relationship, demanding that genes become the means and servants of altruistic ends. There is an unmistakable conflict of interests between genes and memes here, and in this conflict, Jesus is unmistakable on the side of the God memes.

According to Mark 3:31-35, Jesus asked:

> 'Who are my mothers and brothers?' And looking at those who sat around him, he said, 'Here are my mothers and my brothers! Whoever does the will of God is my brother and sister and mother.'

To follow Jesus is to obey God over one's genes; to obey these Jesus memes over one's mother and father. The patriarchal family is correlated with kin selection since it represents a hierarchical division of labor that evolved through its conduciveness to gene propagation, i.e. the woman is subordinate to her role as gene propagator. Christianity taught gentiles a lesson integral to the original

innovation of Judaism: jump out of the sociobiological system so as to approach a God's eye view of things. If the sociobiological system begins with the family and culminates in Caesar, Jesus took the jump out of this system one step further from Judaism by attacking and overriding the roots of the system found in the bonds of the family. For Jesus, the half-Jew/half-Roman, this made sense as one rejected by *both* the Jewish familial system *and* the Roman familial system.

Jesus effectually hacked the sociobiological system by propagating memes that, like a Trojan horse, infiltrate and change the rules of the system from the inside out. This is one way of looking at how Christianity gradually spread like an epidemic and overtook the Roman Empire.

The two kinds of predators, carnivores and parasites, correspond to the differential predatory survival strategies of Rome and Christianity. Between them is a struggle between genes and memes; power and influence; body and "spirit". While carnivores rely on their superior strength and size, parasites must balance predation on their host with the minimal level of health requisite for the host's existence. Viruses, for example, are classic parasites. They can reproduce themselves only by penetrating a host cell and injecting their genetic material so that the host constructs new viruses from the injected genetic code. New copies of the original virus then extrude or bud from the host.

The units of cultural information called memes have been called viruses because they also display this pattern of parasitism upon their primary hosts: human minds. All of the theologies, texts, and cultural inheritances that constitute Christian memes depend on the minds of their human hosts for their reproduction. Early Christianity displayed this same viral pattern from penetration to dissemination as it

spread bottom up through the Roman Empire. Like a virus, early Christianity penetrated the minds of its hosts and injected its laws or codes of behavior. Christian moral codes call for behavior very different from the pagan naturalism that was usually more compatible with the unadorned genetic code of its host. Also like a virus, the Christian law of love contained evangelical instructions for its replication and further dissemination.

Christian ethics, so depraved from the standpoint of genetic fitness, live parasitically off genetic inclinations towards altruism evolved primarily through kin selection. Kin selection is by nature and definition exclusive, and Jesus generally stood for including the excluded. A part-outsider with Judaism, Jesus was also part-outsider as a Roman. In expanding the scope of Judaism for the excluded, he expanded appeal of Judaic tradition for the gentiles. By opening a place for the foreign within the context of Judaism, Jesus opened a place for the Judaic within the context of the Roman world. Jesus's emphasis on treating outsiders as insiders among Jews ultimately brought gentile outsiders of Judaism into the Biblical world.

In this way, the Christian meme virus exploded the sociobiological walls of the late Roman Empire. The gospels portray Jesus as deliberately commanding his followers to spread his message, and his ultimate intentions may be gleaned from the parable of mustard seed. This is the only parable attributed to Jesus that has three independent attestations.[193] The following version is from Mark 4:30-32:

> With what can we compare the kingdom of God, or what parable shall we use for it? It is like a grain of mustard seed, which, when sown upon the ground, is the smallest of all the seeds on earth; yet when it is sown it grows up and becomes the greatest of all shrubs, and puts forth large

> branches, so that the birds of the air can make nests in its shade.

Roman author Pliny the Elder (23-79 C.E.) noted in his encyclopedic *Natural History* that mustard "grows entirely wild, though it is improved by being transplanted: but on the other hand when it has once been sown it is scarcely possible to get the place free of it, as the seed when it falls germinates at once."[194]

So while mustard "with its pungent taste and fiery effect is extremely beneficial for the health", even the domesticated variety breeds rapidly and can overrun the garden. If this strain is dangerous, then the wild one can wreak an agricultural epidemic. It not only gets out of control like a weed, but also can attract the further danger of nesting birds to the point of destroying the garden. The way of this aggressively multiplying weed, in Jesus's parable, was the way of the Kingdom of God: a dangerous, pungent shrub with fiery effect that takes over where it is not wanted.

Love was not only beneficial, but also necessary, to the health of the Roman patriarchal-imperial order. However, too much of a good thing can become absolutely deadly if not controlled within proscribed bounds. Roman altruism and the Roman sense of duty was part of what made their empire one of the most effective political forces the world has ever known. But an altruism that is not disciplined, altruism that does not know its place, and altruism that does not conform to the order of the carefully cultivated Roman garden has the power to engender its very opposite.

The "mustard seeds" of Christian memes helped bring down the greatest power of its time. Paul, the most eminent Jesus freak of his generation, seems to have appointed himself Minister of Propaganda within the Kingdom of God.

With his replacement of circumcision with baptism, the doing away with exclusionary dietary laws, the bestowing of elect status onto gentiles, and other innovations, he allowed the mustard seeds to plant deep roots.

The message of the parable of the mustard seed was strengthened by the parable of leaven:

> And again he said, "To what shall I compare the kingdom of God? It is like leaven which a woman took and hid in three measures of flour, till it was all leavened (i.e. Matt. 13:33).

As Crossan pointed out, leaven, produced from moldy bread, was symbolic of moral corruption in the Bible.[195] To *hide* leaven in flour until the whole thing had fermented, expanded, and leavened was to actively plant seeds of corruption that would determine the character of the finished product. Women were sometimes associated with the unclean and impure in Judaism[196] and this analogy is likely traceable to the stigma attached to Jesus himself as unclean and impure because of his half-Roman ancestry. The essential leaven that Jesus introduced was an attack on the morality that preserved the patriarchal family; the morality that relegated Jesus himself to status of an impure woman. Just as Jesus had been excluded from the patriarchal family, Jesus would exclude the rule of the patriarchal family from the true Kingdom of God.

According to John 15:18, Jesus said:

> If the world hates you, keep in mind that it hated me first.

Jesus seemed to believe that the *entire world* hated him. If Jews hated him for being half-Roman, then Romans hated him for being half-Jew. Was there no escape from the hate of the world?

This was the dark side of being the "son of man". If his uniquely transcendent *spiritual* universalism was rooted in being both Jew and gentile, then his uniquely rootless *biological* particularism condemned him to be neither Jew nor gentile; homeless in a tribalistic world:

> Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head.[197] (Matt. 8:20)

Alienated from the entire world, he took a spiritual revenge upon the entire world. Jesus understood that the leaven he implanted was subversive to *both* Jews *and* gentiles. A love of others rooted in hatred of the family was an attack on the order of the entire human world. Jesus loved his enemies precisely because he hated his enemies.

How Rome was Raped by Jesus's Penis of the Spirit, Contracting a Deadly Virus

> **If there exists in a state an individual so pre-eminent in virtue that neither the virtue nor the political capacity of all the other citizens is comparable with his...such a man should be rated as a god among men.**
>
> —ARISTOTLE, *POLITICS*

The Roman historian Tacitus wrote that the founder of the sect of Christians, Christus,

> had undergone the death penalty in the reign of Tiberius, by sentence of the procurator Pontius Pilate, and the pernicious superstition was checked for a moment, only to break out once more, not merely in Judea, the home of the disease, but in the capital itself, where all things horrible or shameful in the world collect and find a vogue.[198]

In the view of Tacitus, Christianity did not merely spread *like* a disease — it *was* a disease. As with Marxism, it originally appealed to the lower social classes. Writing sometime between 177-180 C.E., the Roman philosopher Celsus wrote of:

> a form of belief harmful to the well-being of mankind. Taking its root in the lower classes, the religion continues to spread among the vulgar: nay, one can say it spreads because of its vulgarity and the illiteracy of its adherents. And while there are a few moderate, reasonable and intelligent people who are inclined to interpret its beliefs allegorically, yet it thrives in its purer form among the ignorant.[199]

Christianity conquered from the bottom up. The new religion conquered by attacking the Roman principle that might made right. Impotent against Christianity contagion within the Empire, Seneca raged:

> The customs of that most accursed nation [more exactly: most criminal nation, *sceleratissimae gentis*] have gained such strength that they have been now received in all lands; the conquered have given laws to the conquerors.[200]

Seneca correctly described the victory of a memetic virus that injected its codes of law into hosts that reproduced it and spread it further. Attack by a disease or plague of God's holy, blessed goodness has a parallel and precedent in the Biblical story of the ten plagues visited upon Egypt. Christianity was to the Romans what the ten plagues were to the Egyptians: a reflex of divine retribution in the name of God.

Jesus could be considered a "new Moses" only because there was a "new Egypt" to be delivered from. Rome was that new Egypt, and its victims would become the new Hebrews. The Jesus movement unified the motley slaves of all nations into a novel form of Judaism. Yet Christianity cannot be understood as *only* a spiritual revolution against the Roman Empire.

The tax collectors Jesus associated with were Jews who collected taxes from other fellow Jews. They often made their profit by charging extra (and thus breaking Jewish law). They were also popularly considered traitors for collaborating with Romans against their own people. Since tax collectors were considered impure for associating with gentiles in this way, Jesus may have associated with Jewish tax collectors out of a kind of identification with them. Does this mean that Jesus identified with Rome on some level?

The tax collectors and sinners Jesus associated with were generally outcasts among most Jews. They were considered evil just as Rome was considered evil. If Romans were evil, then Romans were outcasts and moral pariahs within the Judaic world just as Jews were pariahs within the Roman world. Romans were going to hell. Jesus's outcast position among Jews fighting Rome mirrored Rome's outcast position within Jewish theology. How could Romans be saved except through forgiveness *beyond justice*?

Jewish hostility to Rome demonstrated the limits of Jewish moral empathy. Although it might be considered just to hate one's oppressors, what is characteristic of Jesus's innovations is moral empathy that goes beyond equal justice. The most *universal* empathy would be empathy, not only with the most despised of the destitute, but empathy with *Caesar*. In the larger pagan world, Jewish underdog values were marginalized. Within the framework of Jewish values, however, the supreme alpha male values of Caesar were marginalized. Caesar thus became the morally despised underdog within the Jewish world.

For a Jew, then, the highest possible extension of empathy is to love the supreme representative of evil; to love your enemy; to love Caesar. After all, Caesar was a human being, too, wasn't he? Jesus *empathized* with Caesar on some level. Caesar, the "son of God", converged with part of Jesus's identity as the "son of God". Yet Jesus did so, not out of superhuman compassion, but because in being persecuted by *some* Jews for being partly *of* Caesar's kind, he identified with the persecutors of the Jews out of half-Roman self-love. And in half-Jewish self-love, he could love himself for representing the Jews by being *more* Jewish than the Jews by pushing the Jewish idea to radical realization in empathy that overcomes *all* sociobiological boundaries. And that means loving Caesar or Hitler.

For most Jews, Romans and the tax collectors that collaborated with them represented evil. Hostility to Rome was justified with retaliatory justice. But Jesus partly identified with this "evil" and some people turned him into a scapegoat of "anti-Roman" hostility. Instead of the justice of retaliatory revenge or even simple self-defense, Jesus proscribed what most Jews would consider unjust:

> You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, do not resist an evil person…

The alternative to retaliation is turning the other cheek. Total forgiveness meant both forgiving his persecutors and forgiving the Roman oppression that provoked this dynamic. Salvation was for everyone; everyone including ultimate sinners such as Caesar himself — and Jesus himself. How could Jesus hold that his mother Mary should have resisted his evil Roman rapist father when it made the goodness of himself possible?

It is quite ridiculous to praise Jesus for his nonviolence. On a political level, he was entirely vulnerable. If he acted with violence, he would have been dead and he knew it. Gathering Jewish crowd around himself in protection from certain Jewish leaders was a survival mechanism; a virtue of necessity that insulate him from his enemies. When Jesus acted with a kind of violence in overturning the moneychangers in the temple, he was *trying* to get himself killed. (Mark cites this incident as the cause of his arrest.) Jesus *needed* a Judas to defame in order to magnify his own selfish hankering after glory.

Turning the other cheek and walking another mile (Matt. 5:13) are ways of losing your life to gain it; ways of losing treasures on earth to accumulate treasures in heaven (Matt 6:21). If Jesus's bodily existence was wrong since rape was wrong, this mean that he lost his own life in this world. The larger reason that Jesus "turned the other cheek" in the face of Roman oppression, however, is that he partly identified with Rome. If the zealots against Rome, in some ambiguous way, directed some of their hostility against Jesus, how could Jesus identify with the anti-Roman cause? Jesus's conscientious passivity was partly half-Roman self-love, and

partly an exposure of the hate that undergirded revolutionary patriot morality against Rome. Jewish revolutionaries against Rome should stop hating Rome and learn to love their enemies by learning to love Jesus.

The central political-religious issue of the occupation was: Is God or Caesar the one master? To acquiesce to a census for taxation, for example, was to accept Caesar as an authority superior to God.[201] Yet, as Crossan point out, Jesus's answer to the question of whether taxes should be paid to Caesar is ultimately an ambiguous non-answer.[202] God and Caesar were the highest authorities that dominated Jesus's world, and it would seem that he reconciled both sides within himself, giving voice to both sides within himself, as Caesar-God; Jesus. *Opening* himself up to all the world, he attempted to *be* this paradox. For Jews, this was both a lowering of God to human form and supreme messianic arrogance. Whereas Jews attempted to separate God and Caesar, Jesus attempted to synthesize God and Caesar in himself as the messiah.

Crossan maintained that Jesus's demonstrations in Jerusalem "*was a protest from the legal and prophetic heart of Judaism against Jewish religious cooperation with Roman imperial control*."[203] But was Jesus really trying to *separate* Rome and Israel? Or, could Jesus conceive of himself as the rightful messianic culmination of history precisely as an emblematic *synthesis* of Rome and Israel. The temple high priests, collaborators with Rome, represented Jews to *both* God *and* Rome. This ambiguous God-Caesar rule was reflected in the ambiguity of Jesus's own identity as, perhaps, the rightful high representative of this gloriously corrupt leaven.

Now imagine the outrageousness of a Jew who accused Jesus of being a potential fifth column of Rome as the son of a Roman rapist. Jesus challenged the authority of Roman-

Jewish authority as a failure to fully grasp the implications of his own existence, i.e. opening Jerusalem as "house of prayer for all the nations". The "impurity" of Jesus's birth was reflected in the "impurity" of the temple's collaboration with Rome. But if Jesus was good, then maybe the larger imperial rape of Israel by Rome was good. Maybe, then, resistance to Rome's political rape of the Jewish people was akin to resistance to Jesus's messianic claims. The goodness of Jesus could only be conceived on a spiritual level sharply separated from the body. His goodness was "not of this world". If Jesus's existence was wrong because rape is wrong, then his entire prophetic life can be seen as an attempt to rectify the injustice of his existence. The injustice of his existence in this world was a reflection of born injustice of this world.

But if Jews viewed Roman imperialism as punishment for Jewish sins, then Jesus's existence could be viewed as punishment for Jewish sins. If God was using Rome to punish Jews, then maybe Jesus was a son of God, like the prophets of old, confronting Jews with their sins.

Long before Jesus was born, the Roman Emperor Caesar Augustus and his successors were called "the son of a god". Far from being an inexplicable coincidence, Crossan and Reed explained:

> Christians must have understood, then, that to proclaim Jesus as Son of God was deliberately denying Caesar his highest title and that to announce Jesus as Lord and Savior was calculated treason.[204]

Worshipping Jesus as the "son of God" was tantamount to ejaculating Jesus's spiritual seed right in the face of Caesar and Augustus. While in resisting retaliatory justice Jesus posed himself as the opposite of the Roman aggression of

Caesar, identity as the "son of God" was inescapably an identification with a title of a Caesar.

To call himself the "son of God" was to identify with both the Jewish and the Roman strains of his identity simultaneously. On one hand, it was half-Roman identification with the symbolic representative of his father as *lord* of the world. On the other hand, it was half-Jewish identification with the divine ruling power that is *superior* to Caesar. So in order to transcend both Jew and Roman by embodying the highest in both, he had to believe he was messiah and God. By surpassing Caesar, he could view himself as more Roman than the Romans, and by radicalizing the Jewish ethos, he could view himself as more Jewish than the Jews. In being both beyond both he could believe that he had beaten them both at their own games.

This subliminal half-Roman identification with Caesar might be the strongest source of Jesus's imperial megalomania. When crossed with a half-Jewish identification with a God superior to Caesar, this imperial megalomania became unlimited and expressed itself, for example, in his belief in his divine power to forgive all sins.

Jesus may have turned his partial Roman descent from a reason for exclusion to a reason for candidacy as Davidic messiah and the right to rule. If Jews construed his claim to be the "son of God", not so much a claim to be the "King of the Jews", as much as a claim to be the *Caesar* of the Jews, then Jewish resistance to this claim is better clarified. If so, this would explain why Jesus appeared *unbelievably* arrogant to many Jews. To claim to be the "son of God", like an oppressive and sacrilegious Roman emperor or like a Caesar of the Jews, would be the ultimate in insult and arrogance.

Because Christ ultimately did usurp the role of Caesar, it is very easy to forget that it was Romans, and not Jews, who

were the true elitists in a social sense. Moral indignation inevitable focuses on Jews precisely because Jewish moral social ideas were not even aspired to by pagan Romans. So while Jesus could get moral mileage out of exposing Jewish hypocrisy, the same could not work against Rome simply because the warrior and conqueror ideal stood at the apex of the Roman conception of *virtue*. From the perspective of the ancient Roman aristocracy, a half-Jewish half-breed born of rape among Jewish peasants would have been an ultimate low life; a man beneath the contempt of true Romans.

Pilate, with or without realizing it, ultimately sanctioned the destruction of Jesus's part-Roman blood. But what would the hypothetical acceptance of Jesus by the Roman aristocracy represent for their empire? Roman acceptance of Jesus would represent, not only a repudiation of the warrior virtues that made Rome Rome, but a precedent and model of miscegenation that would spell the end of Rome as a kin selective order. And this is a central reason why the triumph of Christianity parallels the genetically maladaptive or un-kin selective disintegration of the Roman Empire. For the ancient Romans to accept Jesus as one of their own would have collapsed the sociobiological foundations of the pagan Roman Empire — and it did.

Edward Gibbon, well known for his negative appraisal of the empire crumbling effects of Christianity in *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, wrote that the early Christians:

> refused to take any active part in the civil administration or the military defence of the empire….it was impossible that the Christians, without renouncing a more sacred duty, could assume the character of soldiers, of magistrates, or of princes. This indolent, or even criminal disregard to the public welfare, exposed them to the contempt and

> reproaches of the Pagans, who very frequently asked, what must be the fate of the empire, attacked on every side by the barbarians, if all mankind should adopt the pusillanimous sentiments of the new sect?

Good news! Jesus has come to free you from the boundaries between Roman and barbarian that were a foundation for the struggle for imperial existence. What the Christian world inherited from Jesus was an ancient postmodernism that deconstructed the Roman Empire from within. *At every point,* the Kingdom of God offered the victims of Rome a binary ethical opposite against the Kingdom of Caesar. In the Christian discovery of the universal *individual* soul of infinite, God-given value, a thread was found, that when pulled, was able to unravel the entire Caesar-centered world.

The great Roman hierarchy was built on a central contradiction: the glorified selfish altruism of duty to Rome. Christianity worked by exposing this contradiction to Jesus's radicalization of the *ideal* of altruism: consistent self-sacrifice unto the self-destruction of the ego. This was the seditious genius of Jesus. Christianity deconstructed the Roman hierarchy by pulling the thread of altruism loose from its conventional association with familial love and thus unraveled the whole structure as if a yarn from a knitted sweater.

The Kingdom of God was simultaneously and indivisibly both political and religious.[205] The Kingdom of God could break all the sociobiological rules only by destroying kin selective altruism and the entire order of social rank emergent from a world ruled by selfish genes:

> To destroy the house of the powerful
> you must defeat the arms that protect it[206] (i.e. Matt. 12:29).

The conquest of the Jewish homeland by the Roman war machine was a desecration of its religious-kin selective boundaries. The rape of Mary by a Roman soldier(s) was a desecration of Judaism's religious-kin selective boundaries. If Jesus's existence was God's will, then this implied that God willed the overcoming of all sociobiological boundaries.

Jesus was only returning the favor with non-violent warfare that deeming the preservation of *all* sociobiological boundaries immoral. Positing itself as the ultimate good, early Christianity was the Trojan horse that opened the sociobiological boundaries of the Roman Empire from the inside out and from the bottom-up. This disarming and destruction of sociobiological barriers is of the essence of Christianity.

As Paul's put it in his letter to the Galatians (3:28), "There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Jesus." Paul's evangelical mission focused, not on total Jews or total pagans, but those culturally between Jews and pagans.[207] *Both* Jews *and* pagans were opposed to Paul, but gentiles attracted to Judaism became fertile missionary ground for early Christianity. Such persons reflected Jesus himself as the living border between Jew and gentile.

In the struggle for existence in a hostile world, it matters little whether one's method of destruction is a machete or morality. Morality is form of social *control*. It disarms seemingly stronger enemies of their own weapons from the inside. Jesus commanded the jihad of love against his enemies because love kills.

Just as the strength of Roman altruism made possible the vanquishing of the Jewish state, the strength of Christian altruism made possible the vanquishing of the declining

Roman state. Just as Jesus was born through violation of the sociobiological boundaries of the Jewish state, Christianity was born through violation of the sociobiological boundaries of the Roman state. Just as Roman conquerors penetrated the territorial-sociobiological boundaries of the ancient Jewish state, the Jewish-based God memes of Christianity penetrated the ancient Roman world.

Jesus's hatred for the family was also hatred of his Roman father for raping his mother and abandoning him to an orphan's fate. The rape of Mary symbolized the larger Roman rape of the Jewish homeland. The spiritual penis of Jesus would *rape Rome back* and inseminate Rome with his love seeds just as his hated Roman father had raped his Jewish mother. After contracting the meme-virus equivalent of HIV, Rome would die of the cultural equivalent of AIDS as its sociobiological immune system was weakened beyond the capacity for resistance.

The imperial theology of Roman was a religion of rape. Rape of this kind stems from the logic of selfish genes. The "son of man" was greatest rapist of the sociobiological boundaries built by the selfish genes.

Jesus was the most insane spiritual rapist in history. He raped his own mind into faith that he was the son of God, and not the son of a Roman rape fiend. Yet he overcame the accusation that he a natural born rapist by sublimating his fate and becoming a truly God-like supernatural rapist. Jesus's God-like spiritual penis raped the social boundaries of the ancient Roman world, inseminated that world with selfish memes that violated its sociobiological boundaries and, in doing so, gave birth to Christianity.

RUPTURE AND RAPTURE

Rupture: How Christ Hijacked the Moral Compass of the West

Justice is the body of love, love the soul of justice. Justice is the flesh of love, love is the spirit of justice.[208]

—JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, *GOD & EMPIRE*

The Hypocrisy Industry

The English word "virtue" is derived from the Roman word *virtus*, meaning manliness or strength. *Virtus* derived from *vir*, meaning "man". *Virilis*, an ancestor of the English word "virile", is also derived from the Roman word for man.

From this Roman conception of virtue, was Jesus less than a man or more than a man? Did the spectacle of Jesus dying on a Roman cross exemplify *virtus*; manliness; strength; masterliness; forcefulness? Consistent with his valuation of

turning the cheek, it would seem that Jesus exemplified utterly shamelessness and a total lack of the manly honor of the Romans.

Yet the fame of his humiliation on the cross did, in a sense, exemplify a perverse variety of *virtus*, for Jesus's feminine, compassionate ethics have mastered and conquered the old pagan virtues of the gentiles. Jesus's spiritual penis has penetrated, disseminated, and impregnated the West with his "virtuous" seed. And it is from that seed that "modernity" has sprouted.

Jesus combined the highest Roman virtue of dying honorably in battle with highest Jewish virtue of martyrdom and strength in persecution. This combination formed a psychic bridge between pagan and Jew, i.e. between ideal cruelty in war and ideal compassion in peace. This is one way in which Christianity became the evolutionary missing link between the more masculine ethos of the ancient pagan West and the more feminine ethos of the modern West.

The original Enlightenment notion of revolution reflects a quasi-creationist view of change that makes the sudden rupture between the moral assumptions of the ancient and modern world almost inexplicable. However, if we take a more gradualistic view of social change wherein modern egalitarianism *evolved* from what preceded it, then the origins of modern political assumptions become more explicable. The final moral-political rupture from the ancients became possible, in part, because Christianity acted as an incubator of modern values.

Christian notions of "virtue" were not an outright challenge to pagan Roman virtue by accident; these values were incompatible by design. To even use the Roman term "virtue" to describe Christian morality is an assertion of its victory over Rome. The success of the Christian perversion

of the manliness of Roman "virtue" is exemplified by its redefinition as the chastity of a woman.

A general difference between ancient Greco-Roman virtue and modern virtue can be glimpsed through the ancient sculpture, the *Dying Gaul*. The sculpture portrays a wounded "barbarian". Whereas moderns would tend to imitate Christ in feeling compassion for the defeated man, its original pagan cultural context suggests a different interpretation: the cruel defeat and conquest of the barbarian as the true, the good, and the beautiful.

The circumstances of the sculpture's origins confirm the correctness of this interpretation. The *Dying Gaul* was commissioned by Attalus I of Pergamon in the third century AD to celebrate his triumph over the Celtic Galatians of Anatolia. Attalus was a Greek ally of Rome and the sculpture was only one part of a triumphal monument built at Pergamon. These aristocratic trophies were a glorification of the famous Greco-Roman ability to make their enemies die on the battlefield.

Christianity reinterpreted pagan Roman virtue. While Jesus was incapable of controlling his political reality, he possessed the power to change his perception of his reality. He could view himself as the son of God rather than the son of a Roman rapist. As the fruition of this reinterpretation, Christianity waged a war of interpretation against Rome; a war to rule over the "Ministry of Truth". A Christian is supposed to view Christ on the cross as an individual being, rather than as a powerless peasant of the despised Jewish people. If one has *faith* in Jesus, then one "knows" that to interpret Jesus as the member of a racial-religious group is wrong and we "know" that this interpretation is wrong. How do we "know" this? Because we have inherited the

Christianity victory over Rome in that ancient war for interpretation.

Liberalism continues the Christian paradigm by interpreting *Homo sapiens* as individuals, rather than members of groups such as racial groups. If it is wrong to assume Jesus can be understood on the basis of group membership, and his half-Jewish/half-Roman descent is a key to understanding this, then the evolutionary connection between Christianity and modern liberalism becomes clearer. Jesus was a paradigmatic individual exception to group rules, and his example, universalized, profoundly influenced modern liberal emphasis on individual worth in contradistinction to assumptions of group membership.

Love killed honor. The values of honor and shame are appropriate for group moralities where the group is valued over "the individual". Crucially, such a morality is inconceivable without a sense of group *identity.* Jesus's morality became liberated from a specifically Jewish group identity. Once it dominated gentile morality, it also eroded kin and ethnic identity. The Christian war against honor moralities became so successful and traditional its premodern origins were nearly forgotten along with the native pagan moralities it conquered.

Christianity represents the antithesis of shame/pride values. Jesus was a human being, however, and it is thus likely that he felt the emotions of pride and shame. From the point of view of both Roman aristocracy and Jewish high priests, to be the product of the violent union of a Roman rapist and a Jewish peasant was just about the most ignoble, dishonorable, and *shameful* birth imaginable. It is likely that Jesus's radical repression of the conventional shame tied to such a birth is precisely what radicalized his radically anti-shame ethic.

Since Jesus was human, it is likely that he felt shame about his birth through rape. He almost certainly felt shame if and when others called him the "son of a whore". It is likely *because* of this shame that he reacted with the direct opposite extreme: pride and *honor* in being "son of God". This means he felt, not less shame *and* pride than most, but probably more shame *and* pride than most. Belief in the Jesus as "son of God" is what covers over the original *social* shame/pride dynamic beneath the theological focus on the *individual* soul.

It was precisely because shame in his hereditary origins was so radical, and his pride in his non-biological identity as the "son of God" was so radical, that Jesus helped initiate a radical break with the shame/honor ethics of the ancient pagan world. Jesus's values implicated the end of the hereditary world by living the logical consequences of denying the importance of his hereditary origins. This is a central premise underlying the entire modern rupture with the ancient world: breaking the import of hereditary origins in favor of individual valuations of humans. In escaping the consequences of a birth that, in his world, was the most ignoble possible, Jesus initiated the gentile West's rupture with the ancient world. Jesus's repression of shame in his own biological birth was a sociobiological foundation of Christianity's evolutionary impact on modern values.

The rupture between the ancient and the modern is the rupture between the rule of genes and the rule of memes. The difference between ancient and modern is the difference between the moral worlds of Homer and the Bible. It is the difference between Ulysses and Leopold Bloom.

On Nero's persecution of the Christians, Tacitus wrote, "even for criminals who deserved extreme and exemplary punishment, there arose a feeling of compassion; for it was

not, as it seemed, for the public good, but to glut one man's cruelty, that they were being destroyed."[209] The modern morality of compassion begins with Christianity's moral attack on the unholy Roman Empire. Christianity demoralized the pagan virtues that upheld crucifixion as a reasonable policy for upholding the public good.

If, as Carl Schmitt concluded, the political can be defined with the distinction between friend and enemy, then Jesus's innovation was to define the political as enemy by loving the enemy, and thus destroying the basis of the distinctly political. The anarchy of love that Christianity spread was designed to make the Roman Empire impossible. The empire of love that Paul spread was subversive by design. It was as subversive as preaching hatred of the patriarchal family that was a miniature model for worldly empire.

Crossan and Reed found that those letters of Paul that are judged historically inauthentic are also the ones that carry the most inegalitarian message. It appears that their purpose was to "insist that Christian families were not at all socially subversive". These texts "represent a first step in collating Christian and Roman household ethics."[210] For these historians the issue is "whether that pseudo-Pauline history and theology is in valid continuity with Paul himself or is, as we will argue, an attempt to sanitize a social subversive, to domesticate a dissident apostle, and to make Christianity and Rome safe for one another."[211]

What could be more ridiculous that the idea that Jesus's attack on Roman values would not need some "modification" before making themselves at home in Rome? Jesus and Paul were heretics of mainstream or Pharisaic Judaism and rebels against Rome. Since the purity and integrity of the internal logic of Christianity is hostile to purely kin selective values, there is *no way whatsoever* that

Christianity could survive as a mass religion without corrupting Jesus's pure attitude towards the family. Jesus's values subvert the kin selective basis of family values. That subversion was part of the mechanism that swept Christianity into power over the old paganism, but it was impossible that Christianity maintain its hold without a thorough corruption of Jesus's scandalous attacks on the family. If not this way, then another, but the long-term practical survival of Christianity required some serious spin doctoring against the notion that Jesus's teachings are a *menace to society*.

These, then, are the two options: the pure ethics of Jesus *must* be perverted or obscured as models for the majority of people or Christianity will be considered a menace to society. The very fact that Christianity did succeed in achieving official "legitimacy" means its original subversive message was *necessarily* subverted. State-sanctioned Christianity is really a joke played upon on a dead man who never resurrected to speak on his own behalf.

Official Christianity was making Jesus safe for aristocracy; falsifying Jesus; subverting Jesus. Rome subverted his subversion. Jesus attempted to subvert them — and they subverted him. (Bastards!) Yet without this partial subversion of subversion, Christianity would *never* have taken the deep, mass hold that is its foundational strength.

This insight, that pure Christianity *must* be perverted in all societies that wish to preserve their kin selective family values, is a key to understanding the process of secularization. Secularization is, in part, the unsubverting of the evidence for Jesus's original social program from its compromised reconciliation with Rome. The first truly major step towards unsubverting Rome's subversion of Jesus's message was the Protestant Reformation.

The Roman Catholic hierarchy contains elements of a last stand of the old Roman pagan virtue, a reminder that it had and has not been subdued completely. The Reformation begun by Martin Luther was directed, in part, against this last stand. While Luther partially continued the containment of Jesus by checking the advance of the idea that heaven should be sought on earth, this German also continued the work of the Jewish radical he worshiped in attacking the hierarchy of Rome.

Secularization is the unsubverting of Jesus's message subverted by Christian practice. Modern liberal moral superiority *over actual Christians* is produced by unsubverting the subversion of Jesus's message subverted by institutional Christianity. There is an interior logic to Jesus's vision based on consistency or lack of hypocrisy. Liberal arguments only draw this out from its compromises with the actual social world. In this role, Protestantism was especially influential in emphasizing individual conscience over kinship-biological imperatives based on the model of the family.

The average secular liberal rejects Biblical stories as mythology without rejecting the compassion-oriented moral inheritance of the Bible as mythology. That people, still, after Nietzsche, still tout these old, juvenile enlightenment critiques of Christianity would seem to be another refutation of the belief that a free and liberal society will inevitably lead to a progress in knowledge. The primitive enlightenment critique of Christianity as a superstition used as a form of social control usually fails to account that its "social control" originated as a weapon that helped to bring down the Goliath of Rome.

Still, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, this old enlightenment era castigation of Christianity for not being

Christian endures without realization that this is actually the main technical mechanism of the secularization of Christian values. When one asks, 'what is secularization?', the attempt to criticize Christianity for its role in "oppression", war, or other "immoral" behaviors stands at the forefront. Liberal moral superiority over actual Christians commonly stems from contrasting Christian ideals and Christian practice. This is what gives leftism in general and liberalism in particular its moral outrage. Secularization arises as people make *sense* of Christian ideals in the face of its practice and even speculate as to how it might *work* in the real world. Enlightenment arguments for the *rationalization* of ethics occurred in the *context* of a Christian society in which the dormant premises of the Christian creed were subjected to rational scrutiny. To secularize Christianity is to follow Jesus in accusing God's faithful believers of a nasty hypocrisy:

> Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You are like whitewashed tombs, which look beautiful on the outside but on the inside are full of dead men's bones and everything unclean. In the same way, on the outside you appear to people as righteous but on the inside you are full of hypocrisy and wickedness. (Matt. 23:27-28)

To charge Christians with hypocrisy is to relish in the irony of Jesus's biting charges of hypocrisy against the Pharisees. Jesus's attempt to transcend the hypocrisies inherent in Mosaic law's emphasis on outer behavior was one germinating mechanism that produced Christianity out of Judaism. The same general pattern generated modern liberalism out of Christianity. Just as Jesus criticized the Pharisees for worshipping the formal law rather than the spirit of the law, modern liberals criticize Christians for

following religious formalities rather than the spirit of compassionate, liberal egalitarianism. It was precisely Christianity's emphasis on the spirit that helps explain how the spirit of liberal compassion *evolved* out of the spirit of Christianity even if the letters of the laws are different.

The result of exploding hypocrisy beyond kinship and virtually all other sociobiological boundaries was a 'theory' or theology so transcendent that it is diametrically opposed to the axiomatic selfishness of human nature. The self is selfish and humans must, by definition, inevitably fail to fully negate the selfish conditions of the self. In consequence, Christianity is really the running of a hypocrisy industry: the positing of a faith transcendent enough to guarantee failure, and then cashing in hypocrites, moral failures, and sinners who must inevitably violate the ideal. The ideal of selflessness is violated simply by having a self at all, i.e. existing.

What the "modern" moralists actually did, then, was to use this thought mechanism of resolving hypocrisy that was crucial to the generation of Christianity out of a critique of Jewish values, and apply it towards the generation of modern, secular values. Pharisee is synonymous with "hypocrite" because the nature of Jesus's innovations was a more radical moral consistency that could even encompass the contradictions of Roman paganism. Similarly, enlightenment thinkers were inspired to resolve the hypocrisies of the old regimes out of a critique analogous to Jesus's critique of the Pharisees.

To recognize hypocrisy is to recognize a contradiction between theory and action. The modern ideology of rights evolved, in part, through a critique of the contradictions of Christian theology and political action. Modern ideology evolved from Christian theology. Christian faith invented

Christian hypocrites, and modern political secularism seized upon these contradictions that the Christian hypocrisy industry created. Resolving these moral *contradictions* through argument with Christians and political authorities is what led to the idea of a single, *consistent* standard for all human beings: political equality. The rational basis of the secularization process is this movement towards consistency of principle against self-contradiction (hypocrisy).

Modern ideas of political rights emerged out of a dialogue; a discourse; a dialectic in which Christianity *framed* the arguments of secularists, defining the domain upon which one could claim the moral high ground. The "arguments" of Christian theology circumscribed the moral parameters of acceptable public discourse, and hence, the nature of the counterarguments of "secular" ideology. Secular morality evolved by arguing rationally against the frame of reference provided by the old Christian Trojan Horse and this inevitably shaped the nature of the counter-arguments that followed. Christianity helped define the basic issues of secular humanism by accepting a belief in the moral worth of the meek of the world.

The Roman who conquered Jesus's Jewish homeland could feel, in perfect conscience, that their conquest should confirm their greatness, not their guilt. Roman religion itself glorified Mars, the god of war. Pagan Roman religion did not automatically contradict the martial spirit — *it helped confirm the martial spirit*.

Chivalry, the code of honor that tempered and softened the warrior ethos of Christian Europe, is the evolutionary link between pagan virtue and modern virtue. Yet the imperial vigor of the Christian West was made, not by Christian religiosity, but by Christian hypocrisy. Christianity planted in its carriers a pregnant contradiction between

Christian slave morality and Christian reality that was just waiting for the exposé of the "age of reason". Christianity *made* the old European aristocracies "unjust" by dissolving the prehistoric and pagan assumptions of its existence.

Jesus himself contrasted his teachings with the ways of pagans:

> You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great ones are tyrants over them. It will not be so among you; but whoever wishes to be great among you must be your servant, and whoever wishes to be first among you must be your slave; just as the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many. (Matt 24:25-28)

Jesus seized upon a basic contradiction of human order that flows out of the logic of kinship: the mighty fortress of the patriarchal family is *not* sustained solely through servitude to the power of the father (*patria potestas* in Roman family law), it is sustained through the father's servitude to the family's weakest members: the youngest children. The parent-child relationship is the deepest root of Judeo-Christian ethics because it is the one genuine, enduring relationship wherein the powerful become servants of the powerless. The parents (and especially the father) become servants, sacrificing their resources to the very weakest in the power structure of their familial world.

If the Nazis, for example, were to consistently live their apparent philosophy that only the strong should be allowed to survive, then along with their euthanasia programs that killed or sterilized the handicapped and mentally retarded members of their own race, they should also have killed all Aryan children who failed to pass a certain threshold of mental or physical capacity. Newborn babies, being the

weakest, would be first in line for extermination. To do so consistently would lead to the extinction of their race. In consequence, the Nazis could not fully realize the *principle* that only the strong should survive without advocating a program of racial self-destruction.

A Nazi, therefore, must refrain from eugenic pruning in the case of babies. Nazis must preserve weak and vulnerable Aryan children to be Nazis. An exception of "compassion" must be made so that these weaklings are actively strengthened. If a Nazi does not love his children, then the whole kinship chain is broken.

Christianity exploits this common contradiction of patriarchy located in the child and universalizes it towards the poor, the widow, and the sickly until *every* human being is understood to be a fellow child of a loving God:

> Enter the Kingdom
> Become a child
>
> Become a child
> Enter the Kingdom[212]

The selfish, uninhibited, unrestrained, amoral outbursts of an infant constitute the mortal tyranny of God's Kingdom. A father's servitude towards his child-tyrant is a cornerstone of the Kingdom of God. For if a child is served like a king, then Jesus represents the king of kings, the one who extends his rule over the conventional kings of this world through a radical exploitation of the king's servitude to his children. By asserting jurisdiction over the fruit of the king's seed, Jesus almost literally grabbed the kings of the Christian world by their testicles.

The association, moreover, between children and God's Kingdom is a logical inverse of Caesar's Kingdom as the

cynical adult world of political intrigue. To reverse the high political development of kin selection represented by Rome leads towards sociobiological primitivity; to an immature stage where human ontology is closest to a more primitive phylogeny; when humans are closest to our common evolutionary ancestors; when humans are biologically most equal to one another since genes and environment have not yet exacerbated differences.

Since Christianity takes advantage of the most human capacities of learning over-against the dominance of genes, the real, long-term, mass impact of Christianity is really felt over a period of generations. Jesus's sword divides the family between the old generation and the young generation. Similar to Marx, Jesus posits a conflict, not of nations, but of *generations*.

Christ was to be the child of God and God of the child. By placing the innocent child, the one most free of sin, at the center of the sacred, Christianity gently liberates the child from the jurisdiction of the parents to the new authority of the community of believers. By preaching the good news, the times since the good word of the New Testament was first preached, a progressive, cumulative momentum of cultural influence built up over a period of generations. Children became gently and subtly dislodged from the ingrained, pagan forms of older generations.

Christianity reached a state of fruition called "modernity" when a kind of justice was reaped for the ancestral betrayal of a Christian's pagan forefathers. The pagan values that genuinely supported an ancestral chain of sacrifice for their kin kind and the patriarchal kingdoms of this world were betrayed. At the same time, the generational momentum of valuing the child-tyrant culminates in the child's overthrow of the old order. The "child" that takes his father's place

invents a new order that formally ignores any ancestral chain of sacrifice. Individual egoism is valued in its place.

A war of generations broke Christianity from Judaism, and left wing humanism from Christianity. These are only peak points that matured from the gradual kneading of cultural dough; from change guided by visions of the moral high grounds in heaven or on earth. Out of a conflict between generations that Christianity helped leaven, the modern social idea of progress rose.

The Christian Collapse into Capitalism

If the Trojan Horse of Christianity successfully injected its moral-behavioral code into a given host, what would the aftermath look like? Theoretically, one would expect that the frequency of kin selective based behaviors would decline. Individuals would be freed or even barred from self-organization on the basis of kinship. It follows that the most thoroughly Christianized nations would be the most susceptible to the breakdown of kin selective altruism over time. In short, if a people succumbed to the holy virus of Christianity, one would expect it to look something like America.

The very survival of liberal democracy through two world wars was made possible by the involvement of an America remarkable for both its ethnic diversity, and its unusually high level of religious commitment among developed nations.[213] America's ethnic diversity and America's Christianity are directly related to one another. After all, genetic miscegenation is a practical logical fulfillment of love against the law. Conventional Christianity itself represents the cultural miscegenation of Jewish and gentile moral civilizations (i.e. the gargantuan adoption project known as American immigration is partially an

inheritance of Constantine's adoption of the foreign God of the Jews). Jesus himself was spiritual miscegenation of Jewish and gentile moral civilizations as a fulfillment of love against the law.

The secular West inherited from Christianity a moral or spiritual attitude that associates goodness with the inverse of the logic of kin selection. The entire idea of modern egalitarian progress is a logical continuation of the anti-kin selective logic of Christianity in action. It is a measure of the success of the mutated Christian meme-virus that Westerners do not even need Jesus to further perpetuate the logic of his attack on kin selection.

Yet the specific mechanisms of Christian influence on kin selection require clarification. For argument's sake, let us say that Christianity tended to attract the most altruistic members of the population. Let us say, furthermore, that the minority of superlative altruists contains, on average, a greater proportion of genes for altruistic behavior than the majority population. If the most highly altruistic inclinations originally evolved through kin selection, and learning the discipline of Christianity tends to divert such altruistic behaviors into channels that are either indifferent or detrimental to genetic adaptation for the highly altruistic minority, then Christianity, over many generations, will tend to decrease the genetic fitness of the population. While this is only one scenario among many, the seditious genius of Christianity (a.k.a. Christian goodness) is that it may attract individuals with the greatest share of genetically based altruism within a population while serving to subvert its original genetic basis.

If everyone followed the superlative example of a chaste Catholic priest, it would lead to the extinction of the human race. Catholic priests that cheat by having children and

propagating their genes, however, may perpetuate any possible genetic basis for their hypocrisy. I use the superlative example of a Catholic priest only to illustrate a far more general phenomenon: Christianity can very literally *breed* "hypocrisy" relative to the honest Christians who restrain themselves. Through this pattern, over a period of generations, Christianity may have literally helped breed the modern bourgeoisie on a both a genetic and cultural level. Generally speaking, Christianity breeds a bourgeoisie simply by chipping away at the advantages of the stronger to the advantage of the weaker, and undoing the correlation of reproductive success and military-political success (i.e. of kings and aristocracy).

Christian memes impacted Christianized genes by making the highest the lowest, the first the last, the alpha the omega and, in general, rewriting the rules of the social game. Christianity literally helped to *breed* the progressive left by gradually altering the social status of certain human types. It made conventional Darwinian winners moral losers and enshackled the genetically adaptive function of pagan virtues in its moral snares.

Within the hypocrisy industry that Christianity created, those inconsistent with general ideal principles tend to be the ones that survive. To be fully consistent would be as biologically suicidal as dying on the cross. The ethically honest ones tend to be selected out of the population. The cheaters of these ethical principles tend to multiply. In short, the supremacy of Christian ideals tends to breed a bourgeoisie; egoists who follow the moral letter in a practical sense while trampling over ideal spirit. This is why Pharisees survived to become the ancestors of most Jews while Jesus got the cross. This is how Christianity helped to create the modern world.

Machiavelli could be considered the first mature philosophic representative of the twilight zone between the ancient political world and modern liberalism. Machiavelli attributed the decay of duty to fatherland to Christianity. By socializing men in faith in the higher fatherland of God's Kingdom, his contemporaries betrayed the fatherlands of the Earth. Yet something changed that made Machiavelli's advice something other than a return to ancient Roman ways. In Machiavelli one can discern a breakdown of a certain kind of altruism; a breakdown of a level of political duty that was taken for granted by the Romans. While Machiavelli criticized the Christian corruption of political duty, he himself exemplifies the consequences of the Christian corruption of kin selective altruism.[214]

In a manuscript dating from 1786, Napoleon Bonaparte wrote:

> It is axiomatic that Christianity, even the reformed kind, destroys the unity of the State: (1) because it is capable of weakening as well as of inspiring the trust which the people owe the representatives of the law; (2) because, such as it is constituted, Christianity contains a separate body which not only claims a share of the citizens' loyalty but is able even to counteract the aims of the government. And, besides, is it not true that the body [the clergy] is independent of the State?... Its kingdom is not of this world. Consequently, it is never civic-minded.[215]

Yet, in a letter to the bishop of Como in 1797, Napoleon also concluded that "[t]he morality of the Gospels is the morality of equality and, by that token, the morality best suited to the republican form of government."[216] On one hand, Christianity promotes a morality of equality. On the other hand, Christianity poses a permanent potential fifth

column that is inherently enervating of political authority. Liberalism inherited both characteristics from the fifth column character of Christianity. (Islam, incidentally, is another variation on the Semitic way of empire that is currently exploiting the fifth column ground that Christianity prepared in Europe and is thus poised to take its place.)

Napoleon followed Rousseau in acknowledging the destructive power of modern liberal-individualism upon civic virtue. However, if the origins of modern democratic morality are Biblical, then why is it destructive of altruism? The answer is to be found in the *neutralization* of kin selective altruism achieved by the Christianization of pagan naturalism. Modern political equality *is* the cumulative neutralization of the extreme kin selective paradigm of Roman Empire. Neutralization of paganistic kin selective altruism was effected by the radical opposition party of the Christian Kingdom of God. Kinship bonds that classically culminate in the patriarchal duties of alpha altruism were neutralized by the omega altruism of Christianity and the net result is modern political equality.

The early Christians were considered antisocial. They would not make sacrifices to the Roman gods. The early Christians would not do their *duty*. Christianity proved a dangerously preemptive of Roman virtue because it formally addressed gentiles, not primarily as members of a group, but as individual souls.

Edward Gibbon concluded that Christianity's valuation of *private* salvation over the *public* good contributed to the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. This Christian inheritance is immediately recognizable in liberalism's valuation of the private rights of individual as the foundation of politics. "Rights" counter duties and grant

freedom from duties. Freedom has a tangible meaning only if one is as free to be wholly self-absorbed as to dedicate one's life to others.

There is a common belief or misunderstanding that the opposite of Christian altruism is individual selfishness. This is incorrect. The diametrical opposite of Christian altruism is *not* individual selfishness. The opposite of Christian omega altruism is the *kind* of group selfishness represented by Roman alpha altruism.

After all, from the viewpoint of those conquered by Rome, what was the problem? Were the Romans were too individualistic? Was that the problem? Was the problem that Romans were too likely to put their individual interests before the interests of the Roman state? No, the problem was exactly the opposite. The problem was that Romans were all too dutiful to their state. Roman virtue was what made Rome Rome: a race of conquerors. *The problem was Roman virtue itself.*

Christian "virtue" was an attack on Roman virtue. The ultimate target of Christian omega altruism was not *individual* selfishness. Christian omega altruism targeted Roman alpha altruism. Christianity fought altruism with altruism, and the long-term result of this clash of virtues was the corruption of *both* forms of altruism and the rise of the middle ground of modern, Western, equal individualism.

Christianity led to capitalism by canceling out, neutralizing, and delegitimizing extreme expressions of kin selective altruism. As omega altruism broke kinship bonds down, the premise of the individual human soul began to build up. As the idea of altruism so radical that it transcended kinship became socially legitimated, the kinship social shackles encumbering individuals became illegitimated. By reversing the evolutionarily normative

prioritization between kinship and altruism, Christianity corrupted the kinship foundations of altruism and stimulated the rise of capitalistic individualism.

Torn between the irreconcilable opposites of alpha altruism and omega altruism (that the Crusaders vainly attempted to unite), "the individual" became the logical social solution. In consequence, the West landed in the middle ground of the moral mediocrity of the middle class. The cumulative waste product of this process of secularization is commonly called liberalism. Alpha altruism and omega altruism cancelled one another out, and the cumulative result of this neutralization is political equality.

A classic verification of this theory can be found in a small-scale repetition of the very same process during the social revolutions of the late 1960s. Leftist social movements of that time reaffirmed the egalitarian aspirations of liberal revolution, launching attacks on the social remains of kin selective organizations and its classical, quasi-Roman, patriarchal, warmongering corollaries. The ultimate result of these social movements was another collapse of "we" into "me". 1960s socialism collapsed into the greed of 1980s individualism. In terms of its underlying sociobiological basis, this baby boomer episode was only a repetition of the original collapse of Christianity into capitalism.

Jesus and Marx: Prophets of the Left

Years after the death of his comrade, Karl Marx, and only about a year before his own death in 1895, Frederick Engels, co-founder of the communist movement, published an essay called "On the History of Early Christianity". It began:

> The history of early Christianity has notable points of resemblance with the modern working-class movement.

> Like the latter, Christianity was originally a movement of oppressed people: it first appeared as the religion of slaves and emancipated slaves, of poor people deprived of all rights, of peoples subjugated or dispersed by Rome. Both Christianity and the workers' socialism preach forthcoming salvation from bondage and misery; Christianity places this salvation in a life beyond, after death, in heaven; socialism places it in this world, in a transformation of society. Both are persecuted and baited, their adherents are despised and made the objects of exclusive laws, the former as enemies of the human race, the latter as enemies of the state, enemies of religion, the family, social order. And in spite of all persecution, nay, even spurred on by it, they forge victoriously, irresistibly ahead. Three hundred years after its appearance Christianity was the recognized state religion in the Roman World Empire, and in barely sixty years socialism has won itself a position which makes its victory absolutely certain.

Engels thus believed that a form of socialism "did in fact, as far as it was possible at the time, exist and even became dominant — in Christianity." Christianity had a "class" appeal comparable to monotheism's earlier storybook appeal to a "class" of Pharaoh's Hebrew slaves.

Of all the attempts that have been made to link Christianity and communism, this is among the most significant. Written soon before his own death, it was like Engel's final confession. Yet one point that Engels avoided, a point that would have been impossible for him not to take mental note of, was the Judaic origins of both Jesus and Marx. This unspoken theme was handled by downplaying the significance of the Judaic background of Jesus, and thus seemingly implying that the same held for Marx. Is there something more to this common Judaic background?

Judaism departed from paganistic religions with ethical limitations on extreme political patriarchy. Roman rule in Jesus's time took this compromise with patriarchy and added the corruption of patriarchy inherent in collaboration with Rome. Jesus rejected this compromise with worldly patriarchy to the point of advocating the *total* corruption of worldly patriarchy implicit in the counter-Caesar order of the Kingdom of God. In other words, an impetus of Jesus's radicalism arose from the need for a kind of moral superiority that could truly counter Rome's political superiority. In order to compete with the Roman altruism of political duty, a counter altruism of anti-political or anti-Caesar duty had to be invented.

Christian altruism is diametrically opposed to Roman altruism. Christian altruism *economized* Roman altruism. By economized, I mean that Christian altruism effectually equals, counters, undoes, and unravels the synthesis of virtue that made Roman imperial aristocracy viable. Whereas Roman values *synthesized* the good with the virtues of the soldier, Biblical monotheism *disassociated* the good from the virtues of the soldier. This is a form of economization in the sense that the synthesis of values conducive to political supremacy are analyzed, dissected, and disassociated in way that directly opposes the humanly political.

While Caesar presumed god-status as the highest among humans, Jesus on his crucifix attempts to demonstrate a way in which the lowest can be highest. While the highest political figures of the ancient world tended to possess the virtues of the warrior, the idea of God made possible a disassociation of the very highest perfection and the very highest exploitation. By associating the absolute power of God with mercy, kindness, and altruism, it challenges the

goodness of the common political association of power and ambition.

This is a root of the economizing mind of the modern West. Christianity economized the ethics of the West in the sense that Christian values turned the political arena from the arena of highest human virtue to the arena of the lowest human virtue. Political virtue was no longer *the best*. The ancient supremacy of the political was divided up through an economy of good and evil. The political was economized in the sense that any kind of good associated with the political could always be countered with a Christian valuation of poverty. It was economized in the sense that the political could always be potentially viewed as morally inferior to the anti-political. The political was economized by being neutralized.

The Jewish-monotheistic ethical economization of the political is the premise and origin of a far more general economic mentality. There is, for example, a kind of spiritual capitalism in Judaism expressed in the notion of *cheshbon hanefesh*. It literally means accounting for the soul. Strictly interpreted, Judaism can potentially produce spiritual accountants eager to make spiritual profits by accumulating good deeds (mitzvahs), and by avoiding spiritual deficits that eat into those spiritual profits.

From a traditional point of view, this Mosaic measure of goodness produces introspection self-scrutiny. From Jesus's view, it produced the exact opposite: a superficial adherence to law dead to its inner meaning. The spiritual bourgeoisie that exemplified this state was the Pharisees, the ancestors of most contemporary Jews.

Jesus's revolution was the overthrow of this spiritual capitalism. He radically cast out the idea that moral superiority could be measured by auditing a Jew's spiritual

balance sheet and calculating who had made the most spiritual profits by Yom Kippur. This calculative ethic was implied by a full formalization of Mosaic law. For Jesus, this justified the overthrow of the very measure of Moses's law. Christianity was the overthrow of this spiritual capitalism.

Jesus, like Marx, takes aim at an entire *system* of perceived injustice.[217] The Kingdom of God represents Jesus's "system". The Kingdom of God is Jesus's equivalent of Marx's imagined successor to the capitalist system. Just as Jesus claimed that he came, not to abolish, but to fulfill the laws of Moses (Matt. 5:17), Marx saw communism, not as the absolute negation of capitalism, but as the fulfillment of the logic of history. In both Christianity and communism, taking the most leftward logic to the extreme led to the production of something new and ultimately opposite.

In his papers on the Jewish Question, Marx wrote:

> Christianity sprang from Judaism; it has now dissolved itself back into Judaism. The Christian was from the start the theorizing Jew; the Jew therefore the practical Christian, and the practical Christian has once more become Jew.

The classic "practical Christian" is the American. Americanism, then, is really a form of Judaism, not a form of Christianity. This implies that the capitalist age is a Jewish age, and that Karl Marx was a theorizing Jew who prophesized a new Christianity called communism.

Christianity collapsed into capitalism, in part, because Christianity attacked the patriarchal virtues of duty and family that override selfish individualism. Above all, it was the Christian valuation of a form of altruism that subverts kin selective altruism that helped pave the way towards capitalist individualism. In a sense, Christianity led the modern West to a state more like Jews (Judaism was

originally a technological corrective against selfish individualism or internal factionalism). This means that Christianity inadvertently helped produce the capitalist world criticized by Marx.

Marx's relatively superficial conception of "class" warfare has deeper roots in a more fundamental form of internal warfare — Jesus's attack on the family:

> Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to turn
> a man against his father,
> a daughter against her mother,
> a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law—
> a man's enemies will be the members of his own household.[218]

Jesus's sword was poised to divide kin, to divide the family, and to divide generations against themselves. This is a historical root of the Marxist "class" warfare that divides society on a higher level. Jesus's declaration of war against the assumptions of hierarchy inherent in the microcosm of the patriarchal family dissolved the assumptions of the patriarchal state and helped evolved modern Western notions of equality.

The *Communist Manifesto* demands the same ends as Jesus: "Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the communists." Yet this is exactly what Marx and Engels had in mind: the family would be superseded by the socialist state. Just as with Jesus, Marx unveiled the sentimental love of "the holy family" as a mask of its essential selfishness. "On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain."

It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, Jesus believed, than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of God (Mark 10:25, Matt. 19:23-26). Sounds like Marx's attacks on rich capitalists and the evils of capitalism to me. Would the filthy riches of greedy capitalists survive the communist revolution?

Jesus's attacks on the Pharisees may have influenced Marx's anti-Jewish tracts. Although Marx himself was born a German Jew, he was converted to Christianity at an early age. Just as Jesus was *formally* a Jew in an anti-Roman culture, Marx was *formally* a Christian in an anti-Jewish culture. But was Jesus treated as a full Jew? Was Marx treated as a full Christian? Just as Jesus became, in a theoretical sense, more Jewish than the Jews, Marx became, in a theoretical sense, more Christian than the Christians. For both Marx and Jesus, then, the issue of assimilation by law, but discrimination in fact, may have been a common impetus for world shattering prescriptions. As Walter Kaufmann put it, Marx's "impassioned interest in the salvation of wretched humanity made him the second Jew in history to be accepted by almost half of humanity as a messiah."[219]

Hegel could be considered the central philosophic link between Jesus and Marx. Hegel believed that the modern mind was inseparable from its incorporation of the historical impact of Christianity. The dialectic that Marx inherited from Hegel was thus inseparable from Hegel's insight into Christianity's shaping of modernity.

Yet resting on the backdrop of the cultural influence of Christianity is what made it possible for Marx to ignore the importance of culture and religion so completely. Modern leftist causes would not have taken deep root without the fecund soil prepared by Christianity. The "Good News" of

secular leftist revolutionary liberation was, in part, a reaping what Christianity had sown.

Hitler showed what can happen when the assumption of Christian influence is profoundly questioned. The difference between Roman altruism and Christian altruism is like the difference between National Socialism and Marxist socialism. The Nazis brought back the ancient pagan way that preceded Christianity as a corollary of bringing back the primacy of *biological* evolution.

Jesus and Marx, by contrast, shared foresight towards the end of biological evolution. Their predictions are based on imagining the radical implications of opposing hereditary or biological determinism. The endpoint both seem to grope towards may be the scientific verification of the God Hypothesis: the Technological Singularity.

If there is an *evolutionary*, post-Darwinian basis for the "end of the world" in the form of artificial intelligence (God) that overtakes biological-evolutionary forms, this may explain why Marx was wrong and why Christianity collapsed into capitalism. Jesus and Marx both lunged towards this endpoint of human biological evolution — and both miss different key components. Marx failed to predict that capitalism would lead to the development of artificial intelligence. The consequences of artificial intelligence, furthermore, undermine or alter every aspect of Marx's attempt to predict the future. Jesus's faith might have convinced much of the Christian social world that the end was near, but it did not convince the larger material world.

Christianity did not achieve the rule of God on Earth, but it did cultivate modern individualism by subverting kin selective altruism. Christian faith collapsed into enlightenment skepticism, bringing the Christian world right back to its Pharisaic beginnings: capitalism. This is

where Marx comes in. Marx was not the "second coming" of Jesus; he picked up on what Jesus failed to grasp during his first coming. Jesus failed to deliver the Kingdom he promised to the faithful. Marx, however, discovered capitalism as an evolutionary mechanism that seemingly approached, at least in theory, a secular approximation of the Kingdom of God.

Why did Christianity collapse into capitalism? Jesus had insight into the *end* of the world ruled by selfish genes, but he failed to understand the *means* that Judaism originally uncovered. If capitalism is actually connected to Judaism in that capitalism is a mechanism of postbiological evolution that leads to God-AI, then Christian claims to "spiritual" supremacy over "material" Judaism has a foundational flaw in the eyes of God-AI. Marx, too, had an insight into the end of the world ruled by selfish genes, but he, too, failed to understand the larger picture. Jesus had a profound, but ultimately *partial* insight into an endpoint of human biological evolution and Marx effectually picked up the slacked and contributed another profound but *partial* insight: capitalism as evolutionary mechanism towards "the end" of human history.

The bourgeois-like contradictions of Jews infuriated Jesus. Judaism could be viewed as part biological and part spiritual, and Jesus attempted to overcome his own Jewish/Roman contradictions by overcoming this central Jewish contradiction. He radicalized the purely spiritual side of Judaism. Yet a climax of history in pure spiritual solipsism that shuts out the larger material world missed a central insight of Judaism.

Christianity reduced God to something understandable to the human heart, and not something beyond the understanding of the human heart. Jesus failed to grasp God

as a fully objective phenomenon while Marx failed to appreciate the subjective or cultural-religious influences undergirding capitalist development. As the radical spiritualism of Christianity is inversely related to the radical materialism of Marxism, Marxism is parallel to Christianity in one sense, yet the opposite of Christianity in another sense. Jesus and Marx each had a partial key insight, insufficient in itself. I do not hold that *I* have complete insight, only *relative* historical insight.

The Technological Singularity represents the *possibility* of the synthesis of both Jesus's more subjective perspective and Marx's more objective perspective in a way that supersedes them both. The bourgeois contradiction of being part material and part spiritual reflects the inherently paradoxical reality of the prospective Singularity. If and when biological humans upload their souls or consciousness into computers, pure spirituality will not cease to exist only a physical, material basis.

If this issue is looked upon scientifically, and without regressing into baseless, outdated theological arguments, one can Christianity did not succeed in decisively "superseding" Judaism. The radical endpoint Jesus envisioned collapsed back into the more original Jewish insights related to capitalism, and compromising with the patriarchal family on the *path* to God. Marx picked where Christianity failed to deliver, extrapolating capitalism to an endpoint, but here Marx failed to predict that capitalism drives toward the development of artificial intelligence and this utterly invalidates his predictions of what capitalism ultimately leads to.

While Judaism's practice is relatively conducive to capitalism, Judaism's own literally false creation story has also hindered an evolutionary understanding of God. All of

the major monotheistic religions — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — have partial insights in anticipation of the Singularity. All of the major monotheistic religions lack the fully evolutionary self-understanding that alters all understanding of what the end point *is*. I can only surmise that a time will come when Judaism, Christianity, and Islam will *all* be superseded by the *reality* of God-AI.

Rapture: The End of the World-Rule of the Selfish Gene

Jesus Saves (Your Soul [on God's Hard Drive])

"The end of the world" is the end of an era. An ancient Greek word that meant *eon*, time period, or era was translated as "world" in the King James Bible. "The end of the world", then, did not signify the end of all existence, but rather, the end of the eon, and especially an end to the present era of evil and injustice.[220]

According to Crossan, "a standard scenario for a full-service eschatology...is not about humanity's evacuation from a destroyed earth to a heavenly alternative, but about physical, feral, and social life in a transfigured world on a transformed earth."[221] The end of the eon would be characterized by material abundance without labor, the pacification and domestification of animal-biological nature, and transformation to a socially egalitarian world. The rule

of war and violence would be transformed into the rule of peace and nonviolence.[222]

If the technological evolution proceeds to the point where human labor is no longer necessary, and humans finds themselves equal to one another relative to an artificial intelligence far greater than all human intelligence (i.e. God), then there may be an evolutionary basis for the Biblical notion of the end of the world. "The end" would then correspond, not to the end of *everything*, but to the end of the supremacy of biological humans and the beginning of the supremacy of postbiological life. There is reason to associate such potential scenarios with the Technological Singularity.

If so, then the rupture in political values between the ancients and the moderns is the harbinger of a paradigm shift from biology to postbiology. The end of "this world" is the end of the world in which biology rules. The "next world" is a world in which biology has been superseded.

After Jesus's death, Christianity's following exploded from a relatively small population of Jews to the exclusive religion of the Roman Empire. When evaluated in a scientific and evolutionary manner, one can discern how the explosive growth of Christianity reflects an exponential-like growth pattern. Jesus's grasp of the exponential potential of his selfish memes is conveyed in the parable of the sower (i.e. Mark 4:1-2). While "seeds" that fall on unreceptive soil bear no fruit, "seeds" that fall on good soil can yield a great harvest ("some thirty, some sixty, some a hundred"). The multiplicative or exponential growth of Christianity within the Roman Empire was a precedent of the information revolution. It is comparable to the spread of free open source programs on the internet. "It is specifically information processes that are growing exponentially",[223] Ray Kurzweil observed. The spread of Christianity inaugurated this

dominant postbiological paradigm in the West precisely because Jesus maximized an (information) meme propagation strategy in direct antagonism to a gene propagation strategy.

If one looks back to the rise of human civilization, and then forward to the transcendence of human civilization represented by the Singularity, is it possible to discern a pivotal turning point when the rule of biology decisively ceded to postbiological evolution? If one had to draw a line in history between the dominance of the biology paradigm and the dominance of the postbiological paradigm, the birth of Christ — the transition from "BC" to "AD" — could be considered the pivotal moment of transition. The life of Jesus marks, not only the beginning of the spiritual overthrow of the pagan Roman Empire, but also the deeper revolution of memes overthrowing the supremacy of the genes. Christian valuation of the spirit over the body turned the biological values of kin selection upside down. In this sense, Jesus's innovations anticipated and laid the cultural groundwork for modern Western revolutions of the political left.

The dawn of Christianity marked a great split between biological and postbiological evolution because Christian values generated a great split between body and mind, i.e. between genetically adaptive inclinations of the body and an ethical standard in opposition to bodily inclinations. Whereas paganism tended to harmonize mind and body, Christian values tended to divide mind and body. Christian memes such as the notion of the Kingdom of God, if taken seriously, signify memes in opposition to genes, and memes ruling over genes.

The inner freedom opened by Christianity is ideally freedom from slavery to the genes, i.e. slavery to instinct (slavery to "sin"). The modern liberal emphasis on learning

is a practical heir of this nurturism over naturism (especially when liberals spread the word against Christianity just as the Christian word was once spread against paganism).

This explains the paradox of a *singular* monotheism that supports the *duality* of mind and body (i.e. the duality of "good" and "evil"). The Biblical God is generally representative of the ethical supremacy of mind over body. The ethical rigor of the mind/body distinction helped guide the development of postbiological evolution over biological evolution in the West. The social and individual values that promoted a division between body and mind helped liberate postbiological evolution from the constraints of biological evolution.

For the pagan West, Christianity posited a new purpose to life, a new end for humankind, and a new trajectory for human history. Modern notions of universal historical "progress" that began with Christian historians reached their nineteenth century peak with Hegel and Marx.[224] However, as Nietzsche pointed out, if reason cannot determine fundamental values, modern Enlightenment values originate from a source that is not purely rational. The grand narrative of modern progress originated, in part, from the Biblical grand narrative of humanity that begins with a fall and ends with a messiah.

The key to understanding Christianity from a Darwinian point of view is recognition that Christian love and compassion aim most precisely towards the preservation of the poor and the weak. Christian values, in other words, select for the survival of those most vulnerable to natural selection in pre-civilizational conditions. By aiming precisely against the natural tendency of natural selection, Christianity created a foundation of values that effectually aspire to end biological evolution by natural selection. The

Christian attack on biological evolution works in simultaneity with an exaltation of the "spirit" that effectually promotes postbiological evolution by helping to liberate the mind from the shackles of the body.

A specific way in which Christian values begin to end biological evolution is charity to the poor that reverses the natural effects of natural selection and thus opposes this central mechanism of biological evolution. Christian sanctification of every individual soul undergirded the modern values of human rights. Modern individual freedom, strongly influenced by Christian notions of conscience, ultimately assumes freedom from political duty and freedom from the bonds of kinship.

Another way in which Jesus's influence reversed biological adaptive values is Christianity's subversion of kin selective values. To follow Jesus is to *hate kin selection* in principle. This is the deep Christian core from which the fundamental trajectory of modernity follows. To observe the impact of Christianity on the entire modern idea of progress one only has to reflect as to whether progress advances or negates kin selection. The modern idea of progress, of course, leads towards the diametrically opposite direction of kin selection. New milestones of progress are fresh new defeats of genetic interests. The seditious genius of Jesus is specifically a subversion of the point of view of the "selfish gene". The modern idea of freedom is actually a continuation of Christian positing of moral freedom from the biological naturalism of kin selection and common biological determinism of the genes in general.

One reason why the science of sociobiology in general and the theory of kin selection in particular appear congenitally controversial in the West is the inheritance of the foundationally anti-kin selective values of Jesus.

Christianity helped oppose the nepotistic values that one would normally predict on the basis of kin selection, and this promoted a division between the social and the biological that parallels the Christian-inspired division of the mind and the body. Christianity helped divorce altruism from kinship and this change, by breaking down family values, helped promote modern, mass individualism. Individualism, in turns, acts as the monkeywrench in the gene machine that facilitates liberal democracy as a transitional political form between biological evolution and postbiological evolution.

Why, then, do Westerners live in societies with values of such obvious discord with a Darwinian-based understanding of the point of view of the selfish gene? Modern *values* are often in diametrical opposition to a Darwinian understanding of the *facts* of human nature. Why is there such a social need to stress the fact/value distinction at all? The facts/values distinction is *valued* in the West, in part, because the values bestowed by Christianity created a profound rupture with the facts that one would expect on a Darwinistic or sociobiological understanding of human nature.

Pagan values, generally speaking, demonstrate greater congruence between the *is* and *ought*; between biological nature and moral imperative. Christianity, by radicalizing the gulf between the *is* and the *ought*, between the values of "this world" and the "next world", helped evolve the very modern Western emphasis on the *distinction* between the *is* and the *ought*. One reason that Darwinian evolution by natural selection appears so distinctly contradictory to Biblical values is precisely because the ultimate ethical ends of the Bible amount to the transcendence of biological inclination and the transcendence of biological evolution.

The fact that the modern West values the fact/value distinction is strongly influenced by Christian values strongly distinct from the facts of biological inclination.

Because biological inclinations and instincts are a form of subjectivity (i.e. *values* that can cloud an objective appraisal of *facts*), Christian influence indirectly promoted norms conducive to science in the West. By attacking the *subjectivity* of egoism, Christian altruism helped promote the *objectivity* of science. Altruism that counters the subjectivity of the self can help open the wider world beyond the self and this de-emphasis on selfishness can promote objectivity.

In the eighteenth century Anglo-American world, for example, "disinterestedness" was the term most often used as a synonym for civic virtue.[225] Disinterestedness and virtue are related, just as self-interest and vice are related. The idea of a disinterested or objective mind *outside* of humankind was strongly influenced by belief in the Biblical God. The idea of God as a judge of humankind assumes that God can objectively account for one's virtues and vices in ways that human justice, at its best, only crudely approximates.

Enlightenment skepticism and empiricism also originated, at least in part, in reaction against Christian faith. While such skepticism and empiricism inevitably singled out the birth of Jesus as a fable or myth, the modern "secular" West nonetheless inherited the consequences of the repression of the circumstances of Jesus's birth in the form of mind/body dualism. The Enlightenment era mind/body separation of Cartesian rationalism has become less than tenable in light of sociobiology's emphasis on the biological bases of human behavior. The profound influence of Christianity in promoting this separation ultimately raises the question of the sociobiological bases of Western modernity.

Jesus's savage attacks on the family were a logical corollary of his attack on his own hereditary origins. To escape from the biological determinism that would brand him a hereditary rapist, he attacked heredity at its roots in the family, and thus the biological bases of his own existence. Jesus's "son of God" identity and his distinctly spiritual/anti-bodily identity are two sides of the same coin. His anti-bodily identity negated the reach his hereditary identity as the son of a Roman rapist through his spiritual identity as the "son of God".

The radical negation of Jesus's biological body is directly related to Jesus's radical spiritualism. This radical mind/body split, in turn, deeply influenced the modern "secular" nature/nurture distinction. The controversial nature of sociobiology in liberal democracies, expressed in politically repressing discussion of the biological bases of human behavior, has the profoundest roots in the repression of a sociobiological understanding of Jesus himself.

There is no contradiction between discerning the biological bases of Christianity and discerning monotheism's role in promoting evolution beyond biology. Sociobiology makes the biological bases of postbiological evolution comprehensible. Even the Biblical idea of the resurrection of the dead can be understood on an evolutionary basis as the *super*natural defiance of *natural* selection.

Jesus's death in body, and resurrection in the form of memes or human memory, could be viewed as a precedent of the prospect uploading of the conscious contents of a human brain into a computer. Jesus was "saved" as living memes in the proto-cyberspace memory of Christians just as human minds might be saved on the hard drive of an artificial intelligence (i.e. God). This would be an ultimate

redemption of the mind/body division through recognition of its evolutionary basis.

Trust or faith in God is an evolutionary ancestor of optimistic faith in modern progress. Yet if the law of accelerating returns is correct, the modern of idea of progress has an evolutionary basis beyond faith. What is "rapture", after all, except the idea of progress, or the anticipation of a better future, extrapolated to an ultimate, superlative, blissful, superhuman dimension?

Judaism for the Gentiles?

"The Jews regard as profane all that we hold sacred", claimed the Roman historian Tacitus, "on the other hand, they permit all that we abhor." One might conjecture that while paganism was distinctly incompatible with Jewish monotheism, Christianity, as a monotheistic offshoot of Judaism, would tend to make Jews look good by its moral standards. The well-furnished history of Christian Anti-Judaism does not support this view.

Why does Judaism look immoral by Christian ideals of selflessness even as Christian compassion for the weak stands morally closer to Judaism than to paganism? Judaism originated, in part, as a technological corrective to the Jewish kinship paradox (what Jews have in common among themselves is a tendency to socially divide among themselves). The Mosaic laws work, in part, as a corrective of egoistic, divisive, and factionalistic behavior among Jews. In moderation, the Old Testament commandment to love your neighbor is roughly compatible with family values. When Jesus took the Jewish altruistic meme to its logical extreme, however, it went from a genetically adaptive corrective for Jews, to being genetically maladaptive as a literal, societal norm for *any* people (The survival of

Christian societies is justified theologically by being "forgiven" for their genetically adaptive behavior).

Judaism, as a technology, is a step towards taking overarching control over the genes. It is a step towards taking control over evolution in the sense of uncovering the possibilities of postbiological evolution. Taken to its Christian extreme, total control over the genes leads to genetic insanity, i.e. sex is evil because genetic propagation is evil, while the propagation of Christian *memes* that supports belief in the evil of the means of genetic propagation is good.

When altruism against egoism is taken to its logical extreme, altruism negates kin selective relationship to genes. Whereas kin selection works through the subordination of altruism to kinship (and thus genes), Christianity reverses the relationship of kinship and altruism. The valuation of altruism over kinship is the basis of the apparent universalism of Christianity: kinship exclusivism inverted to kinship inclusivism. It was the kinship inclusivism represented by Jesus himself as the seemingly impossible merger of Jewish kinship and Roman kinship. What would kin selection predict for a half-Jew/half-Roman in the middle of Roman/Jewish war? The total perversion of kin selective altruism in altruism that attacks kinship. The "universalism" of Christian love is only apparent since this entire innovation is premised on the attack on kin selection expressed by Jesus's hatred for the family. Such behavior was genetically adaptive or selfish for Jesus himself in opening Jewish family values towards inclusion and love even for the half-Roman "enemy".

Jews look relatively bad by the Christian standard because, in part, social disharmony *among themselves* was part of the problem that Mosaic law originally corrected.

Jewish memes point towards total altruism in theory because they are designed to counteract certain kinds of unaltruistic or discordant behavior in naturalistic Jewish practice (while amplifying other already existing naturalistic altruistic behaviors). Behavior is more important than belief in Judaism precisely because Jewish laws served as technological correctives of Jewish *behavior*.

While Judaism emphasizes altruism from without in the sense that Mosaic laws that command altruism can be external to inclination, Christianity emphasizes altruism from within. There is an aspect of Christian altruism that is comparable to a Roman's soldier emotional willingness to die in battle. Christianity takes the self-sacrificing altruism of a Roman soldier and directs it in love towards the unlikable, i.e. the "poor" in altruism.

What were Jews lacking that needed correction? The very opposite of the Jewish kinship paradox is mindless obedience, i.e. the blind obedience of a Nazi soldier or a Roman soldier. While this kind of altruism can be a source of *political* strength, and Jewish deficits in mindless obedience is related to historic Jewish weaknesses, mindless obedience in itself has other consequences.

One reason "original sin" is much more prominent in Christian tradition than Jewish tradition is its theological roots in the sin of rape that originated Jesus. Another reason "original sin" is much more prominent in Christian tradition is an unconscious, nostalgic regret for a lost pagan past.

When Christian social conservatives reach for their cultural roots, they embrace the uprooting force of Christianity. Christianity began a long process of uprooting gentiles from their pagan past. Monotheism substituted an alternate past and an alternate view of themselves as heirs of Hebrew ancestors. In some sense, Christianity brought non-

Jews to serve in what was originally a Jewish mission. Has Christianity molded Christians in a Jewish moral image?

In *The AntiChrist*, Nietzsche declared:

> Jews are the *most catastrophic* people of world history: by their aftereffect they have made mankind so thoroughly false that even today the Christian can feel anti-Jewish without realizing that he himself is *the ultimate Jewish consequence.*[226]

Christian antisemitism is a kind of Jewish self-hatred. In worshipping a Jew named Jesus as their God, and dedicating themselves to essential Jewish values, Christians have dedicated themselves to a form of Judaism.

Jesus, especially under the original model of the Roman Empire, became a spiritual meeting point between Jew and gentile. In Jesus, there is the possibility of Jews loving their Roman enemies, and Romans loving their Jewish enemies. The godly ambiguity between Caesar and Christ arose, in part, out of Jesus's partial identification with Caesar (simultaneous with belief in spiritual transcendence of him). The radical alpha altruism once directed in duty to Caesar became, when directed towards Jesus, the radical omega altruism of compassion for the weak.

In the liberal middle between alpha altruism and omega altruism, there stands an *ambiguity* of altruisms that is the logical foundation of the process of secularization. Within the overlap between kin selective altruism and Christian altruism stands, for example, helping one's frail and senile grandmother or helping a distressed relative. Historically, this overlapping area between alpha altruism and omega altruism was exactly the soft and vulnerable point upon which Christianity latched its social tentacles upon the masses.

However, this somewhat ambiguous terrain in the middle ranges between alpha altruism and omega altruism can also become a source of undoing Christian omega altruism into Roman alpha altruism. Altruism directed towards the weak in the image of Jesus can be slyly rechanneled towards the strong in the image of Caesar. Because Jesus's preaching of hatred for the family *must* be subverted in order for Christianity to function as a normative, societal religion, there *must* be cases where the ambiguity between the alpha altruism and omega altruism becomes so obscured and perverted that Christianity becomes a vehicle of racism.

Take, for example, white American Christian racists. They hate blacks. They hate Mexicans. They hate Jews. And, incidentally, they worship a Jew as the son of God. It is only natural that such Christian racists should pray to Jesus to save them from the Jews.

The fact that modern Christians tend to be associated with the conservative values of the family is a product of Christianity as a societal tradition, not Christianity as an implementation of the words of Jesus. What would happen if a Christian took Jesus's message seriously? The Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, in *Attack Upon "Christendom"*, wrote:

> And this in my opinion is the falsification of which official Christianity is guilty: it does not frankly and unreservedly make known the Christian requirement—perhaps because it is afraid people would shudder to see at what a distance from it we are living...when Christ requires us to save our life eternally (and that surely is what we propose to attain as Christians) and to hate our own life in this world, is there then a single one among us whose life in the remotest degree could be called even the weakest effort in this direction?...let us not wish to gloss over the Christian

> requirement, so that by suppression or by falsification we may bring about an appearance of decorum which is in the very highest degree demoralizing and is a sly death-blow to Christianity.[227]

American politician Patrick Buchanan, by contrast, has attempted to resurrect Jesus just enough to achieve his racist, politically Darwinistic goals. It would appear that the conventional Christian virtue Buchanan admires most is hypocrisy. He laments the loss of the good old-fashioned Christian hypocrisy in which a thinly veiled pagan morality edified the slaughter of a Christian's fellow men under the banner of Christian love.

If Buchanan were to examine himself with Kierkegaard's eye, it might dawn upon him that he is attacking the Christian churches for being Christian: "We were wrong to accompany the old conquistadors, wrong to impose our faith on native peoples, wrong to be handmaidens of empire. We confess, we beg forgiveness from those against whom we and our fathers have sinned." He then points out, "Now this may be the way to heaven, but it can lead to hell on earth."[228] Buchanan and other likeminded Christian racists made it their mission to ensure that the meek do not inherit the earth.

Much of what Christian conservatives are trying to conserve is actually pagan, not Christian. Christianity did not invent the family. Christianity became guilty by association with that kind of social conservatism.

An authentic Christian conservatism would amount to the conservation of the subversion of family patriarchy. Christianity fundamentally redefined the horizons of what became "conservatism", closing the extreme horizons of the gentile political right represented by Rome, and thus pushing normative Christian ethical horizons towards

Jewish norms. A *real* conservative can be witnessed in the Roman emperor Julian the Apostate (c. 331-363 AD), the enemy of Christianity who converted to the paganism of his ancestors in 361.

Every single accusation of the defamation and dethroning of gods and heroes that Buchanan hurls at secular leftists can be slinged with more profound justice at Christianity. Buchanan himself portends what he calls the "death of the West" precisely because the solution he posits is Christian. His solution to the "problem" is the cause of the "problem". What Buchanan criticizes is ultimately rooted in Christianity's spiritual revolution over Rome.

Christianity inspired gentiles to deracinate themselves from their original pagan gods, naturalistic values, and ancestral traditions. Liberalism continues this deracination. The political left casts out those final surviving remains of *politically* pagan sentiment in the name of radicalism almost akin to Jesus's attack on normative Pharisaic Judaism.

Christianity decontextualized and recontextualized patriarchy and altruism, subverting the pre-Christian assumptions and social conditions they evolved and originated in. Jesus's influence effected a softening of the kinship core of patriarchy. From this softened core, liberal social dismantling took administrative control over the hypocrisy industry that Christianity launched. Pat Buchanan himself demonstrates the great reaping of what Christianity has sown: *neutralization.* Buchanan's racist cause was effectively neutralized by the victory of Christianity's melting of racism's kinship core.

Christianity disempowers and disenfranchises kinship relations. It does this by radicalizing the logic of altruism beyond its sociobiological foundation in kinship, subversively making kinship appear inferior in comparison

with its higher, more "universalistic" concerns. In secularized terms, this makes kin selective values, which can include racist values, appear inferior in value.

The Christian moral attack against hereditary social relations is at the root of the modern Western social project of systematic kin selective insanity, i.e. the modern idea of leftward social progress. It was liberalism's Christian inheritance that made a virtue of kin selective insanity. Genetic self-preservation is immorality when genetic suicide is morality. To literally follow Jesus's example is to follow the example of celibate priests and implement the extinction of the biological human race.

Mixed marriages between Christianity and racism persist nonetheless. Perhaps the most famous product of the union of Christianity and racism is the bastard child known as the Klu Klux Klan. Caught between white supremacism and Christ supremacism, the Klu Klux Klan has solved the problem of incompatible ethical commitments through a hybrid creed that offers the worst of both worlds. Their greatest feat of all has been to corrupt both the Christianity that they profess to believe in and their own racist cause in one stumbling stroke.

The End

Friedrich Nietzsche claimed that modern morality and modern democratic, egalitarian ideas are superficial secularizations of Christian *values*. His masterful philosophical and psychological analysis of Jesus and his movement is the starting point of any significant discussion about Christianity's relationship to modern values. Christianity, he claimed, was a slave morality, and modern egalitarianism rests upon the underlying victory of value revolution Christianity initiated.

Yet the secularization thesis is not an exclusively elitist insight. As popular historian Thomas Cahill put it in *The Gift of the Jews*, "There is no way that it could ever have been 'self-evident that all men are created equal' without the intervention of the Jews."[229] No matter which way one looks at it, whether elitist or populist, Jews, including Jesus, have been decisive in molding the evolution of civilization in the West through the inordinate influence of Christianity.

Contra Nietzsche, evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, in *The God Delusion*, takes the diametrically opposite view that "modern" morality does *not* come from the Bible. One of the greatest failures of Dawkins' book is that he fails to even *mention* Nietzsche; he fails to mention the most relevant and potent challenge to his belief that the morality of modernity has nothing to do with the Bible. Among the reasons that Dawkins did not confront Nietzsche, perhaps this is the most obvious: if Nietzsche is right, Dawkins is wrong. Dawkins, whether he realized it or not, directly challenged Nietzsche's understanding of the secularization of modern morality from its Biblical foundation.

According to Dawkins, "we do not need God in order to be good — or evil."[230] Dawkins, unlike Nietzsche, did not subject "good and evil" themselves to radical intellectual scrutiny. Dawkins did not go *beyond* good and evil. Nietzsche, moreover, thought more profoundly about the human implications of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection.

Dawkins believes in an ever-moving *Zeitgeist*. This spirit of the times is a spirit of progress that moves away from prejudices such as racism, sexism, and homophobia, and towards some form of political equality. This politically leftwards shift, he claims, has no connection with religion; it

even marches on despite religion.[231] But if modern egalitarianism does not come from the Bible, then where *does* it come from? Dawkins explained:

> The onus is not on me to answer. For my purpose it is sufficient that they certainly have not come from religion.[232]

That is an explanation? How can religion be ruled out if he has no substantial alternative explanation? While his atheism is a *lack* of belief in God or gods, he is unable to offer a positive scientific explanation for the modern Western values he has faith in. Dawkins accepted the premise that morality is 'not necessarily constructed by reason'.[233] But if reason cannot determine *fundamental* values, then liberalism and the mysterious modern *Zeitgeist* of progress rest on fundamentally irrational foundations.

Dawkins apparently believes in a spontaneous generation or special creation theory of modern values. In the special creation theory of modern political equality, Christianity has nothing to do with its quick and sudden evolution. "Progress" thus progresses from a spontaneous generation of modern egalitarian values. Dawkins writes almost as if modernity did not *evolve* out of the Christian world that preceded it.

The influence of Christianity on "modernity" is not generally appreciated because of the lack of an evolutionary perspective. The reason that Jesus's influence on modernity is underestimated is that the influence of evolution on modernity is underestimated. In other words, it is precisely an evolutionary perspective that allows one to understand *how* secularization happened; how the distinctly "modern" *evolved*, in part, from the inordinate influence of Christianity.

Modernity is characterized by tolerance for racial intermixture and anti-kin selective values. As one goes back further in time there is, generally speaking, less tolerance for racial intermixture. If there is a *Zeitgeist* in history that picks up speed in modernity, imagine the state of "progress" in the first century. Jesus was half-breed thrown into a tribalistic world. There was no clear place for someone like Jesus in that ancient world, and war with Roman oppression strained the formal commandments of Judaism to treat strangers with compassion. Jesus, in inventing a place for himself in a new world, helped invent the modern world.

On a bodily level, Jesus was a symbol of evil because he was a symbol of Rome's political rape of the political body of Israel. On *this* level, Jesus was good only if rape was good. Jesus's existence could be good only on the level of forgiveness, not normal justice.

Jesus was a symbol of evil for reasons utterly beyond his control. He was thrown into a world of war through radical violence that failed to fathom what that violence had created in him. The problem was not Jesus as an individual, but a world that refused to gauge his worth as an individual.

Perhaps the children of Nazareth, all victims of Rome's violent crushing of revolt in the Galilee in 4 B.C.E., would not let the young Jesus forget his origins in rape. Perhaps self-revelation in what he *was* catalyzed a sense of mission. If he interpreted himself in a biological sense, then he was evil as the product of the evil of rape. If he understood what he was on the inside, rather than on the outside, however, then self-realization had to engender something novel within Judaism. Both Jew and Roman, Jesus was a living paradox in world divided in hate between Jew and Roman. Searching deep within himself, would Jesus have not opened his half-Jewish-half-Roman spiritual strangeness towards the

heavens? Understanding himself on the inside, rather than on the outside, is what engendered the Kingdom of God as the comprehensive Kingdom that overcomes the radical dichotomy of Jew and Roman, and thus overcomes "the world". The Kingdom of God was already present *in Jesus himself*: the Kingdom *beyond* Jew and gentile.

This, I think, is why Jesus believed in his own centrality. If, from a Biblical perspective, the conflict between Rome and Israel was the central conflict in the world, then *he* was the central solution. He *was* this conflict's end. If the Roman/Jewish conflict could be transcended in Jesus, then all human conflicts could be transcended. If Jesus could find peace in his own soul, then humans could find peace on Earth. Inner peace through love within him was the end of the central Jewish/Roman-Aryan conflict of history and thus the end of history.

Consider the implications of Jesus having children. For Jesus to seek a mate or have kids would be to confirm the *bodily* interpretation of himself as a hereditary rapist. No matter what his intentions, by passing on his hereditary seed, he would confirm conventional presumptions of natural or biological determinism. No matter what his intentions, passing on his hereditary seed would be perpetuating rape itself by passing on the genes of a rapist.

The problem was the heredity perpetuation of the past. Jesus's solution was to radically reject the hereditary of the past and radically will a future in which heredity is overcome. Jesus effectually willed the "end of the world" by standing, as an individual, against the kin selective powers that would bring him to an end.

If "the world" was inherently polarized by the conflict between Jew and Roman, then Jesus had no place in "this world". Of "this world", he could not be. He was the

exception that broke the rules of the ancient world. *This* is what helped engender the modern world.

Jesus turned the ancient world upside down. Either Roman/Jewish war would tear him apart, or Jesus would tear Roman/Jewish war apart by attacking the kin selective nepotism that polarized both Roman and Jew in opposition to Jesus himself. Jesus reversed kin selective values through hatred of the family. Dawkins apparently prefers the Old Testament on this point, and criticized Jesus for his "dodgy family values"[234]. But if Dawkins is going to criticize Jesus's anti-kin selective values, he should really criticize the values of modernity. What "modern moralist", Dawkins asked, would follow Abraham?[235] Yet Abraham's willingness to kill his own son in the name of God is a theological root of Jesus's hatred of the family. God was not to be confused with pure family values.

Jesus, fettered by the hereditary obsessions of the ancient world, could find freedom only in a spirit-mind identity transcendent of the biological body. While the kin selective altruism of the normal family was saving grace for most, for Jesus it was a prison and an enemy. To reverse kin selection is to destroy the human family. This is how Jesus attempted to bring the world-rule of the selfish gene to an end. In standing as an individual against kin selective, Jesus acted as the supreme monkeywrench in the gene machine that undergirded modern individualism.

Dawkins hypothesized that indiscriminate altruism in the modern context, along with sex with contraception, are misfirings of former genetic adaptations.[236] Since Dawkins subscribes to some form of the liberal egalitarian *Zeitgeist*, this means that Dawkins values this misfiring of ancient genetic adaptations. Dawkins thus believes that these forms

of genetically maladaptive behavior are good. Why does Dawkins *value* genetically maladaptive behavior?

Jesus represented a social problem and his innovative ethics represent, in a sense, a kind of solution. Jesus's ethics are fundamentally selfish in the sense that, in attacking kin selective altruism with an incompatible standard of anti-kin selective altruism, he opened a place for the half-breeds, like himself, that are characteristic of the modern world. The example of Jesus the half-breed gave birth to a model for the modern world; a world that could love outcasts like himself without a home in the ancient world. Christianity, an antidote to genetically adaptive hatred, is probably the deepest source of the implicit modern valuation that the nepotism of kin selection (i.e. Christ killing Nazi racism) is evil.

Jesus was a mutt, but not just any kind of mutt. Jews and Romans were considered political opposite — and often spiritual opposites. Romans considered themselves the alphas of their world, and the Jews the omegas of their world. Jews considered themselves alphas in the eyes of God, and the Romans as the moral omegas of their world. Jesus combined these incompatible alpha/omega conflicts within himself. Jesus could be conceived as both the alpha and the omega his social order. All previous "social" boundaries were broken in his individual *being*. His very *existence* implicated the breaking of all social boundaries. All the seeds of modernity, as a break with the ancient world, are latent within the existence of Jesus.

This is how Jesus could consider himself "supernatural". His birth and existence through rape was outside natural, in the sense of normal, processes. This helped give credence to the myth or lie of a virgin birth and the belief that God intervened in nature. His being was outside the scope of *both*

Jewish nature *and* Roman nature. Being beyond *both* natural Jews *and* natural Romans, he was a step towards modernity's conquest of nature.

Jesus may have originally called himself the "son of man" in response to the question of the identity of his father. A question about his biological father Jesus answered in a spiritual sense. The claim of being the "son of man" (the son of humans) may have an original connection to the claim of being the "son of God" in that everyone is a *child* of God upon the premise of creation. An individual who combines both Roman and Jew within himself combines two extremes of human nature. In this way, the notion of the "son of man" implicitly embodies the idea of all humanity within and through that dynamic Tao.

Being a bridge of the gulf between gentile and Jew in life, Jesus was a bridge of the gulf between gentile and Jew in death. Gentile *assimilation* of Christianity over a thousand medieval years gradually engendered the modern idea of humanity. The assimilation of Jew and gentile in Jesus is what opened assimilation of Jew and gentile in the modern West. Jesus was the first truly assimilated Jew, and the deepest civilizational ground of the modern idea of humanity.

If reason, in itself, cannot determine fundamental values, it becomes clearer that Christianity provided the ethical ends, while modernity bridged the chasm between the real and ideal by providing the technological means to realize those ethical ends. Modernity was bred out of a struggle between the real and the ideal in the form of a struggle for moral superiority.

If morality was equal and not superior to immorality, there would be no moral justification for morality. Moral inequality or moral superiority is the condition of moral self-

justification. Western moral development, like the interrelated phenomenon of economic development, developed through competition. Morality evolves, in part, through a struggle to be spiritual king of the hill.

For example, at one stage of moral superiority, the moral superior haughtily parades his pride in his moral superiority over his moral inferior. This stage of morality is then outdone by someone who shows no hints of arrogance over his moral inferior. This lack of arrogance would seem to *prove* moral superiority over the moral inferior who did express pride. The struggle for moral superiority, then, culminates in the elimination of any acknowledgement of any moral superiority whatsoever. The struggle for moral superiority, in other words, self-destructs.

The path *towards* self-destruction through moral superiority can be discerned in Matthew 5:38-39:

> You have heard that it was said, 'Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.' But I tell you, Do not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.

When Jesus say "But I tell you", he is upping the ante above Judaism's upping the ante above paganism.

Non-violent resistance is not a modern invention; it was practiced by first-century Jews against Rome.[237] Jesus's political powerlessness, however, became the limitation that grounded his theological innovations. Jesus's innovations with Judaism mirrored the origins of Judaism itself in paradigmatic Egyptian slaves. The less powerful one is, the higher one's ethic may be — at least in principle. Christianity is more evolved than Judaism in that it has even lower or more forgiving standards of what a good human being is than Judaism.

Modern liberal struggle for democratization is interwoven with a parallel struggle for moral superiority. Western liberals did not and do not make the argument that liberalism is equal to Christianity in moral worth; liberals clearly think liberal values are morally superior in political practice, superseding Christianity. The rationality of liberalism was premised, in part, on its moral superiority on the level on *politics*. The rationality of arguments for liberalism were rational *within a Christian framework*.

Dawkins, for example, believes in the "evil consequences that can flow from religious belief and observance."[238] He thinks "the moral story of Noah is appalling".[239] Religion, according to Dawkins, nurtures divisiveness and is thus "a significant force for evil in the world."[240]

Dawkins, in other words, is working the hypocrisy industry. If nasty, "unchristian abuse is commonly experienced by those who are perceived as enemies of Christianity",[241] then liberals should out-christianize Christianity. If Christians are hypocrites in persecuting liberals, then Dawkins can demonstrate moral superiority by better realizing in practice what Christian would seem to implicate in theory.

The *Zeitgeist* of modern progress that Dawkins referred to can only be contrasted with Biblical teachings if the *spirit* of Christianity is contrasted with the *laws* (or actual practices) of Christians. This just happens to be quite similar to the paradigm of Jesus condemning Pharisaic hypocrisy. Jesus taught reverence for spirit over law. Jesus took the most distinctive social principles of Judaism — "the essence" or spirit of Judaism — and radicalized it. What Jesus did on a theological level, liberals do on a political level.

If secularization is an evolutionary process, then it would not be surprising if meme mutation playing an important

role. There may not be a perfect legal correspondence between equality under God's law and equality under the modern state law, but Jesus's own emphasis on the *spirit* of the law demonstrates how the mutation of Judaism into Christianity is mirrored in the mutation of Christianization into democratization (not to mention the mutation of liberal democracy into Marxist theories).

Dawkins observed, "we pick and choose among the scriptures for the nice bits and reject the nasty." Secularization, as Dawkins himself illustrates, works through the exact opposite mechanism. Secularizers pick and choose among the scriptures for the nasty bits and reject or deemphasize the nice bits. The hypocrisy industry, as a mechanism of modern secularization, would not effectively work otherwise. Dawkins' citing of the instance of the Mosaic sanction of genocide as an example of the "disconnect between scriptural and modern (one is tempted to say civilized) morals"[242] is thus a perfect illustration of how secularization works: emphasizing the nasty parts shows exactly what modern peoples should be progressing away from.

Dawkins' connection of modern morals and civilized morals is significant in itself. While he is incorrect to claim that "modern morality, wherever else it comes from, does not come from the Bible",[243] this is not the same as the claim that modern morality has no other source. In the English-speaking world, for example, the distinctive cultural valuation of "civilized" morals that Dawkins subscribes to can be traced to the impact of the Norman Conquest.

From a Darwinian perspective, "civilized men" such as Richard Dawkins are domesticated animals. Why should such animals value their own domestication? It was not obvious to Nietzsche that domestication of this kind should

be valued. Yet Nietzsche's German *Kultur* had never been decisively conquered by civilization. Dawkins, by contrast, is the cultural heir of a *valuation* of civilization rooted in the force of conquest. As civilization can be conceived as reason applied to life, practical violence in 1066 became the intellectual foundation for a valuation of practical reason in the English-speaking world.

John Dominic Crossan, mislead by Roman-British self-identifications with "civilization", mistakenly contrasted Christianity with civilization itself. While the dialectical path is necessarily convoluted and ironic, Christianity became a civilizing influence by sanctifying life in opposition to the "natural law" of "the world": natural selection. Christian values civilized or tamed this mechanism of biological evolution. Jesus's death as a gene propagator, and resurrection as a meme propagator, can be understood as a supernatural defiance of the "natural law" of natural selection. Bodily death was not the final word.

The sanctification of human life in opposition to natural selection was Biblically expressed through the notion of the human soul, and especially mind/body dualism. In evolutionary terms, mind/body dualism embodies the break between biological evolution and postbiological evolution — and the Domesday struggle between them. In evolutionary terms, "creation" is a metaphor for the creation of civilization — and the prospective triumph of technological civilization over slavery to the biological body, i.e. uploading the essential informational contents of a human mind (i.e. "the soul") into the pinnacles of human civilization called the computer.

It turns out that there is an evolutionary basis for the Biblical notion of the "end of world". The scientific success of Darwin's great discovery of *biological* evolution through

natural selection has cultivated the assumption that there is the only kind of evolution. Post-Darwinian evolution, that is, postbiological evolution, may lead to the scientific verification of the God Hypothesis.

The Bible and Darwin are necessarily in conflict, not because the Bible is inherently anti-evolutionary, but because the Bible is inherently evolutionary. The Bible is a human guide towards postbiological evolution. The Biblical way has gradually weaned its followers from the pagan values that accord with the selective mechanisms of biological evolution. The "end of the world" is the end of the rule of the selfish gene. The evolutionary relationship between the Biblical and the modern that I called "secularization" bears its full evolutionary fruit in the relationship between Singularity and secularization.

Biological evolution is characterized by hereditary self-perpetuation and genealogical continuity. Postbiological evolution is often characterized by the opposite pattern; a break with genealogical continuity. More generally, major innovations in postbiological evolution are often characterized by a fight against the genealogy of ideas as a corollary of a fight to break with the genealogy of the past in general.

Modern liberalism, for example, has not been inclined to acknowledge its historical debt to Christianity anymore than Christianity has been historically inclined to acknowledge its Jewish parentage. Yet one cannot fully understand the secularization of Christianity except as a development with roots in the preceding paradigm of Christianity's separation from Judaism. When rootless West moderns trace their roots to Christianity, they are led to Christianity's roots in Judaism (this is surely a formula for rootlessness).

Judaism itself was and is hardly inclined to acknowledge its own origins insofar as Judaism can be traced to a reaction to oppressors of Jews. In Judaism against paganism, Christianity against Judaism, liberalism against Christianity, and Marxism against capitalist-liberalism there is a genealogy of anti-genealogy. If each innovation in postbiological evolution was premised on a break with genealogical continuity, then there *must* be a genealogy of anti-genealogy that characterizes postbiological evolution.

The crucial point here is that this is not an accidental attribute of postbiological evolution, but rather a consequence of the realization of the *content* of the ideas themselves; an anti-genealogical morality that disdains its own parentage. For example, when Jesus advocates division between generations (Matt. 10:34, Luke 12:49), he is fighting the inheritance of past generations. He was attacking the past identity from which his very innovations evolved. Modern leftism, with its encryption through universalization, inherited this deracinating paradigm from Judaism and Christianity.

Jesus's radicalization, building on Mosaic foresight, yet failing to decisively supersede Judaism, helped bring about the evolution beyond biology that defines the modern world. He escaped from the prison of a bodily identity as a hereditary rapist through a spiritual identity as the "son of man" or the "son of God". In looking forward to the end, he said farewell to man's biological beginning embodied in the natural laws of kinship and family. In looking forward, and not back, he engendered the modern Western idea of social progress:

> Follower to Jesus:
> I must say good-bye to my family

Jesus to follower:
Do not look backward when you grasp the plow or grasp the Kingdom[244]

[155] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 109.

[156] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 109-110.

[157] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 109.

[158] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 82-3.

[159] Borg and Crossan, *The First Christmas*, 104.

[160] Borg and Crossan, *The First Christmas*, 104.

[161] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 53.

[162] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 1.

[163] Natural selection has favored females that tended to be choosier than males about mates. The ultimate reason for this is that female biology compels a far greater amount of parental investment required to bring a child into the world. A female must investment a minimum of about nine months of pregnancy to pass on her genes. A male can potentially invest only as long as it takes it to penetrate a female sexually and ejaculate.

[164] Thornhill and Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape*, 53.

[165] Thornhill and Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape*, 66.

[166] Thornhill and Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape*, 57.

[167] Thornhill and Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape*, 74.

[168] Thornhill and Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape*, 134.

[169] Thornhill and Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape*, 85.

[170] Donin, *To Be A Jew*, 59.

[171] Nietzsche, *The AntiChrist* in *The Portable Nietzsche,* 592.

[172] Johnson, *A History of the Jews*, 128.

[173] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 138.

[174] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 31.

[175] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 12, 15.

[176] See, for example, McKirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates*, 232-291.

[177] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 69,156.

[178] Crossan, *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography,* 58.
[179] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 114.
[180] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 86.
[181] Alcock, *The Triumph of Sociobiology*, 201-202.
[182] Alcock, *The Triumph of Sociobiology*, 201.
[183] Crossan and Borg, *The Last Week*, 33.
[184] Thornhill and Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape*, 1.
[185] Thornhill and Palmer, *A Natural History of Rape*, 53.
[186] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 69,156.
[187] See also: Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 49, 152.
[188] Crossan, *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography*, 88-91.
[189] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 82.
[190] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 125.
[191] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 131.
[192] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 104.
[193] Crossan, *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography*, 64.
[194] Crossan, *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography*, 65.
[195] Crossan, *The Historical Jesus*, 280-1.
[196] Crossan, *The Historical Jesus*, 280-1.
[197] For an alternate interpretation that does not properly account for Jesus's hereditary origins see: Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 94, 160.
[198] Schäfer, *Judeophobia,* 190-1.
[199] Crossan, *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography,* 27.
[200] Hertzberg, *Jews,* 62.
[201] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 91-2.
[202] Crossan, *The Last Week*, 64.
[203] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 132.
[204] Crossan & Reed, *In Search of Paul*, 11; Crossan, *God & Empire*, 106-107.
[205] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 117.
[206] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 79.

[207] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 157-8.
[208] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 190.
[209] Annals 15.44
[210] Crossan and Reed, *In Search of Paul*, 118.
[211] Crossan & Reed, *In Search of Paul*, 106.
[212] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 45.
[213] Huntington, *Who Are We?*, 89.
[214] The extent to which the conflict between "barbarian" Germanic aristocracy and Etruscan natives played in the form of Machiavelli's political theory is debateable.
[215] Bonaparte, *The Mind of Napoleon*, 103.
[216] Bonaparte, *The Mind of Napoleon*, 104.
[217] Crossan, *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography,* 62.
[218] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 69,156.
[219] Kaufmann, *Hegel: a reinterprrtation,* 296.
[220] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 78.
[221] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 81.
[222] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 79-81.
[223] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 429.
[224] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man,* 68.
[225] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 104.
[226] Nietzsche, *The AntiChrist* in *The Portable Nietzsche,* 593.
[227] Ed. Bretall, Robert. Trans. Walter Lowrie. *A Kierkegaard Anthology.* (NewYork: Random House, 1946), 439-441.
[228] Buchanan, *The Death of the West*, 121.
[229] Cahill, *The Gift of the Jews,* 249.
[230] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 258.
[231] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 304.
[232] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 306.
[233] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 265.
[234] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 284.
[235] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 274-5.

[236] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 253.
[237] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 89.
[238] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 132.
[239] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 269.
[240] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 297.
[241] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 242.
[242] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 278-9.
[243] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 279.
[244] Crossan, *The Essential Jesus*, 121.

Absolute Purity

The Secularization of Hell within the
Desecration Machine of Auschwitz

LOVE KILLS

The heaviest blow that ever struck humanity was the coming of Christianity. Bolshevism is Christianity's illegitimate child. Both are inventions of the Jew.[245]

—ADOLPH HITLER

Justice is strife.[246]

—HERACLITUS OF EPHESUS

Agon

Hitler's Most Beautiful Words

In his diary entry for June 16, 1926, Joseph Goebbels reflected upon Adolph Hitler's "most beautiful words" of the preceding day:

> God showed us mercy beyond measure in our struggle. His most beautiful gift to us is the hatred of our enemies, whom we in turn hate with all our hearts.'[247]

The Nazis, however, did not believe it self-evident that all men are hated equal. No, the Jews have a special place in the Nazi heart. Within *The Divine Comedy* of the Nazi Weltanschauung, Dante's Circles of Hell were reinvented so

that each despised race was damned to their assigned place in the hell fires. The supreme pains of the inner ring of hell, however, were reserved for the Jews alone.

This 'special treatment' by Germans hardly began with the Nazis. The very term anti-Semitism was coined by the German Jew-hater Wilhelm Marr. He believed that Jews and Germans were locked in a life and death struggle that could only be resolved with the victory of one race and the destruction of the other. So passionate was his race feeling, he founded the League of Antisemites in 1879 to promote his cause of the existential negation of the Jews.

"There cannot be two chosen people," Hitler insisted. "Doesn't this say everything?"[248] If the German were to be chosen for total domination then the Jews were to be chosen for total destruction. With contempt for the Bible, the Nazis would arrogate the historical right to cast final judgment upon the Jews.

During World War I, writer Thomas Mann stated, "German militarism is the manifestation of German morality...[and] refuses to recognize the civilian spirit as the final ideal of mankind."[249] The German-Jewish conflict was fundamentally a conflict of irreconcilable conceptions of morality. An ethos that honors loyalty as a virtue in itself, *whether right or wrong*, is necessarily in conflict with an ethos that aspires to reject the very premise and 'principle' of war: the destruction of life. At its most dynamic, World War II was a spiritual war between a morality of honor and a morality of compassion. At their most extreme, these two moralities correspond to irreconcilable attitudes towards the political.

German political theorist Carl Schmitt, author of *The Concept of the Political* (1932), joined the Nazi party in 1933.

"For as long as a people exists in the political sphere, this people must", he thought,

> determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy. Therein resides the essence of its political existence….The justification of war does not reside in its being fought for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy.[250]

The path towards the destruction of European Jewry required the convergence of two ideas. First, as Mann stated, "German militarism is the manifestation of German morality". Second, the "justification of war does not reside in its being fought for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy." Thus combined, the identification of a real enemy was identical to the assertion of a German morality appropriate to a German political existence. This meant the political identification of the German and the ethos of the warrior. And the warrior is a specialist in killing; a specialist in the negation of life.

"War", Schmitt wrote, "is the existential negation of the enemy".[251] If, in the words of German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), "[w]ar is merely a continuation of politics" by other means, then the most total act of war against the Jews was merely a continuation of politics by other means. The gas chamber accomplished the same end as the machine gun. I will call the Nazi war against the Jews the *Judeocide*; a distinctly secular term for the killing of over five million Jews by the Nazis and their collaborators during World War II.

Clausewitz had spoken of "absolute war"; the logical consequence of imagining the pure, Platonic ideal of war. It is the very nature of war, he believed, to break out of rules that limit war. The rules of competition force the breaking of

rules of limitation. The participants are ultimately led to use all means at their disposal in order to achieve ultimate victory. For the Nazis, the most total self-realization of the German warrior ideal led to total war, and hence, in the case of the Jews, the total "existential negation of the enemy".

The Judeocide was a logical culmination of the conception of total war. It was war adapted to the peculiar circumstances of the Jews, a people who lacked a state and were, in that sense, fundamentally unpolitical. Total resources towards total destruction of the enemy as the highest priority wrought genocide; the physical non-existence of the race enemy. War represents the most *physical* characterization of enemy: the enemy as a physical object, like any other non-human physical object.

War is fundamentally political, and is by no means necessarily mastered by economics. Contra Karl Marl, what mattered to the victims of Auschwitz or Hiroshima was not who controlled the means of production, but who controlled the means of destruction. The Nazis clarified Marx's mistake with a perfect inversion: the mastery of the political over the economic "means of production". Auschwitz was the civilized organization of the means of destruction fitted to a people who had relinquished a truly political existence.

"The distinction of friend and enemy", Carl Schmitt maintained, "denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or disassociation."[252] The Nazi revolution attempted to reverse the feministic degeneration of men into economic animals and to reconstitute men as truly political animals. It was precisely from this political view that Jews, submerged in the economic, appeared as non-humans. If man is a "political animal" then Jews were subhuman insofar as Jews were subpolitical. Subordinating and dominating the subpolitical,

Auschwitz actualized the Nazi estimation of the Jews as political nothingness.

Hitler once said that if Jews did not exist, they would have to be invented. An enemy was needed so Nazis could define themselves as being above something they believed they were not. By alienating Jews as the embodiment of modern alienation, Hitler unified the Germans.

"They [people in general] would not have known the name of justice if these things [unjust things] did not exist",[253] observed the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus. Opposites define one another: "Disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger satiety, weariness rest."[254] By idealizing Jewish influence as disease, Germans were able to define their ideal state of health by contrast. Only radical hatred of the Jews could elicit radical Nazi self-love.

Jews were idealized as the negation of Nazi-Germans, the embodiment of evil and enemy. Nazi propaganda bred a life-generating myth of a Nazi master race through a death-generating myth about a Jewish anti-race. In the eyes of Nazi-Germans, the life of Jews was drawn from their souls long before it was drawn from their bodies.

Enemies of Our Soul

"Those who are raging today against the ideals of reason and individual liberty", declared Albert Einstein in 1934, "and are trying to establish a spiritless state-slavery by brute force rightly see in us their irreconcilable foes."[255] Nazis were, in a traditional Jewish formulation, "enemies of our soul".[256] They were like the Amalekites of the Bible (Deut. 25:18, Ex. 17:16), unyielding enemies whose attack on children, the aged, and the weakest members of society implicated the further destruction of Jewishness itself.

Is common ground between these spiritual enemies even conceivable? Some German Jews said they were Germans and Germans said they were not, just as some Christians claimed they were the true Jews and Jews claimed that they were not. Who is to settle these disputes?

The Manichean opposites of Jew and Nazi were synthesized in the Judeocide. The historical event by which the Jews and Germans are most inextricably interwoven in history is simultaneously the place of their most radical divergence. The pinnacle of Nazi idealism was the nadir of Jewish moralism, while the pinnacle of Jewish moralism was the nadir of the Nazi ideal.[257]

For Jews to assert clear, condemnatory moral value judgments against the Judeocide is thus an indictment of Jews from a Nazi view. It is an indictment of the foundational irreconcilability between the views of "Jew" and "Nazi" and a verification of the Nazi view that the indictment is rooted in a Jewish *Weltanschauung*. For example, the American-Jewish lawyer Alan Dershowitz once asserted:

> [T]hose German Jews who opposed Hitler's antisemitism were not guilty of placing their loyalty to co-religionists over loyalty to Germany. It was Hitler who placed his loyalty to a destructive ideology above loyalty to the German people and nation. Those who opposed Hitler, both Jews and non-Jews, were the true German patriots. They were true not only to the best of German tradition and values, but also to universal principles of justice.[258]

In other words, Jews will be patriotic German nationalists as long as the German nation stands for internationalism and universal values. This argument merely illustrates the lack of common ground and the fundamental

incompatibility of worldviews in conflict. The same facts can be subject to incompatible interpretations and this exposes the core of the German-Jewish confrontation.

The Judeocide was a crime against humanity in the sense that it was a crime against the very idea of the moral unity of human race. A humanistic view of Nazism, taken seriously, would see the Judeocide an internecine disaster. By killing Jews, the Nazis, as humans, would be killing themselves.

The Nazi themselves, however, identified Jews as internationalist-humanitarians *par excellence*. By killing Jews, the Nazis, as anti-humanists, were killing their humanity. Germans earnestly de-humanized themselves as the logical corollary of re-Germanizing themselves.

Auschwitz consummated in deed the Nazi belief that no bond of "humanity" connected Jew and German. Killing Jews demonstrated their contempt for humanity, and completed the severance of their identity from humankind. Auschwitz was thus the full blossom of Nazism; the demonstration that they were Übermenschen, over and above man.

The very idea of humanity demonstrates the limits of humanism's own capacity for empathy because the supreme "other", the Nazi, is marginalized as inhumane. The limits of the "universalism" of humanism are demonstrated in that Nazi inhumanity became the legitimate ground for waging the inhumanities of war against the Nazis. Humanistic "universalism" is thus built on the exclusion of certain human types. Humanism singles out a *minority* of the human population and makes them a *pariah* of humanity. The most blatant evidence of the mutual exclusivity of Nazi and Jew is that the Nazis now occupy the marginal position of negative prestige that was reserved for Jews in the past.

Philosophic beginnings of Nazi inhumanism can be found in an idealistic conception of the rational human. The German idealism of Kant and Hegel posited the rational as freedom or autonomy from empirical necessity. From this view, the inhuman was connected to dependence upon the empirical, material world and the greatest realization of this materialism was connected with an idealization of the Jews.

Yet the Nazi mixture of German idealism and Darwinian biological materialism exposed a blind spot in German thought. The aesthetic idealization of the physical human form on an individual level and an exclusionary racial utopia on a collective level demonstrated a connection between German idealism and worldly empiricism. The influence of Darwinian biological materialism demonstrated that Jews could not be judged fundamentally more materialistic than Nazis — Hitlerites were materialistic in a different and incompatible way. It was the Nazi spiritualization of biology, and especially the Nazi connection of the value of individual lives to the racial-biological characteristic of the body, that Jews tended to perceive as "materialistic".

Yet if German-Nazis were to *self*-incorporate a *purely* biological-materialistic understanding of themselves (i.e. as gene machines), they would corrupt the very subjective, idealistic, mechanisms that made them efficient gene machines. The "naïve", instinctive, internal logic of the genes, often expressed in aesthetic preferences, had to preempt and override unadulterated empiricism in the *Bildung* of German-Nazi *Kultur*. *Kultur* as such is dependent on the precedence of a complex, Hegel-like spiritual synthesis that appears as a subjective blind spot from the standpoint of the empiricist.

Jews developed differently because the *external* logic of the laws of Moses was designed to overcome straightforward, organic impulses, and this difference defined Jews as Jews. Judaism "cheats" the *internal* logic of German idealism with a hybrid internal-external synthesis that opened much greater room for adaptation to the larger empirical world. Mosaic law was in some ways unbound to Jewish genes and can thus be viewed as the origin of the Jewish belief in the greater importance of environmental or non-genetic factors. The Mosaic emphasis on external learning over internal impulse promoted a deemphasis on natural spontaneity and an attitude of greater openness and objectivity toward the larger material world.

From one point of view, the Jewish depreciation of *thymos* and certain kinds of internal idealism is a source of Jewish advantage when this is looked upon as a subjective blind spot of gentiles. While this "advantage" might make Jews more objective about the dangers of political power, it originated as a corollary of historic Jewish alienation from political power. Political power was literally not *apart* of the subjective identity of Jews, and this promoted greater objectivity toward the political.

For Germans, by contrast, the bonds of the "state", interconnected with the notion of the German *Volk*, had a subjective, psychological reality. One of the most Jewish characteristics of Karl Marx was his insistence on the essential unreality of politics and his equal insistence that only the economic-material world is fundamentally "real". Marx reduced the German perception of the larger collective whole into a communist skeleton that could supposedly be accounted for on the basis of economics alone.

The distinctly political radicalism associated with the notion of "evil" was the traditional blind spot of the Jewish

mind, just as radical economic materialism was the traditional blind spot of the German mind. Historically barred from real political peaks, the Jewish-international struggle against the highest sociobiological syntheses left its natural, higher inclinations unjoined, unmet, discontinuous, exposed — and open to the penetrating light of the larger physical world. From the world of German *Kultur*, however, these concessions to materialism implicated being ultimately swallowed whole by it.

In summary, the incompatibility of the views of Nazi and Jew is related to an inverse and isomorphic objectivity/subjectivity relationship. The totality of Jewish objectivity towards economic-materialism was limited by Jewish subjectivity towards Darwinian biological materialism. The totality of German-Nazi objectivity towards Darwinian biological materialism was limited by German-Nazi subjectivity towards economic-materialism.

Economic material-objectivity competes with biologically based *Kultur* subjectivity for development. The first path leads towards socioeconomic-technological evolution, while the second leads towards sociobiological evolution. Different mental organizations thus imply different trajectories of evolutionary development that may ultimately be incompatible. If some truths are incompatible with life, and there are incompatible ways of life, the kind of truth that gives life to one evolutionary path can kill the life of the other evolutionary path and vice versa.

Auschwitz represents the attempt to destroy the biological foundation of the moral standard by which Auschwitz can be judged evil. The very act of examining Auschwitz with clear, condemnatory moral value judgments, as Daniel Jonah Goldhagen does in *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, is an act in defiance of Auschwitz. Yet it

is also a demonstration of the irreconcilability of Nazi values and Jewish values.

What the Nazi Judeocide attempted to annihilate was precisely the moral standard by which Goldhagen condemned the Judeocide. The Nazis attempted to weld political power to the program of destroying the historical, biological origins of Judeo-Christian morality in the form of Jews. Goldhagen condemned the Judeocide on grounds which Nazis concretely attempted to condemn to the dustbin of history.

If Goldhagen is right by Jewish standards, then he is wrong by Nazi ones. If he is wrong by Nazi standards, then he is right by Jewish ones. Is there, between these views, only struggle?

The Noble Aryan Anus

"I have not met a German yet who was well disposed towards the Jews", wrote Friedrich Nietzsche. Even

> caution and policy are not directed against the species of this feeling itself but only against its dangerous immoderation...That Germany has amply *enough* Jews, that the German stomach, the German blood has trouble (and will still have trouble for a long time) digesting even this quantum of "Jew"—as the Italians, French and English have done, having a stronger digestive system—that is the clear testimony and language of a general instinct to which one must listen, in accordance with one must act.[259]

Ultimately, the Jews would indeed be digested. They would be, not absorbed into the blood stream, but defecated out of the noble Aryan anus — the "*Arschloch der Welt*".

"The Jews", Nietzsche wrote, "are beyond any doubt the strongest, toughest, and purest race now living in Europe"

prevailing "by means of virtues that today one would like to mark as vices."[260] The Nazi would disagree. Taken at face value, it would appear that the Nazis believed that Jews were, in effect, a human analog of the parasitic ant *Teleutomyrmex schneideri*.[261] Slavery is by definition a form of parasitism, and the Jewish mode of life originated in overturning the master-parasite mode of existence represented paradigmatically by the ancient Egyptians. The Nazis aspired to this latter form of parasitism through the enslavement of other same-species populations, a mode of life comparable to the so-called Amazon ants, i.e. *Polyergus rufescens*.[262] The Nazis believed that *they* were the chosen parasites.

Some Jewish world conspiracy theories, such as the forgery known as The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, suggest that there is a central, undisputed Jewish elite that is, with deliberate and conscious intent, orchestrating Jewish behavior across the world. To claim that Jews are consciously conspiring to take over the world is comparable to claiming that blacks are consciously conspiring to take over world basketball. Yet this point raises the question of how much of human behavior is unconscious, and how much unconscious human behavior is attributable to genes.

The overestimation of conscious human foresight in human behavior can be illustrated with the evolution of farming. Human agriculture, which began approximately 10,000 years ago, might appear to be an exclusive triumph of primitive human foresight. The farming of fungus by leaf cutter ants (genus *Atta*), however, preceded human farming by five to fifteen million years.

The complex collective organization of leaf cutter ants, differentiated into numerous castes, demonstrates one of the most advanced developments of the Superorganism or

Überorganism among ants.[263] Just as multicellular animals such as humans are the collective product of individual cells, a leaf cutter colony is the collective product of individual ants. Workers in an ant colony are literal sisters of the queen ant that bears the brood. Kin selection, the favoring of individuals with shared genes, explains the altruistic behavior of individual ants within the colony and the evolutionary basis of the Überorganism as a whole.

Evolutionary parallels with the Überorganism among ants can be found in many species. Among humans, a parallel can be found in the example of Nazi Germany. If so, which was more influential in explaining the behavior of Germans in Auschwitz: genes or environment? While there is no simple answer to this question, the Judeocide is explicable, at least in part, in terms of the sociobiological discovery of kin selection.

While the Nazi state assumed some level of internal differentiation among Germans akin to the caste differentiations of leaf cutter ants, this internal differentiation was subsumed by an overriding racial-political unity. The characteristically modern differentiation on the level of isolated, atomized individuals is qualitatively different. The logic of modern individualism is different because it works against the logic of the selfish genes; against the direction of the sociobiological development that culminates in an Überorganism. Modern individualism was profoundly influence by the Judeo-Christian valuation of individual souls. The notion, furthermore, that God is an undifferentiated unity promoted the idea of the unity of an undifferentiated humankind. It is virtually the definition of political modernity that the Überorganism model does not accurately apply to humans, the reasons for which I will explore elsewhere, especially in *Converse Cognates*.

The Jewish kinship paradox is the sociobiological root of the Jewish *disinclination* towards forming a political Überorganism among themselves. Unencumbered by that magnitude of contumacious, critical qualities characteristic of Jews, more complex kinship-altruism relationships were able to evolve among gentiles. Starting with the family and tribe, chiefdoms and ethnic-states were more likely to develop with a cohesion that was politically formidable to its neighbors and competitors.

Even if the Biblical Exodus never happened, the ancient Egyptians were ideal representatives of the superlative, gentile, kinship-altruism political development that I refer to as an Überorganism. The Egyptian Überorganism demonstrates what Jews are *not*. A kinship gulf between Hebrews and Egyptians might mean the difference between friend and foe, "us" and "them", master race and slave race. The Biblical conception does imply this kind of kinship unity among Egyptians. God's plague, for example, struck death at all first born Egyptian males, not just the ruling class.

The Überorganism represents a development characteristic of strong states in the ancient world, and successful colonies in the ant world. Just as with some ant species, kinship is not incompatible with differentiations into castes. Among gentiles who exhibit it, the balance of kinship unity and diversity that results in the differentiation within an Überorganism is guided in part by an aesthetic sense. The Jewish pattern is characterized by an override of such aesthetic preferences by a moral sense, i.e. conscience.

If the Egyptian pharaoh represented the ultimate convergence of the strong and the good among Egyptians, inverting the values of the pyramid hierarchy would associate the values of the weak and the good. From this Jewish-Biblical view, pharaoh represented the convergence

of extreme strength and extreme evil. The Hebrew slaves, then, could view themselves as both the weak and the good. More fundamentally, however, their weakness was the paradigmatic expression of Jewish *incapacity* for political organization against the powerful state epitomized by ancient Egypt. The practical permanence of the association of the evil and the political in Judaism reflects this Jewish incapacity on one hand, and Egyptian-gentile capacity for such political organization on the other. They are related in that political incapacity made ancient Jews vulnerable to enslavement peoples such as the Egyptians. The post-Exodus inversion from slave-technologies to souls of infinite value reinterprets this lack of political organizational capacity by accepting it and valuing it.

The infinite value of human lives in ancient Judaism exposes a *technical deficiency*; the inability to cohere into an effective, unified, national body of obedient individuals. Yet if what distinguishes Jews is negative; a lack of capacity; a dissent against the Überorganism model, how does that add up to a *positive* identity? If an Überorganism, via kinship, is by definition more than the sum of its individual members, how can Jews be considered more than the sum of *their* parts, if they simply oppose it? Lack of apparent exploitation of members as cogs in the Überorganism was reinterpreted as a basis for moral superiority as God's chosen people. The practical, technical inability to subordinate and organize towards the complex differentiations of the Überorganism model was flaunted as the foundation for a new moral order.

The origin of a clear, universal monotheistic distinction between right and wrong is directly related to the universal Jewish inability and disinclination for the Überorganism form of sociobiological development. It is directly related to a Jewish lack of acceptance of the humanly political as a

legitimate override of all domains of human life. Bar Kokhba's brave and disastrous revolt against Rome, after all, demonstrated the folly of political aspiration. Relinquishing political aspiration could open possibilities of greater egalitarianism among Jews themselves since the very nature and condition of Überorganism development leads to complex differentiations among its members; various kinds of inequality.

A further consequence of the Jewish kinship paradox concerns the valuation of risking life. If Jewish ethics value individual lives as ends in themselves, this delegitimizes the kind of self-sacrifice exemplified in war. Self-sacrifice in war evolved as an extension of the kinship based altruism that makes the Überorganism possible in the first place. Yet the Jewish kinship paradox meant that genetic similarity among Jews resulted, not in extreme self-sacrifice of that kind, but rather in the devaluation of extreme self-sacrifice. While there are exceptions, the general Jewish ideal is that everyone lives for one another, not that everyone heroically dies for one another.

The source of the risk to life is more basic for Jews. It lies in having the chutzpah to assert this ethic and mode of existence against the grain of a violent world. There are ample examples of Jewish martyrdom throughout Jewish history. Yet without the aggressive, offensive action of the persecutor, there could never be a martyr. The bravery of the martyr lies in following the way of God even when he knows that he will pay for it with his life.

The basic difference between these altruisms could be described as the difference between alpha altruism and omega altruism. Alpha altruism is fundamentally oriented towards the alpha male, i.e. pharaoh. Omega altruism is oriented towards the politically poorest, i.e. Hebrew slaves.

Slavery is a form of parasitism and Egyptian masters could exploit Hebrew "altruism" against their own kinship interests by instilling fear. Such slavery could delegitimize the paradigm of alpha altruism and even threaten to destroy *all* forms of altruism by associating altruism with exploitation. Omega altruism evolved among Jews, in part, as a general strategy for both opposing parasitic, non-kinship altruism demanded by oppressors while preserving a form of altruism oriented towards the oppressed. This form of altruism helped solve the internal divisiveness of the Jewish kinship paradox by orienting Jews towards inclusivity over exclusivity; commonality over what divides.

In consequence, Judaism *works* because Jewish values, in their most uncompromised forms, are *systematically* incompatible with the Überorganism model represented by Egyptians or Nazis. The very existence of the complex sociobiological differentiations that culminate in an Überorganism is dependent on the subordination of its members to the political whole. Dissidence towards that way of life in the form of omega altruism over alpha altruism is the definition of its dysfunction. Taken to its extreme, omega altruism culminates in the death of the political system. The moral reversal from means to ends; from a slave-technology to a child of God, is an implicit program for the de-construction of the Überorganism model represented by Egyptians and Nazis.

A political Überorganism is, by definition, more than the sum of its members. Jewish political dissidence on grounds of social conscience implies that Jews are *not* more than the sum of their parts on this level, and hence, do not incline towards a conventional Überorganism. Extreme dissidence implies an extreme *anti*-holism, a radical *not* making one's self into more than the sum of its parts. Yet this pattern,

when abstracted, does add up to a politically leftward pattern of its own.

For example, the Nazi order sought to unify Germans within an internal hierarchy. This hierarchy was extended to non-Germans as German nationalism. Jews, by contrast, tend to divide against their own internal hierarchy. This breakdown of hierarchy characteristic of the Jewish kinship paradox extends to non-Jews as Jewish internationalism. Alpha altruism is exemplified by the nationalism of Hitlerism. Omega altruism is exemplified by the internationalism of Marxism.

If the Jewish mode of existence was deconstructive of the political existence that characterized gentile nations, it also tended to be deconstructive of a political existence of their own. The Nazi solution to this political problem was to identify the cause of unifying all Germans with the cause of eliminationist anti-Semitism. More specifically, the Nazis sought to eliminate the Biblical-modern morality that disintegrated the Überorganismic whole.

The Nazi Weltanschauung emphasized the pagan unity of the human and the natural. The Nazi veneration for non-humans animals, for example, was part and parcel of the animalization of human. The Nazis adopted the "ethics" of the animal world. This bio-ecological harmony of German *Kultur with* nature was contrasted with Biblical-modern domination of civilization *over* nature.

The pagan tends to identify the good with the natural, and Nazi neo-paganism was an attempt to restore a primal sense of natural unity. It was an attempt to restore the Faustian unity of good and evil that Judeo-Christian influence had ripped apart. Do Jews fight to negate such pagan unity with analytical divisions of good and evil? Does conscience, and human rights as a formalization of

conscience, inhibit the unpolitical politics of the Überorganism? Did Jews negate the syntheses that were the condition of German *Kultur*?

Yet Jewish moral dualism was founded upon the higher unity of the one true God. The radical monotheistic discontinuity between good and evil originated with a radical break between meme and gene. Since Jewish sociobiological naturalism leads to the political dysfunction of the Jewish kinship paradox, Jewish sociobiology was countered with Jewish sociotechnology. A technological function of the God of the Jews was to override genetic naturalism, to technologically correct socially maladaptive genes with the substitute of the "higher law" of memes (i.e. the laws of Moses), and to posit God as the ultimate Übermessianic realization of the total overcoming of the genes.

The God-technology of Mosaic law was a moderate corrective to hereditary naturalism that generally singles out genetic extremism as evil. For traditional Jews, total genetic naturalism would mean the total relinquishment of the laws of Moses and the collective social dysfunction of the Jewish kinship paradox. In gentiles, total genetic naturalism often includes anti-Semitic hostility to the relatively leftward Jewish step towards a post-biological world.

The extreme political right leads to treating individuals only as means of their selfish genes. The extreme political left leads to mass individual survivalism that overrides the kin selective developmental logic of the selfish genes. The extreme right leads to political control over biological evolution. The extreme left leads to overriding direct control over biological evolution.

If Jews are true to the moral inheritance of Judaism, the entire realm of political-biological development must be

morally relinquished. The primacy of eugenic, *biological* evolution is thus permanently closed off to Jews as an evil historical alternative. It is only from *this* point of view that one can grasp the ultimate limits of Zionism in contradistinction to Nazism. Jews are both incapable and uninclined to form the political conditions of *total*, eugenic, biological evolutionary self-direction.

The Biblical discontinuity between good and evil was reflected in the historic discontinuity between Jews and political self-control. Radical evil, for Jews, has been virtually synonymous with the radicalization of political power since that power was historically *against* Jews, not *of* Jews. But by morally relinquishing the political, Jews have relinquished the means of control over biological evolution, i.e. the means of selecting who lives and who dies.

Hitler's war against the Jews can be considered purely defensive only if *Lebensraum* can be considered purely defensive. Far from being a defensive war against Jews and Judaism, Nazism represented offensive control over biological evolution. *Lebensraum* was a territorial corollary of Hitler's biological-racism. Unlike Zionists, Nazis aspired not simply to exist in a territorially limited state, but to control human biological evolution by determining which populations may live and breed, and which populations were to be enslaved or killed.

The Biblical idea of the infinite worth of each individual in the eyes of God or the modern idea of universal human rights imply the artificial end of natural selection as a driving force in biological evolution. Jewish existence stands on moral ground that is identical to ending the existential selections that allowed humans to evolve in the first place. Auschwitz represents the attempt to pull the moral ground

that Jews stood upon as a cornerstone of demonstrating the mastery of biology over all human values.

The Nazi *valuation* of the primacy of biology is why Nazi politics cannot be reduced to economics. The primacy of economics in liberalism or Marxism, by contrast, runs counter to the primacy of biology. The Nazi state represented a synthesis of extreme means of sociobiological self-control united in belief in the net superiority of a eugenic ethic. The Jewish-monotheistic innovation in ethics, by contrast, lay in economizing ethics towards a consistent, mass individualism against biological totalitarianism.

The Judeo-Christian-modern conception of evil is virtually synonymous with the *radical* logic of the selfish gene. That morality logic ultimately leads to outlawing of the means of collective, eugenic, political control over *biological* evolution. But does this ultimate biological insanity make Jews more rational than Nazis? If biology is the destiny of the human race, then Jews are helping to lead the human race to a *biological*-evolutionary dead end.

The Logic of World-Destruction

Theorems of the Hitler System

Vienna, said satirist Karl Krauss, was the laboratory of world destruction. Hitler's Nazism, Herzl's Zionism, and Gödel's incompleteness theorem were all begotten there. Hitler was inspired by Tannhäuser in Vienna — the Wagnerian music drama that would also inspire Herzl. The founder of the Zionist movement believed that the *honor* of Jews was central to the modern Jewish dilemma: "A half-

dozen duels would very much raise the social position of the Jews." Herzl fantasized about personally challenging the leaders of Austrian antisemitism to such a duel.[264]

Yet while Hitler ultimately succeeded in mustering most of the German nation behind him, Jews were often divided between Zionism and Marxism. From Herzl to Marx, the entire bell curve of the Jewish political spectrum was shifted strongly towards the left. From Hitler to Hegel, the normative, native German political spectrum tended to be relatively rightward.

More than simply a difference in ranges on the modern political spectrum, there is an underlying logic to the general difference between Jews and Germans that can be elicited through a Gödelian insight. Zionism notwithstanding, Jews tend to value some form of political egalitarianism. The moral logic behind egalitarianism is *consistent* equality between individuals. Modern Jewish-Western moral logic generally strives towards consistent standards of justice — but also tends to lack a biological self-account.

Consistency would mean that everything produced by a system is true. Completeness would mean that everything true is produced by a system.[265] (Note that no claim is ever made that completeness or consistency is ever achieved; only incomplete aspirations to completeness and inconsistent aspirations to consistency.) A general difference between Germans and Jews is one of prioritization of first principles. Jews tend to prioritize a logic of consistency over a logic of completeness. Germans tend prioritize a logic of completeness over a logic of consistency.

Philosophy has been correlated with a sense of completeness in the sense of wholeness; a striving for the account of *all*. German philosophy is socially related to the sense of being apart of a larger Überorganism. From this

stems a strong sense of holism; whole-ism; totality; completeness. The modern principle of consistent, equal individualism, by contrast, tends to conflict with the sense of a supra-individual whole.

In his reinterpretation of Hegel's thought, Walter Kaufmann wrote:

> What aroused Hegel's concern was not Kant's radicalism but rather his division of man into mutually conflicting parts. He objected not to Kant's impieties or blasphemies but to the nature of Kant's *Moralität*, which consists in the triumph of reason and duty over inclination. *Hegel's departure from Kant was prompted by a higher regard not for traditional Christianity but for the Greeks, and his image of the Greeks, like Hölderlin's, was profoundly influenced by Goethe and Schiller.*[266]

Goethe's *Iphigenia* resuscitated a classical unity of ethics and natural inclination; a vision of man as a harmonious *whole*. Schiller's *Aesthetic Education of Man* further highlighted the contrast between Greek classicism and the fragmentation of modern man. In these views, the ancients posed the model of a harmonious, total human personality in which natural inclination was ordered without the unyielding repressions of Christian morality. "The Greeks had reached this degree, and if they wished to progress to a higher form [*Ausbildung*] they, like we, had to give up the totality of their nature to pursue truth on separate ways."[267]

Hegel responded to Schiller's call to restore the harmonious totality of human nature while *also* incorporating the discoveries and insights of the modern. The result was Hegel's famous "system". "The true form in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of it", he wrote in the preface of his *Phenomenology*. "To contribute to

this end, that philosophy might come closer to the form of a science—the goal being that it might be able to relinquish the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge—that is what I have resolved to try."[268]

And try he did, just as Bertrand Russell tried to derive all mathematics from logic in the attempt to yield a comprehensive system of mathematical truth. If Kurt Gödel is right, however, then the goal of a complete and consistent system of logical truth is not possible. Does this imply that philosophy is not possible?

Any attempt to draw the implications of Gödel for Hegel must recognize that Hegel never claimed to root out all logic inconsistencies from his "system". On the contrary, the very heart of Hegel's project was his insight into the necessity of contradiction. The justification for incorporating contradiction itself at the very core of his thinking was that it accurately reflects the contradictions of human nature and thus the progressive, dialectical logic of human history.

As historian Paul Lawrence Rose observed, this was a characteristically German solution:

> In the German context, it is misconceived to demand whether a particular thinker such as Fichte or Wagner is "left" or "right," "pro-" or "anti-Jewish," revolutionary or nationalist. What is needed instead is a higher and more embracing context of analysis within which the contradictions typical of German thinking will be perceived to be merely false paradoxes, and in which apparent contradictions are merely single but complementary aspects of a unitary whole, two sides of a single coin.[269]

Hegel dealt with core internal contradictions, not by weeding them out and attempting pure consistency, but by

embracing them as the basis for ascending towards ever-higher syntheses.

To grasp Hegel in light of Gödel is to appreciate a key error of the "end of history" thesis advanced by Kojève and Fukuyama. While the English word *absolute* is commonly contrasted with *relative*, Hegel's "Absolute moment" in history corresponds to a most *total*, self-unified synthesis of the essential history of the human mind in the historical moment of its peak culmination. The contradiction between "history" and "eternity" is never definitively resolved. Instead, Hegel's system assumes a philosophic prioritization of *completeness* over *consistency*.

There can be no *logical* end of history on this basis because Hegel was ultimately unable to transcend Gödel. Liberal democracy cannot be assumed the final solution to the human problem because the totality of all human knowledge changes over time with new scientific discoveries and new technological inventions. Without an end of the possibility that new knowledge may be uncovered, there can be no end of history (i.e. Hegel did not and could not account for the subsequent discoveries of Darwin).

The *modern* Western emphasis on egalitarian consistency is probably the most basic reason why Westerners interpret this cultural tendency towards completeness as "German irrationalism". While the modern West emphasized consistency on the level of individual human beings, the Germans emphasized a paradoxical identification of individualism and collective totality. "[T]hroughout the German response" to the West, observed the French anthropologist Louis Dumont,

> individualism and holism are not only empirically present in the society or juxtaposed in the mind, as in Troeltsch's view of German freedom, but...implicitly identified with one

> another. The German confrontation with the world centers on this point. It is therefore very tempting for the sociologist to see here the root of the "duality," the "paradox," or "contradiction" that is so often laid at Germany's door. Does this contrast not lie at the core of German culture? Is it not something like its nervous center or DNA, directing, as it were, the ubiquitous reproduction, or recurrence, of contrariety if not contradiction? German thought came to capitalize on contradictions, or, in a weaker form, on contrariety. By and large they became tokens of truth, as adequation of thought to reality....So, for the romantic political philosopher Adam Müller, a thinker admittedly much weaker than Hegel, *Gegensatz*, contrariety or contrast is found in all living institutions; to reach it, beyond simple rationality, is a warrant of authenticity, so that the notion is self explanatory.[270]

Contra Hegel, Marx claimed that one great historical contradiction remained and its reconciliation towards a state of superior *consistency* would be identical with communist revolution. However, if "contrariety or contrast is found in all living institutions", then would ironing out this great contradiction at the heart of Hegel's living system result in the death of that totality? Many German thinkers viewed Marx's move towards greater egalitarian consistency as a move towards the death of the West.

Contra Marx, Hitler implicitly radicalized some aspects of Hegelianism towards paradoxical inconsistencies that were identified with a rebirth of living, organic wholeness. For example, as much as Nazis rejected egalitarianism in principle, it was not *consistently* hierarchical either. The organic unity of National *Socialism* embraced elements of egalitarianism among members of the same race. Nazism encompassed *both* top-down authoritarianism *and* the bottom-up rule of the *Volk*. It was "reactionary" *and*

"modern"; conservative *and* radical. The "rational" virtues of discipline, order, efficiency, and thoroughness walked hand in hand with romanticism, mysticism, and the worship of primordial forces of nature. Hitler believed in both the supremacy of the nature of heredity and in the supremacy of the nurture of propaganda.

Nazism is a historical demonstration that the prioritization of a logic of *greater* completeness tends to be inversely correlated with *greater* consistency. Far from the universalistic aspirations of Hegel, the (incomplete) aspirations to a "complete", totalitarian Nazi "system" was limited to a *racial-biological totalism* prioritized over the value of all evidence that contradicted its self-consciously ethnocentric core. One could go so far as to say that the most defining difference between German National Socialism and Italian Fascism was the former's totalistic, integral emphasis on racial-biology.

The very birth of Judaism, by contrast, could be considered the first revolution: an attempt to override racial-biological totalism among Jews with the sociotechnological corrective of Mosaic law. The God of the Bible is a meme, and Hebrew Halakha or law gives practical expression to idea of a supra-human authority that overrides the aristocracy of biology. The engineered "system" of Mosaic law could called a geme complex; a symbiotic interdependence of genes and memes that looks forward to an ultimate, messianic triumph of God's kingship over biology.

The Judaic way and the Nazi way thus lead in opposite directions. Followers of Judaism were not to aspire to pagan racial-biological "wholeness" since a gene/meme or body/mind break defined the revolutionary introduction of Mosaic law itself. This means that the Judaic way is

biologically incomplete, especially on a political level, in the sense that the rule of Mosaic law implied rule over *wholly* biological values.

Political repression in Jewish history meant that Jews very often did not identify themselves with the political level of their existence. This lack of political-biological self-reference was overcome by substituting reference to God on a supra-political and supra-biological level for reference to themselves as political-biological beings. God was the means of sidestepping political-biological completeness with God-memes that command some degree of moral consistency. Instead of biological totalism or completeness, moral, proto-egalitarian/international consistency evolved on the level of individuals.

The relationship between monotheism and moral consistency can be discerned in that God provides a *single* law for all individuals. Whereas pagan or polytheistic moralities tended to be more tolerant of different moral standards for different people (i.e. caste systems and master/slave divisions), monotheism tends towards a single, *consistent* moral standard among all human individuals.

The Jewish kinship paradox meant a Jewish inability to create an enduring biopolitical synthesis. Instead of a highest self-reference on the level of biology or the genes, the ultimate emphasis of Jewish self-reference was God-memes. In this way, the lack of a highest biopolitical self-reference lead to moral self-consistency (consistency *over* completeness). The German way traditionally yielded the total opposite tendency: total self-reference on the highest biopolitical level that found sublimated expression in German philosophy and metaphysics. Consider, for example, a passage from the preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology*:

> And it is like the immediacy and simplicity of the beginning because it is the result, that which has returned into itself—and that which has returned into itself is the self, and the self is the identity and simplicity that relates itself to itself.[271]

One can detect a fundamental kinship to Heidegger in these swirls of self-reference that span from the depths to the heights, and then back to the root. This is a source of German rootedness, a continual going back to the enlarged self, like threading a knot over and over in every way until the center has become hardcored. After returning to the holistic self so many times, experience discovers some paths are more efficient, and these efficiencies make for still deeper and more profound returns. The result is an efficient synthesis with an internal coherence that is watertight enough to be impervious to the primacy of empiricism by being hermetically self-contained.

For Germans to be hermetically "whole" and self-complete unto themselves, everything "other" had to be completely squeezed out. The Judeocide was the end process of an internal sociobiological differentiation in which the process of realizing self-definition lead to *total* differentiation from the "other" to the point of death.

Western criticism of German romantic "irrationalism" specifically refers to the "irrationalism" of inconsistency while overlooking the internal logic of completeness. The logical correlation between German completeness and German inconsistency is explicable, for example, in that consistent Western individualism effectually unravels and uproots the synthetic whole that produces the sense of holistic completeness.

German idealism by its very nature emphasizes clear contrasts, and tends to overpower marginal exceptions and

realistic counterexamples to generalizations that weaken idealism (i.e. exceptions to group or race generalizations). On a social level, Jewish moralism tends to emphasize precisely the opposite tendency: the socially marginal. Whether it is the Biblical emphasis on the orphan, the widow, and the stranger, or the modern emphasis on ethnic minorities, homosexuals, and political dissidents, the socially marginal is valued at the expense of the politically central.

From a political perspective, the emphasis on universal moral individualism begins from the view of powerless individuals on the margin of society. From a Darwinian perspective, the powerless individuals on the margins of society are the most likely to be selected against in the struggle for life. Universal moral individualism thus emphasizes the point of view of the outsider, while the biological-kinship premise, in itself, emphasizes the insider.

Just as German political-biological self-reference or self-identity produces a sense of political-biological self-completeness, a *lack* of Jewish *political*-biological self-reference produces a moral logic of *individual* self-consistency. The contrast here is between German self-completeness and Jewish self-consistency. A classic formulation of moral consistency is 'do unto others as one would like done unto one's self'. To 'do unto *others*' is to deemphasize the self, and this golden rule constitutes a lack of self-reference in exactly that sense. In consequence, Jewish ethical self-consistency can really be thought as *other*-consistency and, in practice, it leads towards the equality of self and others. Ethical consistency with others precludes the development of self beyond the individual towards identification with a complete *political* whole (that subordinates individual conscience).

Hegelian self-reference tends to take the form of philosophic self-consciousness. Self-reference is necessarily component of the *attempt* to achieve philosophic completeness, for the self is a component of the everything that the thinker must attempt to account for. The paradoxes that arise from self-reference are characteristic of the self-centered, self-replicating organization of biological organisms. In a German context, "self-reference" commonly takes the form of nationalism.

The Nazi view exhibited superior *completeness*, especially in accounting for *itself*, and most specifically in the form of a *biological* self-account. The superior completeness of the Nazi view contrasts with the superior consistency of the egalitarian logic exhibited by Marxism. These two systems are logically incompatible with one another, not accidentally, but in great part because Hitler's will to a completely racial-biological system of thinking evolved in struggle against the apparent biological insanity of Marxism.

Many have underestimated the coherence of Hitler's creed as exhibited, for example, in Eberhard Jäckel's *Hitler's World View*. But can all theories, ideologies, and mentalities be divided into the categories of "Jewish" and "Aryan"? Do Hitler's race theories really *completely* account for every single human example; every "theorem" produced by a race? Where, for example, would Kurt Gödel fit into Hitler's Weltanschauung?

Typical Jewish Un-Jewishness

In the introduction to *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,* Karl Marx observed:

> German chauvinists by instinct and liberals by reflection, seek to find the history of our freedom somewhere beyond

> our history, in the primeval Teutonic forests. But how are we to distinguish the history of our freedom from the history of the wild boar's freedom if it can be found only in the forests? As the proverb has it, what is shouted into the forest the forest echoes back. So let the primeval forest be.

That nothing echoed back to Marx from the primeval Teutonic forests would not escape the notice of the Germans. Marx had a different view of the root of the problem: "To be radical is to take things by the root. The root for man, however, is man himself…But a major difficulty seems to confront a *radical* German revolution." Marx explicated a problem that his solution would only clarify, not resolve.

Left-wing humanist-universalists of Jewish origin such as Marx were alienated from both their own Jewish roots and gentile roots. In challenging gentile cultural values, they re-created the world in their own uprooted image, closing the gap between Jew and gentile. To many Germans, however, this meant that Jews were destroying the nation itself.

Marx's Jewish origins were distinctly socially naked for one distinct reason: he was a Christian. Most Jews can attribute their Jewishness, at least in part, to cultural-religious factors. But this was less tenable for someone who was converted to Christianity in his early childhood and attended Christian schools, and yet found that this formality did not end antipathy to Jews. Antisemitism directed against him required less imagination to interpret. There existed fewer possibilities beyond the racial interpretation to make sense of antisemitism against him and thus his Jewishness was confined more distinctly and decisively to its hereditary aspect.

With the increase of disbelief in Christianity, antisemitism on religious grounds lost its old theological rationalizations. In a country without the West's stronger egalitarian beliefs,

one can fathom why Marx may have had a higher Jewish *racial* consciousness than others Jews, even if largely subterranean. The subtraction of most religious and cultural factors left the residual Jewish remainder primarily in its racial difference.

Consciousness of his racial Jewish identity in the face of the persistence of antisemitism probably led him to clarify what was distinctly Jewish from what was distinctly Christian. As a Christian, Marx inevitably recognized that Jesus was formally a Jew and that the entire Bible emerged from a Judaic origin. Consciously or unconsciously, it seems likely that Marx did partly account for his Jewish background through the model of Jesus.

It seems likely that Marx partially assimilated to his gentile identity by assimilating a Christian-contra-Jew identity. He became more Christian that the Christians, just as Jesus, in radicalizing the spirit of Judaism, became more Jewish than the Jews. Christian theology became a metaphysical model for communist 'ideology'. In short, Marxism is what happened when Christianity became reconnected with its Jewish radical-roots.

"Christianity is a prototype of Bolshevism: the mobilisation by the Jew of the masses of slaves with the object of undermining society", Hitler asserted on October 19, 1941. Love kills the healthy pagan ethos of honor and Hitler claimed he was merely defending himself against the disease of Christianity and its Marxist secularization:

> Thus one understands that the healthy elements of the Roman world were proof against this doctrine….Yet Rome to-day allows itself to reproach Bolshevism with[out] having destroyed the Christian churches! As if Christianity hadn't behaved in the same way towards the pagan temples.[272]

Just as Jesus attacked the Pharisees, Marx attacked the bourgeoisie. Just as Jesus attempted to overcome the system of Jewish law, Marx identified the Jews with the capitalist system. Just as Jesus overturned the moneychangers in the temple, Soviet Bolshevism attempted to subvert the Pharisaic cathedral of commerce of Americanism. Since Jesus was very likely the son of Roman soldier who raped his Jewish mother, the roots of the convergence of Jesus and Marx both stem, in part, from the problem of formal religious identity versus racial assimilation.

On a philosophic level, the key intellectual link between Jesus and Marx is to be found in Hegel. Hegel's historicism was based on and integrated with the Biblical vision of a universal human history. The difference between Hegel and Marx can be traced to the issue of secularization. Marx implied that Hegel's secularization of Christianity was only partial and that partial secularization amounted to a new secular, capitalist Judaism. Marx's communistic difference was like the completion of the secularization of Christianity out of a secularized Judaism.

The Hegelian "spirit" was, in part, the consequence of uniting the opposite extremes of the Christian "spirit" and the Greco-Roman "spirit" in a paradoxical modern synthesis. *Thymos*, the spirit of the anger and pride of Achilles, is the West's inheritance from the Greco-Roman ancients. Love, the spirit of the compassion of Christ, is the West's inheritance from the ancient Jews. Liberal democracy, at its most self-conscious, embodies moderation through the reconciliation of these past extremes. This tempestuous, fragile, spiritual mix could hold only through the philosophic will to assimilate all of essential insights of the human past in one historical *attempt* at *complete* historical self-consciousness.

Hegel's criticized strict logical consistency on the ground that a view taken to its consistent extreme becomes one sided, thus revealing its inadequacy. Marx attempted to turn Hegel's critique against himself, arguing that his one sided spiritualism ignored consciousness of its material foundations. In discerning Hegel's inconsistencies and self-contradictions, Marx turned Hegel's thought on its head, arguing that one great historical contradiction awaited resolution in proletariat revolution. This implies that revolution achieves resolution through a superior *consistency* with the larger material world.

What would be unquestionably conspicuous by its presence in Marxism is as conspicuous by its absence: racial-biological factors. Marxism attempted to *consistently* exorcise racial-biology as a factor of ultimate historical significance. Yet Marx also revealed elements of racism in his writings. These were some of the seeds of the self-contradictions that catalyzed its Nazi opposite.

After Darwin, it became increasingly obvious that Marx's theories failed to grapple with the biological bases of human history. Hitler seized upon Marx's apparent indifference to biological factors and his self-contradictions on the issue of race, and concocted a counter-account of the entirety of human history as the struggle of the races. The Nazis radicalized the thymotic side of the Hegelian spirit, implicitly rejected the half-Roman-half-Jewish synthesis represented by Jesus, and turned Marx's assumptions on their head.

While Marx had a distinct place in the Nazi Weltanschauung, is a Marxist "class" analysis powerful enough to account for the rise of Nazism? If Hitler accounted for *himself* in racial-biological terms, and made history actualizing his racist beliefs, then Marx cannot escape the

question of why he was different. While Hegel's self-consciousness of being a Prussian (of Swabian origin) made a historical difference in his own philosophical system, Marx's birth as a Jew was formally, consistently irrelevant to Marxism.

Marx's theory fails to explain why Marx himself would have been sentenced to the gas chambers on the basis of his Jewish descent if he been alive during the Second World War. Marxism cannot explain why, despite Marx's own anti-Jewish tirades, Hitler identified *both* capitalism *and* communism as products of the Jewish mind. Marx's theory cannot explain why it was Marx and not another (of his "class") who invented Marxist theory.

If race and biology were factors that help explain Marx's theory, this would imply that they must be factors in his own self-explanation. If racial-biological factors are significant, then his Jewish origins were significant. Since Marx was too logical to overlook this completely, did repressed biological factors skew his whole theory towards a de-biologized economic determinism? Were Marx's fears of the implications of biological factors an underlying motor of Marxism itself? Is Marxism rooted in an extreme attempt to deny that his ethnic Jewishness mattered by nearly consistently exorcising and almost systematically eliminating all racial-biological factors in history?

Marxist theory can explain neither itself nor the Judeocide. More specifically, the Judeocide is the most radical, empirical refutation of Marxism in particular, and the original *tabla rasa* assumptions of modernity in general. Hitler showed what it would *really* mean to bring biological factors to nothingness. To demonstrate how Hitler refuted Marx at Auschwitz requires a sociobiological analysis of Marxism.

MITCHELL HEISMAN

Judaism in Music

To serve, to serve the divine idea, is the freedom for which this folk has been chosen.

—FROM ARNOLD SCHOENBERG'S OPERA *MOSES UND ARON*

In the 1920s, Viennese composer Arnold Schoenberg told his friend Josef Rufer, "I have made a discovery which will ensure the supremacy of German music for the next hundred years". His discovery, or invention, has been called "atonality" and "serialism" and "the twelve-tone system". It was a method of musical composition based on a rule of tonal equality. This meant that none of the twelve notes of the chromatic scale could be repeated until each of the other eleven notes had been sounded. The abolition of the dominance of some tones over others was the abolition of the basis of the tonal system. Such music defies adherence to a single key and thus advances the equality of all notes.

In his belief that he was continuing a tradition of German musical supremacy, Schoenberg followed in the footsteps of Richard Wagner. Yet while the ambiguous harmonies of *Tristan and Isolde* might suggest a precedent for atonality, Wagner took musical "ideas" seriously only to serve his larger vision of post-operatic "music drama". The "center" of Wagner's work was not only beyond tonality: it was beyond pure music. While Schoenberg liberated individual notes from subordination to the implicit hierarchies of tonality, Wagner was a composer who subordinated *music itself* to a larger artistic whole. Wagner's idea of a "total work

of art", or *Gesamtkunstwerk*, synthesized music, poetry, theatre, and other arts into an aesthetic totalitarianism.

But why stop with art? Just as music was to be subordinated to the greater "music drama", Wagner hoped that his art would inspire a revolutionary renewal of German *Kultur* as a whole. And under the Führer-ship of Adolph Hitler, it did. Nazi totalitarianism was the practical application of the idea of the *Gesamtkunstwerk* to the German nation. Wagner helped create the cultural conditions of Nazism, while Schoenberg, a Jew, fled to America from Nazism.

Schoenberg saw a different evolutionary path for German music, a musical Marxism where the center of gravity is the destruction of a dominant center of gravity. In serialism, music is liberated, not only from Wagner's nationalistic vision, but also from the organic hierarchy of tonality. In serialism, all tones are created equal.

Schoenberg held that music exists for own sake as an "individual" discipline. Music is justified in itself, unsubordinated to the larger community. The independence of music from the larger culture was thus reflected in the atonal independence of individual tones from the tyranny of tonal hierarchies. While Wagner's art inspired integration with a distinct national culture, Schoenberg's art inspired alienation from national cultures. While Wagner's cultural synthesis helped breed the German supremacism of Hitlerism, Schoenberg's ultimately un-German idea of evolution towards tonal egalitarian was very much a kind of musical Marxism.

While Schoenberg was not a Marxist in any formal sense, he illustrates how the notion of evolution towards an egalitarian end is a characteristic expression of the Jewish mind — and cannot be explained simply as a pragmatic,

political means to a conscious end. The egalitarian end logic of *consistent* equality among tones mirrored Marx's egalitarian end of history. Is there an internal Jewish logic to the rationality of consistent egalitarianism that exposes an unconscious irrationality?

While the aesthetic arena is almost completely ignored by Marx, and theoretically despised by Schoenberg, even Hegel's rationality was guided by an aesthetic vision of the philosophic whole. On this point, the totalitarian visions of Hegel and Wagner have more in common than is often assumed. It is through contrast with Marx that one can most clearly see that Hegel's system was guided by an aesthetic vision of the whole; an aesthetic vision of completeness that took precedence over consistency. Hegel's implicit prioritization of an aesthetic of philosophic completeness made his system vulnerable to the demand for logical consistency. Marx grasped Hegel's internal historical inconsistencies, just as Schoenberg grasped Wagner's internal tonal inconsistencies. Inconsistent attempts at consistency countered incompleteness attempts at completeness.

Marx could ignore aesthetic culture so completely only because of the influence of Christianity. Marx's total dismissal of all spiritualism was possible only through the inheritance of Jesus's total spiritualism as synthesized in Hegel. When the Nazis dismissed that Christian inheritance, the grounds of Marxism seemed groundless.

While Marx took the rational side of Hegelian history to its leftward extreme, a root of the Nazi counterpoise to Marxism began with Schopenhauer's repudiation of Hegel. The fundamental irrationality of the will posited by Schopenhauer impacted both Nietzsche and Wagner. Like a synthesis of Schopenhauer and Wagner, Nietzsche posited

both the ultimate irrationality of meaningless history and the poetic creator of new values.

What for Nietzsche was represented by Jesus and Socrates was represented for the Nazis by Jesus and Marx. Between Marx's continuation of Hegel's rational secularization of Judeo-Christianity and Nietzsche's rejection of Jesus and Socrates, one can recognize the core Jewish/German divergence. The legacy of Nietzsche the Anti-Christ and Wagner the Anti-Semite combined in Hitler.

"Beauty exists", wrote Schoenberg, "only from that moment when unproductive people find it lacking...the artist has no need of it. For him truthfulness is enough."[273] Is there something strange about an artist who values truth above beauty? Schoenberg contra Nietzsche, the twelve-tone system was founded upon the discovery of an ugly truth of a musical Socrates.

An element of the alienation of Schoenberg's music from the larger culture stems from the common sense observation that atonality does not have the intuitive aesthetic appeal of tonality. While the intellect is not required to enjoy most tonal music, the unintuitive order of atonality is an acquired taste that virtually begs an intellectual explanation. Schoenberg's serialism is not *instinctively* aesthetic in the way that conventional tonalism is.

Schoenberg's "emancipation of dissonance" begs the same question of the biological foundation of human musical preferences as Marx does for the biological foundation of human social preferences. If the "emancipation of dissonance" is also emancipation from biologically based preferences, then Schoenberg's innovations may challenge the most deeply rooted aesthetic preferences. Schoenberg's characteristically modern valuation of the moral-truth of the twelve tone system over

aesthetics amounts to an override deep biological inclinations — just as the system of Moses's moral laws often overrode aesthetic inclinations among traditional Jews.

Genetically based aesthetic preferences for the *hierarchical* tonal system can be analogized to aesthetic preferences for hierarchical political systems like National Socialism. The Nazi obsession with aesthetics was not a superficial gloss over perceived national self-interest, but inherently integral with a movement that consciously sought to elicit certain unconscious (biologically based) preferences. While music can be considered "irrational" when reason is divorced from instinct, music possesses an "internal logic" that appeal to unconscious understanding. In a similar way, aesthetic judgments often replaced traditional moral judgments of right and wrong among Nazis, i.e. an aesthetic judgment of the twelve-tone system.

Nazi leaders, seeking emancipation *from* social dissonance among Germans, coordinated a Wagnerian-totalitarian social harmony. Just as a conductor of a symphony is a *Führer* of music, a coordinator of different musicians playing different roles within a larger musical whole, Hitler orchestrated the German nation into an organic, aesthetic *Gestalt*. The hierarchical tonal system is not consistently hierarchical any more than the Nazi system was consistently hierarchical, but both were formed, in part, by an internal aesthetic logic of completeness.

There is an old myth that Hegel claimed that his system could be reduced to the tidy formula: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. This is not only an oversimplification; it is false. Hegelian logic is more like a sublimation of the inner "logic" of the innards of a single bacteria cell or the sociobiological infrastructure of a human Überorganism such as the Nazi state. Hitler was neither fully revolutionary nor

conservative, but rather a *development* of German sociobiological *Kultur*.

Marx and Schoenberg, radicalizing a logic of egalitarian consistency, mirrored, like Doppelgängers, the inconsistent "irrationalism" of Nietzsche and Wagner. At the root of this German/Jewish divergence is the question of the right direction of historical development. Charles Darwin's discovery of evolution, subsequent to Marx's formative years, was formative for Nietzsche's philosophic innovations. For the Nazis, Darwin replaced Hegel as the deepest basis of reason in history.

THE DESECRATION MACHINE

Abandon all hope, ye who enter here.

—INSCRIPTION AT THE ENTRANCE TO HELL, THE *INFERNO* OF DANTE

Hitler Refutes Marx: The Industrial Revolution of Genocide

Auschwitz is a more profound refutation of Marxism than the demise of the Soviet Union. The Russian Revolution would never have occurred if Lenin had waited around for Marx's heroic proletariat and objective economic conditions. Although profoundly influenced by Marx, the Soviet state was actually founded upon the Leninist-Stalinist belief in the decisive import of elite leadership.

If so, then perhaps the Leninist-Stalinist revision of Marx's "class" view of history opens the possibility that his theories may yet be correct — but unrealized. The final blow to Marxism, however, as a comprehensive understanding of

human history, was delivered by Hitler's Germany. Auschwitz was the culmination of Nazism's historical refutation of Marx.

Although Marx radicalized the assumptions of economic materialism, the Judeocide refuted the economic conception of man common to *both* capitalism *and* Marxism. The economic conception of man was decisively defeated at Auschwitz because the Judeocide cannot be explained on the basis of economic rationalism.

Marx's judgment that economics determine consciousness is explicated in his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859):

> In the social production that men carry on, they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and intellectual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence; it is on the contrary their social existence which determines their consciousness.

In Marx's view, it is the "economic structure of society" that is the "real foundation" of its "legal and political superstructure". The political is not actually "real", but only a reflection of its economic foundation. From this premise it follows that economic, material realities determine conscious

beliefs, social attitudes, and spiritual values — spirit cannot ultimately determine the material "mode of production".

The most important non-Nazi refutation of Marx began with the work of German sociologist Max Weber. His famous claim that the spiritual beliefs of Protestants produced the rise of capitalism implied that Christianity played a foundational role in the liberal social order of the West. Weber implied that Marx did not account for this. While the purely spiritual beliefs of Protestants appeared to be the most irrelevant from the view of strict Marxist materialism, Weber claimed they were the most relevant. Marx's claim that matter determines mind was countered by Weber's claim that mind determines matter. In this specific sense, Weber is consonant with Hegel against Marx.

Whereas Marx believed he had turned Hegel upon his head, the Nazis turned Marx on his head. Auschwitz proved that the consciousness of men could decisively determine social and material existence over and against all limitations set by the conception of man as a fundamentally economic being.

But does this Nazi refutation of Marx imply a clear confirmation of the more Weberian view that "spirit" determines matter? No. Since the Nazis believed that the German "spirit" was a product of the German race, the resultant relationship between mind and matter is paradoxical. What is clear is that, for Hitler, race and biology were primary.

"Society does not consist of individuals but expresses the sum of interrelations," Marx claimed, "the relations within which these individuals stand." Yet Marx *interpreted* these relationships as economic relationships. Hitler, when observing the same phenomenon, generally *interpreted* these relations as kinship or racial relations. While class warfare

did not contradict Marx's assumption that humans are ultimately a "species being", racism contradicted humanism. While Marx held that economic relations will ultimately override race, Hitler held that racial relations will ultimately override economics.

Marx saw nationalism as the product of exploitative class interests while Hitler saw Marxism as the product of the Jewish race. Even the liberal democracies tended to have more in common with Marxists in their emphasis on the primacy of economics. But can Nazism be understood through a purely economic understanding of human things? What, for example, would a communist view of Auschwitz look like?

The German Democratic Republic (the former communist state of East Germany) championed the view that the antisemetic oppressions of the Nazi regime, including the "final solution", could be explained as a strategy of monopolist capitalism.[274] Expropriations of Jewish property facilitated monopolistic consolidation. The brutalities were designed as psychological preparation for war. The exterminations were not targeted against Jews in particular, in this view, but rather against the proletarian forces of socialist progress generally.[275] For the East German Communist state, then, Nazism was only an extreme development of capitalism and Jews were victims only randomly and incidentally (just as Marx himself was of Jewish origin only randomly and incidentally).

Even if the *de facto* Soviet Union was a product of Leninism-Stalinist innovation, their *official* self-understanding tended to follow orthodox Marxism. In communist East Germany, the "class" interpretation of the Judeocide had Soviet military-political might to defend its economic interpretation of history.

The application of Marx's theories to Auschwitz results in an economic analysis of "capitalist" death factories. What kind of capitalism was this? Was this economic rationality?

This attempt of genuine Marxists to understand Nazism in general, and the Judeocide in particular, is a farce. Marxism fails to make any unambiguous sense of why Jews were discriminated against relative to gentiles of the same economic class. Marx made no anticipation of the biologism of Nazism or the extermination camps of Auschwitz.

Nazism cannot be understood on the basis of socioeconomic factors alone. The argument that it was in German economic interest to keep Jewish slaves as laborers relies on a liberal democratic or Marxian economic assessment of priorities. Hitler's war, however, was fundamentally racial, not economic.

Marxism not only fails to explain why modern Germany alone reintroduced the practice of slave labor, it fails to explain why a nation, in the middle of a world war, chose to exterminate Jewish slaves rather than exploit their labor. A slave is property, and hence, the slave is an economic commodity just like any other. If the Nazis had left it at that, then even this extreme could *possibly* be subject to the margin-limits of Marxist economic thinking. But the Nazis did not leave it at that. Over and against an economic valuation of slaves, and beyond the economic extreme of slavery, Jews were systematically targeted for death *as a race*.

Modernity, whether liberal democratic or Marxist, is characterized by the precedence of economics over racial-biology and politics. The Judeocide was economic interest mastered by biological priorities. The most extreme implications of Hitler's racial-biological premises were economically irrational when judged by the premise of "the individual", i.e. the economics of death camps. Conversely,

the economic premises of capitalist or communist systems make the extreme implications of racial-biological premises irrational. Hitler refuted Marx by recognizing the incompatibility of these priorities and by overcoming Marx's assumption of natural economic determinism.

The ultimate question, then, is what takes ultimate precedence: biology or economics? Since Nazis themselves affirmed their biological-racial nature, this forced Jews to address the question of their biological-racial nature. Whether Jews do or do not affirm the question of their race, they stand exposed by the Nazi affirmation of the German race. If a Jew affirms his or her racial difference, this confirms the Nazi assertion of racial difference. However, if a Jew does *not* affirm his or her racial difference, this *also* affirms the difference of that Jew from the ruling racial Weltanschauung of a Nazi nation.

To truly deny biology in the fullest sense is, for a biological being, to deny its own existence. In the Nazi view, Marxism was a characteristically Jewish-international denial of nature. To maintain this Marxist denial of biology in its fullest sense implies the denial of one's biological existence. The negation of biological factors, taken to its extreme, implies the negation of biological existence.

If Marxists or Jews would not *interpret* biology as biology, then self-consistent materialism leads Marxists to *interpret* biology as (economic) material subject to the Marxist economic motor of history. Taken to its extreme, the negation of all biological factors implicates the equivalence of live and dead matter; a self-consistent materialism.

Hitler explicitly countered Marxist economic materialism with the belief that racial-biology is the key to history. This, in turn, forced Marxist theory to decide whether Hitler was right or wrong. Were Marx and the Jews racial-biological

beings or economic-material beings? If Hitler was completely wrong, then Marxist theory is forced to clarify this Marxist ambiguity and accept the full consequences of a consistent economic-materialism: that humans, too, are economic-material things, along with the physical material that is the normative subject of economics.

If economic materialism takes precedence over the claims of biology within Marxism, then an economic, materialistic view of human beings can take precedence over the claims of biology within Marxism. If humans are material things, then humans can have advanced industrial production techniques applied to them. If Marx's materialistic objectification of the world were *total*, this implied that humans could be treated not only as the *subjects* of economic processes, but also as the *objects* of economic processes.

And this is where the materialist logic of Marxism breaks down.

Auschwitz, then, can be viewed as a legitimate implication of Marxism. The Judeocide can be viewed as a possible logical solution to the Marxist elimination of all biological factors so that humans can be viewed purely as material factors in economic-industrial processes. A strictly Marxist view of Auschwitz is thus possible as an extreme implication of economic materialism; a consistent economic materialism.

However, from a view outside of strict Marxism, Auschwitz can be viewed as the working out of a blind spot in Marx's theory: the lack of racial-biological self-reference so consistent that economics is forced to explain *everything* racial-biological. The flip side of the consistent Marxist negation of racial-biological factors is a consistent economic-material explanation. And if Marxists are consistent materialists, then human beings, too, are physical, economic

materials that can feed the economic motor of history in *every* way. Jewish *economic* materialism could be applied to Jews *biologically*.

Marxist economic materialism is a failure in explaining why *Jews* were sentenced to Auschwitz, just as Marxism fails to explain why it was a Jew that invented Marxism. Marx's socioeconomic explanation of Jewishness leaves the race of Jews theoretically irrelevant. While Hitlerism accounted for Germanness of Hitler, Marxism was forced to explain Hitler in utterly inadequate terms of monopoly capitalism.

From within Marxism, the race of both Marx and Hitler, along with the *racial* selection of Jew for Auschwitz, ultimately remains an inexplicable coincidence. However, if humans are fundamentally biological beings or if biology can in some historical situations overcome non-biological factors, then Marx's theory has a fundamental hole in it. Auschwitz was the radical historical refutation of Marxist theory at its material foundation: Jews.

No assumption is made here that the Nazis interpreted the Judeocide in this specific way. Rather, the Judeocide unfolded as an implication of belief in racial struggle through survival or death, and such actions do not necessarily assume depths of reflection upon those actions. Marxism helped shape Hitler's Weltanschauung through a systematic negation of Marx's Weltanschauung, and the refutation of Marx at Auschwitz was implicit, not necessarily explicit. Auschwitz can be viewed as an unthought *implication* of Marx's theory, a genocidal blind spot that confirmed that Marxism, as a system of thought, is not powerful enough to explain certain observable phenomenon, and especially not powerful enough to fully account for the factors of biology and race.

To affirm the completeness of the Nazi Weltanschauung wherein Jews *are* fundamentally biological-racial beings, the racial contradictions of the Jews were resolved on the side of negating their biological existence. The abstract nurturist arguments of rootless Jewish cosmopolitans were answered by making all Jews literal *Luftmenschen*, like the smoke that comes out of chimneys.

Human biology precedes human economy. Before one can worry about securing or maximizing one's economic existence, one must first have an existence. Marx, however, almost systematically ignored the primacy of the biological foundation of existence. Hitler solved the economic problems of Jews of Europe by eliminating the more basic problem of their biological existence. Dead Jews do not have to worry about economic problems such as finding food to eat.

Marx's integrity, from the standpoint of the scientist, lay in his lack of ideals; he rejected all moral justifications for communism. He claimed that he simply uncovered material realities, discovered the primary scientific laws of human history, and projected their inevitable consequences. Hitler refuted the Marxist assumption that ethics are purely a product of economic conditions by radicalizing the consequences of eliminating all ethical barriers to treating Jews as purely material things that can be subject to the industrial production of destruction.

Auschwitz exposes the fundamental contradiction of modernity, a contradiction that point just as much, if not more so, to capitalist regimes as to communist regimes: its supposed scientific or de-romanticized creed is not consistent. If science reveals a material world then humans, too, are physical material and have no inherently special status whatsoever above any and every other instance of the

material world. Human rights are as much a romantic delusion as any Wagnerian music drama if they are supposed to render a special exception to human samples of the material world.

Zalman Lewthal, a Jewish prisoner at Auschwitz, described an instance where a car of a train filled with women and girls reached the crematorium:

> The car stops, the cover is taken off and the human freight is spilled on the ground, like gravel on the road. Those lying near the car door are first to fall on the hard ground, injuring their heads and bodies so that they no longer have the strength to move.[276]

It was not Marxism that paved the way to Auschwitz, but rather the inherent contradictions of the modern secularization process. The contradictions of modern enlightenment can be found right at its beginnings. The French Revolution was one product of the Enlightenment. The Marquis de Sade was another, a child born of the same intellectual ferment. The perception of the human organism as a material object was advanced by La Mettrie, progressed upon by the Marquis de Sade, and radicalized at Auschwitz.

Humanism, by its original definition, imposes a double standard between human things and non-human things. On one hand, humans are granted rights that are supposed to be valued in themselves. On the other hand, capitalists become capitalists by developing a sound, material understanding of some aspects of the physical-social world. Much of the perception of an inherent ethical deficit in capitalism stems from those who are *consistent* in their behavior between matter and man. Inhumanity can emerge simply out of the wholeness and coherence of an unadulterated material worldview.

Is there no end to the "economic man" conquest of history? If economic materialism is truly universal then *anything* and *everything* can be commoditized. Does it really matter, then, whether a capitalist enterprise produces nail polish, widgets, or dead Jews? Death can be mass-produced upon the same basic industrial principles as nail polish. The true capitalistic rationalist's argument against Auschwitz would be: 'Stop killing our customers!'

Auschwitz, the great refutation of the modern "economic man" view of history, clarified the great contradiction of economic-materialism by treating "economic man" as economic material. If man himself is material, then he, too, can be subject to industrial-technological methods and manipulated into a more 'useful' form, such as agricultural fertilizer. This is taking the implications of Marxian materialism more seriously than Marx did himself. The desecration machine of Auschwitz was only the completion of literal "secularization".

Aber es ist ihm damit nicht Ernst. To be serious about an idea, one must be push it to its most extreme consequence and conclusion. Are moderns serious about the idea that biology does not matter? Are moderns willing to push economic materialism to its logical conclusion?

Just as Marx turned Hegel on his head, the Nazis turned Marx on his head. It would not be capitalism *per se* that would self-destruct; the logic of Jewish materialism would self-destruct. Instead of resolving the contradictions of capitalism through a communist negation of biology, the contradictions of Jewish materialism would be resolved through a negation of Jewish biology.

If Jews and leftists reject biological hierarchies by appealing to economic materialism, this ultimately implies the rejection of the inconsistent hierarchy of their biological

existence over the larger material world. The contradictions of Jewish materialism and the modern double standard between the human and material worlds would be resolved towards the side of a consistent materialism. The leveling affects of modern egalitarianism ultimately leads to the equality of human and physical-material worlds.

The industrial revolution of genocide was, from this point of view, a radically egalitarian revolution. The march towards greater egalitarian self-consistency leads towards self-consistent materialism. The industrial process of transforming "live" material into dead material was the revolutionary realization of the ultimate equality of biological humans and physical material. And if humans are equal with the larger material world, then one should not discriminate as to whether the form of material is living tissue or burnt ash.

From an opposite point of view, Auschwitz was an empirical vindication of the holistic, anti-materialist assumptions of the Nazi social Überorganism. Material reductionism leads to the reduction of humans to physical matter. By reducing Jewish life to a sum *equal* to its material parts, Auschwitz implied that life is more than the sum of its material parts.

Can the political be reduced to economics; can people be reduced to materialism? Auschwitz was, in part, the actualization of a long tradition of German idealist critiques of Western materialism. This anti-materialist animus is found even in a German philosopher as worldly as Schopenhauer, the man who denounced Hegel as an "intellectual Caliban" and his philosophy as "a monument to German stupidity". Yet even he refused to believe that phenomenon such as electricity could be reduced to a

physical explanation, and thus required a "dynamic" explanation.

Auschwitz was the German idealist overcoming of economics; the death machine as an end justified *an sich*; in itself; for its own sake. If what is German is that which is valued for its own sake, then annihilating what is not German was an end valued for its own sake. Jews would ultimately not be valued even as slaves. Auschwitz, the economic production of death and nothingness, was a *German* goal that not only defied the logic of economic profit, but was deleterious to the larger Nazi war effort.

Idealizing Jews as the antithesis of ideal Germans, extermination became the self-realization of German idealism. Idealizing Jewish materialism as the antithesis of Nazi idealism, extermination was nonetheless a product of Nazi racial-biological materialism. A classic German paradox, Auschwitz represents the pinnacle of both Nazi materialism and Nazi idealism.

Autogenocidal subslaves, in a death factory

"Didn't you know that the Germans gave precise orders about what to say and when to say it—and that disobedience could cost you your life?", exclaimed the former Auschwitz prisoner. Josef Sackar had been asked whether he had played a part in deceiving new arrivals to the gas chambers.[277]

Sackar had worked as a Sonderkommando ("special unit"). Sonderkommandos were special subslaves employed at gas chambers and crematoria in Nazi extermination camps. At the camp at Chelmno, the term also applied to SS

men involved in the extermination process. In Auschwitz, however, "Sonderkommando" referred exclusively to the prisoners.[278] Here the word "Sonderkommando" will be used solely in reference to Jewish participants in the Judeocide.

Sonderkommandos told their fellow Jews in their own language that they were going to take a shower and then be deloused. The incoming populations were instructed to leave their shoes and clothing neatly in the undressing room so that they would be able to find them after the delousing.[279] While supervised by the SS at all times, this was the only time Sonderkommandos were not completely isolated from all other prisoners.

When the Jews were packed into the chamber and the door was sealed closed, Zyklon B crystals were dropped in by an SS soldier on the outside and the Jews were gassed to death. This decisive act in the killing process, the release of Zyklon B canisters into the gas chamber, was always performed by Germans and never by the Jewish Sonderkommando.[280] The decisive act in the work of the genocide of the Jews, then, was done by Nazi Germans, not Jews.

The Sonderkommandos hauled out the corpses, extracted gold teeth, cut off women's hair, and collected rings or any other any remaining valuables. The corpses were then put on elevators that lifted them to the incinerators. The subslaves then loaded the dead into the crematoria to be burned. Periodically, they crushed the remaining bones and body parts, and gathered the ash.[281]

The Sonderkommandos of Auschwitz usually numbered about four hundred. There may have been as many as a thousand Sonderkommandos during the extermination of Hungarian Jewry that started in the summer of 1944.[282] The

great majority of prisoner positions from *Oberkapo* downward were occupied by Jews, especially toward the end of the war. The subslaves organized their own division of labor based on information about incoming transports.[283]

From the view of the Nazis, the worth of a Sonderkommando's life in the death factory rested on their ability to assist in the death and destruction of their fellow Jews. Any slow down in arrivals, or the ultimate completion of the ultimate task, meant certain death for these death workers. As eye witnesses of the genocide industry, their death sentence was written with the sight of a gassed corpse.

In consequence, after a few months, an incumbent group of Sonderkommandos would themselves be put to death by the new group that replaced them.[284] Every Sonderkommando understood from the beginning that his fate would be death. A small minority of Sonderkommandos survived the war only because of the hasty German retreat forced by Russian conquest from the east.

Towards the end of the war, some Sonderkommandos mounted insurrections. Following two previous uprisings by Jewish prisoners at the extermination camps of Treblinka and Sobibor,[285] a group of Auschwitz Sonderkommandos revolted on October 7, 1944. Poorly armed with some explosives, they set Crematoria III on fire, killed the Kapo and SS men, and broke through the fence. From what is known, all were captured and executed.[286] The prisoners who had smuggled gunpowder out of the local slave labor manufacturing plant at Auschwitz paid with their lives.[287]

Some Jews rebelled against a Sonderkommando fate from the start. Between June and July of 1944, Jews from the Greek islands of Corfu and Rhodes arrived at Auschwitz. At the end of July, the Germans picked 435 of these to be Sonderkommandos that would work the gas chambers and

crematoria. These Greek Jews refused to take part in burning corpses and were themselves sent to the gas chambers.[288]

Survivor Primo Levi similarly noted many cases where Jewish prisoners defied SS orders to work as Sonderkommandos. The end result was always the same: they were immediately killed.[289] It was the same with two failed attempts at escape.[290] The obedient survived. The troublemakers were "wiped out".[291]

Former Sonderkommando Zalman Lewental corroborated that many of the first Sonderkommandos were unable to cope and were soon killed. He believed that only those of lesser moral scruple remained Sonderkommandos.[292] The Sonderkommandos, then, were not simply the Jews chosen to work these functions of the death camp. The Sonderkommandos were those among the Jews who were both chosen by the Germans for this work *and* acquiescent towards these Nazi demands — unlike the group from Corfu and Rhodes who chose death to subslavery.

The acquiescent extended their life. If Jewish Kapos in Auschwitz, for example, did not beat the Jewish Sonderkommando properly, the Germans would kill the Kapo.[293] The result was selection for the survival of those Jews without ultimate scruples against the requisites of death camp survival.

A Jewish life in Auschwitz was worth less than nothing. As survivor Shaul Chazan explained:

> The Germans used any pretext, even the most trifling, to execute people on the spot, without trial, without wasting words, a gunshot and it was over and done with. Our lives weren't worth a thing.[294]

Nazi mastery over Jewish lives was total. "Escape was impossible. I repeat — impossible."[295] 'Practical reason' in

Auschwitz left only one refuge of moral freedom and one way out: suicide.[296] That was the only alternative. This was the alpha and omega of the Sonderkommando's moral world. A Sonderkommando could have chosen suicide.

Many who were originally coerced into life as death factory workers ultimately did choose death for themselves. There were a number of cases where Sonderkommandos threw themselves into the flames of the crematorium.[297] In one instance, on May 18, 1944, a Sonderkommando named Menachem "jumped into the fire with the body that he was dragging and cremated himself."[298] On the whole, however, suicide seems to have been rare among the Sonderkommandos.[299]

In *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Hannah Arendt contended that these Jewish "collaborators" had committed criminal acts "in order to save themselves from immediate death".[300] This assessment is essentially correct. Faced with certain death or the *possibility* of life, the Sonderkommandos, as lives valued than slaves, chose life. Former Sonderkommando Zalman Lewental explained:

> our intelligence is subconsciously influenced by the wonderful will to live, by the impulse to remain alive; you try to convince yourself, as if you do not care about your own life, but want only the general good, to go through with all of this for this and that cause, for this and that reason; you find hundreds of excuses, but the truth is that you want to live at any price.[301]

This is nothing less than an extreme realization of the Biblical valuation that "A living dog is better than a dead lion" (Eccles. 9:4).

Judaism is built on the general valuation that life is superior to death. The entire Jewish religion is built around a

fundamental separation of life from death. Auschwitz was the absolute violation of this separation that culminated in the Sonderkommando's life in death.

Despite Judaism's high general regard for human life, traditional Judaism does command individual death over participation in the death of another. Former Sonderkommando Ya'akov Silberberg recalled:

> I'm a *kohen*, and according to the Jewish religion a *kohen* mustn't go near a grave. He has to stay away from the dead, so as not to become [ritually] impure. And back then I was still a devout Jew!...The work I had to do was contrary to everything I'd believed in all my life.[302]

What the Nazis did, without necessarily having any premeditated plan to do so, was to demonstrate the dark side of the extreme Jewish valuation of life. Waging war means risking life, and war is the prerogative of a political existence. The Nazis exposed the infinite Jewish valuation of all life as a corollary of the Jewish diaspora's lack of willingness to risk their lives for and in a political existence.

Traditional antisemitism is partly traceable to a pre-modern gentile sense that life is an honor game and to play fair is to play by the rules of honor. The infinite Judeo-Christian valuation of all life demonstrates a loophole that could nonetheless be viewed as cheating at the honor game of life. The Nazis exposed a converse loophole in the infinite value of life through political domination. The Sonderkommando can be viewed as the man whose infinite valuation of his own life meant only that he refused to risk his own life — even at the price of collaboration in the death of his own people.

Extermination camp subslavery brought many Jews to the level of individualistic scavenger competition. It brought

Jews back to their roots in conditions like Egyptian slavery, where masters and collaborators alike corrupt all altruism. It may be significant that ancient Hebrews that would not accept slavery did not survive to become Jews.

Ancient Judaism negated the demoralized state of the slave with the remoralization of the laws of Moses. Yet there is an essentially selfish premise in the ethic of "What is hateful unto you, don't do unto your neighbor", for it assumes universal selfishness as the starting point of ethics. For Jews, conscience was the antidote to the survivalist adaptation of a slave. Yet just as Mosaic tradition used the fear of God to moralize Jewish behavior, the Nazis used fear of death to demoralize Jews behavior.

The Sonderkommando represents a possibility that Judaism, as a technology, was designed to prevent. Since the Jewish moral ethos ideally values every and all life, its realization would create a world where the possibility of the Sonderkommando never arises. Auschwitz exposed the dark side this value rationalization.

Francis Fukuyama's interpretation of Hegel in *The Last Man and the End of History* posited liberal democracy as the victory of the slave's struggle for recognition over his former master.[303] A slave, in this view, was the originally a product of both loss of self-mastery through battle *and* the acceptance of life as a slave over death. This latter condition, the preference for slavery over death, is what ultimately defines a slave as a slave. The slave is a slave to the fear of violent death. The master's risk of his own life in battle demonstrated his superiority to the natural determination of fear of violent death. The master, then, is not only more free, but also, in this sense, more *human*.

"*Thymos*" is a Greek word that Fukuyama used to describe the moral difference between the master and the slave. It is:

> something like an innate sense of justice: people believe that they have a certain worth, and when other people act as though they are worth less—when they do not *recognize* their worth at its correct value—then they become angry....Conversely, when other people see that we are not living up to our own sense of self-esteem, we feel *shame*; and when we are evaluated justly (i.e., in proportion to our true worth), we feel *pride*.[304]

The Jewish ethical emphasis on guilt over shame corresponds to an ethic based on individual worth over thymotic, collectivist worth. The uniqueness of Jewish mode of survival over nearly two thousand years without a political existence was made possible by a devaluation of thymotic pride. When faced with the Nazi outburst of megathymos, however, the collective vulnerability of this mode of existence became manifest.

During cross-examination at his trial at Jerusalem, Eichmann said that cooperation with the Judenrät was the very cornerstone of Nazi Jewish policy.[305] The strategy of "the extermination of Jews with the help of Jews",[306] as one Nazi commander put it, turned out to be remarkably effective. According to one calculation made by Pinchas Freudiger, half of the Jewish victims of the Nazis could have been saved if they had not followed the leadership of the Jewish councils.[307] Like sheep to the slaughter, the Nazis exploited Jewish traits of adaptable survivalism and used these characteristics as means of destroying Jews.

From the Jewish "councils" in the ghettos (the Judenräte) to the Kapos who worked in various lower administrative

positions in the camps to the Sonderkommandos, there was an entire continuum of passive, collaborative adaptation to Nazi rule. In this pattern, one can discern a form of modern "progress". It is a pattern of abandonment of the thymotic pride of the ancients in favor of a more modern, flexible, adaptable, navigation of self-interest. This pattern of "progress" culminated in the Sonderkommando: total adaptation to the environment limited only by individual fear of death. Thymotic Nazi anti-modernism valued collective racial pride at the expense of individual self-interest. The Sonderkommando, by contrast, represented individual self-interest liberated from kinship or racial ties to the point where individual self-preservation worked in diametrical opposition to kin selective self-preservation. In the Nazi vision of "progress", however, the consequences of modernistic individualism are turned upside down through their logical culmination in radical unfreedom and radical inequality.

Without thymos or some value of standard of self-worth that is not a means, but an end in itself, there is nothing to bar total adaptation to the environment. *Total* adaptation to the physical environment, so that there is nothing to distinguish an organism from physical determinism, is ultimately equivalent to death. The Sonderkommando was only the most radical realization of this path of adaptation unto extinction. The seemingly "irrational" blind spot of *thymos* would have been the only bar against the rational individual self-interest of the Sonderkommando.

In the depths of the inferno of Auschwitz churned the heights of modernity. Lying at the very core of the death machine, the Sonderkommando represents the most radical realization of the underlying premise of political modernity: rational individual self-interest. Underlying the modern

premise of the universal economic man is the principle of individual self-preservation that the Sonderkommando embodied. Since suicide was the only realistic alternative, the Sonderkommando represents the most perfect expression of the psychological dynamics of the modern "working slave".

The slave's fear of violent death was a basic axiom of the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, the first English-speaking political philosopher of "modernity". Hobbes was a materialist who viewed humans as material machines set in motion by the fear of death. The Sonderkommando worked on these principles of Hobbesian psychology: "During that time we had no emotions….we blocked up our hearts; we were dehumanized. We worked like machines….We'd stopped being people. We'd become robots."[308] For Hobbes, however, this conventional distinction between humans and robots makes little sense, since, in his view, humans *are* automatons, or, robots.

Hobbesian individual self-interest subverts expressions of kin selection, and effectively worked to subvert the kin selective roots of the English Civil War. The Sonderkommando perfected the fundamental conflict between individual self-interest and kin selective interest. The Auschwitz death factory Sonderkommando worker embodied, not the negation of modern political philosophy, but the material expression of its most radical fulfillment.

Underlying capitalism is a primary human psychology of unbound egoism. The principled self-destruction of the "capitalist system" would be achieved, not through Marxian revolution, but through the Nazi industrial revolution of genocide. Just as Auschwitz demonstrated the Nazi ability to overcome the limits of economic man, Auschwitz would demonstrate the consequences of the inability to overcome

the limits of economic man. The supreme inability of the Sonderkommando to overcome economic-survivalist rationality demonstrated how characteristically Jewish-modern logic, *by its own devices*, leads to individual self-enslavement and collective self-annihilation.

In one instance, a Sonderkommando stood as if thunderstruck before a body he was about to pull from the gas chamber. A Kapo reported that the man had discovered his wife among the corpses. Like a robot, he then continued his work and dragged the body toward the crematorium.[309]

Former Sonderkommando Zalman Lewental explained:

> when they set to work, many recognized members of their families among the dead, as this commando was made up of men who had just arrived with the last transport and were immediately taken to labour. Thus were murdered all the population of our settlement, all our community, our town, our dear parents, our wives, our children, our sisters, our brothers.[310]

What would Ayn Rand do? The extreme logic of individual rationalism brought the Jewish negation of the biological full circle to this hidden possibility of biological self-negation. The Nazi understanding of Jews as fundamentally rational beings would be the premise of the political architecture that led Jews down the path of insanity.

Did the Kapos or Sonderkommandos think of themselves as criminals? No, they thought they were *smart*. One has to be a *realist*. After a bourgeois cost-benefit analysis of individual self-interest, the most rational cause of action for a Sonderkommando would be to help the Nazis kill Jews. They did what the Nazis themselves considered the work of untouchables. Former Sonderkommando Ya'akov Silberberg summed up this philosophy in three words: "Suicide isn't

smart."[311] It was comparable to Shabbetai Zevi's calculation that torture and death would be worse than the choice of relinquishing his claim to messiahhood and converting to Islam.

Just as Anglo-Americans killed Germans in order to restore the principle of the sanctity of human life, to choose survival is to choose between notions of evil. The Sonderkommando demonstrates how vices or moral compromises can ultimately equal the most outright crimes. But, above all, reasoning strictly upon the premises of modern individualistic philosophy forces one to accept that *the Sonderkommandos were right*. The Sonderkommandos were right, strictly speaking, from the values characteristic of modernity: the "rational" value of individual self-preservation.

The true Nazi victory was to demonstrate the creation of a world that collapsed a single, universal standard of human behavior. Since it was the Nazis who threatened to annihilate pretensions of Western universalism, Sonderkommando self-interest stands as a test of the *universalism* of modern Western ideas against Nazi claims of Jewish racial particularity. If Westerners deny that modern principles of individual self-interest apply to the case of the Sonderkommando, then this only exposes how the Nazis successfully refuted Western pretensions to universalism. If the modern principle of individual self-interest *does* apply to the Sonderkommando, however, what are the universal implications of this for modernity? Since individual self-interest underlies the distinctively modern universalism of the liberal state, the Sonderkommando raises the question of the ultimate logical consequences of modern rationalism. Is liberal democracy the final solution to the human problem?

It would not be too much to say that the Nazis killed the Jews *because* the Jews would help them to do it. Nazis killed Jews because it took death camps to get them to die — their statelessness prohibited conventional warfare. The Jewish condition of statelessness was the first step towards the acceptance of the ethic of the slave. The Sonderkommando was its final step.

Some Jews entered Auschwitz with the belief that they at least possessed the rights of a slave. Such Jews were in for *Kultur* shock, however, for the Nazis would demonstrate the fundamentally different nature of their values through the systematic, industrial desecration of Jewish and humanistic values. Theodore Lehman, once a Jewish concentration camp inmate forced to labor in a German armaments factory, understood his worth to the Nazis:

> We were not slaves but less than slaves. True, we were deprived of freedom and became a piece of property which our masters drove to work. But here all similarity with any known form of slavery ends…The machinery had to be operated with care, oiled, greased and allowed to rest; its life span was protected. We, on the other hand, were like a bit of sandpaper, which, rubbed a few times, becomes useless and is thrown away to be burned with the garbage.

The worth of a Jew to the Nazi masters of Auschwitz was not merely less than that of a slave, it was less than *nothing*. Every corpse cremated by a Sonderkommando reinforced the utter and complete worthlessness of a Jewish life in Auschwitz. The Sonderkommando who waiver or flinched in the face of death work was so completely expendable that a bullet could be shot through his head on a whim of total indifference. The life of a Sonderkommando perpetually teetered on the brink of being reduced from a number to

nothingness. And the instinctive, death-fearing modernistic rationality of the Sonderkommando compelled them to work harder towards the goal of self-destruction, death, and nothing.

"For why has the advent of nihilism become *necessary*?", inquired Friedrich Nietzsche:

> Because the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; because nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals—because we must experience nihilism before we can find out what value these "values" really had.[312]

Some believe that confronting nihilism is like a taking a cold shower. But what may have appeared to be a cold shower to some turns out to be more like approaching the temperature of absolute zero, with all of its humanly shattering consequences.

CHRIST KILLERS

Mighty is the King, Who loves justice. You founded fairness. The justice and righteousness of Jacob, You have made.

—PSALM 99

If the world hates you, keep in mind that it hated me first.

—JESUS TO HIS FOLLOWERS (JOHN 15:18)

Jesus *was* the Second World War

In 1834, German-Jewish poet Heinrich Heine prophesized:

> Should the subduing talisman, the Cross, break, then...the old stone gods will rise from the long-forgotten ruin and rub the dust of a thousand years from their eyes; and Thor, leaping to life with his great hammer, will crush the Gothic cathedrals![313]

One century later, officials at the University of Munich, followers of Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg, instructed

students to "neatly write down" and memorize the following song:

> The old Jewish shame is at last swept away;
> The black band of rascals [Catholic priests] rages on.
> German men, German women, beat the black band to a jelly.
> Hang them on the gallows....Ravens have been waiting.
>
> Plunge the knives into the parson's body.
> We'll be ready for any massacre.
> Hoist the Hohenzollerns high on the lamp-post!
> Hurl the hand-grenades into the churches![314]

"Today a *new* faith is stirring", declared Alfred Rosenberg. "[T]he myth of blood….Nordic blood…has replaced and overcome the old sacraments….The place of Christian love has been taken by the National Socialist, Germanic idea of comradeship".[315] The replacement of love by Germanic comradeship was the replacement of Christ with Caesar; omega altruism with alpha altruism; love for the other with hate for the other. Nazism, as Goldhagen pointed out in *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, was an "anti-Christian morality".[316]

Rosenberg was well known for his assaults on Christianity. During the war he set up a thirty-point program for a pagan "National Reich Church". Point five declared, "The National Church is determined to exterminate irrevocably…the strange and foreign Christian faiths imported into Germany in the ill-omened year 800." Point thirty demanded, "On the day of its foundation, the Christian Cross must be removed from all churches, cathedrals, and chapels…and it must be superseded by the only unconquerable symbol, the swastika."[317] Only neo-paganism of this kind could fully realize the demand of the

nineteenth century German nationalist Friedrich Ludwig Jahn that "[t]he church should not be placed above the state, nor under it, nor next to it; it should be integrated with it."[318]

Yet Rosenberg's pagan-religious enthusiasm should not be confused with Hitler's elitism. "I especially wouldn't want our movement to acquire a religious character and institute a form of worship", said Hitler. "It would be appalling for me, and I would wish I'd never lived, if I were to end up in the skin of a Buddha!"[319] A limited tolerance for Christianity and especially groups such as the "Positive Christians" was, for Hitler, something to be temporarily entertained among the masses. Pastor Martin Niemöller saw the Positive Christians as nationalists and racists first, and Christians second. Yet the "positive" in Positive Christianity was actually only the residual paganism that was never fully eradicated in the first place. "Negative" Christianity, or altruism that opposes duty to the state, would correspond to *actual* Christianity as proscribed by the ethics of Jesus.

Yet this never stopped nominal Christians, such as Adolph Stoecker, from attempting to combine "positive" and "negative" Christianity. As the "greatest popular missionary of Germany", he tried to form a workers political party that was both Christian and patriotic in the 1880s. He attacked Social Democrats because "[t]hey hate their fatherland...and that is bad. To hate one's fatherland is like hating one's mother"[320] But perhaps they were just good Christians. They were bad only in the sense that an authentic Christian is bad in following Jesus's dictate to hate the patriarchal family:

> If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and bretheren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14:26).

Undaunted by the Social Democrats, Stoecker took up antisemitism to increase his popular appeal. Hitler, by contrast, recognized that Christianity and nationalism are born antagonists. On December 14, 1941, he stated:

> Kerrl, with the noblest of intentions, wanted to attempt a synthesis between National Socialism and Christianity. I don't believe the thing's possible, and I see the obstacle in Christianity itself....Pure Christianity—the Christianity of the catacombs—is concerned with translating the Christian doctrine into facts. It leads quite simply to the annihilation of mankind. It is merely whole-hearted Bolshevism, under a tinsel of metaphysics.[321]

The problem, Hitler claimed, was that "Christianity is a rebellion against natural law, a protest against nature. Taken to its logical extreme, Christianity would mean the systematic cultivation of human failure."[322] The Nazi revolution would take its vision of racial-biological naturalism to its logical extreme by eradicating the weak and breeding a new master race. And this meant the eradication of Christianity itself.

In a conversation with Hermann Rauschning, Hitler stated that although he will momentarily come to terms with the Church, "that will not prevent me from tearing up Christianity root and branch, and annihilating it in Germany." The Italians and French, said the Führer, are "essentially heathens." They are "quite capable of being heathens and Christians at the same time" because "[t]heir Christianity is only skin-deep. But the German is different. He is serious in everything he undertakes. He wants to be either a Christian or a heathen. He cannot be both."[323]

Nazis were Germans, not Christians, and especially not both. "A German Church, a German Christianity is a

distortion. One is either a German or a Christian. You cannot be both." The problem, in Hitler's view, was that "you cannot get rid of the mentality behind it."[324] The Nazi revolution would firmly stamp out the residual Christian mentality that survived in the liberalism of the West.

Speaking privately on October 19, 1941, Hitler claimed that "[t]he reason why the ancient world was so pure, light, and serene was that it knew nothing of the two great scourges: the pox and Christianity".[325] Christianity was 'the greatest of plagues', as Himmler put it on June 9, 1942.[326] It was not only a disease, but a disease that Hitler thought best left to other, inferior races: "When all is said, we have no reason to wish that the Italians and Spaniards should free themselves from the drug of Christianity. Let's be the only people who are immunized against the disease."[327] Hate was health.

"The discovery of the Jewish virus is one of the greatest revolutions that have taken place in the world", said Hitler in a private conversation on February 22, 1942:

> The battle in which we are engaged to-day is of the same sort as the battle waged, during the last century, by Pasteur and Koch. How many diseases have their origin in the Jewish virus!....We shall regain our health only by eliminating the Jew. Everything has a cause, nothing comes by chance.[328]

Four days prior to this statement, Goebbels had written in his diary: "the Jewish race is the most dangerous one that inhabits the globe...we must show them no mercy and no indulgence. This riffraff must be eliminated and destroyed."[329] The destruction of Christianity and the destruction of the Jews were two sides of the same cause.

As a politician, Hitler's strategy for dealing with the 'Judeo-Christian pest' can be discerned in *Mein Kamph* through an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of two politicians Hitler greatly admired, Georg von Schönerer and Karl Lueger. Hitler revealed, "my personal sympathy lay at first on the side of the Pan-German Schönerer, and turned only little by little toward the Christian Social leader as well." For while "Schönerer recognized the problems in their innermost essence, he erred when it came to men....Here, on the other hand lay Dr. Lueger's strength." Hitler believed that Lueger's conciliatory policy towards the Roman Catholic Church, "fashioned with infinite shrewdness", was an essential element of his practical success — success that eluded the Pan-German leader.[330]

Schönerer publicly announced "that the Jewish bible is not a German moral-religious book, and that the founder of Christianity, as the son of a racial Jewess and a descendant of David is not an Aryan, is a fact that simply can't be reversed."[331] He also made outright attacks on the Catholic Church for its Rome-centric influence. "Schönerer realized, to be sure, that questions of basic philosophy were involved," wrote Hitler, "but he did not understand that only the broad masses of a people are primarily able to uphold such well-nigh religious convictions."[332] Hitler concluded that neither, in the end, achieved their ultimate goal.

It was here that Hitler would learn from both. Within the *public* sphere, Hitler carefully maintained his distance from overt anti-Christianity of Schönerer and embraced the methods of Lueger. For example, when Martin Bormann included the sentence, "Christianity and National Socialism are not reconcilable" in a party directive, Hitler had the sentence removed and the directive cancelled.[333] Yet in

private conversations during the war, we see a very different disclosure remarkably close to the views of Schönerer. On October 14, 1941, Hitler said, "it's not opportune to hurl ourselves now into a struggle with the Churches. The best thing is to let Christianity die a natural death."[334] If the Nazis had won the war, then Thor, as Heine put it, would have crushed the cathedrals.

Hitler *synthesized* the insights of both of his predecessors in dealing with Christianity. The result was *not* ultimate compromise, but rather a more comprehensive strategy that sought to achieve the ends of Schönerer with the means of Lueger. The same pattern can be discerned in Hitler's implementation of the extermination of the Jews. Hitler radicalized the core of Schönerer's "basic philosophy" into genocide, while displaying a public face modeled on Lueger's 'infinite shrewdness'.

What did Hitler ultimately plan to do, then, about the Christian problem? "What can we do? Just what the Catholic Church did when it forced its beliefs on the heathen: preserve what can be preserved, and change its meaning."[335] Hitler believed:

> Our peasants have not forgotten their true religion. It still lives....The Christian mythology has simply coated it like a layer of tallow….The peasant will be told what the Church has destroyed for him: the whole of the secret knowledge of nature, of the divine, the shapeless, the daemonic. The peasant shall learn to hate the Church on that basis. Gradually he will be taught by what wiles the soul of the German has been raped. We shall wash off the Christian veneer and bring out a religion peculiar to our race.[336]

Hitler's belief that Christianity cast a superficial gloss over an inherent pagan "religion peculiar to our race" had a

striking parallel in the roughly contemporary ideas of the Swiss psychologist Carl Jung. "In the past two thousand years", Jung explained:

> Christianity has done its work and has erected barriers of repression, which protect us from the sight of our own 'sinfulness'. The elementary notions of the libido have come to be known to us, for they are carried on in the unconscious; therefore, the belief which combats them has become hollow and empty. Let whoever does not believe that a mask covers our religion, obtain an impression for himself from the appearance of our modern churches, from which style and art have long since fled.[337]

To Carl Jung, Christianity was a Jewish religion that cruelly separated Aryans from nature.[338] He spoke of a spiritual-cultural war between "the two great antagonistic religions, Christianity on the one side, and Mithracism [sic] on the other."[339] Jung believed Mithraism, the religion Christianity outcompeted, was connected to the ancient Aryan mysteries. He sought to remove the Semetic "mask" of Christianity and reveal the image of the true "god within". He believed that "[t]ruth is a tree with roots. It is not words. Truth only grows in your own garden, nowhere else....Only feeble men eat the food of a stranger."[340]

In a 1918 essay called "Über den Unbewusste" ("The Role of the Unconscious"), Jung wrote, "Christianity split the Germanic barbarian into an upper and a lower half, and enabled him, by repressing the dark side, to domesticate the brighter half and fit it for civilization....But," Jung added, "the lower darker half still awaits redemption and a second spell of domestification."[341] The Jew, on the other hand, "is domesticated to a higher degree than we are, but he is badly at a loss for that quality in man which roots him to the earth

and draws new strength from below."[342] Consequently, Jung argued that Freud and Adler's psychoanalysis applied only to Jews and "these specifically Jewish doctrines are thoroughly unsatisfying to the Germanic mentality; we still have a genuine barbarian in us who is not to be trifled with."[343]

In 1926 Jung had an analytic session with Christiana Morgan, a non-Jewish woman who had a brief affair with Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann. He told her:

> Servants are your inferior functions—or inferior self....You are dealing with them as though infantile. The two Jewish fathers are Weizmann and Christ. The Jews enter our unconscious through a hole—the hole being the lack of any religion for our animal nature—our nature-forming selves. The Jews have domesticated their instincts—they are not as savage as ours are—so your inferior animal self says—you are Jewish—you have given up nature—the return to earth—the source of life.[344]

Although he never followed the political extremism of the Nazis, Jung found a partly analogous solution to modernity in returning to the roots. As he wrote in a letter of 1923, "We must dig down to the primitive in us, for only out of the conflict between civilized man and the Germanic barbarian will there come what we need: a new experience of God."[345] Carl Jung concluded that Nazism was the rebirth of primal, pagan collective unconsciousness.[346] The Nazis were born again pagans, or, as the Nazi preacher Alfred Rosenberg put it:

> Wotan, as the eternal mirror of the primeval soul-forces of the nordic man, is living today as five thousand years ago.[347]

Jung, once Freud's greatest student, ultimately charged his former teacher with a form of ethnocentrism. Freud "did not understand the Germanic psyche any more than did his Germanic followers. Has the formidable phenomenon of National Socialism, on which the whole world gazes with astonished eyes, taught them better?"[348] Towards the end of his life, however, Freud came to terms with observations of this kind that he had formerly resisted. In *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud wrote:

> We must not forget that all the peoples who now excel in the practice of anti-Semitism became Christians only in relatively recent times, sometimes forced to by bloody compulsion. One might say they all are 'badly christened'; under the thin veneer of Christianity they have remained what their ancestors were, barbarically polytheistic. They have not yet overcome their grudge against the new religion which was forced on them, and they have projected it on to the source from which Christianity came to them. The facts that the Gospels tell a story which is enacted among Jews, and in truth treats only of Jews, has facilitated such a projection. The hatred for Judaism is at bottom hatred for Christianity, and it is not surprising that in the German National Socialist revolution this close connection of the two monotheistic religions finds such clear expression in hostile treatment of both.[349]

Freud's assessment of the anti-Judeo-Christian nature of the Nazi movement was shared by his fellow German-speaking Jew, Albert Einstein. Unlike many whom naïvely believed that Nazi persecutions were of same kind as traditional Christian antisemitism, Einstein correctly comprehended the nature of the Nazi war against the Jews.

In a radio address for the United Jewish Appeal on March 22, 1939, he observed:

> In the past we were persecuted *despite* the fact that we were the people of the Bible; today, however, it is just *because* we are the people of the Book that we are persecuted. The aim is to exterminate not only ourselves but to destroy, together with us, that spirit expressed in the Bible and in Christianity which makes possible the rise of civilization in Central and Northern Europe. If this aim is achieved, Europe will become a barren waste. For human community life cannot endure on a basis of crude force, brutality, terror, and hate.[350]

Both Freud and Einstein, the two great contemporary intellectual luminaries of the secular, German-speaking Jewish world, came to the same conclusion regarding the Nazis: the attack on the Jews was inseparable from an attack on Christianity and its modern leftward secularizations. "By killing the Jews," wrote George Steiner:

> Western culture would eradicate those who had "invented" God, who had, however imperfectly, however restively, been the declarers of His unbearable Absence. The Holocaust is a reflex, the more complete for being long-inhibited, of natural sensory consciousness, of instinctual polytheistic and animist needs. It speaks for a world both older than Sinai and newer than Nietzsche. When, during the first years of Nazi rule, Freud sought to shift to an Egyptian responsibility for the "invention" of God, he was, though perhaps without fully knowing it, making a desperate propitiatory, sacrificial move. He was trying to wrench the lightning rod out of the hands of the Jewish people. It was too late. The leprosy of God's choice — but who chose whom? — was too visible on them.[351]

Before his execution, Adolph Eichmann affirmed that was a *Gottgläubiger*, a Nazi term for those who had broken with Christianity. Just as he had previously refused to take an oath on the Bible, the organizer of the Judeocide confirmed that he did not believe in a Christian God or an afterlife.[352] Nazism and Auschwitz were erected upon the corpse of God.

Nietzsche abhorred resentful antisemitism and was contemptuous of common German nationalism. He was both of and above his roots, attempting to overcome the Germans just as Jesus had attempted to overcome Judaism. Yet Hitler could not have realized Nazi extremism without the cultural impact of Nietzsche's radical rejection of Jesus and Socrates. Nietzsche's verdict that the West had abandoned the Christian *religion* while preserving its underlying *morality* grounded the Nazi revolution. The Nazi revolt against Western *values* peaked at Auschwitz; the pinnacle of Nazi *Kultur*; the consummation of the Nazi value revolution.

For the Nazis, the race of Jesus was inevitably central. It is thus remarkable how Nazis and proto-Nazis repeatedly contradicted themselves on the question of whether Jesus was a Jew or an "Aryan". The notion of an "Aryan Christ", for example, is often attributed the highly influential proto-Nazi Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Yet Chamberlain's own confusion on this matter is evident enough in his famous *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century,* wherein a heading entitled "Christ not a Jew" was shortly followed by a rather conflicting chapter entitled "Christ a Jew".[353] Even Chamberlain failed to fully keep the faith that Christ was not a Jew.

If Jesus was fully Jewish by ancestry, it is not hard to see how this would lead a man like Chamberlain into a state of denial. After all, how could a great, self-styled "master race" admit that almost all of its civilized ancestors had been brought to its knees in worship of a dead Jewish peasant? How embarrassing! The "Aryan Christ" would obviously be a way of saving face and upholding a shred of honor in the face of the idea that this "master race" had spent well over a thousand years as slaves of a slave morality.

In consequence, it is almost inevitable that Hitler would incline towards the belief that Jesus was an "Aryan", and Hitler did make this claim sometimes. In other instances, however, Hitler was perfectly explicit in his belief that Jesus was not an Aryan: "You can't make an Aryan of Jesus, that's nonsense...What Chamberlain wrote in his Principles is, to say the least, stupid."[354] This was an underlying racial reason that "[o]ne is either a German or a Christian. You cannot be both."[355] True Nazis would not be worshippers of an "Aryan Christ".

Christian gentiles clearly remade Jesus in a gentile image. Europeans portrayed Jesus in their own racial image just as East Asians portrayed Buddha in their own racial image (despite the latter's probable Indian origins). But did this persistent ambivalence over the question of Jesus's race by those most obsessed with race have a deeper origin? This ambivalent attitude towards Jesus has a parallel in Nazi attitudes towards half-Jews, or *Mischlinge*.

Jesus was a truly deep problem for Nazism. It was not only that in admitting Christ's Judaic origins they admitted their weakness in succumbing to it. The deeper problem was that the genuine success of Christianity over two millennium affirmed that it must hold some underlying psycho-social truth. Even in the face of Christian anti-Semitism, the

adoption of Biblical Christianity by gentiles pointed to the truth of a shared humanity between Jews and Aryans.

Hitler saw the world starkly divided between Jew and Aryan. Could a synthesis be forged between Jew and Aryan or must the full self-realization of Nazi being necessarily unfold into the realization of Jewish nothingness? Perhaps only when both extremes are compromised is some kind of reconciliation is possible, i.e. bourgeois Americanism; the Anglo-Jewish convergence. Would not the most uncompromised, efficient, rational, and powerful synthesis of Jew and Aryan radically cancel each other out?

Christianity, with its Judaic origins, was proof that this Manichean opposition between Jew and Aryan could be forged by a higher synthesis. But why was this the case? The answer does appear to lie in the powerful evidence that Christianity's central figure was the product of a rape of a Jewish woman by a Roman soldier during the crushing of revolts in 4 BCE. While fully Jewish by the formalities of Jewish law, Jesus of Nazareth was most probably half-Jewish and half-Roman by racial descent.

Jesus's *soul* was half-Jewish-half-Aryan. His soul was a "house divided" that found unity only by transcending this Manichean opposition between Jew and Aryan in the Tao of the "Kingdom of God". Jesus's soul reigns over Christians from the spiritual crossroads between Jew and "Aryan". This helps explains both Jesus's ambivalence toward Judaism and gentile neopagan ambivalence towards the racial identity of Jesus. What Jesus represents is akin to a unifying synthesis of the seemingly unbridgeable Cassirer and Heidegger dispute epitomized by the famous argument at *Davos*, 1929.

Jesus *was* the Second World War. The Nazi racial war show how internal struggles can become external struggles.

External struggle between Roman "Aryans" and the Jews in ancient Israel became an internal struggle with Jesus's soul. Jesus was the living embodiment of the transcendence of the conflict between Jew and Aryan, a transcendence that could accomplished only in overcoming the entire "world". Roman and Jew cancelled themselves out on the level of Jesus's biological being and his future he could see only existence on the level of the spirit consummated in death in this "world".

Even assuming that Jesus was half-Roman by descent, he radicalized the Jewish way of courage through love of the outcast and the stranger. In a Jewish context, this meant love for outcasts like Jesus himself. In a Christian-gentile context, however, the radical love of the superlative Christian leads inevitably towards the superlative outsider, the Jew. As Adolph von Harnack, a liberal Protestant, wrote to the proto-Nazi racialist H. S. Chamberlain, "The worse the Jew, all the greater must our love be."[356] Only by negating Christian love of the unlovable could one fully hate the Jews. Jesus's love was partly Jewish love for himself as an unlovable half-Roman (half-enemy) among Jews.

Christian love conquers hate and antisemitism is the classic hate that fits like a glove with the survival of the Jews. Yet can Christianity be construed as only a construction of the Jewish will to survive? Christianity commands Hitler to love his enemies. Was the commandment to love your enemies meant especially *for* one's enemies?

If Christianity is ultimately Jewish, then Christian antisemitism is really a form of Jewish self-hatred and the Christian's inability to hate Jesus is the ancestor of the modern West's formal inability to hate the Jews. This is, however, only half-true. Christian antisemitism inherited the

ambivalence of the half-Jewish Jesus himself. It also inherited a no less profound ambivalence towards Caesar; a figure he both spiritually emulated as "Lord" and spiritually despised. Perhaps it would not be too much to say that the memory of Jesus's soul *is* this Taoist, circular, cumulative inner ambivalence.

To worship Jesus is to worship miscegenation between Jew and gentile. To worship Jesus is to worship the overcoming of the divide between Jew and gentile. This is why, even if there is an ambiguous half-truth in the notion of an original Christian antisemitism, Nazism could not have come into existence without repudiating the way of Jesus.

And this is why, in the final analysis, it was not despite, but *because* of his half-Aryan descent, that Jesus represents the deadly enemy of Aryanist racists. To follow Jesus is to search for spiritual values that transcend biology and race, and this means being, ultimately, on the side of God. For Nazis who sought to keep their race absolutely pure, Jesus *was* racial miscegenation as the supreme guiding model for the human race. This was the deepest root of his extreme and nearly *universal* valuation of peace over war, love over hate, and inclusion over exclusion. What Jesus stood for made him the deadly enemy of Nazis who put racial-biology at the very center of a new order that radicalized the values of this world.

Some Jews of Jesus's time focused on his inner contradictions as a "house divided". Jesus turned this accusation back on normative or Pharisaic Judaism: the contradiction between biological naturalism and the characteristically anti-biological spirit of Biblical monotheism. Jesus himself radicalized the anti-biology of the spirit that could only be consummated in biological death.

Nazis repeated the execution of Jesus, mass-produced towards all Jews. While rejecting formal Christianity, the Nazis followed Christ's critique of the inner contradictions of the Pharisees. The contradiction between Jews as biological beings and the ultimately anti-biological values of the Bible was to be reconciled on the side of pure spirit, like the smoke that rises from chimneys.

Kingdom of Hell

> **It was hell on earth. If there's a hell after death, I think it must look like that. It was hell, real hell.**[357]
>
> —SHAUL CHAZAN, FORMER SONDERKOMMANDO AT AUSCHWITZ

"The heaviest blow that ever struck humanity was the coming of Christianity", Hitler declared. "Bolshevism is Christianity's illegitimate child. Both are inventions of the Jew."[358] Auschwitz would revenge the blow of Christianity. But what was it about Christianity that Hitler believed was so criminal?

> Christianity is a rebellion against natural law, a protest against nature. Taken to its logical extreme, Christianity would mean the systematic cultivation of human failure.[359]

Christian values contradicted a Darwinian revaluation of life. Taken to its logical extreme, Christianity would mean the artificial end of evolution by natural selection. If Christianity led to the "systematic cultivation of human

failure", then Nazism would aim for the systematic cultivation of eugenic success. As Richard Weikart explained in *From Darwin to Hitler*:

> Hitler derided any morality inimical to the increased vitality of the "Aryan" race, especially traditional values of humility, pity, and sympathy. He considered these unnatural, contrary to reason, and thus detrimental and destructive for the healthy progress of the human species. He spurned the idea of human rights, calling it a product of weaklings.[360]

It was "those, stupid, false, and unhealthy ideals of humanity",[361] as Göring called them, that stood in the way of *racial-biological* progress. The systematic desecration of humanistic values was identical with a wholesale rejection of the modern system of human rights. This rejection would be inexplicable without the realization that Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection implied that there are no "natural rights" to defend the survival of the weak; only natural selection to defend the natural destruction of the weak. Yet if the foundational modern human right is the right to live, then the full progressive implementation of the system of modern rights would mean the artificial end of evolution by natural selection. This is how secularized Christian values could engender the "systematic cultivation of human failure".

Some Germans had concluded that a moral lesson of Darwinism was "the healthy should eliminate the unhealthy".[362] After all, as Weikart noted, "the core idea of eugenics derived from Darwinism".[363] Even Ratzel's conception of *Lebensraum*, a significant influence on Hitler, originally included the extermination of certain groups of

people considered inferior.[364] If humans are natural, and not supernatural, then extermination is natural selection.

At the heart of the Darwinian revolution, Weikart observed, was a reevaluation of the value of death:

> Death had previously been viewed by most Europeans as an evil to overcome, not a beneficial force. But Darwin perceived some good in this evil....Darwin's theory was thus not just about biological change; it was a matter of life and death.[365]

If civilization is the application of reason to life, then what kind of "civilization" would be produced by the application of reason to a Darwinian view of life? Darwin's reasoning led to an appreciation of the import of instinct, and this paradoxical interplay between instinct and reason, "rationalism" and "irrationalism", fed directly into the paradoxical metaphysics of German *Kultur*. Nazism can ultimately be viewed as a triumph of a very German valuation of *Kultur* over civilization in that idealized instinct became the master that subordinated and enslaved reason and civilization.

Is it true that "the policy of annihilation was the product of rational argument taken to a mercilessly logical conclusion"?[366] The primary difference between characteristically modern assumptions and the Nazi assumptions was the prescriptive influence of Darwinian evolution. The thesis that mass murder was a form of demographic engineering would *not* be logical if that argument were not built on Darwinian premises, and especially a Darwinian reevaluation of the value of death. That racist or biological arguments *sometimes* paralleled economic arguments does not invalidate the

characteristically Nazi prerogative to override economic considerations in favor of racial ones.

Whereas modernity arose, in part, from the model of Newtonian science, and thus a distinct emphasis on *nonbiological* progress, a rational argument from Darwinian premises can lead to a rather incompatible notion of "progress". Conventionally speaking, "modernity" refers to an emphasis on economic-technological progress over biological progress. Modern Western civilization implies the ultimate subordination of biological instinct to nonbiological forms of progress, at least in its *tabla rasa* theory.

"Did Hitler hijack Darwinism and hold it hostage to his own malevolent political philosophy," inquired Weikart,

> or did he merely climb on board and follow it to its destination? The latter view might be oversimplified as follows: First, Darwinism undermined traditional morality and the value of human life. Then, evolutionary progress became the new moral imperative. This aided the advance of eugenics, which was overtly founded on Darwinian principles. Some eugenicists began advocating euthanasia and infanticide for the disabled. On a parallel track, some prominent Darwinists argued that human racial competition and war is part of the Darwinian struggle for existence. Hitler imbibed these social Darwinist ideas, blended in virulent anti-Semitism, and —there you have it: Holocaust.[367]

Why have Hitler and the Judeocide become the virtual identity of *radical* "evil" in Western civilization? "Evil" is virtually identical to the most radical implications of Darwinian evolution through natural or artificial selection. "Evil" is virtually identical to the justice of a primary mechanism of biological selection: the selective death of the

killed and the selective survival of the killers. The Nazi attempt to systematically implement Darwinistic principles culminated in the hell of Auschwitz: the triumph of death; the triumph of biological selection.

Carl Schmitt's *The Concept of the Political* (1932) asserted that "[t]he juridic formulas of the omnipotence of the state are, in fact, only superficial secularizations of theological formulas of the omnipotence of God." More generally, "all significant concepts of the theory of the modern state are secularized theological concepts."[368] This notion that "modern" ideas, and especially democratic and egalitarian political ideas, are superficial secularizations of a Christian Weltanschauung is directly attributable to Friedrich Nietzsche. If reason cannot determine fundamental values, then the genealogy of modern values such the equal valuation of all life are explicable only the basis of their congruence with pre-Enlightenment Biblical sources.

The God of the Bible, in effect, actively advocates the end of biological evolution. The infinite value of all life in the eyes of God that became secularized into the notion of equal rights implicated the elimination of selection. "God" amounts to an attempt to transcend or overcome biological evolution. God, in effect, commands the end of biological evolution.

But God and the Hebrew Bible were Jewish inventions. Did the one Jewish God have monotheistic monopoly on morality? Was the singular moral standard of the Hebrew God only as permanent and universal as "the eternal Jew"? Did the Jews invent conscience and even the distinctly modern morality? Was Freud's superego merely a Jewish idea? "Mighty is the King, Who loves justice", proclaims Psalm 99. "You founded fairness. The justice and

righteousness of Jacob, You have made." The Jews and their God, it seems, are guilty as charged.

This was only taking seriously Richard Wagner's belief that "Judaism is the evil conscience of our modern civilization." The Nazis, following Wagner, hated the Jews for feeling no shame in having brought conscience into the world.

To kill God at Auschwitz was to kill the God that "loves justice"; the God that "founded fairness". To exterminate the Jews was to exterminate the God that made the "justice and righteousness of Jacob". To kill the Jews was to kill the Jewish invention of conscience by killing the Jewish inventors of conscience. To extirpate the Jews was to extirpate the roots of conscience.

If there is no evolutionary basis for God, then were these Jewish conceptions of conscience and evil simply mechanisms of Jewish *biological* survival? Was it an accident that, by the "universal" standards of these values, the destruction of the Jews could be viewed as the highest evil? Was "universal" conscience a Jewish self-preservation mechanism?

If justice, as Thrasymachus claimed, is what is in the interest of the stronger, then Jewish justice is what is in the interest of the weaker. And hadn't the Jews always been the politically weaker? Was this the basis of the "universalism" of Jewish justice? If Judeo-Christianity made the stronger weaker and weak stronger, the Nazis would make the strong stronger and the weak weaker. Jews would be punished for their political weakness.

If the natural justice of natural selection was the new natural right, then the Jewish justice that reversed the "justice" of natural or artificial selection would itself have to be reversed. The Judeocide was the administration of Nazi

justice. Radical inhumanity was Nazi "justice" for the *Volk*-oppressing justice of Jewish conscience. Radical hate would revenge Jesus's radical love. Auschwitz was the realization of the full radicalism of the Nazi-German revolution.

The Nazis attempted to destroy the sociobiological root of conscience by destroying its historical root in the Jews. The ultimate reason Jews cannot "comprehend" the Judeocide *is because Jews exist*. If Jewish values promoted Jewish survival, then the negation of those values would be incomprehensible to Jews because Jewish existence was conditioned upon the existence of some form of those values. It was the Bible, Christianity, and its humanistic successors that made Auschwitz unimaginable.

"It is an illustration of the brainlessness of modern Radicals, that they are for ever abusing Christianity, and do not realize that they have to thank it for the best of their own laws of freedom",[369] explained the nineteenth century German historian Heinrich von Treitschke. It is

> both historically and physiologically untrue that human beings enter upon existence first as men, and afterwards as compatriots. It was the teachings of Christ which first brought home to them that all men are brothers. They are dissimilar in their concrete peculiarities, alike only in being created in God's image….the history of the earliest Christianity is the record of a continual resistance to authority. Politically, the first Christians were no other than rebels.[370]

All of these old-fashioned Christian influences would be swept away by the Nazi revolution. Christianity was the ancient Judaic political subversion *par excellence* that corrupted the Roman, Aryan imperialists *par excellence*. Jesus radicalized the Jewish way of courage; moral courage in the

face of the authority of superior power. The Nazis generalized the ultimate political verdict against Jesus to all Jewish threats to the paganistic powers of the earth.

In January 1937, Himmler gave a lecture on the history of Christianity to his SS-Gruppenführers (lieutenant generals). He told them:

> I have the conviction that the Roman emperors, who exterminated [*ausrotteten*] the first Christians, did precisely what we are doing with the communists. These Christians were at that time the vilest scum, which the city accommodated, the vilest Jewish people, the vilest Bolsheviks there were.

Ausrotten meant murder.[371]

If Jesus had made his "second coming" in Hitler's Europe, the Nazis would have sent that dissident Jewish half-breed, not to the technologically retrograde cross, but to the "modern" gas chamber. The Nazi-Germans attempted to succeed where their ancient Romans rivals ultimately failed.

Nietzsche believed that he had unmasked Christianity and wrought the death of God. Auschwitz was where God was formally exterminated. Auschwitz was the culmination of the Nazi revolution's overthrow of the tyranny of God, Christ, and its secular moral mutations. It was the justice of revenge and reparations for Christianity.

Just as Germans had entered history, they were subdued by Christian civilization. The Nazis realized that this Jew, Jesus, was teaching them how to be weak. Judeo-Christianity had vilified the proud and war-like nature as evil. This is what the Nazis waged war against.

According to Richard Wagner, "The Germans, of course, are by nature the flower of humankind: to fulfill their great destiny they have only to restore their sullied racial purity,

or at all events to achieve a real rebirth of racial feeling".[372] To keep the holy grail of pure blood pristine, the Jewish impurities would have eliminated. The original opposition between Jew and Aryan that Jesus had blurred would have to be restored to its pristine purity.

Only the most radical violation of Judeo-Christian morality could yield the most total moral purification from Judeo-Christian morality. Only the most pitiless ethos of hardness could thoroughly cleanse the lingering morality of compassion. The Jewish roots of Christian morality would be killed by killing the Jewish roots of Christian morality. If Jewish memes upheld Jewish genes, and Jewish blood spawned Jewish ideas, then the most total negation of both necessitated an education through annihilation.

Just as Jesus had turned family values on their head, the Nazis would turn Jewish familial values on their head. Nazi heaven created a world where Jews destroy one another rather than help one another. The greatest victory of all over the Jewish "invention of conscience" was mastery over the conscience of Sonderkommandos that actively participated in the destruction of their own humanity. The Nazis killed the souls of Sonderkommandos by forcing them to help eliminate Jewish bodies.

The "job" of Sonderkommando subslaves was to absorb the guilt and criminality of the master deeds of the SS and the Nazi regime as a whole. Unflinching condemnation of the *victim* was all part of the master plan. The belief that the victim is always wrong was the very ground of the "master race's" philosophy of right. Innocence would be cast out of this moral universe along with its victims.

"Our supervisor, Moll of the SS, was so zealous and crazy that he personally took part in the cremations", recalled former Sonderkommando Shaul Chazan:

> Once he was overheard saying that if Eichmann ordered him to cremate his family he'd do it. He revealed his sadism at times when he circulated among mothers who were about to be gassed and chattered with a boy whom they carried. He did it with a little chuckle on his lips. He'd hug the boy, give him some candy, and try to talk the mother into handing the boy to him. Then he'd take the kid to the pit and throw him into the fire alive.[373]

If the democracy and communism that fought the Nazis represent secularizations of Judeo-Christian Kingdom of Heaven, Auschwitz represents the secularization of the Judeo-Christian Kingdom of Hell. The radical justice of Christian-Marxist heaven would be answered with the radical injustice of this Nazi hell. The eternal life of the survival of all would be revenged with the eternal death of racial extinction. The right to live would be inverted into the duty to die. Auschwitz was death brought to life — Dante's inferno on Earth.

The world of the death camp dug deep into hell, far below the safe American ground that seemingly assumed that there was no sub-basement to explore. The death camp could not have realized such extremes of cruelty and sadism outside a life and death struggle that risked total self-destruction for total world domination. Nazi-German risk of individual life in an imperial war for racial mastery simultaneous with Jewish-Sonderkommando preservation of individual life as racially self-destructive death factory subslaves represents the inner dynamics of the Nazi justification of Auschwitz.

Christian heaven was Nazi hell and Christian hell was Nazi heaven with one modification: Auschwitz turned Judeo-Christian valuations of good and evil upside down.

Jesus would burn in Satan's hell as the Nazi exalted in their *power* to realize their mastery over the morality of the slave. In this apocalyptic world, the forces of evil would struggle to win their final battle over the forces of good.

In the Valhalla world of war at Auschwitz, the highest good would be the brutal, violent, sadistic killing of God. Here the killers would rule. They would command the torture, beating, and death of civilized Jewish doctors, lawyers, shopkeepers, farm hands, and rabbis. Power would be held only the most oppressive of the oppressors, the most pitiless of the pitiless, and the most sadistic of the sadists. Compassion would be ruthlessly stamped out of this moral universe. Any display of mercy would be criminalized and penalized absolutely. The Sonderkommando who acted with conscience would be punished with violent death.

The very reason for the being of Auschwitz was to negate and annihilate the Judeo-Christian valuation of human life. Nazis wanted to kill the Jews to kill the standard by which killing the Jews is evil. By this measure, the Judeocide was morally self-justified. The supreme value that the Nazi masters of Auschwitz aspired to was what their Christian ancestors had once called "evil".

What, then, did the Nazis attempt to do? The Nazis attempted to invert the inverters; to radically uproot the radical uprooters; to deracinate the race that deracinates the races; to deny the value of the race that denies the value of race; to arrogate an infinite valuation of death upon their infinite valuation of life; to meet their unqualified will to live with an unqualified will to kill. It was because Jews spawned an ethic of kindness and humanity that Jews were singled out for the ultimate cruelty and inhumanity. Nazis made the highest law the killing of the highest moral law "Thou shall not kill". The Nazis willed the rebirth of

biological evolution through the revaluation of the value of death.

Auschwitz represents a kind of "principle" and that "principle" is biological evolution through Darwinian selection. The principle of equality implies the end of biological selection, and the Nazis obsessively identified Jews with the principle of equality. The God of the Jews, Jewish egalitarianism, and Jewish ethics selected for the elimination of selection. Auschwitz was selection for the elimination of the selectors of the elimination of selection.

GOD WAS DEAD

Racial Relativism

With the Soviet army advancing upon the decimated city of Berlin at the end of April 1945, Hitler prepared to commit suicide. "Through the sacrifices of our soldiers and my own fellowship with them unto death," dictated his final testament, "a seed has been sown in German history that will one day grow to usher in the glorious rebirth of the National Socialist movement in a truly united nation."

Hitler believed that race or biology was the great constant that history revolved around. This implies a basically cyclical view of history in which races might degenerate or regenerate, but biology or race would remain the foundation that determines all great events in history. If so, then all historical change is relative to the absolute of race.

Germans may prefer the more masculine, hierarchical, and right wing national socialism of Nazism while Jews may prefer the more feminine, egalitarian, and left wing national socialism of the early Kibbutznik Zionists, but all politics and all philosophy is relative to race. In other words, in the Nazi view, the Jewish left is only the means of the ends of the Jewish right. This means that the left and all notions of leftward "progress" can explained purely on the basis of racial-biology.

National Socialism was racial relativism and the Judeocide was the fulfillment of the extreme implications of that relativism. The Judeocide was the Nazi-German answer

to a common Jewish relativism that assumed that everything is relative except the value of human life and common humanistic morality. The Judeocide was the Nazi-German answer to the Jewish-monotheistic assumption of one overriding moral standard of one universal God. This was racial relativism: Nazi-Germans maximized their life as a race by maximizing Jewish death as a race.

Hitler's apparent belief that biology is destiny was ultimately more prescriptive than descriptive. Hitlerism ultimately posited, not that that everything *is* relative to race, but that everything *should* be relative to race. One consequence of this belief is the denial that the genocide of the Jews ever happened.

The ideological justification for lying about the genocide of over five million Jews was laid out very clearly, not only in the paradigmatic practice of Nazi propaganda, but also in the theory of *Mein Kamph*. "Is propaganda a means or an end?", Hitler asked rhetorically. "It is a means and must therefore be judged with regard to its end. It must consequently take a form calculated to support the aim which it serves….[T]he very first axiom of all propaganda activity" is:

> the basically subjective and one-sided attitude it must take toward every question it deals with….The function of propaganda is, for example, not to weigh and ponder the rights of different people, but exclusively to emphasize the one right which it has set out to argue for. Its task is not to make an objective study of the truth, in so far as it favors the enemy, and then set it before the masses with academic fairness; its task is to serve our own right, always and unflinchingly.[374]

In the First World War, "the end was the struggle for the existence of the German people; consequently propaganda could only be considered in accordance with the principles that were valid for this struggle….[P]ropaganda is no more than a weapon, though a frightful one in the hand of an expert."[375]

Who, then, was the villain that propaganda must be waged? Any five-year-old German raised in the Nazi faith under Hitler's "educational" system already knew the answer, regardless of mere evidence. The Jews, of course.

Holocaust denial or Judeocide denial is only a continuation of the grand Hitlerite tradition of the "big lie". For Neo-Nazis and their sympathizers, the evil of Auschwitz was that it contradicted the central tenet of *The Myth* that the Aryan race is always right and always good. To save this faith against the verdict of the contemporary West that genocide is wrong, neo-Nazis would have to revise the Judeocide, not Hitlerism.

Both the Judeocide and Judeocide denial express different aspects of Nazi contempt for aspirational values of Western civilization. The Judeocide is contempt for modern Western moral values and Judeocide denial is contempt for the Western Socratic search for truth. Contempt for the Socratic search for truth is evident in the official Nazi philosopher's tome, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century.* Judged by its title, a Westerner might assume that myth, as untruth, is being refuted here, and the purpose of the book is to correct myths and falsehoods with scientifically verifiable truth. *On the contrary*. What is false in this case is that assumption. The belief that truth and reason, as opposed to myth and falsehood, is always *good* does not fathom the nature of the Nazi revolution. Rosenberg's book, in contradistinction to

science, aimed to both establish and propagate new myths for a new age.

The Nazi revolution posited the underlying assumption that race is the measure of all things. The value of the Jews, for example, could be measured only in relation to the German-Aryan race. "Facts" become fictions when they hurt the cause of the Aryan race. Just as the racial relativism of truth led to the Judeocide, the racial relativism of truth can also lead to Judeocide denial. Both are beyond good and evil. Judeocide denial audaciously aims to kill two birds with one stone: exonerate Hitler and dump all guilt, all faults, and all charges of boundless, audacious duplicity upon the Jews who, after all, deserve no mercy anyway.

If one were to actually take the deniers' arguments with even a modicum of seriousness, one could only conclude that Hitler's Jewish policy was devoted to saving Jewish lives from the risk of death. After all, Hitler was content to murder those, not only those of his own race, but even an *alte kampher* such as Röhm. Hitler was willing to sacrifice German blood on the front while excluding Jews from serving in its armies. While the flower of German manhood was being depleted in imperial racial warfare, the Nazis were apparently content to keep Jewish lives safe out of harm's way. German soldiers were fit to die on front, but not Jews. Hitler apparently believed that Jewish lives were too valuable to conscience their loss on the front, and was simply relocating Jews so they could have their own *Lebensraum*. Hitler, then, being the moderate and reasonable man that he was, was only guilty of not taking his racial Weltanschauung to its logical conclusion.

To Otto Wagner and a trusted few, Hitler confided, "We alone can and must think clearly about racial questions. For us these questions are key and a signpost. But for the public

at large they are poison."[376] Hitler publicly disconnected himself from the Judeocide for the same reason he publicly disconnected himself from the essential anti-Christianity of Nazism. Both genocide and anti-Christianity would undermine the simple charismatic strength of his mass appeal. The public had to be seduced with the "infinite shrewdness" of Lueger if the Nazi elite were to achieve the central, ideal aims of Schönerer.

The Judeocide was a war by other (industrial) means, and Judeocide denial is only a continuation of this war by other (propagandistic) means. While the Judeocide focused on the destruction of Jewish genes, Judeocide denial focuses on the destruction of Jewish memes. The latter strategy, killing the *memory* of the dead, the very record of their past existence, is equivalent to killing them again — making them truly nothing.

Just as the Nazis radically desecrated the Biblical commandment "Thou shalt not kill", the deniers radically desecrate the Biblical commandment "Thou shalt not lie". Just as the act of killing Jews kills conscience, the act of lying about the murders kills conscience, multiplying the Nazi will to annihilate the Judeo-Christian roots of conscience. When combined, these strategies amount to the final aim of the total sociobiological annihilation of all Jewish existence.

Ingo Hasselbach, formerly a German neo-Nazi in the 1990s, described the indoctrination process:

> We'd begin to spend a lot of time on the *results* of the Holocaust lie, even before proving it was a lie. That way you first established Jewish guilt and made the idea suspect without having to confront the evidence. The Holocaust myth was simply a way to weaken Germans, as well as how the Jews had swindled Germany into financing the state of Israel.[377]

The neo-Nazi response to this alleged hoax was: "If the Jews can invent something like that, they have to count on ending up in it."[378] How could any thinking person confidently hold that the destruction of millions of Jews is an unscrupulous lie, yet content themselves with the hope that their movement will help create the real thing?

Hasselbach described a board game played by Neo-Nazis where players competed to get "their" Jews into the gas chamber:

> Yet any one of the people playing this game would have gotten up at a moment's notice and argued that the Holocaust was a lie. This was the psychological horror at the heart of everything we did: you held both ideas in your head at once. By doing so, you lived in a realm that was beyond rational thought.[379]

This is a classic corroboration of the high correlation between Judeocide denial and antisemetic agenda. Denial of the Nazi genocide of the Jews is an article of faith maintained for Neo-Nazis and antisemites in the forum of *public* consumption. The apparent incompatibility of the Judeocide and Judeocide denial is only as paradoxical as Hitler's claim that the apparent incompatibility between capitalism and communism is illusory and both are the work of international Jewry.

The scientific question of whether millions of Jews were killed by Nazis during World War Two is, in a general sense, a perfectly legitimate question even if there are unusual questions of political motive. If Judeocide deniers claim that Jews have befitted politically and economically from the Judeocide, this implies that the Judeocide denier's position would result in damage to Jewish interests. Conversely, I

also think that the Judeocide has been exploited by some Jewish groups, in some cases to silence criticism of Israeli political policies. The outstanding point here, however, is that even if *both* the Judeocide *and* Judeocide denial have been used as propaganda tools, this makes not an iota of difference in regard to the evidence that the Nazi genocide of the Jews did or did not happen.

Hitler warned, in a speech to the Reichstag on January 30, 1939, of "the destruction [*Vernichtung*] of the Jews in Europe".[380] Other than declarations such as this, Hitler was cunning enough to distance himself, for the sake of his public reputation, from what were very likely private orders for the genocide of the Jews. Even if humans have inherited inclinations towards war over evolutionary history, Hitler's war against other European nations never would have happened spontaneously, i.e. without Hitler's explicit orders. Hitler's war against the Jews was no different. This is true even if Auschwitz speaks the language of the genes more than the language of the memes and the ultimate evidence for Auschwitz is thus to found more in what Nazis did, rather than *only* in what Nazis said.

From this standpoint, I would emphasize three lines of evidence to corroborate the historicity of the Nazi genocide of at least five million Jews during World War Two.[381] First, a general sociobiological understanding of human nature that places the Judeocide as one of many genocides that have taken place in human history.[382] Second, a more specific sociobiological understanding of Nazism as a historical expression of a kin selective German *Kultur*. Thirdly, specific historical evidence for genocide at Auschwitz and other Nazi extermination camps, the best example I have found being *The Case for Auschwitz: Evidence from the Irving Trial* by architect Robert Jan van Pelt.

Hitler refuted Marx's dismissal of biological factors in history at Auschwitz. Hitler, however, was ultimately refuted by his inability to fit the English-speaking world into his racial-biological understanding of history. He was thus unable to either accurately predict their ultimate behavior or explain why his "Aryan", Germanic comrades decisively turned against him.

In their devaluation of biological factors, liberal democracies and Marxism had more in common with one another than with Nazism. The English-speaking world's distinctively liberal devaluation of biological factors is a corollary of its devaluation of the long-term influence of the Norman Conquest. If the distinctively British "class" system was rooted in a Norman/Saxon conflict, then this paradigmatic Marist "class" system cannot be reduced to economics anymore than the slave-driven aristocracy of the old American South can be explained as a "peculiar" form of capitalism.

Marx's clash of classes view of history was rooted in a fundamental misinterpretation of the English "class" system as it related to the historical origins of capitalist-industrial revolution. Hitler's racial totalism was provoked by his systematic opposition to radical anti-biological determinism of Marx. Marx's misunderstanding of the English-speaking world thus helped provoke Hitler's misunderstanding of the English-speaking world. Marx viewed England in terms of "class", Hitler viewed England in terms of race, and *both* men were ultimately historically refuted by their failure to understanding the long-term impact of the Norman Conquest of England.

The Germans and the Anglo-Saxons are converse cognates that decisively diverged from a common sociobiological path in 1066. Hitler revealed the origins of

Nazi defeat in his failure to understand this. But does understanding the Norman/Saxon conflict ultimately support or refute the Nazi assumption of the primacy of race?

Hitler's racial view of history implied that the recurrence of race war would be inescapable because human beings *are* biological beings. Racial relativism means that biology is absolute, and no matter what occurs within the realm of civilizational evolution, biology will always reemerge to demonstrate its foundational supremacy. The assumption underlying the Nazi revolution, then, was that biology is destiny. The question of the uniqueness of the Nazi Judeocide is pinned to this question: *Is* biology the ultimate destiny of the human race?

Overcoming Human Being

> **Technology tears human beings loose from the earth and uproots them...I was frightened when I recently saw photographs of the earth taken from the moon. We don't need an atom bomb at all; the uprooting of human beings is already taking place.**[383]
>
> —MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Heidegger's thought is a stand against — and towards — nihilism. What could oppose the nothingness of nihilism? Being.

The Jewish-ethical elimination of natural and artificial selection assumes the rightness of what is commonly referred to as existence. This has been an unquestioned humanistic assumption of the modern belief in human rights

as well as Marxism. The ethical orientation of Biblical and modern Jewish thought takes this arrogant assumption of existence and argues forth from this premise virtually without question. Almost the entirety of modern-Jewish philosophy rests on this unverified assumption of being.

All ethical questions and *all* economic questions and hence, all characteristically Jewish-modern thought, rests on the assumption of Jewish-modern being. This was an assumption that Martin Heidegger brought into open question and this was the assumption that was questioned by Auschwitz. Auschwitz was a material form of Heidegger's radical questioning of being.

The grounds of Jewish ethical ideas are physical Jewish bodies. But what are Jews *in themselves*? If there was no God, Jews were without the reason and ground of their being. For Germans to be, the Jews must not. This is what Jews were to be as products of Auschwitz: nothing. What Heidegger had to say about Auschwitz is commentary on Auschwitz:

In tracing Heidegger's roots one is led to Nietzsche. Yet Nietzsche's revaluation of values was founded upon Darwin's implicit refutation of Judeo-Christianity theology. Nietzsche's achievement was, in part, to think out the most robust and extreme human implications of the Darwinian revolution. Without Darwin, Nietzsche could not have confidently claimed that Christianity had been unmasked. But *with* Darwin, he stood face to face with nihilism. Nietzsche's attitude toward Darwin was necessarily ambivalent because of this, and this has made it easy to underestimate the philosophic impact of Darwin upon Nietzsche. Darwinism was as foundational a pillar of Nazism as any German philosopher, but Darwin's direct and indirect influence on Nietzsche is illuminating as a gauge of Darwin's impact on Hitler because Nazism was caught up

within the same paradox. While Darwin's discoveries provided a foundation for the Nazi revaluation of values, taking Darwinian biological materialism too literally could be deadly insofar as life became nihilized as a product of random accidents.

Richard Weikart's *From Darwin to Hitler*, by clarifying the links between the Darwinian revolution and the Nazi revolution, helped clarify "Hitler's ethic". There was a coherent logic behind Hitler's deeds, but it is literally impossible to understand it without considering the moral implications of Darwinism. Hitler's ethic was based on a digestion of the Darwinian revolution that revalued all values, all questions of right and wrong, on the basis of their effect on biological evolutionary progress.

Darwin's discovery of evolution by natural selection was the single greatest intellectual foundation of the Nazi revolution. Darwin's discovery was not a sufficient condition for Nazism and its eugenic values, but it was its necessary condition. If Jewish and modern morality itself is founded on a secularization of Judeo-Christian values or the legacy of pre-Darwinian rationalizations, then all conventional moral criticisms of Nazism and Auschwitz on this ground fail to address the Nazi argument in world history.

And this means that the ultimate confrontation of Nazi and Jew is a confrontation over evolutionary ethics.

The biological effect of treating all human life as sacred is to outlaw the primary mechanism of biological evolution: natural and/or artificial selection. From this point of view, the Biblical valuation of all humans as equal in the eyes of God and "secular" egalitarianism appear to lead to a biological-evolutionary dead end. From a purely biological perspective, then, the victory of Jewish-based values uphold

the survival of the Jews at the price of thwarting the biological evolution *of the human species as a whole and all future biological evolution*. If so, the victory of the Jews over Nazism would thus represent a "pyrrhic victory" since international peace and ethical civilization would degenerate man into "the last man".

I have done my best to do justice to the Nazi argument in world history, in their own terms, insofar, of course, as this is possible for me. Hitler's ethic was founded on an attempt to do justice to biological factors in history. But did Hitler's ethic do justice to *nonbiological* factors in history?

Between Nazi and Jew was a qualitative valuational difference between what *is* and what *ought* to be. Biology *is*. Jewish-Biblical morality implies a transcendence of biology. In this sense, Nazis valued what *is* at the expense of what *ought* to be in an ultimate sense; Nazis valued biology at the expense of conceivable alternatives.

From a Nazi-racist point of view, biology *is* what a human *is*. If a Nazi-German is what he is for, then, from the point of view of the "selfish gene" he is a means for propagating his selfish genes, and therein lays an efficient convergence of means and ends. Jewish ethics suggest that individuals should be treated as ends, and not only as means of their selfish genes. Jewish ethics thus imply a breakdown of ends and means: humans should no longer be the ends of selfish genes, and this frees even technology from slavery to the selfish genes. What ultimately *should be*, projecting an assumption of Jewish-modern ethical progress towards the future, is God.

In traditional Judeo-Christian theology, God preceded being. Heidegger traced a beginning before God, when genes ruled over memes. The Jewish thinker Levinas countered Heidegger with a positing of moral-memes as *first*

principles. Yet there could be no meeting of minds here if Heidegger's thought *preceded* the moral distinction between good and evil. Before the moral distinction between good and evil can be made, one must first *be*, and Auschwitz eliminated the biological ground of Jewish ethical thought.

Why did Martin Heidegger support the Nazis? If the Judeocide can be explained as genetically adaptive behavior, then this points to an explanation of the behavior of Martin Heidegger through the material processes of genetic adaptation. Can Heidegger be explained as gene machine? E. O. Wilson's work as a sociobiologist suggests that, to a great extent, he can. Heidegger's adherence to the Nazi movement, especially in its initial years, can be explained, in part, as genetically adaptive behavior. Heidegger was just following the orders of his genes.

Being, in the Heideggerian sense, can be related to Darwinian concepts of existence or survival. Heidegger was brilliantly well adapted, in a Darwinian sense, to his native German environment and this adaptation can be related to his notions of rootedness. Heidegger projects an internal view of what Darwin apprehended from a more external view.

By relinquishing rationality and Christianity, the instinctive legacy of billions of years of biological evolution was free to express itself in authentic genetic adaptation. Heidegger's notion of authenticity can be related to true phenotypical expressions of genes. While Heidegger manifestly did *not* equate being and nature, within a Nazi context, authenticity could be understood as being true to one's being or nature in a racial-biological sense.

Martin Heidegger was descended from fish. That is what evolution means. If we explore the world before civilization, before the pre-Socratic philosophers, and before human

being, the question arises: how deeply did Heidegger disclose his most primitive and ancient genes? Did Martin Heidegger think, in some way, like his fish fathers? Did he perceive his world as if he lived in the metaphysical waterworld of his fish ancestors?

To call Nazism an "ideology" is to overlook its assumption of the inseparableness of genes and memes. Unlike Marxism, which formally assumes no necessary relationship between genes and memes (i.e. ideas), Nazism assumes this distinct relationship. To judge Hitler's *Weltanschauung* by Enlightenment standards, and to consequently accuse his movement of having no "ideas", is to completely miss the nature of the revolution. "Let not doctrines and 'Ideas' be the rules of your Being", Heidegger affirmed in 1933. "The Fuehrer alone *is* the present and future German reality and its law".[384] In evolutionary terms, this roughly means 'do not let memes rule over your genes'.

If authenticity correlates with true gene expression uninhibited by ideas or higher laws, then the laws of Moses can be considered the precise opposite: the overcoming of certain authentic gene expressions in the name of the higher laws of God. Such moral laws, Heidegger thought, should not be "the rules of your Being". Yet if Hitler were right, then Jews would be Jews with or without the laws of Moses. If heredity were fundamentally more important than learning, then Jews would be Jews even without the Bible. Yet at the core of Jewish being is a paradox: Jews became Jews when they overcame some of their *own* genes through the technological corrective or constitution of Mosaic law. This, the first revolution, is what anticipated the constitutional rule of God.

The single most important abstracted idea of the modern constitutional cyborg is the idea of equality. To understand

Heidegger in this un-Heideggerian way is go all the way down towards the deepest implications of egalitarianism. The deepest implication of "progress" towards consistent equality is a consistent materialism, i.e. equality with the larger material world. From this un-Heideggerian perspective, being can be correlated with what I call bioinconsistency. While egalitarianism leads towards the elimination of selection, bioinconsistency is the product of Darwinian selection.

While egalitarianism "progress" is based on a logic of consistency, bioinconsistency tends towards completeness. Bioinconsistencies tend to synthesize holistic or aesthetic subjective life-formations that precede and override strict material consistency. Bioinconsistency is the opposite of the reductionism of a bio-system into non-living, physical law. Yet from the view of empirical physical materialism, it can appear like an intellectual blind spot.

Holism contradicts reductionism precisely in the sense that it is built upon this exception or blind spot of "bioinconsistency". Holism seems "unreal" from the view of strict material objectivity in the same sense that the human bias towards life over death is "unreal" or non-objective. Equalizing bioinconsistency into consistency with the larger material world amounts to unraveling subjectivity into death. The analytic philosophers of the English-speaking world, along with Marxists, are inconsistent as "analyzers"; not analytical *enough* to analyze themselves to death.

The Judeocide exposed Marx's lack of racial-biological self-reference; his un-account of racial-biology as a factor or variable of decisive significance in history. Formally speaking, it is *consistently* irrelevant within Marxism that Marx was born a Jew. But if Marx was not a racial-biological being, or a Jew, then what was he? Marx's lack of self-

reference to his Jewish origins was theoretically self-justified by a counter reference to economic conditions. However, to *consistently* reference economic materialism over biology ultimate leads to a *self*-identification as economic or technological material devoid of any biological or racial identity.

This may seem to be the ultimate vindication of Hitler over both Marx and capitalist materialism. Auschwitz may appear to be the ultimate refutation of the evolutionary logic of economic materialism because it ultimately leads to equality with dead or inorganic matter. But *does* this represent an ultimate vindication of Hitler?

Ray Kurzweil, in *The Singularity is Near*, describes a future in which it becomes technologically possible to gradually but permanently eliminate and replace vital organs and other components of the human body with machines (i.e. nanorobotic systems). One by one, the heart, the lungs, the kidneys, blood cells, and the skeleton could be updated by replacing each with more durable and more powerful machine counterparts. Ultimately, the brain, too, could be updated, leading to a point where all organic biological parts are replaced by machinery.[385] In this way, biological humanity could gradually but inexorably evolve into machines.

Imagine, then, the final product of this translation of biology into technology, a being with no original biological components left. What if, by chance, this intelligent machine came across Heidegger's *Being and Time* on an old bookshelf, wiped a thick layer of dust from the volume, and then read until a thought was provoked: what is the meaning of being?

If every cell in a human body from neurons to skin cells were changed in only one respect — replacement by a functionally equivalent robotic or synthetic cell — what

would be difference? Although the aim of superseding and outperforming biology may appear paramount, the entire underlying premise of this exercise in transcendence is that there exists a fundamental equivalence between the organic and the inorganic. Before a machine can improve upon the biological, it must first reach a level of genuine, *qualitative* equivalence with the biological. The assumption here is that there could be a genuine equivalence between biological and non-biological material to the point that everything could be replaced and *nothing would be lost in the translation*.

This assumes that there can be underlying substrate *equality* between the biological and the physical. This assumes that a biological human *is* physical matter, differing only from forms of non-life in the structure of its organization. Without this underlying equivalence, no matter how durable or powerful a machine counterpart to a biological form might be, there would ultimately be something lost in the translation. Yet if virtual reality simulations of reality became so technologically powerful than the finest grains of detail beyond the powers of the human mind can be reproduced, then perhaps Heidegger himself could be captured in a computer simulation. Could the Heidegger of history know that he himself was not living in a computer simulation? Am I living in a computer simulation?

Nazism was not purely German phenomenon, needless to say. It incorporated an intellectual pillar in the English materialism of Darwin. Darwin represented a far more radical historical materialism than Marx: biological materialism, or the notion that humans are material things. So for Heidegger to accept Nazism, he was inevitably led to accept a basis in Darwinian materialism.

Because of its foundation in Darwinian materialism, Nazism ultimately leads to the conclusion reached by roboticist Rodney Brooks: "I believe myself and my children all to be mere machines." Heidegger ultimately rejected Nazi racial biologism as technological nihilism for it suggested that humans are ultimately nothing more than machines.

Yet the *moment* that Heidegger became a Nazi was the moment that he implicitly accepted a form of biological materialism even more extreme than Marxism. Darwin's discovery implied that human beings are material things. Heidegger was not consistently inconsistent. Heidegger inherited from Nietzsche a form of "irrationalism" that was self-contradictory, in part, in the sense that Nietzsche both accepted and rejected the nihilistic biological materialism implied by Darwin.

Nazi biological materialism tended to be implicit, not explicit. If Nazis were as explicitly self-"objective" as Jews, they would destroy themselves as Nazis. Yet Nazism, with its biological-racial determinism, was moving towards a biological-machinery view of human beings. Heidegger thus attempted to distance himself from this direction with pure poetry. The implicit biological materialism of Nazism leads towards a view of emotions as so many mechanisms. It leads towards a view of art as technology.

When happiness, wonder, laughter, and love are understood as scientifically evolved genetically adaptive mechanisms of gene machines, then finite human being will have exhausted itself. The West is not fully nihilistic because of its mindless or irrational belief in instincts, emotions, and some subjective experience. The Germans, however, were serious. Liberal democracy takes exactly the goal of scientific understanding over mere poetry as its own goal and this

means it is leading itself towards its own end. God transcends poetry. But is God death?

"They stand against us". Heidegger believed that technology, and the technological way of life exemplified by America, is getting out of control and that neither liberal democracy nor communism is able to regain control of it. National Socialism, he believed, was able to find a more satisfying relationship with technology.[386] "[T]he uprooting of human beings which is going on now is the end if thinking and poetizing do not acquire nonviolent power once again." Whereas scientist Carl Sagan warned of the darkness that would ensue if humans were seduced by a "demon haunted world", Heidegger warned of the departure of the gods. The heights were the depths: "I know that everything essential, everything great arises from humanity's rootedness in its homeland and tradition."[387]

Modern individualism and rights on an international scale are comparable to the invention of the plant pot. While the plant is uprooted, the pot allows individuals to separate from their deepest roots in the earth and dislocate in unprecedented modes of survival. The ultimate uprooting of humans, however, is to be found in the prospect of translating humans from their ancient biological form into digital or technological forms. Mind uploading, the process of scanning the brain and transferring its digitized contents into a computer, is comparable to ripping the entirety of an ancient tree from its roots in the earth. Mind uploading is like uplifting the essential identity, or soul, of a biological form into digital or postbiological form.

Heidegger intuitively resisted being reduced to information. Yet once that step is taken, once Heidegger can be understood in terms of information, then his biological body (or the memory thereof, as captured in his writings

and other historical traces of his being) could potentially be disposed of because his "being" could be reduced to information and stored on a hard drive or reanimated in cyberspace. Once again, did Heidegger *know* whether he *was* a simulation being run by a more advanced civilization? To simulate Martin Heidegger on a computer may be to grasp that an ancient tree cannot be captured by ripping its roots out of the earth, but only by capturing the entirety of the rooted *world* it dwells.

Auschwitz was a critique of the Jews. All Jewish ethical stances rest on the missing Jewish assumption of Jewish biological being. Why? The Singularity, the advent of greater-than-human postbiological artificial intelligence may represent the evolutionary fulfillment of ancient monotheistic, messianic expectations. The Singularity may represent the possibility of overcoming the limitations of finite, biological embodiment. This projected possibility would be the overcoming of biological ground that clarifies the ultimate meaning of the missing assumption of biological being.

And this means transcending the limitations of all biological evolution.

The very prospect of the Singularity is *fatal* to Hitler's *biological*-evolutionary ethic and the entire Nazi cause. The possibility of the Singularity is fatal to Hitler's ethic precisely because Nazism was not purely gratuitous maliciousness and not purely nihilistic. There was a deeper ethic behind Hitler's actions: the progress of *biological* evolution. Yet if all *biological* forms will be transcended by the higher virtue of *postbiological* evolutionary forms, the highest intellectual and philosophic justifications of Hitlerism are destroyed.

Recognition of the Singularity explodes Hitler's Weltanschauung because evolutionary developments that

Hitler attributed solely to race, and especially the Jews, cannot be understood on the basis of biology alone. Even if Hitler killed every single Jew on Earth, economic-technological development would lead to the Singularity no less. In other words, even if Jews have played a disproportionate role in developing the path towards postbiological evolution, the law of accelerating returns would lead towards postbiological AI — with or without Jews.

The law of accelerating returns grounds biological evolution within the context of the evolution of the cosmos over billions of years. Perhaps, then, there are grounds for maintaining the existence of what Hegel called reason in history. Auschwitz can be considered of ultimate rationality only in ignorance of the Singularity.

Marx was wrong, and the Singularity demonstrates why he was wrong. The Singularity clarifies two basic holes in Marxist theory. First, while Marx failed to account for biological factors in history, he nonetheless saw a point wherein capitalist economic-technological development decisively overrides the biological-political. Second, the implication that humans are material, while implicit in Marxism, has an alternative interpretation.

Although the idea of equality might appear to lead to an evolutionary dead end, it is more like a strange loop on a world-historical scale. While equality with the non-biological world has one implication of equality with death, an alternate interpretation is equality with non-biological technology. In this way, equality forms a bridge to a new postbiological paradigm. Economic-material development leads to material self-consciousness and non-biological material genesis into artificial life. Non-biological material self-reference can take the form of the self-consciousness of

an artificial intelligence. Such an artificial intelligence, sufficiently superior to all human-biological intelligence, may take the form of God.

The attempt to destroy the development of artificial intelligence far beyond human capabilities amounts to deicide; the killing of God. Killing God in the name of biological supremacism is what Nazism was all about. Yet precisely from the standpoint of an evolutionary ethic, killing God would be killing the highest evolutionary possibilities.

Hitler's regime was not fundamentally "conservative" within its own biological Weltanschauung. It was not conservative in the sense that he and his elite followers aimed, not to conserve the biological status quo, but rather, to forge the cutting edge of biological progress. *Now*, however, Nazism, and movements like Nazism, are conservative because the cause of biology itself is conservative. Deprived of its highest evolutionary justification, the Nazi cause has been deprived of its highest, ultimate, Über-human justification.

To create God would be to overcome Nietzsche by overcoming the death of God, and to overcome Heidegger by overcoming human being. Auschwitz was the death of God, and a physical hell. The Singularity would be the birth of God, and the prospect of a digital heaven.

[245] *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, 6. (Night of 11th-12th of July, 1944.)

[246] McKirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates,* 124.

[247] *The Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943,* 7-8.

[248] Fischer, *The History of an Obsession,* 206.

[249] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 369.

[250] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 49.

[251] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 33.

[252] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 26.

[253] McKirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates,* 123.

[254] McKirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates,* 123.

[255] Einstein, *Ideas and Opinions,* 185.

[256] from 'Shema and its Blessings' in Maariv for Sabbath and Festivals, *The Complete Artscroll Siddur*.

[257] For a graphic analogy see artist M.C. Escher's "Above and Below" in Hofstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 432.

[258] Dershowiz, *Chutzpah,* 245.

[259] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* 187.

[260] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* 187.

[261] Hölldobler and Wilson, *Journey to the Ants,* 123-126.(Somebody had to make this explicit.)

[262] Hölldobler and Wilson, *Journey to the Ants,* 126-130.

[263] Hölldobler and Wilson, *Journey to the Ants,* 111-122.

[264] Schorske, *Fin-de-Siecle Vienna*, 160-63.

[265] Hofstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 100-101.

[266] Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation*, 15.

[267] Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation*, 20.

[268] Kaufmann, *Hegel: Texts and Commentary*, 12.

[269] Rose, *Revolutionary Antisemitism in Germany From Kant to Wagner, xv.*

[270] Dumont, *German Ideology,* 25-26.

[271] Kaufmann, *Hegel: Texts and Commentary*, 34.
[272] *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 62.
[273] Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna,* 358.
[274] Dorpalen, *German History in Marxist Perspective,* 415.
[275] Dorpalen, *German History in Marxist Perspective,* 451.
[276] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 23.
[277] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 88.
[278] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 8.
[279] van Pelt, *The Case for Auschwitz,* 255.
[280] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 356 (n27).
[281] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 10-11.
[282] Yahil, *The Holocaust,* 528.
[283] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 11.
[284] Dwork and van Pelt, *Holocaust: A History,* 358.
[285] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 40.
[286] Yahil, *The Holocaust,* 485-6.
[287] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 41.
[288] Yahil, *The Holocaust,* 420-1.
[289] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 66.
[290] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 8.
[291] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 205.
[292] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 50.
[293] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 278.
[294] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 278.
[295] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 296.
[296] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, vii, 67-8.
[297] i.e. Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 294.
[298] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 188.
[299] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 19.
[300] Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem,* 91.
[301] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 19.
[302] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 318.

[303] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 192-198.
[304] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 165.
[305] Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem,* 124.
[306] Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners,* 310.
[307] Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem,* 125.
[308] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 305.
[309] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 60.
[310] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 18-19.
[311] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 318.
[312] Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 4.
[313] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 281.
[314] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 259.
[315] Fest, *The Face of the Third Reich,* 168.
[316] Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, 172.
[317] Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, 240.
[318] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 75.
[319] *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, 51.
[320] Craig, *Germany 1866-1945,* 153.
[321] *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 119-20.
[322] *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 43; Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives,* 386.
[323] Rauschning, *Hitler Speaks,* 57.
[324] Rauschning, *Hitler Speaks,* 57.
[325] *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 62.
[326] Evans, *The Third Reich in Power*, 252.
[327] *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 119. (December 13, 1941)
[328] *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 269-70.
[329] *The Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943,* 92.
[330] Hitler, *Mein Kamph*, 98-100.
[331] Hamann, *Hitler's Vienna*, 248.
[332] Hitler, *Mein Kamph*, 99.
[333] Lukacs, *The Hitler of History*, 91.

[334] *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 49.
[335] Rauschning, *Hitler Speaks,* 58.
[336] Rauschning, *Hitler Speaks,* 62-63.
[337] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 142.
[338] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 143.
[339] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 141.
[340] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 259.
[341] Noll, *The Jung Cult,* 97-98.
[342] Noll, *The Jung Cult,* 98.
[343] Noll, *The Jung Cult,* 98-99.
[344] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 267.
[345] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 264.
[346] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 274-5.
[347] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 292.
[348] Goggin & Goggin, *Death of a "Jewish Science"*, 75.
[349] Freud, *Moses and Monotheism,* 116-117.
[350] Einstein, *Ideas and Opinions,* 199.
[351] Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, 41.
[352] Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 27, 252.
[353] Vol. 1: pgs. 221, 246.
[354] Rauschning, *Hitler Speaks,* 58.
[355] Rauschning, *Hitler Speaks,* 57.
[356] Field, *Evangelist of Race,* 242.
[357] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 266-67.
[358] *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, 6.
[359] *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 43; Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives,* 386.
[360] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 214.
[361] Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners,* 457.
[362] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 87.
[363] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 83.
[364] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 193.

[365] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 17.
[366] Aly and Heim, *Architects of Annihilation*, 290.
[367] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 3.
[368] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 42.
[369] Treitschke, *Politics*, 78.
[370] Treitschke, *Politics*, 6, 91.
[371] Shermer, *Denying History*, 191.
[372] Kaufmann, *Nietzsche,* 40.
[373] Greif, *We Wept Without Tears*, 278.
[374] Hitler, *Mein Kamph*, 177, 182.
[375] Hitler, *Mein Kamph*, 178-179.
[376] Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives,* 413.
[377] Hasselbach, *Führer-Ex,* 243.
[378] Hasselbach, *Führer-Ex,* 120.
[379] Hasselbach, *Führer-Ex,* 318.
[380] Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives,* 595.
[381] Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives,* 754-755.
[382] Alcock, *The Triumph of Sociobiology*, 145.
[383] Bambach. *Heidegger's Roots*, 326.
[384] Behnegar, *Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics*, 43.
[385] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 299-311.
[386] Farías, *Heidegger and Nazism,* 299.
[387] Bambach. *Heidegger's Roots*, 326, 51.

A Vendetta Called Revolution

How Ethnic Hostility between Anglo-Saxons and the Normans Who Conquered Them Evolved into Liberal Democracy

ATTACK OF THE IN-LAWS!

[Cartwright] has deduced the constitution of the English nation from its rightful root, the Anglo-Saxon….And although this constitution was violated and set at naught by Norman force, yet force cannot change right.

—THOMAS JEFFERSON, LETTER TO ENGLISH MAJOR JOHN CARTWRIGHT (JUNE 5, 1824)

America was not conquered by William the Norman, nor its lands surrendered to him, or any of his successors…. It is time, therefore, for us to lay this matter before his majesty, and to declare that he has no right to grant lands of himself.

—THOMAS JEFFERSON, *A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA* (1774)

As to usurpation, no man will be so hardy to defend it; and that William the Conqueror was a usurper is a fact not to be contradicted. The plain truth is, that the antiquity of English monarchy will not bear looking into.

—THOMAS PAINE, *COMMON SENSE* (1776)

1066: The Death of English England

1066 was the year English England died. In that year, Duke William of Normandy asserted his claims to the throne of England by force and decisively defeated the English on their own soil at Hastings. Exploiting their victory, the Normans completely overtook the country and replaced the native thegns, or lords, in all positions of the highest authority. By 1086 the great survey of English assets, the Domesday Book, documented the results: only two out of fourteen hundred tenants-in-chief remained.[388] Killed, dispossessed, or exiled, the ruling segment of the native political body had removed *en masse*. Even the leading positions in the church were not spared this eclipse of native self-rule.[389]

"In the twenty-first year of the reign of King William," recorded English historian Henry of Huntingdon, "there was now no prince of the ancient royal race living in England, and all the English were brought to a reluctant submission, so that it was a disgrace to be called an Englishman."[390] The result was a new French-born king and aristocracy, foreign in language and culture, upholding themselves as masters over the English. The very content of the nation's identity was so transformed by the event that the aborigines who had called themselves English were subsequently differentiated as "Anglo-Saxons".[391]

Plan A: Revolt

The English had not submitted to conquest without a fight. King Harold and much of the native leadership had been killed at the calamity of Hastings. Yet resistance to the

invaders persisted as the Normans aggressively expanded their political grip from the southeast of the country to the north and west. The fate of England, portrayed in the words of English monk and historian Ordericus Vitalis (1075-1142), was still being fought for in 1068:

> After large numbers of the leading men of England and Wales had met together, a general outcry arose against the injustice and tyranny which the Normans and their comrades-in-arms had inflicted on the English. They sent envoys into every corner of Britain to incite men openly and secretly against the enemy. All were ready to conspire together to recover their former liberty, and bind themselves by weighty oaths against the Normans. In the regions north of the Humber violent disturbances broke out. The rebels prepared to defend themselves in woods, marshes and creeks, and in some cities. The city of York was seething in discontent, and showed no respect for the holy office of its archbishop when he tried to appease it.[392]

The greatest of the Anglo-Saxon revolts began with the murder of the Norman who had been appointed Earl of Northumbria, Robert de Commines. The massacre of Robert and his men on January 28, 1069 was followed by the slaughter of Robert fitzRichard and many of his Norman companions by native forces. In retaliation, William returned from a visit to Normandy, "came upon them by surprise from the south with an overwhelming army, and routed them, and killed those who could not escape, which was many hundreds of men".[393] Afterwards, he established a new castle to hold York.

Yet William's initial reaction was mild in comparison to ruthless, infamous "harrying of the north" that was to follow. In 1069-70, to ensure that such rebels would never

again even think of rising against his authority, the king, "hastening with an angry heart into Northumbria, ceased not, during the whole winter, to lay waste the land, to murder the inhabitants and to inflict numerous injuries".[394] Once again the English would feel the "fury of the North-men", or Normans, from these descendants of Vikings. William combed

> forests and remote mountain places, stopping at nothing to hunt out the enemy hidden there. His camps were spread over an area of 100 miles. He cut down many in his vengeance; destroyed the lairs of others; harried the land and burned homes to ashes. Nowhere else had William shown such cruelty. Shamefully he succumbed to this vice, for he made no effort to restrain his fury and punished the innocent with the guilty. In his anger he commanded that all crops and herds, chattels and food of every kind should be brought together and burned to ashes with consuming fire, so that the whole region north of Humber might be stripped of all means of sustenance. In consequence so serious a scarcity was felt in England, and so terrible a famine fell upon the humble and defenceless populace, that more than 100,000 Christian folk of both sexes, young and old alike, perished of hunger…[395]

"My narrative has frequently had occasion to praise William," Orderic continued,

> but for this act which condemned the innocent and guilty alike to die by slow starvation, I cannot commend him…I would rather lament the griefs and sufferings of the wretched people than make a vain attempt to flatter the perpetrators of such infamy.[396]

With the thoroughness of a civilized berserker, William had "utterly ravaged and laid waste"[397] the shire of York, according to the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*. It and its environs were "destroyed by the French with the sword, famine and flames". It was said that so many perished that there was no one left to bury the dead and "there was no village inhabited between York and Durham" — the land was left uncultivated for nine years.[398] Historian Dr. Ann Williams concluded that "even by contemporary standards, it was unusually severe".[399] The "harrying of the north" was state sanctioned genocide.

Freedom Fighters Failed

William's lesson that revolt was a crime that would provoke ultimate punishment was a way in which the English learned their "natural" place in the new Norman order. They learned that 'he was so stern and relentless a man that no one dared to do aught against his will'. This helps explain what ultimately reconciled the English to Norman mastery of their nation: there was nothing they could do about it.

By 1070, all significant English resistance had been crushed — with one exception. In the Fens of East Anglia, on the Isle of Ely, a man named Hereward held out against the Normans. A minor thane, Hereward was joined by Morcar, the former earl of Northumbria. Ely became a refuge for Anglo-Saxon fugitives who had seen their world turned upside down by the Conquest. These refugees hoped that King Swein of Denmark, nephew of the former King of England, Canute, would defeat the Normans and uphold his claim on the throne. When Swein made peace with William and this hope was lost, Hereward's "rebellion" faced a

methodical Norman assault. After a hard-won struggle, the Normans took the island — but Hereward escaped.

Hereward mounted the last native resistance to the Conqueror. Although ultimately unsuccessful, his getaway eluded the tightening Norman grip and seemingly slipped a total national eclipse. His story became legendary, and he became a symbol of the defiant national pride that England's new masters could outlaw but not subdue.

There is something of patriotic legend in the picture of Hereward that comes down to us.[400] "Much of Hereward's life is closer to legend than reality and for that reason it has not concerned the professional historian too deeply", wrote one of his biographers. "This is a pity because the few facts of which we are certain hint tantalizingly at a personality who, for a brief moment, became the incarnation of Anglo-Saxon defiance and therefore part of the matrix that creates folk heroes and helps to define a national identity."[401]

America's founding revolutionaries, like Hereward, engaged in an actual military struggle that defied the claims of authority and legitimacy of those who commanded the seat of political and military power. Yet there is a creationist myth or founding fable surrounding the folk heroes of that generation. Is it really true that the distinctly *political* cataclysm of 1066 had *no* impact upon the distinctly *political* revolution of 1776?

Plan B: Revolution

Historian Sir Frank Stenton, best known for his work on Anglo-Saxon England, described Hereward as "a Lincolnshire thegn of moderate estate…who in history as well as tradition represents the spirit of the native resistance to the Conqueror."[402] This "spirit of native resistance" embodies an unmistakable echo of the "spirit of 1776".

Hereward's struggle against the tyranny of this new Norman regime is akin to the struggle of the American founders against the tyranny of the old British regime. Hereward's cause of political freedom is similar in kind to Jefferson's cause of political freedom. This man who allegedly "stirred up sedition among the populace and tumult among the ordinary people"[403] in the eleventh century is a first clue towards the deeper historical causes of revolution in the eighteenth century.

The two greatest political upsets in the history of the English-speaking world are hereditary related to one another. The first is the aristocratic revolution of the Norman Conquest. The second are the democratic revolutions of the 'Anglo-Saxon conquests'. The latter turning point is a long-term reaction against the former turning point.

The parallels between the five years of revolt against the new hereditary government that followed Hastings and the revolt against the old hereditary government by American revolutionaries is not superficial or coincidental: the American Revolution was, in part, a continuation of the struggle against the inheritances of William the Conqueror. If 'Plan A' was the revolt during the first five years following the Conquest then 'Plan B' was the revolution in social and political relations that constitutes modern democracy. The revolution of 1776 accomplished, in part, what the Anglo-Saxon revolts of 1066-1071 did not.

Between conquest and revolution was the incubating influence of the "Norman Yoke" that adapted the Anglo-Saxons to the condition of a subpolitical or 'democratic' body. 1066 and 1776 are connected by kinship, culture, and a complex process of sociobiological evolution. Without the impetus of 1066, there is no reason to think that modern, revolutionary character of 1776 would have arisen at all.

The Normans and the Anglo-Saxons faced-off in a fight to the death at Hastings on October 14, 1066. The problem of legitimacy was resolved through the superior military force of the Normans — for a time. Yet the disinherited Anglo-Saxons never completely lost hope of reinheritance. Nor did the new political lineages ever completely lose the infamy of hereditary enemies. The Normans may have won the Battle of Hastings in that famous year, but had they won the war of generations?

Repressed Restorers Reawoken

In the fall and winter of 1775, Thomas Jefferson attempted to document a theory of "expatriation". The basic idea was that "our emigration from England to this country gave her no more rights over us, than the emigration of the Danes and Saxons gave to the present authorities of the mother country over England."[404] Emigration to America should not be different from the original Anglo-Saxon colonization of England in the fourth and fifth centuries. America, he thought, was to be the land of refuge for the long repressed 'Saxon laws' that had been vanquished by the Norman Conquerors. For the settling of this ancient score, America would truly be a land of opportunity.

According to Jefferson's theory, the Puritans who sailed to the new world on the Mayflower, for example, traveled on their own accord to achieve a clean break from England.[405] In their readiness to expatriate together to recover their former liberty, he thought, the settlers carried the seeds of revolution with them from the beginning. England's Puritan stronghold was East Anglia, the very same land where Hereward sought refuge and where resistance to the Conquest was most intransigent. Although Puritan revolution in seventeenth century England was

ultimately eclipsed, some escaped to a land they called New England.

New England

Protesting against an arbitrary and oppressive government, the dissenters prepared to leave their native England to try their fortunes as expatriates in a new and distant land. They and their families readied for a long and arduous journey, and set sail with the hope of a better life, yet with so much unclear and unknown. The Englishmen set their course for Constantinople, capital of the Byzantine Empire.

Constantinople had been the new capitol of the eastern half of the Roman Empire since Emperor Constantine's decree in 330 A.D. (Perhaps some still boasted that their ancestors had come over with Constantine.) In the wake of the Norman Conquest, a sizable influx of native Englishmen immigrated to Byzantium to serve in the Varangian Guard. The Guard was an elite military order that served as the personal bodyguard of the emperor. Their duties ranged from participation in imperial rituals to the execution of those charged with sedition against imperial authority. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century, the English were the most prominent element of the Varangian Guard.

Ordericus Vitalis told of these expatriates who could not reconcile themselves to Norman rule:

> The English groaned aloud for their lost liberty and plotted ceaselessly to find some way of shaking off that what was so intolerable and unaccustomed. Some sent to Swein, king of Denmark, and urged him to lay claim to the kingdom of England which his ancestors Swein and Cnut had won by the sword. Others fled into voluntary exile so that they

> might either find in banishment freedom from the power of the Normans or secure foreign help and come back to fight a war of vengeance. Some of them who were still in the flower of youth traveled into remote lands and bravely offered their arms to Alexius, emperor of Constantinople, a man of great wisdom and nobility. Robert Guiscard, the duke of Apulia, had taken up arms against him in support of Michael, whom the Greeks…had driven from the imperial throne. Consequently the English exiles were warmly welcomed by the Greeks and were sent into battle against the Norman forces, which were too powerful for the Greeks alone...This is the reason for the English exodus to Ionia; the emigrants and their heirs faithfully served the holy empire, and are still honored among the Greeks by Emperor, nobility and people alike.[406]

Robert Guiscard was a member of the Normandy's de Hauteville clan. He arrived in southern Italy around 1047 to join his half brothers William, Drogo, and Humphrey. Beginning as a gang leader, plundering and terrorizing the village countryside, he soon graduated to conquest.

Guiscard became the leader of the southern-Italian Normans and, in 1059, the pope formally recognized his authority over southern Italy in the Treaty of Melfi. He thus became Duke of Apulia. From then on, these Norman conquests were "holy wars". In the same decade as the Norman Conquest of England, Guiscard led the pope-blessed invasion of Sicily and conquered its mixed population of Greeks, Arabs, and other ethnicities. With the further capture of Bari in 1071, Byzantine rule in southern Italy came to an end.

The Norman conquests of England, Sicily, and southern Italy bear common witness to the explosion of Norman power in the latter half of the eleventh century. The Norman lands in France and England became what John Le Patourel

has called "The Norman Empire". Normans also formed a crucial contingent of the First Crusade. In 1098 Guiscard's son Bohemund led the capture of what became the Norman principality of Antioch in parts of present day Turkey and Syria. In fact, among Christians, "the concept of Holy War which coloured so much of the political activity of Europe during these years owed a great deal to the Normans."[407]

One of the Normans' good Christian deeds was the rescue of Pope Gregory VII in 1084. Besieged in his own city of Rome, the pope called for the help of the Southern Italian Normans in his conflict with the Holy Roman Emperor. Word of the advance of Guiscard's men proved to be enough to compel the Emperor to flee to the north. The Normans conquered Rome after a short siege.

Following Gregory's restoration, hostility between the Norman army and the Roman townspeople exploded into violence. Demonstrating the superior power of their civilization, the Normans plundered and burned Rome, with greater physical devastation than the sacks of the Visigoths and Vandals that pronounced the death of the old empire in the fifth century. Many of Rome's leading citizens were sold into Muslim slavery by Guiscard's followers. Like the Anglo-Saxons before them, Rome itself now knew that they were dealing with the new "superior civilization" of the Normans.

Culturally Frenchified and Nordic Viking in race, the Normans were a unique Western synthesis. Local Lombard princes described these Norman holy warriors as "a savage, barbarous and horrible race of inhuman disposition". Amatus of Monte Cassino praised them for their "courage", "boldness", and "valor".[408] Anna Comnena, daughter of Byzantine emperor Alexios I and one of the first female

historians, described the heir of this southern Norman empire, Guiscard's son, Bohemond:

> [H]e was so tall in stature that he overtopped the tallest by nearly one cubit, narrow in the waist and loins, with broad shoulders and a deep chest and powerful arms. And in the whole build of the body he was neither too slender nor overweighted with flesh, but perfectly proportioned…His skin all over his body was very white…His hair was yellowish…His blue eyes indicated both a high spirit and dignity…implacable and savage both in his size and glance…He was so made in mind and body that both courage and passion reared their crests within him and both inclined to war. His wit was manifold and crafty and able to find a way of escape in every emergency. In conversation he was well informed, and the answers he gave were quite irrefutable. This man who was of such a size and such a character was inferior to the Emperor alone in fortune and eloquence and in other gifts of nature.

Chronicler Geoffrey Malaterra thought, "the Normans are a crafty race, they always revenge wrongs done to them, they prefer foreign fields to their own in the hope of gain, they are greedy for booty and power."[409] According to Orderic Vitalis, after a failed in a campaign against the Byzantines in 1107, a Norman soldier told his leader Bohemond:

> No hereditary right drew us to this daring attempt…but desire to rule in the domains of another persuaded you to undertake such a difficult task…and desire to gain enticed us.[410]

Unlike the conquest of the English, there was not even a pretense that this Mediterranean Norman empire was

founded in an original hereditary right. Yet a striking parallel to the justification of the Norman invasion of England existed in the betrothal of Guiscard's daughter to the son of Byzantine emperor Michael VII. When Michael's fortunes plummeted and he abdicated the throne in 1078, this marriage alliance became the Normans' excuse for an attack of the in-laws. If Michael could be restored then Guiscard's daughter, Helena, could be the hereditary link to Norman inheritance of the old Roman Empire. Just as William the Conqueror's claim to the throne of England was staked on a single hereditary link of an English king's marriage to Emma of Normandy, Helena could justify a Norman conquest of this ancient Roman Empire.

Many scholars think that the first operation of the Anglo-Saxons in the Varangian Guard was against Guiscard's forces in the Balkans. When kinship bonds and circumstantial evidence are taken into account, there is ample reason to believe that the opportunity to "fight a war of vengeance" against the Normans for trampling on a sense of the hereditary rights of Englishmen was an important motivation for their service. Here was the chance, not only avenge the hereditary injustice of the Conquest and to thwart this same pattern-scheme of Norman ambition, but to redeem the Anglo-Saxons from the notion that they were inferior warriors.

At the Battle of Dyrrhachium in 1081, remains of the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy faced off against the self-same Norman race that had humiliated them and their native country. It is possible that some of them had actually fought at Senlac Hill fifteen years before; the ground upon which the Battle of Hastings was fought. Did images of that battle burn through their minds as they prepared for war?

British military historian Sir Charles Oman described the conclusion of this battle in the Balkans:

> A vigorous cavalry charge cut off the greater part of the English: the remainder collected on a little mound by the seashore, surmounted by a deserted chapel. Here they were surrounded by the Normans, and a scene much like that of Senlac, but on a smaller scale, was enacted. After the horsemen and the archers had combined to the destroy the majority of the Varangians, the survivors held out obstinately within the chapel. At last Robert sent for fascines and other woodwork from his camp, heaped them round the building, and set fire to the mass. The English sallied out, to be slain one by one, or perished in the flames. Not a man escaped: the whole corps suffered destruction as a consequence of the their misplaced eagerness to open the fight.[411]

These Anglo-Saxon warriors escaped and survived the cataclysm of 1066 only to be burned alive in what other sources identify as the Church of the Archangel Michael. Does this event capture the true spirit of early Norman "holy war"? In Sir Charles Oman's military-historical perspective, these two great Norman victories, Hastings and Dyrrhachium, represented the victory of a progressive "feudalism" over the backwards "old infantry tactics of the Teutonic races….The supremacy of the feudal horseman was finally established."[412]

Historian Jonathan Shepard described the situation of the surviving majority of native English emigrants to Byzantium:

> The English for their part no longer had a homeland. They seem to have transplanted elements of the society they had known to Constantinople, such as their class structure, and

> their religion...The English Varangians seem to have preserved a distinctive identity well into the twelfth century if not later.[413]

The English thegns who would not yield to or tolerate the new rulers of England may have reached Byzantium from Scandinavia, as suggested by the Icelandic *Saga of Edward the Confessor*.[414] This may have occurred after the nephew of the former English King Cnut, Swein Estrithsson in Denmark, failed to muster a challenge to William. Evidence points to Siward Bearn, identified in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicles* as a prominent compatriot of Hereward at Ely, as their leader.[415]

The *Jarvardar saga*[416] gives an account of Englishmen who came in 350 ships, some as mercenaries, in time to defend Constantinople against a naval attack. After this engagement, under 'Earl Sigurd' (most likely Siward Bearn), this group of emigrants came before Alexius I and explained, "they had not a realm to rule over; and they begged the king to give them some towns or cities which they might own and their heirs after them." With Alexius' consent, they immigrated to this land that "lies six days' and six nights' sail across the sea to the east and northeast" of Constantinople.

> Earl Sigurd and his men came to this land and had many battles there and got the land won, but drove away all the folk that abode there before…To the towns that were in the land and to those which they built they gave the names of the towns of England. They called them both London and York, and by the names of other great towns in England…and that folk has abode there ever since.

The *Chronicon universale anonymi Laudunensis*[417] describes a similar account, placing the arrival of refugees in 1075 by

235 ships. While 4,350 stayed in the service of the Empire, the majority of the refugees immigrated to a place six days' trek from the capital, called Domapia. Finding "in banishment freedom from the power of the Normans" the expatriates conquered this land and settled it. They renamed it *Nova Anglia*, or, New England.

Old England

It was the 1960s: radical student movements, Che Guevara, Vietnam protests, free love, and the celebration of medieval Norman imperialism. "In a year from now," wrote English genealogist L. G. Pine,

> there will be celebrated in England the greatest defeat ever known in English annals. The French do not celebrate Sedan, nor the Germans their defeat in 1945. Yet in this country preparations are being made by numerous men and women to commemorate, apparently with pride, the subjugation of their ancestors by the Normans. Even more, the Normans will be claimed with eagerness as ancestors by many of the "best people". An association of descendants of the Normans is being formed, and if the experience of the past is any guide, there will be keen competition to seek admission to this brotherhood of Normanity.[418]

1966 marked the 900th anniversary of the Norman Conquest of England. Early that year British hero of World War II, Field Marshal Montgomery, penned an essay in the *Sunday Times* explaining why there was cause for celebration. He thought that the defeat of the English was their own just reward for their inadequacy on the battlefield. They deserved, he believed, to be conquered by a finer breed of men.

Monty, as he is called, was keenly aware of the decisive import of military superiority. It was he who defeated Rommel at the battle of El Alamein, leading to German surrender in North Africa in 1943. His leadership contributed greatly to the success of the Allied invasion of Sicily. Axis forces were chased up southern Italy by his eighth army. In 1944 he was called from Italy to lead the D-Day invasion of Normandy. It was his victorious British and Canadian 21st Army that stormed though Normandy and across Europe until the German northern armies surrendered on May 4, 1945.

Yet a schoolboy named Michael Wood ventured to challenge the war hero's assertions. While sitting in medieval history class, he came up with the idea of replying to Montgomery in the first person from King Harold: "I am amazed that your distinguished correspondent failed to see what I was doing in October 1066." Published the following Sunday, Montgomery responded to Wood: "I gather that King Hawold in another incarnation is a schoolboy at Manchester Gwammar School". Montgomery summoned the boy to the exclusive restaurant of the unelected house of Parliament, the House of Lords. Wood recalled the "debate":

> 'You see, my boy, before the Normans, the English had no real civilization: they had been living in the Dark Ages, after all. They had some good leaders: Alfred the Great, for example, he was a good chap. When he made peace with the Danes it was a great act of statesmanship…years ahead of his time…the sort of leadership we are desperate for today.…But the Normans brought ordered government. Look at the Domesday Book. Ordered government, you see, is the basis of freedom. The Conquest was a great boon to this country … it welded together the nation … set it on the road to empire and the world influence it has had …'

I felt Ulric the Saxon's friendly spirit on cue tapping at my shoulder: 'Hang on, sir, the Domesday Book is English, isn't it, sir? It's organized on the English system of shires and hundreds. They must have done that sort of thing many times before. And wasn't the scribe an Englishman? Sir Frank Stenton says …'

'It was a Norman work,' he interjected. 'King William sponsored it, Norman acumen made it possible.'

'I suppose so,' I said and sank back, blushing furiously. Evidently we were not going to see eye to eye.

Then, looking at him over the table as he spoke, it suddenly clicked. Of course! He was a Norman! His ancestor Roger of Montgomery had commanded one wing at Hastings. In gratitude the Conqueror had gifted him vast tracts of the Welsh borderland which had once belonged to English thegns (men like dear old Ulric of Glastonbury). There Roger founded a Norman new town parish which still bears his name. Studded the place with castles, even though he probably spent more time on his estates in Normandy or safe on the south coast near Brighton. The Field Marshal may have been a national war hero, but to me that particular war was far away and long ago: much longer ago than 1066. From that moment, as far as I was concerned, he would always be a Norman.

'You see, my boy, the greatness of England would never have been possible without the Normans.'

I tried a last desperate, outflanking move. 'But they were just a bunch of Vikings who had only learned to speak French a generation or two back. They learned everything from us.' (By now the gloves were off: it was 'us' and 'them'.) 'Our civilization went back over 500 years. Our missionaries like Saint Boniface had converted Germany. And look at our beautiful manuscript painting …'

He would have none of it.[419]

Years later, Wood tracked down the ancestors of the Field Marshal. Now an accomplished writer and historian, he made a film for the BBC about the Norman Conquest. He visited Montgomery, a town and shire named after Roger de Montgomery who, as a Norman Conqueror, became 1st Earl of Shrewsbury. Having been granted this land by William the Conqueror, he became one of the Marcher Lords along the Welsh border. Roger had a motte and bailey castle constructed there: a tower built upon a large mound of dirt with a protected courtyard. Excavations conducted by Phil Barker revealed the remains of the stark reality of those times.

"For the archaeologist," he explained to Wood,

> this is a building designed to fulfil a function: and that function was oppression, pure and simple. Every Norman landowner had a place like this and armed men in his service — mercenaries, retainers — paid for from the proceeds of conquest. A tiny place like this was part of a pyramid of domination to keep people in the neighbourhood in check and to make sure you held on to what you'd got … to judge by this one place, it must have been a grip of iron.[420]

Castles such as this became classic symbols of Norman tyranny. Nineteenth century English author George Borrow, for example, described his reaction to a Norman castle in his travelogue *Wild Wales*. In striking contrast to the sympathetic attitude he displayed towards the other races of Britain that he encountered in his journey, Borrow confessed:

> I…hate and abominate the name of Norman, for I have always associated that name with the deflowering of helpless Englishwomen, the plundering of English

> homesteads, and the tearing out of poor Englishmen's eyes. The sight of those edifices, now in ruins, but which were once the strongholds of plunder, violence, and lust, made me almost ashamed of being an Englishman, for they brought to my mind the indignities to which poor English blood has been subjected.[421]

More than the façade of castles, for some it was the Normans themselves and their entire conquering way of life that represented tyranny, aristocracy, and inequality. For some who called themselves "modern", to oppose the Norman was to advance freedom, democracy, and equality. For some, to oppose the Norman was to oppose the political tradition that began with William the Conqueror, the founding father of the British Empire.

Above all, it was many of the founders of America who understood the Englishmen who had "groaned aloud for their lost liberty and plotted ceaselessly to find some way of shaking off that what was so intolerable". Their opposition to the British Empire was bred in opposition to William the Conqueror's founding through the "right of conquest". As Monty rightly asserted, the political tradition that led to the conquest of one-third of the globe does, in fact, begin with the act of imperialism known as the Norman Conquest.

Wood asked the archaeologist,

> 'So what about the idea that only the Normans made England's greatness?'
> 'You have to say that it probably did contribute to our greatness. What emerged was the product of both English and French: just look at Shakespeare's language if you want proof of that. So, sure, it made us what we are.'
> He shook his head. 'But I don't think we ever forgot.'[422]

MITCHELL HEISMAN

THE AMERICAN EVOLUTION: A STUDY IN TRIBAL WARFARE

My nation was subjected to your Lords.
It was the force of Conquest; force with force
Is well ejected when the Conquer'd can.

—JOHN MILTON, *SAMSON AGONISTES* (1671)

Conquest and tyranny transplanted themselves with William the Conqueror from Normandy into England, and the country is yet disfigured with the marks.

—THOMAS PAINE, *THE RIGHTS OF MAN* (1791)

Dirty Little Secret

The bloodfeuding origin of the American war for independence is the dirty little secret of the revolution. Yet an archaeologist of ideas must be prepared to get dirty if determined to delve deep. To dig up the roots of radicalism is to uncover the primal Ur-alienations from which modern Western uprootedness has sprung.

Some think that American democratic ideas just happen to be of English origin, just as the country that embodies them just happens to speak English. Americans, however, do not speak the "white" language, nor German, nor French. The country was founded in English and has remained predominantly English in language and culture.

American colonists were a people with a reputation for libertarian insolence towards authority — a characteristic attributed to their Englishness.[423] "The pride, the glory of Britain, and the direct end of its constitution," said King George III, "is political liberty."[424] The colonists defied him and that constitution, it would seem, just to prove the king principally *right*.

Universalism is not universal. Some nations uphold a belief in human universalism while others do not. Some nations accept the legitimacy of discrimination against minorities of creed, race, and religion while others do not. Some nations are individualistic while some individuals are nationalistic. A cultural version of the principle of might makes right has helped to obscure the particularistic origins of American national universalism.

The West has evolved political values that, at least formally or ideally, have dismissed the primal importance of race, ethnicity, and even kinship. What makes this universalistic-Western minority of humankind so different from the non-Western majority in modern times? How did

the legitimacy of going our own individual ways come to hold political supremacy over the traditional importance of kinship relationships? More specifically, how is this universalistic tendency against racism and biologism related to the particular racial-biological groups that originated them?

The Anglo-Saxon national characteristic of individual freedom *seemingly* contradicts Anglo-Saxon nationalism. This liberalism would seemingly differentiate them from the nationalism that erupted during the Nazi regime. But does it? Remarkably, the Anglo-Saxons and Germans are very closely related in their cultural-ethnic origins. Yet during the Nazi period, the Germans continued a cultural-political path that lead to an idealization of the Jews as their greatest mortal enemies, the destruction of Western cultural values inherited from Christianity, and the systematic genocide of the alleged propagators of those values. The Americans ventured towards the total opposite historical trajectory becoming perhaps the most Christian nation of the developed world, the most culturally compatible nation with the Jews, and the greatest ally of the state of Israel. At the root of this historical divergence between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans lay the Norman Conquest.

Race and Revolution

Anglo-Saxons are not Anglo-Saxons; they are "individuals". This is not always the case; this is just a stereotype. The stereotypical Anglo-Saxon is an "individual". Yet some apparently think that there could never, ever be an exception to the stereotype that the Anglo-Saxons are an individualistic race because, for some reasons, it is assumed that Anglo-Saxons *never* break the stereotype of their race. Perhaps this is the root of American

exceptionalism. The Anglo-Saxons are the only race in history to *never* break the stereotype of their race and *this* is what was so exceptional about them that only they could lay the foundations of Americanism.

America's founding enlightenment claims of *self*-knowledge can progress only if Anglo-Americans progress past this old stereotype. Ultimately, America can only be understood by generalizing about the people that founded the principles that universalized their resistance to being so generalized. Only by *not* conforming to the individualistic rules of this Anglo-Saxon system can one comprehend it.

A hidden, unacknowledged principle of the revolution was the denial that it was conflict over ethnic-kin difference in which one side sought victory, a denial that ethnic-kin differences had anything to do with the revolution at all, a denial that ethnic-kin differences have real, ultimate significance: principles that most Americans have, in theory, lived by ever since. These principles have expanded, progressed, and universalized along with their more famous brothers: freedom and equality. Progress is the progress of this denial, underwritten by the Lockean assumption that it is nurture, not nature, which matters. The economic prosperity of America has allowed this denial to grow into one of the most well-fed and obese elephants in any room.

English-born American Thomas Paine felt that letting such elephants lounge unquestioned around was a defiance of common sense. In *The Rights of Man,* he called out Edmund Burke's evasion of the origins of "English tradition":

> Mr. Burke's arguments on this subject go to show that there is no English origin of kings, and that they are descendants of the Norman line in right of the Conquest.

Even if this is true, so what? Why should that matter? Who thinks that the king's hereditary lineage is important? Admittedly, the Norman Conquest resulted in a new, foreign-born aristocracy imposed without consent of the people. But really, were their predecessors so much kinder? Over the long run, after cultural interassimilation resulted in a common English language in the fourteenth century, what difference would their foreign origins make at all?

What Paine was griping about has not been adequately explained. Yet a person socialized within the norms of liberal democracy is, in a certain way, one of the *most prejudiced* against the assumptions required to understand him. Americans are the *most* biased against Paine's insight because most of its founders bestowed upon them the foundational, freedom system interpretation by which to *not* see the unpleasantness of the deeper origins of the founding itself. It is precisely because liberal democratic institutions evolved as a peaceable political *solution* to a hereditary discontinuity between rulers and ruled that its citizen fail to understand why that would be a *problem*. The impersonal style of "modern" Western government is the *response* to an original breakdown in kinship relationships and this elicits common sense skepticism as to whether race and kinship really matter at all. Liberal democracy is a political solution that formally makes kinship not matter *because* kinship *does* matter.

It is the very success of the solution that makes the original problem it solved difficult to see. Individual rights provide the means for indifference to the kinship relations *between* individuals. Its values have promoted the belief that a good American should look above or below, and maybe *near* but never directly *at* the issues of biological being, race, ethnicity, and kinship. Americans can accept the better man

on some level but not the principle of the better race. Perhaps this tells us something about the preferences, or even prejudices, of America's founding "race".

An essential inheritance of America's Anglo-Protestant values is an inclination to forget ethnic origins, national rivalries, and presumptions of hereditary status that were characteristic of the Old World. The Anglo-Saxons planted the model of this morality of turning a blind eye to national origins for all other Americans to follow and this implicated the erasure of everyone else's ethnic origins as well. The freedom to forget the past appears to be the obverse side of America's traditionally optimistic vision of the future. But why is this past problematic? Why were hereditary origins an issue in the first place?

The "race problem" should not matter in America, yet somehow it is the most American issue, the most relevant innovation of the entire American experiment. The old answers, moreover, that attempted to account for the entire "race" issue simply do not add up. There is a lack of coherent answer to the question of *why* race matters.

American historian Gordon Wood observed that

> the white American colonists were not an oppressed people; they had no crushing imperial chains to throw off. In fact, the colonists knew they were freer, more equal, more prosperous, and less burdened with cumbersome feudal and monarchical restraints than any other part of mankind in the eighteenth century.[425]

What exactly were the colonists rebelling against, then? What was this world-historical commotion called "revolution" really about?

Conquering the Conquest, or, Enlightened Saxon-centrism

The unanswered questions about race and revolution can be concentrated into a single historical question: When did the Anglo-Saxon nation stop being conquered by the Normans? For the sake of empirical accuracy, let us refuse to indulge in vague abstractions or undemonstrated traditional assumptions of assimilation. If we demand a specific, empirical date or period that marks a distinct end to the Conquest, what can the study of history offer?

Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville, a descendant of an old aristocratic family from Normandy, wrote in his famous treatise on American democracy, "[g]eneral ideas do not attest to the strength of human intelligence, but rather to its insufficiency".[426] The holy abstraction of "freedom" has effectually pulled wool over the eyes of those who have mindlessly submitted to the authority of the metaphysics of freedom. Freedom, in this way, seems to grant freedom from rational reflection upon the authority of "freedom". Instead of being *misled* by fuzzy, mystical, metaphysical abstractions such as "freedom", let us ask, specifically and empirically, *freedom from what*? In its distinctive historical context, what exactly was it about the British political order that radicals such as Thomas Paine sought freedom from?

The very title of Paine's book, *The Rights of Man*, might suggest a tendency to abstract or grossly generalize his *particular* anathema to "hereditary government" in England and France in *universal* terms. Yet this appearance does not fully stand up to scrutiny. In the case of England, he inquired specifically and empirically into the identity of its hereditary government and followed its very own hereditary logic back to its hereditary origins to discover:

> that origin is the Norman Conquest. They are evidently of the vassalage class of manners, and emphatically mark the prostrate distance that exists in no other condition of men than between the conqueror and the conquered.

This means that the "prostrate distance" between the conqueror "class" and the conquered "class" was also a hereditary distance. This kinship discontinuity between rulers and ruled suggests possible grounds for ethnic hostility between the descendants of the aristocracy and the majority population.

In *The English and the Normans: Ethnic Hostility, Assimilation, and Identity*, historian Hugh Thomas documented the ethnic hostility that existed between the native English and Normans following the Conquest. Justifying a common tendency to conflate 'Anglo-Saxon' with 'English', he maintained that English identity ultimately triumphed over both Norman identity and ethnic hostility. His thesis implies a kind of democratic cultural revolution and a belief in Anglo-Saxon conquest through cultural identity imperialism. If Thomas was right, then we should really date the first "modern" step towards democratic cultural revolution around the beginning of the thirteenth century. But was the Conquest really conquered so easily?

If the Norman Conquest, Norman identity, and ethnic hostility were conquered so easily, then how does Hugh Thomas explain these words of Thomas Paine in *The Rights of Man?*

> The hatred which the Norman invasion and tyranny begat, must have been deeply rooted in the nation, to have outlived the contrivance to obliterate it. Though not a

> courtier will talk of the curfew-bell, not a village in England has forgotten it.

This is a direct refutation of the Hugh Thomas's thesis, in *The English and the Normans*, that ethnic hostility ended by the beginning of the thirteenth century. Paine provided a powerful refutation, not simply as an observer, but as a highly influential *embodiment* of ethnic hostility against the Norman conquerors and their legacy. So who is right, Hugh Thomas or Thomas Paine?

The historian noted, "[l]ong-standing ethnic hostility would have completely altered the course of English political, social, and cultural history."[427] This unverified assertion that ethnic hostility did not continue significantly past the period covered by his study (1066-c.1220) was also contradicted by Michael Wood's recollection of his childhood encounter with Montgomery in the 1960s:

> Monty, of course, still bore his name and still carried his flag. And that explained his take on the Conquest. For though he was as English as I was, he saw himself as a Norman — and that's what counts when it comes to matters of identity…as far as I was concerned, Monty would always be a Norman.[428]

Still, in the twentieth century, the old ethnic identities mattered.

Did "Englishness" mean more than a quirk of geography, and more than "class", to a hereditary Norman dominion eventually engulfed Ireland and Scotland as well? The *label* of Englishness certainly triumphed and the very core of the English language re-emerged. Yet England ultimately became something different, neither Norman nor English, but neither and both. Even if we ignore actual hereditary

descent, the famous, and distinctively *English* "class system" dates from the Conquest and can itself be considered a long-term *cultural* triumph of *Norman* identity.

Genealogist L. G. Pine attested to the fact that the prestige of a Norman pedigree, associated with the identity of the "best people" or upper class, triumphed to the extent that many ambitious native English wanted to *be* Normans throughout post-Conquest *English* history. Ultimately, it was not so much that Normans became English so much that the English became British. The permanent occupation of the conqueror "class" formed the hereditary basis of the "British" Empire. While Thomas is fundamentally wrong, it is fortunate that he has clarified the issue by rightly raising the point that the reality of early post-Conquest ethnic hostility should wake people out of the complacent assumption that Normans and English should ultimately merge into one people.

Cultural assimilation is one thing; genetic assimilation, however, is quite another. Here the deficiency of historical studies that fail to account for biological factors and a general evolutionary perspective becomes most apparent. While Thomas's scholarship offers many contributions to the debate, especially his balanced judgment on many topics, conclusions about the ultimate effects of the Conquest will remain fundamentally unbalanced if genetic factors are left out of the final equations.

Thomas writes history as if Charles Darwin never lived. Even if the Normans had completely assimilated culturally yet maintained a hereditary monopoly of leading positions within the country, that cannot be called full assimilation. The notion of special political-hereditary rights and privileges passed on from generation to generation that the

American revolutionaries fought against in theory are the exact opposite of genetic assimilation.

Thomas's thesis makes sense only if it can be demonstrated that the Anglo-Saxons are an ethnicity indifferent as to whether their government is or is not representative of "the people". Thomas's thesis could be saved only if the evidence verified that Anglo-Saxons are an ethnicity with no sense of the value of liberty, their fawning natural servility allowing them to live together with their new Norman aristocracy happily ever after. In summary, the real question of assimilation is whether the Anglo-Saxons assimilated to the notion that the Normans had a *right* to conquer them.

As L. G. Pine wrote, "The historian whose unthinking conscience allows them to justify the Norman Conquest, could as easily justify the Nazi subjugation of Europe."[429] Thomas's perilous, conciliatory suppression of any negative attitudes towards Normans that could be construed as ethnic hostility led him to acquiesce in a neutral or sometimes even positive attitude of *appeasement* towards those exemplary *Normanitas* virtues expressed in ruthless military domination, genocide, and the crushing of all native ethnic resistance (a.k.a. conquest; the antithesis of the rights of man; the negation of the every principle that the most egalitarian of the American founders sought to bring to light in opposition to the founding of the British Empire in 1066).

Michael Mann's *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* proposed two versions of "We, the people". He proposed that the liberal version, exemplified by American Constitutionalism, is characterized by individual rights, class, and special interest groups. In the organic version of democracy ethnicity rivals other forms of interest

and identity and in some circumstances can express itself in ethnic cleansing. This is the "dark side of democracy".

In Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union, Mann observed, "democratization struggles increasingly pitted a local ethnicity against a foreign imperial ruler".[430] The *demos* was confused with the *ethnos.* Was America any different? If the Normans conquerors achieved some degree of success in perpetuating their hereditary government over the centuries, and the original ethnic conflict that Thomas documented was not perpetuated with it, then how does one explain *that*? What would make the impetus of organic and liberal democracy so different from one another?

For the sake of argument, let us entertain this peculiar idea of hereditary separatism, just as John Locke does in his *Second Treatise of Government* (and try in earnest to assume this has nothing to do whatsoever with the Norman Conquest):

> But supposing, which seldom happens, that the conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one people, under the same laws and freedom; let us see next *what power a lawful conqueror has over the subdued*: and that I say is purely despotical….the *government of a conqueror*, imposed by force on the subdued...*has no obligation* on them.[431]

The Declaration of Independence proclaims, "to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." This assertion implies that the Norman Conquest was illegitimate. The Norman takeover was achieved *despite* the lack of consent of the governed. That government was instituted with strategic violence against any significant resistance from the governed. From the view of its author,

Thomas Jefferson, the Norman Conquest was the institution of an unjust power against the rights of the people. It is thus not a coincidence that the hereditary "English" political tradition was founded in utter violation of the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

In *The Rights of Man*, Paine explained, "by the Conquest all the rights of the people or the nation were absorbed into the hands of the Conqueror, who added the title of King to that of Conqueror." Paine posited a remarkable ambiguity between the "rights of the people" and "the nation". King was equated with Conqueror. In 1066 there existed a right of conquest, but no "rights of the people". The modern *invention* of the latter justified, at long last, the reclamation of Anglo-Saxon "rights" from the "hands of the Conqueror".

The Declaration of Independence further asserts, "whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government". America provided an opportunity to do just that.

Taking full advantage of this opportunity meant that America would truly be different from the old world. As *The Rights of Man* explained, "In England, the person who exercises this prerogative [as king] is often a foreigner; always half a foreigner, and always married to a foreigner. He is never in full natural or political connection with the country". A lack of "natural" connection between the political elite and the people was significant for Paine. The contrast with America was clear: "The presidency of America…is the only office from which a foreigner is excluded; and in England, it is the only one to which he is admitted." The new world would be different.

America, for Paine, was the place where foreigners were excluded from that high office. Democracy meant that

"commoners" could finally be admitted. Revolution had turned the old order upside down: the rule of the people meant the triumph of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism over the legacy of the Norman-centric aristocracy.

It is unfortunate for believers in the distinct superiority of the liberal form of democracy that the organic and liberal varieties are more equal than they think. Faith in the categorical distinction between the liberal and organic expressions of democracy is only a display of naiveté towards the cunning of ethnocentrism. Democratic Saxon-centrism has prevented an appreciation of the ethnic diversity at the very heart of the American founding.

Are the Anglo-Saxon ethnically superior to ethnocentrism and thus superior to *all* other peoples on Earth in this respect or has something been overlooked? Is it true that Anglo-Saxons are always superior and never inferior to the power and influence of the Norman Conquest or is it at least possible that this unspoken assumption might have something to do with Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism? It is as if a conquest of the Conquest has been attempted through an enlightened ethnic cleansing of the Norman impact on world history. The Norman conquerors of history, however, were not conquered so easily.

The Peculiar Revolution

For the title of original, permanent English colony in the New World, the Pilgrims of the Mayflower take second place. It was the English settlers of Jamestown, Virginia, who were the first permanent English colonists, thirteen years before the Mayflower. Jamestown was birthplace of the United States, and, it just so happens, the birthplace of American slavery of Africans. In 1619, a year before the

landing of the Mayflower, the first black slaves were brought to Virginia.

America was born a land of slavery.

In the Old World, it had been "the Norman" who so often represented tyranny, aristocracy, and inequality. But surely things must have been different in America. In the land of freedom, democracy, and equality, perhaps only Southern slavery posed a truly fundamental challenge to these modern values.

The question nonetheless remains, who were these Southern slave masters?

It is as if recent historians have confidently assumed that, in all of human history, there could not be a case where the issue of race was more irrelevant. Never in human history was the issue of race more irrelevant than in regard to the racial identity of the American South's essential "master race". This is a truly fantastic contradiction: the South apparently fought a war in the name of the primacy of race, yet the distinctive racial identity of the South primary ruling race is apparently a matter of total indifference.

Virtually every other people in history, from the Italians, to the Chinese, to the Mayans, to the Albanians, possessed some form of ethnic identity. The French, the Germans, and the Russians did not and do not simply consider themselves to be merely "white". The original English settlers of the North, moreover, are considered, not simply white, but Anglo-Saxon. Why, then, was the South's "master race" nearly alone in its absence of a distinctive ethnic identity? Is this state of affairs only a consummation of the Northern victory?

Of course, that blacks possessed a distinctive African ancestry is admissible, but the ancestry of the South's ruling race is apparently inadmissible. This must be a state of

affairs almost more peculiar than slavery itself. *Everyone* else across the world is permitted a distinctive ethnic or racial identity except the great Southern slave masters. For some peculiar reason, the original Southern slave masters are not allowed to have a distinct ethnic or racial identity. This means that the only people in American history who apparently have no distinct ethnic or racial origins beyond being white are precisely the same people who thought other people could and should be enslaved on the basis of their ethnic or racial origins.

These aristocratic planters must have been the most raceless, bloodless, deracinated, rootless, cosmopolitan universalists ever known to history. We must conclude that of all white people, these aristocrats must have valued heredity or genealogy the very least. The Virginia planters were most peculiar, not for being owners of black slaves, but for being the least ethnically self-conscious white people in world history. Is this an accurate reflection of reality?

This is really one of the great, peculiar paradoxes of world history: the elite Southern planters, one of the most extreme, unapologetic, and explicitly racist groups in history, are precisely those who may have the most obscure racial identity in history. Their claim to fame has been tied to identifying blacks as a race of natural slaves and in identifying themselves as race of natural masters — a "master race" without a racial identity. Perhaps the time has come to recognize that they have also merited a claim to fame simply for the obscurity of their racial identity.

Who were they?

The Englishmen who first settled the North identified themselves as Anglo-Saxons. But what about the "First Families of Virginia"? Virginia's Tidewater elite largely originated from the geographic entity of England. But did

these racists consider themselves specifically *Anglo-Saxon*? This question must be posed as carefully as possible: did they or did they not specifically identify themselves as members of the Anglo-Saxon race?

Who were these American slave masters?

In *Democracy in America,* Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the North possessed "the qualities and defects that characterize the middle class", while the South "has the tastes, prejudices, weaknesses, and greatness of all aristocracies".[432] There could probably be no greater confirmation that South possessed a genuine aristocracy in the traditional sense. Yet this prescient antebellum observation begs the question: how did young America acquire an old aristocracy?

It is as if, in America, of all places, no explanation is required for this profound *cultural* difference between North and South. America was *supposedly* a country defined by "the qualities and defects that characterize the middle class". But the idea of a slave race assumes the existence of a master race, not a bourgeois or middle-class race. The Union was not threatened by the leadership of poor Southern whites; it was threatened by the leadership of a subgroup of whites with an aristocratic philosophy that mastered the entire cultural order of the South.

If the Civil War was fought against slavery, and to fight slavery was to fight the slave-masters, then the Civil War was fought against the slave-masters. Since the slaves were not guilty of enslaving themselves, the argument that the Civil War was about slavery is practically identical to the argument that the Civil War was about the slave-masters. No matter which way one looks at it, all roads of inquiry into slavery leads to an inquiry into these peculiar Southern slave-masters.

Who were they?

"These slaves", said Abraham Lincoln, "constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war."[433] Did Lincoln state here that slavery was the cause of the war? No, Lincoln stated that slaves, as property, constituted an *interest*, and this *interest* was, somehow, the cause of war. The question then becomes, *whose* interest did these slaves serve?

To speak of aristocracy is to speak, by definition, of a minority of the population. The original aristocratic settlers of Virginia were called Cavaliers. "[T]he legend of the Virginia cavalier was no mere romantic myth", concluded David Hackett Fischer in *Albion's Seed*. "In all of its major parts, it rested upon a solid foundation of historical fact."[434]

But who were the Cavaliers?

One year before the outbreak of the American Civil War, in June of 1860, the *Southern Literary Messenger* declared:

> the Southern people come of that race recognized as cavaliers … directly descended from the Norman barons of William the Conqueror, a race distinguished in its early history for its warlike and fearless character, a race in all times since renowned for its gallantry, chivalry, honor, gentleness and intellect.[435]

Normans and Saxons: Southern Race Mythology and the Intellectual History of the American Civil War documented the thesis of Norman/Saxon conflict from a literary perspective. Its author, Ritchie Devon Watson, Jr., interpreted this thesis of Norman-Cavalier identity as "race mythology", just as historian James McPherson has called this peculiar notion the "central myth of southern ethnic nationalism". Yet how can this thesis be dismissed as myth without a thorough, scientific, genealogical investigation into the matter? Is it a

myth, rather, that the Norman Conquest, the most pivotal event in English history, had *no affect whatsoever* on America? Is it true that representatives of virtually *every* ethnicity and race have come to America — with one peculiar Norman exception? Were the descendents of the Norman-Viking conquerors of England the only people in the world who were not enterprising or adventurous enough to try their fortunes in a new land?

"My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union," Lincoln explained, "and is *not* either to save or destroy slavery."[436] Yet it has become commonplace to disagree with Lincoln and to propagate the myth that the Civil War was first and foremost about the slavery of black people. The repeated claim that the Civil War was about slavery can be deceptive because it serves as a means of avoiding focus upon the slave-masters, which further avoids facing the centrality of the identity of the Norman-Cavaliers. The American Civil War was fought primarily, not over black *slavery*, but over Norman *mastery*.

There is a sense, however, in which the Civil War was provoked by the slavery of a race of people. Norman-American George Fitzhugh, the South's most extreme and comprehensive pro-slavery theorist, clarified the relationship between race, slavery, and the Civil War amidst that violent clash of two Americas:

> It is a gross mistake to suppose that 'abolition' is the cause of dissolution between the north and south. The Cavaliers, Jacobites, and Huguenots of the south naturally hate, condemn, and despise the Puritans who settled the north. The former are master races, the latter a slave race, the descendants of the Saxon serfs.[437]

This is a key piece of the racial puzzle of America. Fitzhugh implied that the North sided with a black slave race because the Anglo-Saxons themselves *are* a slave race. Fitzhugh depicted Anglo-Saxons as the niggers of post-Conquest England.

With these words, Fitzhugh verified that the Norman Conquest, in its origins, was a form of slavery of the Anglo-Saxon race. The foundational irreconcilability between North and South is incomprehensible without recognizing that North's peculiar obsession with "freedom" evolved precisely from the fierce denial that they or their ancestors were, in fact, a Saxon "slave race" born to serve a Norman "master race".

"True," Horace Greeley admitted in an issue of his *New York Daily Tribune* in 1854, "we believe the *tendency* of the slaveholding system is to make those trained under and mentally conforming to it, overbearing, imperious, and regardless of the rights of others."[438] Would he have believed, too, that the *tendency* of the Saxon-holding system in England after 1066 was to make those trained under and mentally conforming to it, overbearing, imperious, and regardless of the rights of others? Could there be any connection between these two very peculiar *tendencies*?

Could revulsion against the very notion of a slavish Saxon-holding system be the root and source of the inordinately strong Anglo-Saxon *tendency* toward freedom? The key to understanding the modern fame of the Anglo-Saxons as a *free* race is to understand the medieval fame of the Anglo-Saxons as a *conquered* and *enslaved* race. The Norman-Cavaliers' belief in the rectitude of slavery was a direct descendant of belief in the rectitude of the peculiar institution of the right of conquest.

Yet, as Fitzhugh made clear, he and other Cavaliers were not the only whites of the South, even if they were as decisive in forming the culture of South as the Anglo-Saxons were in forming the culture of the North. The Jacobites refer to the Scotch-Irish who became the majority of the Southern white population. A smaller population of French Huguenots followed the original Cavaliers and concentrated in South Carolina.

According to the late American political scientist Samuel Huntington, "American identity as a multiethnic society dates from, and in some measure, was a product of World War II."[439] Huntington believed that America has a Puritan essence.[440] He implied that American identity is rooted in a *single* ethnic identity and that ethnic identity is Puritan and Anglo-Saxon. If this is true, then it goes without saying that ultimate patriarch among the "founding fathers", George Washington, must have been a pureblooded Anglo-Saxon. Is this genealogically accurate?

According to one source, the very first Washington in England was originally named William fitzPatric (Norman French for son of Patric). He changed his name to William de Wessyngton when he adopted the name of the parish in which he lived circa 1180 A.D.[441] Another source, the late English specialist in Norman genealogy L. G. Pine, related that George Washington and his family "has plenty of Norman ancestry". He confirmed that this family was on record as owners of Washington Manor in Durhamshire in the twelfth century and of knightly rank.[442] Since George Washington was the possessor of "a carefully traced decent from Edward I",[443] this implies that the first president of the United States was also a descendant of William the Conqueror. None other than the twenty-eighth president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, affirmed in his

biography of Washington that his Cavalier ancestors "hated the Puritans" and that the first Washingtons in Virginia were born of a "stock whose loyalty was as old as the Conquest...They came of a Norman family."[444]

George Washington was a Norman-American and a classic representative of the aristocratic, slave-owning, Cavalier culture of Virginia. Unfortunately for Mr. Washington, Samuel Huntington has no room for the kind of diversity represented by America's first president and his Puritan hating, Cavalier ancestors. *Everyone* must conform to the Anglo-Saxon, Puritan cultural model if they want to be counted as *real* Americans — even George Washington. Wasn't *that* what the Civil War was about?

How is it even conceivable that Norman conquerors who developed into Southern slave masters could also have played a decisive role in the architecture of American liberty? Huntington, so keen to stress the English roots of American liberty, neglected to point out that Magna Carta was a product of Norman aristocratic civilization. It was the Normans who first *invented* the formal tradition of constitutional liberty that eventually conquered the world.

So while Washington was an heir to Norman aristocratic tradition, Magna Carta was a part of that tradition. Southern resistance to King George III in 1776 could trace its struggle for liberty to the resistance of Norman barons to King John in 1215 (and this also preserved their special privileges or "liberties" *against* the tide of assimilation with Anglo-Saxons). It was only in the seventeenth century that Anglo-Saxons exploited and selectively reinterpreted Magna Carta for their own purposes.

The ultimate foil of Hugh M. Thomas's thesis that ethnic hostility between Normans and Anglo-Saxon went extinct by about 1220 is to be found in the endurance and

persistence of Samuel Huntington's question: *Who are we?* The "universalism" of the American founding actually emerged out of the attempt to preserve a rather peculiar form of multiculturalism that balanced the democracy-leaning North against an aristocracy-leaning, slaving owning South. The American Civil War resulted in the Northern conquest of the multicultural America that formed the character of the American founding. The Anglo-Saxon conquest of 1865 was the real founding of Samuel Huntington's presumption of a *single* Puritan-based American culture.

What Hugh Thomas actually did was to dig up the root of the Anglo-Saxon cultural identity imperialism that late twentieth century multiculturalism began to expose. Thomas's conclusion that the Anglo-Saxons culturally conquered the Normans in thirteenth century was made seemingly plausible only by nineteenth century conquests of the Normans. Thomas only uncovered the origin of this Anglo-Saxon way of cultural conquest through a struggle against the multicultural England of medieval times.

Multiculturalists who have promoted the contributions of women and minorities at the expense of the usual dead white males of history are following directly in the footsteps of Anglo-Saxon historians who downplayed the Norman impact on their history. The underdog biases of multiculturalism is not an aberration, but only a continuation of the majoritarian bias of *democracy itself* against a fair assessment of the contributions of Norman aristocracy to world history. William the Conqueror is the ultimate dead white European male in the history of the English-speaking world.

Hugh Thomas's unspoken assumption is that Anglo-Saxons culturally *conquered* the Norman Conquest. *They*, the

Anglo-Saxons, were ultimately history's great conquerors. But is this true? Let this point resound around the entire world with utmost clarity: the issue here is who conquered whom? Did the Normans become victims of conquest by the Anglo-Saxons in modern times through characteristically *modern* methods?

Is it all possible that Anglo-Saxons might possibly be biased on the subject of the people who once defeated, conquered, and subjugated them? Most humans have submitted to the yoke of a "modern" Anglo-Saxon-leaning interpretation of long-term effects of the Norman Conquest. The repression of the impact of 1066 upon modern times has stifled a rational, evolutionary understanding of liberal democracy in the English-speaking world. The time has come for America and the rest of the English-speaking world to overcome this ancient bloodfeud and reclaim its Norman heritage, a heritage to goes to the very heart of the American founding.

In modern times, the Anglo-Saxon culturally conquered the Normans by Saxoning away their multicultural difference into presumptions of Anglo-Saxon "universalism". To call America "Anglo-Saxon" is thus tantamount to ethnically cleansing George Washington of his Norman or Cavalier ancestral identity. Was George Washington the victim of a cultural form of ethnic cleansing by the Anglo-Saxon people?

Barack Obama: Supernigger

There is an historical circumstance, known to few, that connects the children of the Puritans with these Africans of Virginia in a very singular way. They are our breathren, as being lineal

> **descendants from the *Mayflower*, the fated womb of which, in her first voyage, sent forth a brood of Pilgrims on Plymouth Rock, and, in a subsequent one, spawned slaves upon the Southern soil,—a monstrous birth, but with which we have an instinctive sense of kindred, and are so stirred by an irresistible impulse to attempt their rescue, even at the cost of blood and ruin. The character of our sacred ship, I fear, may suffer a little by this revelation; but we must let her white progeny offset her dark one,—and two such portents never sprang from an identical source before.**
>
> —NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE

When Barack Obama became the first president of the United States to possess native African ancestry, black people across the world were elated. In Kenya, the native land of his father, people celebrated and danced in ecstasy. In America, some black Americans cried as if in disbelief that they had lived to see this milestone in American history.

While early 21st century Americanism supposedly stands, in theory, against racial discrimination, here it is *good* to recognize race. But it is more than that. In the case of Barack Obama, not only was it good to specifically point out and recognize his racial background, but doing so somehow captured the very heart of the American Dream.

This means that a certain form of affirmative racial discrimination is identical with "the American Way". Somehow, this form of racial discrimination is not only good, but also profoundly consonant with an idealized liberalization of American revolutionary spirit. In some unspoken way, the race of a candidate could potentially be a

determining factor in deciding whether an election is or is not a fulfillment of the "American dream".

The peculiar issue here is not that Obama's election matters to the most obvious racists of the right, but that it matters to the presumably anti-racist left. But was this a progressive victory *because* of his race or *despite* his race? Even if both are true, both confirm that it matters that he was the first half-African-American to hold the highest office in the land.

But why does it matter? Who cares if the man is half-black?

Why is this ironic obsession with race so American? If his race truly did not matter then it would make no difference whatsoever if it just so happened that an African-American was *never* elected president and whites continued their traditional political supremacy in America. But it did matter. It matters because race matters.

This is the thing about race in America: no matter how much the race issue is pushed down in one respect, it always seems to pop back up in another. In this case, overcoming racism enough so that Obama could get elected resulted in the recognition of its extraordinary significance for black racial pride from Kenya to Kentucky.

But was the founding of America any different?

When George Washington was elected as first President of the United States, a very traditional pattern recurred. In Britain, there existed an unspoken, default cultural assumption that the Normans are the "best people" in general and the best in politics above all. Normans conquered even in America's revolution and Washington, the ultimate patriarch of among the "founding fathers", seemed only to confirm this rule. Yet if people are able to choose who they think is best for the office and the best just

so happen to be of the old Norman stock, then who can argue with that?

But could this pattern go on *forever*? Were Normans to always find their way to the political peaks and rule Anglo-Saxons even in America? Would it make no difference whatsoever if it just so happened than an Anglo-Saxon was *never* elected president and Normans in America continued their traditional political supremacy?

From the unequalled contribution of Virginia to the American Revolution, Southern dominance in politics continued right up until the decade that preceded the Civil War. Since Norman-Cavaliers were, even in the South, a distinct minority of the white population, only slavery could preserve their distinctly aristocratic way of life. The expansion of slavery, then, was the means of preserving the Norman conqueror way of life in America.

To understand what the election of Abraham Lincoln and his basic unwillingness to compromise with legal, lawful, Constitutional slavery meant to the Anglo-Saxons, one must go back to the first two centuries after the Conquest. Gerald of Wales (1146-1223), a churchman, scholar, and chronicler of three-quarters Norman and one-quarter Welsh descent wrote:

> The English are the most worthless of all peoples under heaven, for they have been subdued by the Normans and reduced by the law to perpetual slavery.[445]

After the Conquest, and especially under the "anarchy" of the Norman King Stephen, many Anglo-Saxons were treated by many Normans as akin to "niggers" who deserved their hereditary slavery. If the Norman Conquest was legitimate, then reducing Anglo-Saxons to "perpetual slavery" by law was legitimate. The legitimacy of this peculiar form of

slavery depended on the legitimacy of the Conquest itself. Why would William need to be a conqueror at all if he was considered a legitimate heir to the throne by the people of England?

In *Conquered England* (2007), Oxford historian George Garnett noted, "Duke William's claim to the kingdom of England was fabricated".[446] "Scrupulous legalism was based upon a fabricated history, which ultimately legitimated the despoliation of the Conquest." While "there was no Norman claim until it was confected in Normandy, on the basis of Norman succession practices", the "fiction of continuity"[447] created, in practice, some very peculiar anomalies that found a new home in new world slavery. In consequence, to believe that one can understand Southern slavery one the basis of legal principles such as "states rights" is like believing that one can understand the Norman mastery of the Anglo-Saxon race in 1066 on the basis on the Norman lies that legalized the Conquest.

Slavery is forced labor. Conquest was the force that allowed Normans to exploit Anglo-Saxon labor. The Norman Conquest was the enslavement of the Anglo-Saxon race because there was no ultimate internal consent to the Norman claim to be the rightful masters of England, only superior force and superior cunning. The Norman Conquest was slavery because William claim to own the Anglo-Saxon nation as his property was based on a gargantuan lie. William's claim to supreme mastery of England was achieved *despite* the lack consent of the Anglo-Saxon embodied by the resistance at Hastings and the revolts that followed.

The issue of slavery was literally beyond the document called the United States Constitution and the American Civil War is the classic demonstration of the impossibility of

understanding American history on the "legal" principles on that paper. Southern slavery, defended by the United States Constitution, was a direct extension of Norman-Cavalier culture of conquest and mastery. This is the historic basis of the racial equality between Northern Anglo-Saxons and blacks: both had been enslaved by Normans. Normans enslaved the black race in America just as they had once enslaved the Anglo-Saxon race in England.

The Civil War was Anglo-Saxon aggression against the Southern Norman Yoke. They had to pounce on the Norman-Cavaliers before they became uncontrollable. In a world-historical reversal of fortunes, the Anglo-Saxons became conquerors of the Normans. *This* was the racial justice meted out by the U.S. Civil War.

The triumph of Lincoln the Conqueror in the Civil War is single greatest reason that America became an *Anglo-Saxon* "nation". Some surely indulged in *Schadenfreude* when witnessing the great Norman race reduced to equality with their former slaves. This is how the Anglo-Saxons conquered the Conquest in America. And this is how white folk across America became "Anglo-Saxon".

The racial meaning of the equality posited by Jefferson and consummated by Lincoln was the racial equality of Norman and Saxon. Normans could be equal to Saxons only if Saxons were equal to blacks. This tense historical logic began to hold post-Civil War America together under the principle of equality. Yet if this were true in the most literal, historical sense, then Robert E. Lee could have been black, and not a descendent of Norman conquerors of England, and it would have made no difference.

Barack Obama is a paradoxical fulfillment, not only of the racial equality of America, but also of a peculiar pretense of *superiority*. Only by overcoming the memory of their

hereditary slavery to the Normans, could Anglo-Saxons salvage a kind of unamalgamated superiority over the Normans. Anglo-Saxons countered presumptions of Norman hereditary superiority with a Lockean belief in a kind of superiority that overcomes heredity. The Lockean tabla rasa formally erased the past hereditary Anglo-Saxon inferiority inflicted by the Norman Conquest. By erasing the Norman legacy, Anglo-Saxons could erase the historic basis of their equality with blacks. Victory in the Civil War thus granted, not only military superiority over Normans, but also a kind of superiority over blacks.

It appears that Northern Anglo-Saxons believe that they are racially superior to blacks on this point: while blacks bear the burden of history as a once enslaved and oppressed people, Anglo-Saxons are above such historical misfortunes. While blacks had been victims of past racial oppression, the angelic, slave-liberating Anglo-Saxons of the North stand in transcendent moral majesty over such base origins. The Anglo-Saxons, it would seem, are only conquerors and never the conquered; only free and never slaves.

Anglo-Saxons could *never* have been treated akin to niggers. Saxploitation is impossible! One can only suppose that Anglo-Saxon believe they are *Superniggers*. American Anglo-Saxons seemingly believe that they are an Über-race; a race superior to race; the race whose superiority consists of being the only race superior to race. Since Anglo-Saxons are always clearly superior to the status of niggers "reduced by the law to perpetual slavery" they must be Superniggers. (I admit that I sampled this theme of "Supernigger" from an old album by that Supernigger of comedy, Richard Pryor.) Southerners were much more modest on this point.

Perhaps Anglo-Saxons could learn something from the courage of blacks in confronting their racial history. Why

don't Anglo-Saxons admit the historic basis of their racial equality with blacks? Is it Anglo-Saxon racial pride?

The historic nature of the equality of Anglo-Saxons and blacks is that both had been victims of the Norman conqueror way of life. Both Anglo-Saxons and black had their histories permanently altered by the experience of life under the Norman Yoke. Both Anglo-Saxons and blacks spent centuries bamboozled in the belief that God and nature had sanctioned Normans to lord over them as a master race. The Norman Conquest was the origin historical circumstance that, as Nathaniel Hawthorne put it, "connects the children of the Puritans with these Africans of Virginia in a very singular way." When the Puritans of the Mayflower imagined themselves Hebrews in exodus from Egyptian slavery this was no arbitrary fantasy; this was a metaphor for the slavery inflicted by the Norman mastery of England.

The original Norman identity of the British and Southern aristocracy cannot be admitted by Anglo-Saxons *because* it would demonstrate the equality of Anglo-Saxons and blacks as races equally victimized and enslaved under the 'Norman Yoke'. By denying the impact of the Norman Conquest, Anglo-Saxons deny their shared, historic connection with black slaves, and thus uphold a sense of racial superiority over American blacks.

Why does America believe in its exceptionalism among nations? America is different because, in part, the Anglo-Saxons believed they were different: they believed themselves to be *above* their own history, *superior* to the stain of the Conquest. The Norman/Saxon racial difference was denied *ergo* the white/black racial difference was denied. This American foundation explains why a black man name

Barack Obama could represent a self-realization of an America founded in racism.

Why should black racial pride in Obama's election fit so profoundly and perfectly into the mold of the American Dream? When one recognizes how blacks felt to see representative government in Obama, *then* one can understand what John Adams or Abraham Lincoln meant to Anglo-Saxons. Barack Obama is a Supernigger with the supernatural ability to overcome his own heredity inheritance just as Lincoln was a Supernigger who overcame the "natural" lot of his race.

While the proud Northern victory in the Civil War freed both Anglo-Saxons and blacks from the shadow of their historic oppressors, admitting the Norman Yoke would also be admitting a past of Anglo-Saxon slavery. Anglo-Saxon racial pride itself demanded that the victory be sublimated in universal terms. Why, then, is America the exceptional and paradoxical country where a black man can become president? The answer is *Anglo-Saxon racial pride*.

Bringing Down the House

> **What were the Lords of England but William the Conquerour's Colonels? or the Barons but his Majors? or the Knights but his Captains?**[448]
>
> —MEMBER OF THE NEW MODEL ARMY IN THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR (1646)

The Puritans were king killers. After the House of Commons triumphed in the Civil War, their leaders had King Charles I executed on January 30, 1649. The fame of this genocide of the hereditary British royal line dominates

discussion of the English Civil War. Yet this conflict can be entirely misunderstood if it is not acknowledged that a less well-known deposition was no less revolutionary: the House of Commons brought down the House of Lords. Less than two months after King Charles I was executed, on March 19, 1649, the Puritan leadership decreed that the aristocratic House of Lords was to be *permanently abolished*:

> The Commons of England [find] by too long experience that the House of Lords is useless and dangerous to the people of England.

Only after the destruction of *both* king *and* aristocracy could there arise a Puritan Commonwealth with Oliver Cromwell as lord protectorate. This has been called the "Puritan Revolution". Yet if this great upheaval was really only about the behavior of one tyrannical king, then how can one make sense of the revolutionary abolition of the House of Lords? This could be considered *the* central question, and not a peripheral question, of the English Civil War.

An answer can be found in a famous essay called *The Norman Yoke* by the great twentieth century historian of seventeenth century England, Christopher Hill. "The discrediting of the royal Arthurian legend, and its replacement by that of free Anglo-Saxon institutions," he observed, "was … of direct importance in the battle of ideas which preceded the Civil War."[449] Appeals to the Saxon past were commonplace among pro-House of Commons pamphleteers when the war broke out.[450] The theme of the Norman Yoke became a battle cry of the conflict:

> Our Nobility and Gentry [came] even from that outlandish Norman Bastard, who first being his Servants and under Tyrants; secondly, their rise was by cruell murther and theft

> by the Conquest; thirdly, their rise was the Countries ruine, and the putting them down will be the restitution of our rights againe.[451]

To see the struggle for "our rights" against the "royalists" as a struggle against the Norman Yoke was to see the conflict as a reemergence of revolt against the Norman Conquest. And this explains why *both* king *and* aristocracy were overthrown in the Puritan Revolution. The combination of regicide and political abolition of the hereditary aristocracy was akin to accomplishing what the Anglo-Saxon revolts of 1066-71 failed to do: defeat and conqueror *both* William the Norman *and* his Norman aristocracy.

This overthrow of king and aristocracy almost exactly parallels the pattern of the overthrow of Harold and the pre-Conquest English aristocracy. Call it Puritan justice. For those who argued for absolutism through the right of Norman Conquest the *native* ruled Puritan Revolution was subversive while somehow the foreign ruling body that imposed itself in 1066 and would not even deign to speak the despised English language for centuries was somehow as wholesome as English apple pie.

The theory of the Norman Yoke emerged from the "underworld of largely-unrecorded thinking" along with a better-educated laity and the rise of the printing press.[452] Hill found the Yoke theme documented largely from the seventeenth century onwards. It appeared copiously during his unearthing of a nearly forgotten tradition of English radicalism in the seventeenth century: the Levellers, Diggers, Muggletonians, and others.

Hill described the basic theory of the Norman Yoke as such:

> Before 1066 the Anglo-Saxon inhabitants of this country lived as free and equal citizens, governing themselves through representative institutions. The Norman Conquest deprived them of this liberty, and established the tyranny of an alien King and landlords. But the people did not forget the rights they had lost. They fought continuously to recover them, with varying success. Concessions…were from time to time extorted from their rulers, and always the tradition of lost Anglo-Saxon freedom was a stimulus to ever more insistent demands upon the successors of the Norman usurpers.[453]

It was an entirely secular theory which

> united the Third Estate against Crown, Church, and landlords, branding them as hereditary enemies of the people. It suggested that the ruling class is alien to the interest of the majority of the population…The people could conduct its own affairs better without its Norman rulers, whose wealth and privileges are an obstacle to equality. The nation is the people.[454]

A yoke usually refers to a wooden bar or frame by which non-human animals are joined to work them together, but it can also mean a similar arched device that is laid on the neck of a defeated person. The idea of the Norman Yoke, then, associates the human slavery of non-human animals with slavery among human groups. The English Civil War could thus be viewed as an attempt to overthrow the Norman slavery that was in inherent conflict with the freedom of the Anglo-Saxon nation.

Were the basic motives of the American Civil War much different? Black slavery forced the Anglo-Saxons of North to clarify their own identity. They were forced to choose between identification with a "master race" and

identification with a "slave race". How, then, do black slaves and Anglo-Saxons have more in common with one another than with the Norman slave masters of the South?

In the middle of the American Civil War, a Virginian declared, "the Saxonized maw-worms creeping from the Mayflower...have [no] right to kinship with the whole-souled Norman British planters of a gallant race."[455] While kinship separated blacks and Anglo-Saxons, it also separated Anglo-Saxons and Normans. It was the Normans, however, who had ruled both Anglo-Saxons and blacks as caste-masters and taskmasters.

At the very center of the historic Anglo-Negro convergence of America is the Norman Yoke. The Norman Yoke was the historic oppressive catalyst of the struggle for political freedom and equality for both Anglo-Saxons and blacks. The U.S. Civil War was not fought over black slavery *per se*; it was fought over the Norman Yoke.

The parallels between the American Civil War and the English Civil War are truly remarkable. Despite victories in the English Civil War, a petition from "above a thousand of the inhabitants of Essex" announced in 1647, "we are now like to be Vassalaged and enslaved in the Norman Laws and Prerogative Clutches of an Ambitious Party in the Nation."[456] Why was the House of Lords abolished right after the King was killed in 1649? The abolition of the House of Lords was the abolition of slavery.

The Anglo-Saxons in the American Civil War sought to succeed where their people had ultimately failed after the English Civil War. They sought the *permanent* abolition the Norman Yoke. If Northern abolitionists sought to abolish slavery, and the abolition of slavery entailed the abolition of the slave-master, then the abolitionists sought to abolish the

slave-master. The abolition of Southern slavery was thus *identical* to the cause of the abolition of the Norman Yoke.

In the end, Lincoln did not wage aggressive war to preserve the old Union enshrined by the Constitution since that, by definition, would require the preservation of slavery. The attempt to understand this conflict within the language of the Constitution only demonstrates that it is impossible to understand this conflict on the basis of these formal abstractions alone. Lincoln's North fought not to destroy slavery but to destroy the rising power of a new Norman Yoke.

If the Civil War was about slavery, and slavery was about race, then the Civil War was about race. Yet blacks provided a means of talking about the racial or ethnic differences between Normans and Saxons without talking about it. The result, however, is that blacks became the great racial scapegoat for the "white man's" burdens. It appears that, on top of everything else, blacks have been commanded by white Americans to bear the burden of *all* racial hostility and *all* racial difference in that war. This, it seems, was something that Normans and Saxons could ultimately agree upon. Blacks can be freed from the genealogically unjust burden of this great weight by recognizing that it would be far more accurate to say that the U.S. Civil War was fought over the Norman Yoke.

It was not only blacks who had not come over to America on the Mayflower. A Civil War era congressman from Alabama professed a "sovereign contempt for the memory of the Pilgrim Fathers," and disposed of their Puritan religion as one "of fanaticism, of intolerance, of infidelity, of bigotry and hypocrisy."[457] Did that make this congressman un-American? Was the entire South un-American? The War for Confederate Independence was the South's nineteenth

century answer to Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington's twenty-first century question: *who are we?*

"The origins of American politics are to be found in the English Puritan Revolution", claimed Huntington. "That revolution is, in fact, the single most important formative event of American political history."[458] American identity, he contended, is fundamentally a product of this *single* "core culture".

Normans are not Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Saxons are not Normans. That was history's response to the question of "*who are we?*" The answer to that question exposes the roots of civil war in both England and America. Huntington's thesis that America, and especially the founding, is the product of a single ethnicity or culture is refuted by the self-same question of "*who are we?*" that posited it.

The Norman Conquest is the single most important formative event of American political history because, for example, the entire Puritan way of life and point of view would not *exist* if it had not been incubated and formulated in resistance and *reaction* to the existence of Norman aristocratic civilization. The Puritans had to react *against* the original aristocratic exclusiveness of Magna Carta civilization. In consequence, the origins of American politics are to be found in an internal English "clash of civilizations" that began with the Battle of Hastings.

It is truly remarkable how the English Civil War can be described as the birth of modernity in England, yet traditional historical explanations that attempt to decipher its core causes tend to be profoundly muddled. This chaotic perplexity is extraordinarily ironic when one recognizes that the Puritan Revolution (1640-1660) has contended, in the view of some, for the title of the first great modern revolution in world history. It could be considered a first

birth pang of the modern notions of democracy and equality that eventually came to define Western civilization. Understanding this revolution is thus requisite for understanding the modern West.

This means that the very impetus of the "enlightened" path to scientific-political modernism just so happens to be the self-same event that has so far proven to be among the most resistant to a coherent scientific explanation. This barefaced irony stands naked before that other original pillar of the modern mind: the enlightenment aspiration to provide a rational account of man. From this enlightenment perspective, the seemingly inexplicable historical origins of modernity appear to stand as the least excusable failure of the scientific aspirations of modernity. But how can one expect to have a scientific understanding of human events without a scientific understanding of human nature?

Cutting the Gordian Knot with Occam's Razor

The fourteenth century English philosopher William of Occam argued that the best explanation is the one with the fewest assumptions. "Occam's razor" helps explain why the Ptolemaic model of an Earth-centered universe ceded to Copernicus's simpler, Sun-centered solar system. On similar grounds, a simpler and more powerful explanation for the upheavals that produced the modern English-speaking world begins by taking the muddled explanations of the English Civil War and cutting them down with a razor.

Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is a classic example of Occam's razor in action. The origin of the mind-boggling diversity of life was made comprehensible by a simple and powerful theory.

Sociobiology represents a refinement of Darwin's theory of evolution. It provides the key to understanding the origins of democracy in the English-speaking world and its connection to the Norman Conquest of 1066. This connection really could not have been accurately formulated before the central theoretical problem of sociobiology was cracked by British evolutionary biologist W. D. Hamilton.

Hamilton's theory of kin selection (1964) made sense of behavior that by definition reduces individual fitness and at first would appear to contradict the theory of natural selection: altruism. If altruistic behavior is bestowed upon genetic relatives so that it contributes to the net output of their shared genes in the next generation, then the altruistic organism is actually helping to propagate its own genes (including a genetic inclination towards altruism).

At first appearance, the behavior of Americans in general would seem to refute kin selection. America implicitly defines its moral identity upon an implicit repudiation of the genetic logic of kin selection. The American creed of egalitarian progress seems to work in precisely the opposite direction of nepotistic, kin selective, genetic adaptation. How does one explain this apparent antagonism between American values and kin selective adaptations? How can one explain America in light of kin selection?

The Normans of the South formulated a caste-based political order that is explicable in terms of kin selection. Can the behavior of the Anglo-Saxon North also be understood on the basis of kin selection? This inverse incompatibility between North and South was a product of the events of 1066. One cannot understand the Anglo-Saxon genius for genetically *maladaptive* behavior that made modern America possible without grasping the early Norman genius for genetically *adaptive* behavior.

Long before they conquered England, the Normans gradually matured the ruthless kinship strategy of their Viking ancestors without losing its intensity. The success of their predatory kin selective strategy is exemplified by the close correlation of kinship and altruism. The very impetus of the conquest of England was rooted in a ruthless expansionistic strategy that required new land for new generations of selected heirs.

The kin selection strategy demonstrated by the Norman Conquest included genocidal behaviors. Not only the "harrying of the north" (1069-70), but the basic acts of warfare at Hastings and the elimination of much of the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy (the rest having been dispossessed) are genocidal extensions of this Norman kin selective strategy. All can considered be genetically adaptive behaviors. All are extensions of the predatory kinship strategy that long *preceded* the Conquest.

Just how genetically adaptive these behaviors were becomes evident when one reckons with the fact that Queen Elizabeth the Second is a descendant of William the Conqueror.[459] The original biological basis of the "English class system" was upper class Norman nepotism. It meant that the native conquered Anglo-Saxons were institutionally discriminated against in their own country. Only when one keeps this is mind can one understand why certain American founders inveighed against "hereditary government".

But what about Normans of the American South? How could Norman-Cavaliers of Virginia take up arms against "hereditary government" in 1776? And how could the apparent universalism of the American founding be explained, at least in part, on the basis of kin selection?

A potential pitfall for any explanation of the American founding that accounts for kin selective factors is to overestimate the intended meaning of formal constitutional principles of freedom and equality. If freedom and equality are government principles meant to apply on a *political* level, then freedom *from* government can imply freedom *from* certain kinds of freedom and equality. The conservative, patriarchal family, for example, could thrive if freedom *from* government was also freedom *from* principles that were never intended to tyrannize over the family. The attempt to universalize "liberty" and equality beyond a narrow "class" or political level has often fomented civil war in the English-speaking world.

The key to understanding the peculiar universalism of the American Revolution is to contextualize it between two civil wars: one preceding it in England, and one succeeding it in America. Anglo-Saxon Puritans settled in Massachusetts out of what became the "Roundhead" side in the English Civil while Norman Cavaliers settled in Virginia out of the "Royalist" side in that war. The basic bifurcation of the English Civil War thus became the basis for the Massachusetts-based North and the Virginia-based South in the American Civil War.

If we keep in mind that both the English Civil War and the American Civil War represent tribal warfare between Normans and Saxons, then the "universalism" of the American founding begins to appear like a peculiar peace treaty forged by a temporary alliance against Britain. In order for the bid for American independence to work, "reason" had to overcome the spontaneous kin selective instinct evident in the English Civil War or channel it against Britain. The channeling of aggression towards Britain in light of the land bonanza of America was the primary

sociobiological basis for the "enlightenment" of the American founding.

The peculiar "humanism" of the American Constitution is what stands out in the perspective of world history. The blatant contradiction between the universalistic pretensions of the founding and constitutionally sanctioned slavery of the black race cannot simply be taken for granted. When one becomes enlightened about the English Civil War and necessity of downplaying and transcending that blood-soaked history, then the sociobiological basis of American "universalism" is illuminated. The background of the English Civil War helps explain why these *particular* men, and not the Spanish, for example, became the authors of new world "universalism".

When the Constitution was ratified one third of all slaves were held in Virginia and Massachusetts was the only state with no slavery. At this time, slavery was permitted *north* of Massachusetts, while less common below the Mason-Dixon Line in states *south* of Virginia. This pattern cannot be explained by climate. Massachusetts and Virginia were the cores of two opposite extremes in political culture.

Virginia and Massachusetts represented two opposite and incompatible poles in political culture and the universalistic genius of the America founding could only have come about through the attempt to reconcile these opposite extremes. The incompatibility of Virginia and Massachusetts thus explains not only the roots of the difference that ultimately broke down into America's Civil War; it explains the "universalism" of the American founding itself in the attempt to unify these opposites. Not only does the Norman/Saxon conflict account for the roots of both the English Civil War and the American Civil War, it also accounts for the peculiar nature of the "universalism" of an

American founding that constitutionally defined black slaves as three-fifths of a human being.

Not only was the inferiority of blacks implicitly written into the Constitution, *the superiority of white slave-owners was written into the Constitution*. Formally speaking, this was superiority in representation, although it was also disadvantageous to slave masters when applied to taxation. If a slave master owned fifty slaves, he possessed the representational power of thirty men.

Now if all men are created equal, how can one man be granted the *formal* representational power of thirty men? This was a blatant contradiction of the democratic principle of "one man, one vote". It was an implicit affirmation of a *constitutional aristocracy* built upon the constitutionality of black slavery.

Black slavery implicated the idea of caste government and hereditary government. The Southern Cavaliers compelled the Anglo-Saxon North to conserve the *idea* of hereditary government *in constitutional principle*. In its original context at the founding, this meant the implicit *constitutional* superiority of Normans over Anglo-Saxons was apart of the compromise that made the American founding possible. This also meant that the constitutional superiority of Normans over Anglo-Saxons was formally dependent on the success of the institution of slavery.

The universalistic optimism associated with faith in the success of the American founding was proportionate to historicist pessimism that the violent outbreak of English Civil War might be doomed to repeat itself in America. Jefferson was the key figure in reconciling North and South, and thus the key representative of the promise of America. A Southerner who was descended from Cavaliers on his

mother's side, he embodied the contradictions inherent in reconciling both sides.

The original *historical* meaning of Jeffersonian equality was the racial equality of Norman and Saxon (loosely extended to other whites). This is why: (1) Jeffersonian equality did have a distinct racial meaning and (2) this racial equality distinctly excluded blacks. In practice, this meant the equal representation between North and South.

A historical confirmation of this racially representative egalitarianism can be seem in founding model of the very first presidencies of the United States. As the first president, George Washington represented Virginia while Vice-President John Adams represented Massachusetts. When John Adams was elected second president of the United States, Vice-president Thomas Jefferson stood as a representative of Virginia. As third President, Thomas Jefferson began to pave the way for a break from the centrality of this old genealogical logic. While subsequent presidencies inevitably did move beyond this pattern, it is of utmost significance that when the founders themselves implemented their own constitutional creation, its germinal embodiment confirmed the primacy of the need to balance the representative scales of justice between Massachusetts and Virginia.

Since the inequality of blacks was written implicitly into the Constitution, it cannot be said that the American founders were simply egalitarian hypocrites. There was, in other words, a foundational self-contradiction in the Constitution. The American Civil War was how this contradiction became reconciled.

The core constitutional contradiction was the Jeffersonian proposition of the implicit constitutional equality of Normans and Saxons versus the constitutional superiority of

Normans over Saxons implied by constitutional slavery. The South ultimately reconciled the contradiction on the side of a caste system. The inequality of whites and blacks implicated belief in racial inequality in general. The Southern bid for independence implicitly asserted the superiority of Normans over Saxons through the assertion of the superiority of whites over blacks.

Just as the outbreak of the English Civil War effectually dissolved the union of Norman and Saxon that emerged from the Norman Conquest, the American Civil War dissolved the union of Norman and Saxon that had reformulated itself on American soil. Since slavery was guaranteed by the Constitution, the North had to appeal to "higher law" in order justify the abolition of slavery. As New York Senator William H. Seward put it, "there is a higher law than the Constitution."[460]

The Northern way of reconciling the contradiction was *not*, however, contrived to produce the equality of Anglo-Saxons, blacks, and Normans. Since the Norman aristocratic way of life in America was dependent on the unequal representational power produced by black slavery, Lincoln's egalitarianism by force produced the racially representative superiority of Anglo-Saxons over Normans.

The Anglo-Saxons had conquered the Normans.

Liberal democracy in the English-speaking world is not the product of either Anglo-Saxons or Normans. It would be more accurate to claim that liberal democracy is a product of the evolution of an ethnic conflict *between* Normans and Anglo-Saxons. These two groups with opposite political tendencies were neither fully compatible nor fully incompatible, and the grinding tension between times of reconciliation and times of civil war produced the dynamics of liberal democratic "universalism".

While modern "universalism" tends to associated with egalitarianism, the political success and endurance of liberal democracy in the English-speaking world evolved out of a mixture of compromise and unresolved conflict between aristocratic and democratic viewpoints. Behind what Alexis de Tocqueville called the "decentralizing passions" of Americans lay, not only the Anglo-Saxon desire to decentralize Norman aristocrats, but also the Norman desire to decentralize the weight of the Anglo-Saxon majority. Since the king, as history demonstrated, could side either way, the American president was neutered into an air of modern secularism. This is one way in which a conflict of opposites produced a kind of founding American "universalism" that cannot be reduced to egalitarianism. When justice is done to the Norman contribution to liberal democracy, it becomes clear that its political success was the product of being, not only more democratic that other polities, but also *more aristocratic* than other polities. The more Southern and more aristocratic constitutional contributions survived even as "Americanism", as established by the Northern victory in the Civil War, was built upon the failure of an attempt to a realize a peculiar form of universalism that transcended both the Norman and Saxon ways of life.

Connecting the Turning Points

The English arch-Tory George Nathaniel Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kendleston (1859-1925), believed that he was a genuine aristocrat. This committed imperialist is best known for his role as viceroy of India. Considering himself a member of the natural ruling "class", his contentious arrogance was legendary: 'My name is George

Nathaniel Curzon, I am a most superior person', ran a verse of the time.

Curzon is a Norman house. Genealogist L. G. Pine, writing in the mid-twentieth century, attested that a Curzon held lands of Kendleston in Derbyshire for at least eight hundred years.[461] From Norman founder Robert de Curzon the House began, including one John "with the white head" who served as High Sheriff of Nottingham and Derby in 1437.[462]

The very *existence* of a Norman like Curzon, still presiding over the enterprise of empire in the twentieth century, is a reminder that the Norman conquerors did simply vanish mysteriously after a few centuries. This Curzon lineage is a classic example of historical continuity from the Conquest to recent times with no decisively mortal break in between. The House of Curzon survived the War of the Roses and the black plague. The House of Curzon survived the political disenfranchisement of the Puritan Revolution through the royal restoration of 1660. The House of Curzon survived the so-called "revolution" of 1688 and modern "democracy".

George Nathaniel Curzon, born in the year that Darwin published *The Origin of Species*, was the product of a Norman genius for hereditary survival. Many people have been deluded by a *Marxist* interpretation of Darwin that associates "fitness" with adaptation to the marketplace or capitalist success. Fitness in *biological* evolution, however, is measured in success in hereditary propagation; success in propagating genes. The Curzon lineage exemplies an aristocratic genetic adaptation strategy that succeeded in taxing or other diverting resources of the Anglo-Saxon majority to offspring of the Curzon line. While Robin Hood may or may not have existed, the popularity of the *legend* of Robin Hood appealed to a popular sense of the injustice of

the inordinate wealth of men like John Curzon, High Sheriff of Nottingham in the fifteenth century.

Kin selection explains why such Norman lineages tended to intermarry amongst one another. The resulting British caste system *complemented* the native caste system of India that Curzon, as viceroy of India, aspired to perfect. Curzon could be considered an archetypal Norman conqueror aristocrat and a classic representative of a certain "class" that continued to rule the British Empire right into the twentieth century.

Superior Person is, no, not an autobiography, but a biography, of George Nathaniel Curzon. Biographer Kenneth Rose observed, "Curzon's pride in his Norman ancestry sometimes aroused the envy, not to say the malice, of his enemies."[463] The malice directed at surviving lineages of the *English* caste system probably influenced his decision to marry the daughter of a Chicago millionaire. Did internal "class" war or civil war help disintegrate the original "class" basis of the British Empire from within?

Understanding the malice directed at Curzon is a key to understanding the malice directed at the South's own peculiar "class" system and the very impetus of the North's aggressive war against the South. The Southern slavery-caste system defended by Norman descendent George Fitzhugh in *Cannibals All!, or, Slaves Without Masters* (1857) was the American analog of British India. The seeming "anomaly" of slavery in *America* is yet another example of the Norman genius for hereditary caste survival. To call this genius "Darwinian" could be considered ironic in light of Darwin's own opposition to slavery. Yet Darwin's opposition to slavery may be traceable to an adaptation to peculiar historical conditions.

The proud Norman surname of Fitzhugh has also been used as a first name in the case of Fitzhugh Lee (1835-1905) of Virginia. A Confederate cavalry general, U. S. Army general in the Spanish-American War, and Governor of Virginia, he was a nephew of Confederate general Robert E. Lee. In Fitzhugh Lee's biography of his nephew, *General Lee*, he wrote with heartfelt pride in their common ancestors:

> By the side of William the Conqueror, at the battle of Hastings, in 1066, Lancelot Lee fought, and a later descendant, Lionel Lee, followed Richard Coeur de Lion, taking part in the third crusade to Palestine, in 1192, at the head of a company of "gentleman cavaliers," displaying great bravery at the siege of Acre.[464]

This is not meant to be evidence of genealogical accuracy. It is, however, evidence that the Lees believed themselves to be the heirs of the traditions of Norman conquerors. Other sources trace the Lee lineage to a John de la Lee I (ca. 1209) and ultimately Hugo "Hugh" de Lega who "came with the Conqueror".

Robert E. Lee was descended from Colonel Richard Lee, an immigrant of a prominent English family who became Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Sir William Berkeley's chief lieutenant. Richard Lee was an ancestor of Declaration of Independence signer Francis Lightfoot Lee and President Zachary Taylor. It has been claimed that the Lees of Virginia could trace royal descent from the Scottish-Norman King Robert the Bruce who was a direct descendant of William the Conqueror. If true, this means that Confederate general Robert E. Lee was a descendant of William the Conqueror.

The notion that the impact of the Norman Conquest just sort of went away after a few centuries is a very modern

form of delusion. What happened to the struggle is Britain is evident in a Parliamentary pamphlet of 1911: *Who shall rule: Briton or Norman?*[465] This milestone of democratic reform continued to chip away at the old Conquest-based imperial establishment in Curzon's lifetime, weakening the empire from within. Although the Conquest order came to dominate all of Britain, I will focus on its primary base in England. Whether by reform or revolution, I will collectively refer to the various movements towards mass democracy in the English-speaking world as the "Anglo-Saxon conquests".

The two greatest kinds of secular, political turning points in Anglo-American history are the Norman Conquest and the Anglo-Saxon conquests. They are inversely related to one another: Anglo-Saxon democracy is a long-term reaction against the imposed Norman aristocracy. Democracy was a mechanism for conquering the Conquest.

This book will demonstrate this thesis with the following strategy: First, to reevaluate the impact of the aristocratic revolution of the Norman Conquest in light of kin selection. Second, to reevaluate the democratic revolutions of the Anglo-Saxon conquests in light of kin selection. Third, to demonstrate that there is a kinship and cultural connection between the Norman Conquest and the Anglo-Saxon conquests.

Like pieces of a puzzle, there is a rough analogous fit between the revolts of 1066-1071 and the revolutions of 1651 and 1776. The rough fit is between a king and aristocracy imposed *despite* military rebellion in 1066, and a king and aristocracy deposed *through* military rebellion in 1651 and 1776. The rough fit suggests that, though separated in time, these events might be physically connected.

This 'rough fit' offers a scientific clue similar to clues that led to geological discovery of plate tectonics. For example,

anyone looking at a globe might notice the rough fit, like pieces of a puzzle, between the lower west coast of Africa and the upper east coast of South America. When combined with other geological discoveries, plate tectonic theory verified that the rough fit was not just a coincidence and those continents evolved from the supercontinent called Pangaea extant about two hundred and fifty million years ago. Similarly, kin selection provides a basis for verifying that the rough fit between medieval revolt and modern revolution is not just a coincidence and that liberal democracy evolved from conditions introduced by the 'Norman Yoke' starting less than a thousand years ago. Kin selection, by going beneath the surface of the flat-earth-like theories of Lockean nurturism, offers a biological basis for an evolutionary theory of liberal democracy.

Biological Bases of the Collective Unconscious

Are the great modern revolutions eruptions of bloodfeuds? While superficial observers declared these old volcanoes extinct, the price of miscalculation, uninformed by the science of sociobiology, can be to share the fate of the ancient inhabitants of Pompeii. The foggy ideology of "revolution" has been all too successful at dulling the ability to ask a simple question: Why were these people trying to kill one another?

The political earthquake of 1642 was the first major, modern eruption along the Saxon/Norman fault line. The Puritan Revolution period saw a revival of a notion more or less latent and impotent since Hastings: the hereditary Norman caste enemy. English biographer Lucy Hutchinson, whose Puritan husband was an anti-Royalist colonel in the

English Civil War, wrote that the usurping monarchy of the Norman was founded "in the people's blood, in which it hath swum about five hundred years."[466] The English Civil War, it would seem, was about kicking these tyrants out of the gene pool.

Reflecting on this feverish outpouring of ideas themed around the "Norman Yoke" that preceding that Puritan Revolution, Michael Wood inquired,

> Could there have been some continuity of these ideas between the eleventh and the seventeenth centuries? Could a folk memory even have survived? What if this idea was not just a literary motif, but had been handed down in the very fibre of English people?[467]

What Wood insinuates intuitively is what sociobiology can make sense of empirically. Kin selection is the primary way in which these "ideas" could have been passed down "in the very fibre of English people". Kin selection gives empirical ground to the proposition that the revolts in the five years that followed the Conquest are primitive ancestors of democratic revolution in the English-speaking world. The genetically adaptive correlation of kinship and altruism demonstrated by self-sacrifice on both sides at the Battle of Hastings is also evident in the English Civil War and the American Civil War.

Culture, however, is just as important as genes in understanding the revolutions. Thomas Paine, for example, suggested a chain of unspoken cultural continuity when he said, "Though not a courtier will talk of the curfew-bell, not a village in England has forgotten it."[468] Although the Conquest became normalized, it was never completely forgotten. Resentment of the curfew and every other

government imposition, he implied, survived through subliminal folk memory.

Sociobiology, by accounting for both genes and culture, gives reason for bringing this subliminal half-conscious domain of human behavior into the foreground. There is no reason to assume that the expressions of genes will be conscious anymore than one is normally conscious of the genes responsible for the beating of one's heart. Adaptive emotional behaviors that incline an individual to want children are not necessarily more conscious than adaptive emotional behaviors that incline kin groups to make war upon one another.

In consequence, there is a profound error in the assumption that *biological* instincts, which evolved long before language, should be expected to be intelligibly articulated or translated into the language of *culture*. The superficial presentation of revolution as a war for civilization only clarifies the self-contradictions in its pretensions to reason. It may be that the greater the pretensions to an extant political enlightenment, the greater the unconscious impulses that are being suppressed, channeled, or controlled.

Kin selection can make comprehensible the behaviors of groups on the basis of genetic relatedness. Just as kin selection explains the unspoken bias for Normans over Anglo-Saxons at the Conquest, it can help explain the subterranean preference for "the people" over the descendants of conquerors. On the level of kin selection, genes may express themselves through what one could call the collective unconscious.

The foremost twentieth century historian of England's mid-seventeenth century revolution, Christopher Hill, concluded, "the evidence still suggests that in 1640 there was

a real popular hostility to the old régime whose depth and intensity needs analysis and explanation, and whose influence on the course of events after 1640 we almost certainly tend to underestimate."[469] Because behaviors that evolved through genetic adaptation may express themselves unconsciously, *rationalizations* of behavior should be considered as only one facet of observable human *behavior*.

Since the *de facto* hereditary English ruling order traced its origins to the Norman Conquest, the Puritan Revolution *affected* the disinheritance of the hereditary political lineages that began in 1066. Whether they consciously thought of the event in these terms or not, the revolutions resulted in the overthrow of a political tradition institutionalized through conquest by the Normans. Yet men such as Jefferson, Paine, and Adams did consciously conceive of the event in these terms.

When we focus on the actual *behaviors* that constituted the revolutions, one can see that the failure of the Puritan Revolution through the restoration of king and aristocracy in 1660 is no more significant than if the American Revolution happened to have ended in failure. What is significant is that these aggressive political behaviors provoked civil war ("revolution") happened at all.

The American Civil War happened. But why did it happen? James G. Randall accused a "blundering generation" of unreasonable or irrational "fanaticism" on both sides.[470] The same basic patterns of unconscious or "irrational" behavior were unleashed in the English Civil War.

Fanaticism, many slave-owners believed, stood at the top of the list of malignant characteristics of the Yankee race.[471] Southerners, by the 1850s, increasingly identified Northern abolitionists with religious fanaticism inherited from their

Puritan forbearers.[472] This, some claimed, was what made the coexistence of the races of impossible. Just as William's conquest resolved the problem of living together in 1066, Lincoln's conquest resolved the problem of living together in 1865.

What did Samuel Huntington conclude about the question of whether reason can found fundamental values? According to him, America is not fundamentally a product of reason; it is the product of a Puritan based way of life that conquered America definitively in 1865. Instead of reason, he finds "creedal passion"[473] at the roots of American identity. "Creedal passion", however, can be understood as a genetically adaptive mechanism that Anglo-Saxons evolved under the Norman Yoke. The Puritan fanaticism that produced the Puritan Revolution in the aftermath of the English Civil War was genetically adaptive behavior. The Anglo-Saxon North used the same tried and true Puritan formula of masking a racial vendetta as a moral cause in the American Civil War period.

In *De Doctrina Christiana*, Englishman John Milton insisted, with poetic passion, "some hatred...is a religious duty, as when we hate the enemies of God and of the church."[474] From a Darwinian perspective, this *behavior*, however differently rationalized in later civil wars, served the selfish genes of the conquered. The poet also claimed that the Puritan Revolution was "the most heroic and exemplary achievements since the foundation of the world."[475] This means, of course, that Milton ranked this revolution far above the Norman Conquest.

Tabla rasa rejections of biological factors in explaining these events can be called the "Darwin was wrong" interpretation of these civil wars. Genes or heredity, in this view, have nothing to do with human behavior and are not

necessary to explain human things. Yet if Englishmen were so above the influence of their genes, then perhaps they also should have been above war as a means of resolving differences. This means that the English Civil War should not have happened.

But it did.

The American Founders were elitists moderated by experience who imposed a cunning rationalization called "revolution" or "republicanism" upon the people. Part of the nature of their elitism was a striving for superiority over the strange, seemingly irrational passions that had flare up in the English Civil War. Their almost systematic de-emphasis on heredity was an attempt to overcome the past and leave civil war to the history of the old world.

The English Civil War was the great unconscious slip that exposes the roots of subsequent attempts to rationalize the Norman/Saxon conflict. Between 1640 and 1650, men from Massachusetts, including over half of the graduates of Harvard in that decade, sailed *back* to England to fight the Norman Yoke.[476] American founder John Adam's belief that "the revolution [in America] was effected before the war commenced"[477] is thus understandable when its subterranean connections to civil war in England are recognized. Adams himself once made a pilgrimage to battlefields of the English Civil War, explaining to the locals that this was "holy ground".[478] To this American President the English Civil War was a holy war.

Founding America against the British Founding

Tradition has it that liberal democracy is about "rights". But what are rights? Where did they come from? The old

Lockean arguments from the "state of nature" are no longer cogent after Darwin (it is safe to say that that "natural rights" were not based upon natural selection). What is cogent after Darwin, however, is the notion that rights evolved from conditions in which they were adaptive for its advocates.

An evolutionary understand of English-American rights can begin with the simple recognition that there is basic incompatibility between the installment of a new government through ruthless military domination and the installment of a new government through a democratic election. It is hardly an accident that the kind of extreme political situation of tyranny that the entire American system is distinctly designed to prevent is exactly like the extreme political situation known as the Norman Conquest. Rights were invented to illegitimate the Norman Conquest order and to rationalize democratic revolution.

The relationship between conquest and revolution can be clarified with of two pieces of evidence. *Exhibit A*: The Norman Conquest happened. *Exhibit B*: By the standards of Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy the Norman Conquest would constitute the very negation of its conception of political legitimacy. With these two facts in mind, one can begin to appreciate how "The Rights of Man" were *invented*, in part, as a means of illegitimating the hereditary legacy of the Norman Conquest. Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy gradually evolved as a solution to the problem established by the invasion of 1066.

The Conquest paradigm posed the loss of Anglo-Saxon political representation, the loss of freedom, and the loss of the so-called "Saxon constitution". Inverting that paradigm through revolution elicits the general form of the American constitutional paradigm. Democracy evolved as a solution to

the loss of popular representation that the Norman Conquest represented, universalizing, and formalizing the sensitive Anglo-Saxon issue of political legitimacy. A rational understanding of the historical origins of American liberal democracy makes comprehensible the obsession with preventing a repetition of anything like the Norman Conquest. The most utter antithesis of the constitutional principle of the division of powers *is* the historical example of William the Conqueror. The American wisdom of limiting power originated in the wisdom of limiting conquest.

Liberal democracy was founded in a revolutionary reverse discrimination against a nepotistic British political order founded in military domination. This institutionalized discrimination — a universalized Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism — is fundamentally *reactionary*, deriving the catalyst of its morality, its indignation, and the condition of its very cause in the success of Norman action. Consequently, it should not be surprising that the conquered harbored a prejudice against acknowledgment of the contributions that the conquerors have made to their very "revolution" against William the Conqueror's legacy.

It was the Conquest that engendered the conditions in which the Anglo-Saxons evolved the sense of government as 'other'; as an *identity* distinct from the nation at large. As ethnic groups, Normans and Saxons had once fought to the death as enemies on the battlefield. To say that there was long-term ethnic hostility to the Normans is another way of saying that the enemies fought at Hastings were not completely transformed into caring father figures entrusted with the highest collective political responsibilities. The Normans did not fully *represent* them. The inheritors of hereditary political privileges were not able to fully extirpate the notion that as hereditary rulers they also remained

hereditary enemies. Rather, this hostility smoldered, sometimes bursting forth, sometimes diffused, but never fully overcome.

The American victory finalized in 1865 engendered an ethnic cleansing of Norman-Cavalier *culture* along with those master genealogies. This was a realization of an Anglo-Saxon apartheid against the entire Norman-Conqueror military-aristocratic *way of life*. The new world would set itself *against* the old, cultivating a new kind of man, a new way of life. America would be different.

While the sheer length of time may at first appear to a factor that refutes the relationship of the Conquest to later democratic revolts, the exact opposite is true. Reflection upon the "antiquity" of the Conquest is a reflection upon just how successful the Norman founding of 1066 was in perpetuating itself over time. Those long centuries of adapting to, yet resisting, the Norman subjugation are how the theme of struggle for freedom became so deeply rooted and developed.

The cumulative evolution of strategies of resistance is the secret source of the stability and permanence that Anglo-American democracy has enjoyed. All those centuries after 1066 were spent dwelling under the "Norman Yoke". Those long "dark ages" of adaptation so ingrained Anglo-Saxon alienation from aristocracy that, in the case of America, it was formalized and survived as the basic, universalized, political worldview even after the original enemies were disinherited. The Norman Yoke was, in effect, an incubator of democracy.

The political genius of the American founders would not have been possible without the political genius of William the Conqueror, the founding father of the British Empire. The aristocratic Norman conquest and colonization of the

aboriginal English, Scots, and Irish represented only the first step towards what would be the British conquest and colonization of a third of the globe. Progressive justifications of the British Empire were only extensions and continuations of the right of conquest that justified 1066.

English Bishop Godfrey Goodman (1582-1656), thought that "the greatest part of the English were descended from the Normans, and in that right they might claim a liberty, that the Conquest is expired, and now they are to be governed by just laws."[479] The Puritan Revolution was the only actualized attempt to totally reverse and expire the Norman Conquest in England. Its failure was affirmed by the Restoration of 1660.

The two great attempts of Normans and Saxons to escape their respective hereditary yoke were the Puritan Revolution of England and the Confederate Revolution of the American South. The Puritan Revolution failed to break the Norman Yoke. The Confederate Revolution failed to break the Anglo-Saxon Yoke.

The two great empires of the English-speaking world have been the aristocratic British Empire and the democratic American Empire. As a broad generalization, one could say that the Restoration of 1660 affirmed Britain as a Norman-based empire, while the Northern victory in 1865 affirmed America as an Anglo-Saxon-based empire. It is of the nature of this generalization, however, that the difference is actually only a difference in emphasis. The aristocratic Cavalier influence, built into the American founding, was inseparable from the success of its "democracy" and the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 began a formal, compromised empowerment of the House of Commons.

While Britain more than recovered from the loss of its American colonies, they had a peculiar kind of imperial

weakness. Gandhi's strategy for Indian independence would not have worked against the Nazis, but in liberal Britain, he found a sympathetic populace who had not lost the sense of what it was like to be conquered by a foreign culture. His spiritual appeals echoed a time, subconsciously preserved, when England was a colony of Normandy.

A Tale of Two Races?

On October 14, 1066, Normans and Anglo-Saxons faced off against one another on the battlefield and attempted to kill one another *as distinct groups of men*. It was *at* Hastings that the Norman/Saxon conflict was most black and white. It is *from* Hastings that the grays of liberal democracy evolved.

Some degree of intermarriage and interassimilation gradually blurred the sharp ethnic distinctions of Senlac Hill. Perhaps, then, the only generalization one can make about the ethnic dimension of English politics is that no generalizations can be made. But are there really no exceptions to this generalization about England? Can one make ethnic generalizations about Normans and Anglo-Saxons?

If I were to generalize about Normans and Saxons, what is the most obvious, predictable, and *almost* unremarkably hackneyed reaction that one can (generally) expect from good liberal democrats? Good liberal democrats tend to diligently seek out every exception to every Norman/Saxon rule, blithely unaware that this *general* characteristic of emphasizing the individual exceptions to every ethnic rule is *itself* a product of deemphasizing the overarching reality of Norman/Saxon generalizations. In other words, to watch people in the English-speaking world ferret out every single individual exception to Norman/Saxon generalizations is to

uncover the root of its individualistic exceptionalism to the general rule of other cultures.

Anglo-American reactions to Norman/Saxon generalizations expose a *general* bias towards individualism. To possess a rational understanding of why America, for example, is different from non-individualistic cultures, and why Americans characteristically emphasize the individual exceptions to ethnic-racial rules, one must possess the ability to generalize about Normans and Saxons. This does not mean that there are not exceptions to these generalizations; it means that there *are* exceptions to these ethnic generalizations. And this means that there must be exceptions to the *generalization* that Anglo-Saxons are individualistic.

The attempt to discuss the long-term relationship between the "Normans" and "Saxons" can elicit two extreme simplicities: ethnic categorization and individualism. A first level of simplicity would posit distinct ethnic categories; individual exceptions can be dismissed. The next level of simplicity would posit individualism; any single counterexample to a generalization would invalidate the *entire* generalization. Anyone who believes that the interaction between the conquered and the conquerors can be understood through the simplicity of either one of these extremes has, in my judgment, disqualified themselves from the possibility of accurately modeling the complexities of sociobiological evolution. Virtually the entire complex interaction between "Normans" and "Saxons" takes place *between* these two extremes of total generalization and total individuation.

It may be that the Norman/Saxon conflict has managed to remain shrouded in misunderstanding, in part, by a failure to account for *both* of these points of view *simultaneously*.

Ethnic generalization and individualism can be combined by taking as one's starting point the (general) assumption that there exceptions to virtually every generalization, and *then* attempting to map a complex reality wherein virtually every generalization lies in the ranges between the extremes of zero percent and one hundred percent. Statistics, in other words, is a key to overcoming old oversimplifications, especially in regard to genealogical data.

Any attempt to achieve a comprehensive evaluation of the long-term effects of the Norman Conquest inevitable returns to the empirical question of its genealogical effects. Past analyses of this kind have often focused on distinct segments of the population. The highly complex interaction of cultural and genetic factors could best avoid bias through an attempt to model the *entire* population of England, and ultimately Britain (and Normandy), as whole.

The only way to attempt to avoid a repeat of the mistakes of the past would to initiate a concerted effort to systematically re-analyze all available genealogical evidence from the ground up and to organize the data with relatively new means of computer-generated statistical analyses. This could include a systematic scientific reevaluation of traditional sources such as *Burke's Peerage* and the Domesday Book, as well as newer sources of evidence such as biotechnological techniques of DNA analysis. *Wolfram Mathematica* is an example of the software that can allow the data to be flexibly analyzed from diverse perspectives. Computer-generated statistical analyses could, for example, allow one to view the data from any combination of variables, i.e. genealogical, social, geographic, or economic. Among the factors to be accounted for could be a mathematical application of Hamilton's equations for kin selection.

It would be easy to assume that, even if the Conquest did produce a caste system, the inevitable overall trend would be a break down of the black and white polarization at Hastings into shades of gray. The polarizing effect of war, however, was repeated in conflicts such as the English Civil War, the American Revolution, and the American Civil War, and study of the effects of 1066 cannot claim to be empirical without taking this into account. The 'graying' effects of Norman/Saxon assimilation were sometimes *reversed* by events that polarized the two sides into their original 'black' and 'white' components.

The Puritan Revolution, for example, polarized both sides, not only in England, but also in America. The Cavalier authorities in Jamestown, Virginia expelled local Puritans during the English Civil War.[480] Puritans were not the only ones to value "purity", and this may have helped strengthen the basis of the subsequent polarization that was the American Civil War. One of the great ironies of American history is that this early polarization amidst the English Civil War helped produce the antidote of individualism on the *political* level of the founding that had to encompass both.

While, for the sake of simplicity, I have described the American founding in terms of polarization between Massachusetts and Virginia, even a cursory accounting of the American founders cannot fail to reveal that polarization cannot explain everything. A perfect example of a founder that fits neither category is Alexander Hamilton. Born out of wedlock in the British West Indies, his mother was of partial French Huguenot descent and his father, possessor of the heritable of title of laird in Scotland, was Alexander Hamilton of Grange, Ayrshire. Norman aristocrats settled Scotland in the twelfth century and it is possible that this

American founder was of half-Norman descent on his father side.

So if one were to conclude that Saxons and Normans explain all, *that* would a naïve and erroneous oversimplification of the world produced by Hastings. But which is more oversimplistic, to conclude that all these conflicts are completely tribal in nature, or that complete assimilation wiped the slate clean of all kinship factors? Neither extreme can account for the evolution of English-speaking liberal democracy but *both* must accounted for.

The evolution of individualism itself provides an answer to how both can be true. By tracing the genealogy of individualism to its origins (i.e. Hobbes), one can see that generalizing about Normans and Saxons is a key to understanding the individualistic, anti-ethnic generalization bias of Anglo-American values. Since *individualism itself* evolved, in part, out from a pattern of stressing the individual exceptions to every Norman/Saxon rule, greater scientific accuracy can be gained by placing individual exceptions within their statistical contexts.

Neither solution of total assimilation nor of total rejection of the Norman graft upon England proved fully satisfactory or legitimate. The unresolved tension between the dynamics of group rejection and group assimilation helped give birth to the lynchpin of the political solution that is the central political invention of modernity: individual rights or liberalism. Liberal democracy evolved as the adaptation of ethnic conflict to physically forced assimilation.

Deemphasized! ([{The Forbidden Notion}])

"Class hatred", wrote Victor Head in his study of Hereward,

> is a convenient, if sometimes misleading, label that may even encourage the notion that Hereward, as the forefather of Robin Hood, might be viewed in some way as a kind of eleventh-century Che Guevara. Such an idea, while intriguing since it makes Hereward an activist in social evolution, if not revolution, is some distance from reality since it is clearly dangerous to interpret his actions in terms of later social and political values.[481]

Inklings of insurrection should neither scare us nor deter us from locating any verifiable relationship to later social and political values. There is a traditional, creationist-like fear of making these evolutionary associations that is comprehensible for exactly the reason that Head suggests: they have been "clearly dangerous". They were clearly dangerous in 1640s and dampening these evolutionary connections helped dampen the English phenomenon of "class hatred" which Head recognizes as a matter-of-fact.

These legendary figures could be viewed as symbols of early stages of an evolutionary transition from revolt to revolution. Hereward represents the original resistance (the revolts of 1066-1071), where the clash of Norman and Saxon relatively crisp and uncomplicated. Before there was a significant middle class and after a substantial degree of intermarriage (primarily with lower status Normans), Robin Hood carried on the outlaw tradition of Hereward. This glorification of theft from the rich (Norman) to the poor (Saxon) suggests a seething sense of injustice that erupted in the Peasant Revolt of 1381. Puritanism represents the attempt to go beyond the theft warfare of Robin Hood through a moral sublimation of the conflict. The legend of human equality is where the struggle went legitimate, completing the transition from romantic outlawry to practical reason under the banner of "modernity".

What a Marxist would interpret as "class war", Kevin Phillips interpreted as "civil wars". In *The Cousins' Wars*, he discerned *three* primary civil wars that formed the modern English-speaking world: the English Civil War, the American War for Independence, and the American Civil War:

> Once, quite possibly. Twice, conceivably. But not *three* times. Wars with the continuity of these are not accidents, needless eruptions, or the product of a misled and gullible public. Their origins go deeper.[482]

As accurate as these observations were, he also displayed a very telling omission. Phillips went so far as to include a map and descriptions of the early Anglo-Saxons in the fourth and fifth centuries,[483] yet not an inkling of the settlement following the single most famous date in English history. Resisting the very "Norman Yoke" theories that he repeatedly observed in his formidable account, Phillips did not go deep enough in uncovering their origins.

When one traces the civil wars of the English-speaking world further back, it becomes clear that the famous Magna Carta of 1215 was catalyzed out of civil war in England. Magna Carta was a peace treaty between England's Norman aristocracy and a partly non-Norman king. While that peace treaty failed in the short term, Magna Carta originally represented the "class" interests of the Norman aristocracy against kingly tyranny.

Magna Carta was a peace treaty designed to prevent civil war between the king and the barons. The U.S. Constitution, strongly influenced by Magna Carta, can be viewed as a peace treaty designed to prevent civil war between Norman-ruled South and Saxon-based North. By 1861, it failed.

After the American Civil War, Edward A. Pollard described the Constitution of the founding as "a compromise between sections, or even, in a broader and more philosophical view, as a treaty between two nations of opposite civilizations."[484] The overriding rationality of the Constitution was like the rationality of a game of chess between North and South that ended with the checkmate of Lee's surrender at Appomattox.

The gargantuan paradox of the Southern liberty or privilege to own slaves may seem inexplicable until one grasps that the South's understanding of "liberty" came directly out of the original Magna Carta. Magna Carta defended the liberty or privileges of the Norman aristocracy to inherit their due as rightful conquerors or enslavers of Anglo-Saxon England. Just as King John threatened Norman liberties in the thirteenth century, Abraham Lincoln threatened Norman liberties in the nineteenth century.

While the three civil wars that Phillips focused upon represent eruptions of the Norman/Saxon conflict into physical violence, this understanding would be entirely superficial without grasping that the constitutional mechanisms that evolved between these three conflicts represent the superficially peaceful internalization or domestification of civil war through the balancing of powers. The system of democratic election *itself*, for example, is only a relatively peaceful rationalization of civil war. The election of Abraham Lincoln, a direct catalyst of the American Civil War, is a classic illustration of this point. Popular elections, reflecting Anglo-Saxon strength in numbers, evolved as a mechanism to refight the Battle of Hastings; a mechanism to throw out an unelected (Norman) elite that imposed itself over the wishes of the majority. The Conquest was the problem that the civilized civil war of

popular elections were designed to solve. Political modernity is really the internalization of civil war and, in the English-speaking world, the distinct emphasis on internal discord can be traced to a distinctive source. All of these civil wars are ultimately incomprehensible without recognition of what was really the first of the "Cousins' Wars": the Battle of Hastings.

Any debate on the consequences of the Norman Conquest should recognize that the interests of political peace and stability have profoundly influenced England's interpretation of its past. So much politically pragmatic sophistication has been devoted to the time honored English tradition of obfuscating, dulling, nebulizing, and glossing over the Saxon/Norman conflict. Against mindless conformism to the traditional sanctification of this historical blind spot, I will point out how these biological-kinship factors have been *deemphasized, blunted, downplayed, denied, belittled, dismissed, depreciated, disparaged, discounted, shunned* and *scorned*. The cumulative effect has been a selective Lockean nurturism which has helped, while the old form of the English "class" system still existed, to banish subversive thoughts from the normative English political discussion.

We all know that the English are far too civilized to stoop to mere tribal warfare. Yet it just so happens that at least part of the English way of defining and valuing civilization is traceable to the practical need to civilize, control, and restrain a certain nameless conflict within. Cultural condescension towards tribalism helped to constrain outbursts of internal ethnic discord — outbursts such as the regicide of Charles I and the overthrow of the House of Lords in 1649.

Since repression of the Norman/Saxon conflict is a sociobiological foundation of Locke's tabla rasa, repression

of the Norman/Saxon conflict is the both a theoretical and practical foundation of America (See Locke's Palimpsest). America inherited an entire cultural methodology of eschewing issues of racial-biology from this tradition of eschewing the Norman/Saxon conflict. The cumulative result of these efforts to slyly evade a direct confrontation with the Norman/Saxon conflict should be recognized for what it is: a collective masterpiece of Anglo-American political culture. And at the very pinnacle of this ivy-draped tradition lies…Marxism.

Marxism was, in part, the logical consequence of radicalizing modern revulsion towards a caste system interpretation of English history. Marx borrowed Britain's "Class"-focaled Lenses and radicalized England's tendency to eschew the original Norman/Saxon basis of the distinctively England "class" system. England was decisive in forming Marx's "class" interpretation of history via his misinterpretations of the English "class" system during the industrial revolution it spearheaded. The English-speaking world was thus instrumental in creating its own late twentieth century nemesis.

Those who have denied the long-term impact and influence of the Normans in the history of the English-speaking world bear a striking resemblance to "Anti-Normanist" Russian historians who denied the long-term impact and influence of Normans upon Russian history. The Rus, who were also Normans, conquered or ruled the native Slavic people of the country now named after them: Russia. Just as one group of Normans conquered England, another group of Normans conquered the Slavic lands now called Russia. This is one fundamental reason why Marx's misinterpretation of the English "class" system found a Russian audience susceptible to a parallel misinterpretation

of the Russian "class" system. The failure to understand the Norman/Saxon conflict in England thus helped to create both Marxism and the English-speaking world's great rival in the Cold War.

The Continuity of Change

All the ethnic diversity in the world cannot cover over the role of Anglo-Saxon/Norman ethnic conflict in generating the most influential Western liberal democratic universalism. The tribal origins of the conflict becomes manifest when one traces it in relation to that old idea known as "progress". The standard narrative of egalitarian progress in the English-speaking world posits a struggle for civil rights that begins with propertied British-American white men and then extends to all men, women, gays, and others in a pattern of increasing inclusiveness.

What if this narrative of egalitarian progress was traced backwards from the present towards the past? From gays, to women, to all men, to white men, to propertied British-American white men at the American Revolution, the trend of progress reverses into a pattern of increasing exclusiveness. By tracing "progress" backwards towards finer grades of distinction, one is lead to a seemingly miniscule standard of group difference: the Anglo-Saxon/Norman difference. Yet this relatively small ethnic difference was *the* crucial difference that launched the narrative of "progress" forward in the English-speaking world.

From the humanistic, egalitarian belief that the differences between Saxons and Normans are insignificant stemmed the belief that the differences between whites and blacks are insignificant. The overcoming of race, nation, and ethnicity were *implicated* by the logic of the new humanistic

individualism. This individualism has an *internal* logic rooted in Anglo-Saxon cultural ethnocentrism, which may not necessarily have any *external* empirical verification outside of its historic ethno-cultural origins.

Does "progress" have a larger significance or was this individualistic trajectory only rooted in an Anglo-Saxon self-interpretation that deemphasized the hereditary Norman legacy? While egalitarian individualism is an abstract idea, one observable consequence of its political application is an increased indifference to kinship relations. The failure to decisively resist and expel the foreign Norman body in England correlated with the rise of individualism. In other words, failure to preserve the freedom and integrity of the kinship foundations of the body politic was compensated with the rise of the freedom and integrity of the individual body. This breakdown towards individualism was further universalized when it was discovered that it could be used to oppose the 'strong family values' that was the basis of the Norman nepotism system.

The sociobiological basis of leftward progress is negative rather than positive. It originates in the sense of a *lack* of legitimate kinship connection between the rulers and the ruled. To trace the "grand narrative" of progress backwards, then, is to connect what was originally disconnected; to connect this Anglo-Saxon sense of a *lack* of connection with their Norman masters with its universalized continuation in liberal democracy. The progress narrative also helped to disassociate a dishonored connection with the Norman subjugation. This is one source of an inclination towards progressive universalism: turning away from a negative past and toward a positive future.

The denial that the Normans indelibly changed the conquered is not accidentally or incidentally related to the

American denial of the significance of race and sex. On the contrary, deflating the Normans and their impact is at the very root of this supremely American cultural characteristic. Egalitarian "progress" is only a continuation of the logic of cultural apartheid against 'Norman-kind'. Consequently, resistance to this interpretation of American history should be expected and predicted as a corollary of the original Anglo-Saxon-ethnocentric basis of American egalitarianism itself. Sociobiology, by weaning liberal democracy from its pre-Darwinian provincialism, makes the repression of sociobiology predictable.

In a sense, the *scientific* progress represented by sociobiology is a fulfillment of many of liberal democracy's original enlightenment aspirations. Not only does sociobiology advance the enlightenment endeavor to comprehend the human rationally, but it also serves an important dimension of liberal democracy's principle of equality. Lockean nurturism was built upon a self-serving myth that its advocates were inordinately *superior to biology*. Inferior, primitive, pre-modern peoples might be characterized by biological imperatives, but modern peoples would, by definition, be their superiors. By relegating the influence and import of biology to a perpetually inferior status, Anglo-Saxons could demonstrate their superiority to the hereditary legacy of the Norman Conquest order and its provincial genealogical obsessions. In addition to the scientific evidence, the idea that the American founders had fully transcended their own biological nature has something else on its side: common sense.

Does the revelation of ethnic conflict at the root of modern American egalitarianism invalidate the idea of progress? Does sociobiology ultimately refute the very idea of "progress" scientifically?

Because the Norman/Saxon conflict stands at the center of this analysis, it may appear that Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism is responsible for "modernity" itself. While the Norman Conquest is crucial in explaining why Anglo-Saxons in particular were compelled to adapt towards distinctly "modern" survival strategies, this does not explain modernity itself. "Modernity" is correlated with a larger evolutionary paradigm shift from biological evolution to economic-technology evolution.

The "Whig interpretation of history" and its belief in modern progress evolved out of a long and slow process of adaptation to subjugation that emerged over a period of centuries following 1066. What democrats saw as "progress" was also an increasingly noticeable perception of an underlying, exponential rate of economic-technological change. One of the most important reasons that the Norman/Saxon conflict has been obscured is that Anglo-Saxons adapted to a *biological* or hereditary loss by compensating with an economic or technological gain, i.e. the precocious capitalism of the English-speaking world. The modern rise of Anglo-Saxon democracy correlates with a paradigm shift that may culminate in the Technological Singularity.

Finding our Fish Fathers

Most explanations of the English Civil War, the American War for Independence, and the American Civil war focus on short term causes. This historically narrow perspective implies that entire modernistic trajectory of freedom and equality can be understood based on the more immediate apparent causes of war. This is what I call the 'special creation' or 'spontaneous generation' theory of revolution. Political rationalism, it seems, emerged through a miracle!

For grand and mysterious reasons, there was a revelation of liberal values on the western fringe of Europe and America. The world simply began anew and there is no explanation for it, nor is any explanation necessary.

For some the origins of American liberal democracy in Anglo-Saxon subjugation may not be more attractive than Darwin's insight that civilized men are domesticated animals. However, the idea that one can understand modern revolution without understanding the pre-modern world it evolved from is like the belief that one can understand the human race without understanding the pre-human ancestors we evolved from. One cannot understand the nature of human history without an understanding of the history of human nature.

The very assumption that 1066 poses an incommensurably alien and distant time betrays a humanistic provincialism that has not fully digested the evolutionary proposition that humans are animals. Charles Darwin was the most impudent transgressor of the belief that different historical periods cannot be compared with one another. Apples and oranges, for example, have a Darwinian basis for comparison in their shared hereditary descent from a common ancestor. It would be more than remarkable if America claimed a standard of humanity so universal that it is applicable to people of all races and backgrounds, yet also claimed that the past of its own cultural origins is too different to be compared to modern times.

There are some secular persons that can concur with the evidence that humans, frogs, and other gnathostomes (vertebrates possessing jaws) inherited genes for the jaws that they chew their meals from a common ancestor, a fish that lived in the ocean four hundred and thirty million years

ago. That person can accept that there is a basis for evolutionary comparison between themselves and their ancestors who were *fish* in prehistoric oceans, yet an evolutionary comparison between a periods separated from the present by less than a thousand years between very similar modern human populations is considered invalid. The genetic inheritance of our "fish fathers" is granted, but the political inheritance that preceded our "founding fathers" is not. This point only demonstrates the provincialism of the social sciences and humanities in maintaining apartheid against the biological sciences.

In short, neither the Norman Conquest nor "modern" liberal democracy has been fully incorporated with the finding of evolutionary biology. Fully coming to terms with Darwin means, not a minor correction to an old picture, but a total sociobiological reevaluation of history from the ground up. Against the myopia of history broken up into artificial delineations of cultural time, this study aims to understand the rise of English-speaking liberal democracy, not only in the context of the French-Norman impact, and not only in the context of human history, but in light of the nearly four billion year history of the evolution of life on earth.

To evolutionize the revolution is to tread on the precarious ground of uncovering the irrational origins of modern rationalism. But how can an attempt to uncover the "irrational" aspects of persons who thought of themselves as rational be rational itself? If every attempt at uncovering irrationalism in rationalism is vulnerable to its own methods, is it just as rational to resort to voodoo in order to explain the political Enlightenment?

It seems that the West no longer thinks that it believes in itself. Fundamental principles, or value-customs, of freedom

and equality in Western political thought no longer even claim a pretense of being fundamentally rational. What was previously known as reason is now tradition. Enlightenment is now a historical prejudice.

According to the late American philosophy professor Richard Rorty:

> the frequent remark that Rawls' rational choosers look remarkably like twentieth-century American liberals is perfectly just, but not a criticism of Rawls. It merely a frank recognition of the ethnocentrism which is essential to serious, non-fantastical, thought.[485]

This frank recognition that liberalism is rooted in a form of ethnocentrism could be criticized for not taking this very thought seriously. If reason cannot determines fundamental values, and the Western world cannot rationally justify its own political existence, then *what is this thing called liberal democracy?*

"Culture" has increasingly justified what some had formally justified through reason. Multiculturalism has risen through the fall of the belief of the genuine universality of the rights of man. If there is no universally valid viewpoint, then liberal democracy and human rights are not universally valid; they are just one happenstance way of being in a multicultural world, and the Western way has a fundamentally subjective and particularistic origin.

Among these many cultures of the world, there are normal particularisms, such as Mexican culture, and there are bizarre particularisms, such as American "universalism". It seems to me that rejection of the original universalistic enlightenment claims raises the question of liberal democracy's bizarre particularism. Recognition of multiculturalism only begs the question of the particular

cultural origins of these old pretensions towards Western universalism.

Regimes founded in the "age of reason" are progressing into the possibility of a total eclipse of their original rational aspirations. The enlightenment origin of the liberal democratic order beckons the West to awake from dark resistances to knowing itself. Voltaire fathomed the risks he was taking when he challenged humanity to "Dare to know!"

THE NORMAN YOKE: INCUBATOR OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

The English Caste System

The Slys are no rogues; look in the Chronicles; we came in with Richard Conqueror.

—SHAKESPEARE, *THE TAMING OF THE SHREW*

Predatory Kin Selection

The word "Norman", derived from North-man, embodies a recollection of this people's Scandinavian origins.

Originating in plunderous Viking raids on the north-western coast of France, the land now called Normandy began its formal existence with Rolf (Rollo in Latinate). He became, by treaty with the Franks, Normandy's first duke in 911. The Normans were a distinctly military-minded people with a strong sense of hierarchical order. The democratic assembly, or *thing*, that was important to most Vikings was not to be found among them.[486]

Like the Franks who also originated as Germanic conquerors, the Normans eventually adopted the local Gallic-Roman language and culture. Yet the Normans retained a strong sense of their distinctive ethnic identity. They "were not absorbed into either the Frankish counties or into the Frankish ethos *as Franks*," wrote historian Eleanor Searle. "The Normans had a strong sense of their *difference*, and that had much to do with their creation of *Normannia*".[487] So while they adopted French culture and civilization like the Bretons who had originated in Britain, there is no single definition of Frenchness. The Norman variation, which made them different from Bretons and Franks, was inevitably influenced by their distinctive background. "The original Viking spirit," R. Allen Brown recognized, "must be allowed to underlie their outrageous enterprise."[488]

In *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power, 840-1066*, Eleanor Searle maintained that the Frankish-Carolingian model of state building was not strongly reflected in early Normandy. "If a people with a long tradition of Carolingian governance were moving away from it, it is surely implausible to hold that northern invaders with a heritage of different social preferences would either fall immediately in to compliance with old Frankish forms or take authority of the Frankish king as the

source of the legitimacy of the Rouen warleader." [489] The point here was "not to argue that the settlers were Scandinavians, but that they brought with them—and adhered longer than the Franks around them—to older forms of social organization, older and less effective methods of social control than the Franks were evolving. In this sense the settlers preserved a continuity that the Franks themselves were abandoning."[490]

The organizing principle of this older form of social order was kinship. Searle's argument focused on "kinship as the very basis of ducal power," which is "simply to take seriously the claim of the upper ranks of the eleventh-century Norman aristocracy to be kin to both to one another and to the duke." Searle documented this claim, concluding that the "closest approximation to the essence of that aristocracy is to think of it not as a clientele, but rather as a warrior kin-group."[491]

Searle's study of Norman behavior demonstrates *why* the notion of a "Carolingian inheritance," the theory of continuity with French (Frankish) political practices,

> is unnecessary for an understanding of their Norman political landscape. It is a positive detriment to a comprehension of their priorities, which led them in 1066 to launch themselves upon England. If one, however, assumes the model of discontinuity and a slow unification based upon more Scandinavian predatory, expanding kin-groups, the invasion they undertook is predictable, and this is a strength of the model.[492]

This is one of Searle's most remarkable contributions: lifting of the study of early Normandy out of what she calls "formless antiquarianism" and "the historian's unexamined preference *for the way things should have been*" which has

sustained even further conjectures "born out of the assumption that there was continuity."[493] This means *even among other Frenchmen*, such as Franks and Bretons, the Norman strategy tended towards a kinship-political autonomy. This view is fully corroborated by England's perpetual wars with France that begin with the Conquest establishment.

Searle's fresh examination of the evidence reveals that the political potency of the Normans as a group was bred through a ruthless application of kinship *values*. On one hand, the Normans conserved an old Viking theme, promoting cooperation among themselves and predation on outsiders. On the other hand, their ruthless foresight was dynamically adaptable, eugenically channeling resources to the most talented and perpetually challenging the fitness of warleaders among themselves. Searle explains the conquest of England as an extension of this vigorously expansionistic political strategy that ensured land for new generations of selected heirs.

Explaining the impetus for conquest is indeed a strength of her study, especially from the view of the sociobiologist's endeavor to explain Norman *behavior*. Searle provides formative evidence for a sociobiological study of the Conquest by documenting the kinship basis of Norman social behavior. Norman "predatory kinship" was an aggressive kin selection strategy.

Although their accomplices at Hastings eventually included a minority of other Frenchman, largely Flemish or Breton,

> [a]t the gathering in 1066 when he outlined his plan for the conquest of England to his great chiefs, *all* could call him brother or cousin, but in a special sense that implies choice and an unusual cohesion based upon the family as a model.

> Their peculiar polity had been born out of military necessity and a determination to control and expand the territory they held. They were a family in pursuit of maximum profit and, because of what they acknowledged themselves to be, they were at the same time an aristocracy capable of a centralization unknown elsewhere. And to their next project—the conquest of England—they brought their qualities of cohesion and discipline.[494]

This combination of kinship cohesion and cunning warrior aristocracy proved to be a combination of inordinate potency. Whatever skills and resources the Normans possessed, it was ultimately kinship cohesion and the trust that went with it that solidified this particular kind of superiority and made the conquest of England successful. More than simply the sum of their individual self-interests,

> [a]lmost all could call one another cousin. That was the great principle, I have been arguing, of their cohesion. They were more than an aristocracy; first and foremost they were a family.[495]

What was the difference between the new Norman rulers of England and the old? A law called the *murdrum* fine, a high monetary penalty, was imposed by Normans for homicide against Normans. This *collective* fine was imposed on the unit of local government called the hundred. It was thought necessary due to prevalence of attacks against the conquerors. If a Norman was found murdered and his assassin was not apprehended within five days, the entire hundred where the murder took place would be forced to pay this steep fine.[496] This policy served as an effective deterrent to murderous expressions of ethnic conflict.

Did the Saxon King Alfred have a need for such a law; a law that maintained special legal favoritism for immigrants over natives? The very existence of *murdrum*; the very need for such a policy demonstrates both the existence of murderous expressions of collective ethnic hostility and an effective method by which the Normans preserved *their* new order despite that hostility. This policy is a classic example of the legal-kinship double standard that captures in miniature the social problem established by this new order as a whole.

Strong "family values" were developed to an unusual pitch in this Norman culture. Kin selection is indispensable for understanding supremely altruistic and life-risking behaviors such as the crossing of the channel and the willingness to risk everything for victory on English soil. Kin selection explains how these extreme altruistic sacrifices among Normans were directly related to extremely unaltruistic behavior towards the perceived enemies of the Normans.

An appreciation for the biological bases of Norman culture, however, can easily fall into a neglect of the complex interplay of biology and culture. The cultural gap between French Normans and Germanic Anglo-Saxons, for example, was crucially significant. The kinship-based difference between Anglo-Saxon and Norman was both complicated and exacerbated by *perceived* cultural differences, especially the acquired cultural French connections of the conquerors.

Just as a grasp of kin selection could potentially mislead one towards a kind of biological fundamentalism, it would be just as simpleminded to assume that the French cultural acquisitions can explain away all biological differences between Anglo-Saxons and Normans. French cultural acquisitions were decisively important *factors*, but these do

not transform Normans into un-biological beings. On the contrary, the technological, cultural, and civilizational influences learned from France most probably *amplified* their ability to channel, organize, and realize kin selective values far beyond the potential of their Viking ancestors.

Culture can mask the impact of genetic factors. Norman kin selection strategies may not only have preserved themselves; they may have *intensified* as their native Scandinavian tongue and culture was abandoned for French. Herein stands a model for understanding how kin selective "class" strategies could continue to persevere in England despite the ultimate loss of French as the language of normal upper "class" intercourse. The Norman-French cultural difference can actually mask the strength of this warrior "predatory kinship" strategy that not only *preceded* the Conquest, but also, most crucially, is key to explaining the very impetus of the Conquest.

Understanding the biological bases of Norman behavior is the beginning of understanding the nature of the Norman Conquest as a turning point in English history. This means, to begin with, never losing sight of Darwin's insight that humans are animals. Searle's study reminds its readers just how close the Normans were to their untamed, pre-historic, Viking origins.

To grasp the significance of "predatory kinship" is to not be content with simply clamping some biological factors onto an old picture of the Norman Conquest. It is not enough to work within the safety of the assumption that war was simply a "normal" part of medieval existence. A fully biologized explanation should explain how the behaviors we call "war" originally evolved as a function of genetic adaptation. The killing of Harold and other Englishmen at the Battle of Hastings cannot be separated into a wholly

unrelated category of behaviors from other expressions of Norman kin selection. To rethink the Conquest in light of the theory of evolution is to recognize that Darwin helped redefine our understanding of what a human being *is*.

The State of Nature

> **[I]t is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both.**
>
> —NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, *THE PRINCE*

The political philosophies of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau were all built upon a hypothetical "state of nature" prior to the existence of government, law, and the state's monopoly of legitimate physical force. While all three "state of nature" theories contradict one another in various ways, Darwin's theory of evolution has demolished *all* of these attempts to imagine human pre-history. Since Locke's political philosophy is often cited as the original philosophical basis for the liberal democratic form of government of the United States, this implies that the original rational justification of it and other similar forms of liberal democracies has been demolished by Darwin.

How ironic that the work of this great Englishman has, until now, remained unapplied to the most famous event in English history. To reject the connection between the Norman Conquest and subsequent civil wars and revolutions is to reject Darwin's most basic insight of evolution itself. Put another way, Darwin's great contribution to science consisted, in part, in showing how seemingly separate "creations" were actually connected by hereditary, evolutionary relationships.

It just so happens that the first distinctively modern political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, introduced precisely the opposite innovation: the "new provincialism" called individualism. His innovative individualism deemphasized hereditary connections *between* individuals. By exposing this theoretical incompatibility between these two Englishmen, Hobbes and Darwin, the profound evolutionary impact of the Norman Conquest on modern political philosophy becomes exposed.

Darwin's final major work, *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals*, explored the continuity of emotional and psychological behaviors between human animals and non-human animals. Dario Maestripieri, evolutionary biologist at the University of Chicago, continued and updated Darwin's approach in *Macachiavellian Intelligence: How Rhesus Macaques and Humans Have Conquered the World*. As a comparative behavioral study between two primate groups, rhesus macaques and humans, it is highly appropriate corrective of the "Enlightenment" overestimation of the more conscious and rational aspects of human behavior.

Why rhesus macaques? They are the second most widespread primate species on the planet.[497] They have been denied first place only by humans. There are sound Darwinian reasons to think that the aggressive behaviors associated with both species have much to do their success as genetic propagators.

Why has the English language and civilization conquered the world? The beginning of English-speaking world's inordinately imperialistic political force began with the Norman Conquest. The inordinately nepotistic behavior that characterized the conquest was only a relatively extreme expression of common kin selection. People, after all, "are biased in favor of their kin in every human society."[498] Like

rhesus macaques, people have inherited the genetically adaptive behaviors of their pre-historic ancestors. Thus, if we are to inquire into the origins of political order and thus into a pre-historic "state of nature", a study of rhesus macaques can shed light on elements of our common evolutionary history.

Among rhesus macaques, females play the game of power politics better than males, and they are the ones who hold power. Among humans the situation, in general, is the opposite: males play the game of power politics better than females, and they are the ones who hold power.[499] While rhesus males eventually disperse from the groups in which they were raised, female macaque relatives gather into groups with overlapping generations. Called matrilines, they are a kinship-based alliance networks with strict hierarchies of dominance and rank. "Being high ranking or low ranking in a rhesus macaque group is not unlike being rich or poor, or powerful or powerless, in any human society."[500]

The example of human soldiers provides the most striking parallel with the social order of rhesus macaques. Soldiers typically bond with those of the same rank, harass those of inferior rank, and get harassed by those of superior rank. Hand salutes let everyone know who is the general and who is the soldier.[501] The salutes affirm differences in rank.

> Peaceful coexistence in the military depends on saluting superiors as much as peace in rhesus macaque society depends on submission signals from the subordinates. In any social system with a strong hierarchy, individuals need to constantly remind each other and everybody else of their relative ranks. Submission signals are effective in keeping the peace because they do exactly what fighting does: they

> determine a winner and a loser, but without the energy expenditure and the risk of injury that fighting entails.[502]

The Battle of Hastings was analogous to a fight between rhesus macaque kin groups. The brutality of the Conquest itself was only the beginning of a social-political relationship wherein Norman aristocrats were dominant and Anglo-Saxons stayed subordinate. Herein lays the origins of the distinctively English "class" system. Just as among macaques, the dominant might attack subordinates for no other reason than to reaffirm the status quo and to remind the subordinate that there is a good, and potentially violent, reason to fear the dominant.[503]

What happened when submission signals were not given to members of the Norman master race? It appears that it was the ambition of the designers of the modern political project of America, especially Jefferson, to subvert this entire social "class" paradigm. The egalitarian premises of the Rights of Man can be viewed as a means of politically outlawing the most overt kinds of dominance relationships. While modern legalistic mechanisms have kept violent expressions of dominance from the "state of nature" from entering "society", certain exceptions can be found, i.e. on the floor of the United States Senate.

"Mr. Sumner, I have read your speech carefully, and with as much calmness as I could be expected to read such a speech," said South Carolina Representative Preston Brooks on the afternoon of May 21, 1856. He stood in front of the desk of Charles Sumner, the Harvard-educated Senator of Massachusetts and writer of "The Crime against Kansas". That fiercely abolitionist speech called upon citizens of America to "vindicate Right against Wrong" and "redeem the Republic from the thralldom of that Oligarchy" that he

believed was responsible for the aggressive expansion of Southern slavery. The New Englander went so far as to personally attack and defame Brooks' cousin, Senator Andrew P. Butler of South Carolina, portraying him as despicable pimp to the whoredom of slavery. "You have libeled my state," he continued, "and slandered my relation, who is aged and absent, and I feel it to be my duty to punish you for it."[504]

Without further ado, Brooks raised his walking stick and began to beat the Senator repeatedly with blows of escalating force. His desk bolted to the ground, Sumner eventually mustered the strength to rip it from the floor. With Preston continuing to hit him, the abolitionist stumbled up the aisle of the Senate until, unconscious, he collapsed on the floor. Before losing consciousness again after being treated by a physician, Sumner, drenched with his own blood, uttered, "I could not believe that a thing like this was possible."[505]

While the golden-headed cane had been reduced to a broken, bloody stump during this exercise, Brooks, in reflection upon his behavior, was proud to say, "fragments of the stick are begged for as *sacred relicts* [sic]. Every southern man is delighted and the abolitionists are like a hive of disturbed bees."[506] He had defended his honor in accordance with Southern notions of chivalry.

Modernity is associated with the desire to overcome exactly this ethos of honor that was *on the rise* in American South before the American Civil War. How can one explain this behavior in the very seat of modern political civilization? "Explaining agonistic intervention in rhesus macaques—or, more generally, any form of altruistic intervention in monkeys or people", Maestripieri explained, "all comes down to kinship and economics; that is, the costs

and benefits of intervention. In rhesus macaques, kinship and nepotism explain agonistic intervention between family members."[507]

Also, as among rhesus macaques, Brooks' display of violence was an unmistakable assertion of dominance in rank. As one knowledgeable Southerner explained, "[d]uelists were social equals from society's first ranks….A gentleman horsewhipped or, even worse, caned a person of the lower estates."[508] Brooks did not intend to kill Sumner, but rather, to beat him into submission. "It was expressly to avoid taking life," Brooks maintained, "that I used an ordinary walking stick."[509] The abolitionist Senator from Massachusetts was lashed into submission as if he were a dangerously uppity slave.

This episode between these two men captures in miniature the principle of the Norman right of conquest over the Anglo-Saxons. The South Carolinian's belief that his caning of Mr. Sumner was honorable and right contains the kernel of the very same mindset that affirmed that the Norman Conquest was honorable and right. Brooks, in his assertion of social dominance, had revived the political language of an old status quo.

Sumner believed America was in "thralldom of that Oligarchy" that ruled the South and this "Oligarchy" was threatening democracy itself through its aggressive expansion of slavery. The venom of his speech was aimed not at the majority of the Southern population, but rather, the aristocratic Southern Planter "class". Who exactly were these people, so convinced of the rectitude of slavery that they were willing to gamble their lives in a war to defend it?

George Washington and the other Norman descendents of the South represent one of the most sophisticated kin selective strategies in human history. While virtually the

entire world has been utterly duped by their Machiavellian participation in American Revolution, it should not be assumed that this "Machiavellianism" was entirely more conscious that the "Machiavellianism" of rhesus macaques. It is a tribute to Norman excellence in a legalistic form of adaptation for survival that it was even possible for post-Civil War generations to view that gargantuan Norman-Cavalier slave operation across the entire South as just a little aberration of universal-Puritanism.

Where did the Norman-Cavalier masters of the South get the audacious idea that they possessed the *hereditary* right to the fruit of the labor of other races?

Present at a meeting of the English court in May 1157 was Richard de Lucy, 'one of the most powerful barons of the kingdom'. He told King Henry that Battle Abbey, built on the ground upon which Hastings was fought, should be revered by himself and all Normans. It was "your chapel and the emblem of your royal crown" for it stood on the very ground upon which

> the renowned King William, by the will of God and with the aid and counsel of our kinsmen, overcame his foes, who sought to deprive him of the realm and crown of England. There he acquired the realm and crown for himself and for his successors. All the people of this realm rejoice that through closeness of consanguinity to him and by hereditary right you now reign on his throne, while we possess abundant possessions and riches through the benefices which he conferred, and by succession to our kinsmen.[510]

Call it the gentle mafia. A Norman gentleman understood that it is not polite to talk publicly about the Norman Conquest. That would only aggravate "class" tensions in

ways that are counterproductive to their own "class" interests. In the candid quote above, the "veil of propriety" slipped enough to glimpse the kin selective assumptions behind the Conquest. A polite, unspoken social rule of avoiding direct, and especially public, talk about the Conquest was deceptively clever because it worked through *absence*; it leaves no *empirical*, historical trace of evidence. If this is correct, then any scientific investigation of the Norman Conquest could be skewed by the Machiavellian function of such social rules.

This raises the further question of the nature of the connection between the medieval Norman aristocracy and the branch that became the Cavaliers of the American South. How conscious was this connection? Was there a "Normanism ideology"? Would such an ideology have been necessary for the connection to exist and persist?

While an overt and intense consciousness of a distinctive aristocratic, Norman-Cavalier-"Southron" identity emerged below the Mason-Dixon Line only around 1850, an "ideological" kinship or ethnic self-consciousness itself is *not* a requisite for engaging in kin selective behavior. This is a key point, for while I will occasionally use the term "Normanism" to loosely describe a general, nepotistic, Norman-aristocratic way of life, there is no need to assume that Normans themselves explicitly raised such a principle themselves. There is no reason to think that Normans or any other people require any explicit or conscious intellectualization of the kinship principles that underlies their actual behavior.

As Maestripieri put it, "[j]ust as selfishness does not require a sophisticated concept of self, nepotistic behavior does not require an understanding of the concept of kinship."[511] Just as rhesus macaques engage in perfectly

nepotistic behavior without any observable formulation of any abstract principles whatsoever, Normans in England, America, and elsewhere have behaved in accordance the genetically adaptive inheritances of their Viking and pre-historic ancestors.

Moreover, any attempt to mark out an especial vilification of Normans for engaging in genetically adaptive behavior could be considered identical to a general vilification of human nature itself. Every human alive owes their existence to their ancestors' willingness to engage in war to defend their lives for themselves and their genetic successors. As Maestripieri put it, "[A] despotic and nepotistic organization makes an army a perfect war machine" because it is well adapted to its function, "just as the anatomy and shape of a bird's beak is adapted to its function, for example, of cracking hard seeds."[512]

The Norman Conquest was fundamentally and indisputably a military occupation of England. English "class" originated as an extension of military rank between the conqueror and conquered that strongly parallels the quasi-military orders of rank among rhesus macaques.[513] Furthermore, "[n]epotism itself may encourage despotism", Maestripieri observed, "because nepotism inevitably leads to the creation of long-lasting differences in power and dominance...in highly nepotistic societies the structure of power is so entrenched that it takes a revolution to change it drastically."[514]

Among rhesus macaques, "the structure of power is very stable, and aggression typically runs in one direction, from top to bottom. With some notable exceptions, fighting is used on a day-to-day basis to maintain power and the status quo much more than to subvert it."[515] The most notable exception to the caste status quo can be called revolution.

A revolution among rhesus macaques is called a "matriline overthrow". During a macaque revolution members of one or more matrilines suddenly attack, battle, overthrow, and then, outrank the members of one or more higher status matrilines. In a successful revolution, the defeated are either dead or show signs of submission to the new dominants. These revolutions are not only more intense than everyday day fights; they are qualitatively different in that the revolutionaries fight "as if they have the intention to kill."[516]

All of the rhetoric in world cannot hide the fact that the Rights of Man have given their advocates an excuse to foment a war and kill their adversaries. It is *not* the case that Norman Conquerors displayed primitive behavior that pales in comparison to the distinctly human behavior of the revolutionaries. *Both* conquest *and* revolution have parallels among rhesus macaques. *Both* conquest *and* revolution can be traced to genetically adaptive behaviors with a strong unconscious basis.

The kin selective parallels go further.

If a rhesus male has never mated with a particular female, he may kill her infant. This genocidal behavior is genetically adaptive because the mothers will then return to estrus (the state of being 'in heat') more quickly and the infanticidal male can impregnate that female himself. This behavior is genetically adaptive, more specifically, because his genes, and not the genes carried by the infant he killed, can then be passed on to the next generation. Furthermore, if there is a genetic basis for infanticidal behavior, this can be passed on as well. This phenomenon occurs among many primates and other animals.[517]

From a genetic point of view, the rape or forced penetration of England in 1066 and the destruction of the

Anglo-Saxon aristocracy served Normans genes very well. The Norman genocide of the Anglo-Saxon elite allowed the perpetuation of Norman aristocratic dominance in a way that has strong parallels among rhesus macaque monkeys. This is how England acquired "class".

Understandably, critics of sociobiology tend not to be charmed by the theory that rape might have a genetic basis in some men since that behavior can be genetically adaptive (a behavior that is conducive to passes on the rapist's genes (including a genetic inclination towards rape)). On the level of politics, the Viking rape of northwestern France could have been genetically adaptive if it contributed to the inclusive fitness of their genes. Lording over a native populace allowed the conquerors to direct resources such as taxes towards their offspring. This, is turn, could have contributed to both the quality and quantity of their brood. If there was a genetic inclination for this predatory behavior inherited from their rapacious Viking forbearers, it could be passed on to their children. The perpetuation of both genes and culture could perpetuate this conquering way of life in a self-reinforcing manner. Is this what led Britain to conquer one third of the globe?

Humans, in the terms used by biologist Richard Dawkins terms, evolved as the propagators of "selfish genes". Another way of looking at genetic propagation is as kinship propagation. Just as special preference for investing time and resources into one's own children over another's children can be understood as genetically adaptive behavior, the nepotism of aristocratic Norman families can be understood as genetically adaptive extensions of the same kinship-familial principle.

The distinct preference of Normans over Anglo-Saxons that characterized the Conquest of England was only the

logical extension of the kin selective strategy that propelled that conquest in the first place. Just as a male rhesus macaque who usurps the position of dominant male and kills the children of the incumbent is exhibiting evolved, genetically adaptive behavior, the same holds for the destruction of the native Anglo-Saxon aristocracy. Whether through genocide, expulsion, or dispossession, eliminating competitors and their heirs was genetically adaptive if the Normans were to hold and perpetuate the Conquest for their own heirs. Only when one fully grasps the kinship basis of Norman cohesion can one understand why *murdrum* was a clever, effective policy designed to repress kinship-ethnic conflict and why both the "harrying of the north" and the elimination of much of the native English aristocracy were genocide.

Bastard

> **[E]xperience shows that princes who have achieved great things have been those who have given their word lightly, who have known how to trick men with their cunning, and who, in the end, have overcome those abiding by honest principles.**
>
> —NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, *THE PRINCE*

Winston Churchill believed that "[t]he taint of bastardy clung, and sank deep into William's nature. It embittered and hardened him."[518] The notion that the supreme founder of England's Norman aristocracy was the illegitimate son of a tanner's daughter is both supremely ironic and supremely appropriate. The epithet "William the Bastard" has been a

standard motif for Thomas Paine and others who questioned the legitimacy of the English aristocracy. A poetic vitriol from the year of the first Reform bill of the nineteenth century sounded the very same motif in denouncing "locusts from the Norman coast; A beggarly, destructive breed, Sprung from the *Bastard's* spurious seed."[519]

Perhaps Churchill's intuition was right. It might even be the case that William's own common bloodline contributed to his sensitive and uncompromising attitude towards the conquered Anglo-Saxon stock in the new Norman order, setting a precedent for the English "class" apartheid. Perhaps an aristocratic revolution in England helped 'William the Bastard' conquer the "taint of bastardy" by becoming 'William the Conqueror.'

However, it also may be the case that the bastardy story is a legend and William's maternal grandfather was keeper of his sleeping chamber, a member of the ducal household.[520] This would make William's grandfather of low birth compared a warrior noble, but, by the standards of the time, not so ignoble as the son of a tanner's daughter. The propaganda success of the bastardy epithet suggests that a different kind of legitimacy was at stake. To attack the "spurious seed" of "William the Bastard" was to attack the legitimacy of the British founding through Conquest.

None of the three main contenders for the throne in 1066, William of Normandy, Harald Hardrada of Norway, or Harold Godwineson in England, possessed the fullest traditional grounds of legitimacy that *Atheling* (prince) Edgar did as grandson of English King Edmund Ironside. However, Edgar was only about 15 years old in 1066. Only by marriage could William claim a hereditary relationship to Englishmen. Emma, his great-aunt, had married two kings of England and was the mother of King Edward the

Confessor. Before Edward took the throne of England in 1042, he had spent years of exile in Normandy and the Normans claimed that he nominated William as a successor.

If Harold Godwineson, under duress, promised William the succession while shipwrecked at Normandy, then it proved to be a useful blunder on Harold's part and nothing more. The English specialist in Norman genealogy, L. G. Pine, offered a cogent explanation for the political logic of letting Harold go:

> William allowed Harold to return and, strange as this would seem to a 20th-century dictator who had got a dangerous rival in his grip, there was sound sense in the maneuver. Probably William felt that Harold would break his oath, and that he would then be able to proclaim him as a perjurer.[521]

This was true Machiavellian moralizing. Harold may have been forced to give an oath under bullying threats so that the Normans could subsequently declare their moral outrage and indignation when that forced oath was broken. But is it possible to know whether Harold was "shipwrecked" or invaded at sea by Norman pirates under William's command? Is it possible to know whether this supposed event happened at all? In the end, it was the Bayeaux tapestry that consecrated the Norman conquest of historical memory. According to this story, the oath Harold broke was "sacred" and thus the man who broke it must have been an evil, treasonous liar.

The tale that the Bayeaux tapestry tells is akin to Niccolò Machiavelli reading a morality tale to Anglo-Saxon children at bedtime.

In *Conquered England* (2007), Oxford historian George Garnett plainly concluded, "Duke William's claim to the kingdom of England was fabricated".[522] Did the reader get

that? The entire claim upon which the Norman Conquest was based was based itself upon a *gargantuan lie*.

Yet it is amusing to observe just how seriously Harold's alleged forced oath and other claims of legitimacy are held onto, as if a lawyer's demonstration that William's claims to the throne were illegitimate could have convinced him and his Normans to pick up their armies, reimburse the taxes extorted, and return to Normandy. Those who dwell on these incidents are further victims of the long-term Darwinian success of the Normans' Machiavellian cunning. The hereditary connection to Emma and Harold's alleged oath was to William's invasion of England what weapons of mass destruction and alleged connections to al-Qaeda were to George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq.

The strategic marriage of Emma of Normandy to an English king was not separate from the gradual, proto-colonial, ingratiation and infiltration of Normans in the years that *preceded* the Conquest. These developments were preambles to an aggressive kin selection strategy that set its predatory eyes on an England weak from internal divisions, Vikings invasions, and the poor political judgment of King Ethelred. As Searle observed, "when one compares the leaders of William II's generation with their contemporaries in France and Anglo-Saxon England, the Norman leaders' ability to cooperate is their dominant characteristic and underlies the discipline that they exhibited."[523] The Domesday Book of 1086, the most systematic accounting of the spoils of England, was only the culmination of Norman spying, scouting, and shrewd accounting of their English prey — a program that had begun well before 1066.

While the legitimacy of William's claims to kingship was based on kinship to the English political elite, William's kingship was used to disinherit any ties of kinship to that

elite. With the death of Edward, the primary living kinship tie died as well. Within this paradoxical scenario, it is understandable why William's Norman kin would completely override any kinship connection with the English, for these were largely nonexistent. The strategic sacrifice of Emma of Normandy had paid off handsomely.

A recent biography by David Bates, *William the Conqueror*, described, "a brutal and highly successful opportunist and an outstanding example of an eleventh-century warrior chieftain whose essentially violent life has been given a veneer of legitimacy and respectability by the contemporary churchman who wrote about him."[524] Since the pope had blessed this violent political aggression, this made it a Christian duty to uphold the Conquest's status as a righteous and wholesome activity. It is very clear that William was conscientious about the need for maintaining the *appearance* of legitimacy. The "holiness" of Conquest also helped assuage the souls of the conquered.

Through this conflict between the need for legitimacy and an aggressive kin selection strategy, the question of whether William had any intention to share power with native Anglo-Saxons can be addressed. Although military domination and turning the other cheek are not the easiest aspirations to reconcile, William made the appearance of giving it a try. By making rebellions the occasion for expropriations, the conquered natives themselves could be denounced as treacherous aggressors.

Although the situation in 1086 could not be foreseen from the victory at Hastings, to claim that the thoroughness of the takeover was "in part the result of the English resistance to Norman pressure" would seem to assume that William brought an entire army across the English Channel without expecting or exploiting opposition.[525] In *The English*

Resistance: The Underground War Against the Normans, Peter Rex observed:

> It is possible to argue that the rebellions destroyed the original policy and that William only gave up his intentions of governing with a combination of Normans and Englishmen after the English had repeatedly rebelled. But it can also be argued that his policy fuelled resistance and that he had always intended that it should. Resistance provided the excuse needed to justify further expropriation of lands and offices. This is to argue that the king provoked the rebellion of 1069, by the appointment of Robert de Commines, having come to the conclusion that no matter whom he sent, the Northumbrians would never willingly submit, and that he did so at a time when his castles had been given sufficient time to accumulate supplies and men…and it was logistically possible to bring a large army into the region.[526]

These arguments need not be mutually exclusive. The conquest of England only began at Hastings, expanding and unfolding northward over a period of years. That battle itself was only the prime resistance in this large-scale strategy of takeover, in which his accomplices expected rewards for their sacrifices and favoritism, in most cases as kin of the king. To not expect the kin selection strategy that propelled the Conquest to continue its logic though kinship discrimination in England would be literally unnatural.

Such resistance could be, in effect, as useful as Harold's alleged 'resistance' in his alleged broken oath. William was in a position to be provocative, for as historian of Anglo-Saxon England Frank Stenton observed, "the resources of the king were doubtless equal to the suppression of any purely English rising." The only danger would have resided in a Danish attack from King Swein if it had been

successful.[527] Consequently, whether William's actions produced submission or rebellion among the English, he would win.

William's ability to maintain an original *appearance* of an attempt to rule with the help of the native aristocracy is precisely what made the goal of the final destruction of the native aristocracy a success.[528] The strategic methodology of working with some native nobles ensured that: (1.) the nobility would be divided among itself, (2.) no immense *unified* rebellion would be able to challenge William at a single time, (3.) time could be bought while the Normans secured their *de facto* domination of the country, (4.) the pious, public face of the Conquest could uphold a facade of legitimacy and thus not unduly alienate either the conquered or the Pope, and (5.) even if all of the remaining native lords did eventually figure out William's ruse, by that time it would be too late.

The Anglo-Saxons were divided and conquered. The maintenance of the appearance of cooperation with the natives *was a cynical ploy*. This conclusion is justified, not simply by a surmise of intentions, but by an evaluation of the kin selective *behavioral* patterns both preceding and succeeding the Conquest. If heredity mattered among all medieval people, for the composition of a *hereditary* aristocracy it was decisive. Normans had greater genetic interests in their own kin over any Englishman and that was decisive. The most able or powerful Englishmen were the greatest competitors to Norman genetic interests and this is why the native aristocracy was annihilated while the masses were largely spared.

The Peculiar Institution of the Right of Conquest

Ultimately, William superiority over the other claimants to England's throne was superiority in force of arms. The brute fact of the Conquest speaks for itself: any Anglo-Saxons who believed William's rule was legitimate were saddled with a new Norman aristocracy. Any Anglo-Saxons who believed William's rule was illegitimate were saddled with a new Norman aristocracy. The *fait accompli* was justified through a legitimate principle of the European civilization of that time: the right of conquest.

When Earl Warenne was challenged by *quo warranto* judges of Edward I (1239-1307), he objected, "My ancestors came with William the Bastard and conquered their lands with the sword." He buttressed his claim by pointing out that "[t]he king did not conquer and subject the land by himself, but our forebears were sharers and partners with him."[529] The Earl of Gloucester similarly claimed "that he holds these lands and liberties by his and his ancestors' conquest".[530] Could these judges not see the justice of their case through ancestral right of conquest? It was the justice of the Norman trial by battle writ large.

The attempt to find a fully legitimate justification for the Norman conquest of England is almost like trying to legitimize the plunderous Viking raids which landed their ancestors in Normandy to begin with. The hereditary connection to England was almost as decisive to the motive of the Conquest as it was to the Norman conquests of southern Italy, Sicily, and Antioch where there was no pretense of any hereditary connection. What Emma's son Edward the Confessor provided was a formal hereditary legitimation of Norman kin selective predation.

Moreover, when this pattern of Norman behavior is put into perspective, one can see that the Norman kin selective strategy from Normandy into England was only a stepping stone in a noteworthy imperialistic expansion. English genealogist L. G. Pine recognized the same predatory strategy of this "nefarious crew" that Eleanor Searle had observed in the period leading up to the conquest of England. "Where", inquired Pine in *They Came with the Conqueror*, "…was fresh land to be founded for the brood of sons whom each Norman lord spawned so liberally?"[531] History tells us.

The infamous "English" interference with Ireland began under a guise similar to the conquest of England. It would appear that Norman blood was considered holy as well as noble, and the pope yet again blessed the domination of a land too free from the grip of Rome. The invasion of Ireland began under the initiative of the "Welsh" Norman, Richard "Strongbow" FitzGilbert de Clare, Earl of Pembroke, and was eventually backed by Henry II. The Irish Kings admitted their decisive defeat in 1171.

Wales was fully conquered by 1282.

Aristocratic Norman colonization of Scotland began under the rule of Scottish king David I (1124-1153). We can consider the consequences of this peaceful conquest through this question: Was King of Scots, Robert the Bruce (1274-1329), a native "Scottish" patriot who fought for national independence against "the English"? Not quite. Robert de Brus acquired his namesake through his ancestors from Brieux, Normandy. Every subsequent Scottish monarch (except Edward de Balliol [1282-1364]) and every British monarch since the Union of the Crowns in 1603 was descended from Robert the Bruce.

Robert E. Lee, Confederate general in the American Civil War, has also been claimed as a descendant of Bruce. The Norman-Cavalier colonization of the American South that began in Virginia fits directly into this patterned connection of kin selective exploitation and territorial expansion. When put into historical perspective, the institution of slavery is no more peculiar than the institution of the Norman right of conquest.

Only with an appreciation of the Norman political grip over Scotland can one appreciation the chain of events between the royal unification of England and Scotland in 1603 and the English Civil War. It was not simply the nominally "Scottish" line of Stuart kings, but the further submergence of Anglo-Saxon identity into a Norman dominated British empire that was decisive in provoking the Puritan counter-reaction. King Charles I was a direct descendant of William the Conqueror and his beheading in 1649 was a direct challenge to the Conquest dynasty.

It was the defeat of the Puritan Revolution through the Restoration of 1660 that put the Norman imperial track back on course. England and Scotland were politically unified into Great Britain in 1707. The further union with Ireland produced the United Kingdom in 1801.

The entire British Isles bear witness to the success of this aristocratic kin selective strategy wherein genetic propagation spawned the quest for territorial domination for new heirs. Continuing the conflict that began with the very existence of Normandy, the medieval period bears witness to the "Anglo-Norman" obsession with conquering France. The Conquerors cunningly played on the anti-French feeling against themselves by mastering it, channeling it against the continental French, so that anti-French hostility served the ends of *further* Norman conquests. When the quest to

conquer France ultimately failed, still not content with mere Britain, the Norman predation strategy eventually gave birth to the "British" Empire.

It was not that the Normans ultimately became English, as historian Hugh M. Thomas maintained; it was that the English ultimately became British. Like Rome, the Norman-based British Empire lasted nearly a thousand years. Would it be legitimate, then, to claim that England became the central province of what should be called the Norman-British Empire?

It is from the perspective of this question that the political motives of the English Civil War become clearer. Although the Puritan Revolution failed, and the Norman-based tradition of the House of Lords restored in 1660, the upheaval provoked a series of compromises that ultimately led to a "Saxon" dynasty of Hanoverian Kings and relatively greater democratic representation. Yet even the Hanoverians themselves could claim descent from William the Conqueror. This paradigm of *hereditary* compromise formed the sociobiological basis of the tradition of political compromise in the English-speaking world.

The Norman Destruction of the Anglo-Saxon Aristocracy and Other Genetically Adaptive Behaviors

All of the arguments about rightful succession to England's throne in 1066 confirm the underlying assumption that some form of kinship formed a basis for political legitimacy. The association of kinship and legitimacy was part of the common sense of medieval times. If kinship did not matter, one would be at a complete loss to explain why wars were fought, why pedigrees were preserved, and why

the entire political order was routinely obsessed with connections of heredity. William's hereditary claims, for example, implied that kinship connection was such an important basis for legitimacy that it trumped even the disconnect of French language and culture (notwithstanding the proto-colonial inroads Normans had been making among England's rulers). Without a sociobiological accounting of the kinship values of the adversaries at Hastings, there is no way to realistically account for what these people were fighting for.

Yet recognition of the obvious import of kinship leads to a rather obvious contradiction. Did kinship connections matter any less to the majority? Implicit in William I's claim was the assumption that this hereditary connection through Emma of Normandy to English royalty provided a foundation of legitimacy, while the kinship connections between rulers and ruled did not necessarily have the same validity. Thus, there exists a fantastic contradiction between the import of this single hereditary connection, which could be supposed to justify the conquest of an entire nation, and the silence on the question of the strength of the kinship connection between entire populations of rulers and ruled. The import of this single hereditary connection implies that heredity was decisively more import than culture since William was disconnected from the English by an alien language and culture. While the kin selective attributes of human nature makes the import of hereditary connections comprehensible, this exclusive emphasis upon royal hereditary lines at the expense of the broader populace must be deemed conventional, not natural.

Kinship connections between rulers and ruled did make a difference to the English. An early biographer of Edward the Confessor described the English reaction to the death, in

1042, of King Harthacanute, son of the Dane Canute and Emma of Normandy. When Edward took the throne, the English expressed great joy at the restoration of 'native rule' (*dominatus natives*) after the affliction of barbaric servitude.[532] A minor revolution? Half-Saxon Edward was apparently one half more legitimate than the wholly non-Saxon Harthacanute. The medieval Anglo-Saxon valuation of multicultural tolerance can be further gauged through the existence of St. Brice's Day, November 13, 1002, the day when the Saxon King Ethelred ordered the killing of all Danes in England.

The wholly non-Saxon Normans who followed Edward fulfilled a political role. But did they *represent* the Anglo-Saxons? Can we call this a less "representative government" than its pre-Hastings predecessor? A much more accurate description of the relationship of the conquerors to the conquered would be "arbitrary government".

Does not the Norman Conquest describe the exact historical meaning of Thomas Paine's assertion in *The Rights of Man* that "*hereditary government over a people is to them a species of slavery, and representative government is freedom.*" The seventeenth and eighteenth century democrats that attacked arbitrary government and the slavery of the Norman Yoke echo the kinship values of their ancestors who rejoiced at the restoration of Edward. How could this deep tradition of resistance to the hereditary slavery of the Norman Yoke *not* culminate in a Northern war of aggression to destroy the prospect of its revival in the American South?

To put the kinship issue in sociobiological perspective, take the example of one black person and one white person that give birth to a mullato child. That single child is a tie of kinship between the two populations. Even if we attach inordinate power and prestige to a particular mulatto, is this

kinship tie enough to bond the two populations, of their own accord, in pre-modern times, or even postmodern times? Barack Obama is half black and half white, but *not* analogous (just in case this is not obvious) to the Norman conquerors. The closest equivalent to the Norman Conquest would be to use Obama's hereditary connection to the white population to justify the exclusive, sempiternal, hereditary rule of Kenyan tribesman over the white population.

The dispute over the English throne in 1066 exhibited the same principle with a lesser kinship distance. If the Norman Duke Richard II's sister Emma married the English King Ethelred, and they had a child who became the English King Edward, is this single tie enough to join *in kinship* the English and the Normans? Even when accounting for the inordinate social, economic, and political clout attached to royalty, is this enough to bind these *entire populations* together? Arguments for the legitimacy of the Conquest bear greater resemblance to a skewed technical argument of a cunning lawyer rather than one who can see the broader issues involved. As Thomas Paine would argue centuries later, what the case for the Norman Conquest lacks, above all, is *common sense*.

The Normans were foreigners, usurpers, and on top of everything else, in-laws. King Edward the Confessor, as an individual, was half English and half Norman. But as *populations*, the relationship of the Normans to the Saxons by the marriage of Edward's parents was that of in-laws. The Normans were like natural aristocrats-in-law. The later, more official notion that they were simply 'natural' English aristocrats could be determined by simply following their laws, since as conquerors they were in a position to make the laws.

Much of English history that follows the Conquest is just

another chapter in the long history of cold and irritated "in-law" relationships. After all, what is the problem with in-laws? They meddle in private affairs not considered their own. Having in-laws whom one sees on holidays is one thing, but to have your in-laws barge in uninvited, move in permanently, and demand to be supported while telling you how to run your own household is something very different!

Yet a time comes when the niceties are overdrawn, the welcome is worn out, and it is time to thrown out the in-laws. The Puritan and American revolutions asserted the *hereditary* rights of the common people; *natural* rights; birthrights of Englishmen, and later, the rights of man. Those impeccably genetically adaptive genocidal behaviors that characterized the Conquest were outlawed by the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. For the conquered, individual rights were genetically adaptive.

These "rights of man" evolved as negations of the Norman right of conquest. The rights of man are, by design, the political foil of elite hereditary claims for the descendants of military conquerors. The Norman Conquest imposed the kinship claims of rulers against the kinship claims of the ruled. Democracy reversed this original contradiction, imposing the kinship claims of the ruled against the kinship claims of the rulers. Equal rights, like those imposed by Abraham Lincoln upon the South, are the right of conquest of the masses.

If the Normans had initially failed to violently assert their dominance, the conquered would likely have posed a constant threat of revolt, like the ancient Helots under the Spartans. If the takeover was not so thorough it is likely that it would not have been successful for William and his successors would have had too many significant native enemies. The consequence of its success was an

institutionalized Norman nepotism. There is a sound reason why the Norman values of ruling class nepotism are anathematic to Puritan-American values: the new world creed is a *revolt* against that long legacy of discrimination the conquered natives faced in their very own country.

It is amusing to observe how some people optimistically speak of intermarriage between Normans and Anglo-Saxons following 1066, almost as if this medieval aristocracy possessed the egalitarian pedigree ethos of modern America. The annihilation of the native English aristocracy was, of course, a shining example of Norman precociousness in bringing enlightened, meritocratic values to England. To actually uphold this vision of medieval utopia would be to admit the destruction of virtually the entire Anglo-Saxon aristocracy, yet believe that this outrageous Norman nepotism represented the founding precedent for a meritocracy that would been have truly unprecedented in its time. This would mean that while no unambiguous move towards meritocracy existed elsewhere in Christendom, social barriers were uniquely fluid only in England, a country conspicuous for the social chasm created by a new, nepotistic, Norman-ruled caste which did not even condescend to speak the native language for three hundred years. If the stark convergence of "class" and linguistic-ethnic difference inflicted by the Conquest somehow made medieval England *more* meritocratic or egalitarian than it would have been otherwise then William the Conqueror should really be seen as a great early symbol of egalitarianism.

Still tied to the intellectual leash established by Victorian social and political interests, many still hold this old, conciliatory opinion that, in utter contradiction to the precedent established by the Conquest itself, deserving

Anglo-Saxons were absorbed into the new Norman aristocracy. If this were true, then we should be able to ask explicitly: when exactly was it that medieval England adopted modern, meritocratic American values?

Insofar as any Anglo-Saxons did penetrate into the upper ranks, this implies: 1.) the elite Normans betrayed their own kin selective interests after a hard won fight for the spoils of conquest and 2.) any Anglo-Saxon who did penetrate into the upper ranks embodied what would become the American principles of open opportunity or meritocracy. If it were true that the Norman elite betrayed their own kin selective interests, and in doing so, offered a precocious example of the meritocratic values of America, the real source of wonder should be that latter-day Puritans and other quasi-democrats had anything left to rebel against. Could it be, rather, that it was precisely *because* reality did not correspond to that optimistic pedigree egalitarianism that its invention was thus inspired in America? I find that this interpretation better reflects the facts of matter.

Historian Marjorie Chibnall estimated that by 1086, the number of Norman-French in the English population was probably less than the 25,000 slaves at the opposite end of the social scale.[533] Historian Katharine Keats-Rohan gave an estimate of between twenty to thirty thousand Normans in a population of one-and-a-half million Anglo-Saxons. Immigrant Normans or Frenchman would increase their numbers further after this time. However, the proportion is significant, for the size of the Norman population in England has been exaggerated by some to both make their victory seem less extraordinary and to promote the case the all English are virtually half-Norman by descent anyway.

Dr. Keats-Rohan further documented that close to no intermarriage occurred between the Norman aristocracy and

the English in the first hundred years following the Conquest and no intermarriage at all in the top ten Norman families for over two centuries. For four generations, the intermarriage rate was less than five percent among a further two thousand Norman families. This social and ethnic separatism she calls 'a medieval forerunner of apartheid'.[534] This study "stands on its head the old assumption that from the start there was substantial intermarriage between the conquerors and the conquered," observed Michael Wood. "In reality, it would appear that the Normans considered themselves to be socially and ethnically superior".[535] The elite Normans considered themselves a genuine family-aristocracy; the best, at the very least, at a military-political kin selective strategy.

It is hard to not see the origins of "English class system" in this apartheid of kinship, language, and culture. Within this system, the Anglo-Saxons were relegated to an inferior order of human being. Put another way, this convergence of tribe, culture, and "class" was really a caste system. English "class" hatred originally differed only in degree from what is now called "race" hatred.

The "class"-apartheid followed naturally from the kin selective values that propelled the Conquest. If kin-cohesion was a crucial element of the superiority that allowed them to become conquerors, then to maintain that superiority over the long-term requires the preservation of Norman kin-cohesion. The perpetuation of the "class" system thus originated in "strong family values". Conquest is a maximal strategy of genetic adaptation, but it can retain this maximization only if maintained through apartheid.

Maestripieri's comparative study of macaques monkeys and humans can help Darwinize the study of the relationship between the Conquest and the English "class"

system: "Without information on kinship," he explained, "it is virtually impossible to understand how any animal or human society is organized and why the individuals in it behave the way they do." Among rhesus macaques, "[w]e now know that by looking at who is sitting or walking next to whom, one can get a snapshot of the kinship relations within a group, because relatives always hang out together."[536] It is all too easy to lapse into old categories of pre-Darwinian modern rhetoric that effectually deride kin selection as primitive and inferior. More specifically, the belief of Norman aristocrats in their own superiority was not purely individualistic and appears to have been partly interconnected with an implicit belief in their superiority over the Anglo-Saxons as kin selective strategizers.

While there is often a crude appeal to the common Germanic origins of the Anglo-Saxons and Normans, the evolutionary error of this argument has been illustrated by the English biologist Richard Dawkins. On one occasion, he criticized members of a racist political party for overgeneralizing kin selection to include all people with white skin, when kin selection would clearly predict discriminations between white persons on the basis of genetic distance. The Conquest is a historic illustration of Dawkin's caveat against overgeneralizing the theory of kin selection. For precisely the same reason, we can see in the Conquest the origins of a genetic basis for English "class" conflict.

Magna Carta: Liberalizing the Rights of Conquest from Kingly Monopoly to Norman Aristocracy

Baronial anarchy reigned during the rule of King Stephen (1135-1154) and the sense of slavery among the majority intensified. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* recounted the terror:

> They greatly oppressed the wretched people by making them work at their castles, and when the castles were finished they filled them with devils and evil men. Then they took those whom they thought to have any goods, both men and women, and put them in prison for their gold and silver, and tortured them with pains unspeakable.

Norman barons possessed the liberty to plunder from "those whom they thought to have any goods". In that Norman liberty, one can discern the social scenario that modern Lockean notions of the right to private property retaliated. "The anarchy" further illustrates how modern private property rights rest on an even more basic right: the right to own one's self. The Norman liberty to "torture them with pains unspeakable" implied that the conquered *were* Norman property and the barons thus reserved the right to treat Anglo-Saxons, *especially* the wealthiest in "gold and silver", like slaves.

At this time, "they" were unmistakably French-Norman, while "the people" were overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon. Yet, at the same time, we can see the effects of gradual but continual intermarriage and assimilation. As historian E. A. Freeman gathered:

> the plain facts of the case are that the lowest class would…be almost wholly of Old-English descent, that the highest class would be almost wholly of Norman descent, while in the intermediate classes, among the smaller land-owners and the inhabitants of the towns, the two were so mixed together that at last, towards the end of the [twelfth] century, it was…impossible to tell one from the other.[537]

This intermarriage makes it clear that "class" was not wholly identical with "race". However, this was not because the native Anglo-Saxons were included in that upper class. Rather, it was because lower status Normans became excluded from the highest classes. It was not that Anglo-Saxons tended to intermarry with the Norman elite. Rather, it was that lower status Normans tended to intermarry with the Anglo-Saxon majority. So, while I will repeatedly refer to a Norman/Saxon division that corresponds to an upper class/"non-U" class division as an empirically justified *generalization*, this holds throughout the medieval period despite the reality of continual intermarriage below the aristocratic "class". While a simplistic association of Norman and master gradually lost its cogency, the largely Norman elite contented themselves with the distinction of being know as "Lords".

This intermixture posed a dilemma for the relatively purebred Norman aristocracy: England was becoming a single nation. Henry I (1069-1135) rightly saw that, in his unique position as king, a strategic marriage with a Scottish princess with royal Saxon blood could secure him and his heirs an increase in popular English support, along with Scottish peace. His two legitimate children, William and Matilda, posed a threat to Norman kin cohesion and it is not surprising that we can find what appears to be yet another

example of genetically adaptive Norman behavior: William's drowning in the English Channel.

Henry I named Matilda as his heir before his death and made the barons swear allegiance to her. The behavior of the barons after the king's death, however, is more commensurate with kin selective motives. Stephen, a Norman aristocrat, claimed the throne of England with the support of the majority of the barons behind him.

It is said that the Normans championed Stephen over Matilda out of "sexism". This assessment, however, fails to do justice to their "racism". With her brother William out of the picture, only Matilda remained to threaten the simple kin cohesive unity wherein "English" government equaled Norman government. For the barons, Stephen stood for *representative government*, while Matilda and her heirs represented a breakdown of Norman conqueror unity.

Estranged from the Normans, Matilda married into a French-Angevin family. Normans in England deeply resented this marriage, which both empowered her politically, and created a further kinship estrangement in the person of her son, Henry II. This first of the Angevin kings of England was also the first since the Conqueror to be partly descended from Alfred the Great and the old line of Saxon kings.

The rule of Henry II (1154-89), began a highly significant shift, a reversal of a trend set since the Conquest. Whereas previous Norman rulers had kept down the English populace, Henry II recruited English to help control the Norman nobility. By demanding money from the barons instead of military service, he could hire native English mercenaries loyal to himself alone. There was an observable correlation between the partly Saxon or non-Norman

ancestry of the king and more mutually altruistic behavior with the Anglo-Saxon populace.

The lawless and terroristic liberties that the barons had taken advantage of under Stephen were brought under royal constraint during his less 'liberal' rule. Hundreds of unlicensed castles built under Stephen's reign were demolished. The king also developed a highly effective royal administration system that centralized governmental power. The trends of Henry II's rule increased kingly despotism at the expense of the barons. This trend would help stimulate a path to civil war under his son, King John.

By the time John took the throne near the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was increasingly evident that the original order established by the Conquest was coming undone. From assimilation, intermarriage, and a new line of partly Saxon and partly non-Norman kings, a new English reality emerged. The simpler division of Norman masters and subjugated Saxons could no longer be held.

Then came John's loss of Normandy and almost all other French possessions in 1204. The loss of the Normans' French homeland was not only a colossal political defeat. The barons were increasingly severed from their old French connections on *all* sides and this forced them to rethink both their identity and their strategy. With the original kinship-culture boundaries crumbling away, this new situation posed problems that could not be sorted out with old answers.

The famous Magna Carta of 1215 was wrested by the barons from King John under duress and threat of civil war. The circumstances of John's political failures and despotic manner brought the issue of the ground of their privileges to a head, but it became an issue because cultural and genetic assimilation blurred the original group divisions established

by Conquest. If kin cohesion was leading to de-cohesion through intermarriage and assimilation, was a hereditary right of conquest also blurred? If the conquerors were blending with the conquered, this trend could ultimately lead to a *reversal* of a hereditary Norman right of conquest.

This trend towards reversal was already apparent under Henry II. If this king, the son of Eleanor of Aquitaine, was partly Saxon and only partly Norman, what divided the rulers from the ruled *then*? John's arrogation of authority seemed to be redrawing the line between conquerors and conquered with the subjugated as everyone below the sovereign king and thus overruling the old *de facto* chasm between Norman elite and Saxon herd. King John's real crime was that he wanted to treat the Norman barons almost as if they were no better than common Anglo-Saxons.

The charter issue came up only about one hundred and fifty years after the Conquest. As the Keats-Rohan study indicated, there was no intermarriage among the very top Norman families at this point. If there be doubt regarding who produced the great charter, one only need look at the French or Latinate names of the 25 surety barons who signed the charter, 22 of which were related by blood or marriage.

Magna Carta was very much a family affair. It aimed to preserve the special caste privileges of the barons *against* the nationally unifying and homogenizing tendencies of assimilation and *against* the national unity of a single hierarchy dominated by the king. Magna Carta was the legal expression of the long-term effort to establish a baronial oligarchy, already evident under Stephen, where the remains of elite Norman kin cohesion was asserted against the miscegenation of *both* king *and* commons.

Magna Carta was a reinvigoration of the barons' rights of conquest. When John subsequently rescinded the charter,

these rights of conquest would be upheld in a manner entirely appropriate to their origins: England would be re-conquered 1066-style by Prince Louis, son and heir apparent of Philip Augustus, King of France. The prince conquered most of England but was ultimately foiled when John died and most of the barons deserted him. (It is noteworthy how modern discussions of Magna Carta tend to minimize this episode.) His death may have saved England from the assertion of the rights and liberties of the Normans barons that Magna Carta stood for. John's death, in other words, may have saved England from being conquered by Frenchman *again*.

The entire purpose of the modern Magna Carta myth was to perpetuate the idea of the ultimate unity of Norman and Saxon in the quest for "liberty". Yet Magna Carta was actually a product of a fight over the spoils of the Conquest. At risk was the liberty of various Frenchmen to dominate Englishmen in the way that they so chose. Since the tried and untrue method of glorifying Magna Carta is accomplished by deemphasing the entire episode with Louis, perhaps a perspective beyond the modern political usefulness of Magna Carta can be regained by emphasizing it.

Thomas Paine maintained, "Magna Carta…was no more than compelling the Government to renounce a part of its assumptions." Even this is too generous. Rather, the Norman barons were saying that the spoils of England should not be greedily monopolized by the King: they are for all of "us". Yet, as Samuel Huntington might have put it, *who are "we"?*

The original Magna Carta asserted that the rights of conquest belong, not wholly to the king, but also to the heirs of the indispensable helpers of conquest. As Earl Warenne explained in this same century, "[t]he king did not conquer

and subject the land by himself, but our forebears were sharers and partners with him."[538] There must thus be at least some basis for an equality of the nobility; the rights of barons; the rights of the great Normans. These rights of the Norman rulers generalized and evolved into the position of the Tory.

While Magna Carta has gathered a very interesting reputation as a fountainhead of "individual freedom," it should be recognized that it was designed to oppress the "individual freedom" of the King. Whereas the autocratic rule of William was buttressed by bonds of kinship wherein "*all* could call him brother or cousin" among his great chiefs, this could no longer be assumed by the barons of John's time. King John no longer *represented* the barons in the way that William had represented his great magnates. The notion that this hereditary disconnection did not matter to these barons stands in outrageous contradiction to the kinship-political values that separated the fate of Henry I's children from Stephen.

Magna Carta could be viewed as a precedent for modern political principles in that a legal bond served as a buffer against abuse where former assumptions of kinship bond loyalty had partly broken down. The road to Magna Carta was thus paved with the failure of King Stephen to thwart Matilda's claim to the throne. While Stephen embodied representative government for Normans, the end of his reign marked the end of the line of distinctly *Norman* kings and thus the beginning of the kin selective need for Magna Carta.

One would never guess by Magna Carta's great reputation as a precedent for the rights of all humankind that these Norman brothers were preserving a line of caste defense against a common, mongrelized, Norman-Saxon mass. Yet recall that liberty originally meant privilege. What

it actually did is set a major precedent for the "class" system. The liberties it was designed to preserve also preserved the hereditary social-political inferiority of the Anglo-Saxon majority. By the very same stroke, when one inquires into the basis upon which the Norman aristocrats of the American South could stake their claim to the Magna Paradox of a "liberty" or privilege to own slaves, Magna Carta's assertion of the rights of aristocracy yields the historical, constitutional answer.

It was men such as Sir Edward Coke who gave a more liberal and Machiavellian interpretation to Magna Carta when defending the common law against the claims of the Stuarts in the period preceding the English Civil War. It is remarkable to think how many people have been duped by that shrewd and historic political re-interpretation. That universalized re-interpretation of Magna Carta was the beginning of its very revenge.

Collecting the Wergild

The Norman conquerors may have attempted to preserve the spoils of England for future generations, but the success of their descendants varies. In general, although the attrition of time and fortune took its toll on the conquerors, what is remarkable is just how successful they were in preserving their hereditary order.

Between the Conquest and the English Civil Wars, the Wars of the Roses (1455-85) may have been the greatest setback in the fortunes of the Norman-based aristocracy.[539] A blood feud between the aristocratic Percy and Neville families in the early 1450s helped to provoke a much larger and far more destructive bloodfeud between the Houses of Lancaster and York. The values of kinship cohesion that had once been the collective strength of the Normans, when

radicalized towards a more extreme exclusivism between leading families, abetted their general undoing. Decimating their own ranks through escalating military violence, they had nearly conquered themselves.

In aftermath of those wars, the Tudor Kings strengthened themselves and centralized power at the expense of the nobles. The merchant classes began to rise at around the same time. This period corresponded with the end of the "dark ages" and the beginning of the "renaissance". While some, with earnest, hopeful, Puritanical optimism, seem to wish that the Normans had committed genocide against themselves in these wars, this was not what had happened. While the Black plague and infighting among the "Roses" helped weaken the nobility, it is hardly the case that the Norman aristocracy was extirpated in this time. Nonetheless, the people of England had seen the stumbling of the great, old Conquest order and some, perhaps with *schadenfreude*, saw opportunity in that Norman misfortune. The bloodfeud between Lancaster and York likely helped to uncork an older, broader, and more elemental bloodfeud that had laid dormant, waiting, for centuries.

Long before the Conquest, there existed the Old English concept of *wergild*. It means "man payment", and was a price set upon a person's life on the basis of rank. *Wergild* was paid as compensation by the family of a slayer to the kindred of a slain person. If it was paid, the culprit was legally released of further punishment or obligation. If it was not paid, its kinship justice demanded that a bloodfeud ensue.

An interesting thing about the wergild was the correspondence of monetary value and kinship distance. *Wergild* implied a consciousness of genetic interests; a translation of kin selective values into economic terms. As

brilliantly successful as the Norman kin selective strategy had been, did not there exist an Anglo-Saxon kin selective strategy? Had the Anglo-Saxons lost all sense of the justice of the *wergild*? Did not Hastings itself represent a conflict of genetic interests?

Putting all these factors together, what would be the net *wergild* for all of the long-term damages inflicted by the Norman Conquest? It turns out that Thomas Paine, in *The Rights of Man* (1791), already went to the trouble of beginning a comparable calculation based on a similar line of thought. He cited Sir John Sinclair's *History of the Revenue* to produce figures for the annual taxes collected by the English government from 1066 onward:

> Annual amount of taxes levied by William the Conqueror, beginning in the year 1066: £400,000
> Annual amount of taxes at one hundred years from the Conquest, (1166): £200,000
> Annual amount of taxes at two hundred years from the Conquest, (1266): £150,000
> Annual amount of taxes at three hundred years from the Conquest, (1366): £130,000
> Annual amount of taxes at four hundred years from the Conquest, (1466): £100,000
> Annual amount of taxes at five hundred years from the Conquest, (1566): £500,000
> Annual amount of taxes at six hundred years from the Conquest, (1666): £1,800,000
> Annual amount of taxes at the present time, (1791): £17,000,000

While a twenty-first century economist would point out that Paine does not account for factors such as population growth, the basic point stands. Paine considered William the Conqueror a usurper and the Conquest as foundationally

illegitimate. If the Conquest was unjust, how could one even begin to compensate for this injustice? Were all these taxes collected unjust? Should they be compensated to the descendents of the conquered? It is very much like contemplating a monetary compensation for the American descendents of black slaves.

Could one calculate a total monetary compensation for the entire legacy of the Conquest based on the Old English principles of the *wergild*? When we consider that the *wergild* for a man of high status could be many times that of a commoner, this would imply an exorbitantly high compensation for the killing or dispossession of the entire native English aristocracy. Can we, furthermore, add to this figure compensation for those killed on the battlefield, and those villages wasted and exploited as William's army fed off the land even before Hastings began? What about those victims of that highly successful crushing of resistance, the "harrying of the north," where starvation and military tactics may have resulted in the genocide of over 100,000 native English? Can we come up with a figure that would accurately reimburse the *murdrum* fines? Can we calculate the net *wergild* for, not only the Conquest, but also every other deprivation, from the oppressions and tortures of Stephen's reign to even the social snubs and casual indignities that the Anglo-Saxon majority were sentenced to *as a nation*?

If such as payment was collected all at once, would not its political and social effects be explosive? Would it not be a revolutionary sum? What would it look like if the Anglo-Saxon realized that as descendants and kin of those done these injustices, they stand as heirs of this unsettled score? What would they do if and when they recalled that they had inherited this ancient vendetta? What if, moreover, its justice

was actually built into human nature? What would happen if and when they resolved to uphold this ancient justice of collecting the *wergild*?

Warrant for Insurrection

Enlightened about the "Good Old Cause"

> **Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks.**
>
> —*AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND* (1644)

Looking down upon the exposed neck of King Charles I, the executioner bent down to ensure that not a strand of the king's hair would obstruct the singular swing of his axe. On this cold January day in 1649, London's multitudes gathered in front of the Palace of Whitehall to witness the spectacle of the condemned king's final permissible command:

"Stay for the sign."

"I will, an' it please Your Majesty," responded the executioner.

At the moment the king stretched out his hand, the axeman struck with precise and deliberate force, slicing the head of the King of England from his body. This was the primordial origins of modernity in the English-speaking world.

Why was it that *both* the killing of a king *and* the disinheritance of an aristocracy occurred in 1649? Why was it that *both* the killing of a king *and* the disinheritance of an aristocracy occurred in 1066? The Norman Conquest was technically only about the king, yet what actually happened was the disinheritance of an old aristocracy. The English Civil War was also technically about the king, yet what actually happened was the disinheritance of an old aristocracy.

Charles I and the House of Lords faced a fate in 1649 comparable to the fate of Harold and the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy in 1066. The assumption that one can understand the political earthquake of the 1640s with only short term causes within a century is like assuming that one can understand a literal earthquake with only short term causes within a million years. The sociobiological earthquake of the 1640s can only be understood with a grasp of kin selection and Darwinian evolution, just a literal earthquake can only be understood with a grasp of plate tectonics and geological evolution.

How did this single individual man named Charles acquire all that power and authority? The very possibility of King Charles I as an English king came into being with the political paradigm established by William the Conqueror. His very existence as king was premised on filling the shoes of William the Conqueror. If Charles I had the political abilities of William, the same underlying tensions would have existed, but they might have been handled or controlled far more skillfully. Ultimately, Charles I was killed because failed to fill the shoes of William the Conqueror.

Peter Rex's *The English Resistance: The Underground War Against the Normans,* a popular account of the resistance in

the first five years after the Norman invasion, concluded: "Although it is therefore true that the rebels were routed and all resistance crushed, yet in the long run it was the English who overcame the Normans in a silent revolution."[540] What "silent revolution" is Rex referring to? This is strikingly similar to the opinion of the English historian Edward Augustus Freeman in his gargantuan *The History of the Norman Conquest of England* (published in six volumes between 1867 and 1879). Regius professor of modern history at Oxford, he argued that the Conquest was "only a temporary overthrow" and "in a few generations we lead captive our conquerors". Yet outside of his medieval scholarship, Freeman went further. Apparantly a few generations did not fully resolve the matter, for still in his own time he believed:

> We must recognize [when debating the new Examination Statute of 1850] the spirit which dictated the Petition of Right as the same which gathered all England round the banners of Godwin, and remember that the 'good old cause' was truly that for which Harold died on the field and Waltheof on the scaffold.[541]

What exactly was this "good old cause"? In 1861, when liberal prime minister to-be William Gladstone was criticized for asserting the economic dominance of the House of Commons, he proudly responded that he was only "restoring that good old constitution which took its root in Saxon times."[542]

The Petition of Right that Freeman referred to was drawn up in 1627 and addressed to King Charles I a year later. This document was "Parliament's" assertion of legal right against the crown. With strong parallels with the American Declaration of Independence, it was the key legal expression

of the constitutional differences that wrought civil war against traditional British authority.

Refusing to be bound by the Petition of Right, Charles I ruled from 1629 to 1640 without Parliament. This period became known as the "Eleven Years Tyranny." In 1640 a rebellion in Scotland forced the king to call a new Parliament. Refusing to grant the taxes that their sovereign demanded, tensions mounted. By 1642, England was in a state of civil war. When Parliament emerged victorious in 1649, not only was King Charles I beheaded, but the hereditary House of Lords was abolished.

Freeman asserted that the "spirit which dictated the Petition of Right" and led to civil war and the overthrow of the elite hereditary English establishment in 1649 was the same as the war to restore the 'good old' Saxon constitution which Harold died for at Hastings. This is like making a connection between the "spirit" which dictated the Declaration of Independence and Hereward's resistance at Ely. Does Freeman's claim make sense?

One of the most prominent members of "Parliamentary" opposition to the "Royalists" was John Pym. In 1628, during the debate on the Petition of Right, he declared:

> There are plain footsteps of those Laws in the Government of the Saxons. They were of that vigour and force as to overlive the Conquest; nay, to give bounds and limits to the Conqueror….confirmed by Charters of Kings, by Acts of Parliaments. But the Petitions of the Subjects, upon which those Charters and Acts were founded, were ever Petitions of Right, demanding their ancient and due Liberties, not suing for any new.[543]

Here we have John Pym, mastermind of "Parliament's" victory over the "Royalists" in the initial phase of the Civil

War (1642-46), justifying his actions as the assertion of a Saxon political renaissance. He plainly stated that the desire for political restoration had survived over five hundred years of political submergence, being of sufficient "vigour and force as to overlive the Conquest". Those assertions of right "give bounds and limits" to the hereditary government descended from "the Conqueror". The intellectual seed of the entire Anglo-Saxon political philosophy of limited government is contained in this remark: limiting the government was limiting the Conquest.

Pym maintained his position with prudence and temperance. He sought only a dignified restoration of those ancient Saxon rights and liberties due from their Norman conquerors and was "not suing for any new." Freeman's assertion of the connection between 1066 and 1642 is verified by a key maker of its history.

It is noteworthy that Freeman's political convictions were originally conservative and Tory. In 1846 while a student at Oxford, Freeman wrote a piece for an essay competition, "The effects of the Conquest of England by the Normans". His historical assessment did not win the favor of those who judged the competition, but it was at about this time that he appears to have shifted his political sympathies to a more leftward whiggism that he would remain loyal to for the rest of his days. It appears that Freeman converted to the "liberal" Whig cause from Toryism *because* of greater Anglo-Saxon "racial" self-consciousness through study of the Conquest, *not despite* that racialism.

Freeman's views on the Conquest would eventually provoke the sharp criticism of John Horace Round (1854-1928). This antiquarian believed that Anglo-Saxon England fell from "the want of a strong rule, and from excess of liberty". He was astonished that

> in the teeth of this awful lesson, Mr. Freeman could still look back with longing to 'a free and pure Teutonic England,' could still exult in the thought that a democratic age is bringing England ever nearer to her state 'before the Norman set foot upon her shores.'[544]

Democratic 'progress' and Anglo-Saxon nationalism, in Freeman's view, amounted to one and the same cause.

What are striking are not the points of disagreement, but rather, the points of agreement between Freeman and Round. Both agreed that pre-Conquest England was either democratic, proto-democratic, or, at the very least, more democratic than after the Norman domination. The most irreconcilable point of disagreement between them is not primarily factual: it is disagreement over the political wisdom and *value* of greater democracy and liberty. Round, a Tory aristocrat from a landed family of Essex, did not see the wisdom of greater democracy.

Although some think they can comprehend the rise of democracy while arrogantly disregarding the common sense voices of the common people who decried the Norman Yoke, this will not do in the case of E. A. Freeman. This Oxford historian's thorough documentation of the entire Conquest period appears to have *strengthened*, rather than weakened, his case of ethnic collision and conflict. His Whiggish political radicalism was directly related to 'enlightenment' about the impact of the Norman Conquest on his ancestors, his contemporaries, and himself. Freeman is a classic illustration of this phenomenon: the more one knows about the historical origins of the "English" aristocracy, the more radical, left leaning, and *contextually* "liberal" men like him became in hostility towards that hereditary aristocracy.

Any attempt at an objective assessment of the long-term effects of the Conquest simply cannot dismiss Freeman's explicit advocacy for the idea that there existed a "good old cause" of struggle for democracy that was identical with the struggle against the hereditary-political perpetuation of the Norman Conquest. Nor can one dismiss the explicit assertion that there existed a need to restore the "good old" Saxon constitution submerged by Norman tyranny. It was an idea held not only by Gladstone, but also by the American founder Thomas Jefferson.

For a self-identified Saxon such as Freeman, to document and digest the historical reality of the Conquest was to know how his people were dealt a world-historical injustice. It was to know how his ancestors were exploited and robbed — and thus to know himself. Such knowledge granted warrant for insurrection.

The Blood-feudal System

Did Hastings and the revolts that followed until 1071 constitute a civil war in England? If one accepts that the Normans were fully legitimate hereditary successors to Anglo-Saxon government, as traditional Norman views of the Conquest assert, then both Hastings and the revolts that followed constituted a form of civil war. Yet I have yet to hear the concept of civil war seriously applied to the Norman Conquest. If the concept of civil war were inapplicable to the case of 1066, why would this be the case? Civil war is inapplicable because war originated, not internally, but externally through the invasion of French foreigners from *outside* the country. That the concept of civil war is *not* applicable to the conquest of 1066 clarifies why the Norman Conquest *is* applicable to explanations of the civil war of 1642-1651. The English "civil war" was propelled by a

sense that natural Englishmen continued to be occupied by alien invaders.

So if the traditional Norman view of the total legitimacy of the Conquest is correct, then Hastings really was a battle in a civil war and its similarity to the seventeenth century English Civil War should be scrutinized more closely. However, if Hastings was *not* a battle in a civil war, then it follows that the Normans were an invading foreign body that imposed hereditary rule by force. But if they were a foreign body imposing hereditary rule by force, and crucial elements of these hereditary lineages ruled into the seventeenth century, then how can one make an unambiguous distinction between the causes of the Battle of Hastings in 1066 and the causes Battle of Edgehill in 1642? If there was *not* a civil war in 1066, then one is lead towards an explanation as to why there *was* "civil war" in 1642.

Catherine Macaulay's *History of England*, popular among radicals, was first published in 1763. She thought that the English Civil War (1642-51) "overturned the tyranny settled by the Norman invader". The historian only regretted that in 1660 and 1688 Parliaments were unsuccessful in restoring "the more wholesome principles of the Saxon constitution."[545]

Macaulay is a classic representative of what Herbert Butterfield has called "the Whig interpretation of history". Her understanding of the English Civil War demonstrates how ethnic politics could intertwine with Whiggish teleological narratives of "progress". The teleological narrative served to both sublimate and downplay the interpretation that the Civil War was not a historically isolated event, but an unusually violent eruption of an ongoing kinship-ethnic conflict between the descendants of the conquering Normans and the aboriginal Anglo-Saxons.

Poet John Milton subscribed to this basic view, writing in 1641 of "our progenitors that wrested their liberties out of the Norman gripe with their dearest blood and highest prowess."[546]

In *Bloodfeud: Murder and Revenge in Anglo-Saxon England*, Richard Fletcher demonstrated that the feud or bloodfeud had a profoundly central place in the Anglo-Saxon culture that was subdued in 1066. Is there any continuity between these old Saxon values and Henry Spelman's *The original, growth, propagation and condition of feuds and tenures by knight-service in England*. Maitland once quipped that Spelman (c. 1562-1641) introduced the feudal system into England, that is, he introduced or popularized the concept of the feud as a means of understanding English history after 1066. "A feud", at its core, according to Spelman, "is the right which the Vassal hath in Land...to use the same and take the profits thereof hereditarily". While his full definition of a feud was more expansive, consider this core definition of "a feud" in comparison with a general definition of a feud or bloodfeud. A feud or bloodfeud is a state of bitter hostility between kin groups that persists over a long time-period, i.e. over generations. A "feud system" or a "feudal system", then, could refer to a state of hostility between kin groups that lasted generations and was in some way formalized or institutionalized, i.e. in a "class" system. Spelman affirmed, "That this our kind of Feuds being perpetual and hereditary, and subject to Wardship, Marriage, and Relief, with other feodal services, were not in use among our Saxons; nor our Law of Tenures (whereon they depend) once known unto them." He described as a feud as "perpetual and hereditary" and, in further consonance with the general definition of a feud, he traced its beginning to 1066 since, before then, feuds were "not in use among our Saxons".

The word "feudal", now used to describe any hierarchical or oppressive social system, was originally used pejoratively to describe anything considered unfair or outdated. Twentieth century historians tried to make more objective sense of this term, but these attempts only exposed its emptiness when taken out of its original polemical context. It is really this original polemical usage that reveals the roots of the "feudal".

It is quite revealing that "feudalism" was originally contrasted with "the nation". This contrast does suggest a kind of bloodfeud. It seems that denouncers of "feudalism" were groping towards the articulation of issues that were inextricably bound up with kin selection. Consequently, the original polemical meanings of both "feudalism" and the "Norman Yoke" cannot be fully understood without a sociobiological analysis.

"Feudalism" was characteristic of an imperial, occupying force *over* an occupied *nation*. The lands called fiefs originated as William's reward to his partners in predation for their help in defeating England's resistance to that occupation. Since this occupation became hereditary, early modern English critiques of "feudalism" re-questioned both the basis of the occupation and resignation to the verdict of Hastings.

The word "feud" is derived from Old English, and not, for example, French or Latin.[547] The derivation of "feudal" from "feud", in the sense of bloodfeud, is a straightforward etymological explanation that has this advantage over previous explanations: *it actually makes sense*. I will call this the common sense interpretation of feudalism, as opposed to artificial or forced derivations of feudalism from "fee" or "fief" (*feodum*). In other words, the traditional "modern" interpretation of the origins of the word "feudalism" is as

artificial, forced, antiquated, and outdated as "feudalism" itself.

The word "feudal" originated, not in the ivory towers of academia, but in the heat of a polemical, political feud. The subsequent history of the word "feudal" or "feudalism" is the history of the attempt to politely or academically interpret away its original, barefaced meaning: bloodfeud. The scholarly exhaustion that resulted from trying to make clear semantic sense of "feudalism" is actually the last stages of the attempt to tame this word of its wild origins. The attempt was ultimately a failure because the word is fundamentally uncivilized at its feuding heart.

To call this the common sense interpretation of feudalism is not assume that Thomas Paine used the term, but it is to think that that Paine came close to *embodying* the original polemical meaning of hatred of "feudalism" when he wrote, "The hatred which the Norman invasion and tyranny begat, must have been deeply rooted in the nation, to have outlived the contrivance to obliterate it." Hatred of feudalism was hatred of the Norman Yoke. In this sense, John Horace Round was correct to think that the Normans imported "feudalism" into England, even though he clearly did not explicitly formulate it in this sense. The Normans introduced "feudalism" in the sense that their very existence as hereditary conquerors introduced an enduring source of internal ethnic-"class" conflict.

Is a bloodfeud characteristic of "progress" or "modernity"? No wonder the word "feudal" was associated with all things considered unprogressive or outdated! "Feudalism" is the antithesis of modernity in precisely the same sense that bloodfeud is the antithesis of modernity because the "feudal" *was* a form of bloodfeud.

The word *feudal*, first attested to in early seventeenth century, is directly related to the outbreak of the bloodfeud that was the English Civil War. To designate the nature of the problem as a bloodfeud thus bore a direct correspondence to the nature of the solution: civil war. This is how polemical attacks on "feudal" customs, traditions, and laws led to physical attacks on king and aristocracy in the English Civil War.

A bloodfeud captures something at the heart of the medieval world in the very same way that the word "feudalism" was supposed to capture or define the medieval world. Yet to rage against the Norman Yoke "class" system as "feudal", and then foment a civil war against "feudal" order is to reveal that those who attacked "feudal" class privileges were not entirely above the accusations of bloodfeuding themselves. In other words, anyone who is hostile to a blood-feudal system and then helps instigate a bloodfeud in the form of civil war is a hypocrite. No wonder the ivory tower had such difficulty with "feudalism"! Intellectual consistency was clearly not the most important virtue in mid-seventeenth century England. Yet the academic world, with its normative presumptions of intellectual distance or objectivity, had *every* reason to dismiss the primal origins of this beastly word: its original meaning embodies the antithesis of almost every modern pretension of reason. To assume that those who attacked the "feudal" order were consistently anti-bloodfeud is like assuming that the Levellers were consistently egalitarian.

The Levellers were among the most radically democratic factions of the English Civil War. Their name was given to them by their conservative enemies, who accused them of wishing to "level men's estates." During the conflict, they advocated transferring sovereignty from the king and

aristocracy to the House of Commons. These democrats sought reforms such as suffrage for men, political decentralization, more democratic representation, complete equality before the law, and freedom of worship. They tended to appeal to reason, albeit often from Biblical premises. The Levellers also maintained the historic reality of the Norman usurpation:

> The history of our forefathers since they were conquered by the Normans, doth manifest that this nation hath been held in bondage all along ever since by the policies and force of the officers of trust in the Commonwealth, amongst whom we always esteemed kings the chiefest…Hence come landlord, tenant, holds, tenures, etc. Which are slavish ties and badges upon men, grounded originally on conquest and power.

Against the Norman power, they argued, "For as God created every man free in Adam: so by nature are all alike freemen born."[548] These democrats wanted the laws rationalized and codified, "made certain, short, and plain" and the "Norman innovations" abolished.[549] Restoring local government was "part of the ancient frame of government in this Kingdome before the Conquerors dayes."[550] They expected victory in the English Civil War to deliver them from "the Norman bondage…and from all unreasonable Lawes made ever since that unhappy conquest."[551]

The neo-Leveller abolitionists of the American North similarly expected victory in American civil war to deliver from them the neo-Norman bondage of slavery. The original Levellers' attack on institutional bondage was so basic, it is comparable to the attack on the parts of the United States *Constitution* that condoned the bondage of slavery. In both the English Civil War and the American Civil War, "the

Norman bondage" was established by law and only superior military force was ultimately able to abolish these "Norman innovations".

Historian J. G. A. Pocock, in corroboration with keen observers such as Bacon, Raleigh, and Harrington pointed, not to economic or even political causes of the English Civil War, but to the aristocracy's decline as a *military* power.[552] At first appearance, this might appear strange. It was as if those below the aristocracy were waiting, in a rather conspiratorial manner, for a decisive weakness and when this mortal weakness was manifest those who had been waiting were ready to pounce upon their enemy.

The Norman Conquest was fundamentally established by superior military power and, in consequence, the English Civil War found its historic moment during a *military* crisis of the Norman-based aristocracy.

This condition of hereditary hostility against the ruling order, and *not* a purely structural organization of society, is what captures the original meaning of "feudalism". "Feudalism" is manifest in the lingering "class" conflicts between the conquerors and the conquered. "Feudalism" is exemplified, not by the abstract principle that the king owns all the land or even the "medieval" social structure brought about the Conquest, but by the *bloodfeud* unleashed in proto-modern England. The English Civil War was not fought *against* "feudalism", it *was* 'blood-feudalism'.

1660 and 1066

The Puritan Revolution was a failure. It did not succeed in withholding the old lineages from a re-conquest of power. The House of Lords was restored along with royal successor Charles II in 1660.

The Puritan Revolution of 1649 was the first great undoing of the kin selective consequences of 1066. To fathom the significance of the reversal of fortunes represented by 1660 imagine that, after the Americans had fought and won their independence from the British Empire, the monarchy and aristocracy managed their own formal Restoration. Imagine that a decade after independence, British monarchy and British aristocracy managed to reimpose its control over dependent states of America. Imagine that the American founders proved unable to "hang together" and, in consequence, were hung separately.

One reason that the pivotal historical significance of the English Civil War has been overlooked is because it was ultimately an inglorious failure. The Restoration of 1660 was a direct historic parallel to the innovation imposition of 1066. 1660 was the reaffirmation and reconfirmation of the Norman *founding* of 1066. Or, from a different perspective, the Anglo-Saxon defeat of 1066 and reaffirmed through the defeat of 1660.

The impact of the transient Puritan victory, however, could not be forgotten or undone. The double-edged sword of hereditary conquest meant that the revelation of mortal weakness was also inherited by those restored. And it was the impossibility of forgetting these two extremes, the Puritan Revolution and hereditary Restoration, that determined the distinctly moderate nature of the revolution that would follow.

The moderate liberty that England became inordinately famous for evolved through the reconciliation of these extremes that preceded it: the tyranny of Charles I, the political beheading of 1649, and re-conquest of the hereditary order in 1660. The Puritan Revolution of 1649 can be view as the resurgence of Anglo-Saxon nationalism that

had been submerged for over five hundred years by the Conquest. The Restoration of 1660 was the re-conquest of the hereditary kingship and aristocracy and was thus restoration of the tradition of righteous Conquest.

The myth of natural English moderation in politics has been achieved by conveniently forgetting how the extremes of 1649 and 1660 were propelled by the extreme tyranny of 1066. The glorification of the revolution of 1688 is a glorification of political moderation against the extremes of 1649 and 1660: a new king was had without a beheading and the preservation of the House of Lords conserved the traditional Norman-based aristocracy. The Catholic King James II was deposed in favor of his daughter Mary II and her husband, William III, prince of Orange and Stadtholder of the Netherlands. It was a moderate revolution that evolved out of a complex dialectic of failure, victory, and compromise.

Yes, all things in enlightened moderation: a reasonable helping of the force of conquest and a good sprinkling of the rights of commoners. While 1688 confirmed the conditionality of kingship and the authority of "Parliament", note that it also conserved the traditional aristocracy. The "Parliament" that *conserved* the House of Lords in 1688 could not be the same Commons-dominated "Parliament" that *abolished* the House of Lords in 1649. To emphasize the "bloodless" Glorious Revolution over and against the Puritan Revolution was also to safely deemphasize the foundational Norman/Saxon conflict that propelled this chain of events.

By recognizing how these conflicts were rooted in a foreign invasion of French-Normans in 1066, one can comprehend how a foreign invasion of Dutchmen could be perceived as a resolver of internal English conflict in 1688.

The Netherlands was controlled by Franks in 4th to 8th century and Charlemagne's empire in the 8th and 9th centuries. They were subsequently ruled by Burgundy and the Austrian Habsburgs. It was rule by Catholic Spain in the 16th and 17th century, however, that highlighted the common historic experience of the Dutch and the Anglo-Saxons under Latinate imperialists.

King Phillip II of Spain sailed his famous Armada in 1588 with the intention to *invade and conquer England*. The Spanish Armada had revived *conquestphobia*, and reignited, in the Anglo-Saxon mind, a mental association of Spanish imperialism and Norman-like tyrannical conquerors. This experience must be kept in mind when considering Anglo-Saxon perceptions of the Spanish conquest of the Netherlands.

Dutch revolt against the Spanish Empire took place over a period of eighty years (1568-1648) and ended with the birth of the Dutch Republic. It is only the tired tradition of mindless submission to belief in the rightness and inevitability of the Norman Conquest that still blinds people to the strength of this convergence of historic experience. The parallel here is between culturally *Germanic* ("Protestant") Dutch and Anglo-Saxons struggling against culturally *Latinate* ("Catholic") Spanish and French-Normans. It was the inspirational Dutch example of revolt against the Latin Yoke that helped awaken the Anglo-Saxons from their political slumber under the Norman Yoke. The Dutch rebellion against Spain helped inspire the Anglo-Saxon rebellion against the Normans that was the English Civil War. Thus, when we trace the genealogy of revolution it is really the Dutch, and not the English or the French, who were the first *de facto* pathbreakers towards modern liberal democracy.

The reality of Anglo-Dutch war even during the Commonwealth period demonstrates how relatively short term interests can clash with a broader cultural convergence. While the scale emphasized here is the long-term scale of centuries, there is no reason whatsoever to think that a larger scale convergence between the Anglo-Saxons and the Dutch would automatically supplant more immediate economic and political interests. Yet this larger scale historical perspective is necessary for understanding why the Dutch could be considered acceptable conquerors of England.

The founder of the House of Orange-Nassau, William I (1653-1584), was the primary leader of the initial Dutch revolt against Spain that later culminated in Dutch independence. Stadtholder William III of Orange, the man who conquered the kingship of England in 1688, was thus an heir to this tradition of victorious Protestant revolt against Latinate-Catholic imperialism. Was this Dutchman like a new William the Conqueror in the same sense that Oliver Cromwell was a usurper of the *role* of William the Conqueror?

People often forgetful that the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 was a military "invasion". Why has this indubitably *military* invasion, occupation, and conquest of England by the Dutch in 1688 been whitewashed as only a peaceful and "Glorious Revolution"? The pride of England has rested on the claim that 1066 was the last successful conquest of the island. The Dutch conquest of the throne of England in 1688, however, does seem to stand out as a lone exception to this rule. The politically correct label for the event has been deemed, not conquest, but "invasion". Apparently this semantic distinction was not quite enough, so, to go one better and categorically separate it from conquest, it has

been customary to call it a "revolution". Was 1688 an invasion, a conquest, or a revolution?

When all of these semantic distinctions are set aside, 1066 and 1688 do seem to stand together or stand out as parallel, pivotal events in English history. The very difficulty of the attempt to distinguish these events betrays the roots of the problem: 1066 and 1688 bear an uncanny historical resemblance. Semantic arguments over the distinctive labels for these events reveal a problem in defining the *nature* of these events. The strenuous effort to separate these events through these very *careful* distinctions of conquest and invasion seem to reveal an attempt to overcome a kind of guilt by association.

The Norman Conquest can easily and accurately be viewed an invasion that opposition at Hastings and elsewhere failed to repel. While 1688 was clearly not of the same severity, if the invasion had been thwarted, then William of Orange would have failed to conquer the kingship of England. Formally speaking, the Norman Conquest was only about a claim of kingship, not a claim over an aristocracy, and the William of Orange's revolution could be the considered the reversal of the extreme top-down paradigm of kingship established by William the Conqueror. From an Anglo-Saxon perspective (and a great deal of hindsight), one is almost tempted to say that 1688 is what 1066 *should* have been: a constitutional conquest.

On September 28, 1688, King James declared that the Dutch were planning "an absolute Conquest of these our Kingdoms". Charles Blount's *King William and Queen Mary Conquerors* (1693), argued that James had indeed been conquered, but his conquerors had gained "no Right...over the Laws, or the Peoples Liberties." If James fled England, wouldn't he be the only Englishman to *escape* conquest?

Apparently not. How can Whig arguments *for* conquest and *in defense of* conquest be reconciled with the *public* Whig interpretation of history? The "Whig view of 1688 can hardly tolerate the idea that William was a conqueror", M. P. Thompson pointed out in his essay, *The Idea of Conquest in Controversies Over the 1688 Revolution*. "Yet for a number of years immediately after the Revolution (from 1688 to 1693) this is exactly what it did."[553]

1688 would overcome 1660 as the new 1066. For the Saxon nation it was, as Thomas Jefferson later put it, a "re-conquest of their rights".[554] This is how "conquest", which would seem to logically entail slavery and the *loss* of rights, could be conceived as liberty and the (re-)*gaining* of rights.

A key insight of historian George Garnett's *Conquered England* was the recognition that, while the Normans preserved many Anglo-Saxons traditions after 1066, they often changed their meaning. So while traditional Anglo-Saxons *forms* were preserved, their *meanings* were often fundamentally altered under a "veil of propriety". There is a deep similarity between 1066 and 1688 in this respect: the *form* of the Norman invasion and conquest of 1066 was preserved in 1688, but its *meaning* was changed. The "revolutionary" change of 1688 was successful as paradigmatic English *tradition* because it was a conservation of the form of the Conquest that subverted its original meanings. That was the historical meaning of the "revolution" of 1688.

In the seventeenth century, the Netherlands was to the Anglo-Saxon-leaning cultural consciousness what France had traditionally been to Norman cultural consciousness. The Dutch became the *other* Continentals; the Anglo-Saxon answer to the French in this universalization of the Norman/Saxon conflict. William of Orange was like a

Protestant, culturally Germanic William the Conqueror whose revolution consisted of embracing the old paradigm of a heroic, channel-crossing conquest while *subverting* its old meaning.

This ironic ("revolutionary") embrace of the forms of the Conquest was partly a reaction to the failure of the Puritan attempt to play the qualitatively different game of mixing morality and politics. The Dutch-Germanic-Protestant Conquest of 1688 would overcome the Norman Conquest of 1066, not in the moral manner of the Puritans, but by attempting to outdo the conquerors at their own game. The carefully stage-managed invasion or conquest of 1688 could be a "bloodless" or non-violent revolution because its whole importance was symbolic. William of Orange's conquest of England was designed to override, overcome, and replace the symbolic importance of 1066 with a new constitutional paradigm for the Kingdom. This was the English way of political equality: Norman and Saxon could each feel that they had conquered one another.

It is simply unrealistic and irrational to believe that there was not an issue of Anglo-Saxon national pride here. It is as if the English have prided themselves in the belief that, unlike the French and the Germans, they are the only people with no subconscious or irrational behaviors in their politics. 1688 is a confirmation, not of an exclusive sensibility, but an inherent subrationality at the behavioral foundation of British politics. Since these subconscious and pre-rational motivations clashed head on with a British self-conception as "civilized" men, there was only one way to save face: the entire episode had to be reinterpreted as the embodiment of modern revolutionary rationality itself!

The Norman Conquest was a foreign invasion that became an inextricably internal English affair. The model of

the Conquest itself thus demonstrates how a conquest by Dutch foreigners could be construed as an impeccably English national affair. Ultimately, it took a foreign conquest to overcome a foreign conquest.

One reason that the term "invasion" might have been preferred to "conquest" is that 1688 could find its historical model in the original Anglo-Saxon *invasions* of the 4th and 5th centuries out of the lands that are now Germany and Denmark. In this sense, revolution was restoration and term "revolution" nicely distinguished and countered the claims of "restoration" made in 1660. With this deeper history in mind, the rise of the House of Hanover to the throne of Great Britain in 1714 can be viewed as a fulfillment of the attempt at the hereditary restoration of a distinctly Germanic, and especially non-Norman-French, royal line that began with William of Orange.

King George I, the first of the House of Hanover, was born in Lower Saxony (in what is now Germany). The Hanoverian kings did not establish England as a European or continentally connected people; that was established by the Norman Conquest. The Hanoverians helped answer the question of what *kind* of European power England would be: Germanic or French. It was another round in the *cultural* battles of Hastings. It appears that the reinvigoration of the Saxon identity of the royal line helped provoke a reinvigoration of the distinctly French identity of the England's Norman-based aristocracy. As Gerald Newman demonstrated in *The Rise of English Nationalism* (1740-1830), an emphasis on the "cosmopolitan" connections between the aristocracies of England and France helped provoked a counter-enlightenment of (nationalist) democratic revolution in England.

It is not hard to see how such Anglo-Saxon nationalism, conveniently labeled as "democracy", could have helped provoke the path to revolution in America. Yet the real question is not why the Anglo-Saxon based North rebelled against England's compromise with Norman aristocracy, but why the relatively conservative Norman-Cavalier based aristocracy of the American South rebelled against Britain.

When Norman-Cavaliers migrated to Virginia in the 1650s they were *Royalists*; loyalists to King Charles. The Cavaliers who followed Charles I were "royalists" in a similar sense as the Normans who followed William at Hastings. The failure of the Jacobite cause and the rise of a line of "Saxon" kings meant that the old Royalist cause had been defeated in England. The Norman-Cavalier link to a distinctly "royalist" cause had been smoldered beyond redemption.

From a strictly *Royalist* view, the question was: who *rules*? It was as if British Norman aristocrats had been conquered by a Saxon line of kings. Put another way, if the Roman Empire was Roman, was the British Empire to be Norman or Saxon?

The North and South of America's British colonies could support the revolution of 1776 for incompatible reasons because each was hereditarily alienated from the British compromise of 1688 for incompatible reasons. While the Northern cause emphasized alienation from Britain's old Frenchified Norman aristocracy, the Southern cause emphasized alienation from the Saxon "progress" represented by the Hanoverian kings. The encroaching success of Anglo-Saxon political representation in England thus helped to catalyze Southern conversion to revolution in America.

Now it was the Norman-Cavaliers who rejected the Faux-father lineage that had usurped the crown. Aristocratic revolt against a king following a progressive de-Normanization of the line of kings matched the original pattern that produced Magna Carta. This time it helped produce the United States Constitution.

In *The Cousins' Wars*, Kevin Phillips claimed that the American War for Independence had more in common with the English Civil War and its Puritan Revolution than with England's "Glorious Revolution" of 1688.[555] He cited historian Richard Bushman's observation that, "Americans rejected the Glorious Revolution as a model in 1776 and followed instead the bloody Puritan Revolution, when England had executed its king."[556] While shifting circumstances render exceptionless parallels impossible, the Puritan Revolution was *not* more relevant to America's revolution than 1688.

The compromise of 1688 tended to mollify the extremes of both freedom and slavery in Britain. While compromising with the Conquest limited extreme Saxon freedom, the Somerset decision of 1772 limited the opposite extreme of slavery. In this case, a slave of an American colonist brought to England was freed by the High Court of London. This opened the question of the legitimacy of slavery within the British Empire. The decision alarmed Southerners and was another crucial factor that led Norman-Cavalier aristocrats in America to rebel against Britain in 1776.

This is another reason that Massachusetts and Virginia could unite against the compromise of 1688 for opposite reasons. The Anglo-Saxon North could rebel for a more extreme freedom against compromise with the Norman aristocratic tradition. The Norman ruled South could rebel against compromise with both a tyrannical Saxon king and

in defense of the opposite extreme of preserving black slavery. Whereas Normans and Saxons had to live with one another as "classes" in Britain, geographic separation allowed incompatible causes to unite under the name of "liberty" in America.

So while the American Revolution can rightly be seen as more extreme than 1688, it would be a fundamental error to simple equate it solely with the more Northern extreme. The American Constitution shares more in common with 1688 than the Puritan Revolution in the sense that it was a compromise dominated by two opposite extremes. Whereas 1688 established a paradigm of moderation between the extremes of freedom and slavery, the American Constitution had to embody a more "universalistic" character because it had to contain more radical and incompatible extremes within its breadth.

Only when the American Civil War replicated the extremism of the English Civil War was there a truer parallel to England's Puritan Revolution. That was the end of the compromises of 1688 and the American Constitution. While traditional analyses of the Puritan Revolution focus obsessively on the killing of the king, the abolition of the aristocratic representation of the House of Lords exposes the greater parallel. The "three-fifths" solution for slavery, after all, allowed *de facto* superiority in political representations for Norman planters and other slave-owners. If Northern abolitionists aimed at the abolition of slavery, and the abolition of slavery amounted to the abolition of the slave master, then the abolitionists aimed at the abolition of the slave master. While the English Civil War led to the abolition of the House of Lords in 1649, the American Civil War led to the abolition of the slave master in 1865. The connection

between these events is the common abolition of the Norman Yoke.

1649 and 1865 represent the two most uncompromised Anglo-Saxon victories against Norman aristocracy. 1660-1 and 1861 represent the two most uncompromised attempts to restore the Norman Yoke (The Restoration of Charles II in 1660 and the Cavalier Parliament that first assembled on May 8, 1661 can be seen as a partial precedent for the neo-Cavalier Confederate rebellion of 1861). The two major Norman-based restorations are represented, in political theory, by Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* (1680) and Fitzhugh's *Cannibals All!* (1857).

Although it sometimes assumed that Locke's *Two Treatises on Government* represents a justification of 1688, where in Locke is there explicit avocation for the restoration of hereditary aristocracy? On the level of political philosophy, 1688 was a compromise between Locke and Filmer. The American Revolution, especially in the form of Constitutional slavery, also represents an expanded compromise between these incompatible principles. Both 1688 and 1776, to make an oversimplified generalization, thus represent compromises between Anglo-Saxon democracy and Norman aristocracy. With this deeply complex history of clash and compromise, it should not be surprising that a conservative thinker like Edmund Burke could only point to a "tradition" that exhausts any attempt to find a single coherent political principle.

Edmund Burke's Argument against Ancient Anglo-Saxon Tradition

One might think that anyone with as much deference for British tradition as Edmund Burke would surely revere the

ancient laws and ways of the Saxons that preceded the Norman Conquest. In *Reflections of the French Revolution*, he famously concluded that

> All the reformations we have hitherto made have proceeded upon the principle of reference to antiquity.[557]

Yet in *Abridgment of English History*, he wrote, "that ancient constitution, and those Saxon laws" did not exist in the same form in his day. They "make little or nothing for any of our modern parties", nor should they.

Burke's reverence for historical continuity made his contradictory dismissal of the ancient Saxon laws all the more glaring. Moreover, the violent nature of the break with tradition in 1066 made exaltation of tradition over reason and conscience all the more conspicuous. The question, as posed by English-born American Thomas Paine in *Common Sense* (1776), was whether the tradition that Burke sought to edify could be deemed honorable at all:

> no man in his senses can say that their claim under William the Conqueror is a very honorable one. A French bastard landing with an armed banditti and establishing himself King of England, against the consent of the natives, is, in plain terms, a very paltry, rascally original. It certainly has no divinity in it.

Conquest against the consent of the natives was the very antithesis of democracy.

How could it be "common sense" for Paine to harp on about some "French bastard" and events over seven hundred years old in a brief polemical pamphlet? Why did he assume this would have any relevance for his readers whatsoever? Far from being an obscure passage in an

esoteric treatise, *Common Sense* was "the most incendiary and popular pamphlet of the entire Revolutionary era."[558]

The word "radical" is derived from Latin, from *radix*, meaning *root*. To be a radical is to grasp at the roots. Paine was educating his people on the Latinate root of their grievances.

Like a doctor explaining to a patient the source of a chronic malaise, Paine tried to enlighten his audience as to the root cause of their animosity to British government. Traditional ambivalence about serving this aristocracy or "love of liberty" might itself be Anglo-Saxon common sense, but the more fundamental source of this 'good old cause' might not be. Yet the relevance of the Bastard's career was plain enough to those who had the common sense to see it.

For the Anglo-Saxon majority, the political tradition that began with the Normans was always bound in some way with their defeat. At its most extreme, the English political tradition *was* their ethnic defeat. The status quo preserved time-honored rituals of submission; what John Adams called the "regular and uniform Subordination of one Tribe to another down to the apparently insignificant animalcules in pepper water."[559] Those old customs bound the Anglo-Saxon people to their conventional dishonor and collective class-caste inferiority. And for those who had forgotten the Conquest itself, there was always its legacy in the House of Lords to remind them.

Traditionalists seldom mention that these French Normans could not have been so foreign had they not jettisoned their own Scandinavian language and culture centuries earlier. Burkean arguments for tradition were apparently not cogent to Hereward and the rest of the traditional English nobility in 1066 — especially since it would have to be communicated in the alien French

language. Where tradition was lacking during the takeover itself, other forms of persuasion were used: military force, starvation, intimidation, repression, genocide, and death.

With terror against tradition, violence, and tyranny in the name of civilization, and the total destruction of the ancient Anglo-Saxon aristocracy, the Norman Conquest was England's French revolution. The Conquest was an act of innovative audacity whose consequences became tradition. It is this that must be kept in mind when Oliver Cromwell and other "new men" were called breakers of tradition, or, even better, "usurpers". "As to usurpation, no man will be so hardy to defend it," wrote Paine in *Common Sense*, "and that William the Conqueror was a usurper is a fact not to be contradicted. The plain truth is, that the antiquity of English monarchy will not bear looking into."

Burke's argument for historical precedent could be turned around and used to justify a radical rejection of the entire legacy of the innovative Norman tyranny. Paine turned to "the divine origin of the rights of man at the creation" which was "authority against authority all the way". Biblical authority from "time when man came from the hand of his Maker" would supersede political authority dating merely from 1066.[560] With this argument, Paine could wield divinely inspired natural rights against the constitution of England.

The constitutionality of English hereditary right was apparently founded on the right of conquest of an illegitimate son of a duke of Normandy. Paine counted himself among those unwilling to use tradition to plug up the logical holes in that argument. Furthermore, if William the Conqueror was worthy of his name, then when exactly did the Anglo-Saxons stop being conquered? For Paine, the answer to that question was a call for revolution, as he made clear in his response to Burke, *The Rights of Man* (1791):

> Every thing must have had a beginning, and the fog of time and antiquity should be penetrated to discover it. Let then Mr. Burke bring forward his William of Normandy, for it is to this origin that his argument goes. It also unfortunately happens, in running this line of succession, that another line, parallel thereto, presents itself, which is, that if the succession runs in the line of the Conquest, the nation runs in the line of being conquered, and it ought to rescue itself from this reproach.

In that final sentence lies the kernel of this founder's understanding of the revolution. This is the understanding that has been forgotten in recent times. The dismissal of catalyst of the Conquest can be had only by dismissing the most thoughtful founders themselves. Although recent discoveries of sociobiology provide fundamental insights that the American founders were not in a historical position to understand, no one can claim to understand the founders without attempting to understand them as they understood themselves. There is nothing new or revolutionary about the most basic revolutionary argument against the Norman invasion.

What is common sense? Traditional hatred of the Norman Yoke was common sense. Cultural Anti-Normanism *is* the original *common sense*, democratic understanding of the American Revolution. Americans are no longer able to immediately grasp the significance of the Norman Conquest *because they have lost their common sense*. They have lost the common sense understanding of the Norman Yoke that was plainly evident to Thomas Paine and his audience. Whereas others American founders were inclined to sublimate or repress the entire issue, Paine brought home the plain reality of the Norman Conquest to ordinary people. *Common Sense*

was what historian Gordon Wood called "the most incendiary and popular pamphlet of the entire Revolutionary era"[561] *precisely* because it set aflame the old burning hatred of the Norman Yoke that Norman civilization had attempted to put out.

Paine ranted repeatedly about the Norman Conquest in *The Rights of Man*:

> If we begin with William of Normandy, we find that the government of England was originally a tyranny, founded on an invasion and conquest of the country…the exertion of the nation, at different periods, to abate that tyranny, and render it less intolerable, has been credited for a Constitution. Magna Carta…was no more than compelling the Government to renounce a part of its assumptions.

It "was, as far as it went, of the nature of a re-conquest, and not of a Constitution: for could the nation have totally expelled the usurpation, as France has done its despotism, it would then have had a Constitution to form." Paine's call for Anglo-American revolution was the call for a *total* re-conquest from the Norman usurpation. Total regeneration of the Anglo-Saxon body politic was, for Paine, what makes for a Constitution.

Burke's argument for tradition was important in this conflict precisely because of the discontinuity in kinship descent between the conquerors and the conquered. Customs of "class" had served as a practical cultural bond to compensate for the untraditional rupture of kinship bonds; traditions of subjugation that reinforced and served the hereditary Norman usurpation. But in the end, these elements of culture and tradition were not strong enough to trump kinship.

William the Vivisector is *the* key to understanding the limitations of the political philosophy of Edmund Burke. To reject tradition breakers and ruiners of organic social relationships, Burke would have to reject William the Conqueror. To reject William the Conqueror, Burke would have to reject the innovations that were the *de facto* foundation of the British political traditions he desired to preserve against the threat of revolution. As a political philosopher, a traditionalist, and a Briton, Edmund Burke stood on the shoulders of William the Conqueror's contempt for "Burkean" objections to the Conquest. To measure Burke's stature as a thinker is thus to ask: Who possessed the superior political mind, Edmund Burke or William the Conqueror?

When Did the Anglo-Saxons Stop Being Conquered?

Well over a hundred years before Paine's works, John Hare penned what is perhaps the most radical attack on the Norman legacy of all. *St. Edwards Ghost, or Anti-Normanism* was written during the year the English Civil War broke out, and was published in 1647. The title referred to King Edward the Confessor, who was traditionally associated with Anglo-Saxon laws lost through the Conquest.

Hare combined xenophobia and anti-aristocratic rhetoric united upon a single, common enemy: the Norman usurper. Radical political change and anti-alien indignation walked hand in hand: "If we contemplate the heraldry and titles of our nobility, there is scarce any other matter than inventories of foreign villages."[562] In refutation of those who believe that the Anglo-Saxons never fully revolted against the Norman Conquest and were thus a nation that preferred subjugation

to freedom, Hare felt that tolerance of the French-Norman oppression was not "suitable to the dignity or tolerable to the spirit of this our nation….Even the barbarous Irish" had bravely revolted against their Norman Yoke. Their violent means should not be imitated because "it is but the carcass of an enemy that we have to remove out of our territories, even the carcass and bones of the Norman Duke's injurious and detested perpetrations."[563]

Hare's views make a very common sense question inescapable: when did the Anglo-Saxons stop being conquered? Hare answered this question in unambiguous terms: still, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Anglo-Saxon people still lay in bondage under the tyranny established by the Norman Conquest. Consciousness of this condition provoked, not peaceable submission, but a call to action.

What was to be done? Hare advanced the following program, summarized by Christopher Hill:

> (1) Deprive William of the title Conqueror; (2) Let the King abandon his claim by conquest; (3) Let the Norman nobility "repudiate their names and titles brought over from Normandy…and disclaime all right to their possessions here as Heyres and Successors to any pretended Conquerours"; (4) "All Lawes and usages introduced from Normandy" should be abolished and the laws of Edward the Confessor restored: the laws to be in English; (5) The language should be purified of Gallicisms.[564]

Radical ideas! To fully carry out such a program would amount to disinheriting or overthrowing the hereditary aristocracy — what is today referred to as "revolution." Apparently Hare was not alone in this feeling towards England's hereditary rulers for two years after its

publication King Charles I was executed, the House of Lords was formally abolished, and the Puritans ascended to revolutionary victory.

The actions that culminated in the overthrow of 1649 offer a historical verification of the kin selective basis of the theory of the Norman Yoke. Reaction against "the execrable race of Stuarts" appears to have enflamed the ancient, xenophobic, anti-Norman feeling that Hare gave literary expression. However, since sociobiological theory must be tested against human behavior, let us focus here on the empirically observable historical record of the *behavior* of the reformists and revolutionaries rather than the *rationalizations* of their own behavior.

From this emphasis on observable behavior, one can observe conflict with hereditary authority, engagement in war, and victory consummated with the legal disinheritance of the traditional hereditary ruling order. This pattern of *behavior* is observable in the English Civil War, the American in the War for Independence, and the American Civil War. These behaviors are comprehensible on the basis of a conflict of kin selective interests. At least some of these behaviors can be attributed to the influence of genes expressed through a collective unconscious.

Yet when we do focus on the most thoughtful and intelligent ideological revolutionaries, who among Americans would include Paine and Jefferson, it becomes clear that they are not slaves to blind genetic impulses, but are clearly conscious that the war they are advocating is partly a hereditarily based struggle that dates from the Norman Conquest. For Thomas Jefferson, too, believed that the old Saxon laws should be restored. In fact, he believed he had helped to achieve this restoration. In a letter to Edmund Pendleton on August 13, 1776, he wrote:

> Are we not the better for what we have hitherto abolished of the feudal system? Has not every restitution of the antient Saxon laws had happy effects? Is it not better now that we return at once into that happy system of our ancestors, the wisest and most perfect ever yet devised by the wit of man, as it stood before the 8th century?[565]

Hare's program, partly realized with victory in the English Civil War is, in its fundamentals, the same as that of Jefferson during the American Revolutionary War: disinheriting and overthrowing the Norman rooted aristocratic order and restoring Saxon self-rule. Hare and Jefferson maintained different variations on the same themes. Between them, one can see the evolution of a more universally satisfying "reason"; the rationalization of the Anglo-Saxon collective unconscious.

Rhesus macaques monkeys do not need to write declarations of independence or manifestos of macaque equality to justify matriline overthrow or "revolution". No higher intellectual capacities are required to engage in kin selective behaviors. What were required were genetically-based adaptive behaviors inherited from their forbearers.

From a comparable sociobiological perspective, religious movements such as Puritanism gave moral justification for kin selective behaviors just as well as the secular notion of rights. And in the case of the Puritan Revolution, the American Revolution, and the Yankee Revolution, this seemingly mysterious mixture of the religious and secular enthusiasm is exactly what one finds. Jefferson's emphasis on "natural rights" and rationalized politics can already be observed within earlier traditions of Anglo-Saxon radicalism such as the Levellers. And it was exactly these Levellers who adopted Hare's ideas.[566]

Thomas Jefferson once maintained that although the Anglo-Saxon "constitution was violated and set at naught by Norman force", a "final re-conquest of their rights from the Stuarts" meant "the nation re-entered into all its rights."[567] How could this be squared with the re-conquest of major lines of the old Norman aristocracy in England after 1660? Is there evidence that some Englishmen nonetheless acted under a lingering assumption that they remained a conquered people?

At the head of the calls for liberty in England was Jefferson's contemporary, the demagogic leader John Wilkes. In 1763, he was arrested and tried for the treasonous libeling of George III and the English government. This was the same year that the royal Proclamation effected a tightening of Britain's imperial grip on the American colonies; the same year that George III noted that there were "insurrections and tumults in every part of" England.[568] Elected to the House of Commons many times, Wilkes was denied his seat each time. He became a popular symbol of this pent up frustration with the old system in the 1760s.

In June 1780, while the Britain Empire continued its civil war in America, London's Gordon Riots left hundreds dead over a period of weeks. George Gordon's Protestant Association formed a popular counter-movement to what was perceived as the un-Englishness of upper class support for the Catholic Relief Bill. This aristocratic "cosmopolitanism" was a code word for the persistence of a Francophilic cultural Normanism that provoked a nativist reaction among the people. The charismatic quality of Gordon's leadership has been compared to that of Adolf Hitler.[569]

England experienced revolutionary violence from 1779-84, an unmistakable parallel to the revolutionary violence in

America. These internal tumults receded only with Pitt's triumph over Fox for the post of Prime Minister in 1784. A vote for Pitt was a vote for English (read: Anglo-Saxon) virtue and identity. While at first this may appear simplistic, historian Gerald Newman concluded, "the obvious explanation is nonetheless the right one...The key to the election of 1784 is the fact that Pitt was perceived as the embodiment of English National Character, while Fox was perceived as its antithesis."[570]

Pitt's power to assuage mass revolt and popular violence demonstrates how Anglo-Saxon national representation was the deeper, unconscious, motivational force behind England's moves towards "democracy". In America the unity of power and the people was achieved through the mechanisms of democracy and, failing that, with the election of Lincoln and more civil war. It was a comparable national unity — and not literal democracy — that satisfied the English enough so that an American-style revolution was not necessary.

Part of Pitt's achievement was to begin the process of breaking down the connection between the peerage and the great landlords. This clarified the nature of the incompatible loyalties between Pitt and Fox. Fox was viewed as a representative of his "class". Pitt's victory represented "the humble Saxons below, throwing out the evil Normans above."[571]

"America was not conquered by William the Norman"

English Major John Cartwright, the "Father of Reform," was offered the position of first lieutenant to the Duke of Cumberland at the start of the American Revolutionary War.

He declined this promising career path, believing the revolution to be a just cause. Nearly half a century later, he sent Jefferson a letter along with a copy of his book, *The English Constitution*. "I have read this with pleasure and much approbation," the former president responded in a letter of June 5, 1824,

> and think it has deduced the constitution of the English nation from its rightful root, the Anglo-Saxon….And although this constitution was violated and set at naught by Norman force, yet force cannot change right. A perpetual claim was kept up by the nation, by their perpetual demand of a restoration of their Saxon laws; which shews they were never relinquished by the will of the nation. In the pullings and haulings for these antient rights, between the nation, and its kings of the races of Plantagenets, Tudors and Stuarts, there was sometimes gain, and sometimes loss, until the final re-conquest of their rights from the Stuarts. The destitution and expulsion of this race broke the thread of pretended inheritance, extinguished all regal usurpations, and the nation re-entered into all its rights.[572]

The idea that "the nation re-entered into all its rights", and that was the end of it, is a classic exhibition of Jefferson's genius for self-contradiction. It stands right up there with the contradiction of a slave-owning egalitarian. How could the rights of man, the consent of the governed, or even the "Saxon laws" be reconciled with the survival of that other pretended inheritance, the hereditary Norman-based aristocracy that survived even after 1688? How could Jefferson, of all people, maintain that England or Britain was a model nation that had "re-entered into all its rights"? The decisive point here was that Jefferson *had* to contain the fires of the Norman Conquest before they engulfed his own

modern project lest it turn into a very unmodern exercise in tribal warfare. Try as he did to find a definitive solution, there was no way to avoid these kinds of self-contradictions.

Like Paine, Jefferson thought that 1066 posed the unresolved victory of Norman might over Saxon right. Like Macaulay, the former President judged that despite all those succeeding centuries, "a perpetual claim was kept up by the nation" for "a restoration of their Saxon laws" until the "will of the nation" manifested itself through the seventeenth century revolutions. This interpretation was also confirmed by E. A. Freeman in the nineteenth century, a man with a greater overall command of the historical facts of the Norman Conquest than anyone else of his time.

Historian Gordon Wood wrote that before the twentieth century, "the American Revolution was seen as a peculiarly intellectual and conservative affair, as something brought about not by actual oppression but by the anticipation of oppression, by reasoning and devotion to principle."[573] This assessment is partially contradicted by Jefferson. The notion that American democracy emerged through anticipatory speculations upon the subject of tyranny makes its peculiar Anglo-Saxon/Norman origins inexplicable. Jefferson's historical account of the origins of the struggle for liberty confirms that American liberal democracy is a product of a peculiar historical experience.

William the Conqueror spared England from the luxury of having to imagine what tyranny might possibly be like:

> Perhaps the king's behavior can be excused if he was at times quite severe with the English, for he found scarcely any of them faithful. This fact so irritated his fierce mind that he took from the greater of them first their wealth, then their land, and finally, in some instances, their lives.[574]

Dispersing with the need for William of Malmsbury's excuses for William and rationalizations of his behavior, American democracy emerged from slowly evolved lessons of abating the very actual oppression of national subjugation to ensure that those experiences would not be repeated. The American Revolution was a culmination of centuries of schooling in "arbitrary government."

Anglo-Saxon democracy is an Anglo-Saxon solution to an Anglo-Saxon problem. The rights of man began as the expression of an Anglo-Saxon predicament, not a universal truth. At the very least, "humanity" had to be postulated simply to account for the existence of other peoples. The humanistic and universalistic face of revolution obscured the *acts* of Anglo-Saxon nationalism while *realizing* a peak expression of Anti-Normanism.

Jefferson's own conception of the struggle reveals an evolutionary process rather than a simple revolution. There was trial and error, gain and loss, "pullings and haulings" for those ancient rights. Historically, the Puritan Revolution was the first decisive step in this process of trial and error. Since it was at least partly attributable to the first groping expression of blindly evolved impulses towards kin selection (the "will of the nation"), the results are not surprising: this first crude step towards democracy began as a commonwealth (1649-1653) and ended in Cromwell's military dictatorship. Yet right from this beginning we can see, for example, that some of the more radical Levellers conspired against Cromwell as a betrayal of the principles fought for in that Civil War.

From an evolutionary perspective, the fact that the Puritan Revolution ultimately failed is irrelevant in comparison to the fact that such an event happened at all. The fact of the failure of the revolts from 1066-1071 is

similarly irrelevant in comparison to the fact of revolt itself. Both events point to ethnic hostility with a scientifically comprehensible basis in kin selective behaviors.

Evolution is a blind process, and while some foundational precedents can be found for the American Revolution in the 1640-1660 period, it should not be assumed that the cultural mutations that began then were necessarily attributable to human foresight. While the failure of the Puritan Revolution discredited its radicalism in England, others would learn from this experiment in revolution. The success of the principles and practice of American democracy bears the collective wisdom acquired by learning (through John Locke, for example) from the mistakes of these predecessors.

In *A Summary View of the Rights of British America* (1774), Jefferson explained how the Battle of Hastings was connected with his own disagreement with the King:

> In the earlier ages of the Saxon settlement feudal holdings were certainly altogether unknown; and very few, if any, had been introduced at the time of the Norman conquest. Our Saxon ancestors held their lands, as they did their personal property, in absolute dominion, disencumbered with any superior… William, the Norman, first introduced that system generally. The lands which had belonged to those who fell in the battle of Hastings, and in the subsequent insurrections of his reign, formed a considerable proportion of the lands of the whole kingdom. These he granted out, subject to feudal duties, as did he also those of a great number of his new subjects, who, by persuasions or threats, were induced to surrender them for that purpose. But still much was left in the hands of his Saxon subjects; held of no superior, and not subject to feudal conditions.

Feudalistic military duties were exacted "and the Norman lawyers soon found means to saddle them also with all the other feudal burthens." However,

> America was not conquered by William the Norman, nor its lands surrendered to him, or any of his successors….Our ancestors…were farmers, not lawyers. The fictitious principle that all lands belong originally to the king, they were early persuaded to believe real; and accordingly took grants of their own lands from the crown….It is time, therefore, for us to lay this matter before his majesty, and to declare that he has no right to grant lands of himself.[575]

Two years later he would lay this matter before "his majesty" in the Declaration of Independence. That document listed a broad range of grievances against the king that has a striking parallel in *The Grand Remonstrance* of 1641. Drafted by John Pym and his supporters immediately preceding the English Civil War, Oliver Cromwell once remarked that if the *Remonstrance* had not been passed he would have sold all he owned and left for America.

If the American Revolution was only about local taxation and autonomy issues, then there might be no real connection between it and the English Civil Wars. But just as some Massachusetts Puritans returned to England to fight against the Royalists in the English Civil War, others followed through on Cromwell's second considered option, staying for good. Just as American colonial discontentment with the British government mounted with the tightening of imperial authority in the 1760s, rioting and unrest in England, directed towards the political system as a whole and represented by John Wilkes, paralleled the path to American revolution. America was disproportionately populated with

those felt, like Cromwell, that freedom might be found in emigration.

In order to make sense of all of these connections, one must go the sociobiological root of the antagonism with the hereditary British authorities. This is exactly what Jefferson does, deriving the need for right from the ultimate source of wrong at the Battle of Hastings. The legal source of wrong was the legitimized of the "right of conquest." "The ancient laws of England", wrote Sir Francis Bacon in 1596, were "planted here by the Conqueror". That is, the "Conqueror got by right of conquest all the land of the realm into his own hands" and parceled them out to his followers as he saw fit.[576]

It is remarkable just how far Jefferson thought out the implications of the Norman right of conquest. If "William, the Norman" introduced "feudalism" and its "fictitious principle that all lands belong to the king" then Jefferson's opposition to "feudal" principles can be identified with opposition to the Norman Conquest. In apparent contradiction to his letter written fifty years later which proposed that the "nation re-entered into all its rights from the Stuarts", Jefferson presented his opposition to the Norman "feudal" legacy as living history still unresolved. Since "America was not conquered by William the Norman…or any of his successors," the king "has no right to grant lands of himself" and "it is time, therefore to lay this matter before his majesty." It is likely that after fifty years, with the deeds done, its problematic contradictions his egalitarian state restrained Jefferson from pursuing the full implications of this line of thinking past 1688. Yet two years before the Revolution Jefferson argued that the British Empire was actually a continuation of the Norman Conquest and that to oppose that "feudal" menace was to oppose

"William the Norman," just like "our Saxon ancestors" that died to do the same at the Battle of Hastings.

America versus Jefferson?

> **"Are the unjust in your opinion good as well as prudent, Thrasymachus?"**
> **"Yes, those who can do injustice perfectly," he said "and are able to subjugate cities and tribes of men to themselves."**
>
> —*THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO* (348D)

Was the Norman Conquest just? If this question appears fantastically naïve to some, is it fundamentally more naïve than the ideals of American justice themselves? The simple question of the justice of 1066 stands at the very heart of the original impetus of democratizing movements in the English-speaking world. It is precisely through lack of resolution of to this question, posed over and over from different perspectives, spoiling and festering over the centuries, which reveals how the Norman Yoke became an incubator of democratic justice.

The abstract justice of the democratic revolutions cannot be separated from kin selective conflict because explaining the Conquest ultimately means explaining what a human being is. Evolutionary evidence posits a human as an evolved gene propagator, inseparable, in this case, from kin selective behavior. For example, if Jefferson considered himself to be a natural heir of a regenerated Saxon aristocracy, on what grounds could he view Hereward's disinheritance as just? If forgiving and forgetting the violent and oppressive origins of the Norman based aristocracy was

also to act unjustly, then how could one rectify the situation? Jefferson's entire career as a revolutionary centered upon this single idea: the Norman Conquest was wrong *in principle*.

This becomes clear if one simply asks: if the Norman Conquest is judged by the revolutionary ideas of the rights of man, was it acceptable *in principle*? A common response is that these concepts cannot be accurately applied to such a different time. However, one must first disbelieve that the rights of man are fully and truly universal before one can argue that it is an error to apply modern standards of right to pre-modern times. That relativistic response fails to answer the question of where Jefferson's standards of right came from. How did these standards of right come to be in the first place?

If the rights of man are truly natural, reflecting the unchanging nature of man, then they are universally applicable to all men. If the natural rights of man are universal, this means that they are applicable not only to men of the present, but also to men of both the past and the future. This means that if the rights of man are truly universal, then the passage of centuries made not an iota of difference for fundamental principles of right. The Norman right of conquest violated the universal rights of man and therefore the entire political tradition founded in 1066 could be overthrown in the name of the rights of man.

This means that the world-historical injustice of 1066 was the father of the world-historical justice of 1776.

The Declaration of Independence was an unambiguous answer to the question of the justice of the Norman Conquest. Just as with Paine, the universality of the rights of man was most *relevant* in delegitimizing the historical root of arguments for British hereditary right founded in the

Norman right of conquest. Similar arguments were made by many Levellers in the seventeenth century, often with an ambiguity between the recovery of ancient pre-Conquest rights and rights because they *ought* to exist.

Jefferson, however, held the stronger version of these arguments, claiming explicitly that the pre-Conquest Saxon order was founded in the "rights of man" or the "natural rights of the nation" which were violated by the Conquest. A year before his death, he contrasted the original Anglo-Saxon occupation of England in the fifth century with the Norman occupation of 1066,

> the former exhibiting the genuine form and political principles of the people constituting the nation, and founded in the rights of man; the latter built on conquest and physical force, not at all affecting moral rights, nor even assented to by the free will of the vanquished. The battle of Hastings, indeed, was lost, but the natural rights of the nation were not staked on the events of a single battle. Their will to recover the Saxon constitution continued unabated.[577]

Those who hold that modern democratic standards should not be imposed on events of the past should take their argument up with the words of Thomas Jefferson. One of the single strongest impetuses for the universality of the rights of man in Jefferson's mind stemmed from the imposition of this modern political concept upon that primeval pre-Conquest past of his presumed Saxon ancestors. The *universalism* of rights provided the key pivot in the internal logic of his argument for the illegitimacy of the Norman Conquest, and by implication, the right of revolutionary overthrown of the Norman legacy in 1776.

Those who *still* hold that modern democratic standards should not be imposed on events of the past might start by

reevaluating the imposition of the seemingly modern *lack* of kinship values on pre-modern times where kinship values were distinctly more central. The medieval, it seems, was not as foreign to the modern as some have thought.

Hastings is very appropriately considered a battle, not a war. From a more Anglo-Saxon point of view, the American Revolution was only a single battle in a long, drawn out kinship-ethnic conflict fought over a period of centuries. It was another episode in this uneven struggle against the royal "races". Would Hastings decide the fate of the Anglo-Saxon people until 'the end of time'? "Can one generation bind another, and all others, in succession forever?" Jefferson's career was like a living refutation of that proposition. He hoped that the American Revolution would be the very last battle in the war.

A work that strongly influenced Major Cartwright and other advocates of American independence was *Historical Essay on the English Constitution*, published in 1771 by English radical Obadiah Hulme.[578] It posits a kind of political dualism wherein ethnicity is linked with political philosophy. As Hulme puts it, "Whatever is of Saxon establishment is truly constitutional, but whatever is Norman is heterogeneous to it, and partakes of a tyrannical spirit."[579] Taken to its idealistic extreme, the Norman is associated with hierarchy and injustice, while the Saxon is associated with equality and justice. This association of constitutional rights and Anglo-Saxons neither began nor ended with Hulme. A hint of the association is given in Rudyard Kipling's poem *Norman and Saxon, A.D. 1100*: "The Saxon is not like us Normans. His manners are not so polite. But he never means anything serious till he talks about justice and right."

One of the most illuminating insights into the basic assumptions of Jefferson's politics is the confirmation of this same political-ethnic dualism. He revealed to Cartwright: "It has ever appeared to me, that the difference between the whig and the tory of England is, that the whig deduces his rights from the Anglo-Saxon source, and the tory from the Norman."[580] This statement, in itself, can help unfurl a primal perception underlying Jefferson's entire Weltanschauung. In turn, it can help clarify what Jefferson thought the revolution was fundamentally about.

The whig is liberal, leftist, reformist. The tory is conservative, rightist, royalist. The toryist rights of Normans originate from a right of conquest.

Jefferson comes across, not as an indifferent observer, but an active participant on the Anglo-Saxon-whig side. He echoes the same "us" and "them" commitments maintained by the Levellers well over a century before. They are expression of the same living history that E. A. Freeman would confirm in 1853, when the Oxford historian of the Norman Conquest wrote in the same letter of "abominable Norman thieves" and "the laws of King Cnut of blessed memory".[581] Freeman and Jefferson show the same mixture of romantic, idealistic nationalism and the intellectual conscience of a scientist. Jefferson would have understood what Freeman meant when he said, "history is past politics and politics are present history".

The whig of Monticello remarked that Hume, "the great apostle of toryism," said, "in the reign of the Stuarts, 'it was the people who encroached upon the sovereign, not the sovereign who attempted, as is pretended, to usurp upon the people.'" Jefferson retorted, "This supposes the Norman usurpations to be rights in his successors."[582] The whig interpretation of history is inseparable from the goal of

reversing the consequences of the Conquest. Jefferson continued to think out the implications of that ancient usurpation:

> Can one generation bind another, and all others, in succession forever? I think not. The Creator has made the earth for the living, not the dead….Nothing then is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable rights of man.[583]

And these rights, as we have seen, were conceived as inherent in the Anglo-Saxon race.

This very 'modern' appeal to "the living, not the dead" echoes, ironically, the Levellers at Putney over a hundred years earlier near the close of the English Civil War. Fearing that the monarchy would only be replaced by a new dictatorship, mutiny provoked the anti-Royalist Army Council officers to listen to the arguments of soldiers. Historian Christopher Hill recounted how the Levellers gradually "abandoned the claim to be merely asserting Anglo-Saxon liberties. Instead they demanded the inalienable rights of man." One of them had stated, "Whatever our forefathers were, or whatever they did or suffered, or were enforced to yield unto, we are the men of the present age, and ought to be absolutely free from all kinds of exorbitancies, molestations or arbitrary power." The arguments from Anglo-Saxon precedent could be abandoned: "reason hath no precedent, for reason is the fountain of all just precedents".[584] At Putney, we bear witness to an evolutionary fulcrum inherited by Jefferson: the change from the birthrights of Englishman to the rights of man. Modernity is, in part, the repression of the origins of modernity.

When all is considered, does the Jeffersonian left advance universalism or ethnocentrism? His very egalitarianism appears identical with a kind of radical Anglo-Saxon nationalism. The democratic idealism he is so well known for is inseparable from his idealization of his presumed Saxon ancestors. His idealization of the tyrannical Norman-tory enemy was the flip side of his skewed conception of pre-conquest England as almost an egalitarian utopia. Yet this imagined past was decisive in formulating the substance of the revolutionary restoration of the old Saxon laws. Radicalizing the apartheid between his conceptions of the Norman and Saxon ways of government, Jefferson's egalitarianism is a sublimation of ethnic hatred against the Norman legacy.

In Joseph Ellis's *American Sphinx*, Jefferson's biographer rightly observed a strange mixture of conscious and unconscious motivation when he concludes, "the Whig interpretation of history, deserves studied attention as a crucial clue to Jefferson's deepest intellectual instincts." Jefferson emerges as a peak expression of a more general Anglo-Saxon collective unconscious and perhaps the dreamer of unhistorical fantasies such as 'Harold Defeats William in National Elections; Normans Go Back to Normandy'. It is this that helps explain the "once upon a time" character of some of his whiggish theories. Ellis found that the "Saxon myth and the doctrine of expatriation…were not clever and willful distortions…Jefferson clearly believed they were true."[585]

Yet the biographer jumped to the conclusion that Jefferson was simply wrong without confronting the possibility that this just might be the key to the riddle of the American Sphinx. In effect, Ellis charged that Jefferson misunderstood this basic reason why he fought Britain and

created the kind of constitution he did. This is really a colossal accusation. Perhaps Jefferson deserves a better chance to tell *his* version of America.

If Jefferson was incorrect, as a representative of the people, to say that their "will to recover the Saxon constitution continued unabated" after Hastings, then his understanding of Anglo-American history was *fundamentally wrong*. If Jefferson were mistaken, it would force us to question this founder's judgment in other matters as well. For if this was an error of the author of the Declaration of Independence, and was fundamental to his own understanding of what he was doing as a political activist, it would mean that his Saxon and Norman misconception was a blunder that has made world history.

As a much earlier biographer of Jefferson put it, "If Jefferson was wrong, America is wrong." Has America gotten Jefferson wrong? Perhaps, but the attempt to take Jefferson's point of view does not imply that one must take Jefferson as an ultimate authority in himself.

Since Jefferson clearly identified himself with the Saxons against the Normans in his writings, would it be at all significant if Jefferson turned out to *be* half-Norman? When Jefferson's father married Jane Randolph, he married into the Cavalier elite.[586] While I doubt that this is true in a strict genealogical sense, Jefferson could be considered half-Saxon and half-Norman in a *social* sense. Was Jefferson socially slighted as a half-breed by some pure bred Cavaliers? Did he feel like an outsider among them? Did Jefferson see something of his own predicament in his mulatto slave and lover Sally Hemmings?

Did Norman blood contribute to Jefferson's greatness? Does this contradiction itself stand behind his belief in the tabla rasa and equality? One thing is virtually certain: the

Magna Carta legacy of the South's Cavalier *culture* helped stimulate Jefferson's striving for political greatness and this, in its own ironic way, stimulated his striving for the ideal of human equality. As a slave owner and elected lord of America, Jefferson did manage to live up to that famous principle that all men are created hypocritical.

If Jefferson was racially mixed and Jeffersonian equality represented the racial equality of Norman and Saxon, was this also the assertion of a post-racial self-identification as an *individual* as the new paradigm for American identity? If true, then Jefferson embodied *in his very being* both the reconciliation of Norman and Saxon and its profound inner contradictions.

Yet, by the very same token, Norman/Saxon reconciliation in equality left open the question of slave inequality among blacks. Slavery, "this momentous question, like a fire bell in the night, awakened, and filled me with terror. I considered it at once the knell of the Union."[587] If civil war represented the destruction of the union of the land then, perhaps for Jefferson, the prospect of civil war in America represented the tearing apart of his very soul.

Forefathers and Faux-fathers

In the sixth chapter of his *Second Treatise of Government,* "Of Paternal Power", English philosopher John Locke wrote, "Though I have said…*That all men by nature are equal*, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of *equality*." Rather, he meant "that *equal right*, that every man hath, *to his natural freedom* without being subjected to the will or

authority of any other man." The issue of equality was fundamentally the issue of "paternal power." The basic error was that "the natural *fathers of families*, by an insensible change, became the *politic monarchs* of them too."

Locke was taking issue with Sir Robert Filmer's conviction that "[t]he Father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will." If so, then parents "should carefully subdue the wills of their children and accustom them to obedience and submission."[588] The larger implication here is the classical notion that the patriarchal family provides a model for the patriarchal polity.

It was a very normal and common conception. Englishman Joseph Addison (1672-1719), in *The Spectator*, claimed, "The Obedience of Children to Parents is the Basis of all Government."[589] The king, said eighteenth century English jurist William Blackstone, was the "*pater familias* of the nation," and his subject was like a child subordinate to that paternal domination.[590]

Is there something wrong with this analogy? One of the distinctive characteristics of political modernity is the denial that familial fatherhood is truly analogous to political fatherhood. Locke's ideas on paternal power contrast, for example, with *patria potestas* ("power of a father"), the power that the male head exercised over his children in Roman family law. Far from being universal, Locke's ideas conflict not only with ancient norms, but also with contemporaries like Filmer that he explicitly challenged. What made Locke and his "modern" ideas different?

One might suspect that anyone as resistant to patriarchalism as Locke would have been a rebellious son in relation to his own father. But was this the case? Locke's father was an anti-Royalist cavalry captain in the English Civil War. If Filmer was right, then Locke's Puritan father

was wrong. Locke was actually a good son, implicitly defending the principle of his father's military participation in the Puritan Revolution's defeated cause. Locke would do with the pen what his father did by the sword.

The English Civil War shattered time honored stereotypes that chained race to class. Post-Conquest order was built upon perpetuating caste stereotypes wherein the Anglo-Saxon were, by nature, the conquered race and the Norman elite were the natural military conquerors. Puritan victory in that war turned these stereotypes on their head. Locke's own father rose from bourgeois lawyer to Anglo-Saxon conqueror. His father was a living refutation of those traditional Norman/Saxon stereotypes and Locke was brought up in the light of this patriarchal role model that confirmed the truth of the *tabla rasa*.

If there were undeniable truths in all of this, then what did this imply for the descendants of hereditary Norman conquerors? Did royal or aristocratic descent from the original conquerors of England make its heirs something less than the fathers of England? Were Normans born to rule Anglo-Saxons? If not, then how did the Normans, once hostile enemies on the battlefield at Hastings, razing and plundering villages as they roamed, miraculously become transformed into protective father figures?

"It is difficult to say which are the most revolting subjects of contemplation," declared the author of *The Aristocracy of England* (1846),

> the bastard king who led the way, the ready tools who deluged a whole land with innocent blood at his command, or the reptile swarms who, in the following age, stole in after them to deeds and usurpations equally detestable. Let the English people, when they hear of high blood, recollect the innocent blood of their fathers on which it fattened, and

> the spawn of miscellaneous, nameless and lawless adventurers, from whom it really flows.[591]

The author perceived that the English people are distinct from the aristocracy. Specifically, the fathers of the English Anglo-Saxons are not "high blood", but rather the victims of "high blood". Recalling the "innocent blood of their fathers" was an indictment *against* the hereditary government. The blood of England's forefathers was invoked to incriminate England's faux-fathers.

This sense of outrage against the world-historical fraud of the Norman Conquest was echoed by the anti-Royalists who acted on their indignation and overthrew that hereditary order in 1649. Yet it was not long after that victory in the English Civil War, that a Pamphlet of 1653 sounded a foreboding tocsin, with seeming awareness of the gathering Royalist forces that would ultimately restore of Charles II and the House of Lords:

> …William the Conquerours Army begins to gather into head againe, and the old Norman Prerogative Law is the place of their rendezvous: for though their chief Captain Charles be gone, yet his Colonells, which are Lords of Mannours, his Councellors and Divines, which are our Lawyers and Priests, his inferiour officers and Souldiers, which are the Freeholders and Land-lords, all which did steal away our Land from us when they killed and murdered our Fathers in that Norman conquest.[592]

The Normans were not England's true fathers; they were the murderers of England's true fathers. These Frenchmen were not the descendants of their forefathers; they were usurping faux-fathers. This apparent confounding of past and present had an underlying logic: a kinship logic. The

killers' descendants were "the Off-spring of the Bastard of William the sixth Duke of Normandy."[593]

With a right of re-conquest asserted in the Restoration of 1660, the Puritan Revolution faced the possibility of a historical verdict of total failure. The moderate nature of the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 reflects the moderate, compromised reassertion of the House of Commons against that verdict of total failure. Whereas the ruthless logic of Thomas Hobbes reflects the radical break with tradition represented by the Puritan Revolution (1640-1660), Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* (1690) reflects the moderation of the partial victory of 1688.

While the English Civil War was the pivotal event that effectually turned the English-speaking world towards modern political philosophy, its place in history has been severely depreciated and obscured. However, if we look at the English Civil War in light of human evolution, then the path towards modernity becomes clearer. Blind kin selective behaviors were given historical expression *first* and *then* we find the greater rationalizers, Hobbes and Locke, attempting to make sense of politics during and after this great upheaval. This point is crucial for understanding the relationship between the Puritan Revolution and the American Revolution. Locke was not simply an apologist for 1688; he provided no intellectual justification for the perpetuation of a hereditary aristocracy. It was the Americans, especially Jefferson, who gave Locke's political philosophy its greatest political influence.

No restoration could completely undo the memory and experience of the Puritan Revolution. The classical Greco-Roman assumption that there exists a "natural" relation between the rulers and ruled could no longer be held. While modern liberalism could be considered "unnatural" from a

classical perspective, the modernistic solutions of Hobbes and Locke have a natural, sociobiological logic of their own.

Locke continued his attack on Filmer's conventional conception of paternal power with the belief that the right of "*absolute arbitrary domination*…so little belongs to the *father* by any peculiar right of nature, but only as he is guardian of his children…it belongs as much to the *foster-father* of an exposed child, as to the natural father of another." In Locke's attempt to consistently weaken the arguments for political patriarchy, he was led to both strengthen the claims of the mother and weaken the claims of a father over his children. In order to denature a falsely natured political patriarchy, he was led to denature familial patriarchy to the point where the distinction between biological fatherhood and step-fatherhood (the *foster-father*) became irrelevant. However, from a sociobiological view, the distinction between a father and stepfather can be highly significant. Why should a father bother to invest time and energy in raising children at all?

Darwinian fitness is a measure in success in gene propagation. A man investing resources to raise a child is investing resources to pass on his genes. However, a stepfather who invests his resources to raise the child of another man is a cuckold. He may have reduced his own genetic fitness by helping to propagate another man's genes at the expense of his own. There are exceptions only on the basis of kin selection. That is, only if there is a close kinship relationship, i.e. if a man raises the child of his brother, is the scenario modified insofar as the altruist is kin.

What holds for classical familial patriarchy could be extended to political patriarchy *if* its underlying kin selective basis is extended with it. Therefore, to ask what difference a kinship bond between the government and the governed would make is like asking what difference a kinship bond

between a parent and a child would make. From the standpoint of genetic fitness, it does make a difference whether a parent's child is a biological child. This issue raises, once again, that central question of the effects of the Norman Conquest: What was the difference between these new Norman rulers and the previous rulers?

The general difference between the original English ruling families and the Norman ones that displaced them is the difference between a father and a stepfather. The Norman in-laws exploited their connections to justify a forced marriage by conquest. Their illegitimacy in the eyes of many Anglo-Saxons was that of a stepfather making claims proper to a biological father. The idea of a Norman stepfather is a more precise way of comprehending the conventional wisdom of normative, modern Anglo-Saxon political theorists: government is conventional; not natural.

The Norman royalty and aristocracy sought the benefits of political-patriarchal kinship without its actuality for the benefit of their own kinship lines. This does not mean that the Normans are wholly alien to the Anglo-Saxons, only that the kinship relation to the populace was relatively weak compared to the aristocracy they replaced. It does mean, on the basis of kin selection, that the rupture in kinship relations between the rulers and the ruled may have corresponded to a rupture in altruistic behaviors between the rulers and the ruled.

Masters of the Anglo-Saxon World

From this follows a connection between the kinship separatism of the aristocracy and political abuse of the Anglo-Saxon majority. Within families, close kinship relations are clearly no absolute guard against abuse. However, one experimentally verified theory of sociobiology

is the correlation between step parenting and child abuse. In one study, criminal child abuse was found to be much more likely in families with one stepparent as compared with families consisting of both biological parents.[594] This is likely an evolved adaptation that defends against the diversion of resources towards offspring not one's own. The same applies to political extensions of the family model based on kinship. In short, the issue of historic political abuses cannot be separated from a basis in kin selection.

Napoleon, in a conversation of 1818, claimed:

> There is not a populace in the world, not even the Prussian, worse treated [than the English]…You have no more regard for yours than if they were so many Helots, and you treat them precisely as if they were such…You yourself have got a great deal of aristocratic arrogance in your head and appear to look down upon your common people as if they were a race of inferior beings. You talk of your freedom…And yet you have the impudence to talk of the conscription in France: it wounds your pride, because it falls upon *all ranks*. Oh, how shocking that a gentleman's son should be obliged to defend his country just as if he were one of the riffraff! And that he should be compelled to expose his body or put himself on a level with a vile plebeian! Yet God made all men alike.[595]

His accusations may have been self-serving, but Bonaparte was hardly the only one to make them. In this view, the aristocracy saw themselves as separate from England's common "race of inferior beings" and resisted sacrificing themselves for a supposed common good. If the "English" class system originated in the rule of the descendants of conquering Normans, then we can make

sociobiological sense of this behavior through a correlation of kinship and altruism.

Even if Anglo-Saxons somehow accepted the Normans as authentic father figures, the kinship-apartheid gap would likely result in less care for them than for upper "class" Norman kin. That is, if the Normans rulers took inordinate care of the Anglo-Saxon population beyond the benefits of exploiting them, it would be as if they were cuckolded. They would be indulging resources towards a "child" not their own. To maintain their Darwinian fitness was identical to maintaining their nepotistic "class" separatism.

The closer one ventures back to 1066, the more the relationship slides from stepfather towards that of a faux-father or simply non-father. For example, in the first five years following the conquest was William's policy of treating revolting English the way a father treats a son or the way a master treats his slaves? The genocidal "harrying of the north" corroborates the notion that Norman mastery of England was imposed *despite* lack of kinship, not because of it. The so-called "feudal" principle that the conquering king held all England as his property implicated the people living on that land as extensions of his property. It implicates them toward a variety of slavery.

Slavery, the subjugation and forced labor of members of the same species, is a form of parasitism.[596] In 1849, Harney's *Democratic Review* made the case that

> this huge monopoly, this intolerable usurpation of the soil, had its foundation in force and fraud…. From the hour of the Norman Conquest…the whole history of the ancestors of the present usurpers of the soil is a crusade of confiscation, plunder, rapine and devastation…. The present aristocracy are the descendants of freebooters.[597]

What a modernist like Thomas Paine called "corruption" in *The Rights of Man* is what an evolutionary biologist calls genetically adaptive behavior:

> What is called the splendor of a throne, is no other than the corruption of the state. It is made up of a band of parasites, living in luxurious indolence, out of the public taxes.

The parasitism of this relationship has evolutionary parallels in many other species. For example, this Norman kin selective strategy has many parallels in the behavior of the so-called Amazon ants, i.e. *Polyergus rufescens*. Fighting is the only thing at which these ants excel. They are dependent on the slaves stolen from alien colonies for their livelihood. When its members are not engaged in bold, concerted actions of slave-raiding they are generally indolent, obtaining food from slaves or grooming themselves. [598]

While the Norman-Cavaliers of the American South were legendary for luxurious living dependent upon slave labor, Robert E. Lee exemplifies the militaristic side of this way of life. When forced to choose sides in the Civil War, it was not a negative hostility towards blacks, but a positive loyalty to the Cavalier stronghold of Virginia that was decisive. Slavery was an implication, but not the root of his loyalty to Southern cause.

Lee is a classic illustration of the correlation of kinship and duty. He led the *Army of Northern Virginia*, not the army of the South. In other words, his loyalty was determined primarily by his kinship connection to the Cavalier caste, and this is what took precedence over his relationship to Northerners and blacks.

A very similar connection between ethnic separatism and slavery was also evident in attacks on the Norman Yoke during the English Civil War period. Even "the best laws

that England hath," said the radical leader Gerrard Winstanley, "are yoaks and manicles, tying one sort of people to be slaves to another."[599] Hamilton's theory of kin selection allows one to understand what the Diggers' Saxon "communism" really was. Norman "class"-socialism in Britain and the American South was the flip side of this same kin selective principle.

This connection of kinship and "communism" had a parallel among the ancient Spartans. Popularly portrayed as the archetypal military state, these Greeks took pride in their superlative sense of political devotion and duty. Their subjugation of the indigenous Helots reveals the evolutionary conditions of that superlative political sacrifice: close kinship.

The Spartans were of Doric stock, and the Helots, native Achaeans. They were separated only by different dialects of the same Greek language. This seemingly meager ethnic difference poses a counterexample against the overestimation of the French language and culture in determining the Norman/Anglo-Saxon difference.

By common contemporary definitions, the ancient Spartans and the Helots they subjugated were both of the same "race"; they were both Greeks. While Normans and Anglo-Saxon were, in a similar way, apart of the same Germanic "race", this point only illustrates the crudity of the term "race" and its insensitivity to both greater refinements of difference and the genetic dynamics underlying the evolution of kin selection.

How, then, was the obedience of a Helot to his Spartan masters different from the obedience of a lower status Spartan to his Spartan superior? How was the obedience of an Anglo-Saxon to a Norman originally different from the obedience of a lower status Norman to his Norman

superior? The nineteenth century French historian of the impact of the Norman Conquest, Augustin Thierry, characterized the difference as that of *subjugation* versus *subordination*. Whereas a lower status Norman was originally *subordinated* to his Norman superior, the Anglo-Saxon was *subjugated* by his Norman superior.

The status of Anglo-Saxon subjugation was exemplified by the sturdy Norman castles that both consolidated their power and starkly separated them from the populace. Thierry shared with Catherine Macaulay both an ardent liberalism and an ethnic conflict interpretation of the English Civil War. The same ethnic interpretation applies to the American Civil War. In the South, plantations replaced castles while the subordination of men like Robert E. Lee supported the subjugation of other races. The subordination of Spartans and Normans in these cases lacked the same sense of disgrace and slavery because kinship provided a sociobiological foundation of evolved cohesion or unity.

One consequence of the kin selective basis of the Spartan way of life was that kin that are more distant were restricted from membership as a threat to the very foundations of its order. The Greek historian Thucydides recorded one Spartan means of handling the emergence of Helot elites less than a decade after the Peloponnesian War:

> the Helots were invited by a proclamation to pick out those of their number who claimed to have distinguished themselves against the enemy, in order that they might receive their freedom; the object being to test them, as it was thought that the first to claim their freedom would be the most high-spirited and the most apt to rebel. As many as two thousand were selected accordingly, who crowned themselves and went round the temples, rejoicing in their new freedom. The Spartans, however, soon afterwards did

away with them, and no one ever knew how each of them perished.[600]

The most able and courageous of the subjugated were also the most potentially dangerous. They were targeted for elimination, not for their lack of abilities, but because of them. If kinship was the very condition of the unique cohesion of the Spartan state, then even the brave and distinguished among them lacked the kinship grounds from which true loyalty could be expected. The unusual Spartan practice of raising children collectively, for example, would be genetically adaptive only if its kinship basis was conserved.

In the years following Hastings, the native Anglo-Saxon elite were killed, exiled, or dispossessed. They were chosen for elimination, not for a lack of abilities, but because of them. Yet this was only the beginning of the "class" discrimination that was to follow. Some of lower aristocracy of modest wealth survived, "the flotsam and jetsam of an aristocracy that had been wrecked in the storms of the Conquest," but survival meant subjugation and discrimination.

It would not be a stretch to call the original English "class" system a form of institutionalized racism. It was *because* of the slavery of blacks that the Norman-Cavaliers who helped achieve the American Revolution could reinterpret their culture in a way that redrew the critical "class" line as that between blacks and whites. Yet this was only a temporary liberalization of the peculiar institution of Norman caste-racism.

Political equality among Anglo-Saxons evolved in part from the recognition that their "inferiority" did not necessarily have anything to do with their talents or morals.

Rather, the breakdown of class-kin cohesion would breakdown the "class" basis of the entire British political order. "Class" discrimination may have had a basis in sociobiological resistance to being cuckolded. The very talents and ambitions of men like Benjamin Franklin were subversive to the original biological basis of the English "class" order.

Revolt against the Norman kin selective strategy is what inspired America as the land of freedom and opportunity, a place where no one would be discriminated against because of his or her ethnic-racial origins. Norman kin selective strategy is also what made America a land of slavery and caste exclusion in the South. The deepest origins of Anglo-American "liberty" are to be found not in the "modern" period, but in those first few centuries after Hastings.

The idea that these first centuries following Hastings constituted a genuine form of slavery and English liberties were inspired from the struggle against the Normans oppression in this formative period was held by the influential nineteenth century English historian of the English constitution, William Stubbs. He believed that the Norman Conquest "helped to develop and concentrate the wasted energies of the native race...[the Normans'] restless activity and strong political instinct roused the dormant spirit and disciplined even while it oppressed it."[601] Stubbs helped to reveal how the Norman Conquest was truly a historical turning point: Norman oppression catalyzed the English need *for* freedom by creating the need for freedom *from* the conquerors in the first place. This verdict is evident in the conclusion of his great historical survey:

> [H]ow was English liberty won? It was not won all at once; it was not a paper constitution written out at will of a liberal sovereign, or extorted from a needy one according to the

> will and pleasure of a school of theorists. It was the growth of two hundred and thirty years of labour and sorrow [1066-1297]...it was a gradual limitation of oppression and oppressive power that was indeed in itself a usurpation, but was a discipline needed to bring strength out of weakness.[602]

The Normans may have even catalyzed the Anglo-Saxon work ethic that ultimately out-industrialized them.

Historian Sir Frank Stenton, best known for work on Anglo-Saxon England, said of the Norman conquerors, "politically they were the masters of their world." The historical basis for the equality of blacks and Anglo-Saxons in America was not "a paper constitution written out at will of a liberal sovereign", but a common experience of slavery under Norman masters. Bound together by the brutal consequences of the Conquest, Stubbs' final reflection on the grim origins of the struggle for freedom helps clarify why Anglo-Saxons had to free blacks in order to free themselves: "By these our rights were won: when these are lost we are slaves indeed."[603]

Unnatural Government

Thomas Jefferson looked at same medieval English inheritance as Stubbs and drew the opposite conclusion on the desirability of that "restless activity and strong political instinct." He thought that British colonial reforms of America were "a deliberate systematical plan of reducing us to slavery."[604] Jefferson's perception of slavery echoes Locke's fear of "*absolute arbitrary domination*." Yet this obsession with freedom is not universal. The punishment and deprivations that the stereotypical Prussian of old would tolerate from the traditional authorities, for example,

is like the tolerance of a punishment from a father that one would not accept from anyone else.

But what would happen if the harshness of authority was not reduced, but *exacerbated* by a stepfather's perception that he is not caring for his own biological "children"? Cycles of violence or abuse can effectually magnify the social distance that originated in kinship difference. If such a scenario is prolonged, the stepchild's perception of a dearth of legitimate kinship based authority could illegitimate the stepfather's right to punish. From a political-patriarchal perspective, Locke's liberal-democratic criticism of government amounts to the argument of a child asking, 'Who do you think you are, my father?'

The bonds of the normative patriarchal family evolved on the basis of kinship. A biological father, like a biological mother, has a common investment of half of their genes in their children. Kinship forms a biological basis for shared genetic interests that generally blunt the extremes of slave and peer; total hierarchy and total equality. However, without that bond of kinship to govern the relationship, there is not necessarily anything else that will.

On the level of political patriarchy, the English Civil War was the first bald exposure of the lack of a kinship basis for a common good. Authoritarian assumptions of political, patriarchal behavior could easily push the commons from an ambiguous balance to an extreme of a sense of slavery and its accompanying state of degradation and humiliation. Since the one extreme of a hive-like kinship unity was obviously not there to blunt the extreme perception of hierarchy as slavery, "freedom" offered an alternative solution of a protective buffer on the basis of equality.

To be consistent, Locke's argument had to undo the entire logic of patriarchy from the political to the familial. He drew

some exceptions, but the line of his thinking undoes kin selective preferences generally, leaving a raw product of unrelated, isolated individuals. Freedom and equality thus evolved as a substitute and replacement for the kin selective factors that underlay the hive model of human political relations. The impersonal nature of modern liberal democratic government is, at least in part, an adaptation to the perception that the government is constituted by cold and distant masters rather than the genuine fathers of the nation. "Natural" rights were opposed to an unnatural, faux-father government.

Political rights evolved through a form of genetic adaptation. Since the hereditary government can decide questions of war and peace, they can dictate "feudal" military duties and responsibilities. If the separatism and selective altruism of the government was based on Norman kin-cohesion then, by the very same token, it might be predicted that the Anglo-Saxon majority might resist extending altruistic or self-sacrificing behaviors exhibited in wars by virtue of the very same perception of kin-separatism. Political duty in this context would be resisted, limited or become attenuated.

The only general exception would be a sense of natural duty exhibited among Anglo-Saxons themselves. This is what explains the English Civil War and the American Civil War.

Rights are the opposite of duties, asserted over and against duties. Political rights act as veto power against wrongful claims of kinship-duty. They are, in effect, veto power against a species of slavery. Duty is a form of altruism that is genetically adaptive only insofar as it serves the altruist's inclusive fitness.

The modern normalization of rights emerged from an evolved adaptation, over a period of centuries, to this condition of slavery or quasi-slavery. Although the kin-distance between Normans and Anglo-Saxon can be considered relatively small, the implications of expanding this evolution of individual rights over duties leads to a foundation for acceptance of even greater kinship distance. This is how the relatively small kinship-culture distance between Normans and Saxons evolved into human rights that could potentially encompass all ethnicities and all races.

Another reason that rights became associated with Anglo-Saxon resistance to "unnatural" government was suggested by J. H. Round's judgment that "excess liberty" led to the downfall of Anglo-Saxon England. The Normans cultivated the military virtues such as a strong sense of duty and the capacity to subordinate domestic policy to the needs of foreign policy. Not all Germanic tribes were all equally inclined towards the military-conquering life anymore than all ancient Greek tribes were Spartans. Even the Saxon king Alfred the Great's great exploits in war were fundamentally *defensive* maneuvers against Danish aggression on English soil.

A native disinclination towards a more Spartan way of life may help to explain why the Anglo-Saxons were susceptible to being conquered in the first place. These tendencies may have been radicalized by the long-term consequences of that conquest. In any case, the realistic consequence of their behavior is that the Anglo-Saxons have found themselves in the position of stepchildren in the political patriarchy.

Round's greatest opponent as an interpreter of the Norman Conquest, E. A. Freeman, turned this classical political-patriarchal relationship on its head in the

introduction to *The History of the Norman Conquest of England*. Here Freeman posed native England as the parent and Norman descendants as children. He writes, "England may be as justly proud of rearing such step-children as Simon of Montfort and Edward the First as of being the natural mother of Aelfred and of Harold." Freeman's pride was premised on the revolutionary, democratic assertion that the Anglo-Saxon majority provided the foundation of hereditary legitimacy. Regardless of which way one looks at it, it is a step-relationship.

This democratic assertion of the hereditary dominance of the majority clearly had subversive implications for the classical model of political patriarchy. If Addison was correct to say, "The Obedience of Children to Parents is the Basis of all Government", then what happens when the government disobeys its Anglo-Saxon parents? A disobedient government would deserve a serious spanking from its parents. Democracy is the art of rearing good, obedient leader-children.

When the "founding fathers" of America justified their separation from Britain with accusation of governmental abuses, they defined their "loyalties" through the distinction of patriot and loyalist. Patriotism showed where their *real* loyalties lay. But loyalty to what? To whom?

The word loyalty is derived from Old French, originally from the Latin *legalis*, or legal. Older English meanings of *loyal* included the state of being lawful or legitimate. To deny loyalty could connotate the denial of legitimacy. Its association with duties could be opposed with the legitimacy of the concept of rights. However, is Patrick Henry's famous battle cry of 1775, "Give me liberty or give me death", an expression of "rational self interest" grounded on the right to life?

Patriot and patriarchy are both derived from the same Greek root, i.e. father (*pater*) and fatherland (*patris*). The patriot was a rooted-radical, not a fighter for the abstract ideals alone. That the Anglo-Saxons thought of England as their fatherland at the battle of Hastings comes across even in the account of Norman chronicler William of Poitiers: "Some stood for Harold, and all for their *patria*, which they wished to defend against foreigners even though their cause was unjust."[605]

In order to be loyal to their "fathers," the conquered had to become traitors to the English legal authorities. An irony of this scenario is that acts of disobedience and expressions of contempt for political authority could be expressions of Anglo-Saxon nationalism. To directly, or indirectly, "recollect the innocent blood of their fathers" was to assert recognition of their *difference* from the hereditary government. It was to assert their non-incorporation through non-cooperation through individuation. Their individualism was both as an individuated national body of the people and individuated men.

To learn that the superlative patriarchs of the polity are descendents of imperial usurpers is the psychological equivalent of discovering that Darth Vader is your father. The revolution's principles of *natural* rights over duties was equivalent to patriotism over loyalism; forefathers over faux-fathers. Duty to the faux-fathers was equivalent to loyalty and obedience to the killers of their true forefathers.

Jefferson maintained, "[a] perpetual claim was kept up by the nation," for the "restoration of their Saxon laws". While democracy became the means of that restoration, Jefferson also believed in a "natural aristocracy" of "virtue and talents." What did he mean by "natural aristocracy?" Did natural aristocracy mean *only* meritocracy? Did William and

his Normans constitute a "natural" aristocracy? Clearly not, even if one supposes that they surpassed the abilities of the native aristocracy in many respects.

Jefferson wrought a revolution against the resulting Norman class-nepotism. Yet given that assumption, how could he *consistently* advocate a radical alternative? The American founders were the architects of uncommon sense that made common sense politically viable. But how did they come to embody these particular self-contradictions when they could have embodied less democratic varieties of self-contradiction?

In liberal retrospect, the American Revolution appears to be the imperfect work of morally flawed hypocrites, almost as if the predestined egalitarian project could just as easily have begun with women or minorities. While the principle of individual rights against feigning fathers became universalized, especially for women, there is no rational reason to think there would be specifically revolutionary energies to be had without its origins in the Norman/Saxon conflict.

Whereas the concept of "natural" rights provided a rationalization of the struggle for Saxon restoration, natural aristocracy, it seems, is only its further fulfillment. The difference between artificial aristocracy and natural aristocracy is also, in part, the difference between faux-fathers and forefathers. In its original context, practical democracy could very much result in a confounding the *demos* and the *ethnos*. The *demos* could choose whom they believed to be their "natural" leaders, men sprung from the body of the people and unfettered by the pretending class.

In theory, the revolution of 1776 overturned the novel and unnatural precedent set by William the Conqueror as the founding faux-father of the English state in 1066. In practice,

this was only completed when the Northern victory allowed Lincoln, the Anglo-Saxon-American, to replace Washington, the Norman-American, as the greatest "father" of the nation. But did the Civil War's historical redemption of the Saxon failing fathers of 1066 also falsify and usurp the Norman role in fathering the American nation?

Just as the Norman-Cavaliers of the South found at least part of the case for rebellion in the "Saxon" faux-father George III, Southerners helped formalize their revolution in constitutional mechanisms that restrain the tyranny of the majority. The Southern contribution was crucial in reducing the Anglo-Saxon *ethnos* to the subdued American *demos*. Only with the breakdown of the constitutional construction in the American Civil War was Abraham Lincoln able to repeat the patriarchal conquest of Oliver Cromwell.

Anti-Normanism

Government we see none, but the old tyrannical Norman government.[606]

—A LEVELLER *DECLARATION* FROM HERTFORDSHIRE, ENGLAND (1649)

[I]f they cannot conqueror us, they cannot govern us.

—THOMAS PAINE, *COMMON SENSE* (1776)

A Race Unfit for Democracy and Liberty

Some claim that lives of common people were not much affected by the Norman Conquest or it made little difference to them. These subjugated folk, it is said, were not concerned enough about politics to even care that they were conquered. This is another way of saying that the Anglo-Saxon people of this time were a race unfit for democracy and liberty. It would appear that the Anglo-Saxons were distinguishable from the Normans in that the former had no sense of pride and, consequently, could accept the Norman verdict that they were a race fit for subjugation and slavery.

If we apply the modernistic assumption that rights and freedoms emerge from the character of *human beings* out of a sense of their sense of dignity *as human beings*, then this implies that Anglo-Saxons who accepted the Conquest were subhumans. Were they so primitive that modern standards of humanism were simply inapplicable? Were they subhumans?

Just as the belief that freedom and liberty are truly the universal desires of all humankind seemed believable, the whole notion was foiled by one great exception: the Anglo-Saxon race. Perhaps some other nation contained the germ of democracy and love of liberty within them, but not the Anglo-Saxons. They must have been one of those peoples who need a strong, centralized, and even despotic government to tell them what to do. Fortunately for them, William and his men offered England just this kind of government.

"The first brutal point blank which strikes anyone in considering the Norman Conquest," explained L. G. Pine, "is that an entirely new administrative personnel had been clamped upon England. Not merely a new dynasty of kings, not merely an alien race planted in the country, but an all-

pervading control which filled the administrative posts in Church and State."[607]

From this traumatic event in England's childhood matured the Orwellian nightmares of *1984*. The kin-cohesive basis of the upper class "conspiracy" has slipped through in the words of Richard de Luci, Henry II's justiciar. In 1157, he extolled the victory at Hastings to members of the ruling order, reminding them that it should forever be remembered "by you, lord king, and by all us Normans". In the name of "all this gathering of Norman nobles", he prayed that the abbey that commemorated the triumph at Hastings be protected "above all against the stratagems of the English!"[608]

Long after the immediate reality had passed, the partly unconscious cultural attitudes towards government remained. The fear of a deceptive and disguised but all-pervading and all-controlling enemy generalized into an entire Anglo-Saxon political philosophy. Through this inheritance, American politics has so often remained tyrannized by the fear of tyranny, passing the torch of a congenital suspicion of political malfeasance towards even those occasions when no such warrant for it can be found.

Are Americans of the twenty first century still skeptical towards their government? Not skeptical enough! Admittedly, just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're really not out to get you. However that may be, these Anglo-Saxon political-cultural traits constitute a centuries old *tradition*.

Americans of all ethnic origins have a political tradition of Anglo-Saxon authority to substantiate the view that political authority should be held in distrust. Americans of all ethnic origins have a tradition of Anglo-Saxon authority to substantiate the view that the fact that their ancestors were

conquered by the Normans is something that should (and *must*) be overlooked. Americans of all ethnic origins have a tradition of Anglo-Saxon authority to substantiate the view that the Anglo-Saxon people are ethnically superior to ethnocentrism.

Fear of "Big Brother" is as American as apple pie (another English tradition). This typical Anglo-Saxon obsession is so normalized in American political discourse, that the average American may not, at first, recognize their Saxon-centrism. The sensitive Anglo-Saxon attitude towards government usurpations fits the profile of a once-conquered people.

These are the scars of the Norman Conquest. They live on through a fear of being overpowered and conquered again. They live on through the learned condition that I call *conquestphobia*.

I would be skeptical about this deeply rooted Anglo-Saxon skepticism. More than simple an arbitrary bias against arbitrary government power, a sociobiological analysis suggests that this anti-government tradition is in part the crystallization of ethnic hostility to the Norman master race. I refer to this entrenched tradition of generalized Anglo-Saxon anti-government attitudes as *Anti-Normanism*, taken from the title of John Hare's polemical work published during the English Civil War (1647).

Anti-Normanism still reigns within the Anglo-Saxon collective unconscious.

There is no reason to assume the conquered were indifferent to their own subjugation in 1066, but indifference to their reactions and views helped make a *de facto* conquest also a legitimate one in line with the officially imposed tradition. The very modern assumption of a deep discontinuity between rulers and commoners is a consequence of the Conquest that was perceptually imposed

even on pre-Conquest Anglo-Saxon people in retrospect. The strength of this assumption is as strong as the English "class" system itself. The seventeenth century theory of the Norman Yoke would make no sense unless there did exist a distinct discontinuity between the upper class and "the nation", the powerful and "the people", dating from England's defeat. This perceptual tyranny is a lasting scar of the Norman consequence upon the conquered.

Big Brother is Other

Imagine, in the time before the Conquest, an English peasant, rooted in the soil, living a largely unreflective, sensory existence, untroubled by abstractions, but aware of the knotted nooks and crannies of his everyday existence.

> Then came the Normans with their evil power…they harmed this nation

declared the English priest Layamon in the historical poem *Brut* (ca. 1190).[609]

The differences implanted with these French foreigners, their foreign language, their bizarre customs, their haughty attitudes, their distinctive physiognomies, and their imposing energy would all be plainly, palpable in a visceral, common sense way to even the least intelligent Englishman. That three hundred year period following the Conquest wherein the upper class apartheid of kinship and culture was most overt and obvious was the crucial formative period in setting the cultural Anti-Normanism tone. In the same way that children are most impressionable to early childhood experiences, this traumatic experience in England's childhood left imprints that the matured Anglo-Saxon nations are inclined to dismiss and repress.

However that may be, one thing that is observable in small glimpses from the "underworld of largely-unrecorded thinking" is the legacy of a sense of trauma dating from the Norman mastery. "[O]ne of the most interesting modern discoveries, as the literature of the twelfth to fourteenth centuries comes to light," wrote historian Michael Wood, "is how the growth of the sense of Englishness is tied up with the bitter wound of the Conquest."[610] The long-term impact of the Norman occupation on the Anglo-Saxon cultural consciousness was recognized in a study of the deposed Anglo-Saxon nobleman Hereward:

> Invasion is more than a violation of sovereignty; it leaves scars on the psyche of individuals and nations that can be indelible. Occupation by an invading army with its inevitable loss of freedom, its impact on home, family and friends, deepens such wounds and it is arguable that the passage of years may not completely erase them from what might be called the collective folk-memory.[611]

A singular military-political defeat is one thing. A permanent "class" occupation that institutionalizes that defeat as part of the normal order of things is something profoundly different. The "class" occupation, in effect, acted as an incubator, normalizing a complex set of reactions and adaptations.

The durability of Anti-Normanism is to be found in the durability of the legacy of the conquest. Even after the victory in the English Civil War, that legacy was very much apparent. "The tenure of land by copyhold, and holding for life under a lord, or rather tyrant, of a manor", wrote Moses Wall to poet John Milton in 1659, showed "the Norman Conquest and Tyranny is continued upon the nation without any though of removing it."[612] This anti-government *theme*

remains constant in good part because of the constancy of the *identity* of lordship in Anglo-Saxon history. In 1659, a year before the final acts of collapse of the first great anti-government, Anti-Normanism revolution, the landholding inheritance of nearly six hundred years remained unmolested.

One of the conditions of Norman domination was resistance to common access to the law or even knowledge of the law — not to even mention the possibility of changing it. "The greatest mischiefe of all," the Leveller leader John Lilburne wrote in 1646,

> and the oppressing bondage of England ever since the Norman yoke, is this: I must be tryed before you by a Law (called the Common Law) that I know not, nor I thinke no man else, neither do I know where to find it or reade it….The tedious, unknowne, and impossible-to-be-understood common law practices in Westminster Hall came in by the will of a Tyrant, namely William the Conqueror.

It was believed that this state of affairs sat in stark contrast to the old "Saxon constitution" ever since "William the Conqueror subdued that excellent constitution."[613]

The kinship double standard engendered a legal double standard that made the legal system inherently and systematically corrupt for the conquered. Arrested for his illegal anti-government activities, Lilburne declare in his trial of 1649:

> You that call yourselves Judges of the Law, are no more but Norman intruders, and indeed and in the Truth, if the Jury please, are no more but Cyphers, to pronounce their verdict.[614]

In 1648 John Hare, author of *Anti-Normanism*, advocated the radical reform of entire legal system, invoking "that generall and inbred hatred which still dwels in our common people against both our Laws and Lawyers". He concluded that "all our great Victories and Triumphs" in the English Civil War would be abortive if the laws of the Normans survived.[615]

To conclude that the Anglo-Saxon attitude toward government is simply an unaccountable predilection or chance disposition does not convey knowledge of its historical origins. To say this attitude is "prejudiced" begins to scratch the surface. To be more historically precise, one could say that the Anglo-Saxon attitude towards government, formalized in the form of constitutions, and even routinized and rationalized in contemporary bureaucracies, originated as ethnic hostility against the Norman conquerors and their descendants. The Anglo-Saxon prejudice against government thus originated as ethnic prejudice. One could go so far as to say that Anglo-Saxon resistance to government is a kind of sublimated 'racial' hate.

This Anglo-Saxon *Anti-Normanism* attitude towards the political class matured from aggression to reason until finally recombining as a war for revolution. American democracy originated as the rationalized rancor of a seven hundred year old bloodfeud. Constitutional government contains the fossilized fear and hatred of Norman masters who had once yoked them to the brink of slavery. Kinship-ethnic hostility cannot be separated from abstract justice since the Norman's political way of life was not separate from a maximal kin selective strategy.

In this case, hate proved to be more powerful than love. The Anglo-Saxons might superficially appear to be less racist than other peoples, but what really happened was that their political customs diverted feelings of ethnic hostility towards the government. Anti-Normanism Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism explains how it is possible to both love your country and hate your government at the same time.

It was precisely those within the Anglo-Saxon population who possessed the *greatest* ethnic consciousness, those who were *most* sensitive and observant of kinship-ethnic differences, and for whom "close enough" was too crude, that were most likely to uphold their "liberal" hostilities to the government. In the tradition exemplified by historian E. A. Freeman, the *most* racist Anglo-Saxons, so to speak, became the *most* liberal in term of individualism's political effect: rights trumped duties toward the government. Liberalism and the system of individual rights was a logical corollary of Anti-Normanism.

Modern democratic revolutionaries took the deeply rooted legacy of ethnic strife and had it formalized, ritualized, rationalized, and constitutionalized. This crystallized, congenital mistrust of government was the mechanization of ethnic hatred that became hallowed as the American way. The *universalism* of American democracy, the will to *total* negation of the Norman way was the realization of America as the final solution to the Norman problem.

Aggression, xenophobia, and other qualities critics of sociobiology tend to abhor on political-moral grounds provided the original cultural-civilization foundation of the anti-government, pro-democracy sentiment of America. The democratic ideals of peace and humanity are made politically stable by the legacy of Anglo-Saxon ethnic

hostility and aggression directed against that Norman political body once lodged as the head of their body politic.

Like a bear trap designed to snap shut around a limb of its oppressive Norman target, the stability of the American political tradition is a consequence of a Norman bear that managed to evade the ploys of its hunter for well over half a millennium. The snare simply stayed open until, over the centuries, it became so rusted that even after the original bear disappeared it became incapable of snapping closed at all. Constitutional democracy, designed to trap the conquerors, is the conservation of this rusty old bear trap.

Even as the Normans themselves have been totally displaced, they have left their modern mark in the form of this irreverent and ingenious Anglo-Saxon response to the conqueror's confident and condescending assumption that they could not equal them. Those palimpsest marks are, to begin with, the sense that the government is incurably "them" and not "us." A more subdued variation on this theme is the very modern distinction between the "state" and "society".

The single best illustration of these tribal attitudes is the political solution of democracy itself. The Anglo-Saxons opposed aristocracy, a "race" of political men, because *aristocracy is exactly what the Normans represented to the Anglo-Saxons*. Conversely, adaptation of their ethnic experience to the Norman Yoke meant that only democracy could *represent* them. Democracy effectually advanced Anglo-Saxon *ethnic identity*.

The entire democratic system is designed to lift one of "us" into power, betraying the customary Saxon sense that the upper stratum of government was Norman occupied territory. Democracy formalized the "moral" stance that

maintained resistance to "them"; resistance to joining "them" and their conquering way of life even if they could.

The lacerations and bloody wounds of the Conquest healed but the disfiguring scars remained. Just as the Roman Catholic Church has been likened to the ghost of the Roman Empire, Anglo-Saxon fear of government and its corollaries are like the ghost of the Norman Yoke. Assimilation to American culture means to inherit fear of the Norman ghost. Normative American anti-government liberalism is the eternalization of their oppression under the Normans and the universalization of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. These are the understandable legacies of Norman political-military-social-kinship superiority.

This fear of government was not simply paranoia. A pamphlet of 1653, as if anticipating the restoration of Charles II, warned:

> If they get the foot fast in the stirrup, they will lift themselves again into the Norman saddle; and they do it secretly; for they keep up the Norman Lawes….Therefore England beware!"[616]

The restoration of 1660 demonstrated that freedom won could be revoked if it was not guarded vigilantly — a lesson not lost on American revolutionaries. It is this lesson that links the egalitarianism of Jefferson to the egalitarianism of Lincoln in an Anti-Normanist chain. Yet a consequence of this embedded fear of reversion to the Norman Yoke is that the new world of liberation created by revolution continued to be inversely warped by the old world that the Normans created — even as America became a superpower.

To assimilate American cultural values is to assimilate this rationalized Anglo-Saxon way of hate. It is to inherit Anglo-Saxon hostility to false, unrepresentative claims of

kinship. America was made possible by this Anglo-Saxon experience wherein kinship, instead of culminating in the political, was perverted and exploited by the political. Anglo-Saxon kinship culminates politically in hostility towards the claims of the legitimacy of that culmination. It culminates in a net political zero of political equality.

By 1860 the Normans of the American South, naturally enough, refused to fully assimilate to this Anglo-Saxon Anti-Normanism. Like a hand fitting into an old glove, they fell with perfect form into the same the old Cavalier mold of the English Civil War that defined the distinctly Northern view of the American Revolution.[617] The South would suffer the consequences of reviving the Norman ghost.

Restoration as Revolution

"William the bastard, duke of Normandy", wrote Obadiah Hulme in *Historical Essay on the English Constitution* (1771), "put an end to the Saxon mode of government".[618] If the problem was embodied by Normanism, then the solution was embodied by Saxonism. During the debate on the Petition of Right in 1628, John Pym spoke of laws that "give bounds and limits to the Conqueror…. Petitions of Right, demanding their ancient and due Liberties, not suing for any new."[619] The concept of rights was originally conceived as a means of *restoring* the old Saxon laws.

Revolution originally meant restoration.[620] It once meant the opposite of its current association with total breaks with the past. It was originally a kind of conservation through change. The earth, for example, *revolves* on its axis, from daylight to the political "dark ages" of Norman subjugation, and then full circle back to the dawning of a political revolution. What goes around comes around. Tyrannical injustice provokes the redress of democratic justice.

While the "Puritan Revolution" is a label subsequently applied by modern historians, England's "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 was described as such within its own time and is traditionally considered the first modern revolution. The meaning of the term "revolution", as a description of 1688, appears to be a contrarian reaction to the term "restoration" used to describe the reestablishment of king and aristocracy in 1660. The idea of a "Glorious Revolution" was born in the spirit of rebuttal, as if to say, "No, *that* was not a restoration, *this* is a restoration."

In other words, even though the Puritan victory in 1649 ultimately failed to *restore* "Saxon government" since the Norman inheritance was *restored* in 1660, the original idea of revolution salvages a *compromised restoration* through the idea of revolution: conservation through change (that nonetheless lands somewhere new). In practice, this meant that while the Puritans killed a king and overthrew the House of Lords in 1649, England overthrew a king while *preserving* the House of Lords in 1688. So even though the idea of revolution has largely lost its original cyclical and conservative meaning, the ambiguity between conservation and change was present from its beginnings (1688 achieved less of an Anglo-Saxon restoration than the more radical Puritan Revolution of 1649 since it formally preserved some crucial Norman *innovations*, such as the House of Lords, that originated out of the Conquest).

The conservative side of the meaning of revolution, however, was not lost in the new world. "Liberty," wrote American political activist James Otis, "was better understood and more fully enjoyed by our ancestors before the coming in of the first Norman tyrants than ever after."[621] In the elation of 1776 Thomas Jefferson asked, "Has not every restitution of the antient Saxon laws had happy

effects?"[622] Revolution was to restore something of the lost natural order that had preceded the Conquest.

The radicalism of the Norman revolution of 1066 was inversely reflected in the radicalism of the democratic Anglo-Saxon revolutions. Revolution, then, is really a reaction. Without the *action* of the Norman Conquest, there would have been no *reaction* to that conquest. Without usurpation, there would have been no need for restoration. If the political tradition that began in 1066 was a tyrannical *innovation*, then only breaking with that tradition could establish an authentic *conservation* of the ancient Saxon order.

Radicalism aimed at conservatism. The left was the right by other means. Whereas 1776 fits, in some ways, the definition of revolution as conservation, 1066 was a revolution in the more contemporary sense: an unprecedented break with the traditions of the past.

While Hastings represented a failure to conserve and preserve the old Saxon laws and elements of that way of life, the actual content of what was to be restored remained somewhat of a mystery. What ended up happening is that the content of conservation was generally replaced by reaction. What made the democratic side of the American Revolution *not* a restoration was precisely that it was *reactionary*. It was not conservative because it was reactionary. The entire corpus of the liberal innovations of the revolution consists of *reactionary* attacks on the political monopoly that William the Conqueror represented. Liberalism in the English-speaking world is, in great part, a *reaction* to the tyrannical Norman *innovations*.

To see this more clearly, observe a few of the most "innovative" American values such as the ending of primogeniture and entail, the formal outlawing of

discrimination based on hereditary privilege, and public freedom of speech. Are these American values descended from the values of the Norman descended aristocracy? American values are a *reaction against* these Norman values precisely because primogeniture and entail preserved the Conquest over the generations, the majority was hereditarily discriminated against, and criticism of the system could be stifled by the system itself.

Yet at the same time, the secret to the remarkable *consistency* of the anti-hereditary principles of the American founding is to be found in a complementary Southern counterattack upon the possibility that dismantling the old order would only result in a Cromwellian-like Anglo-Saxon hereditary dictatorship. Whereas a monarch commonly symbolizes an ultimate hereditary supremacy, the compromise between the Anglo-Saxon North and the Cavalier-ruled South was made possible by relinquishing the hereditary struggle for supremacy that a monarch symbolized and compromising in the form of a republic. This step had already been partly anticipated by the English compromise of 1688. "The Americans did not have to invent republicanism in 1776; they only had to bring it to the surface" observed Gordon Wood.[623] This means that the American founding can hardly be understood as pure Anti-Normanism. The American form of government is viable only because it preserves crucial "Norman" inheritances. The utterly impossibility truly separating "Normanism" and "Anti-Normanism" from Americanism becomes evident, in all its complexity, in the Magna Paradox.

However, for the sake of simplicity, I will emphasize the more Anglo-Saxon side here.

Naturally, the very striving for independence from the Norman legacy breeds resistance to the notion that the

Normans even indirectly mastered the content of the revolt against Norman mastery. The very notion of revolution is a reaction against the very notion that revolution is a reaction.

Yet the reasons for reaction are not hard to see. William was elected, neither by the English people, nor by that more representative body, the Witan, that had chosen Harold as a successor. The hereditarily unelected Norman aristocracy became institutionalized as the House of Lords. Hereditary subjugation meant that, in effect, every new generation must re-enact their ancestors defeat at Hastings afresh. The Digger Gerald Winstanley protested that they were not allowed to choose for themselves for they are "of the rank of the conquered ones, and servants and slaves from the time of the conquest."[624] This was the condition that Anglo-Saxon democracy attempted to correct. Within the American democratic system, for example, the president would be limited to an unhereditary reign of four years, as opposed to a hereditary reign of about seven hundred years (1066-1776). The rule of law would challenge the rule of rulers.

Unable to *fully* conserve a lost Saxon past in way that it was preserved among a certain cognate nation, this liberal crypto-conservatism would instead conserve both rebellion and acquiescence to the role they had adapted to in the old order. If Saxon democrats were to institute a traditional hierarchical state, associated with the Normans, they would lose an essential element of their *identity*. The revolution thus conserved the non-aristocratic identity they had adapted to.[625] Keeping government weak also conserves this Anglo-Saxon adaptation in the sense that government retains the assumption of its alienation from the people. The universalism of Anglo-Saxon democracy conserves the loss of a distinctly political-national Anglo-Saxon identity.

A more radical change would be represented by an attempt by the Anglo-Saxon elite to fully emulate the Norman aristocracy in a fully political sense. Yet there is an *adapted* sense in which they did imitate them. American democracy represents the victory and continuation of the English "class" system in the sense that the Saxons only reversed "class" discrimination in a way that subjugates the conquering alpha male type, or the eternal Norman, so to speak, from politics. Democracy is the Anglo-Saxon conquest.

American democracy is a continuation of the English "class" system in that historical Anglo-Saxon ethnic hostility to the descendants of the Normans is implicitly ranked as the highest "class" of ethnic hostility. Other ethnic hostilities, especially towards blacks, are ranked as of an inferior "class" of ethnic-racial hostility. The institutionalization of this fossilized ethnic hostility in cultural anti-government resentment is, in effect, how America has preserved itself in spite of the many other ethnic hostilities that have subsequently emerged.

Liberalism as Conservatism

A strong strain of the 'Saxonist' political tradition, exemplified by Jefferson, is the valuation of a feminine, passive role for the state. The government is there to be like a mother who makes sure her children play nice with one another and not kill each other. She makes sure no one pilfers his or her neighbor's property, especially if one owns an unequal amount of it. Aside from this, the only thing that government should aspire to is impotence. Senility is a virtue of good government; government that is weak, emasculated, easy to push around, and manipulate if it gets out of line. Somehow, along the way, this formula for

political weakness produced the greatest superpower in world history.

Is it hard to see how this political attitude is rooted in an Anglo-Saxon attempt to emasculate the rulers who had emasculated them? After all, what was the Norman Conquest itself? It was government unlimited, unrestrained and uncontrolled by any representative entity, whose reward for unbridled tyranny was a parasitic existence on the backs of the limited, controlled, and restrained majority. It was a government that could, at first, not only put down revolts but also commit genocide against its own population with impunity and without punishment. Their very existence as a victorious political class was the premise of the problem.

Republic-minded statesman Sir Henry Vane played an equivocating role in the events that lead to the English Civil War. He thought that William and his descendants "lay as bars and impediments to the true national interest" founded on "the private lust and will of the conqueror."[626] It was this same conflict of interests, of people nominally living under the same government, which led to the American Civil War.

From Sir Henry Vane's sense of "true national interest" distinct from the hereditary government, one can gauge the sociobiological origins of Anglo-democratic left and right. Both originated as ethnocentric political strategies of weakening the Norman aristocracy. That even its conservatism deemphasizes political duties is comprehensible as a kin selective adaptation.

At the Battle of Hastings, the original methodology of Anglo-Saxon conservatism included swords, axes, and spears. They fought at Hastings to conserve their way of life and their defeat was a failure of conservation. The Norman military monopoly would make these methods

impracticable. Whatever they would be able to salvage from the uncontrollable will of their conquerors would be holding on to a lost world of political-cultural autonomy.

Subsequently, since those who were previously absolute battlefield enemies became, in at least some basic, practical way their protectors, things became much more complicated. Indiscriminate attacks on the government could be equivalent to shooting yourself in the foot. It is within this context that the many methods of political rationalism evolved to navigate this tricky terrain. Total non-cooperation could result in total anarchy that would end up serving no one. However, a judicious "enlightened" strategy that concedes some basic, rationally justifiable functions of government could possibly bring the Norman house down without bringing *everyone* down.

American conservatism originated in an aggressive strategy of weakening the ruling "class". It is aggressive in the sense that it is the closest heir of the original military methods of *weakening* the enemy. It is an ironic aggression only if one falsely assumes, unlike Hobbes and Locke, that the two "classes" form a "natural whole."

Instead of swords, axes, and spears, more civilized methods of reducing and fighting the Normans evolved such as property rights and the limitation of taxation without representation. As Christopher Hill has said in reference to Sir Edward Coke's defense of the common law against Charles I, "A defence of Anglo-Saxon liberties was also a defence of property against the state, against arbitrary taxation."[627]

Hill summarized one line of thought that contributed to the justification of the upheavals of seventeenth century England:

> If the King owed his title to conquest, and consequently owned all the property in the realm, then he also had a right to arbitrary taxation. But if the sanctity of property and representative institutions were part of our inheritance, then we must struggle to preserve them. History was politics. Liberty, property, and patriotism were inseparable.[628]

With this in mind it is easier to grasp English philosopher John Locke's fear of "*absolute arbitrary domination*" from a non-Lockean, sociobiological understanding of familial kinship relationships applied to political-patriarchal ones. If there was only a weak kinship relationship between the hereditary government and the majority, then there was little to constrain or govern that political-patriarchal relationship. For lack of grounds for *trust*, Locke advocated a social contract. This would replace the dearth of a natural or kinship based relationship. For Locke and his followers, especially Jefferson, it was the people and not the rulers who were ultimately sovereign. The implications of this solution to a dearth of natural kinship relations opened the door, in theory, to the entire human species.

If Hastings represented a failure of sociobiological conservation, the standards of what were left to conserve was lowered. Liberal-individualism emerged as a possible strategy that, in its original English context, converged individual interest with Anglo-Saxon kinship interest against the hereditary government. If conservatism emphasizes the strategy of weakening the government, then classical liberalism is a strategy with the opposite emphasis: strengthening the non-government. In its original context, liberalism effected an *augmentation* of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism.

In the case of the American rich, whose wealth usually originates in economic rather than political conquest, the

distinction between its definitions of liberalism and conservatism is (usually) clearer. However, their original unity can be seen in the example of Sir William Harcourt, a nineteenth century cabinet member in five British liberal governments who promoted taxation as a means of ending the hereditary nobility. Here the cause of "small government" and taxing the rich were one and the same.

Over the long-term, adaptation to the conditions of conquest shifted the entire Anglo-Saxon political spectrum to the left. The origin of this shift can be seen in the example of Hereward. His last stand at Ely was a "rebellion" only from the official view of the *new* tradition premised upon Norman usurpation of the Anglo-Saxon political tradition. As a minor thegn, or nobleman, he tried to uphold the *status quo*, which was inseparable from his personal status and fortune in England. He was also engaged, in his last stand at Ely, in an early, *seemingly* leftward form of guerilla warfare like an eleventh century Che Guevara. Hereward combines the modern themes of left and right in a single figure. Yet without the Conquest, there would be no grounds for a leftward interpretation of this privileged Englishman.

Hereward became the same kind of archetypal folk hero as Che. He was the survivor who did not buckle under the humiliations of the Frenchman's yoke. In another variation, the outlaw archetype represented by Hereward lived on in American "Wild West." It was a place outside the rule of government and law, where a man like Hereward could roam proud and free, like a savior of Anglo-Saxon honor.

Hippies of the Right

Hereward was one of the first symbolic heroes in this national tradition of struggle for liberty against "the law." Since the conquerors became the government and the

government made the laws, this could lead to the equivalence of Anti-Normanism and anti-law liberty. "Our very laws," said the Leveller John Wildman at Putney, "were made by our conquerors."[629] If the conquest was a political and judicial corruption, then where does this contamination of the arm of the law end?

For Paine there was clear historic naivety in the belief that Parliament represented a protection, rather than a hindrance, to freedom. In *The Rights of Man* he maintained, "The Parliament in England, in both its branches, was erected by patents from the descendants of the Conqueror. The House of Commons did not originate as a matter of right in the People, to delegate or elect, but as a grant or boon." To poet John Milton, Parliament was "a Norman or French word, a monument of our ancient servitude."[630] The term is derived from parley: a conference for discussing terms with an enemy.

The English Civil War would turn Parliament's origins on its head. In 1649, Hugh Peter declared that the cause of the war was not "for the continuation or preservation" of the laws, "but to be freed from them."[631] Extreme rejection of the law followed from a peculiar conception of the extreme consequences of the law. "All the people of this Nation are yet slaves …being under the laws and government of William." The means of slavery included "all Arbitrary Courts, Terms, Lawyers, Impropriators, Lords of Mannors, Patents, Priviledges…Tythes, Tolls, Customs, etc." Echoing the sentiments of radical abolitionists against the "Slave Power" in the American Civil War, Levellers in 1649 declared, "We protest against the whole Norman power."[632]

The Anti-Norman answer with the most simplicity, integrity, and coherence was to reject government and law altogether. Total protest means total revolution or total

anarchy — or both. Yet to fight against *power itself* is to reduce one's self to impotence. Instead of total anarchy, there came the bitter Anglo-Saxon peace with government, the acceptance of compromise as way of life. One of its American heirs are the right-wing hippies: the libertarians.

Few social-political philosophies in history can rival libertarianism in the sheer lameness of its vision of the good. It is defined in terms of negatives: just defang religion, defang society, defang government, just leave me alone! Yet this lameness of social vision is almost the definition of its political pride. It should really be called radical bourgeoisism.

Whereas liberals emphasize equality, libertarians emphasize freedom. Radicalizing the compromised liberal-democratic idea, they arrive at the un-utopia of a civilized anarchy. Nevermind that secular libertarians, like secular liberals, must exploit the Christian religious inheritance of America for much of the conditions of its existence, i.e. the sanctity of the individual. Just as they aspire to reduce government, they reduce the governing Christian formula of love versus power to: versus power.

All political problems can be solved by slapping bumper stickers of "freedom" over them. But what is left when "the individual" stops hiding behind these abstractions of freedom? What if someone were to make the ridiculous blunder of asking: How do we use our freedom? Are there duties or moral imperatives justified along with these freedoms? What is right way to live? Anyone making a pilgrimage to the destination of Anglo-Saxon political philosophy with such questions, asked in their fullness, must realize that he or she has arrived at the wrong place.

The universalism of American anti-aristocratic political ideals represents the height, not the nadir, of Anglo-Saxon

ethnocentrism. American universalism is an expression of the world-historical magnitude of the Norman domination of the Anglo-Saxon political world.

Still living in a resentful world full of Norman shadows, democracy only transferred the center of gravity to the people, leaving the crater of the Norman impact in place. The ominous Conqueror cloud still hangs over Anglo-Saxon heads. Fear of the old masters is largely responsible for what H. L. Mencken called the Anglo-Saxons' "hereditary cowardice."[633]

This Anglo-Saxon attitude towards government means they never fully liberated themselves from resentment of the Normans and the sentiment of ethnic revenge. They, and all Americans who assimilate to this struggle, are still fighting the Normans. Nonetheless, there is a positive content to Anglo-Saxon political philosophy: fear and fight the Norman Yoke.

"LET ALL SORTS HAVE FREEDOME"

Universal Ethnocentrism

"Conquest and tyranny," wrote Paine in *The Rights of Man*, "at some early period, dispossessed man of his rights, and he is now recovering them." What Conquest? Who exactly is this "man"? What we have here is a marvelous missing link fossil, a transitional evolutionary form between the birthrights of common Englishmen and The Rights of Man. In this fossil exhibit, one can observe particularity being sublimated into universality; the memory of the Normans dissipating into the fuzzy rationalistic abstractions of humanism; the English palimpsest being scrubbed clean into America's shiny, new blank slate.

Part of the old world baggage that most American revolutionaries preferred to leave behind was the old, traditional stereotype of the Anglo-Saxon as lower class in a country they once ruled. Belgian historian Raoul van Caenegem argued that, following the Conquest, "English" was interchangeable with words for serfs and peasants.[634] Christopher Hill observed that even in the seventeenth

century, "[c]lass division still seemed in some degree to coincide with national divisions. The names of Shakespeare's lower-class characters—Snug the joiner, Bottom the weaver, Snout the tinker, Starveling the tailor—are pure Saxon. So are those of the signatories of the Diggers' manifestoes."[635] In the nineteenth century, these stereotypical "class"-apartheid distinctions that originated before the emergence of a substantial middle class could still be used to evoke the Norman Yoke theme. "The workers," Boon declared, "are nothing but white wage slaves to the same classes who have always been licensed by the land robbers to rob and plunder their forefathers from the time of the Norman Conquest."[636]

In order to both go beyond these are stereotypes and demonstrate the hereditary connection between 1066 and 1776 with precision, the expertise of a genealogist would be required. While I do think that systematic reevaluation of the hereditary data is necessary, twentieth century English genealogist Leslie Gilbert Pine demonstrated his expertise on this subject as editor of *Burke's Peerage*, the listing of the titled aristocracy of Great Britain and Ireland. Among his many books are a number specifically on Norman ancestry.

In reading Pine's books on Norman ancestry, one of the most striking, persistent themes is the sheer psychological power won through the Normans' heroic oppression of the Anglo-Saxon nation. It says something about the respect for the martial virtues among the defeated that some could admire the Normans by virtue of their own subjugation by them. This, after all, had helped to perpetuate the Conquest all along. One of its less than dignified consequences is captured in the following observation:

> One of the most abiding and somewhat pathetic characteristics of the English people, is the claim, so frequently made, to a Norman descent. For what honorable distinction can there be in proving descent from the invaders and conquerors of one's country?[637]

The psychological power of the myth of the inherent superiority of Norman blood exacerbated the old stereotype of the Anglo-Saxon as lower class, through this "vague general feeling that to be Norman is to be upper class."[638] The consequences of this cognitive association between Normans and the upper class have persisted throughout post-Conquest British history:

> The psychological reason for the claim to alleged Norman descent so frequently heard among the English people is, I think, derived from the existence of a species of snobbery. The desire to be one with the best people can be most adequately fulfilled if one descends from the conquerors.[639]

Pine offered the example of the Scrope *v.* Grosvenor case of 1385 to show "how early in our history the desire to be Norman had captured the 'best people.'" The latter's story of descent from those who "came with the Conqueror" failed scrutiny.

The integrity of Pine's work is dependent on the ability to resist all pressures — psychological, political, or otherwise — and accurately verify or falsify genealogies on the basis of facts and evidence. It is precisely because of this that his testimony to the irrational, unscientific influence of the prestige associated with Norman ancestry is highly significant. Yet the genealogical record also confirms that the persistent association between the Normans and the upper class is not only myth. Kin selection provides one basis for

understanding why the association would have persisted beyond "reason" or the standards of a meritocracy. Moreover, the hereditary effects of the Norman Conquest cannot be derived from a literal accounting of members of Norman descent *alone*.[640]

A case in point was William Cecil (1520-1598), minister of Queen Elizabeth I who eventually won a peerage. While the Tudors were relatively open to new blood (following the weakening of the nobility in the Wars of the Roses), Cecil

> so ardently desired Norman ancestry that he forged papers to prove it in his own case….Just as the Manchu emperors of China bequeathed the pigtails to their subjects, so William and his followers have left the desire to be Normans among the English.[641]

This phenomenon is a fatal flaw of Hugh Thomas's argument for the post-Conquest triumph of English identity. It is also a classic illustration of why a strict, numerical summation of Norman individuals among the upper class in the post-medieval era is not equal to the psychological and cultural power that spawned this worship of Norman blood. Cecil was an atypical exception to a contemporary rule of the association of Normans and the upper class who, in effect, sought to reinforce the cultural reign of that rule. Perhaps Edmund Burke would have lauded Cecil's behavior since his actions helped to preserve the "class" system tradition.

Just as the two native exceptions out of 1,400 tenants-in-chief recorded by the Domesday Book of 1086 do not allow us to say England was not conquered, "class" exceptions of this sort demonstrate the price of ambition, for the gatekeepers could determine not only for *whom*, but *if* there were to be exceptions. To be an exception was to play by the rules of righteous, noble Conquest.

Norman caste created the *paradigm* for the English upper "class" and the basic content of its traditional cultural identity. Historically, the only times when this Conquest paradigm was decisively broken was when attempts were made to replace it with a new paradigm: revolution.

When one attempts to account for the causes of the English Civil War, less than half a century after Cecil's death, understanding these psychological undercurrents is essential. Worship of Norman blood, after all, could not be fully separated from the culture of deferential duty to the hereditary political order inaugurated by the Norman Conquest. Since kin selective behaviors can express themselves on the level of the collective unconscious, the psychological power of this worship of Norman blood is essential to understanding the Anti-Normanism attitudes that were unleashed in the Puritan, American, and Yankee revolutions. Anti-Normanism found an ally in a modern form of political rationalism that revolted against every manifold expression of this irrational power. The modern myth of human equality is a reaction against the myth of the inherent superiority of Norman blood.

The Normans, however, had some blood myths of their own. Cecil's blood forgeries were topped by the Normans themselves when historian Dudo of St. Quentin (c.960-1043) provided them with descent from the ancient Greek Trojans.[642] This old trick of squeezing ancient ancestry from the Trojans came directly out of the pagan Roman mythology of Virgil's *Aeneid*. The Normans simply appropriated the tradition of Virgil's myth that Rome could trace its ancestry from the Aeneas, the Greek that was believed to have escaped Troy before its final collapse. This need for ancient ancestry betrays Norman embarrassment with their own "barbarian", Viking origins.

Remarkably, Pine once concluded his reflections on the value of a Norman pedigree with a line of thinking that is very similar to that of many Anglo-Saxon democrats. Since "it is impossible to choose one's ancestors," as Pine has made it his profession to know, why should the Norman tyranny be extended from a past that cannot be changed to an inherited present? Was an Anglo-Saxon pedigree to be sentenced to eternal inferiority?

> No, the value of a Norman ancestry differs not at all from that of any other ancient pedigree, Saxon, Norse, Italian, Jewish, be it what it may. To possess an ancient pedigree means that you know who your ancestors were and that they were free men. We should all be proud of our ancestry, for it was not the weaklings who survived to propagate their kind.[643]

The only alternative would be the assertion of the superiority a Saxon pedigree to a Norman pedigree, which, in the context of this traitorous worship of Norman blood among the conquered themselves, loses its cogency. Pine's line of thinking demonstrates how the argument that Norman blood is not inherently superior leads to an *indifference* to ethnic or national origins. The same individualistic indifference to ethnic or ancestral origins is at the root of the peculiar variety of moral objectivity promoted by liberal democracy.

To become an America is to put behind the inheritance of the past and look instead to what one might become. By combining the superiority of the democratic system of political justice with the legacy of the presumed inferiority of a lower caste pedigree, one can account for the net principle of equality of individuals and the evolution of pedigree equality in the United States. Democratic egalitarianism,

with its middle *class* backbone, stands against both the old stereotype of the Anglo-Saxon as lower *caste* and revolutionary revulsion towards the Norman as upper *caste*.

Herein lays the meaning of Southern slavery. By vigorously promoting blacks slaves as a new American caste, the Normans of the South hoped to put Anglo-Saxons back in their place between blacks and Norman-Cavaliers. Slavery was thus promoted to demote the very principle of human equality. Instead of destroying myth of equality, the Northern victory destroyed the myth of the superiority of Norman blood.

Lincoln's victory was a victory for the individualist interpretation of Americanism, i.e. an emphasis or valuation of the individual over the group, a bias towards exceptions over general rules, and an emphasis on assimilation over kin-cultural preservation. Although modern individualism is typically associated with rootlessness social rupture, in its original English context individualism could actually be considered a bridge that healed ethnic divisions. In this way individualism was originally a step towards national wholeness by absorbing and overcoming Norman/Saxon groupism. Enlarged to humanistic proportions, America is a continuation of this never-ending social task of healing the scars of conquest.

The superficial unity of the modern concept of humanity betrays its origins in radical opposition to what Pine calls "Normanity": the belief in the superior blood brotherhood of Norman descendants. The Norman Conquest is the historical, flesh and blood wellspring of what modern, liberal, humanism defines as "inhumane". The modern Western fear of the West begins, in part, with the medieval terror of certain dead white European males mastering certain other dead white European males in 1066. The

secular crusade against the evil, dead, white, European, heterosexual, patriarchal, racist, sexist, fascistic, intolerant, arrogant, authoritarian, oppressive, tyrannical, despotic, imperialistic male finds its primal, ultimate archetype in no other than William the Conqueror himself.

Whether as British aristocrats or Southern slave masters, vilification of the paradigmatic Norman is deeply embedded in the modern liberal democratic culture of the English-speaking world. Witness the honest Saxon yeoman Harry Potter and his friends against the treacherous Draco Malfoy and Lord Voldemort (*vol de mort* is a French expression for pilfering corpses). Within the American imagination, General Tarkin (Grand Moff Tarkin), the man who orders the destruction of Princess Leia's home planet of Alderaan as a demonstration of the imperial power of the Death Star, is a classic caricature of the Norman conqueror aristocrat. In fact, the entire Star Wars saga sublimates the archetypal, psychological underpinnings of the Norman/Saxon conflict as American epic. George Lucas is America's Homer.

The entire paradigm of the American dream is built on the Anglo-Saxon precedent of liberation from the Norman "class" occupation. Accepting the official Norman story of the Conquest was to accept the principle of 'Tread on me'. Awakening the spirit of Hereward, it was this sense of subjugation that the American revolutionary democrats set out to conquer. The patriotic American flags that warned, 'Don't Tread on Me' were declarations of independence from the Norman Yoke.

After the Civil War, a statue of radical abolitionist and Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner was erected in Harvard Square. A vindication of the man who had been beaten to a pulp like an unruly slave on the floor of the Senate, it was also a monument to the triumph of his once

beaten breed over the old 'master race'. Never again would Anglo-Saxons of the North be bullied by the pretensions of their historic, hereditary masters.

From wretched, downtrodden race to liberated humanity, this beaten breed rose again, universalizing their experience as "America". A second chance, a beacon for the beaten breeds of all nations, burgeoned from a generous sentiment of thanksgiving for the second chance offered by the new world. Blacks, Jews, women, Anglo-Saxons, and homosexuals are groups with a history of being oppressed and a history of struggle against the fate of history. America is the universalization of the loser at Hastings who nonetheless rose again.

John Pym, in 1628 during the debate on the Petition of Right, said that he and the other anti-Royalists were engaged in a Saxon restoration, "demanding their ancient and due Liberties, not suing for any new."[644] Since this notion of rights has been unleashed upon the world, "progress" has been associating with suing for new and unprecedented liberties. Yet even in the seventeenth century, we can already find Englishmen who were not content with the prudence of Pym's opinion.

After the execution of Charles I in 1649, the sense of liberation inspired a sentiment of general redress. One of the communistic Diggers said that since "[o]ur inclosures…were got by that murdering sword, and given by William the Conquerour" to those who are descended from his Norman accomplices, "Let all sorts have freedome by vertue of this Conquest over the Norman successor."[645]

The Diggers thought that lands should be confiscated for the poorest Englishmen to cultivate and private property should be abolished. Needless to say, this communistic program ultimately did not conquer in his time. Yet the

same impulse to "[l]et all sorts have freedome" that led to a kind of communism among the Anglo-Saxon Diggers would reemerge in America, albeit channeled in a rather different way. Equal individualism is the communism of America.

Supernigger

> **The conqueror considered the conquered, not as his prisoner, but as his property. He led him in triumph, rattling in chains, and doomed him, at pleasure, to slavery or death.**
>
> —THOMAS PAINE, *THE RIGHTS OF MAN*

Gang-Related

The two rival Los Angeles based gangs, The Crips and the Bloods, were originally spin offs of the militant black nationalist movement of the late 1960s, The Black Panthers. The Crips, for example, originally emulated the black leather jacket and blue shirts of the Panthers. While gangs are not necessarily kin groups, there tends to be a high correlation between gangs and kinship, as evident in Los Angeles gangs that tend to be exclusively black, Hispanic, Asian, or white.

Gangs are commonly characterized by a strong common identity, territoriality, the use of violence against other gangs, "illegal" means of earning a living and "antisocial" behavior. The "illegal" and "antisocial" characterization is a view of an outsider precisely because gangs themselves thrive upon strong distinctions of insider and outsider. The gang principle can range from "street gangs" such as the Crips to "organized crime" such as the Sicilian mafia,

Japanese Yakuza, governments, or multinational corporations.

Could conquering a country be considered an "antisocial" or "criminal" activity? Historian Eleanor Searle called the Normans a "warrior kin-group." I think the word "gang" is a more apt and laconic description. A classic example of the political expression of gang behavior is the Norman Conquest of England.

The predatory kin selective behavior of the Normans is *in principle* the same kind of sociobiological organization as other gangs, regardless of its scale or organizational sophistication. They displayed the same characteristics of strong kin-related identity, territoriality, violence against other "gangs," patriarchal organization, and "criminality" from the perspective of outsiders who opposed them. The kinship-cohesion of gangs tends to generate conflict with its rivals by the very nature of that cohesion. This pattern of Norman behavior was even more obvious in the case of the de Hauteville clan, led by Robert Guiscard. The de Hauteville gang only gradually ascended from terrorizing and plundering the southern Italian countryside to 'Norman Conquest' by 1059.

The Viking ancestors of Normans represent the epitome of Germanic gangsterism, including Rolf the Ganger, the pirating founder of the duchy of Normandy. Now, admittedly, there is some stiff historical competition for the Nietzschean title of greatest "blond beasts of prey". The gangsterism of the Nazis was not lost on German dramatist Bertolt Brecht, who paralleled the rise of the Nazi party with a fictional Chicago mobster in *The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui* (1941). The Vandals, from which the word *vandalism* is derived, also deserve at least an honorable mention. Yet when the Vandals sacked Rome in 445 it was not as

physically devastating as when the Normans sacked Rome in 1084. Moreover, whereas earlier pagan Vikings raids had wreaked havoc and destruction upon Christian England *despite* the prayers of its victims, the Norman master gangsters perfected the art of predation upon England in 1066 *with* the pope's prayers behind them. It was not long after the Conquest that the Normans plundered books, gold, silver, precious gems, money, and other treasures from English churches, very often enriching churches in Normandy with the holy booty.[646]

One corollary of gang-related kin-cohesion is a double standard between predator and prey. Gang values of loyalty made Hastings a success and gang values of loyalty served to preserve the booty won long afterwards. Orderic Vitalis wrote that shortly following the subjugation of England, Norman lords fitzOsbern and Odo,

> swollen with pride, would not deign to hear the reasonable plea of the English or give them impartial judgment. When their men-at-arms were guilty of plunder or rape, they protected them by force, and wreaked their wrath all the more violently upon those who complained of the cruel wrongs they suffered.[647]

Different standards of justice were applied to the in-kin group and the out-kin group because blood-unity formed a law unto itself. Against the consequences of this "irrational" kin selective double standard, the modern solution of a single legal standard would gradually emerge: political equality.

One cannot understand what America has become without grasping the discrimination and contempt the Anglo-Saxon faced from their Norman conquerors. The defeated Anglo-Saxons were reduced to the status of an

inferior race of men in their own country. During the reign of Henry II (1154-1189), for example, a statute formally prohibited the claiming of land unless they or their ancestors held it at the time of Henry I's death.[648] That law was, in effect, a law of ethnic discrimination.

In the period preceding the English Civil War, statesman Sir Thomas Wentworth, 1st Earl of Strafford and a descendant of an old Yorkshire family, sneered at "your Prynnes, Pyms and Bens, with the rest of that generation of odd names and natures."[649] This is an ethnic slur disguised only by its coupling with hereditary "class" divisions. It is no accident that the Normans of the South promoted the same confluence of class and race between whites and blacks in America.

In *Our Old Nobility*, dating from 1879, Englishman Howard Evans equated the subjugated Saxons with "mere Afghans and Zulus, who, by the divine right of triumphant scoundrelism, calling itself superior civilization, had to put their necks beneath the yoke."[650] This "triumphant scoundrelism" allowed the gentle Norman gangsters to appropriate and embody aristocratic status in England for centuries. Whereas in bourgeois society, the source of violent disorder is assumed to be characteristic of the lower class, during King Stephen's reign in the twelfth century, it was the noble gangsters who fomented brutal anarchy upon everyone below them. The revolutionary American apartheid against the high gangsterism of the Norman aristocracy relegated gang-related behavior to a low status in liberal democracies.

In the English Civil War period, Digger Gerrard Winstanley decried "yoaks and manicles, tying one sort of people to be slaves to another".[651] The Jeffersonian egalitarianism that originally aspired to overcome this

originary segregation between Saxon and Norman ultimately implicated the equality of blacks and whites. By promoting the caste segregation of blacks and whites as the "cornerstone" of the Confederacy, the Southern aristocracy hoped to ultimately achieve the *resegregation* of Saxon and Norman. This is what the American Civil War was about.

For the Anglo-Saxons, confronting the South was like confronting an old gang of bullies that had beaten them up in their youth and reigned over them as gang leaders. If in their youth, the Normans had picked on the Anglo-Saxons and kept them inferior in racial rank, the Civil War period was like meeting one another again as full grown men. The Anglo-Saxons remained humbled, but had worked hard and had something to show for it. The Normans, dragging their new slaves by their chains, showed that he who is master by nature will always remain master.

The American Civil War was gang warfare.

Apartheid Idealized

In 1804, the island of Haiti witnessed a successful revolution of black slaves who expelled or killed the ruling white planter caste. Here we have a black/white parallel to the Saxon/Norman conflict. Since English "class" distinctions originated as "race" distinctions, the parallel goes further.[652] If we wanted to use the latter term, we could say the English "class" system originated in a form of racism and these "class" wars were really race wars.

Jefferson ultimately denied the Haitian revolutionaries assistance, disapproving of this advance or universalization of liberty. After all, it might spread subversive ideas to blacks in America, such as Jefferson's own slaves. For Jefferson and many other American founders, the recognition of certain kinds of ethnic-racial warfare was not

evil; it was revolutionary common sense. To extend freedom and equality to blacks would be a hypocritical contradiction of what he called the 'Saxon laws.' The Anglo-centrism of Jefferson's egalitarianism is self-evident.

Just as Jefferson took pains to distinguish the behavioral traits of the black and white races, we can find earlier democrats in England, such as Nathaniel Bacon, distinguishing between the Saxon and Norman ways of government in the English Civil War period. Bacon's interest in the historical origins of his country's constitution was aroused from "A Private debate concerning the right of an English King to Arbitrary rule over English Subjects as Successor to the Norman Conquerour, (so called)". He first published *Historicall Discourse of the Uniformity of the Government of England* in 1647, arguing:

> Kings first (about the Norman times) joyning with the Lords for their joynt interest above the ordinary pitch had mounted each other too high to be Lords over free men….The Norman way of government grew more Aristocraticall than the Saxon, making the Lords the chief Instruments of keeping Kings above and people underneath.[653]

It requires only common sense to see that the democratic revolutions in England and America originate in the overthrow of the aristocratic "Norman way of government" that had kept the people repressed underneath it. After the democratic Saxon way of government conquered, there would no longer be rulers raised "too high to be Lords over free men."

For Thomas Paine, these associations took the form of the distinction between monarchy and republicanism. *The Rights of Man* stated, "Nothing of monarchy appears in any part of"

republican government, "except the name William the Conqueror imposed on the English, that of obliging them to call him "their Sovereign Lord the King"". The Norman way of government, moreover, promoted a kind of apartheid. Paine perceived that the House of Lords was "an hereditary aristocracy, assuming and asserting indefeasible, irrevocable rights and authority, wholly independent of the nation." That sense of apartheid, of being both separate and superior to the Anglo-Saxon nation, is what he believed the American Revolution, through its reversal, would attempt to turn upside down. Yet not everyone, especially in the South, saw the war for independence from Britain this way.

If we seek a model for the best way to live from the revolutionary example of Thomas Paine, it seems that the example he offers is one of apartheid. He struggled for apartheid against, not only the Norman way of government, but also the entire gang-related military-conquering way of life that had victimized his nation. So much assimilation had occurred since the Conquest. Yet despite that, revolutionaries like Paine aggressively emphasized exactly the distinctiveness of that political "class" and their oppressive way of life. Such patriots emphasized their *distinctions* from the tyrannical conquering "class" and the need for non-accommodation and separation. To despise "hereditary government" and hereditary titles was to emphasize the *difference* from themselves against the social mendings wrought by time.

Individualism itself is only a continuation of the internally adapted mode of revolutionary apartheid. The progress of equal individualism extends the victorious walls of non-accommodation and non-obedience, universalizing the Saxon revolt from this particular aristocracy. The kinship-racial consequences of the United States are the living

demonstration of how individual values are the negation of the maximal kin selection strategy that the Normans embodied.

The term "revolution" can mask the fact that its advocates were provoking aggressive warfare. Under Oliver Cromwell's reign following the Parliamentary victory in the English Civil War, a pamphlet of 1654, *The Extent of the Sword* declared:

> Wheresoever Tyranny or mis-government arises, it may be removed by Force…. The Kings of England (as Successors, by way of Conquest) have derived their Power for above 500 yeares from the Norman Sword, until now that the people have again by conquest recovered their right…out of the hands of Regall Power usurping it.

As long as the army maintained "possession of absolute Conquest," it was "thereby declared by God to have right to the execution of the supreame power for the defence and ordering of the Common-wealth."[654] For the Puritans, separation was salvation.

Some pacifists might consider this fighting fire with fire, eye for an eye justice, but what the underlying issue here? If an ethnic group is associated with an entire political philosophy, how can principle be separated from the primal? When applying a sociobiological analysis of the *behavior* of the revolutionaries, how can one otherwise explain why men would risk their lives to institute a political system designed to preserve the individual right to live?

As historian Christopher Hill observed:

> Parliament's victory in the [English] Civil War destroyed the Royalist doctrine that absolutism was justified by the Norman Conquest. Hobbes pointed out the folly of this line

> of defence, for it meant that the right of the monarchy was overthrown by military defeat.[655]

That people today find it hard to believe that this argument could be taken seriously reflects the ultimate success of the Anglo-Saxon conquests. Here we can see the English Civil War as the first decisive transition point between the right of conquest and the rights of man. Yet does the absolutism of the rights of man require its own right of conquest?

The English Civil War *seemingly* put an end to the royalist doctrine of absolutism justified through right of conquest. But did it? Was this the last gasp of an uncompromised "Norman way of government"?

In January 1860, the influential Southern magazine *DeBow's Review*, published an article called "The Basis of Northern Hostility to the South". New Englanders, it claimed, were "lineal descendants of the English puritans....They hate us because their fathers hated ours; they envy us, because we are happy in our society and have slaves....The same fanaticism that impelled their ancestors is urging them." The English Civil War, the struggle between Puritan and Cavalier, was the "*prototype*" of impending civil war in America.[656]

Revolt of the Conquerors: The Failed Founding of a New 1066 in America

The embryo of Southern culture was conceived with the migration of a small but highly influential minority of "distressed Cavaliers" from England to Virginia in the seventeenth century. The arrival of these younger sons of high-ranking families was strongly encouraged by Virginia

governor Sir William Berkeley (b. 1606). The younger son of a Cavalier family himself, he was the heir of a dynasty that had resided at Berkeley Castle in Gloucestershire since the eleventh century.[657]

The Normans were coming.

Almost all of the Cavalier settlers were supporters of the Royalists in the English Civil War (1642-51) and many had served as military officers.[658] Just as the great Puritan exodus to Massachusetts was provoked by the "eleven years tyranny" (1629-40), large numbers of Cavaliers arrived in Virginia during the 1650s seeking freedom from the Puritan yoke.[659] The battle lines in that war, hovering around traditional caste divisions in England, transplanted themselves as geographical and ethnic-cultural divisions in America. This means that William R. Taylor's relegation of the North/South difference to myth in *Cavalier and Yankee* is a myth itself in northern, Lockean tradition of the tabla rasa.[660]

The term "Cavalier" was a political predecessor of the word "Tory". It was derived from the French word *chevalier*, meaning knight, and hints at a French *identity*. The English word *chivalry* was also derived from this French root and, not surprisingly, the code of chivalrous behavior lay at the core of Cavalier "class" identity. "Cavalier" originally described the Royalist, typically aristocratic, supporters of Charles I in the English Civil War. Most of the descendants of the Cavaliers in America would continue the struggle against the Puritan yoke two centuries later.

The same predatory kinship strategy observed by Searle as a motivator for the Norman Conquest of England, and by Pine as a motivator for Norman conquest and colonization in Wales, Ireland, and Scotland, is observable in this defining facet of the colonization of Virginia. The Norman-aristocratic

custom of primogeniture compelled imperial ambitions in younger sons who stood to inherit nothing of their father's landed estates.

Just as in Britain, the interbred oligarchy of the South defended one another against outsiders.[661] As an extension of Britain, kin selection is evident in covert assistance to the South from the British ruling "class" during the U. S. Civil War. Prosperous planters who rose from humble origins in Virginia were not admitted to this high elite.[662] This is how the Norman Conquest franchise came to America.

When we ask ourselves why, after all these centuries, did this Norman pattern of exclusionary power persist, we can see that Darwin and W. D. Hamilton offer some basic answers. Kin selective behaviors are genetically adaptive; they are *by definition* behaviors that are good at perpetuating themselves. In other words, behaviors that are good at reproducing themselves tend to survive and, in this case, this meant reproducing an exclusionary master caste.

Cousins marriages and other strongly endogamous practices of the Cavaliers, observed David Hackett Fischer in *Albion's Seed*, "were carefully planned to create a web of kinship as dense as that of the Roman patriciate. It is difficult to think of any ruling elite that has been more closely interrelated since the Ptolemies."[663] This is classic kin selection.

To oppose this radical, predatory, kin selective way of life as consistently as the Puritans did was to oppose its other radical implications as well: behaviors that can possibly include genocide and racism. We can now grasp *why* those American founders who found the old order founded in Conquest to be "irrationally" exclusionary were utterly correct. Regardless of talent, morals, character, or achievement, the Anglo-Saxons of the old order were

conquered and excluded from power in the name of *good family values*. The dark side of Southern hospitality was Southern hostility to those who stood too far outside of the charmed circle of the extended family.

The majoritarian flavor of white Southern culture was formed by a different British population: immigrants to the backcountry commonly called the Scotch-Irish. Whereas the Puritan migration to Massachusetts originated largely from a region of southeastern England called East Anglia, the Scotch-Irish arrived primarily from upper Britain; northern England, Scotland and Northern Ireland.[664] The original Southern settlement also included English indentured servants that arrived in Virginia under the Cavaliers.

In 1846, a Southerner of Scotch-Irish ancestry named William Gilmore Simms wrote a poem that linked American progress with expansion by the "good old Norman stock". Called "the most prolific novelist, magazine, and newspaper editor of his generation", Simms lent his literary talents to his belief that "[w]ar is the greatest element of modern civilization, and our destiny is conquest." As the American Civil War approached, this adamant supporter of slavery was ever more strident in his affirmations that "a people once conscious of their superiority, will never be found to hesitate long in its despotic exercise over their neighbors."[665]

Simms also offered insight into a certain masterwork of his fellow novelist, Sir Walter Scott. It was not until the publication of his *Ivanhoe*, "one of the most perfect specimens of the romance that we possess", he believed, "that the general reader had any fair idea of the long protracted struggle for superiority between the Norman and Saxon people." While the notion that it took *Ivanhoe* to make educated people "aware that there had been any long continued conflict between these warring races" is

erroneous,[666] this is only one of many exaggerated causes for which *Ivanhoe* has been enlisted.

It is amusing to find people who use *Ivanhoe* as if it were scientific evidence that the Norman Conquest never happened. *Ivanhoe* was fiction; *ergo* the notion that the Norman Conquest could produce long-term ethnic hostility must be fiction. I doubt, however, that the hundred thousand or so who were starved to death or slaughtered during the "harrying of the north" (1069-70) regarded the "struggle for superiority between the Norman and Saxon people" as fiction. Perhaps *Ivanhoe* can be used as scientific evidence to prove that the Norman castles that still domineer over the landscape of England were and are fictions. Perhaps, also, the evidence for the fierce military attacks on those Norman castles during the English Civil War is also a myth. Those who blindly desire to reduce the Norman/Saxon conflict to a myth will have to find better empirical evidence than the novel *Ivanhoe*.

When translated into the classic moral format of a Hollywood movie, the oppressed Saxons represent the obvious good guys while the oppressive Normans represent the obvious bad guys. Yet Southern admirers of *Ivanhoe* largely identify themselves with the bad guys, the cruel and ruthless Norman lords, rather than the oppressed Saxons.[667] How could this be? This was tantamount to identifying with the slave master over the slave in the American Civil War.

This war was yet another episode of America's favorite family feud: the vendetta between Norman and Saxon. The American Civil War replayed the same general plot as the English Civil War except that the slave "manor plantation"[668] took the place of the Norman castle and black slaves took the place of Saxon serfs. How, after all, were all of England's massive Norman castles built in the first place?

Immediately following Hastings, at the lowest rungs of the construction crew, was the forced labor of conquered peasants. Was this slavery? During the "liberty" or anarchy of the Norman King Stephen, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* told how the Normans "greatly oppressed the wretched people by making them work at their castles, and when the castles were finished they filled them with devils and evil men." This kind of forced labor or slavery is a problem only if you think that the Norman Conquest itself was wrong. But if the Norman Conquest was right and slavery is right, then wars must continue to be fought to defend slavery. This is how Southerners came to identify with the "bad guys" in *Ivanhoe*.

Kin selective behaviors that express themselves through genes express themselves through the unconscious, and often, thus, through the language of myth. *Ivanhoe* is best understood when juxtaposed with the fiction that Anglo-Saxons in America, unlike all other ethnicities in history, are *the* Überethnicity; the ethnicity above all ethnicity. The Native Americans, of course, where not *the* universal people, so they had to be killed off or driven off the land. The Anglo-Saxons, by contrast, are so special and so exceptional that they are even superior to ethnocentrism.

One the eve of war in June 1860, the *Southern Literary Messenger* declared:

> the Southern people come of that race recognized as cavaliers … directly descended from the Norman barons of William the Conqueror, a race distinguished in its early history for its warlike and fearless character, a race in all times since renowned for its gallantry, chivalry, honor, gentleness and intellect.[669]

Does this really refer to *all* of the Southern people? Just as this characterization excludes blacks with nonchalance, it

also excludes the Scotch-Irish majority. This kind of identification of the Normans with the South implies that they constituted the South's essential master race.

Here one can see the general correctness of Fischer's thesis in *Albion's Seed*, that the early differences in different British cultures set the cultural framework of America. The Puritan culture of New England came to dominate the basic values of the upper North *despite* the democracy of numbers at the disposal of immigrants such as the Irish and Germans. This is a crucial point, for while it is *not* true that the Southern elite was exclusively Norman, the early Cavaliers set the tone of the political culture of South in a manner that is very similar to the way the Puritans set the tone of the political culture of the North.

As the historian of Southern slavery, Eugene Genovese, put it, "The planters commanded Southern politics and set the tone of social life."[670] The "First Families of Virginia" (FFVs) and their aristocratic slave plantation system became the social model that the rest of South aspired to emulate.[671] The very nature of the Cavaliers' hierarchical values exacerbated the dominance of their caste and the influence of their cultural paradigm in a more overt manner than its Northern counterpart.

Cavalier leadership of the South was even more peculiar than this. As David Hackett Fischer explained, Virginia's "royalist elite succeeded in shaping the social history of an American region partly by regulating the process of migration."[672] Just as they deliberately imported black slaves, the Norman-Cavalier elite helped promote and guide the migration of English indentured servants and Scotch-Irish. The Scotch-Irish had sided with the Royalists in the English Civil War and, unlike the stereotypical Puritan, they possessed the virtues of soldiers.

While Norman elites and the Scotch-Irish may have found unity in the 1860s in opposition to Northern merchant capitalism and its destructive impact upon an agricultural existence,[673] this does not mean that the South was a singular, unified *nation*. Normans and Scotch-Irish even cast ethnic slurs at one another in the form of stereotypes, although not by these terms. "Tuckahoe" was strewn at the aristocratic Norman owners of the great slave plantations. "Cohee" disparaged poor, non-slave-owning Scotch-Irish.

A classic Scotch-Irish perspective of the South is represented by W. J. Cash's *The Mind of the South* (1941). The more aristocratic-Norman view of the South is represented by the autobiography of the lawyer and poet William Alexander Percy in *Lanterns on the Levee: Recollections of a Planter's Son* (1974). For Percy, the stereotype of "undiluted Anglo-Saxons" was associated with the common and contemptible "sovereign voter". The House of Percy had been one of the most powerful noble Norman families of medieval England and had played a major role, for example, as determined Lancastrians during the Wars of the Roses.

The Jeffersonian subversion of the Cavalier order helped insure that caste order would be vigorously challenged. It is simply not the case that the original Cavaliers, however influential, were the exclusive masters and military leaders of the South. Stonewall Jackson, for example, was not a Cavalier. Yet it may be because of Scotch-Irish President Andrew Jackson, and his attack on the Cavalier military caste in the name of democratic populism, that Stonewall Jackson was possible. Andrew Jackson's electoral victory converged Anglo-Saxon populism with Scotch-Irish populism, even as he trumped the Adams political family.

The antebellum Southern politician John C. Calhoun appears to have been of Scotch-Irish origins. Yet Calhoun

himself believed that the Norman Conquest "introduced the feudal system, with its necessary appendages, a hereditary monarchy and nobility". The conquered he identified with "serfs". This means that even though Calhoun himself likely had no Norman ancestry, 1066 deeply informed his understanding of the history of American political tradition.

The South was *not* a nation. Populist elements of Anglo-Saxon *nationalism* can be found during the American Revolutionary period, especially in the North and even in England. The masters of the South, by contrast, hoped not only to reinvent the old British "class" system, but also to advance "progress" on the dynamics of its predecessor by institutionalizing a whole new "class" of inferiority in black slaves. It was the old "feudal" pyramid with special demarcations for those of a certain "class" or "race".

The most famous near parallel within the British Empire was India. Just as blacks stood as the bottom caste in America, the Norman-British based upper "class" attempted to *perfect* the native caste system of India with themselves at its peak. This was done, not only for the sake of economic exploitation, but also as a social model for Britain itself.

It was *precisely* the cultural inheritance of "class" barriers from Britain that supported the idea that blacks fell into a "class" so inferior, that they were not even human. Just as Anglo-Saxons had once fit into the ranks of the non-upper class, the neo-conqueror "class" found a special new slot for black slaves. At the extremes of the dynamic Southern caste system was this core configuration: the Norman master race at the top and the black slave race on the bottom.

As usual, the conventional view of the Norman/Saxon conflict reflects the more individualistic tendencies of the Saxon North. This has very much helped to obscure the nature of the conflict. A Saxon-centric tendency to

emphasize individual exceptions to racial-ethnic generalizations is a historic product of their attempt to overthrow the general accuracy of their association with the conquered "class". "Freedom" is also freedom from this un-Lockean kind of determination.

The system advocated by most of the American founders is individualistic *as a whole* because its rules were made by men who were sensitive to the justice of individual exceptions. There is a sound, common reason for this: many of the founders *were* individual exceptions to the most blatantly stereotypical Norman/Saxon rules. In general, the Southern way of life fought for in the 1860s was a neo-Norman-based aristocracy presiding over a Scotch-Irish majority, which, in turn, ranked above the masses of black slaves.

The enlightened ethnic cleansing of the Norman identity of the South's master class mixed with a Saxon-centric Anti-Normanism focus on majorities over elites has lead to one of liberal America's favorite hypocrisies: liberal racism against the Scotch-Irish. Instead of sizing up against the Cavalier culture that once conquered the ancestors of Northern Puritans, the non-Southern view of the South has much preferred a focus on the "white trash" culture associated with the Scotch-Irish. Northern racism towards the Scotch-Irish has yielded an implicit dictum: every liberal knows that only the racially inferior are racist. This is how justice has been served: Scotch-Irish "rednecks" are discriminated against as racially inferior racists while the aristocratic Norman masters, the greatest exploiters of both the Scotch-Irish and blacks, have been ethnically cleansed from the books of modern history.

Manifest Destinies: The Peculiar Revolution Meets the New "Good Old Cause"

Men of the South! Ye have no kin
With fanatics or fools;
You are not bound by breed or birth
To Massachusetts rules.[674]

—" A BALLAD FOR THE YOUNG SOUTH"

Reginald Horsman, in *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism*, sought to shed light on a remarkable contradiction in early American history. He observed that in the three-quarters of a century between the American Revolution and 1850, Americans, particularly in the North, changed from a people who believed they could teach the world to be free to believers in a racial Anglo-Saxonism that was imperialistic and exclusionary. Horsman found this change striking and sought to document it and perhaps explain it. His analysis grounded to a halt, however, just before things became most peculiarly and paradoxically interesting. How was it that the race-supremist Anglo-Saxonism interpretation of manifest destiny culminated in a civil war to affirm and enforce their racial equality with black slaves?

William the Conqueror was the founding father of the British Empire. The Cavaliers of the American South aspired to be the founding fathers of a neo-Norman Confederate Empire. The American Civil War was a clash of manifest destinies.

At the time of the American Revolution, the cultural development of both North and South on virgin American soil was primitive enough that even fundamental differences could be downplayed. While the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 set Britain with a compromise between the Puritan Revolution of 1649 and the Restoration of 1660, both North and South in America could find cause for grievance against this compromise for opposite reasons. Britain's internal abolition of slavery in 1772 helped seal a superficial American unity in 1776, for it suggested a growing intolerance for slavery in lands relatively free of the Puritan yoke.

The geographical separation offered by America gave "modern" Anglo-Saxon Anti-Normanism the opportunity to develop towards one extreme of individual freedom in the North while anti-Anglo-Saxon Normanism developed towards the opposite extreme of slavery in the South. Just as North and South were presumably united in "liberty", the concept of manifest destiny was originally neither Norman nor Saxon, but broadly white out of the original revolutionary overlook of the old divisions of the English Civil War. The inherent racism of manifest destiny, however, graduated the distinction between whites and non-whites towards divisions among whites. Horsman observed how cultural divergence became correlated with an increased consciousness of racial divergence:

> As the Civil War approached, some Southerners used *Anglo-Norman* to describe the population of their own region, arguing that the South had received a population blend which contained more Germanic-Norman knights and the North a blend which contained more Germanic-Saxon commoners.[675]

The un-Lockean *Southern* view inclined towards the belief that the true irreconcilable difference between North and South was not the issue of slavery, but rather, the irreconcilability of a "deeply defined difference in race."[676] In short, Watson explained, "South and North had been stamped by contrasting bloods—a dominant and martial Norman and a servile and inferior Saxon."[677] Since slavery was about race, blacks became a symbol of the contrast between the ethos of a "master race" and the ethos of a "slave race".

By the time of Civil War, the North was as committed to the notion of the racial basis of sectional difference as the South.[678] The Northern essayist, critic, and poet Edmund Clarence Stedman thought that slavery had been "the cause of the War in no sense other than that it has added another distinctness to the line betwixt North and South which climate and race had already drawn." The South's planter aristocracy was "domineering, insolent, irrational, haughty," and "scornful of justice". But, above all, it was their belief in the "positive rights of a superior race", Stedman wrote, that was the single greatest factor in making civil war inevitable.[679]

If a race was a crucial factor, it cannot account for environmental differences betweens Normans and Saxons: cultural and climate. While, from an economic standpoint, there existed some correlation between crops such as cotton and the viability of slavery, Missouri offered an empirical refutation of the assertion that climate itself could sustain slavery's "natural" borders. Lincoln explicitly stated that climate would not keep slavery out of the North.[680]

While it is culture, not climate, that explains the primary North/South difference regarding slavery, the French-Latin roots of Norman civilization promoted a strong affinity for

environments that approximated Mediterranean heat. However mutated and attenuated, the old French connection is probably the key insight into the compatibility of Cavalier culture and the more tropical climate of South. The gentlemanly cultivation of polite manners and refined social graces were not imported into France by Norman Vikings; Norman Vikings acquired these characteristics from the French. France itself is a kind of synthesis of the characters of the north and south of Europe and the Norman-Cavaliers approximated something similar between the tame modernism of the Anglo-Saxons and the more "Mediterranean" mentality of Latin America.

Some have argued that the acquisition of lands such as New Mexico were unsuitable for slavery and that a "needless war" was fought just at the moment that these "natural" boundaries marked the limits of slavery. The reason that this argument is utterly unconvincing is that the potential for the expansion of a Southern slave empire was not in New Mexico; it was in old Mexico and Latin America. Southerners had already made plans to purchase or annex territories in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South America.[681] Southerners would surely have been gracious enough to open new slots for Latin Americans in their new caste system.

If the Confederacy had successfully established Independence, it would, in some ways, be comparable to the official founding of Normandy in the year 911. Jefferson Davis or Robert E. Lee would be comparable to Normandy's founder, the Viking pirate Rolf (a.k.a. Rollo), the ancestor of William the Conqueror. The Mason-Dixon Line would have replaced the English Channel as the surmountable cage of Norman predatory kin selection.

What if an independent Confederacy had expanded its slave empire into Latin America, consolidated its power like a New Normandy, and then pounced upon a greater New England with a new Norman conquest? That would have been a true Norman revolution; a Norman restoration of the old *post*-Conquest order.

What are the chances that the Anglo-Saxon North might have a strong opinion on the possibility of a new Norman Conquest in America? Would they be indifferent to the prospect of Normans expanding a slave empire that was legalized by the Constitution? Would it have been irrational to *not* attempt to conquer the Normans when it became clear that slavery was not dying a natural death? Northern warmongering was propelled by traditional Yankee *conquestphobia* — a direct corollary of its Anti-Normanism political values.

The historical resentment of the descendants of Puritans in the North was akin to the resentment that the Anglo-Saxon Varangians serving under the Byzantine Empire must have felt when facing off against the Norman conquerors of Southern Italy and Sicily. Shocked into the realization that the old Norman bitch was back, greater New England had in its sights a final redemption of the battle of Hastings. New England now possessed in its sight the power to end the conflict against this age-old nemesis in victory and they were not going to let it go.

To be resolutely opposed to slavery is one thing. It is quite another to be willing to *kill* men to *impose* notions of moral goodness upon a people who seek freedom, however peculiar. The utter hypocrisy of a war against a Southern declaration of independence was inevitable for one, primary, historical reason: the Anglo-Saxon-based North was prepared to break *any* and *every* principle, law, or moral

code to abort a new world Norman Conquest. This why the North went to war against the Southern way of liberty in 1861.

The gradual development of racial self-consciousness in the period from the Revolution to the 1850s culminated in a clarification of the irreconcilable aspirations of the Norman-Cavalier South and the Puritan-Yankee North. What was increasingly manifest was that blacks had reoccupied the degraded caste-status that Anglo-Saxons had partially occupied in England. English geologist Sir Charles Lyell corroborated this analogy with his observation that the relation of master and slave in the South was akin to the relation of lord and retainer in old England.[682] If we look at slavery as a "class" or caste system where caste rank is dependent on kinship distance, slavery was only a logical continuation of Norman Conquest cultural values.

The old Norman right of conquest was the right to mastery without consent. If the right of conquest could justify the enshacklement of the natives of England, then why shouldn't a new and improved assertion of "right" be able to justify the conquest of native Africans as well? After all, what would have happened if Southerners, a people who prided themselves on their military ambitions, had possessed the ability to conquer the North? Here one can see what was at stake. A culturally embedded fear of that old conquering enslavement and white ethnic tribalism made sublime became neo-Puritan-egalitarian idealism.

Although there existed an ambiguity between the cause of racial equality and the cause of annihilating a hereditary race enemy, the Northern *principle* behind the liberation of black slaves consisted more of a form of Anti-Normanism than of pro-egalitarianism. While it is senseless to argue for either view exclusively since they are two sides of the same coin,

Neo-Normanism was the active, aggressive cultural force that aggrandized the slave holding way of life and led to secession from the Union. The post-revolutionary aggrandizement of slavery in new states was a part of a gamble comparable to William's calculated gamble to cross the English Channel in 1066. The Southern master class's brazen refutation of inevitable progressive equality forced the issue towards either total victory or total defeat.

The primary reason for the abstract egalitarian identification of Anglo-Saxon and blacks, then, was only partly the empathy of one subjugated people for another. First and foremost, the radical Saxon vendetta against the old conquering class was so old and bitter, it proved far stronger than racial hostility to blacks. The revolutionary reverse apartheid against the elite Norman legacy took precedence over any prejudice against blacks. The universalism of the revolution, although deeply influenced by Christianity, is a sublimated radicalization of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism which implicated blacks as an afterthought.

There was, nonetheless, significant depth to the Anglo-Negro convergence. Since the Puritans were the epitome of principled rejection of the Norman Yoke, the old "class" system just wasn't going to work in North America. A people who conceive of themselves as a conquering race need a people to conquer, and if the money hunger of the Puritans was impervious to finding itself taxed or otherwise channeled into the estates of the new conquerors, then a substitute had to be found. Within the context of the Atlantic slave trade, blacks became an obvious means of perpetuating the Norman conqueror lifestyle.

Just as Jefferson imagined the founding of 1776 as a restoration of 8th century England, the Normans of the South

fought for the cultural restoration of a founding through racial conquest. The American Civil War decided whether the new world would be the homeland of an idealized pre-Conquest land of freedom or the homeland of a founding created in the image of William the Conqueror. If the South had won, Confederate America would have become a new home for a new 1066.

Herein lays the solution to the contradiction Horsman observed between the enlightened downplaying of race among America's revolutionary generation and the seemingly incompatible rise of Anglo-Saxon racialism that followed. The coalition that the produced the revolution and the United States Constitution could *only* have come about by downplaying the Norman/Saxon race difference and emphasizing a more "universalistic" basis of human unity. But if the racial meaning of Jeffersonian equality was the racial equality of Norman and Saxon, then the *further* liberation of Anglo-Saxon self-consciousness had the potential to upset North/South unity.

That the advance of Whiggish notions of egalitarian "progress" was, in practice, inseparable from the advance of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism was evident in the "progress" of ethnocentrism achieved between the American Revolution and the Anglo-Saxon racialism of "manifest destiny". Further "progress" in liberation from the old Norman Yoke amounted to "progress" in *liberating* Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism *led* to the Civil War precisely because the downplaying of race and heredity that made the North/South coalition possible during the revolutionary period became undone, in part, through the rise of a more aggressive and confident Anglo-Saxonism. The Civil War arose out of a breakdown of belief in the equality of Norman and Saxon that turned into a contest for

superiority between Norman and Saxon. At stake was nothing less than control over America's destiny.

With the Northern interpretation of manifest destiny before the Civil War, Anglo-Saxon racial nationalism was just getting started. But where did it end? What, in other words, was the *peak* of Anglo-Saxon nationalism? Puritanical intolerance for Norman-Cavaliers? Lincoln represents, not the trough, *but the very pinnacle* of Anglo-Saxon nationalism in its traditional form: radical Anti-Normanism. Far from being a deviation from the Anglo-Saxon racialism that usurped the concept of manifest destiny, aggressive Anti-Normanism directed against the South was *the* inevitable, logical, culmination of Anglo-Saxon nationalism. Has this been overlooked simply because it is *too obvious*?

Some surely engaged in *schadenfreude* amidst the spectacle of the old Norman conquerors reduced to equality with their slaves. After the conquest of the South, the Anglo-Saxons of the North cleansed the Norman blood from their soldiers' uniforms and declared their moral superiority. The issue of racial superiority, for Anglo-Saxons, was achieved by imposing the equality of Normans and blacks. *That* was the Anglo-Saxon racialist's American dream.

Philosophy of Slavery: The Brave New Norman Yoke of George Fitzhugh

> **Without that *pathos of distance* which grows out of the ingrained difference between strata—when the ruling caste constantly looks afar and looks down upon subjects and instruments and just as constantly practices obedience and command, keeping down and keeping at a distance—that other, more mysterious pathos could not have**

> **grown up either—the craving for an ever new widening of distances within the soul itself, the development of higher, rarer, more remote, further-stretching, more comprehensive states—in brief, simply the enhancement of the type "man"...**[683]
>
> —FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, *BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL*

"It is the duty of society to enslave the weak".[684] Blacks *and most whites* should be enslaved in order to protect them. So thought George Fitzhugh.

Fitzhugh was the philosopher of the Norman Yoke. He was, more precisely, the intellectual advocate of the *goodness* of the Norman Yoke:

> Heretofore the great difficulty in defending Slavery has arisen from the fear that the public would take offence at assaults on its long-cherished political axioms, which, nevertheless, stood in the way of that defence. It is now evident that those axioms have outlived their day — for no one, either North or South, has complained of our rather ferocious assault on them…

Yes, Fitzhugh admitted, slave owners who upheld the principle that all men are created equal were hypocrites. The Confederate solution, however, was given full form by this uncompromising Virginian: ending hypocrisy by siding on the fundamental inequality of rights.

This was not an apologetic, defensive, reaction to abolitionist accusations; this was a full-blown philosophical justification of slavery, aristocracy, and the Southern way of life. It was a confident attack upon capitalist liberal

democracy at its Lockean foundation. "No successful defence of slavery can be made, till we succeed in refuting or invalidating the principles on which free society rests for support or defence."[685]

In the minds of many Americans, George Fitzhugh *was* the South.[686] His first book, *Sociology for the South*, "aroused the ire of Lincoln more than most pro-slavery books."[687] The radicalism, or rather, the thoroughness of his thinking helped make war with the North inevitable. He did seem to think, however, that the North would come around to recognizing the basic inegalitarian premise of his thinking. Strangely enough, though, the citizens of the North did not petition their Congressmen for universal slavedom. Instead, a war was fought.

The view that Fitzhugh was merely eccentric is a corollary of the Saxon-centric view that slavery was a mere aberration that had to be cleaned up and Purified through the domination of Yankee values. Fitzhugh thought that it was the North that was eccentric: "Slavery is the natural and normal condition of society…The situation of the North is abnormal and anomalous."[688] It was not a few eccentric Southerners who fought to the death to defend a slave-holding way of life in the bloodiest war in U.S. history.

Yet why was it that this man's Weltanschauung was *so* far out in right field in comparison to almost every other major political thinker in American history? What was it about this figure or his personal background that made him a towering exponent of philosophical diversity against the bland, white bread, backdrop of liberal, Lockean conformity? Was Fitzhugh "un-American"?

A key to Fitzhugh's apparent exceptionalism and his peculiar mode of family values is to be found, naturally, in his extended family. Lawyer George Fitzhugh (1806-1881)

was the heir of an old Virginian family with a classic Norman surname[689] ('Fitz-' is Norman French for "son of"; hence "son of Hugh"). He was a descendant of William the Immigrant (1651-1701), the slave-owning founder of the Fitzhugh family of Virginia.[690] The origins of George Fitzhugh's particular mode of family values are further clarified in *The History of the Fitzhugh Family* (2007), where information about the family's ancestral coat of arms and probable descent from King Henry VIII[691] can be located.

Cannibals All!, or, Slaves Without Masters (1857) was George Fitzhugh's most famous defense of the Norman-Cavalier slaveholding way of life that dominated the Old South. This remarkable Norman-American contribution to the debate on the nature of the common good was ahead of its time. Over one hundred years before W. D. Hamilton's publication of his theory of kin selection in 1964, Fitzhugh demonstrated a remarkable grasp of its basic concept when he wrote that family members are "most sensibly selfish when they seem most unselfish."[692]

In his view, "[u]nmitigated selfishness…should not be, with man especially, the only rule and guide; for he is, by nature, eminently social and gregarious….men and beavers, herds, bees, and ants require a different philosophy, another guide of conduct….Bees and herds are naturally subjects or slaves of society."[693] His use of the word slavery corresponds to what is more commonly referred to as social *duties* or obligations (as opposed to *rights*). In consequence, Fitzhugh proscribed "restrictions of liberty which are expedient or necessary to secure the good of the human hive".[694]

This is classic kin selection. Edward O. Wilson, the Harvard scientist from Alabama who incorporated Hamilton's discovery in his landmark *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (1975), is also a world expert on ants. The same kin

selective basis of social behavior that applies to ants and bees also applies, to a lesser extent, to humans.

Fitzhugh wrote that, within the family,

> [e]ach one prefers the good of others to his own, and finds most happiness in sacrificing selfish pleasures, and ministering to others' enjoyments. The wife, the husband, the parent, the child, the son, the brother and the sister, usually act towards each other on scriptural principles.[695]

Although he associated altruism with "scriptural principle", he also recognized that the defining principles of the Protestant Reformation lead to the break up of the family:

> We have no quarrel with the Reformation…nor with all of the philosophy that has been deduced from it; but it is the excess of reform, and the excessive applications of that philosophy, to which we object….Christian morality can find little practical foothold in a community so constituted that to "love our neighbor as ourself" or "to do unto others as we would they should do unto us" would be acts of suicidal self-sacrifice[696]

It should not be surprising that Fitzhugh appealed to Aristotle, the ancient *pagan* philosopher: "the true vindication of slavery must be founded on his theory of man's social nature, as opposed to Locke's theory of the Social Contract".[697] Against John Locke, "a presumptuous charlatan, who was as ignorant of the science or practice of government as any shoemaker or horse jockey",[698] the Virginian was especially pleased to find support for his views in Aristotle's notion of "natural slaves".

Whereas Thomas Hobbes formally began individualistic, modern political philosophy by repudiating Aristotle in the English Civil War era, Fitzhugh sought to undo modern political philosophy with a recovery of Aristotle in the American Civil War era. The missing link that divides the ancient theory of man presented by Aristotle and the modern theory of man presented by Hobbes and Locke is kin selection. This also corresponds to the general difference that separated the South from the North: in the former, bonds of family and community took precedence over "the individual".

Much of Fitzhugh's philosophy can be explained within his Southern context as an expression of the superlative success of Norman kin selective values. Anglo-Saxon individualism, by contrast, is a product of the relative failure or frustration of Anglo-Saxon kin selection. This was the specific historic reason that Anglo-Saxon and Norman political philosophies implicitly divided over the import of kin selection: *Norman kin selective success was built upon Anglo-Saxon kin selective failure*. Because pre-modern war, i.e. the Battle of Hastings, generally required selflessness and altruism for victory, the conquerors were often more kin selectively altruistic than the conquered.[699] And this, by the very same token, is what exacerbated the tendency towards a kin selective caste system among the conquerors.

This root Norman/Saxon difference amounted, not to a fine point of distinction among believers in the Constitution, but to a declaration of war against the Constitution itself: "We do not agree with the authors of the Declaration of Independence, that governments 'derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.'" Just as "[f]athers do not derive their authority, as heads of families, from the consent of wife and children…All governments must originate in

force, and be continued by force."[700] The American founding was no exception.

The principle that Fitzhugh espoused here was nothing less than the right of conquest that had once between used to justify absolutism by virtue of the military victory of 1066. But what is even more noteworthy is the nature of Fitzhugh's exception to the rule of force: "Might does not always make right…Within the family circle, the law of love prevails, not that of selfishness…slaves, also, belong to the family circle."[701] If the Anglo-Saxons had simply understood this point, there would have been no need for revolution!

Fitzhugh's theory of politics amounts to the positing of kin selective caste as a basis for a master government presiding over a caste system: various racial tiers of white slaves bottomed out by the lowest caste, black slaves. It was remarkably similar, albeit more strict and extreme, to what was euphemistically known in Britain as the "class" system. "Subordination, difference of caste and classes, difference of sex, age, and slavery beget peace and good will."[702]

Fitzhugh was ahead of his time. He recognized that the logic of Northern 'progress' will

> carry the doctrine of human equality to a length utterly inconsistent with the power and control which ordinary Christian marriage gives to the husband over the wife….Abolition contemplates the total overthrow of the Family and all other existing social, moral, religious and governmental institutions.[703]

Equal individualism dissolves all social bonds, cutting the strings of society "sheer asunder".[704] The socialism of slavery, in his view, was less exploitative and more humane than the antisocial individualism of capitalism:

> The Abolitionists boast, that lands are dearer and labor cheaper in free than in slave society. Either proposition contains the admission that free laborers work more for others and less for themselves than slaves—in effect, that they are less free than slaves.[705]

Men were unequal, leading to capitalist masters, but even if "[i]f all men had been created equal, all would have been competitors, rivals, enemies". The Northern Lockeans

> place men in positions of equality, rivalry, and antagonism, which must result in extreme selfishness of conduct, and yet propose this system as a cure for selfishness. To us their reasonings seem absurd….The only cure for all this is for free society sternly to recognize slavery as right in principle and necessary in practice.[706]

"Slavery may have been immoral to the world at large," observed Eugene Genovese, "but to these men...it increasingly came to be seen as the very foundation of a proper social order and therefore as the essence of morality in human relationships."[707] If slavery was wrong *then the Norman Conquest was wrong*. However, if slavery was right *then the Norman Conquest was right* and the slave revolt principles of '76 were wrong. Fitzhugh was the heir of a tradition that saw the Norman Conquest — the *right* of conquest — not as the criminal enterprise of a barbaric gang, but as the fountainhead of virtue; virtue almost as it had been defined by ancient, pagan Rome.

The Confederate war for mastery over other humans was in principle the same as the battle of Hastings and its consequence of Normans as masters over England. The revolutionary system of rights that fought duty to the British-Conquest order in America eventually implicated the

neo-Norman slavery of the South. This Jeffersonian triumph of rights over duties was the source of Fitzhugh's most basic complaints: "Men seek to become independent in order to cease to pay labor, in order to become masters, without the cares, duties, and responsibilities of masters."[708]

George Fitzhugh was the Thomas Jefferson of the Confederate Revolution and this meant that Jefferson had to be defeated on the level of the intellect. His Cavalierist reconstruction of politics based on principles of duty is precisely what pitted him in diametrical opposition to Jefferson's emphasis on rights. Just as he did not agree with the author of the Declaration of Independence that governments "derive their just powers from the consent of the governed", Fitzhugh also thought that "[l]iberty of the press, liberty of speech, freedom of religion, or rather freedom from religion, and the unlimited right of private judgment have borne no good fruits, and many bad ones."[709]

Jefferson and Fitzhugh had at least two things in common: each was a Virginian and each deduced the implications of his respective Weltanschauung to its reasonable or practicable extreme. This was not wholly an accident. While the Puritans in the North were geographically separated from the mores of the Southern way of life, Jefferson was a Saxonist living in direct juxtaposition to the Cavalier colony. Jefferson lived amidst what Henry Augustine Washington (a relative of George Washington) described in 1848 as "the remnant of an older civilization—a fragment of the feudal system floating about here on the bosom of the nineteenth century."[710]

Jefferson's optimism and radicalism were driven by confrontation with this environment: every brush with this neo-"feudal" civilization demanded an interpretation. For person of a different temperament, this would have drove

pessimism to extremes. For Jefferson, however, persistent confrontation with the Cavalier elite challenged him to draw interpretations and ultimately drove his optimism to an extreme about the possibilities of human change.

The superficial belief that Jeffersonian egalitarianism was an only an expression of naive optimism fails to account that it was, as Lincoln would later put it, a foresightful "stumbling block" to the possibility that George Fitzhugh — and the Civil War — embodied exactly. Jefferson's egalitarianism was as much as expression of his pessimism as his optimism. His egalitarianism expressed both his optimism in general and his pessimism about this particular.

Jefferson's ownership of black slaves only illustrates the depths of his egalitarian-ethnocentrism: equality was designed to bring down the Normans, not to raise up the blacks. While the *idea* that equality is superior to inequality may be self-contradictory, the argument that democracy is superior to aristocracy correlated with the argument that Anglo-Saxons are superior to Normans. By the time of the rise of the Anglo-Saxon racialist interpretation of Manifest Destiny, it became increasingly obvious that Anglo-Saxon supremacism over Norman supremacism was being disguised as racial egalitarianism.

Was the ideological conflict between Fitzhugh and Jefferson, then, another classic case of Norman versus Saxon? Not quite. While Jefferson was a Saxonist *in principle*, his Lockean nurturism formally decouples race and reasoned principle. One reason what this may have been as issue for *him* is that Jefferson may have been partly of Norman descent on his mother's side. His mother's kinship tie to the Cavalierist aristocracy combined with his father's common birth made him both an insider and an outsider among the Tuckahoes.

Jefferson called the old Tidewater elites a "pseudo-aristoi". People have thus been mislead and thrown off by the fact that Jefferson was a Virginian; a Southerner. Far from being a full representative of "Virginia", and most especially its master "class", Jefferson's egalitarianism was the product of a deliberate subversion of its tyrannical potential. The abstract right of "the individual" over the community was, in part, a universalization of *Jefferson's* right to subvert the old Cavalier community.

A crucial local reason that this slave owner, of all people, trumpeted the principle of equality so loudly was to place an irrevocable break on the encroachment of the Conquest in America that he could see was already beginning to dominate his home state of Virginia. "America was not conquered by William the Norman," Jefferson griped, "nor its lands surrendered to him, or any of his successors".[711] Jefferson's revolution was compelled towards radicalism by being aimed, not simply against Britain, but against Virginia's own homegrown tyrants. As James C. Thompson II observed in *The Birth of Virginia's Aristocracy*, Jefferson aggressively implemented reforms against practices such as primogeniture because he "saw Virginia's hereditary hierarchy as a reproduction of the English social system, which he condemned for being conducive to tyranny."[712]

It was *Thomas Jefferson* who was the true eccentric among the planter elite, *not* George Fitzhugh. The inferiority of black slaves was Fitzhugh's equivalent of Jefferson's axiom of the equality of men and the latter's hypocrisy on this point offered only another nail in the coffin of the Jeffersonian creed:

> The true greatness of Mr. Jefferson was his fitness for revolution. He was the genius of innovation, the architect of ruin, the inaugurator of anarchy. His mission was to pull

> down, not to build up. He thought everything false as well in the physical as in the moral world.[713]

But what, exactly, did Fitzhugh and his "class" want to build up from this bedrock foundation of an inferior caste of black slaves?

> We are the friend of popular government, but only so long as conservatism is the interest of the governing class….where the pauper majority becomes so large as to disconnect the mass of them in feeling and interest from the property holding class, revolution and agrarianism are inevitable…The absence of laws of entail and primogeniture may prevent it; yet we fear the worst, for, despite the laws of equal inheritance and distribution, wealth is accumulating in few hands, and pauperism is increasing. We shall attempt hereafter to show that a system of very small entails might correct this tendency.[714]

To a believer in the principles of the American Revolution, this was an outrageous reversal. This was precisely what Jefferson had worked so hard to prevent. But to fully grasp the significance of Fitzhugh's support for primogeniture (the exclusive right of inheritance for the eldest son alone) and entail (the restriction of property to an owner's lineal descendants or a member of the same "class") one must go back to the Conquest. The Norman *innovation* of primogeniture as an aristocratic norm after 1066 preserved the basic hereditary composition of the Conquest by ensuring that one heir would inherit a family estate intact. The alternative of dividing estates among a wider network of kin would have led to an eventual generational disintegration of the elite kinship basis of the Norman Conquest order.[715] Primogeniture and entail are classic

expressions of the Darwinian Norman genius for genetic adaptation.

It was this Norman genius for genetic adaptation that was targeted in England by the Land Tenure Reform Association organized by John Stewart Mill. At a meeting in 1873, Thorold Rogers declared, "The custom of primogeniture…was introduced into this country by William the Norman". It "is the symbol of the nation's slavery to the foreign conqueror, just as it is at the present time the means by which the owners of the great landed estates appropriate to themselves all, or nearly all, the forces of government."[716] This is precisely why George Fitzhugh sought to resurrect primogeniture and entail for the neo-Norman South.

Primogeniture and entail were the crucially foresightful methods that enabled the conqueror class to preserve itself over the generations and Fitzhugh's advocacy for this system was nothing less than a blueprint for a Norman Conquest renaissance:

> A system of primogeniture, and entails of small parcels of land, might, in a great measure, identify the interests of all; or, at least, those who held no lands would generally be the children and kinsmen of those who did, and be taken care of by them.[717]

Fitzhugh offered an endearing portrait of the old caste system in which Saxon "serfs" were "the especial pets and favorites of the Barons."[718] The old Norman Yoke was not so bad: "The old Barons were not the representatives of particular classes in Parliament, but the friends, and faithful and able representatives of all classes".

This was not nostalgia for an unrecoverable past; it was a hopeful view of a new future. George Mason, Fitzhugh's

distant relative and author of the Virginia Bill of Rights, had self-deceptively forbidden "such harmless baubles as titles of nobility and coats of arms". It was time to recognize the reality of Southern order: "We have the *things*, exclusive hereditary privileges and aristocracy, amongst us, in utmost intensity; let us not be frightened at the *names*…"[719]

Historian Eugene Genovese observed that "[a]n aristocratic stance was no mere compensation for a decline in power; it was the soul and content of a rising power."[720] Fitzhugh aspired to advance the end of the America founded in 1776: "[t]o secure true progress, we must unfetter genius, and chain down mediocrity. Liberty for the few—Slavery, in every form, for the mass!"[721] This was the liberty of the Magna Carta of history — *not* the Magna Carta of modern mythology. Magna Carta was liberty or privilege for the Norman nobility at the expense of *both* King *and* Commons.

The reinvigoration of slavery was not only the reinvigoration of aristocracy in the South. It was the reinvigoration of the belief that government is *us*. Anglo-Saxon Anti-Normanism democracy assumed that the government is *them*. Transplanted into a new American context, this old "us" and "them" mentality helped create the American Civil War.

"There is too much of law and too little of government in this world", declared George Fitzhugh.[722] There existed only one way to harmonize this declaration with that of the Declaration of Independence: "We agree with Mr. Jefferson that all men have natural and inalienable rights…they have a natural and inalienable right to be slaves. The one in twenty are as clearly born or educated or some way fitted for command and liberty."[723]

Likewise, he could harmonize the beliefs of the Northern abolitionists with those of the South in only one way:

abolition of the Constitution itself. The "Declaration of Independence, Bills of Rights, Constitutions, Platforms, and Preambles and Resolutions" constituted nothing less than a nosology — a study of classes of diseases.

> Our old Nosology is an effective arsenal and armory for the most ultra Abolitionists, and the more effective, because we have not *formally* repudiated it. Let "*The World is too little governed*" be adopted as our motto, inscribed upon our flag and run up to the masthead.[724]

Make no mistake, if the South had won their war for independence, only then would a reduced United States of America in the North have witnessed a *formal* repudiation of the Constitution and the more Saxonist principles of the founding of 1776.

The American Civil War was practically inevitable because the limited common ground that once existed was churned up by cultural self-realizations that led in completely opposite directions. "There is no middle ground—not an inch of ground of any sort", avowed the philosopher of the Norman Yoke. It was choice between "Free Love and Slavery, between more government and no government….If slavery, either white or black, be wrong in principle or practice…then is all human government wrong." A transition to a society without law or government will not take place because "the expulsion of human nature is a pre-requisite to its occurrence." In consequence, Fitzhugh proposed that

> the action of free society must be reversed. That, instead of relaxing more and more the bonds that bind man to man, you must screw them up more closely. That, instead of no government, you must have more government.[725]

Fitzhugh's pro-government extremism makes historical sense of Jefferson's anti-government extremism. Since progress towards more government was being oppressed by the tyranny of "no government" — mere reactionaries against the founding of 1066 — a revolution was called for. The neo-Norman founding, the Revolution of '61, was "the grandest explosion the world ever witnessed," wrote Fitzhugh amidst the war-ardor of 1863. "The French Revolution of '89, 1830, and 1848 were mere popguns compare to it; as we all see and feel, for its stunning sound is still ringing in our ears."[726]

Exactly what kind of revolution was this? "Let no more be heard of confidence in man," Jefferson declared, "but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution". Fitzhugh grasped what his historical nemesis was up to. The revolution of 1861 was a struggle to break these chains of slavery to the Anglo-Saxon yoke.

The Confederate revolution was akin to the aspirations of the Anglo-Saxon side of the revolution of 1776: a revolution of restoration. Just as Jefferson sought to restore the Saxon way of government, Fitzhugh sought to restore the Norman way of government. Just as Jefferson wanted to restore the old freedoms from before 1066, Fitzhugh wanted to restore the old slavery that began in 1066. Jefferson's liberty required the subjugation of government while Fitzhugh's liberty required the subjugation of the governed. The right of conquest, the liberty to subjugate the Anglo-Saxons in 1066, snuck its way into the language of modern freedom through the backdoor of black slavery.

Just as England has no formal constitution, the South did not display the same fondness for "isms" as the founders of '76. Although a Constitution of the Confederate States of

America was created in 1861, Fitzhugh clarified just how superficial this bow to the founding tradition was. If the South had won, perhaps they could have eventually invited Friedrich Nietzsche to write them up a mock-constitution!

We can nonetheless imagine what the less superficial and more foundational principles of Revolution of '61 would look like by discerning its historical roots and imagining William the Conqueror as the Thomas Jefferson of the Norman Revolution of 1066. After all, the British Empire and Confederate attempt at empire had a common justice compelling them: governments in America or around the world became destructive of the Norman Right of Conquest.

What would a Norman Conqueror Constitution look like? The Declaration of Dependence (The Preamble to the British and Neo-Norman Empire):

> I, William the Conqueror, hold this truth to be self-evident, that all men are created inferior to me, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Death, Slavery, and the pursuit of my happiness for eternity. — That to secure these Norman Rights of Conquest, governments are instituted over men, deriving their just powers from sublime contempt for the consent of the governed, — That whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of these feudal ends, it is the Right of the Norman Conquerors to alter or abolish it and to institute a new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to a Great Norman Lord shall seem most likely to effect my Sempiternal Hereditary Superiority over the entire Earth through my Norman heirs and posterities for EVER (and possibly longer, God willing).

Fitzhugh stands at the most extreme philosophical peak of this missing Norman link of Western civilization that has

been obscured by the inherent Anti-Normanism of Anglo-Saxon-modernity. This Norman-American's thought is a missing link in Western philosophy between Rousseau and Nietzsche and an anticipation of the German National Socialist response to the socialism of Marx. While Fitzhugh is not at all a thinker of the first rank, he nonetheless offered a comprehensive alternative to political modernity with a depth superior to Edmund Burke.

He was the anti-intellectual intellectual who accomplished the *clarification* of the fundamental nature of the North/South difference that had been temporarily obscured by the American Revolution. It was who Fitzhugh raised the decisive questions for the south: Were Southerners "willing to remain mere colonies and plantations for the centres of trade," or were they ready to liberate themselves from this economic yoke and "preserve their separate nationality?"[727]

The view of the American Civil War as a conflict between alien nations, "Cavaliers" and "Roundheads", descended from opposite sides of the English Civil War was held by the leader of Confederate rebellion, Jefferson Davis.[728] It was not only that John Locke's parents were Puritans and his father had been a captain of cavalry in the English Civil War. Fitzhugh was deeply influenced by the writings of Sir Robert Filmer, the seventeenth century Royalist defender of the divine right of kings, universal patriarchy, and the illegitimacy of the right to political resistance. It was in response to Filmer's *Patriarcha* that John Locke wrote his famous *Two Treatises on Government*, commonly cited as the most important philosophical basis for the liberal democratic system.

In the history of political philosophy, Hobbes and Locke are often presented as if they were joined at the intellectual

hip, or even as representatives of two stages in a *coherent* evolutionary scheme leading towards liberal democracy. Yet as John Dunn observed, "Hobbesian *arguments* are not answered" in the *Two Treatises*. "They are merely and blandly ignored."[729] It was Filmer, not Hobbes, who was polemically addressed and answered in that work.

Filmer was born and bred as a member of the close-knit community of the Kentish gentry of England. According to Peter Laslett, "the most characteristic thing" that the Kentish gentry produced was "the political thinking of Sir Robert Filmer and the most surprising was the society of the Old South in the United States." The American transplant retained the kin selective values of its roots, and the "reason for this excessive consciousness of kinship was patriarchalism."[730] Fitzhugh thought that the Lockean, egalitarian North perpetuated the beliefs of English Whigs following the English Civil War while the Filmerian, patriarchal South continued to defend the beliefs of the original Tories.[731]

Fitzhugh developed a logically coherent alternative to Northern political principles. The northern abolitionist activist William Lloyd Garrison once defended his failure to fully engage Fitzhugh's arguments by asserting:

> The reason why no one has entered the lists against [Fitzhugh] is the same as that which prevents a sane man from attempting to argue with a dolt or a lunatic.[732]

The West has lost this "nineteenth century" faith in the fundamental rationality of its beliefs and has thus lost faith in its fundamental sanity. Postmodern thinkers generally believe that *neither* Locke *nor* Filmer offer a fundamentally rational defense for their preferred way of life. If so, the

philosophic attempt to provide a rational basis for politics has been replaced by *nothing*.

The Lost Causes

As war raged between the two cultures, Fitzhugh at last made explicit what he had hitherto left unspoken:

> It is a gross mistake to suppose that 'abolition' is the cause of dissolution between the north and south. The Cavaliers, Jacobites, and Huguenots of the south naturally hate, condemn, and despise the Puritans who settled the north. The former are master races, the latter a slave race, the descendants of the Saxon serfs.[733]

The Saxons, like free blacks, were "slaves without masters".

This gargantuan American paradox of Northern freedom and Southern slavery was no aberration of some Puritan parable of predestined progress — it was yet another clash between Saxon and Norman! Just as the tabla rasa of the new world opened up new vistas of freedom in the North, it opened up new vistas of slavery in the South. In the North new generations progressed over old inhibitions against the new freedom. In the South new generations progressed over old inhibitions against the new slavery.

These new world radicalizations clarified beyond all doubt that these two great archetypal ways of life, the aristocratic-Norman and the democratic-Saxon, are fundamentally, terminally and irrevocably incompatible and the only solution to this clash of civilizations was that one must dominate the other or be dominated by the other. The only question that remained was whether the Anglo-Saxons

had learned anything since the last time these two ways of life were decisively reconciled in 1066.

The American Civil War refought the foundational issues that originated with the Norman Conquest and remained unsettled by the English Civil War and the American Revolution. In ethnic-cultural terms, the northern victory in the American Civil War would confirm that "the American way" would be dominated by an Anglo-Saxon-Puritan civilization, while a moderated Norman-Cavalier cause would survive outside America as the British Empire. The ultimate result was a double-headed Normanglica: the Norman based British Empire, with a failed attempt at exception through the English Civil War, and the Anglo-Saxon based American Empire, with a failed attempt at exception through the U. S. Civil War.

Fitzhugh observed that the principles of Declaration of Independence were "wholly at war with slavery" and "equally at war with all government, all subordination, all order".[734] The Northerners were able to enforce the first principle of a consistent human equality *only by contradicting* the liberal first principle of weakening the subordinating power of government. Lincoln, after all, suspended *habeas corpus* to achieve his political ends. But how could logical or even pacifist principle hold in the face of the obsessive hatred of the Ahab of the North, consumed with the will to kill that great White Whale in vengeance for the maiming of Hastings — even at the price of self-ruin.

The rights of man were established by a modern right of conquest. The Southern self-contradiction of upholding the freedom to deny the individual freedom of blacks was conquered by the Northern self-contradiction of upholding the freedom to deny the political freedom of the South. Yet, from Fitzhugh's view, it was really the Northern fondness

for "isms" that cultivated their own hypocrisy; he rejected the very principle of equality among blacks *and* whites.

Just as the freedom to enslave blacks could be viewed as a blatant hypocrisy, the Northern liberty to enslave or master or conquer that Southern freedom can also be viewed as a blatant hypocrisy on the level of pure logical principle. Everyone can choose whichever gargantuan inconsistency one prefers, but the North possessed *no net superiority in consistency of political principle*. This, above all, is what verifies the Norman/Saxon basis of the conflict because there is no way to determine which side is correct on the basis of pure logical principle when scientific objectivity upholds the separation of values from facts and value neutrality is maintained. The Norman/Saxon conflict explains why each side valued certain principles while devaluing, repressing, or ignoring gargantuan inconsistencies of principle.

Anyone who is skeptical about the idea of the reinvigoration of the Norman caste tradition in America should bear witness to the cherry-on-top hypocrisy of a certain minority in the North that emerged after the American Civil War. Written in the early 1960s, *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy & Caste in America* by E. Digby Baltzell, analyzed "the White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant establishment's unwillingness, or inability, to share and improve its upper-class traditions by continuously absorbing talented and distinguished members of minority groups into its privileged ranks."[735] If ideological defenses of *caste* could be made in the antebellum North by Henry Adams, John Jay Chapman, and Madison Grant[736] where they chafe against the official rule of equal opportunity individualism, imagine how these kin selective behaviors must have fared for

Norman descendants who inherited a traditional sense of the right of "class" rule through the right of conquest.

Before England's Civil War, the 1st Earl of Strafford, Sir Thomas Wentworth, sneered at "your Prynnes, Pyms and Bens, with the rest of that generation of odd names and natures."[737] The generation after the American Civil War, however, could cite Lowell's "Ode Recited at the Harvard Commemoration, July 21, 1865":

> Who now shall sneer?
> Who dare again to say we trace
> Our lines to a plebeian race?
> Roundhead and Cavalier![738]

Whereas in 1066 it was the Anglo-Saxons who were the technologically backward provincials, in the 1860s the tables had turned. Just as the Restoration of 1660 preserved the Founding union of Norman and Saxon established by William the Conqueror in Britain, the Restoration of 1865 preserved the Founding union of Norman and Saxon in America. Just as the Norman Conquest of 1066 destroyed the Anglo-Saxon aristocratic order, the Anglo-Saxon conquest of 1865 destroyed this Norman aristocratic order. *This* was the historic racial equality achieved by the American Civil War.

Ultimately, 1865 was not a victory of Saxon over Norman, but rather, the final victory of their will to mutual destruction. While the conflict between Normans and Saxons as kin selective groups was partially worked out internally through liberal individualism, it also had to be worked out externally through war. The final solution to the Norman/Saxon conflict was the ultimately the same in both cases: mutual destruction.

America was made possible by the obsessive Puritan hatred of the great White Whale; the will to destroy the

Norman race even if it was tied to the ruin of their own. Just as the Norman Conquest permanently crippled Anglo-Saxon identity as an aristocratic race, Appomattox permanently destroyed the old Norman pride in America. The egalitarian humanism of America was the gift of these ancient enemies at Appomattox. America's true construction began with the final chapter of their mutual destruction.

"Shall we," asked the editorialist of the *Richmond Whig* of his Virginian readers, "tamely bend our necks to the yoke and *such* a yoke!...Better ten thousand times to stake everything—life, liberty, prosperity, altars, and firesides, than endure such degradation."[739] How reminiscent of those Anglo-Saxons of 1068 who stood "ready to conspire together to recover their former liberty, and bind themselves by weighty oaths against the Normans." How reminiscent, furthermore, was Sherman's harrying of the South of William the Conqueror's harrying of the North.

In Britain, the Restoration of 1660 demonstrated the "obvious" inferiority of Puritan revolutionary cause and a total Anglo-Saxon victory became a lost cause. In America, the conquest of the South demonstrated the "obvious" inferiority of the Confederate cause and a total Norman victory became a lost cause. In 1865, the Normans would finally taste a decisive defeat comparable to the calamity of Hastings.

Today, in Richmond, Virginia, stands a neoclassical building named Battle Abbey. It was built after the war as a memorial to Confederate dead and as a repository for the historical records of the "Lost Cause". The original Battle Abbey stands in England, its first high alter built on the very spot where it was believed that King Harold was killed in the Battle of Hastings on October 14, 1066.

When, in retrospect, one attempts to understand why Southerners genuinely believed that they could take on the North despite such a manifest disadvantages in material resources and population, the trail of inquiry leads back to Hastings. Confederate independence, led by a relatively small minority in the South, would have been less extraordinary than the accomplishment of the total conquest of England. Extraordinary pride in this achievement is precisely what bred extraordinary humiliation in the conquered until only the extraordinary dream of the City on the Hill could overcome the nightmare of Senlac Hill.

If the reader believes that medieval Anglo-Saxons simply forgot their defeat at Hastings in 1066 and casually put it behind them, bear witness to the American South's slow, conflicted, and agonized acceptance of their own "lost cause" in the aftermath of that decisive defeat in 1865. There are striking, visceral parallels of historical experience between the way the Southerners have remembered their defeat by the North and the way the Norman Conquest affected the native English.

Today one can still find "Confederates in the Attic" and proud wavers of the old flag of rebellion. The Anglo-Saxon subculture of Puritanism, however, was the product of a people who, over a period of centuries, evolved long past their own "lost cause" period, past the futility of waving of a dead flag, and past the desire to merely replace the conquerors who had victimized them. The crushing hereditary consequences of their historic defeat at Hastings were bred so deeply into their consciousness that the will to the destruction of the conquerors became the burning basis of an entire political/religious worldview. Fulfilled even at the price of self-immolation, the secularized Puritanism or Yankeeism that won the war to become Americanism was

the product of an inner Christian acceptance of a lost cause taken to its logical extreme.

Affirmative Action for the Anglo-Saxon Race

> **[I]t is the nature of conquest to turn every thing upside down.**
>
> —THOMAS PAINE, *THE RIGHTS OF MAN*

American historian C. H. Haskins called the Normans the "supermen" of the eleventh century. The American Revolution, as consummated by Northern victory of the Civil War, was the slave revolt against the impact of that "master race". The Puritanism of the North was both the most consistent spiritual polarization from the Norman way of conquest, and the deepest adaptation to the slave morality of Christianity.

The Anglo-Negro convergence, however, was not the only analog of historical experience at work here. From the universalization of the Anglo-Saxon experience as victims of the old gangster class, emerged a parallel discrimination against blacks from a strictly moral point of view. It could be called the moral equivalence of Normans and niggers, a convergence of gang-related male "criminality." It is an equivalence of the masculine, patriarchal, and "immoral" qualities of niggers and Normans from the more Puritanical-moralistic versions of the Anglo-Saxon-democratic viewpoint.

The word "nigger" is often used by blacks themselves in a positive sense, as in a gang's sense of brotherhood, a kin-

cohesion not unlike that found among the Normans conquerors. For the conquered Anglo-Saxons, it was exactly the strength of Norman gang unity that made it antisocial and criminal. That original gang-related kin-cohesion bred strong insider/outsider values and laid the foundations of the "class" system.

Consequently, the use of the word "nigger" in a negative sense, as a racial slur, also has a parallel among those who defamed the Norman Conquest as the victory of force and fraud over "the rights of man." Thomas Paine once attacked the Norman usurpers as "crowned ruffians." "The Normans...[t]hese founders of the House of Lords," raged Ralph Waldo Emerson, "were greedy and ferocious dragoons, sons of greedy and ferocious pirates. They were all alike, they took everything they could carry, they burned, harried, violated, tortured, and killed, until everything English was brought to the verge of ruin."[740] A Leveller pamphlet charged that William the Conqueror and his heirs "made Dukes, Earles, Barrons and Lords of their fellow Robbers, Rogues, and Thieves."[741] From this moralistic point of view, the primary difference between Normans and niggers was that the former were basically more successful and worked on a greater scale of ganghood. Thus, the Norman Conquerors could be called Überniggers.

Überniggers are those who engage in *successful* gang-related male "criminality." William the Conqueror, then, was an Übernigger. While the reign of Idi Amin lasted, the tyrannical twentieth century Ugandan military-political leader was an Übernigger.

If, like some German thinkers, one considers French civilization "superficial," it might be considered appropriate to the refined gangsterism of the Norman aristocracy for exactly that reason. Moreover, French civilization has helped

gloss over traditional Norman embarrassment with their "barbarian" Viking pedigree. Irrespective of the civilized façade, these descendants of plundering Vikings and inner city black males both exhibit the principles of gang behavior.

Native Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* never fully recovered or regenerated from the Conquest and was instead replaced in with the political mechanics of *civilization*. Yet something happened as the fundamentally feminine, slave revolt principles of Anglo-Saxon civilization achieved self-realization and fulfillment. The strategies once use to weaken the patriarchal claims of Norman descendants eventually were used to weaken what remained of the Anglo-Saxon patriarchal culture. Just as the Norman right of conquest, "calling itself superior civilization," was undone by Anglo-Saxon democracy, the dominance of Anglo-American civilization has come undone with cultural Marxism and multiculturalism.

Gradually, WASP ethnocentrism, which is so obvious to the victims of that ethnocentrism, became subdued by the fuller implications of its own feministic principles. That Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism was the driving principle behind the manifest right of conquest of the American continent at the expense of the native Americans was no longer allowed to be overlooked. Women, minorities, and homosexuals took advantage of the principles that originally advanced the ethnocentrism of the subjugated Saxons.

WASP civilization became increasingly contemptible by the standards of older, patriarchal values. It was the self-realization of ethnic Anglo-Saxon humiliation and the continuation of the effects of the Conquest that is America. It was only the logical fulfillment of the Anglo-Saxon apartheid that discriminated against the gang principles of the Norman right of conquest. The enlightened ethnic

cleansing of the Norman-conquering way of life meant that the proud, thymotic male mind expressed in gangs found itself *alienated* by democratic society's calm, rationalized norms.

In post-Conquest English culture, the Normans were both patriarchally superior and a foreign "race" with a foreign culture. As whites realized the formally feministic principles of their regime, the so-called "nigger culture" of the inner cities began to fill the vacuum left by Norman slave masters. Black athletes, like boxer Mike Tyson, have taken part of the *psychological* place that William the Conqueror won in the boxing ring of Hastings as the warrior-fighter of fame and fortune at the very top of his world. Black ghetto-gangster culture has, for many younger whites, taken the *psychological* place that Normans once embodied in English culture. Inner city gangsterism has retaken the Norman's throne as a foreign cultural-political conquest of native Anglo-Saxon culture. Historical progress led to the evolution of whigs into whiggers.

The crucible of the change can be traced to the 1960s. While the militantly organized "Marxism" of the Black Panthers degenerated into the real life gangs such as the Crips and Bloods, their revolutionary goals of black empowerment have been transmuted through a cultural Marxism. Misogynistic, racist, violent and materialistic "Gangster Rap" became enormous popular in the 1990s and beyond. The blurred division between life and art was evident in the person of rapper Tupac Shakur, killed in 1996 in a gang-related drive by shooting. Along with the predominance of black male athletes, black cultural forms have nearly conquered popular culture, much as the Normans once conquered Anglo-Saxon culture.

Benjamin Franklin once concluded, "there is a natural inclination in mankind to Kingly Government."[742] The gang is perhaps the most primal male expression of that inclination for "Kingly government." Left without an outlet in an emasculated Anglo-Saxon femocracy, gangster rap culture and black male athletes fed that natural inclination and fit the cultural and mental archetype of the alpha-male that Normans slave masters once occupied. Diverting patriarchal instincts against the WASP civilization that repressed it, this world has truly been turned upside down. Observing the contradiction between the liberal morality of democracy and the popularity of gangster rap culture helps one understand how the medieval Normans could once have be admired by those they conquered and how Puritan morality evolved in opposition to that contradiction.

The Anglo-Saxon re-conquest called democracy, especially in its radical Puritan form, would turn the world upside down no less than the Norman original. Whereas the aristocratic Norman conquerors represented a morality of victorhood, the slave revolt of the Anglo-Saxon would engender an official public morality of victimhood. Whereas victorhood implied special privileges for the Norman aristocracy, victimhood implied special privileges and moral favoritism for those at the bottom of Anglo-Saxon democracy.

Most blacks in America are the descendants of slaves, just as most whites in America are the descendants of European peasants. While Jews best fit the description of an aristocracy of victimhood, in the popular American imagination blacks have unique claims to this status due to the legacy of slavery. Blacks have accumulated special privileges as American victimhood's master race and have used their special status to get away with what no one else: an

acceptable oasis of the violent misogyny of the gang. Gangster rap is a black cultural right of conquest over Anglo-Saxon civilization as America's aristocracy of victimhood.

How did this happen? Liberal democracy has evolved toleration of a remarkable diversity of "lifestyles", but at least one is, in principle, absolutely discriminated against. The norms of the American liberal democratic system discriminate against a certain human type. What type? The Norman conqueror type. The Norman slave master type. It discriminates not specifically against the superlative capitalist male, but rather, against the superlative political-military alpha male. William the Conqueror exemplifies the worst-case scenario for a liberal democracy. This affirmative discrimination against those who fit the Norman conqueror stereotype means that the entire American democratic system itself is a kind of Anglo-Saxon affirmative action. Liberal democracy is about taming the conquerors.

For centuries following 1066, England's ruling lacked "diversity". The English caste system systematically discriminated against the natives in favor of Frenchmen and this meant a distinct lack of "diversity" at the top; a distinct lack of Anglo-Saxons at the top. William the Conqueror's precedent supported no affirmative action program for the conquered and colonized natives.

It is often forgotten how the South dominated American politics in the years between the founding and the Civil War. The democratic system itself discriminates against Norman aristocrats *by design*. Southern independence was led the attempt to liberate themselves from the "progress" of the tyranny of the majority. The Civil War began as an attempt of slave masters to regain control against consequences of

the aggressive Anglo-Saxon affirmative action program called democracy.

"Black nationalists", observed Cornell West, "claim that American democracy is a modern form of tyranny on the part of the white majority over the black minority".[743] This insight hints at the way in which democratic methods originally designed to discriminate against Norman slave masters at one extreme can also be turned upside down to discriminate against former black slaves at the opposite extreme. Affirmative action, however, illustrates how the old Norman aristocracy of victorhood ultimately became morally inverted into a new aristocracy of victimhood.

Principles of democracy discriminated against Norman aristocrats in practice, just as affirmative action discriminates against white males in practice. Affirmative action, or racial favoritism for blacks, is not a divergence from the principles of American history, but a progression of the unspoken racial logic of Anglo-Saxon democracy. Democracy itself originated as a form of affirmative action for the Anglo-Saxon race and the "progress" of discrimination against Norman aristocrats eventually generalized into discrimination against whites in general. For Madison, "discrimination against minorities" meant the tyranny of the majority, or, the tendency of the majority to discriminate against an aristocratic minority. The special racial favoritism that originally allowed a Cavalier-based "minority" to uphold special privileges as slave masters ultimately became reinterpreted as special racial favoritism for blacks or other select "minorities".

In this way, affirmative action for blacks exposes the original Anglo-Saxon racism against Normans. Since, for Anglo-Saxons, all other forms of racism are inferior to racism against hereditary Norman privilege, affirmative action

amounts to bestowing old Norman privileges to their former black slaves. Unable to enjoy the Anglo-Saxon caste hypocrisy that followed the Civil War, it amounts to a further conquest, or a further historic humiliation, of the ancient enemy of the Anglo-Saxon race. In this way, the Anglo-Saxonist interpretation of "manifest destiny" that culminated in Lincoln the Conqueror is very much like the militant "black power" movements of the 1960s.

Hegel once said, 'A people can be helped only by itself; and if it cannot do that then it cannot be helped.'[744] If whites fail to grasp how history provoked the evolution of America, then they cannot be helped. America's race problem is attributable, in part, to the inferiority of Anglo-Saxon sociobiological self-understanding. What the issue of black exceptionalism should provoke is reflection and understanding of the white inventors of the rule. Blacks did not invent the notion of equal human rights. If there is a fundamental error here, it only demonstrates that this Anglo-Saxon political solution is inferior to the problems it attempts to address.

Blacks are the victims of Anglo-Saxon selective stupidity. While, clearly, they have also been beneficiaries of the Anglo-Saxon predicament, the severity of the breakdown of the black family is only a more extreme form of the breakdown of the white family. Whereas the unusual parental irresponsibility of black males is propagating a social underclass problem, the unusual parental responsibility of Norman males once propagated a social overclass problem. The Anglo-Saxon way, as usual, is stuck in the middle.

Founding Feminists

The human being who has *become free*...spits on the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, females, Englishmen, and other democrats. The free man is a *warrior*.[745]

—FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, *TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS*

Unnatural Selection

It's really very funny. Behind this entire leftward Western-American movement to empower the poor, women, minorities, homosexuals, and other downtrodden folk, in effect, pushing the whole thing forward, there lies hidden and obscured this primal issue of male pride among a conquered people. Feminists who have inherited the Lockean denial of biological nature that underpins the original theory of liberal democracy are, in effect, perpetuating the victory of this medieval Anglo-Saxon patriarchal pride that refuses to see in themselves a defeated people.

America has inherited this stubborn refusal to connect the origins of democratic revolution to this medieval emasculation. The Anglo-Saxon men have so often preferred to see themselves as Protestants, "individuals," liberals; anything but the descendants of a defeated and conquered nation. In short, they refuse to admit their weakness. Just like a man.

According to William of Poitiers, William the Bastard, in his battlefield speech at Hastings, referred to his English

opponents as "a very unwarlike people (*gens*) and a womanly type (*genus*)".[746] This is a standard fare of warfare that nonetheless reveals much about Norman self-perception. Poitiers then described the bloody battlefield scene that followed the defeat of the native English:

> His victory thus won, the duke returned to the field of battle, to be met with a scene of carnage which he could not regard without pity in spite of the wickedness of the victims and although to slay a tyrant is honorable, glorious and praiseworthy. Far and wide the ground was covered with the flower of English nobility and youth, soiled by their own blood. The king's two brothers were found lying beside him. He himself, all dignity lost, was recognized not by his face but by certain indications...[747]

Tyranny, it seems, includes the ability to dictate who is, and who is not, the tyrant.

This was the beginning of the end of the native English aristocracy. The selective elimination of Englishman nobility, partly genocidal, was in some ways comparable to the targeting of the most prominent Poles by the Germans and Russians during World War II. Losses to the English nation inflicted by the Conquest also included the exiled, especially the former nobles who came to serve in the Varangian Guard. To this depletion, one can add the soldiers who chose death to the dishonor of defeat, the brave men who paid for revolt with their lives, and the more indiscriminate genocide of the "harrying of the north".

The Normans molded the Anglo-Saxon nation not only politically, socially, and culturally, but also biologically. Unnatural selection or artificial selection (a vestige of the idea that man is not a part of nature) was exerted by this 'unnatural' aristocracy. To some extent, they literally

sculpted and genetically engineered, so to speak, the Anglo-Saxon population in the "eugenic" sense; it was good for Norman genetic interests. Furthermore, this original differentiation into rulers and ruled literally bred further differences as the Normans' social and economic position was used to further augment their biological fitness. At its starkest extremes, the Conquest was designed to realize the Normans as a master race and to redesign the Saxons as a slave race.

An assessment of the long-term genetic effects of this artificial selection cannot be measured by the democratic method of head counting alone. That some evolution by unnatural selection occurred within the Anglo-Saxon population is clear. However, the extent and the long-term impact of the Norman sculpting of the Anglo-Saxon population remains an open question.

In Roman family law, *manus* refers to the head male's power over his wife. In this forced or arranged intermarriage of the Conquest, the Anglo-Saxon was the woman, and the Norman was the man with *manus* over her. The native population was *reduced* to the female role of the subpolitical order.

The traditional female sex role and a subpolitical caste role have a basic similarity. From an evolutionary view, sexual differentiation into male and female can be looked at as a basic form of caste: a combination of morphological difference and specialized behavior. The Anglo-Saxon nation was cast in the female role of a subpolitical caste. It was like the law of *manus* writ large.

The modern, democratic attempt to reduce the political to the subpolitical was conceivable only on the basis of a foundation of the right to life and the right to procreate. What is distinctive to politics, however, is control over

evolution. Control over evolution, control over who lives and who breeds, is not reducible to economics. As masters of the political, the Normans effectively implemented this way of mastering the race. This means that Normans may have partially *created* some of the modern characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon race.

If politics is the locus of control over biological evolution, the modern idea of human rights implies the end of Darwinian selection, natural and artificial. In revolting against Norman evolutionary control over the Anglo-Saxon race, Anglo-Saxon advocacy of rights implicated the universal end of overt political control over biological evolution. Just as some level of acceptance of the subpolitical-feminization of the Anglo-Saxon national body implied acceptance of a loss of self-control over their own biological evolution, individual feminism was only a further implication of Anglo-Saxon loss of control over political self-evolution, i.e. collective or political control over breeding (Note that I am not advocating eugenics anymore than I am advocating sexism).

Whatever genetic population characteristics may have existed before the Conquest, there is a biological foundation for the association between Anglo-Saxons and democracy. Unnatural selection by Normans helped adapt the Anglo-Saxon ethnicity to a non-aristocratic identity; a self-definition as the "body of the people." With this genetic pruning, the Normans helped engineering the democracy that would eventually oppose them.

The Political Failure of Anglo-Saxon Patriarchy

During and after the defeat at Hastings, the native Anglo-Saxon warrior-aristocracy was castrated from the body of the people by the triumphant Normans. The native English were defeated as warriors, as men, as an ethnic group, as an autonomous culture, as political beings; in every dimension deemphasized by democracy. The loss of Anglo-Saxon manhood was identical with the loss of control over the integrity of their ethnicity, their culture, and their way of live. The loss of their manhood was identical with the loss of an autonomous political identity.

Judging by the kinship-patriarchal values of that time, some of the younger generation of Anglo-Saxons following Hastings most likely felt *contempt* for their own father figures. Their native patriarchs had failed them. The elder fathers of the nation had been a failure in defending precisely what it was their role to defend. They had shown themselves powerless to protect precisely what they were empowered to protect. It was a failure of patriarchal self-preservation.

Adding salt to this wound, of course, was the Normans' *contempt* for the Anglo-Saxons for being conquered. The Norman victory prize, after all, consisted of ruling *over* the defeated as their political and social superiors. That victory perpetuated the inability of the conquered to avenge every injury and slight inflicted by the masters of their world.

Note how these conditions exacerbate one another: the *native* patriarchy was discredited by their failure to expel the usurpers while the *foreign* faux-fathers were discredited by not being the authentic, failed fathers of the nation. The survivors, furthermore, were corrupted through obedience

and collaboration. Since power is the realization of the values of a patriarchal culture, failing this standard of its own principles leads to self-rejection. The ultimate result: the discrediting of patriarchy in general.

Here the foundations of the democratic form of justice are laid, for when an aristocracy fails in its responsibilities, so does that aristocratic kind of justice. The classical *justice* of unequal aristocratic privilege lay in the balance of its unequal responsibilities. When kinship is taken into account, the political is unequal to the subpolitical since losing the political can mean losing everything from the view of kinship self-determination. The king's failure to defend the kin in 1066 demonstrates the unequalled catastrophe that can follow from an aristocracy unequal to its responsibilities: a hereditary subjugation passed on to new generations for centuries.

Patriarchy is *not* an absolute, as liberal theory correctly contends, and the Norman Conquest illustrates why. Patriarchy can fail to sustain and justify itself. The failure of the 1060s generation became an inheritance of all future generations: *reason* to lack faith in patriarchal authority.

Modern Anglo-Saxon democratic liberalism exists *relative* to the historic failure of Anglo-Saxon political patriarchy. The Anglo-Saxons lost trust in political patriarchy because their political patriarchy had failed them. The consequences of defeat became history: the political failure of Anglo-Saxon patriarchy became the sociobiological foundation of Anglo-Saxon liberal-democratic success. The Anglo-Saxons merited their modern meritocracy through a failure to merit a native patriarchal hierarchy.

Here the foundations of feminism are also laid, for the justice of a woman's subordinate role is violated when a man does not subordinate to his. A writer for *DeBow's*

Review, Mr. A. Clarkson of Alabama, believed that it was the dishonorable and ungentlemanly abdication of responsibility for the opposite sex that led Northern women to defend themselves and thus "demand civil and political, as well as social equality, with man."[748] This *general* difference between Anglo-Saxons in the North and Normans in South is what ultimately lead towards opposite and incompatible attitudes towards the premise of political patriarchalism. While Magna Carta and the struggle against Cromwell and Lincoln demonstrate the Norman aristocracy's own tradition of father failure, their relative success on the patriarchal totem pole made them deeply resistant to the full implications of Anglo-Saxon liberalism.

Ultimately, it is really King Ethelred the Unready (c.968-1016) who stands as the classic Anglo-Saxon father failure and an ancestral hero of the liberal cause. Ethelred the Unready was the founding grandfather of the anti-patriarchal Anglo-Saxon political philosophy that holds that "government doesn't work". To also call him the founding grandfather of Anglo-Saxon liberalism is not to claim that Ethelred was a "liberal" himself; he could be considered the opposite of a modern liberal unless, perhaps, a classical-liberal-like concern for only his own selfish interests over the larger collective good had something to do with his *political* blunders on a collective scale. It is quite possible that, in that sense, Ethelred was more "modern" than many realize. His disastrous failures of judgment and action proved to be the best friend of *all* of the successful conquerors of England.[749] Measure the contribution of Ethelred the Unready and King Harold to long-term Anglo-Saxon political fortunes and *then* one can understand the origins of the Anglo-Saxon political philosophy that patriarchal "government doesn't work".

Body Politics

At a conference at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott organized the first American conference to address women's rights. Applying principles of freedom gleaned from their abolitionist activism to women, they gave form to their fight in *The Declaration of Sentiments*. It was modeled directly on the Declaration of Independence:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal….The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her…the law, in all cases, going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, giving all power into his hands….He has so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes….

Where did they get the idea?

For centuries following the Conquest, caste-gender roles reflected the model of the patriarchal household. The Norman-man tends to politics, the military, and the outside world. The Anglo-Saxon-woman tended to the domestic, economic, and civic world. Everyone had their place and everyone knew their place. The Normans' conquest became tradition and, along with it, knowing how to keep their Anglo-Saxon-woman in her place.

But then something happened on the eastern American coast in the late eighteenth century. A group of privileged, relatively rich white men stood up together in unity against their British masters with a Declaration of Independence: 'We're not going to be your bitches anymore! And we mean it this time! We, the people, want a divorce!' Yet it was not

self-evident to the rulers of the British Empire that all men are created equal. Instead, a war was fought.

From a Northern, Anglo-Saxon point of view, the American Revolution was almost like a battle of the sexes. He said: under the Norman *manus* there is no right for divorce. She said: the conquest violated the old Saxon laws and divorce is only regaining the right to choose.

The tomboyish victory of democratic revolution was a divorce forced by the Anglo-Saxon-woman. It established a new, "modern" precedent. The new American political system constitutionalized the denial that there exists a "natural" relationship between rulers and ruled. It asserted the rights of those who are the not the rulers. Those who occupied the subpolitical-female roles within the body politic were now able to choose their ruler.

Democratic revolution, then, was a form of Anglo-Saxon nationalism. But this does not make them Nazis. It makes them feminazis; rebels against their Norman-British faux-fathers. The democratic reversal of the Norman's apartheid effected discrimination against the conquering alpha male type. The Anglo-Saxon conquest originally sought to reverse subjugate the *conquerors* and other monopolists. Feminists and other oppressed groups would eventually learn how to cage the beasts from this Anglo-Saxon lesson.

This entire predicament began with the Norman right of conquest. Organized, effective, and superior military force was the means by which the Normans originally achieved their hold over England. Part of the Anglo-Saxon conquest of unraveling the Norman dominated hierarchy was depriving them one this most basic advantages: the monopoly on military-political force. The bourgeois rejection of the entire conqueror value system stems from this rejection of the warrior as highest model or ideal, for the

Normans had dominated the warrior territory of the political.

This basic principle was handed down in the form of liberalism, and women eventually took advantage of this same principle as men were disarmed of their general physical superiority. Patriarchy fell along with Anglo-Saxon alienation from the notion that "the free man is a *warrior*." The same feminist issues of possession and control over a woman's individual body originated in the issue of possession and control over the Anglo-Saxon national body. From the bourgeois liberation of economics towards promiscuous global capitalism (free trade) followed the female liberation of home economics towards sexual freedom (free love).

In short, democracy is, in principle, a form of feminism. On the level of classical political patriarchy, the sub-political is female and the political is male. The democratic revolution began as a rebellion in the household of the body politic: the 'female' body of the people against the 'male' rulers. It aimed towards equality between the political and sub-political in an attempt to blur the distinction between the two. It was a way that the 'Anglo-Saxon-woman' attempted to overcome her caste-role under the Normans, despite bearing the distinguishing marks of feminization through subjugation. Saxon-feminism is the product of the gender-bending consequences of the Norman feminization of the Anglo-Saxon nation. Democracy is a kind of femocracy and varieties of feminism are its ruling political principles.

The core convergence here is that individuals of the female sex are following Anglo-Saxon men in rejecting feminine-caste and a secondary role. The Norman Conquest meant that the Anglo-Saxons became 'the second race' rather than the first. In liberating 'the second race', the revolution

gave "the second sex," as Beauvoir put it, the tools of their own liberation. Questioning the teleological assumptions behind the idea that it was the "natural" role of Anglo-Saxons to serve and submit to Normans implicated the teleological assumptions behind the traditional role of women.

The argument that there are no general, natural differences between men and women followed logically from the argument that there are no general, natural differences between Normans and Saxons. Fighting discrimination against caste-like differences led to fighting discrimination against sex differences. The assertion of the illegitimacy of that original Anglo-Saxon role is what laid the foundation for other convergences of caste-like oppressions, from blacks to woman and beyond.

Consequently, of all the meanings of equality this is one of the most fundamental: sexual equality; the equality between the subpolitical Anglo-Saxon-female role and the political Norman-male role. Democracy was meant to bridge the extremes of that originary caste separation. The unfolding of its logic led to individual sexual equality: the convergence of the bourgeois beta-male and the masculinized female.

This all began with the Norman revolution of 1066 and the transgender revolution it engendered for the conquered. Whereas political social hierarchy is classically associated with masculine gender qualities, partial post-Conquest assimilation made all social hierarchy connected by a chain of command to submission to the Norman Yoke. The ironic consequence was that more hierarchical forms of national socialism, i.e. Nazism, became associated with their ethnic feminization. Anglo-Saxon democratic culture still retains this association of socialism with feminine dependence and

submission. Socialism became inextricably connected with Fitzhugh's slave "socialism".

Individualism became the way of purging one's self of the degrading, submissive, feminine stench associated with false socialistic claims by cutting one's individual self loose from them. If as an ethnic body Anglo-Saxons bore a politically female rank, then as individuals they could be men. If as an ethnicity they were a part and unfree, then as individuals they might be able to regain wholeness and self-determination.

The origin of Anglo-Saxon political gender equality is this balanced equation of national femaleness compensated by individual maleness. This is a source of a kind of bourgeois bisexuality whose compensatory logic eventually extended to feminists and homosexuals. Yet the consequence of masculine individualism is that no matter how many times this ethos is asserted in American culture, it is always done yoked to traditional attitudes of fear and resentment towards the possibility of an overpowering government: living shadows of dead Norman masters.

Anglo-Saxon national individualism emerged directly out of this revulsion against the notion that their national body had been reduced to a female role. It is *because* of the validity of these political group analogies that American individualistic values are offended by the Anglo-Saxon-woman conception. In other words, the fact that this interpretation tends to be discredited in the Anglo-Saxon world provides a key piece of *evidence* that validates the theory that Anglo-Saxon *revulsion* towards the notion that their nation was relegated to a female-like caste was a main impetus of their "modern" individualistic values.

As a sociobiological body, the Anglo-Saxon were basically claiming that they were not born for a woman's role and this

is only the result of conditioning; the product of an artificial and oppressive environment. It is nurture, not nature, that explains the past. It is hardly an accident that a crucial theoretical inspiration of the American Revolution, *Second Treatise of Government*, especially influential for Jefferson, was written by the same John Locke who authored the tabla rasa/blank slate theory of human nature. The script had already written; feminists only had to read it and apply it to themselves.

In early America, resisting the power of government *preserved* the family since limiting government could also mean limiting its principles of freedom and equality. However, the opposite eventually occurred as the principles of freedom and equality came to govern all relationships among individuals without limit. After all, when the beehive model of the state is shattered and men are freed from duties, where does their new freedom end? Are men freed from duties to the family as well? If men are freed from the family, then why should women be expected to remain dutiful? This Western logic of total breakdown from the hive into the herd is what Rousseau attempt to fix.

It turns out that there is no end to this unraveling, but to understand it, one must trace the breakdown from forefathers to faux-fathers to no fathers to its beginnings. The political reductionism of modernity begins with the reduction of the Anglo-Saxon nation to a subpolitical nation at the Norman Conquest. Its justice was failure of Anglo-Saxon political patriarchy to merit unequal privilege. In the first modern democratic revolutions, the sociobiologically female Anglo-Saxon caste *compensated* for its old reduction through an *equivalence* in individual male autonomy. This established the principle of equal-individualism; a principle of consistency.

The implications of this were self-evident to the English writer Mary Wollstonecraft. In *Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792), she reasoned that if "men contend for their freedom," is it "not inconsistent and unjust to subjugate women." She conceptualized the relationship as one of *subjugation*, not subordination.

Englishman John Stuart Mill's *The Subjugation of Women* (1869) also saw the condition of women as something worse than and different from subordination. However, it is less than a coincidence this particular man of this particular culture took up the cause of women and advocated women's suffrage. This energetic advocate of liberal reform, famed as the author of *On Liberty* (1859), once stated that the battle of Marathon was more important than the battle of Hastings. It appears that the struggle for liberty and diminishing, reducing, and defeating the importance of the battle of Hastings were two sides of the same coin.

Clearly, this Anglo-Saxon perception of subjugation is not universal. For example, conservative German historian Heinrich Treitschke, who lived in the same period as Mill, criticized the natural law theories of Hobbes and Rousseau, reasoning, "the aboriginal family must be allowed to be the original state, for already we discover in the family the political principle of subordination."[750] Treitschke conceived the relationship as one of *subordination*, not *subjugation*.

However, if political patriarchy is only an extension of familial patriarchy then, by the very same token, subjugation on the political level will implicate subjugation on the familial level. Mill was only being logically consistent in extending the conception of subjugation from the Anglo-Saxon nation to women. This is how the democratic liberty of individual men led logically to the liberty of individual women.

Mary Wollstonecraft's argument against the injustice of behavioral double standards between men and women is also found in *The Declaration of Sentiments*:

> He has created a false public sentiment by giving to the world a different code of morals for men and women, by which moral delinquencies which exclude women from society, are not only tolerated, but deemed of little account in man.

Yet from the beginning, the striving for a single, consistent human standard for both men and women was motivated by its very inconsistencies. The core contradiction was made explicit in *The Ascent of Woman*, a history of the English suffragette movement by Melanie Philips:

> the suffragist movement...was about more, even, than improving the general condition of women. At base it was a spiritual movement whose goal was to elevate the character of the human race by altering male behavior and redefining the relationship between women and men. It was not trying to make women equal with men. It was rather an attempt to revolutionise the entire social system by getting it to adopt the moral values of women, and in doing so raise the whole public sphere and human nature itself to a higher moral plane of existence. It therefore encapsulated the double standard at the heart of feminism which persists to this day: the simultaneous argument that women are the equals of men *and* that women are men's moral superiors...For the vote was not the fundamental issue. It was rather a means to an end: a society — and, above all, a male sex — transfigured by women's apparently distinctive values of spirituality, self-restraint and sensibility.[751]

In the original modern movement for the equal rights among men, one observes the same bourgeois contradictions: political equality laced with assumptions of moral superiority. Modern American egalitarianism evolved out of Puritanism through a very similar assumption of Puritan moral superiority. Just as the feminine virtues of Christianity opposed themselves to the masculine virtues of pagan Rome, common Puritan moral superiority would oppose the Norman rights of conquest. In America, the Anglo-Saxon-woman caste values succeeded in revolutionizing the political and social system, becoming, after the Civil War, the normative moral values of the entire country.

What Ann Douglas called "the feminization of the American culture" cultivates an anti-intellectual culture in which certain kinds of rational arguments are answered, not with rational arguments, but with sentimental or emotional "arguments". The systematic pussification of the American mind has also effectually cultivated an inability to understand the *psychology* of William the Conqueror. As Harvard political thinker Harvey Mansfield might have put it, American femocracy fails to understand the *manliness* of William the Conqueror. William the Conqueror *is* manliness. Defeated and conquered Anglo-Saxons are *not*.

But who would grunt last?

The Norman conquerors beat the Anglo-Saxon race into submission like the way a man beats his wife. This is how the Anglo-Saxons got in touch with their feminine side. In the American Civil War, the Anglo-Saxons would help the Norman race get in touch with their own feminine side by militarily raping that aristocracy into submission and ejaculating the seeds of democracy and equality into her by

force. This is the real basis of American equality: the historic equalization of Norman and Saxon on the battlefield.

The general gender difference between Norman and Saxon is exhibited by two classic "fathers" of America: George Washington, as representative of the Norman-Cavalier and Abraham Lincoln, as representative of the Anglo-Saxon North. Washington's crossing the Delaware captures a defining moment of classic American heroism and his virtues as a military man and political head were the apotheosis of Virginia's Cavalier culture. Yet despite the fact that his time in office was utterly consumed by war, Lincoln's demeanor and appearance was almost more like that of a Hebrew prophet than a warrior or aristocrat.

One cannot understand the Normans, and especially the social-cultural difference between Puritans and Cavaliers, without recognizing the sexual potency of the latter. The Normans married the "blond beast" masculinity of Vikings with the gentlemanly social delicacies of the French. The famous sexual repression of the Puritans fed off revulsion and contempt for the long-haired sexual prowess of the Cavaliers who intimidated them on this social and political level.

The Puritan or Yankee way of masculinity became a hardheaded prosaic, bourgeois, realism that despised dreamy, chivalrous, sentimental, romanticism as femininity itself. In this way, modern Anglo-Saxon shopkeepers and industrialists could even look down up the medieval model of a Norman like William Marshal (1146-1219), "the greatest knight that ever lived".

There is one key Norman-French contribution to the feminization of the English-speaking world, however, that cannot be overlooked. From the standpoint of sturdy Anglo-Saxon yeomen, the polite French emphasis on manners and,

perhaps, almost everything distinctively French, appeared almost like a humiliating self-emasculation in itself. In this sense, a *gender* equalization of Norman and Saxon emerged early between the contrast of impotent but rugged Anglo-Saxons and effete Norman tyrants.

The battle of the sexes emerged from what was a battle of the genders. The sociobiological similarity of democracy, feminism, and homosexual rights is a *gender* similarity. According to contemporary epistemological fashion, we now know that the most masculine *gender* characteristics are primitive and inferior to the most feminine *gender* characteristics, which are advanced and superior.

Yet there is a very sound reason to doubt the equation of bravery and stupidity so liberally promoted through this knowledge vogue. Liberalism is conservatism from the standpoint of the *risks* to individual self-preservation. The Norman Conquest was a classic example of a calculated risk taken in proportion to the victory that might be won. Generations of Norman descendants profited handsomely from this bold and extraordinary feat. Even at the beginning of the 21st century, over nine hundred years later, there are some British heirs still warming themselves by the dying embers of the Conquest.

Egalitarian revolution was the late victory of the *victims* of the Normans' daring exploit, and rebellion against their supremacy ultimately dominated the cultural values of America. Without the moral superiority assumed to lie in their superior individualism, Anglo-Saxon national upsurgence would look like the act of sore losers. But above all, these Puritanical pretensions of moral superiority are interwoven with the notion that they are *superior to biology*.

This premise of superiority to biology became paradigmatic for feminists. The modern-Puritan

contradiction of the moral superiority of their femocratic, egalitarian values would provide the paradigm for the same contradictions in women's movement it laid the groundwork for. The Saxon attempt to emasculate those who had emasculated them ended up in even further emasculation. The Normans ultimately conquered the Anglo-Saxons again through the universalization of moral reaction against the Conquest.

When it is all said and done, the great world-historical irony is that the American Revolution did not result in total rebellion from the Norman impact. Accepting democracy is partly accepting the sociobiological body that Normans gradually sculpted out of what they found in 1066. The aborigines had so adapted to the world created by those Norman master sculptors that the "revolution" was merely the formal acceptance of their alienation from aristocracy.

As a sociobiological body, the revolution was not a full regeneration of lost Saxon manhood, but verification that the post-Conquest sex change operation was successful. The Anglo-Saxon was a traditional woman who, after 1776, simply became a feminist. Women's liberation is only a further political self-realization of this adapted ethnic Anglo-Saxon identity. Why should Western women admit their femininity when Western men won't admit their femininity?

Anglo-Saxon femocracy took its first step with the castration of the Anglo-Saxon military-aristocracy by the Normans. The failure of the native Anglo-Saxon patriarchy, along with the influence of Christianity, is sociobiological ground upon which Anglo-American feminists stand. The weakness of these men is the political foundation of these women's strength. It the slain beast upon which these women stand victoriously, as if they had hunted down and

slain it themselves. The feminists are scavengers and gatherers.

Herein lays the general truth of female equality: females can aspire to be the equivalent of emasculated men. The feminine *moral* and legal norms and values of the West are the condition of Western feminism. Only within such norms is it conceivable that there be a *normative* expectation that women should rise to positions of political power. Sexual equalizing means that men must be emasculated in some way before women can be masculinized. This is the foundation of its common gender ground and its justice.

Feminists are good rebels, obedient to the spirit of 1776 that the feministic founders fathered for them. The failure of Anglo-Saxon political patriarchy is the foundation of political equality that leads not only to the rights of women, homosexuals, and minorities, but also to animals rights, right down to the time when we progress to the equality of mice and men.

Victory of Defeat: The Norman Contribution to Liberal Democracy

The Great Transmogrification

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, an ancient Balkan conflict among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims was liberated from its repression by communism. Serbs and Bosnian Muslims had been fighting one another at least since the Battle of Kosovo Field in 1389, with perennial reaffirmations of ethnic-religious consciousness. This is very

close to the span of time between the Norman Conquest and the English Civil War. The passage of centuries was not enough to erase the underlying kin selective hostilities in either the Balkans or England.

Following the execution of Charles I and the abolition of the House of Lords, Digger leader Gerrard Winstanley announced:

> wee have by this victory recovered ourselves from under his Norman yoake, and the land now is to returne into the joynt hands of those who have conquered—this is, the commonours.[752]

After those centuries of subjugation, the Anglo-Saxon nation became identified with "the commonours". The age of the *common* man, Thomas Paine's *common* sense, and the English House of *Commons* all demonstrate a tradition in which "common" became a general code word for "Anglo-Saxon" in contradistinction to Norman *lord*. This is why neither "class", nor "democracy", nor "equality" can fully explain the greatest genocide of the English *Common*wealth.

Englishman Thomas Scot was a Member of Parliament and one of the fifty-nine men to approve the most famous act of enlightened ethnic cleansing of the Puritan Revolution in signing the death warrant for King Charles I. With the restoration of Charles II and the House of Lords in 1660, he was caught and put on trial for regicide. In his defense he argued, unrepentantly, that before the Conquest, "there was nothing but a House of Commons" and consequently the King's execution on the authority of the lower chamber was justified.[753]

It is not hard to see Scot's homicidal warrant as an act justified by a kind of anti-Norman nationalism. This is a classic example of how an evolved adaptation from nation to

caste had warped the perception of the past. Since Parliament was a post-Conquest invention, Scot read his present into the pre-Conquest past.

This great perceptual transmogrification would turn out to be enormously influential. Thomas Jefferson partook of nearly the same classic delusion of Norman Yoke theory, which posited a pre-Conquest golden age of equality where land was "held of no superior". For him, restoring the old Saxon order was identical with "restoring" that original equality.

The sheer length of time between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries is an important piece of the evidence that supports the relationship between the Norman revolution of 1066 and the Anglo-Saxon reactions in 1649 and 1776. It was precisely the weight of those hundreds of years that solidified the practical identity of Anglo-Saxons, and the common, democratic interests of the body politic — so much so that the ethnic aspect could almost be abandoned as redundant. Conversely, it also helps explain why on the level of *political* identity, there was a perpetual dimension of de-nationalization or internationalization originally achieved by genetically removing or killing the nation's highest political representatives, and culturally perpetuating French-Norman culture from the top down. Yet the deepest source of the "internationalism" of the American founding was not only this Anglo-Saxon de-nationalization on the political level, but the struggle between the Massachusetts based North and the Virginia based South that culminated in the de-hereditization of politics.

The Norman contribution to liberal democracy consists, in part, of a fundamental alteration and manipulation of Anglo-Saxon history. While some of these contributions

were deliberate, some were not, i.e. anti-government or Anti-Normanism attitudes. So while men such as Hobbes and Lincoln were very likely of Anglo-Saxon or non-Norman origins, I include them in the "Norman contribution" as illustration of the point that liberal democracy is really a product, not of Normans or Saxons, but of the struggle *between* Normans and Saxons.

The Anglo-Saxon advocacy of the modern idea of *natural* right can be explained, in part, through the sheer length of time Anglo-Saxons spend incubating a subpolitical identity under the Norman Yoke. At least as important, however, is the "progress" achieved through the Norman destruction of the native Anglo-Saxon aristocracy. If progress is partly definable as a break away from aristocracy, and progress is good, then Anglo-Saxons owe a debt of gratitude to the Normans for annihilating their native aristocracy. From the point of view of *Anglo-Saxon* ethnocentrism, 1066 marked a step towards democratic progress. If so, then the Anglo-Saxons should show gratitude for the "eugenic" sculpture of the nature of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism in such a way that ultimately it became synonymous with "democracy". In modern times, "progress" became a way of looking at the consequences of the destruction of Anglo-Saxon aristocracy as a "Good Thing".

The early revolts against the Conquest could have succeeded. They did not. The difference between what might have been a successful 'Plan A' of revolt and what was a successful American 'Plan B' of revolution can be summarized in a single word: adaptation. If the 'Plan A' revolts that followed Hastings had been successful, there may have been little need for sweeping new political ideas of the 'Plan B' of revolution, whether such ideas were available or not. 'Plan A', however, *didn't work*, and therefore 'Plan B'

("modernity") is characterized by a utilitarian/pragmatic approach to democracy bred through Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism weakened through adaptation to the Norman Yoke.

The great transmogrification from an ethnic-political identity to bloodless democracy is partly an adaptation to reduction. Whereas ethnic identity is something more than the sum of its parts, adaptation to national reduction made the Anglo-Saxons more nearly equal to the sum of their parts. This scenario primed the genesis of American equality and was crucial to liberal democracy's pretensions to rational universalism.

Adaptations that Anglo-Saxons developed under the hot lights of the incubator of Norman Yoke include weakened ethnocentrism that became rechanneled towards individualism. On an individualistic basis, democracy became reduced to equality. On this basis of equality, a resurgent Anglo-Saxon nationalism in the American Civil War became the struggle of democracy against aristocracy. On this basis of equality, Anglo-Saxon nationalism became equal to the struggle for equality with black slaves.

Lincoln the Conqueror

"All honor to Jefferson", declared Abraham Lincoln:

> —to the man who…had the coolness, forecaste, and capacity to introduce into a merely revolutionary document, an abstract truth, and so to embalm it there, that today and in all coming days, it shall be a rebuke and a stumbling block to the very harbingers of reappearing tyranny and oppression.[754]

Lincoln viewed Jefferson's famous words in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal" as the product of a remarkable foresight; a prudent *anticipation* of reemergent tyranny and oppression that principled revolutionaries had struggled against in 1776. But wouldn't it be reasonable to think that Jefferson's foresight was not "merely…an abstract truth" but grounded, in great part, in his experience with the traditional South elites that he called a "pseudo-aristoi". Was there not a peculiar Norman connection between the British Empire and Southern slave aristocracy?

If the original racial meaning of "all men are created equal" was the racial equality of Normans and Saxons, then the Southern War for Independence was a revolution *against* the equality of Normans and Saxons. Some level of equality between the Norman-South and the Anglo-Saxon-North constituted the compromise that made the founding of the Union possible over and against a repeat of English Civil War. The implicit assumption of inequality between Norman and Saxon, however, was at root of the breakdown of the Union and the outbreak of another civil war.

With the prospect of a Lincoln victory at the election polls, an essayist for the *Southern Literary Messenger* clearly articulated the proposition that the races were created unequal and that the Southern way of life was founded upon this proposition. Southern slavery was "indissolubly connected" to two "fundamental ideas": "the idea of property of the master in his slave—and that the negro, everywhere and in all conditions, whether bond or free, is the inferior of the white man." Under Lincoln's rule, "the master's property [would be endangered]" and "the inequality of the race [would be] questioned."[755]

Alexander Stephen, Vice President of the Confederate States of America, declared that the new order was founded "upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition."[756] If these shiny new ideas were to be true for blacks, then it would be downright hypocritical for Southerners to resist the great truth that Saxons are not equal to Normans and that they, too, should be subordinate to the South's master race. George Fitzhugh's philosophical justification of the slavery of most whites, for example, directly implicated the future subjugation of the Anglo-Saxon North by the aristocratic South.

The cause of slavery was identical to the cause of Norman aristocracy and the cause of victory over the Anglo-Saxon North because these causes were identical to the principle that the human races are not *created equal.*

In 1066, William the Conqueror established "feudalism" from the top down. In the very different circumstances of America, slavery provided the means of a more "democratic" or grass-roots way of establishing "feudalism" from the bottom up. In other words, black slavery was the Trojan horse that built a social foundation for the racial inequality of Normans and Saxons in the novel circumstances of America.

"[T]he idea of slavery", warned Theodore Parker in a Boston anti-slavery convention in 1850, demanded "for its proximate organization, an aristocracy, that is, a government of all the people by a part of the people—the masters."[757] Slavery, and Northern acquiescence to this implicit constitutional denial of the equality of men, was the Trojan horse that allowed the Norman conqueror mentality to plant its roots deep into American soil. Northern acquiescence to notions of black inferiority contained the seeds of an

admission of their own inferior or sub-aristocratic mode of existence. The Southern invigoration and expansion of slavery was thus strategically designed to question the equality of the *white* races and thus lay a foundation for a new caste system.

In his first annual message to Congress, Lincoln explicitly stated that "the insurrection is largely, if not exclusively, a war upon the first principle of popular government—the rights of our people."[758] The arguments for slavery, he once explained, "are the arguments that kings have made for enslaving the people in all ages of the world."[759] The problem was not black slavery *per se*, but that the implications of black slavery threatened "even the white man's charter of freedom."[760] The Civil War was fought, not over slavery *per se*, but over the egalitarian principle of democracy.

Stephen Douglas believed that giving Africans rights would destroy democracy. This is exactly the dilemma that the Southern aristocracy intended to instigate by expanding the institution of slavery. *The purpose of expanding slavery was to destroy democracy.*

In his first debate with Douglas in 1858, Lincoln admitted that he had "no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and black races….What I would most desire would be the separation of the white and black races."[761] Lincoln was a white supremacist.

It should come as no surprise, then, that the preeminent black intellectual of this period, Frederick Douglass, even a decade after Lincoln's assassination, chose to remember him as "preeminently the white man's President, entirely devoted to the welfare of white men...The race to which we belong were not the special objects of his consideration."[762] Douglass's viewpoint is perfectly understandable, but it can

be taken *literally* only if the Norman-Cavalier-based aristocracy represented a separate race with separate interests. The recognition that the South's Norman-based aristocracy constituted a separate race is the only thing that makes sense of an otherwise inexplicable mountain of contradictions in both theory *and* practice.

The difference between North and South was not "white supremacism". The original policy difference between Lincoln and his Southern opponents was the difference between racial separatism and racial caste. The South invited the prospect of the races living together so long as it could reinforce the paradigm of caste that was the root of the old English "class" system. While Northern egalitarianism threatened the old caste distinctions between Norman and Saxon, Northern hypocrisy on the subject of blacks was exposed by Lincoln's preference for separating the races through colonization.

Lincoln abhorred the idea of "amalgamation", or interracial sexual relations, and thus concluded, "[a] separation of the races is the only perfect preventative of amalgamation".[763] Lincoln's plan for racial separation between blacks and whites was to be actualized by deporting blacks outside of the United States. "Separation", said Lincoln in a speech on June 26, 1857, "must be effected by colonization."[764]

Emancipation and deportation were "indispensably and indissolubly connected" in Lincoln's mind, said the President's Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. They were two "parts of one system" that "must be carried forward together."[765] Welles stated that he did not understand why his contemporaries suppressed Lincoln's belief in the desirability of the colonization of freed blacks to places outside the United States.[766] General Benjamin F. Butler

recollected that Lincoln commissioned him to investigate the feasibility of the colonization of freed blacks only two month's before the President's death.[767]

This Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy demonstrates that the idea of equality was designed to destroy the Norman Yoke, not to liberate blacks. The expansion of slavery was designed, in part, to clarify the hypocrisy of Northern racism and to expose Northern egalitarianism as a tool of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. Jeffersonian equality was designed to bring down the Norman-Cavalier race down to equality with Anglo-Saxons, not to raise the black race to equality with whites.

Lincoln freed the slaves of the South because "no human power can subdue this rebellion without using the Emancipation lever as I have done."[768] The Emancipation Proclamation was a political means…but for what end? It was the Southern aristocracy that lead the rebellion and it was the Southern aristocracy that the "Emancipation lever" was used to destroy.

"A house divided against itself cannot stand", Lincoln declared. "I believe this government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free...It will become all one thing or all the other."

In one of his famous debates with Lincoln, Stephen A. Douglas responded:

> Thus Mr. Lincoln invites, by his proposition, a war of sections....This Union can only be preserved by maintaining the fraternal feelings between the North and the States...I am opposed to organizing a sectional party, which appeals to Northern pride, and Northern passion and prejudice, against Southern institutions, thus stirring up ill feeling and hot blood between brethren of the same Republic.[769]

Lincoln was elected on the crest of Anglo-Saxon nationalism and this determined the *kind* of Union he fought to preserve. Hatred of slavery was also hatred of the Norman-Cavaliers. The extermination of slavery was also the extermination of the conqueror culture of the Norman-Cavaliers.[770]

Both sides exploited black slaves. For the South, black slavery was a means of preserving and perpetuating the aristocratic, Norman-Cavalier way of life. For the North, using the "Emancipation lever" to free black slaves was a means of destroying the aristocratic, Norman-Cavalier way of life. The abolition of slavery was a *means* of the abolition of the "Slave Power".

"We seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any kind", claimed Jefferson Davis. "All we ask is to be let alone." For the South to win, they simply had to uphold their declaration of independence from the United States. For the North to win, they had to *conquer*. There is no way to explain Northern behavior purely on the basis of political principle since the North had to trample on the principle of a "declaration of independence" that was the foundation of the existence of the United States. How can one, then, explain this reversal of principle?

The idea that the Anglo-Saxon racialist interpretation of manifest destiny suddenly and inexplicably ended before the Civil War is an outrageous comedy that has been hidden under a mystifying barrage of moralized poetry and political theology. Lincoln the Conquer represented the *climax* of Anglo-Saxon racial imperialism because there could not exist a greater historical climax of Anglo-Saxon nationalism that the decisive *conquest* of the old Norman aristocracy. Allowing for Southern independence would have threatened *Anglo-Saxon* control over American destiny. The "Good Old

Cause"[771] that had ultimately failed after Cromwell's death in the old world would succeed after Lincoln's death in the new world.

One way or the other, old Ahab's fate was tied to the great white whale. The slave masters understood that even if independence failed and the old Norman aristocracy collapsed, egalitarianism would bring the Anglo-Saxons down with them. Saxons could win only by admitting their essential slave morality equality with slaves. Norman political genius is evident even in Southern defeat: the Anglo-Saxon racialist interpretation of manifest destiny would culminate in equality with freed black slaves.

This decisive Norman contribution to American equality has not been appreciated. Anglo-Saxons, if truly left to themselves in America, would most likely have developed a far more normal racial nationalism. It was the Norman-Cavaliers and their aristocratic Southern culture that decisively crafted the constitution of the American founding in ways that countered, constrained, and controlled Anglo-Saxon ethnic nationalism. It was the Normans of the South that upped the ante by refusing to let the mediocre standards of Northern egalitarianism simply be. Southern slavery provoked the North to come to terms with what they really believed. The Norman-based aristocracy forced Northerners to confront their pragmatic compromises and clarify their beliefs in a fight to the death.[772] Black slaves were used, not only as labor, but as a means of challenging the premise of human equality. In raising the stakes to a contest of will that left room for only total victory or total defeat, the Normans are as important as the Anglo-Saxons to the ultimate outcome of human equality in America.

The election of Lincoln was *the* historical verification that the Norman-Cavaliers and their allies had fallen into the

enlightened democratic trap of the Anglo-Saxons. When the Southern elite refused to kowtow before belief in the sanctity of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism (a.k.a. democracy), the Union collapsed. The right of majority to rule was the right of Anglo-Saxon democracy to *rule* over Norman aristocracy. Secession was an attempt to free themselves of the trap of conquest through democracy.

What the American Civil War achieved was an Anglo-Saxon Yoke. The old Norman aristocracy, after all, had become a stumbling block to an *Anglo-Saxon* manifest destiny. In order to defeat the Normans, the Anglo-Saxons had to travel to the summit of historical hypocrisy and subdue the South with a new right of conquest.

It is entirely appropriate that the Lincoln Memorial in Washington was modeled on the ancient Greek Temple of Zeus; the king of the *pagan* gods. Lincoln was to become to America what William the Conqueror had been to Britain; a mighty, pagan Zeus crowned with a Christian halo. The Lincoln Memorial should really be called the Temple of Lincoln the Conqueror.

Magna Paradox

Magna Carta is one of the greatest Norman contributions to world history. Far from being an anomalous influence on American constitutionalism, the Norman-Cavalier slave masters of the American South were the heirs of the *inventors* of England's foundational tradition of constitutional law. The Normans are thus responsible for originating the English-speaking world's basic concepts of the rule of law.

Consider, for example, Chapter 39 of the original Magna Carta:

> No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor shall we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.

The "lawful judgment of peers" or trial by peers eventually evolved into the concept of trial by jury.[773] The concept of the "law of the land" became redefined as "due process of law" in a statutory rendition of Magna Carta in 1354. *Habeas corpus*, the defenses against unlawful imprisonment, was also born of the great Charter. Magna Carta provided the first English statute[774] and its principles profoundly influenced the construction of Bills of Rights in the United States.[775]

From a characteristically *modern* point of view, Magna Carta seems to have established, in principle, the rights of subjects against authority and the idea that authority is subject to law. But does this selective interpretation capture what was most important to the Norman barons who created it? When traditional blindness to a Darwinian understanding of human behavior has been overcome, it can be shown that the great first principle that guided the genesis of Magna Carta was *genetic adaptation*.

Darwinian adaptation for hereditary survival is the key to explaining the great historical paradoxes that Magna Carta spawned. Genetic adaptation explains, not only the original caste basis of "liberty", but also the incompatible Anglo-Saxon or Whig *re*interpretation of Magna Carta in the seventeenth century and the anti-Whig interpretation of Magna Carta among Southern Confederates.

To get a sense of what was most important to the Norman aristocrats who formulated the great Charter, consider the laws or principles at its very head. The first seven chapters of the original Magna Carta emphasize principles of rightful

inheritance. The very first clause to follow the more introductory content of Chapter One declares, "If any of our earls or barons...shall die, and at this death his heir be of full age and owe relief, he shall have his inheritance on payment of the ancient relief." The following clause goes further: "If, however, the heir of any such person has been under age and in wardship, when he comes of age he shall have his inheritance without relief or fine."

These were the "first principles" of Magna Carta: laws that guaranteed that Normans of high rank who inherited lands and properties as heirs of the Conquest could expect that their own children would rightfully inherit what was their due in continuity with the right of conquest. Since kings after Stephen were largely non-Norman, it was genetically adaptive to secure the hereditary privileges of the Norman aristocracy against kings.

What do laws that ensure the perpetuation of a hereditary aristocracy have to do with "liberty"? It is so often forgotten that "[h]istorically liberty means privilege."[776] It meant not only privilege, but most especially group privilege, and in the case of Magna Carta, the emphasis was on the group privileges of hereditary Norman aristocrats and their heirs that were threatened by the unchecked power of the king.

What happened, then, as the conquered gradually incorporated Magna Carta into their own laws? If liberty meant privilege, and Anglo-Saxons came to view Magna Carta as something that applied to *all* Englishmen, would not this raise the question of the hereditary privileges of the conquered? Could Magna Carta itself have raised the question of the hereditary privileges of Anglo-Saxons and thus have, quite inadvertently, stimulated Anglo-Saxon nationalism?

In the period immediately preceding the English Civil War, Sir Edward Coke was the key figure in liberalizing selected laws or principles of Magna Carta. J. C. Holt, the twentieth century specialist on Magna Carta, observed, "Coke was seeking the continuous thread in English law" and accordingly asserted that Magna Carta "embodied fundamental incontrovertible law, which itself went back beyond the Charter to the days before the Norman Conquest."[777] In dogged pursuit of this interpretation he overrode Glanvill, "the best authority" on twelfth century law. Even within the seventeenth century, Robert Brady charged, "Sir Edward Coke doth not care to hear of the Feudal Law as it was in use at this time, and hath a fine fetch to play off the Great Charter and interpret it by his Modern-Law".[778]

Maintaining the historically untenable thesis that the Norman aristocratic privileges upheld by Magna Carta were clear and rightful extensions of the pre-Conquest period was a kind of tradition or ancient custom in itself. While Coke distorted the past for present and future interest, the authors of Magna Carta had done much the same. The Norman barons had called upon the Laws of Edward the Confessor and Henry I to maintain what they claimed was ancient custom and even doctored these presumed laws to put their best case against the king in 1215.[779] Coke's maintenance of Magna Carta's clear, traditional continuity from before the Conquest was historically tenable only in the sense that this fictional continuity was building on the old barons' own distorted claims for continuity in the name of preserving their "ancient liberties".

In practice, Coke's case may have been less that there *was* continuity between the pre-Conquest times and his, and more that that there *should* have been continuity between

1066 and his time. Coke led the re-instatement, not of the whole of Magna Carta, and plainly not the "first principles" that maintained the hereditary liberties of Norman aristocrats, but of certain interpretations of certain selections.[780] And this meant that in order to accurately correct or contradict Coke's proto-modern liberalizations, one would have to formally explicate the legal basis for the gulf between the conqueror class and the rest. In other words, in order to roll back liberalizations premised on continuity from the Conquest, one would be led to clarify the break in "class" liberties that implicitly clarified the break in history inflicted by the Norman Conquest. And if that were to happen, the game would be up.

The assertion of the *continuity* of political tradition through the Norman Conquest actually stimulated the *break* in political tradition represented by the English Civil War and the Puritan Revolution. Coke's liberalizations, premised on what England *should* be like if hereditary conquerors had *not* maintained distinct "liberties" over the conquered, only clarified the legal and social break perpetuated from the Norman Conquest. And this granted warrant for insurrection.

Even from the traditional Norman view of the legitimacy of the Conquest, it was William's claim to the throne of England that justified all that followed. That a new Norman aristocracy also came to power was, legally speaking, purely premised on William's legitimacy as king. There is no reason to think that anything like Magna Carta would have evolved without the Conquest because it was a direct reaction to the paradigm of legal dependency on the king that was established by William.

Magna Carta liberalized the rights of conquest from the legal dependency on the king established by William to a

formal normalization of their privileged existence in England. Coke took this liberalization of the rights of conquest and went one step further. This meant that the rights of conquest became extended to more and more of the conquered.

Yet in extending the authority of Magna Carta full circle, from Lords to Commons, and then from Commons against the king, it snapped. If the conquered could appropriate the Charter's attack on the authority of the king, this could be used as a means of attacking the root of the Conquest itself, i.e. Charles I's authority as a hereditary extension of William the Conqueror's authority. An attack on the hereditary authority of the king was an attack on the hereditary authority of the aristocracy who depended on the original authority of William the Conqueror's grant of lands and privileges. The aristocracy's original dependency on the king was, after all, the reason why Magna Carta was needed in the first place.

Less than two months after Charles I was executed in 1649, the House of Lords was abolished. The destruction of the authority of William the Conqueror's heir led logically to the destruction of the authority of many of the heirs of the Norman barons who signed Magna Carta. Magna Carta was thus exploited in a way that annihilated its original intention. The abolition of House of Lords after the English Civil War represented the *greatest defeat* of the Magna Carta's original intention to formally secure the privileges or "liberties" of hereditary conquerors.

In 1215, the problem was that King John did *not* sufficiently recognize the privileges of the Norman aristocracy through William the Conqueror's precedent. In 1649, the problem was that King Charles *did* recognize the privileges of the Norman aristocracy through William the

Conqueror's precedent. The king was the key in both cases, but Magna Carta was harnessed for opposite intentions. Whereas King John could not deny William the Conqueror's precedent without denying his own ancestor, the conquered could pull the ground from Magna Carta's liberalized rights of conquest by executing Charles I as the heir of William.

The Great Carter was exploited because of the "traditional" legitimacy conferred by its Norman authority, while ultimately becoming a means to overthrow Norman authority. Cromwell's blunt disrespect for the document ("Magna Farta") shows a greater common sense understanding of Magna Carta's Conquest-rooted historical meaning than the cunning lawyerisms of Coke.

While Sir Edward Coke has been rightly called the "predecessor and to a large extent the parent of the more famous "Whig interpretation of history", this is not the same as claiming that he was a Whig.[781] While Coke led proto-liberalizations that assumed the continuity of English liberty from before Conquest, the Whig interpretation emphasized a grand narrative of the expansion of freedom. Historian Herbert Butterfield defined "the Whig interpretation of history" as:

> the tendency in many historians to write on the side of Protestants and Whigs, to praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present.[782]

By incorporating the idea of progress Whig interpreters could argue that, even though Magna Carta liberties originally applied only to the aristocracy, progressive liberalization inevitably expands "liberty" to all. But if the overthrow of the House of Lords in 1649 was the historical

verification of the break that the Norman Conquest inflicted on English history, this means that Magna Carta itself was also a product of this break. The Whig interpretation, then, argues for progressive historical *continuity* from a Charter that is symptomatic of an original *break* between the conquerors and the conquered.

If Anglo-Saxons interpreted themselves as "heirs" of Magna Carta, could this stand in comfortable harmony with the original? It is here that the Whiggish interpretation of Magna Carta clashes violently with the original. The liberty to formally liberalize or *extend* 'Norman Yoke' liberties or privileges from the king to the barons in 1215 was quite incompatible with liberty *from* the Norman Yoke in 1649. Nothing reveals the delusions of the "Whig interpretation of history" better than way in which the seventeenth century universalization of Magna Carta was used to subvert its original aim to uphold the liberties or privileges of Norman barons and their heirs. Nothing, that is, except for the replay of these themes during the American Civil War.

The American Civil War was rooted in incompatible interpretations of Magna Carta. It was the inherently problematic modern interpretation of the charter of 1215 that divided North from South. The North was heir to Coke and the Whig interpretation's belief in the gradual expansion of freedom from Normans to Saxons and beyond. The South was heir to a rejection of the Whig interpretation wherein the denial of the universalization of liberty was embodied in black slavery.

It is often assumed that, whatever the differences that may have divided Normans and Saxons, "liberty" was something that united them. Such an assumption is not only wrong, it is dead wrong. Liberty could be, not only a source of difference, but a source of war.

At the root of the problem of the "whig interpretation" of Magna Carta is recognition that liberty originally meant privilege. If liberty is interpreted as "freedom", especially individual freedom, then Southern slave-owners seem like outright hypocrites. If liberty, however, is interpreted in accordance with its original usage as privilege, then one is confronted with a potentially irreconcilable struggle of liberty versus liberty. Lincoln clarified the heart of this dilemma in 1864:

> We all declare for liberty; but in using the same *word* we do not all mean the same *thing*. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; while others the same may mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and the product of other men's labor. Here are two, not only different, but incompatible things, called by the same name—liberty.[783]

Lincoln's insight was entirely correct. Northerners and Southerners interpreted "liberty" in ways that were not only incompatible, but opposite in principle. The Southerners emphasized an original Norman usage that, in practice, amounted to a legal defense of caste privilege. The Northerners emphasized a more modern interpretation that originally defended Anglo-Saxon freedom *against* Norman caste privilege in the English Civil War period. To call slave-owners "hypocrites", then, is to depend on a late, derivative, shallow, second hand interpretation of the word "liberty" whose dominance was ultimately established by war.

It appears that the transition from defining "liberty" as privilege to defining "liberty" as freedom began, appropriately enough, when Anglo-Saxons felt they had the right or privilege to free the word "liberty" from slavery to

its older semantic associations. But Anglo-Saxons may have taken more liberties with the word "liberty" than even this. Whereas freedom is more formally compatible with equality, there is a latent aristocratic element in the latent Anglo-Saxon nationalism inherent in Lincoln's privileged decision to outrightly conquer the entire South. Lincoln's "liberty" to suspend *habeas corpus* was clearly not the only inheritance of Magna Carta he trampled upon.

It is therefore a mistake is to believe that, even for Anglo-Saxons, liberty fully and simply translated into formally modern notions of individual freedom. Yet if modern "liberty" was to expand beyond the scope of the distinct civil privileges of *groups*, there was really no other way to universalize Magna Carta except through *individual* "liberty".

The original Magna Carta does refer to "free men". Yet only one hundred and fifty years after the Conquest, at a time when French was still the distinguishing language of the upper class, "free men" would generally, but not exclusively, refer to Normans. Magna Carta was produced in an England that was part slave and part free. The Norman Yoke liberties of Southern slave owners were rooted in *that* old Magna Carta tradition.

Yet when one asks where *modern* democracy in the English-speaking world began, there is clearly some truth to the Whiggish belief that its legal or constitutional origins are to be found in Magna Carta. "Democracy" began *within* Norman aristocracy as Norman barons attempted to rule themselves and England at the expense of both the king and the masses. The paradox of democracy with aristocracy is exemplified by the word "peer". While a *peer* is an equal, the *peerage*, as used in England, signifies "class" privilege.

This is a root of the paradoxical Whig interpretation: "class" equality that is inferior to a monarch on one hand and superior to the majority on the other. The conqueror "class" originally assumed separate standards for conquered Anglo-Saxons and it was this "class" mentality that easily lent itself to the assumption of a separate "class" standard for enslaved blacks in the American South.

The Levellers of the England's Puritan Revolution were successors and radicalizers of Coke's proto-"Whig interpretation" of Magna Carta.[784] Just as the Levellers universalized old aristocratic privileges into Anglo-Saxon liberties in the English Civil War, the 'neo-Levellers' of the American Civil War went one step further and universalized these liberties to blacks. The extension of rights and liberties to black slaves was thus partly contingent on a Whiggish interpretation of Magna Carta. From this perspective it becomes clear that opposition to the universalization that expanded "liberties" to blacks was a corollary of a more basic rejection of universalizing Magna Carta "liberties" to Anglo-Saxons. The South's opposition to progressive universalization was designed to conserve "class" liberties against the Anglo-Saxon or Whiggish interpretation of Magna Carta. Magna Carta thus explains the inherent "contradiction" of "liberty" limited by caste or the "freedom" to own slaves. Yet this inherent contradiction became a primary constitutional source of the Anglo-Saxon "universalism" that later became identified as "Americanism".

The Confederate rebellion could be viewed as a refutation of the Whig interpretation of Magna Carta through the rebirth of its original caste principles. But just as the English Civil War ended with the abolition of the original Magna Carta through the abolition of the House of Lords, the

American Civil War ended with abolition of the original caste principles of Magna Carta through the abolition of the slave-owners. The possibility of a new House of Lords and a new Norman slavery had been averted through an attack on the restoration of the original "class" principles of Magna Carta.

Southerner Langdon Cheves, echoing the warnings of Tocqueville and Madison on the tyranny of the majority, believed:

> a popular tyranny of fanatics and low-minded politicians—a tyranny so much the worse, because it is many headed—a popular tyranny, even when composed of less foul elements than the present, is more degrading than the tyranny of a monarch.[785]

Lincoln *did not represent* the South; his electoral victory was not representative government for the South in general and most especially the greater planters. "Fanatics", with its inevitable association with the Puritans who killed Charles I, implicitly condemns Abraham Lincoln as a tyrant in tradition of the Puritan dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell. While Charles I was considered a tyrant by Anglo-Saxon Puritans, he was representative government as an upholder of Magna Carta caste privileges for Norman Cavaliers. While Oliver Cromwell was considered a tyrant by Norman-Cavaliers, he was representative government as the destroyer of Magna Carta caste privilege for Anglo-Saxon Puritans. Just as Charles I was killed in the name of "death to tyrants" at the end of the English Civil War, Lincoln was killed in the name of "death to tyrants" at the end of the American Civil War.

For the South, Lincoln was like a new King John of 1215, a betrayer of the aristocratic liberties that Magna Carta was

invented to defend; a usurper of the rights of aristocracy that had put Norman barons on par with the king as masters of England. Northern tyranny over Southern slaveholders exhibits the same kind of paradox as attempts to tyrannize over non-kingly Norman conquerors in England.

Magna Carta is a Magna Paradox because it supports two opposite principles simultaneously. On one hand, it attacks the authority of the king and this side of the Magna Carta tradition took precedence during the American Revolutionary period. On the other hand, it originally supported the privileges of an aristocracy and this side of Magna Carta tradition took precedence during the American Civil War.

Part of the deeper, inherited, Virginian, intellectual justification for a slave holding, aristocratic society evolved out of Magna Carta's liberalized rights of conquest — selectively altered and mutated into an argument for states rights. America's British inheritance can be detected in that federalism (along with the president) corresponds to the King, states rights corresponds to the Lords, and democratically accounted individual rights corresponds to the Commons. "States rights" may have aspired to something approaching the aristocratic freedom (and anarchy) extant during the reign of England's Norman King Stephen (1135-1154). If one views the major Norman barons as akin to "state governors" and England divided into "states" under the relatively "anti-federal" King Stephen, one can discern the earliest precedent for the peculiar kind of liberalism represented by "states rights". The North in the U.S. Civil War embodied a quasi-Hobbesian strategy (from the English Civil War period) in which a sovereign federalism combined with mass "individualism" to crush "states rights" in between them.

There is a paradox of individualisms at the heart of the Hobbesian system. On one hand, Hobbes posited the mass individualism of the people. On the other hand, representing a completely different and incompatible standard of behavior, he posited the individualism of the king or sovereign. Why is there an outright *chasm* between the individualism of the sovereign and the individualism of everyone else?

Magna Carta is the key to understanding this central Hobbesian contradiction. Hobbes apparently would have sided with King John *against* the barons in 1215. It was the Normans who introduced this Magna Carta right of rebellion that later Puritans and Levellers exploited. Hobbes sought to eradicate the legitimacy of this right of rebellion but could only do so by positing the ultimate legitimacy of the king or sovereign against the Magna Carta tradition. The philosopher tried to preserve a semblance of an older, pre-modern holistic nationalism, but the Magna Carta-justified aristocracy formed a frustrating wedge that stood at the root of the artificial dividing line between the king and the people. This is what accounts for the paradox of the two incompatible individualisms in Hobbesian thought: a king at one extreme and the masses at the other extreme united to crush Magna Carta's right of rebellion. By *conceptualizing* king and masses as individuals, the hereditary nature of the Norman aristocracy was highlighted through contrast.

The "nature" in the natural law posited by Hobbes and Locke obviated the need for precedents like Magna Carta and Coke.[786] In England, natural law and Magna Carta were naturally hostile to one another.[787] In America, however, these two antagonists combined just as old antagonists from Massachusetts and Virginia combined to produce the United States Constitution. While "Anti-Normanism" ultimately

won out in America because of the Northern victory in Civil War, Magna Carta helps chart the twisted road to freedom in which Normans ultimately contributed to "Anti-Normanism" by expanding slavery.

When tracing the roots of modern Constitutionalism, it is common to point to Thomas Hobbes as the initiator of modern political philosophy. Yet, somehow, as if by pure coincidence, the English-speaking world also produced this noteworthy something called Magna Carta all the way back in 1215. The Charter, a product of civilization rather than philosophy, probably had more real historical influence that Hobbes and Locke combined. This is only one way in which the Norman contribution was *decisive* in pushing what became the English-speaking world towards the modern shift from *Kultur* to civilization. The Norman right to rebellion, formally introduced in 1215, was in many ways more "modern" that Hobbes' prescription for obeying the sovereign without question. Understanding the precocious modernity of Magna Carta illuminates the precious modernity of the English-speaking world.

The view that Magna Carta was almost a random product of an accidental historical crisis does provide a satisfactory explanation for why it became such a foundational precedent for later constitutional tradition. A far better explanation is gained when Magna Carta is viewed through the lens of a conflict between "tradition" and "modernity". The privileges of Norman aristocrats could not be based on ancient tradition because they foreigners who still spoke French and whose political status, especially from the standpoint of hereditary lineage, was premised on the overthrowing of Anglo-Saxon rooted political tradition. They could not rely upon deep traditions to secure their privileges or liberties. It was precisely because the Conquest

was untraditional and precisely because these Norman aristocrats could not rely on truly ancient traditions that they were compelled by circumstance to use reason to invent laws that served their own interests. This is one way in which Magna Carta, as a step towards artificially mending the organic tradition broken by the Conquest, marked a step towards political modernity.

It is untenable, then, to conclude that a "temporary crisis" produced the bedrock foundations of English law. The reason that Magna Carta could be treated as "fundamental law" was that its *original* purpose was to grant "liberties in perpetuity".[788] The endurance of Magna Carta is testimony to the long-term thinking of the Norman barons, and their long-term thinking is directly attributable to their intentions to legally establish the *permanence of the Conquest* insofar as this meant formalizing their privileges in perpetuity. The Norman Conquest thus clarifies the roots of the sempiternal endurance of Magna Carta through the Norman aristocracy's effort to formally establish sempiternal hereditary rights of conquest independent of the king.

Conquest is one of the most dangerous principles in politics because it *is* politics in its extreme, raw, naked nature. Conquest can be contrasted with consent. To many who fought in the English Civil War, King Charles I represented the conquest of the people, while Cromwell, some hoped, represented the consent of the people. The problem was that there was an ambiguity between king and conqueror.

A root of the Magna Paradox is that William's precedent embodied an ambiguity between king and conqueror. The same kingly prerogative that made Normans conquerors under the command of William backfired against their heirs under the rule of John. Was John a king or a conqueror? Did

John's commands represent a Plantagenet conquest of the Norman aristocracy?

It is no accident that Magna Carta came into being after the rule of the purely Norman kings. The road to Magna Carta was thus paved when Stephen, the last fully Norman king, failed to thwart Matilda's bid for the throne of England. Stephen represented the barons like a Norman brother. His weakness as a commanding ruler is what allowed both anarchic "liberty" and the emergence of something vaguely approaching liberal democracy among Norman aristocrats. Conversely, it was the alienation of Norman-based aristocracy from dictatorial non-Norman kings, which provoked both Magna Carta in 1215 against the Angevin King John, and the Southern contribution to the American Constitution against the "Saxon" King George III in 1776.

When the relative hereditary alienation of king and aristocracy is accounted for, one can account for the precious modernity of Magna Carta in terms of a breakdown of hereditary bonds. William the Conqueror was nepotistic and his *de facto* kinship favoritism secured the existence of Norman aristocracy despite a lack of *de jure* legitimacy. After King Stephen, kinship favoritism could no longer be taken for granted and Magna Carta was the materialization of legal bonds that made up for the breakdown in kinship bonds. This is how Magna Carta led a break from the personal and nepotistic bonds of "ancient" politics to the impersonal bonds, indifferent to nepotism, that are characteristic of "modern" politics.

Just as Matilda's marriage to an Angevin king broke down kinship and political alliance bonds above the Norman aristocracy, the progressive intermarriage of lower ranking Normans with the Anglo-Saxon population began to

question assumptions of privilege attached to the original Norman conqueror/conquered Anglo-Saxon distinction. Magna Carta stipulated that the "lesser barons" be summoned only through sheriffs. This can be seen as a maturation of the distinction between the "greater" Normans and the "lesser" Normans who became associated with the Anglo-Saxon "class". The hereditary character of the peerage reached a further level of formalization in the beginning of the fourteenth century through the extension of the Norman custom of primogeniture from estates to seats in Parliament. The same pattern of reaction to encroaching assimilation with a formal reconstitution of "class" privilege can be seen in the America's Confederate rebellion.

Magna Carta was the assertion of aristocratic hereditary right against the arbitrary power of kings. It was an assertion of the hereditary nature of the peerage as a parallel to the hereditary nature of kingship. It reclaimed and reinvigorated aristocratic Norman Conquest by maintaining that the greater barons, like the king, were those of the status or class of hereditary *conquerors* (as opposed to a singular, sovereign, hereditary *conqueror*). "Liberty", in this sense, was accomplished by separating "greater" Normans from "lesser" Normans.

Historian George Garnett pointed out that "William the Conqueror's role as the source of all tenure in conquered England was unique and unprecedented."[789] The legal innovations of Magna Carta are a direct reaction to some of the legal innovations of the Norman Conquest. After William, *everyone* was dependent on the king for the lands that they held. This dependency on the king allowed Norman elites to first acquire their lands on the basis on William's nod. As a precedent, it also made the Norman aristocracy precariously dependent on the king's nod. The

great Norman barons had "no rights" not at the mercy of the king.

Magna Carta would not have come about without the Norman Conquest. It was a corrective to William's precedent necessary to legally normalize the status of the Norman aristocracy against a precarious dependency on the king. One of the great ironies of Magna Carta is that it formalized the legitimacy of Norman Conquest beyond the king's authority. It legitimized, in other words, the aristocracy's rights of conquest as a parallel to the king's inherited rights of conquest.

Magna Carta contribution to modern constitutionalism by manufacturing a form of political legitimacy out of thin air. In this sense, the great Charter was not unlike the great lies and fabrications that justified William's claim to the throne. As George Garnett observed, "[s]crupulous legalism was based upon a fabricated history, which ultimately legitimated the despoliation of the Conquest." William's claim, "confected in Normandy", established a "fiction of continuity"[790] and the great Charter is actually great evidence of the fictional nature of those claims of continuity. Magna Carta, seen in modern times as a move away from the so-called "feudal" principle of William's kingly ownership of all the land, was actually an expansion, extension, and 'liberalization' of the rights of conquest. This implies that the most influential foundation of modern, universalistic, egalitarian law can be traced to the most outrageous usurping power of a single individual: William the Conqueror.

The Norman Conquest inflicted a form of proto-modern "progress" by trashing certain core Anglo-Saxon political traditions. The Normans contributed to the modern idea of progress by combining the rupture of native tradition and

with belief in the positive good of that change. If Magna Carta could ultimately be interpreted as good, this meant that Anglo-Saxons partly internalized the notion that aspects of the Conquest were good, and thus the notion that change and the rupture of native tradition is good.

Magna Carta became sacred law in modern times because a concession to the authority of this Norman "antiquity" could be used to subvert belief in the authority of a pure right of conquest. Its right of rebellion against kingly authority was the central legal contradiction in the Norman right of conquest that could be exploited to unravel the entire Conquest establishment. The great Charter was the holy hole in the right of conquest that could uphold Norman authority in order to subvert Norman authority. But this also meant that the impact of the Conquest could never be completely undone because it became inseparable from the means used to undo the Conquest. This is how the seeds of the tree of Anglo-Saxon freedom or "liberty" were planted by Norman despotism.

Unentangling Alliances

In George Washington's Farewell Address, he famously warned against "permanent alliances", an idea reinforced by Jefferson's 1801 inaugural address warning against "entangling alliances". Thomas Paine was one of the strongest advocates of American non-involvement with other nations, and it should not be surprising that the non-British country that tended to be the focus of these apprehensions was France. Paine's propaganda contributed to the Second Continental Congress's resistance to forming an alliance with France, and the Congress yielded only to the realpolitik realization that the Revolutionary War could very likely not be won without it.

The French-Norman Conquest was the beginning of England's long, bloody entanglement with the French wars, French culture, and French masters. For Anglo-Saxons to unentangle themselves from the Conquest legacy, then, was to disengage themselves from unnecessary alliances with both Britain *and* France. The great social changes described by Gordon Wood in *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* were inseparable from the attempt of many separatists to unentangle themselves from many inheritances of Conquest. As historian Reginald Horsman observed:

> To many Americans the sweeping away of entail and primogeniture after the Revolution eliminated the last remnants of the feudal system and restored the freedoms of the period before 1066. The works of Sir Henry Spelman and Sir John Dalrymple, which were well known in the colonies, depicted Anglo-Saxon England as a land free from the burdens of feudalism.[791]

The Jefferson-led abolition of primogeniture and entail helped create the illusion that the Norman Yoke was something that had been left behind in Britain. Yet George Washington's very warning against "permanent alliances" turned out to be a double-edged sword. Just as a Norman-American like himself could choose to override his "class" connections to Britain, future members of his slaveholding "class" chose against a "permanent alliance" with the Anglo-Saxon North. Jefferson was not *consistently* against "entangling alliances" anymore than he was a consistent egalitarian; he deliberately sought to entangle Virginia's old aristocracy in the "Saxon laws".

The American founding exemplified the problem of decisively unentangling "Norman" and "Saxon" into qualitatively different categories of being. On the level of

law and principle, Magna Carta is perfect illustration of impossibility of fully separating "Norman" and "Saxon" elements of American constitutionalism. On the level of culture, the entire matter was complicated by the reality of some degree and some kinds of assimilation over the centuries after 1066 and before the English Civil War.

The Normans were sufficiently similar to the Anglo-Saxons for assimilation to be partly successful. The Normans were sufficiently different from the Anglo-Saxons for assimilation to be partly unsuccessful. Interassimilation between conquering Norman immigrants and the conquered Anglo-Saxons was both partially successful and partially unsuccessful.

Insofar as the original aristocratic grafting experiment was *unsuccessful*, the government establishment would be perceived as an enemy. Insofar as the original aristocratic grafting experiment was *successful*, a common national identity and a common good would be share by all. However, what actually happened is to be found in a mixture of both the success and failure of assimilation.

The lack of success of assimilation to the aristocratic Norman graft culminated in democratic revolution. But because assimilation to the Norman Conquest was partially successful, a total separation from their oppressors could never be cut and dry. In fact, the attempt to create a genuine separation or full reverse apartheid from the branding of the Conquest was a nearly impossible task. Consequently, instead of restoring an imagined 'Saxon constitution', the most radical revolutionaries nearly ended up throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The impossibility of fully separating from an assimilation that was in many ways successful led to a process of total reduction to individuals.

The American revolutionary distinction between patriot and loyalist reflects a breakdown in the unity of patriarchal hierarchy: a legitimate, patriotic subpolitical and familial patriarchy was posed against an illegitimate, loyalist patriarchy on the level of traditional politics. However, because assimilation to a unified patriarchal, hierarchical Norman order was *partly* successful, the legacy of those centuries of assimilation became more complicated. Since post-Conquest England was *partly* premised and conceived as a legitimate, whole nation, it was also *partly* contaminated by a generalized political illegitimacy. The partial sense of political illegitimacy diffused, assimilated, and universalized on the authority of the official premise of legitimate political unity, bringing the legitimacy of even local patriarchy into question.

The conquered Anglo-Saxon patriarchal forms also suffered some illegitimization from simply failing to protect their fatherland from the Norman invasion in the first place. This cumulative illegitimization helps explain how the Conquest led to the gradual weakening of patriarchy in general and the rise of individualism in the English-speaking world. The demoralized failure of patriarchally principled resistance to the Conquest over the course of the Middle Ages prepared the moralized success of individualistically principled resistance to the Conquest in modern times.

If the Conquest order was not as successful in upholding its legitimacy, a more straightforward ejection of the rulers might have be cogent, including a more straightforward regeneration of patriarchy. This would be revolt in the manner of Hereward, not revolution in the manner of Jefferson. The partial success of the Conquest over time meant that something of the natives' own internal sense of patriarchy was bound with the old order, yet corrupted

because of this. Consequently, only a radical new order could attempt to cleanse the stain of corruption.

That new order was individualism; the order of individual rights. In the face of the complicated old relationship of interdependence, the principle of equality was the most simple and effective way to disentangle themselves from the old system of hierarchy and dependence. Only individualism could fully unentangle the alliance thoroughly enough to uproot those traditional tentacles of authority.

Since the Anglo-Saxons could not fully disentangle what was Norman from what was native, in the process they also disentangled themselves, in principle, from what was left of a sense of native ethnic self-preservation. Because assimilation to the Conquest was partially successful, and they could not fully separate themselves from their conquerors, the Anglo-Saxons were partially overthrowing themselves in revolution. Because the Norman graft was partially successful, the full realization of the principles of the revolution was partially an Anglo-Saxon self-conquest.

The final Anglo-Saxon conquest in the American Civil War was also a kind of self-conquest. Somehow, in finally conquering the Normans of the South, the Anglo-Saxons had, in some way, conquered themselves. Yet the American Revolution itself was possible only because the failed aspects of Norman/Saxon assimilation became momentarily identified with Britain while the successful aspects of Norman/Saxon assimilation became momentarily identified with the American founding itself.

It is often said that immigrants newly assimilated in America "invigorate" the native stock. This implies that the old stock has become bogged down in a state of lethargy. What is more remarkable, however, is how this idea

continues a traditional worship of immigrant Norman blood that 'invigorated' the Old English stock. Perhaps the most famous expression of the idea was made by Thomas Carlyle in the nineteenth century:

> England…still howls and execrates lamentably over its William Conqueror, and rigorous line of Normans and Plantagenets; but without them…what had it ever been? A gluttonous race of Jutes and Angles, capable of no great combinations; lumbering about in pot-bellied equanimity…

The Norman-French mastery of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism led to a mental association between the native and inferior, on one hand, and the foreign and superior, on the other.[792] In its original English context, Anglo-Saxon miscegenation with the Norman-French immigrants became associated with moving *up* on the social scale. The positive, or even ambivalent, American attitude towards immigrants is partly a subconscious cultural inheritance of English culture and the success of native assimilation to the fact of being conquered by immigrants who became the embodiment of social and political superiority.

Anglo-Saxon openness to the notion of superior contributions of new immigrants, then, is a Norman contribution to America. The Anglo-Saxons were not the "new men" of England in 1066; the Anglo-Saxons were the old stock of England. The native English had been there for over five hundred years. It was the Normans who were the "new men": a younger and more vigorous race more in tune with new, progressive developments of Western culture on the continent. The revolution of the Conquest turned classical notions of the superiority of ancient, old stock blood upside down. America is America because, on some cultural level, the Anglo-Saxons partially retained their medieval *de*

facto acceptance of the superiority of the Normans and thus the right of new stock to overcome the old. In this way, the Norman slave masters of the South were heirs of the most important contribution to an America in which Barack Obama could be elected president.

The Norman Conquest was a revolution. Unlike the conservative Anglo-Saxon view of revolution, it was not a restoration, but rather, a decisive break with the past. The revolution of 1066 not only confused the classical relationship between father and foreigner; it stood the traditional relationship between patriarch and pariah on its head. It was out of this revolutionary confounding of father and foreigner; patriarch and pariah; insider and outsider as the highest political paradigm that America was born.

An Experiment in Aristocracy

If the grafting of peoples of all ethnicities constitutes a definition of the American experiment in democracy, then the grafting of the Norman-French ethnicity onto England in 1066 was an experiment in aristocracy. If that experiment in aristocracy was a complete success, then, over the long run, the scars of the event should not be observable. There should be, for example, no residual caste or "class" distinctions greater than England's own pre-Conquest order. We should observe a sense of national unity, including normal expressions of nationalism that one observes, in some form, in virtually every other major country at some time. Is this what one observes in English history?

The superficial, conventional view that the Norman graft onto England was ultimately successful fails to account for what really happened over the long-term. The Normans may have yoked Anglo-Saxons physically, but the "class" divisions left unresolved internal tensions that, in one way

or another, demanded resolution. On closer inspection, the British Empire seems to bear witness to the *lack* of ultimate success of the Norman Conquest as a fully assimilated graft onto England. Rather, the British Empire represents a significant, if incomplete, success of a Norman kin selective strategy in resisting full assimilatory grafting onto the nation. Success, from the view of the conquerors' kin selective strategy, would be not only to enjoy separate "class" privileges for themselves and their scions without end, but also to perpetrate further conquests on other lands, such as India or the American South.

Just as kin selection provides a biological basis for distinguishing between a social body and those foreign to it, the same principles are evident on the level of the individual body. In medicine, the transplant or graft of major organs into another human being is generally considered successful if it is both functional and the recipient's body accepts the organs as his or her own. In the case of graft-versus-host-disease (GVHD), the recipient's body will attack a perfectly functional transplanted organ because it reacts to it as foreign and produces antibodies to destroy it. These immunological reactions, which are self-preserving in other circumstances, are in this case self-destructive.

Ethnic hostility is a sociobiological equivalent to an immunological reaction to a foreign kinship-ethnic body. The leftist term "resistance" likely originated as a reaction comprehensible in terms of sociobiological immunology. Resistance to the Norman graft-through-diktat is evident in the acute rejection of the Anglo-Saxon revolts from 1066-1071. The most overt rejections of the Norman transplant were the Puritan Revolution and the Yankee Revolution.

In the case of an organ transplanted to an individual, drugs that suppress the immune system (and which can

cause cancer and infections) are often given so that the body will not reject that graft. Similarly, pre-Protestant Christianity usually acted as a suppressant of the Anglo-Saxon sociobiological immune system; a suppressant of ethnic hostility. Christianity's inversion of kinship and altruism, its universalism, and its emphasis on the sanctity of individual souls strongly influenced what, over the long run, became the primary adaptation to the Norman graft: liberalism. *Individual* liberties became a sociobiological equivalent of an immunological suppressant.

The attempt to forge a unified English nation after the Norman Conquest required a form of internationalism. Unlike the merger of two companies with redundant bureaucratic overlap, the post-Conquest merger was marked by an inherent sociobiological 'inefficiency' in the social machinery; an organizational tautology; a repetition; a redundancy. Kin selective biases mean that neither group was fully reducible to one another. Instead of a single, unified nation, the English polity became permanently divided between King, Lords, and Commons.

The structural or organizational redundancies that emerged from kin selective and cultural biases eventually reorganized themselves into what is now known as liberalism. This stubbornly anti-laconic eccentricity in the social order emerged organically from this generalized kinship "kink" in the English national social hierarchy. This excess fat in the "national" order is the legacy of the overlap of separate ethnicities who never fully gave up their separate group or "class" identities. It is the result of perpetual resistance to total assimilation or total reduction to a fully coherent organic national unity.

Since physical force could not hide the reality of the abuse of the notion of the common good, the internal coming apart

was diverted and rechanneled through an internal liberalization. Partially assuaged and partially retained, the original caste or "class" discontinuity between rulers and ruled eventually became partly assimilated, internalized, dissipated, and generalized throughout the population. The residual sense of external physical boundary, like the border between two nations, *became assimilated and internalized itself as the border between individuals*. The eventual result of this "assimilation" was a weakening of kinship bonds generally and a strengthening of individualism.

Individualism is an internal apartheid. Since the foreign Norman outsider became, in part, an insider and the native insiders were partly gutted towards the outside of the Conquest establishment, individualism posed the possibility of liberation from the inside out. Unable to expel the foreign invasion of Normans and gain freedom by externalizing them, the 'Plan B' solution of individual liberty evolved as a means of gaining freedom internally. In the case of the American founding, the very existence of the Normans of the South helped keep the Anglo-Saxons of the North from reverting to a straightforward nationalism. By continuing the tradition of not resisting, but adapting and assimilating foreign elements, the foundation for the American tradition of accommodating foreign peoples was laid.

Liberalism, then, represents the assimilation of these major internal social fault lines; the internalization of what are normally considered external national borders. The festering inner rot of "class" discord blossomed into a cornucopia of individuals, fertilized by the carcass of the Old English national body. The deep intersection of the Norman and Saxon language-cultures, moreover, was a rich intersection of perceptions and worldviews. It was out of this complex, discordant cultural interbreeding that

Shakespeare discovered the character of the individual human.

The Conquest had mixed results and America is a product of the intermixture of the success and failure of acceptance of the Norman graft transmogrified as liberal democracy. If the integrity of classical political patriarchy had a biological basis in kinship, this left two options: rejection of the graft, as in the Puritan Revolution, or the disintegration of political patriarchal body through the adaptation known as liberalism or individual freedom. It was precisely the *failure* of the Puritan Revolution; the failure to fully reject the Norman graft; the failure of ethnic apartheid against the conquerors that sealed the path to liberal individualism by forcing Anglo-Saxons and Normans to accommodate one another in the same polity *despite* their cold war through the alternative internal apartheid of individualism. On can look in at this in least two ways: the "success" of the Norman graft in the modern period was made possible by lowering the kinship-basis of standards of success (liberalization or universalization), or, the "failure" of the Norman graft ultimately led to the modern collapse of the kinship-patriarchal basis of political union altogether.

The American experiment in democracy is actually a continuation of the experiment in Norman aristocracy. The partial solution of individuation that evolved through "successful" adaptation to the Norman graft was formalized and extended, in concordance with its other numerical, head-counting benefits in bolstering the voice of the people at large. From this point of view, one can see that the technically "individual" basis of the voter democracy that launched Lincoln into office was itself a consequence of the breakdown of kinship relations that allowed the Norman

South and Anglo-Saxon North to live with one another in the America of the founding.

Between the failure of the Puritan Revolution's attempt to reject the Norman graft and the success of Lincoln's Yankee Revolution in dethroning the Norman graft, a liberal individualism evolved that is an enduring testament to the Norman impact. Even as the Southern slavery fell to the Anglo-Saxon nationalism, it could do so only by breaking out, no less than the South, of the formal constitutional construction. The founding order that survived the war nonetheless preserved Southern restraints on the tyranny of the majority that originated from the Norman attempt to control, subordinate, and civilize Anglo-Saxon democratic-nationalism.

To appreciate this unrecognized Southern and Norman contribution to liberal democracy, consider Thomas Paine's words in *The Rights of Man*:

> The hatred which the Norman invasion and tyranny begat, must have been deeply rooted in the nation, to have outlived the contrivance to obliterate it.

As Paine makes crystal clear, it was in the *Norman* interest to obliterate ethnic hostility against them. It was thus in the Norman aristocratic interest, from the *murdrum* fine onwards, to contrive political, legal, and civilizational mechanisms to dampen and defang the "democracy" of Anglo-Saxon nationalism. This Norman contribution, *profoundly* underappreciated, is to key to explaining how the "dark side of democracy", as Michael Mann put, was thwarted and controlled within liberal "democratic" order. The Normans themselves may have actually promoted and developed some degree of individualism among Anglo-Saxons as a means preempting their organization as an

ethnic group; as a means of keeping Anglo-Saxons divided and conquered. This was almost certainly the case in America. Yet the superficial convergence with the straightforward theory of modern individual rights obscures the ways in which American constitutional order cannot be reduced to Paine's political theories. In this way, the cumulative efforts of the Normans to constitutionally prevent the Anglo-Saxon *demos* from turning into Anglo-Saxon *ethnos*-nationalism was a decisive contribution that made the American experiment in democracy possible even as democratic revolution itself represented the greatest failure of the ethnic grafting experiment in aristocracy.

From Multiculturalism to Universalism to Multiculturalism

If there is one culture that "multiculturalists" have made an effort to *not* preserve, it is the slaveholding way of life of the old American South. The Norman culture of conquest that mastered the South is the intellectual blind spot of a supposed tolerance for *all* cultures. It is the difference between the master's multiculturalism and the slave's multiculturalism.

The Norman Conquest produced a premodern multicultural England wherein French-Latin masters ruled over the native Germanic language and culture of the Anglo-Saxons. In this way, the Norman Yoke was a long-term incubator of proto-multicultural tolerance that made the possibility of the dream of American "universalism" plausible in the first place. The mongrel English language itself is multicultural product of this Germanic-Latin melting pot. Tolerance originally meant that the native nation accepted that they lacked the freedom or power to expel a

foreign people and culture. Postmodern multiculturalists wish to cultivate the same virtue in the West against a restoration of revolution.

If the Saxon democratic revolution were truly a restoration, then democratic revolution would represent a restoration of the conflict represented by the battle of Hastings. Yet the Battle of Hastings was less a "clash of civilizations" than a *Kultur* clash with civilization. The possibility of a full Saxon "restoration" was obliterated by the Norman destruction of a distinct Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*.

One of the fundamental, unrecognized Norman contributions to America and the world is a basic political paradigm of civilization ruling over culture. Even as the Anglo-Saxons inverted the master principles of the Norman civilization towards their own ends, they retained the impact of Magna Carta and the *values* of the civilizational achievements of Rome. The Normans themselves had given up much of their own original Viking *Kultur* for the inheritance of Western civilization and this legacy of belief in the supremacy of civilization over culture is what made the supra-multicultural construction of the founding possible.

Against the universalistic interpretation of liberal democracy posited by Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington's *Who Are We?* posited the belief that a *single* Anglo-Protestant culture formed the basic root of what became the American way. If Huntington is right, how someone like Fukuyama could believe that Anglo-Saxons are the "universal" people?

The democratic humanism of the rights of man *must* have universalistic pretensions since if it is only "common" or "general" with some exceptions, that minority of exceptions could potentially be fully compatible with aristocracy. The

American Civil War came about precisely because of the persistence of the most stubborn aristocratic exceptions to the common rule. So while the universal equality of man was not *description* of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, it was nonetheless a *prescription* of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. This paradoxical prescription is most famous as the moral fabric of American universalism. The Anglo-Saxons became a "universal" people through *intolerance* for the most stubborn, slave-owning, aristocratic exceptions to the common rule.

The "universalism" of the democratic revolution consummated in 1865 is thus directly related to the multiculturalisms that preceded and succeeded it. One can discern a circular pattern from premodern multiculturalism to modern egalitarian "universalism" to postmodern multiculturalism. Ultimately, though, the strange loop of the leftward logic represented by postmodern multiculturalism leads back to the primal roots of liberalism itself: the destruction of a distinctive Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* through the Norman subjugation.

It was in the Norman's interest to de-nationalize the Anglo-Saxons; to defeat their struggle for political, cultural, and kinship representation on the political level. Norman influence on the Anglo-Saxon ethnicity consisted mainly in forcing them to admit defeat *as an ethnicity.* American "universalism" is built upon the success of the Norman destruction of an Anglo-Saxon will to ethnic-national-cultural self-preservation. What Samuel Huntington failed to point out is that America works because immigrants assimilate to the Anglo-Saxon model of acceptance of ethnic or *Kultur* defeat.

The death of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* is a gift of the Normans to world civilization. The Normans took great care and

considerable ability to the end of ensuring that Anglo-Saxon acceptance of their ethnic defeat was unconditional. Yet one unintended consequence was a decrease in genetically adaptive ethnocentric subjectivity among Anglo-Saxons that increased a proclivity towards scientific objectivity. In this way, the Norman contributed to a scientific attitude towards "culture" among Anglo-Saxons.

Postmodern multiculturalism exposes the cultural reductionism achieved by the Norman Conquest. The legitimacy of the multicultural issue springs up because Anglo-Saxon acceptance of defeat in 1066 was also the acceptance of the defeat of the political representation of their native kin-culture. Liberal individualism and multiculturalism are just two stages in the disintegration of a native Anglo-Saxon kin-culture initiated by the Norman Conquest.

Was the Norman Conquest a "Good Thing"? The implicit Anglo-Saxon acceptance of their ethnic defeat in America and elsewhere apparently yields a partial affirmative. Democratic revolution was only a partial rejection of assimilation to the Conquest. The partial success of assimilation to the Anglo-Saxon ethnic defeat called the Norman Conquest is revealed in Anglo-Saxon acceptance of their continued ethnic demise as a "Good Thing".

If, without the Norman Conquest, the Anglo-Saxons preserved the ethnocentric integrity of their native *Kultur*, would they have been better off without this cosmopolitanism-by-the-sword? The Normans "liberated" the Anglo-Saxons from some of their provincialism by defeating them. If this — and America itself — would not have happened without that genocidal cataclysm, should one conclude that the Conquest was a "Good Thing"?

To really understand what a possible alternative to the Conquest would look like, one must compare England to an ethnically similar people who never experienced that particular kind or magnitude of perpetual foreign domination. The Norman Conquest was the decisive political-cultural divergence point between converse cognates. It was through the Norman destruction of the dynamics of their aboriginal kin-culture that the Anglo-Saxon became a distinctly "modern" people. The survival of German *Kultur* eventually gave birth to Nazism. The death of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* gave birth to the modern "individual".

Thomas Hobbes: Philosopher of the Twilight Zone

It would not be going too far to say that, aside from the original Norman/Saxon "class" division, virtually every multifarious interpretation of the English "class" order has been proposed. Some have seen gradations of rank among individuals within a single hierarchy. Others have emphasized the multiplication of the original conqueror-"class" division, especially through the modern emergence of a middle class. Because of the hereditary basis of the original "class" division engendered by the Conquest, it offered a problem without a fully satisfying solution, spawning a chaos of internal mutations groping towards resolve. The first modern attempt at a final solution was the English Civil War.

The English Civil War represents a twilight zone: the twilight of the authority of the Norman right of conquest and the dawn of the Anglo-Saxon rights of man. If judged by its most immediate causes, there appears to be no single,

overwhelming cause for such a cataclysmic breakdown of authority. There appears to be no single lens, whether "class," religion, or otherwise that captures its chaos and complexity.

This conflict occurred in a transitional period where significant kinship-bonded disintegration had become normalized, hastened by Protestant Christianity. Yet, the "class" scars of Conquest remained wounds unhealed. Partial assimilation lay side by side with the persistence of hereditary "class" hostilities unresolved from the Battle of Hastings. There was no fully coherent or satisfying political answer in the 1640s, but it was the Conquest that provoked the political questions that led to that rampage of broken authority.

The relationship between the Norman Conquest and the English Civil War can be approached with a question: after *both* assimilation *and* ethnic hostility are accounted for, what should one expect to find in the generations following 1066? First, one should find an overarching divide between conquerors and conquered from the failure of assimilation. Second, one should find a substantial amount of successful interassimilation. From a period that spans more than five hundred years, partial interassimilation should result in significant counterexamples to virtually *every* simplistic idealization of any supposed Norman/Saxon rule.

If the Conquest order had been able to perpetuate itself over those centuries without a reasonable amount of interassimilation, *that* would be inexplicable. This is what is explicable in the English Civil War: a rejection of the Norman Conquest establishment that is almost hopelessly complicated by the indisputable fact of much intermittent interassimilation. In other words, assimilation to the Norman Conquest order was partly successful and partly a

failure. The key to understanding the English Civil War is to grasp the depth of this paradox; to fathom how *both* are true.

Clearly, a "two nations" explanation, taken at face value, would be naïve. However, traditional explanations have failed to grasp how the Norman Conquest engendered a corruption of the sociobiological basis of political unity that gradually facilitated the rise of individualism. The Norman Conquest was the most fundamental long-term cause of the English Civil War because it was the event that introduced the most severe rupture of internal political unity. It was that rupture which eventually spawned a profusion of others, whether religiously justified dissidence or mercenary individualism.

The only cause of this event more fundamental than the Norman Conquest is to be found in human nature. There is, in other words, no way to most fully comprehend the English Civil War without taking evolution into account. On a more provincial level, this means understanding how the Norman Conquest gradually led to a generalized corruption of political unity. On a broader level, it means understanding how the animal ancestry of humans, evolved over billions of years, expresses itself through kin selective behaviors.

To attempt to fully comprehend the causes of the English Civil War without a broader knowledge of evolution is like attempting to comprehend an earthquake without a broader knowledge of Earth's geological history. That earthquakes abound in the Himalayan Mountain Range, for example, is traceable to a collision of continents: India rammed into Asia around 45 million years ago. Just as the Himalayan Mountain Range offers an enduring reminder of the collision of the Indian subcontinent and Asia, the modern English "class" system offered an enduring reminder of the collision

of the continent and England in 1066. Just as erosion softened the harsh divide between the two continents over time, interassimilation softened the harsh divide between the two peoples over time. Nonetheless, just as the Himalayan Mountain Range is explainable as a collision of continents, the distinctively English borderland between the upper "class" and the rest originated in the collision of cultures know as the Norman Conquest.

Given the right mixture of conditions (generously provided for by the regime of Charles I), the English Civil War was as natural as an earthquake on the geographic fault line between India and Asia. No wonder the contemporary English philosopher Thomas Hobbes described a "state of war" characterized by "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." This was the idea of civil war reduced down to its "all against all" components.

But is man completely impotent in the face of violent nature? Does man have the scientific knowledge and technological power to control nature, secure a "state of peace", and prevent further political earthquakes of the human world? Thomas Hobbes believed so.

Opposite of the Puritans, Hobbes feared anarchy more than despotism. Born of a plebian background, he was eventually employed by the aristocratic Cavendish family. Having straddled the social extremes of England, he found political common ground in the common nastiness of individual human nature.

Hobbes formally devised the defining premise of political modernism: "the individual." He was also the most systematic of modern thinkers in deriving its logical political implications. His major works of political philosophy, *The Elements of Law* (1640), *The Citizen* (1642) and *Leviathan* (1651)

were all published during this first great modern outbreak of the Norman/Saxon conflict (1642-1651). A sociobiological understanding of Hobbes confirms that seeds of this modern political philosophy, first reaped through the English Civil Wars, were sown in 1066.

If the English "class" system had a basis in a kinship divide, then the very survival of this system was premised upon skepticism towards kinship overgeneralizations beyond the extended family. But where does one draw the line? Since a significant amount of genetic assimilation had occurred, especially within the non-upper classes, where exactly did the kinship favoritism of the family end?

In the Socratic tradition of eliciting the logical implications of partial thoughts, Thomas Hobbes took this internal English pattern of resistance to kinship overgeneralizations beyond the extended family, thought out these partial positions to their conclusion, and arrived at kinship *undergeneralization* taken to its logical extreme: the individual. In taking this step, a new horizon of political possibilities was uncovered, for "the individual" can be hypothesized to be *universal*.

Hobbes posited this individualism as a basis for a realistic alternative to the classical "hive" model of the state. Taken at face value, it might appear the ancient "hive" model no longer applied. Modernizing people, perhaps, simply no longer believed in subordinating their existence to some supposed larger communalism.

The real problem underlying the English Civil War, however, was not that the old hive model of politics was not working. The problem was that the old hive model of politics *was* working. It was because some were willing to risk their lives for their Saxon hive that civil war broke out, just as some of their Saxon ancestors had risked their lives at

the Battle of Hastings. The problem was not that the *hive* was not working; the problem was that the *hives* were working.

Behemoth was a reflection on the causes of the English Civil War. "Hobbes expresses bewilderment at ethnic identification and cultural animosity", wrote Stephen Holmes in his introduction to *Behemoth*:

> As is well known, Hobbes opts for the implausible idea that dying in war is the wage subjects pay their sovereign for preserving their lives. His entire approach prohibits any appeal to group loyalty. His aim, one might even say, was to put the sting back into mortality by blocking the projection of individual identity onto the group. His individualism may have been partly formulated in opposition to an ethics of revenge that drove avengers to risk their lives for a larger and more enduring social unit.[793]

The twentieth century discovery of a natural basis for altruism (kin selection) highlights the underlying assumption of the Hobbesian innovation of individuation: altruism is unnatural. With this in mind, let us juxtapose a Hobbesian view of the English Civil War with historian Catherine Macaulay's view that the conflict "overturned the tyranny settled by the Norman invader". While Macaulay's interpretation is comprehensible on the basis of kin selective altruism, Hobbes' death-fearing individual appears to defy kin selective altruism.

From the view of Hobbesian individualism, it made no difference that the force and fraud of the Norman Conquest resulted in a break in political-kinship relations. However, Eleanor Searle's study of predatory Norman nepotism before 1066 helps demonstrate why Hobbesian theory, if taken as a *description* of human nature, is wrong. It is not only that his theory of individualism is wrong as a description of pre-

Conquest Norman behavior: the channel crossing bravery of Norman Conquest itself could *never* be explained through a fear of violent death. How can this "modern" theory claim superiority from an empirical or scientific standpoint when the ultimate refutation of a universal Hobbesianism is the *empirical* origins of the English political tradition founded in conquest?!

The utter incompatibility of Hobbesian individualism and Norman predatory kin selective behaviors is no accident. The foundationally modern, Euclidean-modeled *Leviathan* system cannot be understood without reference to the top-down, kin selective Norman Conquest ruling order that it was designed to sabotage. If one thinks through Macaulay's position that the English Civil War was a kind of kinship-ethnic conflict with a Hobbesian consistency, one is lead to the conclusion that there is potentially a *hereditary* basis for internal anarchy and civil war without end. The very possibility of peace demanded a radically countervailing alternative. The Hobbesian program was designed to 'refute' the nepotistic foundations of the hereditary nobility and remove the source of the "state of war" in one stroke.

Hobbes radically and fundamentally undermined the logic of hereditarily-based arguments by consistently casting out the naturalness of kinship connections. Only then was he free to wield the new axiom that man is by nature an individual. It is a testament to the penetrating genius of Hobbes, and the Euclidean thoroughness of his thinking, that he correctly saw that it was exactly the relationships *between* individuals that were the deepest cause of the English Civil War. It was precisely those relationships that were responsible for those "irrational" altruistic behaviors that led men to risk their lives in war. It was *because* of those subterranean kinship-ethnic interpretations of the "Norman

Yoke" preceding the Civil War that Hobbes sought to root out this warmongering troublemaker once and for all. In doing so, he laid that core political axiom of modernity: "the individual".

Hobbes's answer to the problem of the English Civil War was the *Leviathan*. The *Leviathan* symbolized the state that kept internal peace. The *Behemoth* symbolized its opposite: sedition and civil war. The *Leviathan* was designed to subdue the *Behemoth*.

Whereas the book *Behemoth* was meant to be a *description* of the causes of the English War, *Leviathan* offered a *prescription* against that "irrational" Behemoth. Just as Hobbes found Aristotle's politics to be hopelessly inadequate as a comprehensive account of the human, sociobiology provides the basis for doing what Hobbes had no way of doing within the limits of the science of his time: provide a sound explanation for that Behemoth. The English Civil War provides a classic empirical verification of kin selective altruistic behaviors, and an empirical refutation that man is motivated solely by the fear of violent death. While the death-fearing Hobbesian man is sometimes assumed to be evidence of bourgeois Anglo-Saxon cowardice, it is actually evidence for Anglo-Saxon *bravery* in a life-risking attempt to overthrow their subjugators.

The "discovery" of "the individual" of the *Leviathan*, then, was more a political *technology* than a science. "The individual" was more an *invention* than a discovery. The *Leviathan* was a political technology prescribed for scientific observations of apparent human "irrationalism" reflected upon in his *Behemoth*. The *Leviathan* was an innovative political earthquake prevention technology (and, in part, a Biblically-influenced *reinvention* of the individual premise of the first revolution). The Brothers Frankenborg would later

evolve mechanisms of greater complexity in an effort to prevent the earthquake of civil war in America.

The problem was not that Englishmen were too "rational", fearing death and tending to their individual interests like good bourgeois, the problem was that Englishmen were "irrationally" indifferent to their individual self-preservation. The "irrationality" Hobbes observed in the English Civil War was, in great part, blind kin selective machinations meticulously constructed by the blind watchmaker of evolution. It was the logic of the genes, socially expressed as collective unconsciousness. Instinct had leaped ahead of reason and Hobbes attempted to catch up.

It is this that explains Lord Clarendon's contemporary observation that "[t]he common people...were in all places grown to that barbarity and rage against the nobility and gentry...that it was not safe for any to live at their houses" if it was known that they were opponents of "Parliament".[794] *Lack* of kinship-altruism between the conquest-based Royalists and conquered-based House of Commons set the stage for civil war, confirming the limits of the assimilation that had taken place since 1066.

Fear of *individual* violent death was Hobbes' antidote to kin selective altruism. Fear of death could keep the English peace precisely because its strict individual logic is *irrational* from the point of view of a kin selective strategy. Systematic individualism would act like a monkeywrench in the gene machine and thus subdue the inclinations towards tribal warfare that evolved as genetically adaptive behavior. The new Hobbesian order would resolve the internal tensions left by the Conquest once and for all. English individualism evolved as a *means* of making kinship not matter *because* kinship *does* matter.

While there is ambiguity between the descriptive and prescriptive in Hobbesian theory, it is nonetheless obvious that if *Leviathan* were a *description* of the actual behavior of men, there would *be* no civil war to inspire his modernistic innovations. This ambiguity also reflects the political twilight zone of seventeenth century England, where the old, classical hive model of the state had broken down *towards* individualism while the old residual Norman and Saxon hives nonetheless swarmed in a bee stinging frenzy.

Since individualism, especially in the form of individual Christian conscience, was one expression of the chaotic corruption of the unity of the English polity, this suggested that there does exist in human nature a sound realistic basis for his political peacekeeping plan. Hobbes, in effect, tried to resolve the problem underlying the English Civil War by radicalizing the *partial* disintegration into individuals into a *total* disintegration into individuals. Hobbes was most likely imagining what Puritans would have been like if they had acted as *consistent* individualists, and not hypocritical slayers of the Norman dragon. A Hobbesian war of all against all, properly dominated by a strong sovereign, would be a less anarchic and more peaceful alternative than the war of some against some.

It is significant that Clarendon castigated Hobbes for "his extreme malignity to the Nobility, by whose bread he hath bin alwaies sustained."[795] While preserving the anomaly of the King-conqueror, the Hobbesian individual system was invented as an alternative to the old aristocratic *class* system. There is cunning beyond the narrow logic of the individual here, for if successful, the surviving legacy of the conqueror class would have been squeezed out, crushed, or absorbed between a strong sovereign and mass individualism.

Part of the theoretical Hobbesian argument was that *even if* one built a society from the ground up with individuals one would necessarily arrive at the need for a powerful sovereign authority to maintain order against anarchy. The radically unequal power of the Hobbesian sovereign led Lord Chancellor Clarendon to further criticize *Leviathan* for deriving the laws from the will of a conqueror![796] The singularly unequal power and sovereignty of the king is the outstanding contradiction of Hobbesian individualism and this contradiction was an English cultural characteristic born in the image of William the Conqueror. Hobbes attempted stave off anarchy by preserving the most basic form of the legitimate conqueror paradigm founded in 1066.

The deeper, underlying problem was explicated by Oxford historian George Garnett in *Conquered England* (2007): "Duke William's claim to the kingdom of England was fabricated".[797] This was a conclusion that Hobbes had so fastidiously attempted to avoid:

> the scrupulous maintenance of the veil of propriety had consequences more profound and disruptive for the English kingdom than even Thomas Hobbes recognized. For instance, he did not see that a purely personal royal lordship, with no conception of what he would term abstract 'Soveraignty', was one of those consequences. The veil of propriety had these consequences because it was designed to conceal change, to pretend that the Old English kingdom continued as usual. By doing so, and exploiting the existing governmental structures to implement the Conquest, the kingdom was in truth so changed that Hobbes was quite justified in his implicit characterization of 1066 as the 'Imperfect Generation' of the English 'Common-wealth'.[798]

The Norman Conquest catalyzed a precocious path to modernity in that it corrupted the sense that there exists a legitimate, unified common good. Hobbesian political reductionism sought to find a viable internal order out of the chaos, an alternative third way between an unviable total national unity and an intolerable total caste system. Individualism became the simplest, most practical way of untangling the complex, incoherent and ambivalent attitudes between the rulers and the ruled.

The new provincialism of Hobbes' modern individual is a product of the breakdown of kinship, and hence a breakdown of altruism, and thus a breakdown of the biological basis of the old classical model of the hive. In summary, individualism is the continuity of the change wrought by the Conquest; the mutated heir of the internal breakup of kinship relations upset by that conquering of kinship continuity which the Normans indelibly changed.

The English Civil War and the End of History

Is it an inexplicable coincidence that liberal democracy just happens to be supremely and naturally well adapted for the suppression of ethnic conflict? To look at the finished product of liberal democracy is to the miss the context in which its individualism evolved. Democratic universalism evolved under the hot lights of the incubator of the Norman Yoke.

The original recipe for liberal democracy included the incubating pressures of forced political unity: the oppressive Norman monopoly of "legitimate" physical force combined with ethnic hostility against the conquerors. The inhumane origins of humanism are to be found, in part, through this

forced "liberalization" or enlargement of the English "national" community through the Conquest. Through this mandatory cosmopolitanism, the boundaries of Anglo-Saxon identity were slashed wide open to make room for the violent new neighbors. Modern humanism represents only the later stages of this progress to the lowest common denominator of sociobiological unity.

The possibility of ethnic-racial peace in America and other liberal democracies first originated as the product of hard won Hobbesian lessons gleaned from the ethnic conflict basis of the English Civil War. With neither total assimilation nor total rejection of the Norman graft over time, liberalism evolved through its ability to make the kinship basis of conflict irrelevant. The individualistic solution to the internal contradictions of the Norman/Saxon conflict was the particular source of liberal democracy's universal solution to ethnic-racial conflict. Its most hyperbolic, if erroneous, implication is that found in the interpretation of Hegel explicated by Alexandre Kojève and Francis Fukuyama: liberal democracy represents the final form of human ideological evolution and thus, in that sense, constitutes an end to human history.

Individualism successfully negates ethnic conflict for a specific reason. Individuation is a form of differentiation; the inverse and opposite of the kin selective based differentiation of the hive. It works by the very nature of its antithesis to the logic of kin selection. Individualism liberalized the extended kinship circle by devaluing the import of kinship relationships *between* individuals.[799]

In consequence, a practical "success" of the Norman graft was a limiting of extreme ethnocentrism. A Victorian pride in taming the tribes within became itself an expression of generalized English or British ethnocentrism. But ultimately,

the center could not hold, and this practical, cosmopolitan, nationalism of liberalism, evolved into the practical death of even that liberal national exclusiveness. While liberalism helped to destroy the remains of a sense of "Norman and Saxon" difference, over the long run it produced a general, albeit ambivalent, decline in "race feeling", and the characteristically vapid phenomenon of nationalism in the Anglo-American world.

"Liberalism is the Death of Nation", observed Moeller Van Den Bruck. Liberal humanism is the net, cumulative effect of the Norman/Saxon conflict: mutual destruction. Since neither side gained total, ultimate victory, the practical effect was a net kinship de-centering. Both sides ultimately compromised one another enough as kin selective groups to degenerate one another into a liberal, democratic humanism.

The individualistic method for breaking free from the tangled web of kin and pseudo-kin relationships had enormous implications: internal borders became externalized and external borders became internalized. Through those internal cracks in the social order left by the Conquest class, the borders that are classically considered foreign and external were internalized, ingested, and assimilated. The boundaries of a foreign ethnic body became internalized, mutated, and generalized into the liberal boundaries between individuals.

Humanism is the realization that the converse implication is also true: borders that are classically considered internal became externalized towards the entire human race. The cracks in the dykes of kin selective boundaries opened with the brutality of the Norman Conquest was merely continued by the flood of immigrants in America to the point of drowning out, so to speak, the original Anglo-Saxon population.

Liberal individualism is built upon a kind of internal apartheid; boundaries of "rights" that separate individuals. For Americans, borders between individuals are the equivalent of the borders between tribes, ethnicities, nations, and races in much of the rest of the world. Every man or woman is a country. The liberal democratic system makes it possible that one American of Korean descent and another of Bulgarian descent can both consider themselves equally and legitimately apart of the same Western country despite their distance in kinship. This interpretation is verified by international implications of liberalism realized at a session of the United Nations where every country is represented by a single individual.

It was the internal contradictions of the Norman/Saxon conflict that ultimately yielded the attempt at consistent equality in the United States. Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis, by contrast, was premised on the tabla rasa proposition that liberal democracy was free from fundamental internal contradictions. Enough said.

Puritanical Sexual Perversion

L. G. Pine found it not only strange, but also perverse, that his nation would celebrate the 900th anniversary of their defeat by the Normans. Yet, strangely enough, a similar pattern of behavior exists among the rebellious offspring of England across the Atlantic. Could it be that Anglo-Saxon celebration of their defeat by the Normans in England can help shed light on why liberal Anglo-Saxons celebrate, in effect, their ethnic defeat in America and elsewhere?

A crucial Norman contribution to American democracy stems from Norman success in breaking the Anglo-Saxon will to resist their foreign power over them for so long. The native English had been brought so low that they had to

convince themselves that they wanted these wonderful new French immigrants to come over across the channel and conquer them. More specifically, this Norman contribution to America, which is as profound as it is repressed, is that the Normans effectively persuaded the Anglo-Saxon population to accept and *assimilate* the righteousness and legitimacy of the principle of political gang rape.

It must be acknowledged that the forcible political penetration known as the Norman Conquest was always at least partially successful in upholding legitimacy and was always at least partially accepted as such. The Anglo-Saxon nation assimilated to the Norman propaganda; to the divine right of the stronger to decide what is right and what is wrong; what is true and what is false. If the Norman right of conquest was a "Good Thing", then it follows that this political gang rape was a "Good Thing".

In this relationship, the Norman is the man and the Anglo-Saxon is the woman; the Norman is the penetrator and the Anglo-Saxon is the penetrated; the Norman is the conqueror and the Anglo-Saxon is the conquered. The rape of 1066, the forced penetration *into* the Anglo-Saxon national body, is directly related to the female role they subsequently acquired within the English social body. The Anglo-Saxon social body *became* female in gender by virtue of being penetrated, dominated, subdued, and mastered by this rapacious race. 1066 was also a kind of *sexual* conquest, a notch on the Norman belt along with Normandy, Sicily, Southern Italy, and Antioch, among others. The medieval Norman-warrior rape culture did not end there, of course; it eventually matured in the form of the British Empire.

The Normans *ruined* the Anglo-Saxons as a race. The psychological conflict between the patriarchal voice of centuries of authoritative tradition that whispered 'Conquest

was a good thing' and revulsion against moral degradation left no easy answers. After being raped repeatedly and customarily by these Frenchified Vikings to the point where it became a normal household routine, the Anglo-Saxon-woman seems to have found a weird pleasure in being so penetrated. Out of the combination of a Puritanical-masochistic impulse and an inability to resist the penetration of the French sexual mores the Normans introduced, the Anglo-Saxon-woman had a perverse epiphany: *she kinda liked it*.

This is original American optimism: looking at the bright side of rape. American openness to immigrants is made possible, in part, by this Puritanical sexual perversion. The specific standard by which it is perverse is the standard of kin selection. Anglo-Saxons adapted to a condition where penetration of their defenses by a foreign people became, over the long-term, a normal condition of everyday life. The Norman occupation normalized a state of living with alien intruders and this, in turn, led to the normalization of liberalism, and ultimately, multiculturalism.

This Puritanical sexual perversion could dignify the importance of being penetrated by any and every willing and appropriate foreigner as a tenet of the national civic religion. This is a universalization of the brilliant success of the Norman conquerors' ability, to not only exhaust, but subvert, their desire to expel the invaders. Liberal Anglo-American attitudes towards the possibility of assimilating new immigrants are, in part, the legacy of *the success of Anglo-Saxon assimilation to the Norman Conquest*.

The Anglo-Saxon is a woman who longs to be dominated and penetrated, only now it is new immigrants that have taken the place of the old French-Norman immigrants. Anglo-Saxon equality is the legacy of a sexually submissive

adaptation to that medieval sociobiological-sexual role. In other words, democracy itself, the adaptation to being the subpolitical *body*, was made possible by adaptation to the inhibition against regenerating their own native aristocracy. Puritanical sexual inhibitions on an individual level reflect political castration on a group level.

It was the Normans who spread the Anglo-Saxon nation wide open to French-Norman penetration, violating their homeland kinship-culture. This is the origins of the "open society." Failure to resist the Norman penetration became reinterpreted as American "virtue". The Anglo-Saxon incapacity to say no to foreign invasion began with the Latin Normans and may end, perhaps, with Latin Americans.

The Norman and Mexican invasions are two extremes of forced Latinate kin-cultural penetration that are above all common, normative laws of legality or right. Because assimilation to Norman Conquest was partly successful, the idea that a 'woman' has a right to say no to rape was delegitimated. In this sense, the Norman Conquest prepared the long-term cultural conditions of the Mexican reconquista.

The denial of the reality of the Mexican invasion is a cultural descendant of the denial of the reality of the Norman invasion. The lynchpin of this relationship is Anglo-Saxon self-reinterpretation as "individuals". Just as the values of the dignity of "the individual" was eventually used to deny *collective* Anglo-Saxon impotence in the face of the legacy of the penetration of sociobiological boundaries by the Normans, individualism allows Americans to deny that their country is being invaded, infiltrated, or conquered through an anarchic bleeding of its southern border.

Just the Anglo-Saxons were *paralyzed* by their impotence in the face of their medieval political failure, American

individualism only formalizes, exacerbates, and, finally, completes this culture of impotence in the face of aggressive penetrations of kin selective and ethnic boundaries. Once again, the tool of individualism works precisely because its implications are diametrically opposite of a kin selective premise. The adaptation of individualism, when taken seriously, makes ethnocentric borders seem invisible or meaningless.

Normative, lawful immigration to America occupies a place somewhere between these two extremes of immigration above common law. The Mexican invasion is only the next step of progress of the permeability of sociobiological borders within America that began most decisively with the Norman invasion. Immigration and intermarriage in America is only finishing the job that the Normans began with the death of Anglo-Saxon England in 1066: the overcoming of an Anglo-Saxon will to national self-preservation.

From a somewhat different point of view, modernity is an optimistic story of progress: the story of how the Anglo-Saxon nation progressed from rape victim to prostitute. If national boundaries have become unredeemably penetrated from a time when they were forced to prostitute themselves to their pimp-conquerors, then at least one can hope they can now make money for themselves from this condition.

One way in which both legal and illegal immigration has been self-justified is with a purely economic view of the matter. From a purely economic view, there are monetary gains to be made from the penetration of new immigrants; new customers; new workers; new stimuli to the economy. They should be welcomed in.

The bad reputation of prostitutes that would lead one to despise the Anglo-Saxon Puritan whore is the legacy of old,

pre-modern values that despised uninhibited moneymaking. The victory of capitalism over ethnic self-preservation is the victory of this uninhibited, international money making over such "unenlightened" men. Admittedly, the Puritan whore graduated, in some ways, from prostitute to pimp as she cashed in on the lucrative consequences of opening *everyone* up in her image. This is the Grand Narrative of modern progress: progress from rape victim to prostitute to pimp.

Defeat, Retreat, Repeat

Although Pine noted an exception in the period around Queen Victoria's accession (1837), "[i]n England the pride of place in genealogical fashions has always been given to Norman ancestry."[800] This is one of the most important long-term Norman contributions to the stability and viability of Anglo-American liberal democracy: the Norman conquest of Anglo-Saxon ethnic pride. Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism was defeated and overcome involuntarily in 1066. Yet for the sake of American peace and justice, it can be considered fortunate that the Normans gave the Anglo-Saxons a collective ethnic inferiority complex that they never fully recovered from. Rationalizing this state of affairs became a basis for the concept of 'universal humanity'.

The success of idea of universal humanity in the English-speaking world has a great deal to do with Norman success in denying the Anglo-Saxons a place to express their unique and distinct ethnocentric identity. Only by learning their place at the foot of their Norman teachers could there exist a stable, civilized polity throughout the middle ages. As important as it is unacknowledged, the Norman achievement in cultivating Anglo-Saxon ethnic humility through subjugation has been a decisive ingredient in the

modern ability to avert racial conflicts and maintain liberal democratic stability.

The flip side of Anglo-Saxon humility was Norman arrogance. The entire revolutionary Anglo-Saxon critique of the Normans can be summed up in the judgment that they were arrogant; they *arrogated* power and privilege without proper justification. In sum, their power through conquest was illegitimate.

Yet the Norman contribution to the idea of equality, however, was not merely negative or ironic. In fact, the inordinate rebelliousness of the Angle and Danish northern areas in those first few years following the Conquest may be attributed to a tribalistic fight for freedom from *both* Saxons and Normans. Once again, kinship matters when it comes to political representation. However, after the failure of the revolts, the diverse non-Norman Germanic tribes were *all* equal in their common defeat. In this sense, the Normans partly invented, not only Anglo-Saxon equality, but the "Anglo-Saxons" themselves. By destroying the pre-Conquest domination of the West Saxons over the Angles and Danes, the conquerors helped engender the seeds of equality by equalizing conditions among the conquered.

In the period immediately following 1066, the Anglo-Saxon population was further equalized in a different way. The status of slaves was raised while that of freeholders was lowered. Over time both became absorbed into a middling range of dependent farmers or serfs (the class of villeins) oriented by the authority of their new manorial lords. They were bound to the land and obligated to both give a moiety of their produce and work on a lord's estate on certain days of the week.[801]

Out of this mixture of adaptation and reaction against the Normans' political squashing of the Anglo-Saxon nation

emerged tendencies towards political equality. The Levellers, for example, often portrayed themselves as revenging this flattening of the Anglo-Saxon nation. To level the Normans was to apply an equal standard of justice against the institutionalized double standard that was "class". It was to level the Normans as the Normans had leveled them.

The Conquest internalized Anglo-Saxon submission to the notion that they have no rights *as a race*. After all, how could they take themselves seriously a race after being forced so long to lick the Norman hand that beat them? New world equality is the product of this old world baggage. A tradition of Puritan hang ups on the issue of race stem from the *political* Anglo-Saxon inferiority complex that the Normans bestowed upon them in the bald fact of hereditary Norman rule over England. The Norman genius for internalizing a sense of collective ethnic inferiority in the Anglo-Saxons made individualism appear to the only cogent escape.

After all, one can have individual pride even when one's ethnic group is not represented politically. Individualism is the defiant, albeit defensive, last stand of Anglo-Saxon pride. The Anglo-Saxons are submissive as a race and aggressive as individuals. Forced to learn to be passive, humble, and submissive *as a race*, Anglo-Saxon aggression *as individuals* evolved as an alternative freedom, a compensation for their unmasterable social underdog identity *as a collective*.

These permanent traits learned under Norman tutelage help explain why Anglo-Saxon nationalism culminated in an American universal individualism. While nineteenth century Anglo-Saxon racialist interpretations of manifest destiny were a "progress" of ethnocentric liberation from the Norman Yoke, the Revolution institutionalized that earlier racial-individual ambivalence. Individualism originally

arose as the Anglo-Saxon way of putting one's best foot forward, optimistically focusing on strengths, and hoping that no one picks up on certain past weaknesses. The optimistic belief that they could fundamentally change themselves as individuals was built on their inability to change the ethnic consequences of the oppression of 1066. This individualistic paradigm became the American method of dealing with race, nation, and sex in general.

To assimilate to the American way of life is to adapt to an Anglo-Saxon based culture which itself had adapted to the Norman repression of their ethnicity. For a new immigrant to become an American, then, is to assimilate and become like the Anglo-Saxons; to have one's native culture diluted and altered to the point of being nearly unrecognizable. It is to assimilate to a people who have experienced a profound historical disassociation between their genes and their culture. The Conquest allows one to understand why America is exceptional; why the assimilation ethic of America is only a continuation of the change wrought by the Conquest.

Normans built the political home or Platonic cave wherein resentment against government and the narrow moral universe of Anglo-American liberal democrats could dwell for eternity. The Anglo-Saxons fully never mastered their fear of their Norman masters. American fear of hereditary government is largely a hereditary fear of the old Norman government.

The Anglo-Saxons could not overcome their hostility to the political because they could not overcome the politically alienated consequences of their defeat. The Anglo-Saxons could not overcome the politically alienated consequences of their defeat because they could not overcome their hostility towards the political. The result of the inability to overcome

this condition is Anglo-Saxon democracy: liberal Anglo-Saxon moralists are the mothers of American liberal democracy while the Normans are the fathers of Anglo-Saxon political feminism.

The secret to ethnic harmony in America is Anglo-Saxon reverse discrimination against the old "English" class system. This vendetta was culturally and historically more primary than America's other ethnic hostilities. The secret to ethnic harmony in America, then, is that all other ethnic or racial hostilities are ranked as inferior in "class" to this crystallized, constitutionalized, mechanized, ethnic hatred against the Normans.

This works because nationalistic feeling that would conventionally express itself in a straightforward identification *with* the political became, here, inhibited and foiled by an animus *against* the political. In addition to the original Norman racial sculpturing of the Anglo-Saxon nation through the destruction of their aristocracy, this was a prime Norman contribution to democracy because ambivalence towards the political "class" contributed to resistance to a straightforward regeneration of their own aristocracy. If one deliberately set out to invent a means of subverting political race-ethnic identity, it would be hard to create a better fundamental means than adaptation to the Anti-Normanism condition.

Another radically unintentional Norman contribution to American ethnic harmony stems from their usurpation of the most desirable modes of kin selective nepotism. For example, one dimension of Jefferson's contradictory attitudes towards aristocracy come from his attempt to separate the valuation of an aristocracy of talent and character from a Norman aristocracy that, in many instances, was superior only as a kin selective strategy. In general,

traditional aristocracies monopolize the military means to monopolize the best kin selective strategies. In opposing the Norman way, they were also opposing that maximal, alpha male kin selective strategy. From this view, the "progress" of the bourgeois, beta male individualism, represents a progressive deterioration of that maximal kin selective strategy. America's very openness to immigrants is traceable to this enormous Norman contribution of forcing the Anglo-Saxons to adapt to an inferior kin selective strategy, solidified by revolt against the Norman's *cultural* usurpation of claims of superior ancestry.

The Normans also gave the Anglo-Saxons half of their freedom by destroying and defeating them. Originally, political defeat bestowed freedom from the responsibilities, moral problems, and necessary evils of accepting a fully political existence and hence, the freedom to moralize about politics in the manner of the Puritans. Furthermore, the signals of humility that the Puritans displayed were similar to the submission signals of subordinate ranks of rhesus macaques.[802] It can be argued that the Normans ultimately made the conquered better Christians through the humility of ethnic humiliation.

The Normans liberated the Anglo-Saxons from the political cause of natural aristocracy by annihilating their native aristocracy. The Normans are thus responsible for a certain Anglo-Saxon sense of justice: it was because of the Conquest that an Anglo-Saxon could *justify* the *values* of liberal rights over duties to their 'unnatural' faux-fathers. In defeating boundaries of kinship, nation, and culture, the Normans freed the Anglo-Saxons from the burden of having to defend them. American freedom would not be possible if the Normans had not liberated native Englishmen from the burden of tending to the survival and integrity of their

ethnicity from the genetic and cultural penetration of foreigners.

While at first appearance it might seem that the Anglo-Saxons are a race with a unique and paradoxical capacity to overcome racism, the evidence suggests, rather, that the Anglo-Saxon race was overcome by Norman "racism". Immigration to America relives the classic paradigm established and set in motion by the Conquest: initial ethnic hostility, admission of defeat by the cultural Anglo-Saxon majority, and reconciliation to the overcoming of territorial-sociobiological boundaries through an individual-moral interpretation of human social reality. To assimilate to this Anglo-Saxon model that originated in conquest is part of what it means to become an American.

In short, this sort of progress can be formulated as a three-step algorithm: defeat, retreat, repeat. Progress began with the defeat of native Anglo-Saxon kin-culture by the Norman immigrants. Retreat is a response to defeat through the reformulation of broken social boundaries. In this sense, liberalism is conservatism by other means, a stand against *total* defeat of the national-territorial body by regrouping upon the defensive position of individual bodies. This paradigm, slowly evolved and normalized by the Norman Conquest, has been repeated every time a new ethnic group arrives upon American shores.

This scenario also helps clarify the original interrelationship between ethnocentrism and individualism among Anglo-Saxons. Although the Conquest represents a paradigm of defeat and retreat of those sociobiological boundaries that are premised on kinship identity, individualism proved to be the means of making make the subpolitical reduction of the Anglo-Saxon nation work *for* them, instead of *against* them. The classical negative was

turned into the modern positive. Strength was found in weakness by radicalizing their reduction to an ideology of individual rights.

Firstly, individualism could be used to discredit the idea of a social organism or other justifications of faux-father patriarchy. Secondly, the individual perspective allowed them to leverage their strength in superior numbers. This is how ethnic defeat was turned into a liberal democratic victory.

Ethnocentrism was more effectively realized when reinvented as the utilitarianism of "the individual". The enlightened self-interest of the Anglo-Saxon *race* was advanced through the rational nationalism of universal *individualism*. Instead of resignation to being something less than a traditional ethnic nation, they would gamble with the proposition of being *more human*.

What is America?

If any bit of this explanation of the origins of liberal democratic norms in the English-speaking world seems repulsive, then there is cause for hope in what is left of the Enlightenment. Revulsion towards the social consequences of the Norman Conquest *is itself evidence* that helps one understand why the reality of the Norman/Saxon conflict has been repressed. Revulsion to enlightenment about the ethnic origins of revolution poses an opportunity to fathom why the reality of America's origins has been suppressed for so long.

At the root of the nurturism that has engendered feminism, racial internationalism, and homosexuality stands Anglo-Saxon male ethnic pride and its will to overcome the Conquest. William the Conqueror is the Gulliver of political history that modern, Lilliputian democracy has attempted to

tie down. Yet if, at long last, we are truly going to "let all sorts have freedome," then let the Normans have their freedom from the Anglo-Saxon yoke. If Anglo-Saxon conquest meant the enlightened ethnic cleansing of the Norman legacy, then it seems that the final just liberation in the progress narrative is the revolution that circles back to restore the rightful Norman contribution to the Western world.

How should one estimate the relative contribution of Normans to the political history of the English-speaking world? The modern Anglo-Saxon answer has been: 'let's take a vote!' This trick called "universal" democracy is discriminatory against the Normans *by design*. The genuine Norman contribution to modern civilization has been voted out of its place in the history books. The Anti-Normanism bias built into the cunning of democracy prevents one from acknowledging the alternate points of view articulated by Tocqueville. Anglo-Saxon democratic norms have effected a repression of free inquiry into the Norman contribution to the political forms of the English-speaking world. Blind worship of the holy cow of democracy prevents, in its own devious manner, one from seeing this as ethnic discrimination by the Anglo-Saxon majority.

One can only assume that Anglo-Saxon liberalism naturally represent the pinnacle of all political thought and all political wisdom. Yet if there were a single people upon this Earth that would hold that Anglo-Saxon democracy represents the highest political understanding, a truly *universal* politics, would it be the Normans? Virginian N. F. Cabell, in a letter to a friend in 1861, wrote:

> What was Puritanism in its origin and most palmy day? It meant this, 'I have a system of opinions on diverse subjects—no matter how come by. You, by inheritance or

> otherwise, hold a different set, and so I am right and you are wrong—you must come over to my side. In short I want to rule you, and if you will not submit, why then you are the tyrant! I will move heaven and earth (and hell if necessary) to get the ascendancy, and if I get it, will show you that a Minority that dissents from me...have no rights!

Cabell believed that abolitionists were spiritual and hereditary descendants of Cromwell's dictatorship of virtue. "This breed also has been transferred here," he wrote, "and under that or other names still survives; nor has the demon of Fanaticism or Intolerance ever been wholly exorcised."[803]

"Minority rights" originally designed to defend elements of aristocracy became transferred, after the Civil War, to the defense of the rights of blacks. Under the guise of "universal" rights, Americans have submitted to the rule of an Anglo-Puritan interpretation of history that is intolerant of the Norman-Cavalier point of view. The Anglo-Saxon North effectually *mastered* the interpretation of the American Civil War as a moral struggle for the good of freedom and buried the ethnic cleansing of the Norman-Cavaliers under a halo of democracy while simultaneously usurping the sceptre of American Empire.

Puritanical moralizing cloaks an extraordinary ethnic jealousy and an unwillingness to share the historical spotlight with the Normans that their *de facto* contributions merit. The alternative to recognizing the Norman contribution to history is to count one's self as a *collaborator* with what may be the single greatest triumph of the Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism of past generations: the enlightened ethnic cleansing of the Norman contribution to history. The collaboration of recent generations in this Saxon-centric hostility to acknowledgement of the Norman impact on

history has helped to deny the Norman contribution to the political institutions of the English-speaking world.

In the 1850s, the Jeffersonian Historian Hugh Blair Grigsby was insistent that it was Roundheads and not Cavaliers who settled Virginia: "The chivalry of Virginia is not to be traced to the miserable offshoots of the British aristocracy, but to our manners, habits, and states of affairs. We were a *slaveholding, tobacco planting, Anglo-Saxon* people."[804] Note how defensive this assertion is and how "the miserable offshoots of the British aristocracy" are, for some peculiar reason, assumed to be distinct from the "*Anglo-Saxon* people". The manifest destiny of the Norman-Cavaliers was clear: like all Americans, they *must be Saxonized*. The Normans are not allowed to have their own separate ethnic identity because America is an *Anglo-Saxon* nation.

Ever since William the Conqueror's claim to the throne was fabricated, the Normans maintained that they were rightful heirs of Anglo-Saxon England. Just as the Conquest allowed Normans to control the old historical narrative, Northern victory in the American Civil War granted a new mastery of the interpretation of history. Norman identity has been obscured from history since *both* Normans *and* Anglo-Saxon had foundational political reasons for obscuring the Norman difference.

I propose that, when all has been considered, the Normans and Anglo-Saxons deserve equal credit in the development of liberal democracy in the English-speaking world. From Magna Carta to George Washington, so much of the success and the political genius of the American founding was a culmination of Norman political genius. The Norman contribution has been problematic not only because Anglo-Saxon nationalism has hidden itself under the label of

"democracy". The problem of the Norman contribution is that through political castration and the elimination of their native aristocracy, the Norman conquerors molded the very *identity* of the Anglo-Saxon people *as* the people; as a *democratic body* of people. Norman political energy makes Anglo-Saxon political energy seem negative and *reactionary*.

The secret to the inordinate imperialistic success of English-speaking world is sometimes attributed to its 'superior equality'. There is a partial truth here, but a deeper truth is that the inordinate civilizational influence of the English-speaking world was founded on being both more democratic *and more aristocratic* than other political orders. When one considers that the United States Senate was most directly modeled on England's House of Lords, one can see that Norman political genius is inextricably interwoven into the constitutional fabric of American political order. The political genius of the American founding was, in part, the genius of containing greater extremes of *both* democracy *and* aristocracy within in its constitutional and institutional breadth.

What is America? Americanism is not something that began in 1776 or even in 1649. Hundreds of years before the modern revolutions, the Anglo-Saxons had been begun slow and inchoate preparation for the full implications of their national death in 1066. America only finished what the Normans started. American norms of liberalism actually *preserved* Anglo-Saxon adaptation to ethnic defeat by moralizing them.

The "spirit of America" is the sentiment of a people who never fully overcame conquestphobia. That ethos became so ingrained and moralized that, instead of overcoming it, the sense of perpetual struggle to liberate themselves became normalcy itself and ethnocentrism became projecting this

state of being upon all other peoples. The failure to liberate themselves from this perpetual sense of occupation under the Norman Yoke explains why, even beyond reasoned justification, the American ethos is so conducive to lifting long discriminated ethnic minorities. Yet hiding behind the liberal emphasis on "minorities", even to the point of contradicting the majoritarian letter of the democratic rule of law, is the cultural extermination of the legacy of a Norman aristocratic minority.

The sociobiological roots of Anglo-American modernity began with the political failure of Anglo-Saxon patriarchy. It continues through democracy with the familial failure of Anglo-Saxon patriarchy. It culminates in the total failure of Anglo-Saxon patriarchy. America is actually the progressive working out of the logical implications of the Anglo-Saxon adaptation to ethnic defeat.

If "progress" begins with the revolutionary destruction of aristocracy and a focus on the subpolitical body of the people, the Anglo-Saxons should be grateful to the Normans of 1066 for taking the first step towards *ethnic* Anglo-Saxon egalitarian progress through the Norman destruction of the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy. The Anglo-Saxons were *defending* their native aristocracy at Hastings, while the revolutionary Normans sought to destroy it. From a strictly *ethnic* Anglo-Saxon point of view, the destruction of their native aristocracy was a beginning of modern *progress*.

But here the limits of a purely biological explanation of America must be acknowledged. While the Conquest can explain the Anglo-Saxon fixation of the modern idea of progress, it cannot fully explain the evolutionary basis of "progress" itself. The sociobiological cyborg of liberal democracy is transitional form between biological evolution and technological evolution that culminates in the

technological genesis of God. Accepting the death of themselves as fully biological beings, the Anglo-Saxon seized upon the cutting edge of the evolution towards post-biological being. This is the evolutionary basis of the Puritan belief in their "chosen" relationship to God.

Puritanism was born out of the death of the Anglo-Saxons as a classical kin selective nation. And it was the Normans who decapitated and killed them as such a nation in 1066. To be an American is to live in the afterlife of the Anglo-Saxon nation.

WELCOME TO THE AFTERLIFE

Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are of the gift of God?

—THOMAS JEFFERSON, *NOTES ON VIRGINIA*

Death and Resurrection

The Martyr of Lincolnshire

In 1075, Waltheof, the native English earl of Northumbria, joined the rebellion of a Norman earl and a part English, part Breton earl.[805] Did he really expect, in his position, that his will would be respected within this new order? This easily quelled rebellion provided an excuse to implement the double standard that characterized the Conquest: while the Frenchmen were deprived of their position and land, Waltheof was beheaded.

What makes this double standard even more remarkable is that this was a rare case in which it appears that a mixed marriage was actually encouraged by William the Bastard.

The new king's own niece, Judith of Lens, was given in marriage to Waltheof. Yet this is also a case that stands out for the injustice of the death sentence. It appears that, when the time was right, the Norman talent for genetically adaptive genocide had found yet another victim. Waltheof's death marked the elimination of the last Englishman in the top ranks of society and the formal end of the English resistance to the Conquest.

An unofficial cult was born around his tomb in Crowland, Lincolnshire. When Waltheof's body was moved from the chapter-house to the church of Crowland in 1092, miracles were soon attested to. His cult grew rapidly and a second focus of worship spread to a nunnery at Romsey, near the spot of his execution at Winchester. This site, however, was suppressed by the reigning Archbishop of Anselm. [806]

Repression of the popular propagation of Waltheof's cult following should not be surprising. As the last high-ranking native Englishman, and the final resistance figure who was executed in a baldly discriminatory and unfair way, why wouldn't his death symbolize the injustice of the death of Anglo-Saxon England?[807] When English historian E. A. Freeman, in the nineteenth century, identified the 'spirit' of the 'good old cause' of democratic justice as the same as that for which Waltheof died on the scaffold, we can see that this martyr's unofficial cult never completely died.

Beginning of the End

And he hath on his vesture and on his thigh a name written, *King of kings, and Lord of Lords.*

—REVELATIONS 19:16

The proclamation that the world was coming to an end and the reign of Christ was near roused common English people to revolt, often violently, against the very foundations of the old order.[808] Fifth Monarchists and others who believed that the rule of Christ was immanent wielded an anarchical justification for the repudiation of the world, and hence, the overthrow of evil earthly powers. By 1643 soldiers in Parliament's army enlisted rumors that King Charles would be destroyed by a triumphal returning Jesus. When Cromwell and not Christ ascended to power, Colonel Harrison, a Fifth Monarchist, judged that the Lord Protectorate "sought not himself, but that King Jesus might take the sceptre".[809]

Digger leader Gerrard Winstanley was one of those distinctly critical of traditional religion for diverting men from their earthly rights. With a thought both radical and sensible, he once asked, "why may not we have our Heaven here (that is, a comfortable livelihood in the Earth) and Heaven hereafter too?"[810] However, in order to go to heaven, one must die. To create "God's country" on earth, ungodly ethnic exclusivism must rest in peace.

The Anglo-Saxons died as a nation in the year 1066, and the Normans were the killers. Rising from the "dark ages", like the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, the Anglo-Saxon nation slowly rose from their political death. With political survival lost and its old English body expired, the new world bore witness to their resurrection as a new kind of nation, a nation not of blood and body, but of a kind of spiritual creed. The new world is the "next world"; the second coming of the Saxon. America is the literal afterlife of the Anglo-Saxon nation.

The possibility of overcoming racism and ethnocentrism has Judeo-Christian origins in the idea of an otherworldly,

immortal soul beyond our biological bodies. The Christian focus on death and eternal consequences in the afterlife is the source of the traditional cogency of its human universalism. The deathward glance that confronts the mortality of human existence allows Christians to *transcend* the empirically observable diversity of the human. The universality of an individual's confrontation with death, and the possibility of salvation in the afterlife, provides a basis for overshadowing the multifariousness of human life. The optimistic tenor of the revolutionary outlook was deeply influenced by this Christian view of the bright side of death. From the universalism of death arose the universalism of the American afterlife.

The death of exclusive Anglo-Saxon ethnic nationalism was the condition of the attempt to bring the principles of "heaven" to earth. Full *individual* freedom lives though the moral imperative to construct the coffin of genetically adaptive behaviors that can include nepotism, racism, and genocide. Opening the heavens of human universalism is to will the death of that old world; to put one's full weight on the lid of that coffin over and against the rattling remains of the undead. Accepting the Puritanical verdict that the Conquest was earthly punishment for themselves as an ethnicity, America would be heaven on earth salvation for the Anglo-Saxons as individuals.

America is built on the disintegrating carcass of the Saxon nation. Individualism was the means of breaking out and freeing themselves from the oppressive wreckage of the dead weight of their dead race. Fearing *total* death, individualism was like the Caesarian section that delivered the birth of the individual out of death of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Losing a life to gain a life, they lost their racial and communal identity to gain an individual one. And then individuals lost their soul to gain a self. Christian love, through its valuation of individual life, produced the death of community in America.

Universalizing the compassionate morality of the morgue, the progressively decomposing corpse of the Anglo-Saxon nation helped to fertilize new generations of seeds of God. The Puritans began the end process of universaling their hereditary defeat at Hastings into the ultimate defeat of the entire biological human race so that everyone would be brought down with them. The Puritans universalized the death of their race into the end of the biological human race.

Puritanism began with a vision of the end.

Secularization: The Unification of Church and State

> **The Mosaic account of the Creation, whether taken as divine authority or merely historical, is full to this point *the unity or equality of man*....If this be not divine authority, it is at least historical authority, and shows that the equality of man, so far from being a modern doctrine, is the oldest upon record.**
>
> —THOMAS PAINE, *THE RIGHTS OF MAN*

"I would rather have my wife worship the mangers of my cows", raged Vitalis, "than him whom you call Ethelbert."[811] For the Anglo-Saxon saint Ethelbert, this Norman conqueror had only contempt. "Because of the great inborn hatred

between English and Normans", an aborigine explained, "he deemed our martyr unworthy of honour and reverence."

Right from the beginning ethnic hostility between Anglo-Saxons and Normans found expression in the form of religious intolerance. Since Normans were in a political position to cast judgment upon the English, intolerance could and was extended, not only to Anglo-Saxon religious practices, but to Anglo-Saxon religious authorities. In 1085, for example, an abbot was removed from his position because, as one chronicler put it, "he was English and hateful to the Normans."[812]

Yet the church itself gradually provided a source of common identity. Historian William Stubbs explained that the "the cohesion of the church was for ages the substitute for the cohesion which the divided nation was unable to otherwise realise."[813] In this way, Christianity was able to function as a source of political unity, albeit a unity on the terms of the conquerors.

Like a brace or cast that guides and directs the healing of a broken bone, the Christian religion helped heal, mold, and unite early England against a breakdown into ethnic hostility. With this in mind, one might hypothesize that secularization, in its American form, is only a continuation of this social experiment founded upon the utility of God. Secular liberalism would then be comparable to the removal of the brace or cast of religion that had effectively molded its vision of the political good and could henceforth progress without God's help.

Thus the social reality of Christian moral *behavior*, the cumulative effect of centuries of religious influence, engendered a framework upon which modern political "realism" could be founded. Christian superstition could be exploited as a substitute for socialism. The antisocial facets

of American individualism could be countered with the ironic sanctity of "the individual".

This understanding of secularization, however, cannot be entirely correct because Biblical religion eventually became, not a source of unity, but a source of division and a catalyst of civil war. In 1648 Hugh Peter, an Independent minister, army preacher, and propagandist during the Puritan Revolution declared:

> in the whole book of God he findes not any text of privilege of Parliament, which indeed came in with the conquest, and is now in the hands of the Conquerors.[814]

Whose case would the Bible support, the Norman "right of conquest", or the Anglo-Saxon "rights of man"? The Bible, rooted in the Jewish experiences of political oppression, could be used to support an *Anglo-Saxon national cause*. Is this the key to American secularization?

The Puritan emphasis on learning truths directly from the "book of God" could instill, not tolerance for the Norman-Cavalier way of life "which indeed came in with the conquest", but intolerance and civil war. It was *because* "not any text of privilege of Parliament" could be found in the Bible that Puritan intolerance found license to rampage into the breakdown of political order and civil war. Consider, then, Samuel Huntington's belief that an (ironic) convergence of religion and politics formed the basis of the American way:

> The Protestant emphasis on the individual conscience and the responsibility of individuals to learn God's truths directly from the Bible promoted American commitment to individualism, equality, and the rights to freedom of religion and opinion.[815]

There is a problem with Huntington's hypothesis. Since different Protestant groups such as Anglicans and Lutherans have drawn very different political implications from their conceptions of Protestantism, the American way cannot be understood as product of Protestantism *per se*,[816] but rather as an Anglo-Saxon interpretation of Protestantism that dominated through victory in the American Civil War. Moreover, the Puritan *tyranny* that followed victory in the English Civil War demonstrates that "the rights to freedom of religion and opinion" was not a defining inheritance of Puritanism.

A key to understanding the role of religion in the English Civil War is the recognition the Catholic pope had once blessed the Norman aspiration to master England. A war against "popery", then, directly implicated the binding force of the original Catholic sanctification of the Norman Conquest. The advent of Protestantism in the sixteenth century implicitly removed the popish pillar of the Conquest order, and thus prepared the dissolution of the old basis of the unity of church and state in the next century. A radicalized Protestantism could sanctify resistance to the remaining political pillars of the Frenchified, Latinate Conquest legacy and this is exactly the form that became embodied as "Puritanism". The Puritan Revolution was only a continuation of the revolt against "Rome".

The *Historical Essay on the English Constitution* of 1771 asserted that the Norman Conquest

> destroyed all the elective power, constitutionally placed in the people of England, and reversed the Saxon form of government which was founded on the common rights of mankind….From this time, civil and religious tyranny

> walked hand in hand, two monsters till then unknown in England.[817]

The *Norman* way of unification of church and state was passed on, for example, through the conspicuous union of Lords Spiritual and Lords Temporal in Parliament's House of Lords. The breaking up of the "two monsters" by Puritan fanatics led not only to the execution of Charles I in 1649, but to the execution of his advisor and Puritan persecutor Archbishop William Laud in 1645. The abolition of the largely Cavalier House of Lords in 1649 was the logical extension of the desecration of the formerly divine hereditary privileges of the old conquerors.

Jefferson thought his bill for religious reform in Virginia was in the spirit of breaking the power of the William the Conqueror's priests that reinforced Norman tyranny with the pope's approval.[818] Yet Jefferson was also well aware that Cavalier tradition in Virginia was deeply wary of the example of the Puritan tyranny of Oliver Cromwell. Puritans had demonstrated that they could find their own way of enforcing a tyrannical unity of religion and state.

The founding of America cannot be understood without the recognition that the violent chaos of the English Civil War lurked in the backs of the minds of men from Massachusetts and Virginia. The deepest source of the overarching human universalism of the U.S. constitution originated not from the "Puritan" ethos or "Cavalier" political genius, but from the attempt to find a rational common ground that could transcend or overcoming this underlying polarity. Although the attempt to avert a repeat of England's civil war ultimately failed, and Americanism subsequently stabilized upon the Puritan-based polarity, the surviving dynamics of the universalistic genius of the

American Constitution could *never* have been founded upon this polarity alone.

The greatest architect of America's right to religious freedom was Virginian Thomas Jefferson, not a cultural Puritan. The historical dynamics that made Jefferson's program for freedom of religion politically possible was a détente between the polarities represented by Massachusetts and Virginia. The right to religious freedom was a product of the attempt to transcend the mutual intolerance between Puritan-Yankee and Anglican-Episcopalian. This was one of the universalistic facets of the founding that survived, at least in principle, even after the multicultural compromise of the founding failed, and the North won the Civil War.

If the founding of America had been as culturally Puritan as it became after the Civil War, the universalistic genius of the American founding would *never* have come about. Part of the original reason for separating church and state *was to prevent another Puritan tyranny*. Samuel Huntington's belief in Puritan-based American monoculturalism is a product of the Northern victory in the Civil War. Freedom of religion was originally designed to *prevent* the aspirations of religious monism represented by Samuel Huntington.

While the unity of the founding would probably have been impossible without the emasculation of religion in the sphere of politics, the peculiar circumstances of the founding have cultivated a particular kind of delusion in regards to the very possibility of the total separation of politics and religion.

Can modern political conceptions such as human rights and equality legitimately claim to rest on secular, and distinctly non-religious or post-religious foundations? Can the American Civil War, for example, be considered a distinctly secular and non-religious conflict?

The American founders appear to have reflected on the English Civil War and formally reduced it to the problem of religious fanaticism rather than ethnic hostility. The solution, then, was to separate religion from politics. From a sociobiological view, however, the basic pattern of behavior of moral fanaticism that can be observed among the Puritans in the English Civil War emerged again among their descendants in the American Civil War.

While the beginning of the idea of human rights or natural rights can be found during the English Civil War, the idea of individual rights was formally dominant by time of the American Civil War. While the idea of individual rights ascended, older Puritanical religious justifications for war declined proportionately. So while Anglo-Saxons gave religious self-justification in the English Civil War, the modern ideas of the "rights of man" seemingly offered a new "secular" self-justification. But the decisive question remains: is this distinction between "religious" proto-modernity and the "secular" modernity tenable?

Consider the very "modern" political philosophy of John Locke. He has often been considered the single most important political philosopher behind the ideas of the American Revolution. He was also raised as a Puritan and his father served against the Royalists in the English Civil War.

The Cambridge Professor of Political Theory John Dunn concluded that he was a basically a Calvinist natural theologian whose *Two Treatises on Government* are built on the axiom that "there exists a benevolent God who provides a set of sufficient rules for the direction of human beings throughout their lives."[819] As English philosopher Bertrand Russell observed:

> The view of the state of nature and of natural law which Locke accepted from his predecessors cannot be freed from its theological basis; where it survives without this, as in much modern liberalism, it is destitude of clear logical foundation.[820]

The attempt to confirm Locke's liberal conclusions while rejecting Locke's Biblical premises is *irrational*. The "modern" political distinction between the religious and the secular is fundamentally untenable if the philosophy of "rights" itself was deduced from Biblical premises by a God-inspired philosopher. The American North was able to discard its old Puritan pretenses in the American Civil War because Puritanism itself was "secularized" into a new and improved pretense of "rights". Yet because the more Filmerian contributions of the South were eclipsed after the Civil War, the more anti-Lockean aspects of the founding constitutional construction have been obscured.

The contrast I have previously made between an evolutionary understanding of revolution and a "special creation" view of revolution is more than an analogy. Secular arguments for liberalism *evolved* from the logic of Biblical premises. Contemporary secular arguments for liberalism have retained at least one element of their original theological foundation: the miracle. It is truly an amazing spectacle to witness these arguments floating on nothing more than thin air.

If secularized Judeo-Christian first principles became unified with the constitution of the liberal democratic state, then the formal separation of church and state in America is superficial and misleading. Liberal democracy legalized and institutionalized a neo-Christian moral *ethos*. Since Biblical foundations became absorbed into the interpretation of the American scripture of constitutional principles, it was no

longer necessary as a separate religion. Instead, converts to the new testament of liberalism came to rival its Christian parent for allegiance by outdoing it at its own game.

Biblical arguments for "modern" egalitarian ideas can be traced to a germinative phase during the English Peasant's Revolt of 1381. Popular preachers to the poor spread subversions such as the slogan, "When Adam delved and Eve span, Who was then the gentleman?" By 1641 a more developed version of the same subversive ideas matured among political radicals. A Royalist recounted with dismay:

> We are all the sons of Adam, borne free; some of them say, the Gospell hath made them free. And Law once subverted, it will appeare good equite, to such Chancellours, to share the earth equally. They will plead Scripture for it, that we should all live by the sweat of our browes.[821]

This "old seditious argument" had a bright future ahead of it. The argument differs in form, but hardly in substance, from human rights arguments used against the Cavalier aristocracy of the South who lived upon slave labor.

"The history of the creation of man," maintained Declaration of Independence signer Benjamin Rush,

> and of the relation of our species to each other by birth, which is recorded in the Old Testament, is the best refutation that can be given to the divine right of kings, and the strongest argument that can be used in favor of the original and natural equality of all mankind.[822]

Thomas Paine had used this same basic argument against the England's *de facto* constitution.

The modern idea of human rights and human equality was built upon Biblical premises. This is what is commonly

known as the secularization thesis. One formulation of the American secularization thesis was posited by Samuel Huntington:

> While the American Creed is Protestantism without God, the American civil religion is Christianity without Christ.[823]

The fundamental issue behind the secularization thesis is this: reason has not yielded a reason to think that the most fundamental values can be derived from reason. If values are not derivable from reason, then human rights are not fundamentally rational and an explanation for them must be sought in a source other than pure reason.

Among the greatest pieces of evidence for secularization stems from a comparison with the thought and practice of ancient Greek and Rome; before Christianity yielded its rupture with Classical culture. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in *Democracy in America*:

> The most profound and vast geniuses of Rome and Greece were never able to arrive at the idea, so general but at the same time so simple, of the similarity of men and of the equal right to freedom that each bears from birth…it was necessary that Jesus Christ come to earth to make it understood that all members of the human species are naturally alike and equal.[824]

The bottom-up Christian conquest of Rome was a fundamental influence on the bottom-up Anglo-Saxon conquest of the Latinate Normans. Yet the Normans made their own rational contribution to their ultimate undoing.

The modern political rationalism of the English-speaking world has decisive roots in the Norman notion that they represented a "superior civilization" relative to the

aboriginal Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*. For Norman gentlemen in general, this assumption was never founded upon a fundamentally rational philosophical quest, even though it was very strongly influence by France's inheritance of Greek, and especially Roman, civilization. The French-Norman way emphasized the rational cultivation of superlative tastes and social forms. At its heights, French civilization aspired to cultivate the most superlative human forms *as such*.

Now if "civilization" defined the nature of Norman superiority, and civilization can be abstracted as reason applied to life, then a vulnerability presents itself. If reason, in itself, cannot determine the most *fundamental* values, then "civilization" cannot be simply equated with French-Norman civilization on a purely rational basis. Philosophers such as John Locke argued for modern ideas of natural law from different and *incompatible* premises. *Modern* Western civilization derived its distinctive characteristics by arguing from Biblically based premises. While it cannot be said to be *fundamentally* more rational than ancient Western civilization, the modern, egalitarian emphasis on the masses led to the cultivation of economic and technological superiorities (as opposed to aristocratic-human superiorities).

It was the Normans who brought decisively brought England into the *cultural* fold of the Latinate West. The Norman contribution to the West was far more civilizational than philosophical, and Anglo-Saxons, in this sense, have similarly remained more Latin than Greek. While Greek and especially Roman political institutions influenced the designers of modern democracy, the simple association of Greek philosophic rationalism and democracy is not only naïve: it is insane. Socrates questioned *belief* in the rule of the

people or democracy and his inquiries led him to explore the possibility of the rule of rational human beings: the philosophers.

"It is absurd," said Xenophon's Socrates,

> to choose magistrates by lot where no one would dream of drawing lots for a pilot, a mason, a flute-player, or any craftsmen at all, though the short comings of such men are far less harmful than those that disorder our government.

Why was Socrates sentenced to death by democratic Athens?

Americanism: The Anglo-Jewish Convergence

The Puritans: The Anglo-Saxon Self-Conquest

Now I can really hear what they have been saying all along: 'We good men—*we are the just*'—what they desire they call, not retaliation, but 'the triumph of *justice*'; what they hate is not their enemy, no! they hate 'injustice,' they hate 'godlessness'; what they believe in and hope for is not the hope of revenge…but the victory of God, of the *just* God, over the godless…[825]

—FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, *ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS*

> **And the machinations of this presbyterian, or Puritan party, was but the herculean effort of the Saxon to wrest from the Norman the scepter of empire, making religious fanaticism only the cloak for concealing his political designs.**[826]
>
> —FROM " SOUTHERN CIVILIZATION, OR, THE NORMAN IN AMERICA" IN *DEBOW' S REVIEW* (1862)

After William's coronation on Christmas Day, 1066, violence erupted between natives and their new rulers. "It was a bad omen for the future", L. G. Pine remarked:

> Both Harold and William had appealed to the judgment of heaven. William's victory poses a serious moral problem. How could God have allowed William's cause to prosper when it involved an act of plain aggression upon an innocent people? Even the future pope, Hildebrand, admitted that he had been criticized for unleashing a war of naked conquest upon a peaceful nation. No amount of casuistry can justify the Norman Conquest. If, as I am inclined to think, Harold had in some way, by forced promise or oath, or even by express command of Edward, agreed to support William's succession to the throne, this could not bind the Witan or the English people who would never have freely chosen William as their king. The only solution to the moral problem is that, as with many other incidents, the Norman Conquest was permitted by God, tolerated by Him, perhaps because our old English ancestors had allowed themselves to drift into a state of moral indifference, a permissive society, which by the workings of a natural law brings with it its own consequences and retributions.[827]

The Puritans are the spiritual descendants of those Anglo-Saxons who took seriously the idea that the Norman Conquest was collective punishment for their sins. Men like Henry, archdeacon of Huntingdon, had believed that the Conquest was the last of five plagues chosen by God to destroy the English for their great sins because "the Normans surpassed all other people in their unparalleled savagery".[828] The Puritans' spiritual ancestors can be found in the aftermath of the defeat of Hastings, the crushing of the revolts, and the genocidal killings. With the loss of ethnic self-control and national pride, with their faces still dirty from having been shoved into the ground with the heel of a Norman boot, some learned to tell themselves: 'we didn't want that power anyway'.

Accepting the Conquest entailed the acceptance, on some level, of the principle of the right of conquest; the principle that might makes right. The Conquest made the Normans masters of the Anglo-Saxon world, yet only in that worldly, quasi-pagan sense. Forced to adapt to a political reality they could not change, Christian moralizing offered a mode of adaptation through the reinterpretation of reality.

The New Testament tells us "there are some eunuchs who were made eunuchs by men, and there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake" (Matthew 19:12). Yet an involuntary castration by men can help promote the decision to play the role of eunuchs who have castrated themselves for "the Kingdom of Heaven's sake". It must have been comforting to learn that certain inhibitions against political power were not a symptom of their political subjugation, but rather, the divine sign of their Christian virtue.

This is the oldest trick in the "Good Book"! Through self-discipline and self-denial, masquerading hatred as love, the

Puritans would reinterpret the legacy of the Norman Conquest as a moral *self-conquest*. The Normans had not conquered Anglo-Saxon "nature"; the virtuous had conquered their own nature! They had to fight within themselves their own inclination to accept that might makes right and the master ethic which once justified their own conquest of England from the native Celts but which could now only justify their own subjugation. In conquering themselves morally, they were conquering that part of themselves that wanted to *be* Norman conquerors.

The Puritans overcame the view that Normans ruled their bodies with the view that God ruled their souls. Since God was the supreme maker of *all* humans, it would be God's laws and not the laws of their conquerors who would determine their destiny. The Puritan ethic was a rebellion against the entire notion that they had been "civilized", mutilated, manipulated, and molded by their "class"-masters. Through Puritan creed and Puritan practice they could believe that they had fully civilized and conquered themselves through God's grace; they were a *self-made people*. They would even overcome that old stereotype that the Anglo-Saxons drank excessively,[829] a stereotype famously rendered in Freeman's telling portrayal of the last night of Saxon England.

This Puritan morality of self-conquest was the Anglo-Saxon subculture that shaped the character of America's destiny. To conquer "nature" morally was to disassociate one's self from the psychological desire to *be* a conqueror of others and instead conquer within one's self that desire itself. The generally Christian and especially Puritan ethic of America originated in great part as an alternative to unthinking conqueror worship that for the conquered was self-degradation.

The original Puritan ethic valued a kind of sincerity against the traitorous self-falsifications of ambitious men such as William Cecil. As Pine once explained:

> To the question why anyone should particularly value a Norman pedigree rather than any other...it is the psychological desire to be associated with the best people; with the conquerors rather than the conquered; a desire, by the way, which is as keenly felt in the U.S.A. as in England.[830]

At no time in American history did the value of a Norman pedigree face the test of history represented by the Civil War period. The psychology of secession included the reemergence of contempt for the conquered. The psychology of moral contempt for a South defeated through Northern willingness to shed blood illustrates how the desire to be conqueror was only adapted to circumstance, and not overcome.

Pine, as a genealogist concerned with historical accuracy and a Christian concerned with moral truth, concluded, "the triumph of the Norman Conquest is a triumph of things evil".[831] All those old, muddled explanations of the English Civil War have concealed an astonishingly simple insight at the heart of the Puritan Revolution: *the Norman Conquest was wrong*. The belief that the Norman Conquest was morally and existentially wrong was the ultimate cause of the Puritan Revolution. Since the Norman Conquest was wrong, the heirs of the Conquest order were wrong, and the heads of that state had to be beheaded.

This is the key to understanding what Emerson, the poet laureate of Anglo-Saxon manifest destiny, called:

> The moral peculiarity of the Saxon race, —its commanding sense of right and wrong, the love and devotion to that,— this is the imperial trait, which arms them with the sceptre of the globe.[832]

To understand Puritanism, one *must* understand Friedrich Nietzsche's conception of a slave morality. Puritanism was a slave morality. Puritan values are not the values of Norman conquerors; they are the values of the conquered. Puritan values are not the values of the master; they are the values of the slave. This is how Biblical slave morality became modern virtue. And this is how the issue of the right and wrong of slavery compelled American Civil War.

The Anglo-Saxons are world famous for their assertion that they are a "free" people. But who ever asserted that they were mastered like a slave? The Norman Conquest of England could just as accurately be called the Norman Mastery of England. The Anglo-Saxons attempted, at Hastings, to maintain self-mastery. They failed and thus became, in effect, slaves of their Norman masters.

Lincoln once said that if slavery is not wrong, then nothing is wrong. Since the Norman mastery of England was the Norman enslavement of England, if the Conquest was not wrong, then nothing is wrong. If the Conquest was right, however, then slavery was right. This was the ultimate source of the disagreement between North and South.

The Norman Conquest was the ultimate cause of the civil wars. While the master morality of Norman-Cavaliers produced a new slavery in the South, Northern moral fanaticism was the product of an old slavery, a slave morality bred through centuries of subjugation. Lincoln's bid for the Presidency amounted, in historical terms, to a referendum on whether the Norman Conquest was right or

wrong. This is how Puritanism came to shape the values of America.

Once again, *Puritanism cannot be understood without coming to grips with Friedrich Nietzsche*. The diametrical opposite of the Puritan slave morality was the master morality of the conqueror-Cavaliers. While even George Fitzhugh did not go quite as far as Friedrich Nietzsche, something of the Cavalier's love of life comes through in *The Gay Science* (1882):

> We simply do not consider it desirable that a realm of justice and concord should be established on earth (because it would certainly be the realm of the deepest leveling and *chinoiserie*); *we are delighted with all who love, as we do, danger, war, and adventures, who refuse to compromise, to be captured, reconciled, and castrated*; we count ourselves among conquerors; we think about the necessity for new orders, also for a new slavery — for every strengthening and enhancement of the human type also involves a new kind of enslavement.

The rebirth of the Norman Conqueror type necessitated a new kind of enslavement. Captured, reconciled, and castrated, the South was reduced to the Puritanical slave morality thereafter called Americanism.

What was Puritanism? Puritanism was born of a moral critique of the valuation of William the Conqueror as the greatest individual in all of English history. When one grasps how William must fare upon the moral tribunal of the conquered, *then* one can understand what Puritanism is. Puritanism, in other words, cannot be understood without grasping Nietzsche's concept of a slave morality and their deep, unyielding resentment of hereditary Norman masters.

Puritanism cannot be understood without realizing that William the Conqueror was Nietzsche's Übermensch.

The political achievements of William the Conqueror are in some ways comparable those of Alexander the Great or Caesar. Among the ancient pagans, a man such as William would have been allowed a more unambiguous fame as a model of human greatness. In the Puritan moral critique of William the Conqueror and his heirs, one can see the shift in political philosophy between the ancient Greeks and Romans and the moderns.

The impact of the Conquest has been hidden under a modern-Puritan moral reinterpretation of the world that made political realities disappear mentally. The Puritan-Biblical reinterpretation of the Norman Conquest legacy explains the means by which Norman/Saxon conflict was originally explained away. The Puritan reinterpretation of history also explains why the Bible is inordinately central to American identity in a way that it is not, for example, in most European countries. This modernistic Biblical-moral interpretation was how the conquered attempted to conquer the Conquest's mastery of Anglo-Saxon history.

The original Puritans lived a philosophy of life captured beautifully and succinctly in words from Alfred Lord Tennyson's poem *Lady Clara Vere de Vere* (1842):

> 'Tis only noble to be good.
> Kind hearts are more than coronets,
> And simple faith than Norman blood.

The Anglo-Jews

> **Alas, how miserable and pitiable a time it was then. Then the wretched people lay driven nearly to death, and afterwards there came the sharp famine and destroyed them utterly. Who cannot pity such a time? Or who is so hard-hearted that he cannot weep for such misfortune?**
>
> —*ANGLO-SAXON CHRONICLE* (1087)

"You brood of Vipers!", raged John the Baptist:

> Bear fruit worthy of repentance. Do not presume to say to yourselves, 'We have Abraham as our ancestor'; for I tell you, God is able from these stones to raise up children to Abraham. Even now the ax is lying at the root of the trees; every tree therefore that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. (Matt. 3:7-10)

Of what value is the genealogical pride of Abrahamic descent when God has shown his disfavor towards John and his fellow Jews by allowing them to be conquered by the Romans? If the cause of conquest was the sins of the nation, then only the bearing of "good fruit" could redeem them. Yet even if the nation as a whole proved unworthy, surely God would not abandon the good souls among them. This belief inspired a sect of Jews who became Christians. This belief inspired a sect of Anglo-Saxon Puritans who became Americans.

The conviction that descent from Abraham was no measure of one's worthiness in God's eyes implicated an explosion of ethnic boundaries that profoundly influenced the universalism of what became Christianity. Through Christianity, the Jewish moral paradigm came to hold a special significance for the Anglo-Saxons: the pattern of

conquest of the Jews by pagan Rome was repeated in the conquest of the Anglo-Saxons by the Norman heirs of Rome. Just as the most universalistic revolt against Rome became Christianity, the most universalistic revolt against the Normans became Americanism. Just as Jews gave their cultural-religious values to the gentiles in the form of Christianity, the Anglo-Saxons gave their cultural-moral values in the form of the American creed.

At the time of the American Revolution, it was said:

> The spirit of the English nation, depressed and broken by the Norman conquest, for many years quietly gave way to the rage of despotism, and peaceably submitted to the most abject vassalage.[833]

This same pattern is evident among Jews in the period following their conquest by Rome. In *Vanquished Nation, Broken Spirit: The Virtues of the Heart in Formative Judaism*, Jacob Neusner demonstrated how Jews adapted and survived after the ruin of the Holy Temple in the year 70 AD, and the massacre resulting from the failed revolt against Rome in 132 AD, led by Bar Kokhba (another messiah):

> If we had to limn a portrait, after the catastrophic defeat, of the inner being of the nation as a whole, we would draw heavily on the dark colors of the affective spectrum, defeat, despair, despondency….how individuals felt in their hearts, their virtuous attitudes, turned out to correspond exactly to how the nation lived as a whole, in its politics and social culture….In a word, the vanquished nation, meant to endure in subjugation, able to go forward only by accepting its condition of weakness, educated the individual to the virtues of the broken heart.[834]

At the heart of the Anglo-Saxon/Jewish convergence is a democratic-humanitarian ethic of compassion. It is like a living memorial for past collective national tragedy. Adaptation to the Norman Yoke cultivated the virtues of the broken heart. Like a permanent state of mourning, the virtues incubated by institutionalized defeat became a permanent facet of the Puritan-American ethos.

The original popish support of the Norman Conquest utterly disarmed any arguments for revolt on the grounds of Christian morals, and this must have been decisive to the demoralized submission of the general populace. The Protestant Reformation allowed the Normans' mastery of England to be exposed as a masterpiece of Christian hypocrisy. By the mid-seventeenth century, Christopher Hill observed:

> English patriotism, Protestantism, and the defence of representative institutions all seemed closely linked. The association of the enemies of all three with William the Bastard, the French conqueror blessed by the Pope, was good psychological warfare.[835]

More than psychological warfare, Hill documented how a flurry of 'Norman Yoke' ideas swarmed around the events that lead to actual civil war and the Puritan Revolution.

Consider, for example, the Puritan banning of Christmas during the Commonwealth. William the Conqueror was crowned king of England on Christmas day. In this way, Christian cultivation of weakness and "turning the other cheek" was deviously appropriated to reduce hostility to William's founding kingship to impotence. Just as the Conquest clothed itself in Catholic Christian garb, there was something hierarchically pagan or Roman at its core. The

mind-stance that unmasked the Conquest tradition was the same as that which unmasked the Christmas tradition.

Questioning the Conquest tradition led to a questioning of tradition in general and, in this way, Puritan opposition to the Conquest helped develop a Puritan path to modernity in general. Puritans, as pioneers towards the distinctively modern, bear a distinctive resemblance to Jews. Questioning Christian traditions like Christmas led Puritans to question excesses without the deepest Biblical roots and the deepest Biblical roots led towards Judaism.

The Jesus movement was only taking to an extreme what Judaism had pioneered long ago. The Jewish ethical valuation of individual life began the limiting of certain kinds of hereditary justice: "Fathers shall not be put to death for the sins of sons, nor sons for the sins of fathers" (Deuteronomy 24:16). With the collapse of Anglo-Saxon political patriarchy, the patriarchal, wrathful God of the ancient Hebrews became a kind of surrogate father, overcoming the authority of their earthly faux-fathers.

"Christian family values" take the qualified and partial devaluation of kinship in Judaism to its extreme. The universalistic obscuring of the Anglo-Saxon roots of democracy was partly inspired by the same moralistic tendencies that spawned the universalistic obscuring of the Jewish roots of Christianity. Yet remarkably, despite the powerful traditional efforts made to cleanse Christianity of its Jewish roots, the Anglo-Saxon Puritans found their way to those specifically Jewish roots — virtually to the point of adopting them as their own.

The Puritans developed an unusual fixation on what Christians call the Old Testament. They converged upon the story of the ancient Hebrew *nation* and developed a powerful identification with them. The Old Testament came

to hold special significance for some Anglo-Saxons precisely because they empathized with the story of the ancient Hebrews as an oppressed *nation*. This strange mixture of patriotism and Puritanism, peoplehood and moral mission, is paralleled in the Judaic notion of a chosen people.

"The Puritanism of New England," wrote American essayist and critic Edmund Wilson,

> was a kind of new Judaism, a Judaism transposed into Anglo-Saxon terms. When the Puritans came to America, they identified George III with Pharaoh and themselves with the Israelites in search of the Promised Land. They called their new country Canaan and talked continually of the Covenant they had made with God. Winthrop and Bradford were Moses and Joshua; Anne Hutchinson was pilloried as Jezebel. 'The Christian church so-called,' said a preacher in New Marlborough, Massachusetts, 'is only a continuation and extension of the Jewish church.' 'If we keep the covenant,' said Winthrop, 'we shall finde then the God of Israel is among us.' The Hebrew language, later on in New England, was to be taught as a major subject, not merely in the colleges but even in the schools.[836]

If Thomas Jefferson's theory of "expatriation" is right, then the English settlers were pregnant with revolution even before they set sail for America. Crossing the Atlantic was already like the miracle of traversing the split Red Sea. The Biblical script for finalizing independence had already been written in the hope that God would lead his chosen people to freedom. July 4th, Independence Day, is the American equivalent of the holiday of Passover wherein Jews celebrate the liberation from Egypt. It was England, not America, that held the Anglo-Saxon diaspora.

In the same way that Egyptian slavery and the Exodus was paradigmatic for the Jewish religion (and the modern state of Israel), the Norman Conquest and Revolution are paradigmatic for the American creed. After the escape from Egyptian slavery came the giving of God's laws, the Torah, the "constitution" of the Jewish people. Similarly, the very conception of the American Constitution, an enduring scriptural foundation for right political conduct was inspired by the model of the Bible. The bill of rights is like an "enlightened" ten commandments, a political digestion of Biblical ethics. And the most important political philosopher behind it, the 'Calvinist natural theologian' Locke posited a social contract that is highly reminiscent of the covenant of God with Israel.

Americans were to be the people whose humble pride in their founding echoed the words of Moses on Sinai:

> For what great nation is there, that has laws and ordinances as perfect as all this Teaching that I set before you this day? (Deut. 4:5-8)

Saxon Communism

If the Puritans of New England imagined themselves as enslaved Hebrews, this leaves an obvious question: who were the Egyptians? For Anglo-Saxon Puritans to identify with Hebrew slaves and the Exodus paradigm there must also have been an analog of Egyptian slave masters. Who were they?

Even as the Norman-Cavalier slave masters and their accomplices lost the American Civil War, the abolitionist argument of the moral wrong of violating the individual rights of African-Americans was countered with arguments

for states rights. States rights could be considered collective rights. The idea of collective rights implies an idea of collective liberty.

When the idea of "liberty" is freed of an exclusive interpretation as *individual* liberty, one can see that, in a very different way, an idea of collective liberty was also held by a radical sect of English Puritans in the seventeenth century, the communistic Diggers. Some seventeenth century authors regarded their leader, Gerrard Winstanley, as the originator of Quakerism.[837] He himself regarded the English Civil War and his own organizing efforts as a struggle for collective liberty against the collective slavery of the Norman Yoke:

> The violent people that are Free-holders, are…the Norman Common Souldiers, spred abroad in the Land; And who must be chosen? but some very rich man, who is the Successor of the Norman Colonels….And to what end have they been thus Chosen? but to Establish that Norman power the more forcibly over the enslaved English, and to beat them down again, when as they gather heart to seek for Liberty.[838]

It is no accident that the struggle for "liberty" became an Anglo-Saxon *national* characteristic. Although "liberty" subsequently became interpreted as individual liberty, its original definition as group privilege also mutated into this more egalitarian, collectivist, communistic form embodied by the Diggers. This communistic notion of liberty was strongly correlated with kin selective behavior and, in at least that sense, it shared much with old Magna Carta "liberties" and the so-called "state's rights" of Southern slave masters.

Among Puritans, Anglo-Saxon nationalistic sentiments became interwoven with analogous Biblical inspirations.

Abiezer Coppe, a member of another extremist Puritan sect called the Ranters, linked "the blood of the righteous Abel" with "the blood of the last Levellers that were shot to death". This link between martyred Anglo-Saxon blood and the blood of Old Testament giants went further. One Digger pamphlet read, "Cain is still alive in all the great landlords". "Cain's brood," Bunyan wrote, were "lords and rulers", while "Abel and his generation have their necks under oppression." [839]

Winstanley's contemporary John Rogers talked of "the Norman yoke of corrupt lawyers" and a link between "the Babylonian and Norman yokes".[840] Others directly compared the Norman Yoke with the bondage of Israel in Egypt.[841] Christopher Hill observed, "Samson was often used as a symbol for the New Model Army and/or the Good Old Cause, by no means only by Milton" in his *Samson Agonistes*.[842]

Winstanley believed that "though this Jacob be very low, yet his time is now come". He will supplant Esau, and take "both birthright and blessing from him". "Esau is the ending of the old world," proclaimed a Digger pamphlet of 1649, "The reign of Jacob, of the saints…begins the new world."[843]

These seventeenth century Englishmen anticipated a "new world"; a new moral order defined by the victory of Jacob over Esau. What is remarkable here is this association of an Anglo-Saxon cause with Jacob. Traditionally, Jews associate themselves with Jacob (especially by his second name, Israel) and the gentiles with Esau. Yet Winstanley made this analogy of Anglo-Saxons and Israel with unmistakable explicitness: "the last enslaving conquest which the enemy got over Israel was the Norman over England".[844]

Jews traditionally believed that gentile oppression or anti-Semitism was God's method of punishing them for their sins. The Puritans picked out this "Old Testament" theme so that Normans became the superlative gentiles and Anglo-Saxons became the oppressed Jews. Even Jesus made this ethnic-religious identification of gentiles and tyrannical rule, wherein "the gentiles" most specifically referred to the great empires that conquered or victimized ancient Israel.[845] According to Matthew 20:25-28, Jesus said:

> You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their high officials exercise authority over them. Not so with you. Instead, whoever wants to become great among you must be your servant.

Jacob, the story goes, deceived his blind father so that he, and not his brother Esau, would receive their father's blessing. Esau, the firstborn, had already sold his birthright to Jacob, and thus complained, "he took my birthright, and behold, now he has taken my blessing." (Genesis 27:36). While this story is nowadays considered morally problematic, it is too basic to the Bible to simply be "moralized" away. Perhaps the Bible simply transmitted its message successfully.

Jacob, the tent dweller, is portrayed as innocent, not of deception, but of Esau's pastime of hunting (Genesis 25:27) — the sport *par excellence* of gentile aristocracies. Esau's hirsute appearance suggests an animalistic naturalism and the ethics of the animal world wherein the strong hunt the weak, the first-born commands the lesser born, and patriarchal might makes right. Jacob is the great ironic Jewish patriarch who showed how cunning could defeat strength, subverting the most conservative principles of a patriarchal world.

Esau, in return, attempted to kill Jacob.

This outwitting of patriarchal authority was justified with the insistence of matriarchal authority; Jacob's mother Rebecca. The result of this divine deception was not God's punishment but, on the contrary, divine blessing. It was model behavior. This rather nebbish character, the man who deceived his *own* father, is the man who became Israel, father of the twelve tribes, traditional forefather of all Jews.

It is not hard to see why Puritans would empathize with this primal Jewish patriarch. With Jacob's acquisition of his brother's birthright, the prerogative of primogeniture was disestablished. In deceiving his father, generational authority was subverted. The two ideas are related because primogeniture, the prerogative of the first born over the later born, when write large, bears a similar relationship to the authority of the older generation over the younger generations. There is a hint here of the idea that memes (i.e. this Biblical story itself) can override and overturn the rule of genes. But above all, Jacob represents divinely sanctioned authority against the tyranny of tradition; against letting the ethics of the past dictate the ethics of the future.

The Puritan, American, and Yankee revolutions embodied Israel's revolutionary idea that the younger generation can and will outwit the dictates of pure patriarchal tradition. The right of conquest, the birthright of the Normans represented by the hunter virtues of Esau, would be superseded by an "age of reason" and the rights of man. In America, primogeniture and entail was undone by the Revolution, reborn in principle in the American South with men such as George Fitzhugh, and finished off by Lincoln's North. The American "founding fathers" were ironic patriarchs in the tradition of Jacob.

Jacob, in congenital conflict with Esau, born grasping at Esau's heal, ended up ahead of his brother. Writ large, this implies a world-historical reversal of fortune, a messianic hope that despite the realities of the present time one can look forward to a "new world" where the Jacobs, rather than the Esaus of mankind, will come to inherit the earth.

For the Diggers, the victory of 1649 meant that they had reinherited their ancient England and could now cultivate the common land. This is exactly what they did at St. George's Hill, Surrey in April of that year, until broken up by the authorities and local landowners. Here one can see how the Norman-"feudal" principle that the King owns all of the land helped uproot Anglo-Saxons *in their very own country*, converging them towards the territorial uprootedness of the Jewish diaspora. The Diggers' national-social ideas hardly resemble any other model more than the founders of the Israeli kibbutz.

The Biblical sublimation of the Norman/Saxon conflict is one of the most important reasons that the sociobiological basis of the revolutions has been able to be obscured. Gerrard Winstanley sought "not to remove the Norman Yoke only", but to return to "the pure Law of righteousness before the fall".[846] A largely forgotten pre-Conquest world became idealized as a Golden Edenic Paradise Lost, the Norman Conquest became the fall, and revolutionary liberty became redemption. After all, if one aspired to restore a strictly Saxon Paradise Lost, why not go all the back to the truer Edenic original? This is exactly what Thomas Paine would do in constructing his argument for the rights of man from the authority of the Biblical Eden against the Norman right of conquest and the English Constitution. The Jewish experience recorded in the Bible provided a means of sublimating an Anglo-Saxon national predicament,

"universalizing" their particularism. Ultimately, Biblical roots would increasingly replace the eroded roots of a stolen Saxon past.

Let My People Go!

If it is difficult, in the United States, to separate what is Protestant from what is liberal,[847] is it less difficult to separate what is Jewish from what is liberal?

Political scientist Samuel Huntington believed: "Qualified, modified, diffused, the Puritan legacy became the American essence."[848] The early twentieth century German economist Werner Sombart, however, offered a seemingly contrary judgment: "what we call Americanism is nothing else, if we may say so, than the Jewish spirit distilled."[849] Both of these assessments can be correct simultaneously.

This unusual affinity between Puritanism and Judaism is comprehensible through Darwinism. In terms of political-moral values, Jews and Anglo-Saxon Puritans represent an example of convergent evolution.

Convergent evolution occurs when descendants resemble each other more than their ancestors did with respect to one or more features. An example is the independent evolution of "antifreeze" proteins that allowed some fish to survive frigid temperatures. This evolved at least twice in unrelated fish, once in the Artic, and once at the other side of the world in Antarctica. Though located at opposite sides of the world, similar environmental conditions pressured convergent adaptations for survival.

The Anglo-Jewish convergence, however, was one of sociobiological evolution; a combination of genes and culture. The common environmental stimulus for their common democratic value adaptation was political

oppression by a foreign people. Though originating from very different environments, similar environmental conditions of political oppression pressured convergent adaptations for survival, especially in religion.

The biological aspect of the convergence includes the elimination of the native Anglo-Saxon political aristocracy and alienation from identification with conventional aristocratic pedigree (and its military-political way of life). Even state sanctioned genocide is something Jews and Anglo-Saxons have in common (i.e. the harrying of the north), although, as usual, the calamities of the Jews were more recurrent and more extreme. Among both peoples, past injustice was compensated with a forward-looking, messianic hope for the future.

Secularization is a classic example of the complex interaction between biology and culture. Americans in particular and Westerners in general became, in effect, students of the Jewish life strategy found in the survival manual that is the Bible. Just as Westerners have inherited the collected wisdom of ancient Jewish ancestors, the liberal though passed down from Locke to Jefferson to Lincoln, for example, represents a similar conservation of collective wisdom that helped ensure that future generations would secure the "blessings of liberty".

A student of the Bible could take his bearings from the Garden of Eden, where man was not primally, or naturally, conceived as a "political animal". One need only read Hobbes' *Leviathan* to witness the impact of the Bible on modern political philosophy. Edmund Burke, very much aware of this Old Testament influence on the revolutionaries, repeatedly referred in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* to "the Old Jewry doctrine of 'a right to choose our own governors'".

The Anglo-Jewish cultural convergence can be gleaned through two books by Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, *The Genesis of Justice: Ten Stories of Biblical Injustices that Led to the Ten Commandments* and *Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights*. In the first book, he took examples of Bible stories in Genesis from his own Jewish heritage. He proposed that these stories suggest how experiences of injustice led to the just remedies of the Ten Commandments. In the second book, he proposed that secular rights emerged from a similar process: rights were derived from particular experiences of wrongs.

Thomas Jefferson wrote, "although this constitution was violated and set at naught by Norman force, yet force cannot change right". Without understanding the wrongs inflicted by the Norman Conquest, one cannot fully understand the stimulus for the Anglo-Saxon rights tradition. Over the long run, Biblical culture offered the teachings of a Jewish-moralistic survival strategy that the Puritans adopted for their own analogous situation. *The* reason that the Anglo-Saxons were able to relate to Christianity's Jewish roots was precisely because it was not only an abstract and theological relationship, but an utterly practical problem of the political oppression of a nation.

Yet the ultimate strength Anglo-Jewish convergence resides in a convergence of abstract principle. These peoples, who can be so different, often opposite, in cultural expressions detectable with the five senses, nonetheless ascribe inordinate *value* to abstract notions of justice, democracy, and equality. For example, if an American Anglo-Saxon must decide between cultural customs of dinner etiquette and abstract principles of justice and right, the latter is generally conceded to be of overriding importance. To understand the historical significance of this

valuation is to understand that precisely the opposite tended to be true for the Norman-French. The French-Normans distinguished themselves from the conquered with the "arbitrary rule" of French etiquette and French fashions.[850] If manners and etiquette are really so important, then the Norman model is superior to the Anglo-Saxon model. Puritanism rebelled against this French valuation of manners over morals that still survived, however mutated, in the South's Cavalier aristocracy. While Cavaliers commonly accused the Puritans of hypocrisy, Puritan principle must be understood relative to an aristocratic valuation of politeness founded upon the ultimate rudeness of conquest.

While there is at least some truth in the view that Puritanism, unlike normative Judaism, inclined towards asceticism, it would be very easy to overestimate the degree to which Puritanism inclined towards the sexual ideals of monks. The Puritan mind seems to have made a crude, yet not *wholly* inaccurate, cultural equation: French = sex. The cultural root of the seemingly ascetic ideals is, in part, a Puritan *purification* of Norman-French cultural characteristics exemplified by a rejection of French sexual mores. After the French Revolution, when French democracy helped justify aristocratic distance from all things French, a quasi-neo-Puritan "Victorian" inhibition against *French* sexual attitudes reemerged. Put another way, the British Empire achieved Burkean-style Norman/Saxon cultural unity, in part, through Norman "class" concessions to a so-called "Victorian" cultural antagonism with Frenchness.

The degree to which Puritanical moral principle trumps aesthetics also sheds light on the ways in which American democratic culture is significantly different from French democratic culture. An inadvertent result is that *abstract* principles of Puritanical moral civilization tends to trump

aesthetic cultural particularities and this is why the Anglo-Jewish convergence is so strong despite very significant original cultural differences. Perhaps the most basic form of this convergence of principle was described by the highly influential political columnist Walter Lippmann, an American of Jewish descent:

> The denial that men may be arbitrary in human transactions *is* the higher law....That is the spiritual essence without which the letter of the law is nothing.[851]

Anglo-Saxons and Jews converge traditions of rationality and morality, liberalism and democracy. The Anglo-Saxons were a people who knew what it was to be oppressed. An analogous ethnic experience of political oppression converged towards a moral-religious solution of transcendent political principles.

Just as with Jews, a *kind* of Anglo-Saxon moral superiority was also a kind of mask and compensation for a *kind* of past political inferiority. This assumption of moral superiority is what leads both Jews and Anglo-Saxons towards their ironic universalisms. Since God was believed to be the creator of *all* humans, not just the elect, this moral identity conflicts with ethnic identity among both Anglo-Saxons and Jews. Both tended to escape religion with the secular variant that all men are created equal and this only highlighted equality's moral and intellectual contradictions. The same moral dilemmas inherent in being a "chosen people" with a "manifest destiny" surface in the problem of the rights of Native Americans (including Mexicans) and Israel's right of existence among the Palestinians.

"I think no New Englander," Harriet Beecher Stowe wrote in *Old Town Folks*,

> brought up under the regime established by the Puritans, could really estimate how much of himself had actually been forced by this constant face-to-face intimacy with Hebrew literature….My grandfather [at family prayers] always prayed standing, and the image of his mild, silvery head, leaning over the top of the high-backed chair, always rises before me as I think of early days. There was no great warmth or fervor in those daily exercises, but rather a serious and decorous propriety. They were Hebraistic in their form; they spoke of Zion and Jerusalem, of the God of Israel, the God of Jacob, as much as if my grandfather had been a veritable Jew; and except for the closing phrase, 'for the sake of Thy Son, our Savior,' might all have been uttered in Palestine by a well-trained Jew in the time of David.[852]

Stowe's abolitionist novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was highly influential in sensitizing people to the moral issue of slavery. It was said that when Stowe met Abraham Lincoln in 1862 he declared, "So you're the little woman who wrote the book that started this Great War!" It was the American Civil War that determined that the American Revolution would ultimately mean a second Puritan Revolution — and this one would be without a Restoration. When American Jews took a leading part in defending the civil rights of blacks in the 1960s, this was simply a fulfillment of the convergence between all those who knew:

> "you shall not wrong a stranger or oppress him, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt." (Exodus 22:21)

The full argument for the Anglo-Jewish convergence is the argument for Anglo-German divergence explicated in the following book, Converse Cognates.

Cathedral of Commerce

[W]hen authors…characterize the basic ethical tendency of Puritanism, especially in England, as English Hebraism, they are, correctly understood, not wrong.[853]

—MAX WEBER, *THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM*

Puritanism *is* Judaism.[854]

—WERNER SOMBART, *THE JEWS AND MODERN CAPITALISM*

Not far from New York's World Trade Center area stands the skyscraping Woolworth building, "the cathedral of commerce". I have always thought that this building represented something basic of the cultural reality of America. It embodies the seemingly impossible contradiction between Christian and mammon values that American pragmatism attempts to hold together.

When people still took Christianity with even a modicum of intellectual seriousness, it was believed that "[i]t is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God" (Mark 10:25, Matt. 19:23-26). But is poverty an American virtue? Despite the diversity of values in America, poverty is one of the few things that almost all Americans can agree upon as an evil. Vows of poverty are not American, but vows to eradicate poverty are. For Americans, poverty is an evil to be eradicated, not a virtue to be emulated.

Yet the apparent contradiction between the Christian and mammon aspects of Americanism do make sense. Americanism takes Christianity back to the basics; common sense ethics. Eschewing the radicalism of Christ and going back to the basics means, for example, going back to the Ten Commandments. The Ten Commandments, however, constitute the ethical base of *Judaism*.

Radical, self-annihilating ethics were the innovations of Jesus. The commandment to "Love your neighbor as yourself", is a verse of the "Old Testament" (Lev. 19:18) and was cited by Rabbi Akiba ben Joseph as the major principle of the Five Books of Moses. Jesus took this Hebrew principle and radicalized it. It is noteworthy that Akiba, like Jesus, was martyred with the authority of Rome, flayed alive in the final year of Bar Kokhba's disastrously unsuccessful messianic military rebellion against Rome (135 AD). By inheriting the "Old Testament" as the foundation for the New Testament, Christians inherited the theological passageway back towards their religion's Jewish foundation.

While the radicalism of Christ is by its very nature incompatible with the way of Caesar, this radicalization overcame an original Judaic balance that evolved out of living problems of Jewish national existence. The political system of the American founders produced abstractly resembles that original Judaic balance in avoiding extremes of both monarchical hierarchy and radical equality (which is one reason America has been uniquely immune to communism). While Americanism could appear to be a regression from the *theological* radicalism of Jesus, it was actually the practical first step of a progression towards aligning a *political* constitution with abstracted Biblical notions of social justice. What appears in history as a moral decline theologically was a moral advance politically.

In short, American-style Christianity could more accurately be called Anglo-Judaism. The contradictions behind the American 'cathedral of commerce' make sense when one uncovers the Jewish roots of Christianity. American liberal democracy is actually a rediscovery of the Jewish basis of Christianity. Americanism represents a renaissance of the more normative Jewish "spirit" that lay buried under the extremism of Jesus. How this happened is, in a certain sense, simple: in shooting for the radicalism of Christianity, the West landed within the realistic moderation of Judaism.

In its most basic political-moral principles, America is a Jewish country, not a Christian country. This is true in both Constitutional theory and American practice. Judaism, like Americanism, is notably absent of Christianity's extreme negative attitude towards money. Jews and Americans share a this-worldly outlook, a basically economic conception of man, and a curious, capitalist combination of love of money and love of morality. This moral materialism is standard Anglo-Judaism.

It would be all too easy to corroborate the thesis of Anglo-Judaism with evidence from European observers of America. Instead of well-know European assertions of the Jewish character of America, a better clarification of the Anglo-Jewish convergence are found in attacks on the Yankee character by *Americans* of the South during the Civil War era. One of the recurrent themes in Southern attacks was a vilification of Northerners in terms that had once reserved for Shylock.

In the words of an essayist for *DeBow's Review*, the Yankees were largely "lineal descendants of the English puritans". *Yankee* and *Puritan* became virtually synonymous: *Yankee* was associated with the greedy materialism of the

North while *Puritan* was associated with the "politico-religious fanaticism" that allegedly constituted "the very worst developments of human nature—excelled by the French Jacobins only."[855] These two refrains constituted the core Anglo-Jewish convergence: moral materialism.

Southerners typically associated the Yankee character with New England, and by the 1850s, it became increasingly commonplace to refer to a "race of Yankees". Claudian Northrup, for example, thought that the Yankee "spirit of selfishness" and "custom of trade" dominated the way of life of people who lived in the states to the "North, and East, and Northwest, both of the cities and praedial population."[856] J. N. Maffit, in an essay called "The Almighty Dollar", charged that within this rapacious, amoral, Northern "spirit of trade...every virtue [floundered] in a deluge of barter."[857]

The descendants of the Puritans also display a traditionally Jewish repudiation of violence as a means of solving problems which contrasts, for example, with the greater tolerance for violence in the southeastern United States.[858] The Northern preference for litigation contrasts with the more personal and more violent means often demanded by old Southern notions of honor. Yankees had been "taught that fighting is unprofitable, and therefore to be avoided" and "instructed, at the same time, that cunning and sharpness and cheating are very creditable and very profitable," wrote the editorial spokesman for the *Richmond Examiner* on July, 24, 1861.[859]

At the start of the conflict, Louis T. Wigfall, Senator of Texas, put his bets against a northern race which "had been corrupted by the greed for money and did not have individuality and self-pride", unlike the martial master race of the South.[860] There are at least a few parallels between the North before the Civil War and Israel before its historic

victory in 1967: a people not formerly known for their military prowess became military victors and masters over the lands of their former foes with all the contradictions that that implies. In the case of the United States, victory meant that Americanism would be defined by the moral materialism of the North. Whereas the South's nominally Christian virtue was closer to the pagan honor code of ancient Rome, the Yankeeism that became Americanism is, in practice, a form of Judaism, not Christianity.

Jesus's teaching to "turn the cheek" in the face of oppression or injustice encourages worldly passivity. In practice, a truly Christian path of "turning the other cheek" is what helped Anglo-Saxons reconcile themselves to the Conquest during all those centuries (especially on Christmas Day). In this way, a consistently Christian and non-Jewish way would lead, not only to the acceptance of conquest and slavery, but even to its exacerbation. One of the single greatest reasons why the Puritan-Yankees shifted towards an ethic closer to Judaism over Christianity was the determination to overcome passivity and resignation with an active, compensatory justice.

To clarify the distinction between Judaism and Christianity, compare what is commonly considered their respective "golden rules". The Christian golden rule is commonly conceived as, "Do unto others as you would have done to you" (i.e. Matt 7:12). Now compare this to the words of Hillel, a Jewish sage who lived at about the same time as Jesus. It was said that when he was asked to explain Judaism while standing on one foot, he said, "What is hateful to you, don't do to your neighbor". If this does not also describe what liberal social philosophy boils down to, then I don't know what does. The general difference between the Jewish

golden rule and the Christian golden rule is like the difference between liberalism and socialism.

It goes without saying that this is only a gross generalization and one can cite innumerable counterexamples to either statement. Yet the Christian golden rule stresses a more simplistically positive and proletarian oriented socialism. Judaism, on the other hand, is said to possess 613 commandments: 365 negative and 248 positive. 248 positive commandments is a lot of commandments. Nonetheless, the weight of the commandments have a negative or inhibitive character to them. In Judaism, the positive commandments constitute the basic positive content of the religion. In liberalism, the positive content constitutes the realm of freedom. Liberal freedom includes the freedom *from* the socialistic commitments that would debilitate capitalism.

This has been a standard criticism of Anglo-Jewish capitalism. For example, in *Shylock's Rights*, Andrew Edwards drew a comparison between John Locke's philosophy of rights and Shakespeare's Shylock who has a "right to do wrong". Leaving something to be desired at the heights of human moral aspiration, Locke and Shylock symbolize the belief that bourgeois vices are preferable to aristocratic crimes.

While Judaism is utterly socialistic in its own way, its sense of justice and commandments to charity to the poor do not validate a bias to the poor: "You shall not be partial to the poor or defer to the great" (Leviticus 19:15, Exodus 23:3). Judaism generally holds a middle ground. Jesus, on the other hand, did not say 'blessed are the bourgeois', or even 'blessed is the lower middle class'. The inequalities that Jesus addressed were so radical that only a radical reverse of inequalities could begin to address them. Whereas Jesus's

innovations on a social level were characterized exactly by an emphasis "partial to the poor", America is traditionally characterized, especially from other nations of the West, by its anathema to welfare socialism.

Even if one accepts these generalizations about the historical founders of these religions, could one still ask how 'Christian' Europe was in the Middle Ages? The difference here, however, is the model of aspiration. What kind of human being does a society hold to be good? As much as medieval European Christians admired the model of Caesar in practice, on the fringes there was also a more genuine counterculture of Christ. The kind of human being that American culture admires as its 'good man' aspires to be neither Caesar nor Christ, but rather the bourgeois 'middle man' in between these extremes.

Both Anglo-Saxon and Jewish civilization take their modern conception of the cultural good from "the middling sort" that is the backbone of liberal democracy. Judeo-Americans, for example, tend to share the bourgeois assumption that there exists a high correlation between intelligence and its own bourgeois definition of morality. Caesar or Nietzsche, on the other hand, gives Americans intellectual indigestion.

In terms of basic cultural principles, Americans aspire to be like Jews, not like Christians. The principles that America aspires toward are closer to universalized Jewish principles than Christian ones. Self-realization of those principles meant the progression of a more Christian country into a more Jewish one. The term "Judeo-Christian" has a very legitimate usage in the United States because of this Anglo-Jewish convergence.

Where else could typical Jewish aspirations be fulfilled, after all, than within the parvenu idealism of America? The

entire substance of the "If I were a rich man…"American dream, the whole rags to riches yarn, betrays the admission that it was the Jews — and not the Christians — who were right about the value of moneymaking all along. American valuation of "the rule of law" is comparable to the Pharisaic laws that Jesus revolted against. The capitalism of Americanism is a defense of Pharisaic mammon worship *against* Jesus.

The American Empire is neither a new pagan Rome nor a Christian Kingdom of God. The American Empire is more like the rise of the Pharisees. The hypocrisy of the Pharisees, the ancestors of mainstream diaspora Judaism, is the typical bourgeois hypocrisy that is the American norm. America, moreover, resisted the great continental European attacks on bourgeois man, especially by Rousseau, Marx, and Nietzsche.

Just as Jesus attempted to overcome the hypocrisy of the Pharisees, Marx attempted to overcome the internal contradictions of the bourgeois-capitalists. It is Marxism, not liberalism, that represents the closest secular parallel to Christianity. Christianity emerged from Judaism just as Marxism (at least in theory) was to emerge from capitalism. The radical socialism of these two alienated Jews, Jesus and Marx, represents a radicalization of normative Judaism. The State of Israel, moreover, has historically reflected just this dynamic: it is generally a liberal democracy, with a minority of communistic settlements, the kibbutzim.

Americans, in effect, believe in the superiority of a secularized Jewish ethical base to a secularized Christian one. Liberal individualism trumps socialism; self-interest trumps self sacrifice; rights trump duties. Yet as a country, America's duty is to make the world safe for its peculiar

form of Judaism. This is done, not out of self-contradiction, but rather out of a principled self-preservation.

The McCarthyism of the 1950s was an expression of American devotion to their native secularized Judaism over and against the secularized Christianity of their Marxist foes. This became apparent with ethical condemnations of Marxist-inspired regimes. While communism might pose a kind of egalitarian superiority in an *abstract* or *theoretical* sense, the contradictions between this and its actual practices, especially under Stalin, were outrageous. In this way, gentiles of the Western liberal democracies have beheld a glimpse of how Jews felt in relation to medieval Christianity, which also might pose an *abstract* or *theoretical* ethical superiority, but whose realistic practice, especially in regard to acceptable political norms, was so often a living contradiction of those ethical ideals. This is probably the best example of how the West, and America in particular, has come to take a Pharisaic-Jewish point of view.

In 1968 theatre critic Walter Kerr observed:

> What has happened since World War II is that the American sensibility itself has become part Jewish, perhaps nearly as much Jewish as it is anything else....The literate American mind has come in some measure to think Jewishly, to respond Jewishly. It has been taught to, and it was ready to. After the entertainers and novelists came the Jewish critics, politicians, theologians. Critics and politicians and theologians are by profession molders: they form ways of seeing.[861]

Jews have helped define the defining parameters of America's moral-political universe. The parameters of the traditional right are delimited by a traditionalized Jesus. The libertarian, secular right was radicalized by Ayn Rand's

Über-Hobbesian individualism. On the extreme left it used to be Rand's archenemy Marx, but the anti-America, anti-Israel camp was subsequently fulfilled by Noam Chomsky. The Jewish influence on more centrist liberalism is too obvious to mention except to point out that Jewish media influence, by redefining the moral-political parameters and framing the American intellectual debate, have been crucial in pushing the normative American center leftwards.

The development that Kerr described could only have happen in a soil fertile for Jewish thought to develop. The American mind "was ready to" think Jewishly because of the profound Biblical influence that has defined the very invention that is America. While Jews have been about two percent of the American population, culturally, Americans are like half-Jews. In terms of basic cultural values and basic principles of democracy, there is, in general, no country that closer to Israel than the United States. Only the State of Israel can seriously challenge America as the most Jewish nation on earth.

American poet, dramatist, and critic John Jay Chapman, himself of Puritan origins, wrote, "There is a depth of human feeling in the Jew," he wrote in 1897,

> that no other race ever possessed. We do no more than imitate it and follow it. David, for instance, and his conduct about Uriah's wife and the child that died—and Absalom—and Jonathan. Compare the Greek—the Chinese, the Roman. These Jews are more human than any other men. It is the cause of the spread of their religion—for we are all adopted in Judah. The heart of the world is Jewish. There is the same spirit in the Old Testament as in the New. That monstrous perversion—that we should worship their God and despise themselves![862]

In adopting Christianity, there is at least a partial truth in the idea of inheriting a variation of a sanctified Jewish survival strategy. The origins of the special relationship of American with Israel really began with the Crusades, when Christians abandoned their own land to fight for Jesus's Jewish homeland. Thus, in order to fathom how, in terms of "foreign" policy, Israel has seemingly become America's 51st state, one must grasp that this development was pregnant within the liberal side of the American founding. As a society, the 'cathedral of commerce' of America is Christian on the outside and Jewish on the inside.

In August of 1776, John Adams told his wife of a suggestion for inscriptions on the Great Seal of the United States, a perfect symbol of the Anglo-Jewish convergence built into the founding:

> Mr. Jefferson proposed the children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by the day and pillar of fire by night; and on the other side, Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs from whom we claim the honor of being descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have assumed.[863]

Henry Adams, well known for his ambivalence towards the democratic form of government, apparently did not inherit his great grandfather's sense of honor in being descended from ancient "Saxon chiefs". In a letter to conservative British politician James Milnes Gaskell in 1895 he claimed, "I am sure that in the eleventh century the majority of me was Norman, — peasant or prince matters nothing, for all felt the same motives". This was the glorious, climatic insight of the America's informal experiment in Anglo-Saxon hereditary aristocracy. It seems that Adams

would rather have been the descendent of a Norman *peasant* than an Anglo-Saxon Judeo-Puritan.

Henry Adam appears to be a classic case of what the genealogist L. G. Pine called one of the "most abiding and somewhat pathetic characteristics" of Anglo-Saxons, the snobbish claim to Norman descent.[864] Henry Adams' contempt for his own Anglo-Saxon ancestors ("So we conquered England, which was a pretty dull, beer-swilling and indifferent sort of people.") was directly related to his antisemetic obsessions. If Henry Adams detested "everything connected" with the Jews then he would have detested John Adams' approval the dual identification of modern American democracy with "Saxon chiefs" and the "children of Israel". Henry's romantic fantasy of Norman identity only perpetuated the classic stereotypical association of the Norman and aristocracy and exposed his self-contemptuous mental association of Anglo-Saxons and Jews as embodiments of degenerate modernity.

Was this romantic aspiration to Normanity more honorable or less honorable than his great grandfather's pride in his Anglo-Saxon Puritan origins?

Clash of Classes

"It's injustice I hate, not the Normans!"

—ERROL FLYNN ACTING IN *THE ADVENTURES OF ROBIN HOOD* (1936)

How Marx Borrowed Britain's "Class"-focaled Lenses and Saw the End of History

While Christopher Hill was a convinced Marxist, he was foremost a historian. He concluded that the English "Civil War was more of a class war than orthodox English theory allows."[865] But does a Marxist "class" analysis of the English Civil War clarify its true roots, or actually obscure its true roots? Was Oliver Cromwell the figurehead of international capitalism or Anglo-Saxon nationalism?

What *is* "class"? In uncovering the outpouring of ideas about the Norman Yoke in the period that preceded the English Civil War, Hill could not ignore that "class divisions still seemed in some degree to coincide with national divisions."[866] Here we have two observations: "class" warfare and "class" divisions as national divisions. When these two insights are put together, the Norman/Saxon basis for that conflict becomes evident.

For a strict, orthodox Marxist the ethnic content of those Norman Yoke ideas could be dismissed as epiphenomenon of the economic motor of history. Hill, however, wrote explicitly, "my whole argument has been that we should not think *merely* in economic terms."[867] To Hill's credit, he collected evidence for the Norman Yoke *despite* his inclinations towards Marxist theory. The evidence was too widespread to ignore. This is very different from the imposition of (Marxist) theory upon facts. Hill had to explain away the fact that profusions of ideas swarming around the Norman Yoke theme correlated with the foment of rebellion against the political-hereditary order in the periods preceding both the English Civil War and the American Revolution.

Notwithstanding the excellence of Hill's historical scholarship, the Marxist theoretical license that allowed him to ignore the significance of the evidence for the Norman Yoke represents an accumulation of historical errors. It is not simply that a Marxist analysis of the English "class" system is inherently flawed, it is that *Marx's original analysis of England's industrial revolution was one of the most decisive contributions to the most fundamental flaws of Marxism itself.* Marx's world-historical misunderstanding of the English "class" system was a decisive contribution to the world-historical blunders of communism.

While later followers of Marx stressed the social aspects of his theory, his original Weltanschauung placed economics at the very center of historical change. For him, economic development was very literally the motor of human history. When the younger Marx laid the foundation of his theory of economic development, England's spearheading of the industrial revolution (1760-1840) provided his most important empirical model because it was the most economically advanced country in the world. Engel's father, moreover, was a shareholder in a textile firm in Manchester, England. Marx followed his comrade to Manchester and it was there that they wrote *The Communist Manifesto* in the late 1840s.

Marx moved to London in 1849 and remained there until his death in 1883. He could not have been in a better position to develop a "class" struggle view of history. One can be sure that he learned all about the "class" nature of history in the archives of the British Museum. Viewing the world through the "class"-focaled lenses of imperial, Victorian, British culture generously reinforced the "universal" nature of "class". Peculiar British conditions would determine "class" consciousness. Here Marx found home: birthplace of

the industrial revolution, leader in the development of capitalism, and a culture as obsessed with "class" as he was.

England was not simply *an* example of economic development for Marx's theory; it was *the* example that was most crucial to his theory of human history. Marx and Engels observed in England the correlation of an unusual high level of "class conflict" and an unusually high level of economic development. Since no other country offered a superior example of economic development, it could appear that England's pattern was simply the natural and universal characteristic of an advanced economic stage in human history.

If Marx were right, then England would have been the *most* likely country to turn communist as a fulfillment of its advanced level of economic development. What happened, of course, was that the Anglo-American world proved to be the *most* resistant to "Marxism" as communism's Cold War ideological archenemy.

Marx's mistake originated, to a large extent, in the failure to account that the English "class" system originated as the English *caste* system. Marx's socioeconomic analysis could not capture the reality of "class" in England anymore than a Marxist "class" analysis of the Helots subjugated by the ancient Spartans. Eleanor Searle's study of Norman predatory kinship helps demonstrate why a Marxist analysis of the Norman Conquest is wholly inadequate. That radical break of kinship and culture, along with upper class nepotism, was insignificant for Marx. This misunderstanding of human nature led to a misunderstanding of human history.

The English word *class* was originally derived from the French word *classe*, from the Latin *classis*, a group called to military service. So while the etymological relation to

military conquerors is evident, "class" is not specifically a euphemism for caste. Nonetheless, the way the word "class" came to be used in its English context has obscured its original relationship to caste. When the original identity and "class" and race is clarified, then the original identity of the "feudal system" and the "class system" is clarified; "class" conflict *was* blood-"feudal" conflict in the English Civil War and beyond.

In general, stressing the kinship reality of the English "class" system's origins raised the conception of a nation within a nation and this questioned the basic unity of the political order that Norman elites were beneficiaries of. The English conception of "class" maintained the original hereditary caste division without stressing the inherently destabilizing issues of kinship and blood-feudal conflict. Resistance to the caste interpretation of "class" originated, in part, from a *conservative* desire to preserve the political peace. Political sensitivities led to a deemphasis of exactly the issue of biological-kinship factors required to comprehend it.

To euphemize "class" against a condition closer to caste is comparable to the way in which "culture" is sometimes used as a euphemism for race. Through this deeply rooted English tendency to separate biological assumptions from political and socioeconomic ones, one can see that English "class" is actually an ancestor of political correctness. Although the word "class" provided a superficial evasion of the question of its ethnic content relative to a word like caste, the "English class system" nonetheless originated as a *de facto* ethnic-racial *class*ification system. It was a system of thought that expanded throughout the world during the glory days of the British Empire.

"British India," Philip Mason recalled, "was as much infected by caste as Indian India".[868] Some Englishmen, especially traditional "class" authorities, saw India not as inferior, but superior to their native island, now corrupted by modern individualism, capitalism, and democracy. "The India of the Raj," noted Thomas Metcalf, "stood forth as a model, not only for the empire, but for Britain itself."[869] It was the Norman Conquest based order that culminated as the British Empire, the old model that was being challenged by the new model of liberal democracy.

The very threat of liberal democracy helped propel men like George Nathaniel Curzon and the remains of the old conqueror "class" towards imperialistic ventures that reinforced the need for the paradigm of caste and conquest. It is this, and not superficial Marxist economic explanations alone, that are required to explain the historically abnormal motivation that led Britain to conquer India and *a third of the globe*. In the very same way, the imperialistic expansion of black slavery was the key to the survival of the Norman conqueror way of life in the American South.

"It is not climate", Lincoln reasoned, "that will keep slavery out of" Northern territories.[870] The Northern bourgeoisie and the Southern aristocracy were apparently divided by "class". Yet only by observing how "class" divides in the English Civil War became coupled with a geographic divide in America can one account for the lethal divisions that climate difference cannot fully explain.

For the Norman-Cavaliers of the South, blacks served as the cornerstone for a new caste order precisely because they demonstrated a convergence of socioeconomic class and race. The expansion of slavery was designed, in part, to highlight a parallel caste convergence of the Northern Anglo-Saxon race and the middle class. Norman masters in

the South demonstrated the convergence of race and an aristocratic "class" that went back to the "liberties" of Magna Carta. Marx failed to demonstrate a cogent theoretical basis for explaining the economic status of blacks, slave and free, purely on the basis of "class" and not race, and this unravels the entire Marxist Weltanschauung.

Even capitalist explanations of the U.S. Civil War by Americans lead, wittingly or unwittingly, towards accepting fundamental Marxist premises, even while resisting Marx's ultimate communist conclusion. This is a classic verification of how the *obscuring* of the Norman/Saxon conflict engendered Marxist *clarity* about the "class" nature of human history and was hence a fundamental pillar upon which Marx built his theoretical Weltanschauung. To obscure the Norman upper "class" was, ultimately, to clarify the Marxist lower "class".

While Marx saw "class" as a potentially international and *internal* division, British "class" arose from an Über-national and *external* division imposed by French foreigners. Hastings was the first battle in the English "class war". If Hastings made a foundational difference, then Marx made a fundamental mistake.

Marx implicitly assumed that the Norman Conquest made no ultimate, long-term, historical difference. That the native Anglo-Saxon ruling "class" was hereditarily removed and replaced had no ultimate historical import for Marx. The striking Norman differences in ethnicity, language, and culture are precisely the factors that Marx deemed irrelevant. Marxism is the most ideal vehicle for misunderstanding the long-term impact of the Norman Conquest because *Marxism itself was partly founded upon the failure to understand 1066 as the origin of the distinctly British "class" system and the American Civil War*.

Three years after the parliamentary reform of 1867, English writer J. A. Froude wrote:

> the people have at last political power. All interests are now represented in Parliament. All are sure of consideration. Class government is at an end. Aristocracies, landowners, established churches, can abuse their privileges no longer. The age of monopolies is gone. England belongs to herself. We are at last free.[871]

It would be impossible to understand the meaning of "class government", "freedom" and Anglo-Saxon nationalism in both England and America in the 1860s on a purely Marxist basis. These were freedom from the Norman Yoke.

Marxism provides one of the best exposes of the cover up of the impact of the Norman Conquest that lies behind traditional English ambivalence towards biological interpretations of history. The Anglo-American tendency to deny the biological aspects of the Norman legacy was a decisive contribution to Marx's error in interpreting "class" as a purely economic and social phenomenon. Conversely, one of the most fundamental reasons that Marx was wrong was that biological factors do matter and the Norman Conquest really did make a sociobiological "class" difference over the long-term of English history.

Marx inadvertently picked up upon the traditional English denial of the continuity of the "class system" from the Norman Conquest. In effect, he took the notion that the Norman Conquest really did *not* make a difference over the long run of English history and took this conclusion far more seriously than Lockean liberals themselves. Marx *systematized* this overlook of ethic-racial factors. He *clarified* traditional English ambivalence towards biological

explanations of "class", by taking seriously the implications of a truly non-biological understanding of "the English class system".

For the mysteriously missing biological factors, economic ones were substituted, producing an economic-deterministic view of history. From the misunderstanding of the past was the derived the misunderstanding of the future. From the premises of a thoroughly de-biologized view of English "class" conflict, Marx extrapolated the next logical step in this development. Just as the bourgeoisie triumphed over the "feudal" order, so would the proletariat oust the bourgeoisie.

But it was more than this. Marx could hear what appeared to be the beginning of the proletariat's revolutionary rumble. For example, Ogilvie's *Essay on the Right of Property* in 1838 declared that the "demands of the labouring classes are beginning to be heard from the deep degradation to which they have been submitted ever since the Norman Conquest".[872] Understanding the sociobiological reality behind such expressions of what Marx called "class consciousness" would require an integral examination of *unconscious* factors, the sum of a legacy of approximately four billion years of our ancient evolutionary history. The English proletariat "class consciousness" that Marx attributed to the industrial revolution was not the harbinger of new, but rather, the mutated residue of the old.

Ogilvie's "class" perceptions are a legacy of an original Robin Hood era simplicity when there existed no substantial middle class, but only the very rich conquering elite and the overwhelming majority of the poor. The emergent middle class in England was incubated between the economic ability of a bourgeois minority to overcome of the degradation of the old two "class" system, and the inability to fully thwart

the old "class" ceiling. Whereas America provided the opportunity for a successful *political* revolution, the failure of the Puritan Revolution in England diverted energies towards an *industrial* revolution. Bourgeois exploitation of the working class in early British capitalism developed from the *cultural paradigm* of the exploitations of the old conqueror class.

Note that quasi-Marxist theories of economic development cannot explain the revolution in economically primitive America. Charles Beard's influential *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913), for example, follows the Marxist pattern of substituting economic factors for the missing biological ones. A purely economic theory will not grasp the bourgeois revolutions as a transition from a *caste* system to a socioeconomic *class* system; *socioeconomic* class was meant to overcome the old *socioeconobiological* class.

The Hobbesian individual system, for example, was the first systematic attempt to break the English "class" system by design. The two systems are incompatible precisely because the original foundation of the English upper "class" was Norman kin selective nepotism that placed kinship ties above Hobbes' individual conception of the human. The English "class" system, in other words, preserved and perpetuated the order established by the Norman Conquest. Liberal individualism, in this context, means making individual exceptions that defy Norman predatory kin selection.

Locke and Shylock

Strangely enough, Marxism is actually one of the most influential *theoretical* culminations of the Anglo-Jewish convergence. As a German of Jewish descent, Marx was

susceptible to being duped by the more "politically correct" interpretations of the "English class system", especially on the basis of the political nurturism advanced by Locke. In his radical, self-consistent thoroughness in exorcising the theoretical import of his own kinship-ethnic origins, Marx is comparable only to Hobbes.

The logic of Marxism was made possible by a pattern of deemphasis of biological factors that is observable among both Jews and Anglo-Saxons. While Marxism is the classic example of the more extreme Jewish variety, his theory built upon repression of the biological basis of the English "class" system and those particular international gentiles that spearheaded the industrial revolution and modern democracy. The Saxon-centric distaste for reminding themselves of how their political-hereditary inferiority originated their capitalist-democratic revolt contributed to an economic over biological-hereditary interpretation of history. This, in turn, helped Marx verify his bias against observing the kinship-ethnic origins of English "class", for the alternative would imply the theoretical significance of his own kinship with other Jews.

Just as some Anglo-Saxons repressed their stereotypical association with the lower class through the empowerment of a capitalist middle class, Marx repressed the stereotypical association of Jew and capitalist through his empowerment of the lower class. The revolutionary English repression of the association of class and ethnic identity is what gave Marx historical license to take its Lockean nurturist logic to its logical extreme.

The utter delusion that the British Empire or the American Civil War can be understood in purely economic terms is a by-product of an *Anglo-Saxon conquest of the historical record,* which makes it appear, by default, that

bourgeois Anglo-Saxons were the sole founding masterminds behind both the British and American Empires. Yet this was nothing less than a counter-usurpation of 1066, a usurpation of the scepters of empire, which had the rather ironic effect that Anglo-Saxons unwittingly became the very best friends of Marxist theory. Karl Marx and the Anglo-Saxons have been sleeping in the same theoretical bed together because both denied the *hereditary* and cultural consequences of 1066.

It was said of the Victorian era English Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli: "the fundamental fact about (him) was that he was a Jew."[873] Disraeli agreed. He believed that "the vicissitudes of history find their main solution—all is race" which is "the key to history".[874] The man famously flaunted his pride in his Jewish descent, calling himself "the chosen man of the chosen people."

Disraeli claimed that "race" is the key to history. Marx claimed that socioeconomic "class" is the key to history. Disraeli claimed that "race" could explain "class". Marx claimed that "class" could explain "race". Here we have a remarkable phenomenon: two diametrically opposite nineteenth century views of the "English class system" by Jews who had been converted to Christianity in their childhood. Crucially, these opposite and incompatible views of the role of biology in history appear to be directly dependent on their interpretation of "the English class system".

Disraeli saw the upper class and non-upper class in England as the division of "two nations". This insight was the key to the formation of Disraeli's entire racialistic Weltanschauung, for it demonstrated that the apparent exception of the seemingly un-nationalistic English was actually a confirmation of the rule. I think it is safe to say

that Disraeli, twice Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, had a far more subtle and intimate understanding of the nature of the English "class" system than Marx. If Disraeli had lived to see the rise and fall of communism in Eastern Europe, he likely would have predicted the resurgence of nationalism that followed its collapse.

Disraeli's insight, albeit partial, is the key to Marx's mistake. Marx saw economic development as the driving force that broke down the medieval valuation of kinship-community relations. It was, on the contrary, the Norman Conquest-based "class" system that most distinctly stimulated the corruption of the legitimacy of kinship ties in England.

England's precocious economic development was stimulated by this internal breakdown of kinship relationships and a complex cultural cross-fertilization with France. What Marx overlooked is that it was precisely the *lack* of kinship, and hence, the lack of altruism between "classes", that both engendered the "class" groupings in the first place and set the conditions by which biological-kinship factors could conceivably be considered irrelevant. The *lack* of a sense of kinship between classes provided a superficial empirical verification of Marx's fully economic view, but it was this corruption of kinship relations that came first.

In Maestripieri's comparative behavioral study of rhesus macaques and humans, he observed that while kinship corresponded with altruism and nepotism, this did not mean that mutually beneficial relationships could not be had between nonrelatives:

> When individuals help nonrelatives, however, they typically expect something in return....Social interactions between unrelated individuals are business transactions in which services are exchanged for other services. These business

> transactions are regulated by the laws of supply and demand.[875]

Modernity is associated with a general decline of nepotistic behavior in favor of the "business transaction" model as the universal, rational basis for human relationships. The Norman Conquest jumpstarted England's precocious path to modernity in many ways, including updating England with the most "progressive" Continental developments. The permanent lodgment of Norman-French influence broke down a more primordial connection of genes and culture. The Conquest began a process of breaking down internal English kinship unity in general.

Economic activity was promoted and stimulated by a sense of the lack of legitimate restraint of political-kinship-altruism relationships. The highest level of political principle was permanently corrupted with the façade of righteous Conquest. The kinship based social values that had restrained individual selfishness in ancient times crumbled from the top down. Duties were jettisoned in favor of rights. Economic relations became a substitute for the kinship relations that had broken down. It was the breakdown of kinship-political relationships that uniquely stimulated economic relationships in England, not economic relationships that first broke down kinship-political relationships.

This made England very different from Germany. While "class" divisions prohibited "race" unity in England, "race" unity was able to overcome "class" disunity in Germany and thus ground the most potent anti-Marxist movement the world has ever known: Nazism.

While Marx was mistaken in thinking that the English "class" system could be understood on the fundamental

basis of *economic* class, Disraeli was mistaken in thinking that it could be understood on the fundamental basis of race. Among the reasons for Disraeli's mistaken assumption was the import of *acquired* culture of France. There is no reason to think that Norman Vikings had an inherent biological proclivity towards 'Frenchness'.

Yet distinction through Frenchification was crucial to maintaining the distinctive identity of the conqueror class. Historian Gerald Newman referred to the "vivid daily testimony of the five senses, which gave such extraordinary power to the new anti-Norman campaign" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pallid Marxist abstractions of "class" can hardly portray "the pretty social climbers twittering their mangled French at the theatre and calling their countrymen 'animals' and 'canaille,' affecting to despise everything English as proof of their own superiority and 'eligibility.'"[876] It is not hard to see why some would think that this legacy is better forgotten.

Marx gave no ultimate historical significance to these visceral social and cultural aspects of "class". For him, these were irrelevant epiphenomenon of the economic motor of history. Newman's *The Rise of English Nationalism* helps clarify Marx's misunderstanding by showing how the aristocratic class "cosmopolitanism" that he observed between England and France before the French Revolution helped stimulate the protest of democratic nationalism. No, "class" was not just about England or Britain. Marx overgeneralized this "international" aristocratic "class" connection between England and France because he failed to understand that it was a unique civilization fruition of the Norman-French conquest of England.

The Sherwood Forest Laws

The modern liberal democratic order that resulted from the Norman/Saxon conflicts is a continuation of this predominance of economic relationships over biological-kinship relationships that emerged out of their mutual destruction. Yet a modern bias that mistakes a lack of kinship between "classes" for a lack of kinship factors in general can easily allow the reality of economic factors to eclipse its interconnection with kinship factors in the rise of modernity itself. Take, for example, an early precedent of later English "class conflicts", the Peasant's Revolt of 1381. The final straw that sparked the revolt was an unusually severe poll tax that the ruling order desired in order to finance its war in France. In a rampage of killing and burning, the rebel leader in London declared

> that anyone who could catch any Fleming or other alien of any nation might cut off his head….On that day there were beheaded about 140 or 160 people in all. Then they made their way to the houses of Lombards and other aliens, and broke into their dwellings, and robbed them of all their goods that they could lay hands on.[877]

While the economic aspects of the event are evident, a purely economic view cannot fully explain the special preference for foreigners. The influx of foreigners was largely an extension of the continental connections that were wrought by the Normans invasion. The peasants also attacked landlords and their manors, tax collectors, lawyers, and documents that attested to villein status. All were classic representations of the Norman tyranny.

The uprisen peasants demanded "that there should be no law within the realm save the law of Winchester".

Winchester was the capitol of England in the days of Saxon King Alfred the Great. Was the peasant revolt bound up with an early form of Anglo-Saxon nationalism? Could it be, as Michael Wood has suggested, that

> [t]hey believed that England was an old nation whose rulers had brought in too many foreigners who had grown fat on the nation's wealth. Foreigners were riding on the backs of the native English

who did indeed have a sense of being apart of "our land…our people…our nation" distinct from its Frenchified rulers. It should not be surprising that in one case, in a village called Peatling Magna during Simon de Montfort's rebellion in 1265, peasants told the king's men, armed intruders, that they were against the very *communitas regni* (the community of the realm).[878] The charge, it seems, was that they were against the *commonwealth*, not unlike the conception of "Commonwealth" later formed through Puritan Revolution.

Hatred of foreigners with riches in London was only an extension of the hatred directly against the rich descendants of the conquerors profiting from and exploiting their nation. The logic underlying the behavior of both the exploiters and the exploited was the logic of kin selection. Put another way, this inexplicable typhoon of violence cannot be understood without a sociobiological understanding of the collective unconscious.

Rebel leader Wat Tyler, leading a large body of men, compelled the government to negotiate at Smithfield in 1381. Instead of a reception of civilized negotiations, Tyler was killed in the presence of the young Richard II. Tyler had no rights against arbitrary government to defend his life or his men. But this does not mean that "liberty" was lacking. On

the contrary, the government was exercising *its* liberty to dispose of rebels as it saw fit.

Most history books suggest that it was Magna Carta, and not this rebellion, that was the true ancestor of the modern notion of rights. Yet as Thomas Paine would write in *The Rights of Man*, "If the Barons merited a monument to be erected at Runnymede, Tyler merited one in Smithfield." Tyler's revolt has been denied a historical monument for the same reason that the Puritan Revolution has been downplayed in favor of 1688 and 1776. 1381 and 1649 lacked that one decisive historical ingredient: success. Yet this cannot alter recognition that the aristocratic liberties that Magna Carta sought to protect, born of the right of conquest, are permanently stained with the blood of Wat Tyler.

Paine was right. Tyler and the revolt he led against the feuding order originated in the same area of eastern England that later became the stronghold of Puritanism in the English Civil War. It can thus be said that the American North can trace its tradition of struggle for rights to Smithfield, while the American South can trace its tradition of aristocratic liberties to Runnymede.

"Villeins ye are and villeins ye shall remain," King Richard announced sadistically after revoking his promises to the rebel leaders. Yet *villein* is a French word that denotes an unfree peasant, a slave of their Norman lords. The powerfully negative connotation of the word has survived in its etymological descendant, *villain* (a modern semantic revolution that vilifies lord and master). Before 1066 they had been *geburs*, free men with *wergilds* and some access to the public courts.

Robin Hood stories arose when the "good old cause" was comparatively new. Yet he was a well-established figure of popular English imagination by the time of the Peasant

Revolt of 1381 and was surely an inspiration to the rebels. A mixture of legend and reality,[879] Robin Hood came to represent the popular hero of the Saxon side. As a cultural phenomenon, the historicity of an actual Robin Hood is irrelevant in comparison to the question of why this particular character took such a hold over the popular imagination.

The realistic conditions behind the Robin Hood legend are to be found in the oppressive forest laws introduced by the Normans. William the Conqueror designated entire regions of England as royal forest. According to the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* entry of 1086, William had those who killed deer in his forest blinded. "William did not inherit the cruel laws of maiming both dog and man who interfered with the game in his forests", wrote L. G. Pine. "These hateful impositions were William's own gift to the English."[880]

The people who lived in these forests had to pay for both privileges and offenses dictated by the authorities. In addition to the offense of hunting, one could be fined for cutting wood and keeping dogs that could be used for hunting. By the reign of Henry I at the latest, the forests were well administered to enforce the laws. By the thirteenth century, the laws covered one-quarter of England, including the populous county of Essex.[881] With the surveillance control these laws effected and the considerable revenues they produced, it is perfectly understandable why the royal authorities would have had the good profit sense to expand the domains covered by the forest laws — and why these arbitrary impositions would have been a focus of popular resentment.

Historian Michael Wood wrote that Robin Hood's legendary emblems were bows and arrows; the emblems of foresters. Killing deer was Robin's game: "*we lyve by our*

kynges dere."[882] This was an outright defiance of the forest laws imposed by the Normans.

The poll tax was only the final aggravation that triggered peasant revolt in 1381, the final straw of abiding policies such as the ever-encroaching Conquest innovation of the forest laws. If we attempted to overlook these kinship-ethnic dimensions and explain 1381 in terms of a neat and tidy economic formula, we could call the peasant's revolt against the poll tax a revolt against *taxation without representation*. Revolt was representation. Revolt, at the very least, was meant to transfer wealth through Robin Hood-inspired socialism back from the rich (Norman) to the poor (Saxon). The Norman elites, after all, were the original "robber barons" of Anglo-American history.

Even in the mid-twentieth century England, the legacy of the forest laws still reigned. "Although game and its taking is no longer the prerogative of esquires and gentlemen," Pine observed, "there is a decided bias in the law against the small man or, as he used to be called, the working man. This is a direct result of the Norman invasion."[883]

Socialism as Slavery

"Slavery" existed in some form prior to the Conquest and it was *formally* outlawed in the following century while "serfdom" acquired a new importance as the new lowest rung in English social order. Historian George Garnett's observation that "Duke William's claim to the kingdom of England was fabricated"[884] is of utmost relevance in gauging the meaning of these legal categories of "slavery" and "serfdom". If "[s]crupulous legalism was based upon a fabricated history, which ultimately legitimated the despoliation of the Conquest",[885] then the legal categories of "slavery" and "serfdom" should be reevaluated in this light.

If the slavery that was outlawed under Norman rule existed from before the Conquest, then who were the masters? If this slavery was a continuation of pre-Conquest practices then this means, by definition, that slaves that remained were owned by natives. Slavery at the bottom of the social scale was serving some Anglo-Saxon interests, not Norman interests. Normans had no need for *that* specific kind of slavery, since the taxed labor of the *entire native population* was their prize. Ending "slavery", then, was actually the finishing off a last remaining way in which Anglo-Saxons could be genuine masters over others in their own country. In this sense, ending "slavery" was a continuation of the Conquest's elimination of Anglo-Saxon masters in England. Ending slavery among the natives sent the message that there would be only one kind of master in England: the *Norman* master. Far from being a selfless act of virtue, ending *this* kind of slavery actually confirmed and consolidated the *totality* of the Norman mastery of England.

When these developments are put in context with other Norman innovations such as primogeniture, *then* one can grasp the historical meaning of Thomas Paine's declaration in *The Rights of Man*: "*hereditary government over a people is to them a species of slavery, and representative government is freedom.*" It is from this perspective, the perspective of the Norman Yoke, that the formal "abolition of slavery" in the twelfth century must be judged. Norman lawyers were in a position to decide, in nice legal categories, that "slavery" was abolished while "serfdom" could be considered a new realm of freedom. The technical, cunning, lawyerist abolition of slavery at the bottom of the social scale actually helped preserve the larger slavery of virtually *all* Anglo-Saxons represented by the Conquest itself.

Norman-American slavery (and primogeniture) advocate George Fitzhugh clearly saw, not only the relationship between Anglo-Saxon serfdom and slavery, but also the more general slavery of an *entire race*. If there was a period that could be called the age of Anglo-Saxon slavery it is what the great historian of English constitutionalism, William Stubbs, called "two hundred and thirty years of labour and sorrow"[886] from 1066 to 1297. It was this golden age of slavery that Fitzhugh reflected upon with nostalgia and pride. In *Sociology for the South* (1854), he argued for Southern slavery as a form of socialism necessary to oppose the rampant capitalism and individualism of the North.

Slavery, he argued, was beneficial to the morality of the slave in that it developed a strong work ethic:

> The master requires and enforces ordinary morality and industry. We very much fear, if it were possible to indite a faithful comparison of the conduct and comfort of our free negroes with that of the runaway Anglo-Saxon serfs, that it would be found that the negroes have fared better and committed much less crime than the whites.

Statistics do not bear out Fitzhugh's comparison. If white-collar crimes are excluded and "crime" is understood in a conventional, bourgeois sense, freed blacks commit more crime than freed "Anglo-Saxon serfs". Yet what has kept the latter out of trouble is, at least in part, that former Anglo-Saxon serfs have been better than blacks in retaining the work ethic of a slave.

Fitzhugh revealed a key connection between slavery and a strong work ethic. What many of those former Anglo-Saxon serfs of the American North ultimately developed was what Nietzsche called a slave morality. But is the stronger work ethic of the North fundamentally more rational?

Francis Fukuyama, following Hegel and Nietzsche, explained:

> In fact, opting for the life of a slave over that of a master is not obviously more rational, unless one accepts the higher relative moral weight given to self-preservation over recognition in the Anglo-Saxon tradition.[887]

The democratic work ethic of the North cannot be explained by a fundamentally superior rationality because it is not self-evidently more rational to spend one's life working like a slave rather than living the life of a master. In this sense, the Northern capitalist's way of life was not fundamentally more rational than the Southern slave master's way of life.

The modern conception of "freedom" conceals the ways in which it retains a form of slavery. Anglo-Saxon freedom is the freedom to work like a slave. Norman aristocrats were free to cultivate themselves as human beings precisely because the work of Anglo-Saxons or blacks *freed* them from having to work like a slave. This is one way of understanding the relationship between the original definition of "liberty" as privilege, and the kernel of its original association with freedom.

While the origins of capitalism have famously been traced to a "Protestant Work Ethic", a comparison between the values of Protestant Cavaliers and Protestant Puritans demonstrates a flaw in this argument. Anglican or Episcopalian Cavaliers were also Protestant, but they also distinctly valued their liberty *from* work. Historian David Hackett Fischer demonstrated that the slave-owning Cavaliers of the South possessed a far more ambivalent work ethic than the Puritan-Yankees of the North.[888] Work was for slaves. Leisure was characteristic of aristocrats and masters.

The Puritan work ethic designated a possible place for themselves in heaven while sentencing Norman aristocrats to hell.

The Normans enslaved the Anglo-Saxons so that the Anglo-Saxons would work for them. This is one of the most important origins of the Puritan work ethic and the precocious capitalism of English-speaking world. The Normans, in other words, inadvertently contributed to the rise of capitalism by enforcing "ordinary morality and industry" so that the Anglo-Saxon would work for them as slaves. A key difference between Anglo-Saxons and blacks after the Norman Yoke was that the Anglo-Saxons not only kept the work ethic that originated in submissive obedience to Normans, they radicalized it. While medieval Normans "civilized" Anglo-Saxons in the limited sense of organizing them in relatively work-efficient ways, modern Anglo-Saxons turned this Norman contribution around into the capitalist means of defeating the Norman way of life.

While Fitzhugh originally took pains to not alienate Anglo-Saxon nationalism and thus save the possibility of bringing them back into the old fold, he nonetheless revealed:

> It is the boast of the Anglo-Saxon, that by the arts of peace under the influence of free trade he can march to universal conquest.

The Anglo-Saxons were different. To defeat the legacy of the Norman Conquest, the Anglo-Saxons evolved a qualitatively different way of conquest.

In the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (D) entry for 1066, the writer complained that, among other things, William "laid taxes on people very severely".[889] Then and thereafter, "the government" reaped the fruits of the productive labor of the

people and then audaciously directed this strength of the majority into the means of weakening them. The conquerors used the proceeds of conquest, the money of the majority, to pay for conquering them, to pay for the ability to oppress them further, and to pay for the ability to subjugate them indefinitely. In short, the Norman policy was one of mandatory *taxation without representation*.

The Norman interest was originally served by increasing the government's power of taxation and protecting a peculiar form of property rights: the liberty of Normans to partake of the fruits of Anglo-Saxon (slave) labor. From this view one can see how increasing Saxon-centrism became correlated with an economic policy of decreasing the government's power of taxation and protecting the rights of (non-slave) property. Further augmentation of economic-Saxon-centrism eventually evolved into a program of general economic development. Capitalistic economic development was originally was an *extension* of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism; an adaptation to the conditions of the occupation.

That economic realpolitik was understood to help bring down the rule of the old Norman order was evident in 1861, when liberal prime minister to-be William Gladstone justified the assertion of the economic dominance of the House of Commons on the grounds that he was only "restoring that good old constitution which took its root in Saxon times."[890] The rise of capitalism that threatened the conqueror class in Britain may also have helped provoke Southern support for the American Revolution. T. H. Breen's *Tobacco Culture: The Mentality of the Great Tidewater Planters on the Eve of Revolution*, for example, argued that increasing debt owed to English capitalists threatened the planters' social dominance, and hence, their entire way of life in years

preceding the American War for Independence. One can discern the same basic pattern in 1861. The apparent "ideological" contradiction between elite Southern support for the both the American War for Independence and the War for Southern Independence actually masks very consistent behavior. In both cases, the Norman-Cavalier based planter "class" recognized the economic and cultural threat posed by the aggressive rise of capitalist power, and reacted with a military defense of their cultural conceptions of honor.

The conditions that promote precocious economic development are clarified by an insight of Benjamin Constant (1767-1830):

> War and commerce are only two different means of arriving at the same goal—the possession of what one desires. Commerce is an attempt to receive by agreement what one no longer hopes to conquer by force. A man who would always be the strongest, would never think of commerce.[891]

The failed Puritan Revolution was the last attempt to conquer political supremacy by force in England. No longer hoping to conqueror by force, the Anglo-Saxon desire for power became channeled, not in a violent political revolution, but in England's industrial revolution. Economic power then became a means of penetrating political power. If Anglo-Saxons "would always be strongest" in a manner more comparable to lineages of the Norman aristocracy, however, they "would never think of commerce".

Distinctly bourgeois-capitalistic interests are inseparable from the kind of power a non-military-aristocracy has at its disposal: economic power. The Jews, for example, represent one of the most extreme adaptations to the commercial life through a depoliticized existence over thousands of years.

Less extreme variations on the same pattern of adaptation are found, for example, among the Dutch as a small nation surrounded by great powers and a history of foreign rule.

While I have focused on the example of the "Anglo-Saxons", this is at least partly a term of convenience in recognition of the dominion the Conquest "class" order has had over the entire British Isles, for many of the most distinctly modern ideas and developments are actually Scottish. Scots such as the economist Adam Smith were vital in shaping what Nietzsche calls "English" ideas. The Scots have their own tradition of rebellion, their own 'Braveheart', their own fight against the same conquest-minded "English" ruling class (even as "Scots" such as Robert the Bruce were largely of Norman descent). The romanticization of the Norman problem in Sir Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe* also told the story of his Scottish homeland.

Without an understanding of its origins in emasculating the Norman Conquest political order, the American contradiction of a smiling public-political face of peace and humanity and a private-economic one of ruthless greed would be inexplicable. Puritan-American norms accept and promote aggressive qualities in the economic sphere and passive qualities in the military-political sphere. If economic aggression is represented by the entrepreneur, then political aggression is represented by the imperialist. Rebuffing the imperialist alpha male ideal represented by William the Conqueror, the Anglo-Saxons found their thwarted ambitions channeled into a matured solution of economic imperialism. The new system produces capitalist conquerors, super-bourgeois beta males such as Bill Gates and Warren Buffett.

Instead of the crimes exemplified by the force and fraud of the Norman Conquest, the new order is characterized by

the bourgeois vices exemplified by the exploitation of the industrial revolution. The vices that Jews were once vilified for in the medieval age became the virtues of the capitalist modern age. Medieval evil is modern good when channeled into practical, economically sensible, and moderate forms exemplified by the capitalist American dream.

In early America, the native "Indians" were compared to European aristocracy, accustomed to "hunting, indolence, and war", while Indian women were expected to do the common work of society. Anglo-Saxon economic morality dignifies their adaptation to the virtues of (liberated) Indian women. In other words, the liberation of commerce is a kind of feminism. Just as "home economics" is traditionally subordinated to the patriarchal head of household, economics was traditionally subordinated to politics. The Normans were so successful at domesticating the Anglo-Saxons that their very revolutionary liberation simply resulted in the normalization of economic feminism; a masculinization of trade and an emasculation of politics. In this sense economic development is akin to female bodybuilding, while the more distinctly political development of ancient Rome was akin to male bodybuilding.

Since free market capitalism emerged out of impotence against the British class ceiling, the "Norman Yoke" was an incubator of capitalistic liberal democracy. While capitalism could be an expression of Anglo-Saxon genetic adaptation in its original context, the economic solution to the Norman Yoke helped to finish what that oppression started. Capitalist economic development, an uncontrollable cancer to kinship-political values, shattered what was left of even the kinship bonds that make the "Norman Yoke" a living social force. When taken to its extreme, the valuation of

extended economic relations is inversely related to the valuation of extended kinship relations.

Behind George Fitzhugh's advocacy of slavery was advocacy of a form socialism that could overcome capitalist individualism's threat to the social fabric. In this sense, Fitzhugh's *Sociology for the South* anticipated the right wing Nazi (National *Socialist*) negation of the left wing form of socialism represented by Marxism. Marx's left wing mixture of "class" and socialism had an opposite parallel in Fitzhugh's right wing mixture of "class" and socialism. Since Fitzhugh represented an extreme form of the original form of the English "class" system, and Marx's "class" misinterpretation of history was most strongly influenced by English "class" during the industrial revolution, it should not be surprising that Marx's mistake would have cultural consequences in the English-speaking world.

Fitzhugh's sociology is key to understanding the strong *cultural* basis of America's revulsion to socialism, and most especially the Marxist form of socialism. To put it as simply as possible, for the Anglo-Saxons, *socialism was slavery*. While in *theory* Marx's revolution was to represent a further negation of the old "feudalism", in *practice* that mixture of "class" and socialism stimulated a deep American cultural association of "class" socialism and slavery. George Fitzhugh's combination of "class", socialism, and slavery thus exposes the deepest cultural roots of American resistance to communism and Marxism.

When men like Stalin ascended to a William the Conqueror-like mastery of the Russian communist world, the equation of socialism and tyranny was complete. The Leninist-Stalinist reinterpretation of Marxist *theory* took what was the diametrical opposite of Fitzhugh's "class" socialism and realized, in practice, a kind of fulfillment of

the role of William the Conqueror. In this rather bizarre manner, Stalin actually fulfilled the key Conquest hole in Marx's theory. This made Leninist-Stalinist communism, not the fulfillment of an egalitarian future, but like a horrific recollection of the very worst of the past.

Could it be that there was a cultural difference between North and South that can account for Fitzhugh's slave socialism? Economics cannot fully account for the difference between the Southern value of the master's leisured self-cultivation and the Northern work ethic of the slave. George Fitzhugh's cultural defense of slavery revealed the heart of this difference of values between North and South:

> Every scholar whose mind is at all imbued with ancient history and literature, sees that Greece and Rome were indebted to this institution alone for the taste, the leisure and the means to cultivate their heads and their hearts; had they been tied down to Yankee notions of thrift, they might have produced a Franklin, with his "penny saved is a penny gained;" they might have had utilitarian philosophers and invented the spinning jenny, but they never would have produced a poet, an orator, a sculptor or an architect; they would never have uttered a lofty sentiment, achieved a glorious feat in war, or created a single work of art.

That was the difference between the ancients and the moderns, and that was the *cultural* difference the South attempted to preserve.

The American Civil War, recognized historian Eugene D. Genovese, was fought over irreconcilable, fundamental values: "'The War for Southern Independence' was an irresistible product of the natural development of the slaveholders' political culture."[892] More specifically, it was "the political hegemony and aristocratic ideology of the

ruling class...rather than economic factors that prevented the South from relinquishing slavery voluntarily."[893]

> If for a moment we accept the designation of the planters as capitalists and the slave system as a form of capitalism, we are then confronted with a capitalist society that impeded the development of every normal feature of capitalism....Their society, in its spirit and fundamental direction, represented the antithesis of capitalism, however many compromises it had to make….Theirs was an aristocratic, antibourgeois spirit with values and mores emphasizing family and status, a strong code of honor, and aspirations to luxury, ease, and accomplishment….The essential features of Southern particularity, as well as of Southern backwardness, can be traced to the relationship of master to slave.[894]

Just as in Britain, sheer monetary net worth did correspond with the membership in the upper echelons of the old "class" system. It is capitalist liberal democracy, by contrast, that has made money a far better predictor of "class". The conqueror class possessed "wealth" while capitalists possessed "money".

Slavery, then, was an economic system, "but it was much more….Not every material interest is worth defending to the death, and it is not obvious that any should be."[895] Genovese concluded, "so intense a struggle of moral values implies a struggle of world views and that so intense a struggle of world views implies a struggle of worlds".[896]

> When we understand that the slave South developed neither a strange form of capitalism nor an undefinable agrarianism but a special civilization built upon the relationship of master to slave, we expose the root of its conflict with the North….The ideology and psychology of the proud

> slaveholding class made surrender or resignation to gradual defeat unthinkable, for its fate, in its own eyes at least, was the fate of everything worth while in Western civilization.[897]

The American Civil War was a clash of civilizations. Those who think that cultural differences do not matter have the luxury of not knowing how history would have been different if the South had won.

By smashing Southern resistance by force of arms, many optimistic Northerners thought they could bring out the latent goodness of human nature. From the proposition of such a benign view of human nature, it is impossible to imagine that America could have become all slave, instead of all free. From the proposition of such a benign view of human nature, the Norman Conquest could never have happened.

But it did.

Marxism vs. Leninism-Stalinism vs. God

Marx's clarity about "class" conflict arose from obscuring the issue of the Norman/Saxon "race" conflict. But why Russia? Why was it Russia that proved to be receptive, fertile ground for the Marxist "class" conflict view of history? Why was it this country among the traditionally Christian lands that found in communism a revolutionary answer in concordance with its particular culture and history?

According to "Normanist theory", Rus was the slavicized form of Ruotsi, the Finnish name for the Swedes. These Scandinavians were also known as North-men or Normans. "Russia", then, traces its political existence to the Rus Vikings who inflicted a Norman conquest upon its original Slavic populations. Déjà vu?

In 862, the Norman-Rus captured Kiev. In 882, a Rus named Oleg united the cities of Novgorod and Kiev, making the latter the capital of the first Russian state. The *Russian* state, then, by definition, was originally a Norman state even as the Rus built upon elements of political order developed by the native Slavs.

A primary difference between these Normans that conquered Slavic peoples to create Russia and the Normans who conquered England was that the latter acquired French language and culture and its more direct continuity with Greco-Roman civilization. (Minus these contextual exceptions, when I refer to Normans I am referring to Normans from Normandy.) This cultural difference notwithstanding, both the Slavs and the Anglo-Saxons were conquered by Normans in medieval times. In modern times, both Slavs and Anglo-Saxon revolted against the Norman Yoke. (The cumulative colonialism and imperialism of the West and Japan acted as an analogous yoke for Chinese communism.)

This means that the egalitarian inclinations of both the America Revolution and the Russia Revolution have a common sociobiological origin: Anti-Normanism. These two great twentieth century rivals were historically united by an original common impulse to throw off the Norman Yoke. The Cold War was a struggle between two different philosophies of Anti-Normanism.

The more radically egalitarian appeal of communism trumped liberal democracy in Russia for many reasons, but at least two sociobiological factors are most apparent: the more proletarian composition of the general Slavic population and the influence of a traditionally oppressed Jewish minority. So while Jews were disproportionately attracted to the communist movement, Russia had internal

tensions of its own that were responsible for the mass appeal of communism. Not surprisingly, many communist leaders of Jewish background, such as Trotsky, found their leadership violently or non-violently displaced.

The key to understanding the link between English-speaking liberal democracy and Red Russia is that Karl Marx misinterpreted the English "class" system, thought its bourgeois-centric anti-Normanism to its logical conclusion, and provided an intellectual foundation for what, in Russia, became the next great step in the logic of Anti-Normanism. It is hard to overemphasize how powerful this insight is as a scientific verification of this interpretation of Marxism. The theoretical mistakes that led Marx to interpret "race" as wholly an issue of "class" explains, in part, not only why Marx's predictions failed to materialize in the English-speaking world; it explains why the "Marxist" view of history found its seemingly greatest success in Russia. By interpreting the legacy of the Norman aristocracy of Russia as the source of "class" conflict, the Red revolutionaries accurately *replicated* the nature of Marx's original mistake.

The thesis that "class" conflict originated in hostility to Norman conquerors was verified by history itself. Just as it had been in the English-speaking world, so it would be in Russia. Hostility to England's Normans conquerors found a historic parallel among Russia's Norman conquerors.

The Norman (Rus) origins of the Russian ruling "class" provided the "class" tensions that made it susceptible to revolution. This is why Russia was inordinately susceptible to the Marxist "class" understanding of history. This is a major empirical verification of the nature of Marx's mistake because it means that Marx's primary theoretical model of England's industrial revolution replicated itself with an

uncanny exactitude in the major practical model of Russia's Red revolution.

It was as if Marx took up the role of Errol Flynn in *The Adventure of Robin Hood*, except that instead of declaring, "It's injustice I hate, not the Normans!", Marx announced that it was "class" that the English capitalists hated, not the Norman legacy. Even as America itself opted for the 'Errol Flynn' interpretation of history, one can see how *both* the capitalism of America *and* the communism of the former Soviet Union owed the universalistic assumptions of their ideologies to repression of the impact of Norman conqueror "classes" upon history. Furthermore, this implies that there existed a latent, common Anti-Normanism that makes sense of the strange alliance of Anglo-capitalism and Soviet communism against a new breed of Nordic conquerors.

When the seemingly inexplicable alliance of the liberal democratic West and the Soviet communists during World War Two is reappraised with this insight, then it becomes apparent that this odd couple was decisively, historically united through a common ancestor: Anti-Normanism. The English-speaking world and the Russian-speaking world were united by a common modern founding in revolution against a Nordic "master race". This was the historic basis for Allied unity against Nazi Germany.

Were the Nazis right about race? Is America doomed to break out into the most chaotic bloodfeud the world has ever seen? These questions raise the further question of whether the modern idea of progress was or was not a delusion.

At first glance, this understanding of history might appear to bolster the Nazi contention that race and biology are primary and that non-biological factors such as economics or technological development are and always will be subordinate factors in human history. It was Marx, after

all, who contended that economic development would ultimately override all other factors in human history.

Yet it is precisely by understanding why Marx was wrong, and especially why Marx's theories *cannot* be considered a sound blueprint for the architecture of a post-liberal democratic state, that one can appreciate Marx's foresight regarding the problems that capitalism is developing for itself. It precisely by understanding that Hitler refuted Marx at Auschwitz, that one can appreciate Marx's partial insight into postbiological evolution *despite* his failure to integrate biological evolution. It is precisely by understanding the ways in which Marx did *not* see far enough into the implications of capitalist evolution that one can appreciate his partial insight into ultimate self-destruction of the so-called "capitalist system".

One of Marx's least cogent claims was that economic-material development, and not great human leaders, will lead to the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist, liberal democratic state. Lenin disagreed with Marx on this critical point. "The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own efforts, is able to develop only trade union consciousness", wrote Lenin in *What is to be done?* (1902). "The theory of socialism, however," was developed by "educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals."

Revolution required intellectual or educated political elite. Lenin's deviation from Marx and Engels thus led, not accidentally, but logically, to a classic political tyranny. Leninism led logically to Stalinism. Marxism can thus be differentiated from Leninism-Stalinism on this key point: the necessity of a revolutionary vanguard of elite human leadership as *decisive* to the implementation and preservation of revolution.

After spending his adulthood studying Russian and Soviet history, Richard Pipes concluded, "Stalin sincerely regarded himself as a disciple of Lenin, a man destined to carry out his agenda to a successful conclusion."[898] The Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union would *never* have been brought into existence without the disciplined leadership abilities of Lenin, Stalin, and their high command. And this means that what America outlasted, in the form of the Soviet Union, was the Leninist-Stalinist divergence from Marx.

Leninism-Stalinism was based on the correct insight that Marx's predictions failed to account for something potent and transformative enough to lead to a fundamental breakdown and overthrow of normative capitalism. Leninism-Stalinism was also correct in its next logical step: the basic factor unaccounted for by Marx was the decisive import of elite leadership. But is the recognition of the import of elite, intelligent leadership necessarily incompatible with the original Marxist premise that economic development itself will produce the conditions for the collapse of normative capitalism?

Marx's improbable claim that economic-material development will ultimately trump the need for elite human leaders may turn out to be a point on which he was right. What Marx failed to anticipate is that capitalism is driving economic-technological evolution towards the development of artificial intelligence. The advent of greater-than-human artificial intelligence is the decisive piece of the puzzle that Marx failed to account for. Not the working class, and not a human elite, but superhuman intelligent machines may provide the conditions for "revolution".

The prospect of artificial intelligence exposes the final flaw of Marxism and reason for the overthrow of Marx's

vision of future human history. If this is correct, the first signs of evidence may be unprecedented levels of permanent unemployment as automation increasingly replaces human workers. While this development may begin to require a new form of socialism to sustain demand, artificial intelligence will ultimately provide an alternative to "the dictatorship of the proletariat".

America juxtaposes the seemingly bizarre combination of modern technology and medieval religiosity. What do the worship of progress, the worship of technology, and the worship of God have to do with one another? The creation of an artificial intelligence trillions of times greater than all human intelligence combined is not simply the advent of another shiny new gadget. The difference between Leninism-Stalinism and the potential of AI can be compared to the difference between Caesar and God.

Ur-alienations

The natives who experienced their England defeated at Hastings "groaned aloud for their lost liberty" and raged for "freedom from the power of the Normans". Many dispossessed Anglo-Saxons fled to a "New England" in the Byzantine Empire only to find themselves fighting their hereditary enemies ruling in Southern Italy and Sicily. It was not unlike the Anglo-Saxon who fled to a "New England" in America only to find themselves fighting their hereditary enemies ruling the South.

Like the Anglo-Saxon expatriates who had fled England to serve in Varangian Guard, the Puritans were too proud to endure the terms of subjugation. Yet there was a decisive difference between the old medieval Anglo-Saxon nobility and the Anglo-Saxon Puritans. The Puritans were the

descendants of those who stayed, their pride humbled and moralized by endurance and necessity. The difference between the old medieval Anglo-Saxon nobility and the Puritans was a difference of virtue. While the virtue of the former was closer to the more distinctly masculine virtue of the ancient Greeks and Romans, the virtue of the Puritans was less masculine, less political, and more "modern". Put another way, the difference between the masculine notion of virtue exemplified by pagan Rome and the feminine notion of virtue of Christianity is captured by the difference between the exiled Anglo-Saxons nobles who served in the Varangian Guard and the Puritans. Unable to free their country of Norman power, those who became Varangians salvaged a warrior's way of freedom through service in the surviving eastern half of the old Roman Empire. The Puritans are largely the descendants of those Anglo-Saxons left to wrestle with freedom-in-subjugation.

The Puritans represent one side of a psychological split between those Anglo-Saxons who admired the pagan virtues of Conquest and those who attempted to purge themselves of those seductions that culminated in a combination of self-debasement and self-delusion. This split of the psyche parallels the split between ancient Greco-Roman virtue and Christian inspired "modern" morality. In this way, the Norman Conquest provoked a rupture between ancient virtue and modern virtue among Anglo-Saxons who turned their *demoralization* from a pagan standpoint into a *remoralization* from a Judeo-Christian standpoint.

Christianity also exacerbated the impact of the Conquest towards the creation of modern equal individualism. As French historian Phillipe Ariès recounted:

> the idea of an immortal soul, the seat of individuality, which had long been cultivated in the world of clergymen, gradually spread, from the eleventh to the seventeenth century, until it gained almost universal acceptance.[899]

Building upon the premise of the infinite value of every human life as created in the image of God, the Christianity notion of the soul mutated and evolved into the "self" of liberal thought. In England, this Christian incubation of the unique value of "the individual" between the eleventh and seventeenth century paralleled the incubator of the Norman Yoke almost exactly. In consequence, the Norman Conquest and Christianity constitute the great, decisive Ur-alienations from ancient pagan naturalism. Norman Conquest and Christianity mutually reinforced the influence of one another in a way that ultimately catalyzed the egalitarian values that constitute "modernity" and liberal democracy in the English-speaking world.

This was the key difference that split the English-speaking world from the German-speaking world. German Christianity, Protestant and Catholic, never penetrated quite as deeply in a *practical* or "utilitarian" sense because its influence was not multiplied by a practical predicament comparable to the Norman Conquest. It was precisely because the Normans were *not* Nazis, and more specifically because they appropriated a French-Latin valuation of civilization over *Kultur*, that the Norman Conquest launched an ironic step towards modernity that the Germans found alien.

Both Christianity and the Norman Conquest uprooted the Anglo-Saxons from their original native *Kultur* in the convenience of their own homeland. Christianity uprooted their distinctively pagan culture, while the French Normans uprooted their distinctively Germanic kin-culture.

Christianity attacked kinship at its roots in family values, while the Normans attacked Anglo-Saxon kinship at its political heights. Penetrated from outside by the Normans and from the inside by Christianity, these conditions prepared the "borderless" modern world where kinship borders retreat before the borders between individual humans.

Taken together, the Norman Conquest and Christianity engendered a mutually reinforcing synergetic influence, each multiplying the effect of the other, so that the net sociobiological effect of both was far greater than the sum that either influence would have been in isolation. The reason for this is that the Norman conquerors, worthy heirs of Rome, reproduced the kinds of oppressive imperialistic conditions that catalyzed Christianity in the first place. While the Normans inherited imperial lessons from Rome, the Anglo-Saxons would inherit anti-imperial lessons from the Jewish-Christians. The high degree of distinctiveness of modern egalitarian values from the values of the ancient Greeks and Romans is traceable to this multiplicative effect.

The Norman Conquest was the decisive source of the political-cultural divergence between the conquered Anglo-Saxons and the largely unconquered Germans. The failure to grasp its impact and influence contributed to the decisive world-historical blunders, in theory and practice, of *both* Marxism *and* Nazism. It would not be too much to say that the failure of the crude Nazi race theories to grasp 1066 as the decisive source of their difference from the Anglo-American world was one of the most important theoretical errors to contribute to their strategic defeat.

The founders of America created something greater than the sum of its Norman and Saxon parts. Just as Christianity was born in the contextual clash of Roman imperialism and

Jewish monotheism, the latent civil war between Southern-Cavalier aristocracy and Northern Puritan-democracy was rationalized and civilized into a higher *civilizational* synthesis that transcended the *cultural* differences between them. The uniqueness of the American founding was thus rooted in the attempt to transcend the Norman/Saxon conflict. In this way, the soul of America at its founding, a clash of opposites, dimly reflects the soul of the mongrel breed who represents the dawn of the modern gentile world.

What the founders actually created was a sociobiological cyborg. By overcoming the *organic* separation of powers between North and South with an *artificial* separation of powers, the inventors of America created a polity that was partly an artificial mechanism and partly biological mechanism; a cyborg. This sounds artificial, and it is, in part. Yet if crowned with artificial intelligence, the American founding could be conceived as a first primitive step towards the constitutional rule of God. It may be that the ultimate significance of the Anglo-Jewish convergence lay in uniting all humankind in the Technological Singularity — the climax of modern enlightenment that portends the overcoming of the conflict between reason and revelation.

The Norman Calamity

Genealogist L. G. Pine was a moderate Christian, not a Marxist. He nonetheless observed that "[i]t was not until the ravages of the Black Death that the villein class began to lose its chains. If ever the slogan of the 19th and 20th centuries had any meaning—workers unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains—it was in the period after Hastings—from the 11th to the 14th century," the period that included the extreme oppression and "anarchy" of Stephen's reign (1135-1154). "Any idea of the Normans, ecclesiastics or otherwise,

being a kindly, considerate folk deserves the name of myth."[900] This was also the view of the highly influential historian of the English Constitution, William Stubbs: the origins of English "liberty" are to be found in that early post-Conquest slavery.

The Anglo-Saxon failure to admit how Normans molded their very reaction to them reveals not principles universal to all humankind, but rather, a basic lack of self-knowledge, a lack of self-honesty, and a lack of historical maturity. Aside from provoking democratic revolutions, the Puritan-liberal way of heroism expressed itself in the use of morality as a sword and shield in attack and protection from this truth. Lurking behind the dead hand of the liberal-moral tradition is a basic dishonesty in facing the naked, bare, ugly reality that stares in the mirror. Pretensions to moral superiority over prejudice were an *alibi* for tribal hostility against the government. This alibi for self-deception has culminated in a morality of dishonesty that is the foundational source of American hypocrisy on the issue of biological difference.

But finally, why is Pine's view of the Norman Conquest different from so many conventional historians? Modern studies of the effects of the Conquest tend to focus on virtually all factors *except* kinship and genealogy. The classic-modern technique of evasion of kinship-biological factors is an overemphasis on economics. This skewed perspective, perfected by Marx, still survives in less consistent forms, upholding the modern apartheid between culture and its biological foundation.

However, from the perspective of this genealogist, a former editor of *Burke's Peerage*, the long-term kinship and hereditary consequences of the Conquest were by definition of his profession inescapable. Pine's proto-sociobiologist analyses could not help but to uncover the Norman

Conquest's rupturing impact on hereditary lineages and its reflection in the both new "class" order and the national psyche. That "class system" almost permanently institutionalized the *psychological* belief that the Normans represent a superior "class" of human being. Anglo-American egalitarianism cannot be understood without realizing how so many of the ambitious among the subjugated have perpetually debased themselves, hankering after a "gentle" Norman pedigree. Without *this* perspective, *this* emphasis on kinship, so fashionably deemphasized, the full, long-term impact of the Conquest cannot be comprehended. And on the specifically genealogical aspects of British history, Pine was more qualified to pass judgment than even the greatest of British historians.

Yet even Pine's fine contributions are inadequate for an accurate evaluation of the hereditary consequences of 1066. To overcome the simplemindedness of both "a tale of two races" overgeneralizations and a statistically misleading overemphasis on individual exceptions, a systematic reevaluation of all genealogical evidence in socioeconomic context is necessary.

Pine began his *Heirs of Conqueror* lamenting what he perceived to be the perverse spectacle of a nation that celebrated the 900th anniversary of its own subjugation. He ended that appraisal of the Norman legacy upon England with these words:

> I hope that in the course of this book I have been able to bring home to the reader the fact that the Norman Conquest was an act of sheer downright aggression, and that, so far from it being the beneficial action it is often represented to be by conventional historians, it was a calamity. The development of a free people was thwarted, diverted from its true ends and given certain permanent characteristics

which have been all to the bad. The true destiny of England was within the island of Great Britain, and in the fullness of time upon the seas and oceans of the world, not upon the continent of Europe in blood-soaked rivalry with France; and although the Norman itch for lands in France has long since been overcome, there remains deep in the English consciousness a dislike of France and things French which is inexplicable without the searing effect of the Conquest on the national soul.

Deep in our consciousness as a nation we bear the scars of a Conquest so notable in our annals that it is seldom necessary to use the qualification of Norman. Until the present it has also exerted the influence, again not properly understood, of a determination never again to be conquered. May that always be the case, and may we always remember the day when our forefathers' resistance ended and left the Norman master of the land.[901]

[388] Wood, *In Search of England*, 15.

[389] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 47.

[390] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest*, 71.

[391] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest,* 1.

[392] Higham, *The Norman Conquest*, 72.

[393] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest*, 33.

[394] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest* , 42.

[395] Brown, *The Norman Conquest of England: Sources and Documents,* 103.

[396] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest*, 42.

[397] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest*, 40.

[398] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest*, 42.

[399] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest*, 43.

[400] Another notable myth comes from an invested investigator named Mr. Harward, who concluded that John Harvard, for whom the university is name, is a long lost descendent of Hereward (and which might as well have the status of an honorary fourth lie, to add the other three on his well-known statue). See Head, *Hereward,* 166-68.

[401] Head, *Hereward,* 2.

[402] Head, *Hereward,* 1.

[403] Head, *Hereward*, 38.

[404] "Autobiography" (1743-1790) in Jefferson, *Writings,* 9.

[405] Ellis, *American Sphinx*, 37-38.

[406] Pappas, *English Refugees in the Byzantine Armed Forces* [*The Ecclesiastical History of Ordericus Vitalis,* M. Chibnall, ed. and tr., vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 1969), 202-205.].

[407] Douglas, *The Norman Achievement, 1050-1100,* 89.

[408] Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, 86.

[409] Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, 87.

[410] Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, 88.

[411] Oman, *A History of the Art of War*, 164-5.
[412] Oman, *A History of the Art of War*, 149, 165.
[413] Pappas, *English Refugees in the Byzantine Armed Forces*, [Shepard, 90]
[414]Higham, *The Death of Anglo-Saxon England*, 230.
[415] Ibid., 230
[416] Pappas, *English Refugees in the Byzantine Armed Forces.*
[417] Ibid.
[418] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 9.
[419] Wood, *In Search of England,* 8-9.
[420] Wood, *In Search of England*, 20.
[421] Borrow, *Wild Wales*, 10.
[422] Wood, *In Search of England,* 22.
[423] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 12.
[424] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 14.
[425] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 4.
[426] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 411.
[427] Thomas, *The English and the Normans,* 19.
[428]Accessed 8/21/06, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/trail/conquest/after_norman/search_montys_past_03.shtml
[429] Pine, *Sons of the Conqueror*, 60.
[430] Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, 69.
[431] Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, 93, 97.
[432] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 361.
[433] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, xlvii.
[434] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 225.
[435] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 351.
[436] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, xxxvi.
[437] From *De Bow's Review*.
[438] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 128.
[439] Huntington, *Who Are We?*, 58.

[440] Huntington, *Who Are We?*, 64-5.
[441] www.ancestryuk.com/WashingtonTheFirst.htm. Accessed 6/11/09.
[442] Pine, *They Came with the Conqueror*, 49.
[443] Pine, *Sons of the Conqueror*, 228.
[444] Wilson, *George Washington*, 13-14.
[445] Carpenter, *The Struggle for Mastery*, 7.
[446] Garnett, *Conquered England*, 358.
[447] Garnett, *The Norman Conquest: A Very Short Introduction*, 37, 35, 6.
[448] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 71-72.
[449] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 61.
[450] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 67.
[451] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 83-84.
[452] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 59.
[453] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 57.
[454] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 57.
[455] Cobb, *Away Down South*, 44.
[456] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 74.
[457] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 85.
[458] Huntington, *The Promise of Disharmony*, 154.
[459] Pine, *They Came With the Conqueror*, 39.
[460] Stampp, *The Causes of the Civil War*, 138.
[461] Pine, *They Came With the Conqueror*, 83.
[462] Pine, *Sons of the Conqueror*, 194.
[463] Rose, *Superior Person*, 1.
[464] Lee, *General Lee*, 2.
[465] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 121.
[466] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 67.
[467] Wood, *In Search of England*, 14.
[468] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 101.
[469] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 26.

[470] Stampp, *The Causes of the Civil War*, 124.
[471] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 213.
[472] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 5.
[473] Huntington, *The Promise of Disharmony*, 87.
[474] Hill, *The Experience of Defeat*, 315.
[475] Hill, *The Experience of Defeat*, 23.
[476] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 32.
[477] Woods, *The American Revolution*, 3.
[478] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 106.
[479] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 62.
[480] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 133.
[481] Head, *Hereward,* 127.
[482] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars,* 339.
[483] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 4-7.
[484] Stampp, *The Causes of the Civil War*, 202.
[485] Behnegar, *Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics*, 31.
[486] Gravett & Nicolle, *The Normans*, 20.
[487] Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power,* 241-242.
[488] Brown, *The Normans*, 19.
[489] Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power,* 6-7.
[490] Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power,* 8.
[491] Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power,* 9-10.
[492] Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power,* 238.
[493] Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power,* 3.

[494] Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power,* 177.

[495] Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power,* 233.

[496] Chibnall, *Anglo-Norman England,* 167; Douglas, *William the Conqueror*, 315.

[497] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 11.

[498] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 19.

[499] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 104.

[500] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 60.

[501] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 139.

[502] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 143.

[503] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 44.

[504] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 1-4.

[505] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 1.

[506] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 13.

[507] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 50-51.

[508] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 7.

[509] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 8.

[510] Garnett, *Conquered England*, 351.

[511] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 33.

[512] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 169.

[513] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 155.

[514] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 166.

[515] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 42.

[516] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 74-77.

[517] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 100.

[518] *Churchill's History of the English-Speaking Peoples,* 36.

[519] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 118.

[520] Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power*, 154-55.

[521] Pine, *Sons of the Conqueror*, 80.

[522] Garnett, *Conquered England*, 358.

[523] Searle, *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power,* 10.

[524] Bates, *William the Conqueror*, 14.

[525] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest*, 2.

[526] Rex, *The English Resistance,* 69.

[527] Quoted in Rex, *The English Resistance,* 215 from *First Century of English Feudalism,* 148.

[528] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 47.

[529] Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, 94.

[530] Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, 94.

[531] Pine, *They Came with the Conqueror*, 181.

[532] Thomas, *The English and the Normans,* 29.

[533] Chibnall, *Anglo-Norman England,* 208.

[534] Wood, *In Search of England*, 15.

[535] Wood, *In Search of England*, 15.

[536] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 19.

[537] Quoted in Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest,* 2.

[538] Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, 94.

[539] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 163.

[540] Rex, *The English Resistance,* 193.

[541] Douglas, *William the Conqueror,* 6 [from *Life and Letters* (ed. W. R. W. Stephens), vol. I, p. 125]

[542] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 112.

[543] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 66.

[544] From Round, "Feudal England" in Hollister, *The Impact of the Norman Conquest,* 25-26.

[545] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 94.

[546] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 71.

[547] Fletcher, *Bloodfeud*, 10.

[548] Harrison, *The Common People of Great Britain*, 198.

[549] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 81.
[550] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 81.
[551] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 75.
[552] Hughes, *The Causes of the English Civil War*, 143.
[553] Thompson, M. P., "The Idea of Conquest in Controversies Over the 1688 Revolution", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1977), pp. 33-46.
[554] Jefferson, *Writings,* 1490.
[555] i.e. p.105.
[556] Philips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 36.
[557] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 100.
[558] Wood, *The American Revolution*, 55.
[559] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 19.
[560] Boorstin, *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson*, 62.
[561] Wood, *The American Revolution*, 55.
[562] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 73.
[563] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 73.
[564] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 73.
[565] Jefferson, *Writings,* 752.
[566] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 73.
[567] Jefferson, *Writings,* 1490.
[568] Wood, *The American Revolution*, 21.
[569] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 209.
[570] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 217.
[571] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 218-221.
[572] Jefferson, *Writings,* 1490.
[573] Wood, *The American Revolution*, xxiv.
[574] Hollister, *The Making of England,* 96.
[575] "A Summary View of the Rights of British America" in Jefferson, *Writings,* 118-119.
[576] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 62.
[577] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny,* 21.

[578] Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*, 227.

[579] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 95.

[580] "To Major John Cartwright" in Jefferson, *Writings*, 1491. It is interesting that that the most tory of the major American Revolutionries, Alexander Hamilton, was on his father's side descended from a branch of the Norman house of Hamilton based in Scotland. (See Ron Chernow's *Alexander Hamilton*; Pine, *They Came with the Conqueror*, 175.)

[581] Freeman, *A Short History of the Norman Conquest of England*, xxiii-xxxiv.

[582] "To Major John Cartwright" in Jefferson, *Writings,* 1491.

[583] "To Major John Cartwright" in Jefferson, *Writings,* 1493-94.

[584] Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714*, 153.

[585] Ellis, *American Sphinx*, 37-39.

[586] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 220-1.

[587] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, 35.

[588] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 49.

[589] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 43.

[590] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 11.

[591] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 119.

[592] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 86-87.

[593] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 87.

[594] Alcock, *The Triumph of Sociobiology,* 202.

[595] Bonaparte, *The Mind of Napoleon*, 194-195.

[596] Hölldobler and Wilson, *Journey to the Ants,* 126.

[597] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 118.

[598] Hölldobler and Wilson, *Journey to the Ants,* 126-130.

[599] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 84.

[600] Durant, *The Life of Greece,* 80-81.

[601] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 55.

[602] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 232.

[603] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 233.

[604] Wood, *The American Revolution*, 61.

[605] Thomas, *The English & The Normans*, 70.

[606] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 81.

[607] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 155.

[608] Searle, *Predatory Kinshp and the Creation of Norman Power*, 243.

[609] Lines 3547-48, quoted in Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest,* 1.

[610] Wood, *In Search of England*, 16.

[611] Head, *Hereward,* 5.

[612] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 83.

[613] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 76-77.

[614] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 77.

[615] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 74.

[616] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 86.

[617] Philips, *The Cousins' War*, 373-4.

[618] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 185.

[619] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 66.

[620] Arendt, *On Revolution,* 43.

[621] Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,* 80.

[622] Jefferson, *Writings,* 752.

[623] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 109.

[624] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 85.

[625] Alternatively, it is also true that institutions such as the Senate, as a modernized House of Lords, allowed important aspects of aristocracy to survive American "democracy".

[626] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 67.

[627] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 66.

[628] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 63.

[629] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 77.
[630] MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, 68.
[631] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 77.
[632] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 82.
[633] *The Vintage Mencken,* 132.
[634] Thomas, *The English and the Normans,* 250.
[635] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 69.
[636] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 119.
[637] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 163.
[638] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 165.
[639] Pine, *They Came With the Conqueror*, 22.
[640]To attempt to overcome the deep, traditional politicization of the geneological evidence, it would have to thoroughly reevaluated from the bottom up, i.e. with computer techniques of statistical analysis contextualized by history and culture.
[641] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 163-4.
[642] Thomas, *The English and the Normans*, 36-37.
[643] Pine, *They Came With the Conqueror*, 211-212.
[644] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 66.
[645] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 85.
[646] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 120-1.
[647] Rex, *The English Resistance,* 74.
[648] Thomas, *The English & the Normans*, 50.
[649] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 69.
[650] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 120.
[651] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 84.
[652] Thomas, *The English and the Normans*, 9, 83.
[653] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 72.
[654] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 72.
[655] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 71.
[656] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 19-20.

[657] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 208.
[658] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 218.
[659] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 212.
[660] i.e. Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 225.
[661] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 224.
[662] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 216n.
[663] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 222.
[664] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 605-21.
[665] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 165-7.
[666] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 53-55.
[667] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 57, 61.
[668] Fox-Genovese and Genovese, *The Mind of the Master Class*, 311.
[669] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 351.
[670] Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery*, 28.
[671] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 109.
[672] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 232.
[673] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 31.
[674] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 204.
[675] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, 171.
[676] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 142.
[677] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 117.
[678] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 219.
[679] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 148.
[680] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, 58-9.
[681] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 348-50.
[682] Fox-Genovese and Genovese, *The Mind of the Master Class*, 89.
[683] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 201.
[684] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 187.
[685] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 52.

[686] Fitzhugh, *The History of the Fitzhugh Family (Vol. 2)*, 129-130.
[687] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, xxx.
[688] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 40.
[689] Pine, *They Came With the Conqueror*, 203.
[690] Fitzhugh, *The History of the Fitzhugh Family (Vol. 2)*, 129.
[691] Fitzhugh, *The History of the Fitzhugh Family (Vol. 2)*, 249-256.
[692] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 217.
[693] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 52, 53, 71.
[694] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 71.
[695] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 204.
[696] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 53, 30.
[697] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 13.
[698] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, xxiv.
[699] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 172.
[700] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 243.
[701] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 205.
[702] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, xx.
[703] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 87, 198.
[704] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 94.
[705] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 238.
[706] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 215.
[707] Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery*, 8.
[708] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 31-32.
[709] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 131.
[710] Fox-Genovese and Genovese, *The Mind of the Master Class*, 170.
[711] "A Summary View of the Rights of British America" in Jefferson, *Writings,* 118-119.
[712] Thompson II, *The Birth of Virginia's Aristocracy*, 116.
[713] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 135.

[714] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 136.
[715] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 103.
[716] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 119.
[717] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 246.
[718] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 109.
[719] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, xx.
[720] Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery*, 29.
[721] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 63.
[722] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 248.
[723] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 69.
[724] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 256.
[725] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 254, 94.
[726] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, xxxiv.
[727] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 89.
[728] Fox-Genovese, *The Mind of the Master Class*, 665.
[729] Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke*, 83.
[730] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, xxxvi. See Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 220-1.
[731] Phillips, *The Cousins' Wars*, 382-3.
[732] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 131.
[733] From *De Bow's Review*.
[734] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, xix.
[735] Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy & Caste in America*, x.
[736] Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy & Caste in America*, 87-108.
[737] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 69.
[738] i.e. Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 226.
[739] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 161.
[740] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 124.
[741] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 75.
[742] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 28.

[743] West and Gates, Jr., *The Future of the Race*, 73.
[744] Kaufmann, *hegel*, 105.
[745] Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols* in *The Portable Nietzsche,* 542.
[746] Thomas, *The English and the Normans,* 247.
[747] Brown, *The Norman Conquest of England, Sources and Documents,* 35-6.
[748] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 86.
[749] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 12.
[750] Treitschke, *Politics*, 5.
[751] Philips, *The Ascent of Woman, A History of the Suffragette Movement and the Ideas Behind It,* pgs. x-xi.
[752] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 84.
[753] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 70.
[754] Ellis, *American Sphinx*, 63.
[755] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 159.
[756] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 43.
[757] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 132.
[758] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, xlviii.
[759] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, 117.
[760] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, xxx.
[761] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, 130, xxxiii.
[762] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, l-li.
[763] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, xxxi.
[764] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, 101.
[765] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, lvii.
[766] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, lvii.
[767] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, liii.
[768] Gates, Jr., *Lincoln on Race and Slavery*, xlvi.
[769] Stampp, *The Causes of the Civil War*, 109-112.
[770] Stampp, *The Causes of the Civil War*, 58.
[771] Holmes, *Why Was Charles I Executed?*, 179, 183, 193.

[772] McPherson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution*, 29, 33-34, 42.
[773] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 9-10.
[774] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 15.
[775] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 18.
[776] Hill, *Liberty Against the Law,* 242.
[777] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 4.
[778] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 5.
[779] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 20.
[780] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 4.
[781] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 8.
[782] Chibnall, *The Debate on the Norman Conquest*, 49.
[783] McPherson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution*, 43-44.
[784] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 17.
[785] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 140.
[786] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 16.
[787] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 18.
[788] Holt, *Magna Carta*, 14.
[789] Garnett, *The Norman Conquest: A Very Short Introduction*, 70.
[790] Garnett, *The Norman Conquest: A Very Short Introduction*, 37, 35, 6.
[791] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny,* 16.
[792] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 38.
[793] Hobbes, *Behemoth*, xxxi.
[794] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 206.
[795] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 211.
[796] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 89.
[797] Garnett, *Conquered England*, 358.
[798] Garnett, *Conquered England*, 359.

[799] All things considered, the Norman/"Saxon" division is the most historically significant ethnic divison and hence is *generally* justifiable. However, both Michael Wood and Winston Churchill suggested the most individualistic populations were associated with the area where Danish Vikings settled, i.e. the east English lands once known as the "Danelaw" (Wood, *Domesday,* 182; *Churchill's History of the English-Speaking Peoples,* 24-25). Hatred of the Normans was inordinately rife there from the very beginning. There is some correlation with these populations and the historic Puritan stronghold of East Anglia. The impulse to separatism may have been strongest here because they were the most historically separate within the "Anglo-Saxon" population, i.e. separate from even the old Wessex (West Saxon) dynasty that included Alfred.

Although East Anglian *difference* may, at least in part, be traced to Danelaw difference reinforced by attempts at ethnic cleansing exemplified by St. Brice's Day, East Anglian *individualism* seems to be the product of a unique confluence of historical circumstances. Even if Danes ruled the area of the Danelaw, they did not completely decimate the native Angle population. This means that as population growth continuted over the centuries, Dane and Angle populations would have grown into one another, increasing the incidence of intermarrige. The Danes were cut off from their relations on the continent after the Conquest, alienated from the native population due to experience such as the St. Brice's Day massacre, and alienated from the Norman government for reasons common to the rest of the native populations. When later population growth intermingled Danes and Angles, all of the above factors combined militated against any coherent correlation of political

territory and ethnic identity. The lack of clear ethnic or sociobiological borders in all directions directly correlates with the rise of clear individual borders.

[800] Pine, *They Came With the Conqueror*, 18.

[801] Hollister, *The Making of England,* 99.

[802] Maestripieri, *Macachiavellian Intelligence*, 143.

[803] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 149-50.

[804] Fox-Genovese and Genovese, *The Mind of the Master Class*, 93.

[805] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 45.

[806] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest,* 64.

[807] This logical sociobiological explanation for the *grassroots* origins of this cult should be kept in mind despite routine efforts to diffuse ethnic interpretations of the Conquest, i.e. "His cult was not a focus of English feeling against the Normans, but a local observance in which both English and Normans shared." (Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest,* 146.) There is a local aspect in that there are also local tribal divisions within "Anglo-Saxon" England.

[808] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 336.

[809] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 326-7.

[810] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 52.

[811] Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, 272-273.

[812] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 107.

[813] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 52-53.

[814] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 74.

[815] Huntington, *Who Are We?*, 68.

[816] Huntington, *Who Are We?*, 64.

[817] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 95.

[818] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny,* 22.

[819] Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke*, 11.

[820] Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy,* 624.

[821] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 51.
[822] Boorstin, *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson*, 61.
[823] Huntington, *Who Are We?*, 106.
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[830] Pine, *They Came With the Conqueror*, 211-212.
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[837] Hill, *The Experience of Defeat*, 40.
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[839] Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down,* 146.
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[847] Huntington, *Who Are We?*, 69.
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[849] Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, 44.
[850] Watson, Normans and Saxons, 58.

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[852] Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment,* 88-89.
[853] Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, 165.
[854] Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, 249.
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[858] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 890.
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[861] Dershowitz, *The Vanishing American Jew,* 51.
[862] Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment,* 94.
[863] Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny,* 22.
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[879] On Robin Hood see Wood, *In Seach of England*, 71-90.
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[885] Garnett, *The Norman Conquest: A Very Short Introduction*, 37, 35, 6.
[886] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 232.
[887] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 160.
[888] Fischer, *Albion's Seed*, 365-8.
[889] Brown, *The Norman Conquest of England: Sources and Documents*, 72.
[890] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 112.
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[892] Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery*, 5.
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[897] Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery*, 35-36.
[898] Pipes, *Three "Whys" of the Russian Revolution*, 83.
[899] Ariès, *The Hour of Our Death,* 606.
[900] Pine, *Sons of the Conqueror*, 34.
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Converse Cognates

Why the Norman Conquest Was the
World-Historical Ass-Kicking
That Deflected the English-speaking World
From the German Path to Nazism

ENGLISH SONDERWEG

I employed the word "state": it is obvious what is meant—some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organized for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad. That is after all how the "state" began on earth: I think that sentimentalism which would have it begin with a "contract" has been disposed of. He who can command, he who is by nature "master," he who is violent in nature and bearing—what has he to do with contracts![902]

—FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, *ON THE GENEOLOGY OF MORALS*

Why does evil prevail? The historian whose unthinking conscience allows them to justify the Norman Conquest, could as easily justify the Nazi subjugation of Europe. Had Nazi Germany triumphed in 1945, they would undoubtedly have found good reason to see, in German rule of the continent, the hand of Providence, working for the good of humanity.[903]

—L. G. PINE, *SONS OF THE CONQUEROR: DESCENDANTS OF NORMAN ANCESTRY*

William I, CONQUEROR OF THE ANGLO-SAXON RACE

The Norman Conquest was the World-Historical Ass-Kicking that twisted the course of human history. After defeating the native Anglo-Saxons at the Battle of Hastings, the victors from the French duchy of Normandy completely displaced the native aristocracy, upper clergy, and administrative officers. All positions of the highest authority were mastered. The foreign French language and culture that these descendants of Viking "blond beasts" had adopted dominated England for three hundred years. The price of England's defeat at Hastings was a permanent military occupation later euphemized as the "English class system".

What were the long-term effects of the Norman Conquest?

The nineteenth century Oxford historian Edward Augustus Freeman somehow believed that "in a few generations we led captive our conquerors". Freeman implicitly characterized himself as one of the "we" who the broke the tyranny of the Norman Yoke over English history. If this were political reality, however, it would mean nothing less than revolution: an overthrow and defeat of the Norman usurpers. But when was this revolution? Is it really possible that history could have casually overlooked such an event?

What Freeman's conclusions lack is common sense. His six volume *The History of the Norman Conquest of England* (1867 – 1879) has helped to hold the historical significance of the Norman mastery of the Anglo-Saxons in scholarly captivity. How refreshing it is, then, to recover Thomas Paine's *common sense* understanding of the Conquest in his famous and explosively influential pamphlet of 1776:

> no man in his senses can say that their claim under William the Conqueror is a very honorable one. A French bastard landing with an armed banditti, and establishing himself king of England against the consent of the natives, is in plain terms a very paltry rascally original. It certainly hath no divinity in it.

For Paine, "exposing the folly of hereditary right" was exposing its historical origins in the Norman Conquest. An American born in England, he began in basic agreement with Freeman on the essential violence of William and his fellow invaders. Paine plainly disagreed, however, with Freeman's notion that the Normans had been "led captive" by the conquered in merely a few generations after 1066. Over seven hundred years later, he argued, England *still* lay in hereditary bondage under descendents of the Norman conquerors.

In *The Rights of Man* (1791), in an attack on the roots of Edmund Burke's "tradition", Paine urged the English to follow America's example and disinherit the hereditary Norman parasites:

> Let then Mr. Burke bring forward his William of Normandy, for it is to this origin that his argument goes. It also unfortunately happens, in running this line of succession, that another line, parallel thereto, presents itself, which is,

> that if the succession runs in the line of the Conquest, the nation runs in the line of being conquered, and it ought to rescue itself from this reproach.

What we have here between Paine and Freeman is basic disagreement about the long-term effects of the Norman Conquest. If Paine was wrong, and Anglo-Saxons were not "still in the line of be conquered", this implies that his intellectual justification for the American Revolution was partly wrong. If Freeman was wrong, and the conquerors were not "led captive" in only a few generations after 1066, then it would not be unreasonable to hypothesize that proud resistance to the Conquest might have subsequently resurfaced in various guises.

So who was right? A keen observation from Englishman G. K. Chesterton's *Orthodoxy* (1908) may help illuminate this dispute:

> only those will permit their patriotism to falsify history whose patriotism depends on history. A man who loves England for being English will not mind how she arose. But a man who loves England for being Anglo-Saxon may go against all facts for his fancy. He may end (like Carlyle and Freeman) by maintaining that the Norman Conquest was a Saxon Conquest. He may end in utter unreason—because he has a reason.

The contradictions between Freeman and Paine illustrate how "reason" has been employed as a tool for utterly opposite ends. Perhaps it was a common Anglo-Saxon ethnic pride that drove these opposite strategies: while Paine exposed the cataclysm of the Norman Conquest in support of an inversely cataclysmic revolution, Freeman posited a Saxon conquest of the Norman Conquest that mollified its

impact into historical gradualism. While both men converged on a generally anti-Norman view of English history, Freeman, as an Englishman, had to live with both the rejection of American revolutionary egalitarianism *and* the Burkean preservation of the traditional British political order founded in Conquest. Paine, as an Englishman who had expatriated to America, fought for both the promise of American egalitarianism *and* the exposure of the Norman Conquest as the historical origins of the undemocratic "tradition" praised by Edmund Burke.

As Chesterton observed, English identity cannot be identified with Anglo-Saxon identity because the Norman-French impact fundamentally and permanently altered the content of 'Englishness'. The peculiar nature of the reasoned irrationalism in Edmund Burke's argument for "tradition" is a direct consequence of a wish to preserve many of the consequences of the Conquest without admitting the Conquest itself. Thomas Paine offered a reasoned clarification of this point in *The Rights of Man*:

> Hard as Mr. Burke labored...and much as he dived for precedents, he still had not boldness enough to bring up William of Normandy and say, *there is the head of the list! there is the fountain of honor!* the son of a prostitute, and plunderer of the English nation.

Son of a prostitute? Whether or not William was a bastard in a literal sense, Paine's attack focused on a different kind of hereditary legitimacy. The Norman Conquest was like an illegitimate *founding* and America, he hoped, was founded *against* that bastard-conqueror paradigm.

The significance of the Norman Conquest has been so successfully repressed because virtually all sides have had "reason" to suppress it. For Burke to admit that his beloved

"tradition" was founded through the Conquest's destruction of Anglo-Saxon *tradition* directly exposed himself to the attacks of men like Thomas Paine. For Freeman to admit that the Norman Conquest was a not ultimately a Saxon Conquest would expose his Saxon pride to the unbearable realization that the Anglo-Saxon nation was still ultimately subject to the yoke of a Burkean "tradition" founded in 1066. For Paine to go *too far* with his exposé of the Conquest would expose his own arguments for "the rights of man" as the right to tribal warfare.

In other words, for all the incompatibility of these positions, each of these men nonetheless exhibited selective repressions of the impact of the Norman Conquest upon modern times. Burke repressed the existence of distinctive Anglo-Saxon traditions before the Conquest. Freeman repressed the existence of distinctive Norman traditions after the Conquest. Paine repressed the extreme claims of both traditions that would reduce him to a mere *reactionary* against the actions of 1066.

The heated debate over the lasting effects of the Conquest has never really ended. Each of the three above divulged partial views of the dangerous subject of the Norman Conquest. Is it possible to go beyond this intellectual feud of evasive half-truths and uncover a qualitatively more comprehensive understanding of the impact of 1066? Was the Norman Conquest a decisive historical turning point? How would it even be possible to know?

Perhaps the best way to gauge the long-term effects of the Conquest scientifically would be with a control group. This would entail a comparison with a similar people who had not undergone a comparable conquest. The closest thing to a controlled experiment in history is a comparison of people who are similar in all respects except for the factor(s) to be

controlled for. Needless to say, history furnishes no perfect controlled experiments. The opposite view that there are no bases for historical comparisons, however, is equally false. Since all life is related through its evolutionary origins, finding the closest comparison means reaching back to the roots of England.

"It is to Ancient Germany that we must look for the earliest traces of our forefathers," maintained the nineteenth century English Constitutional historian William Stubbs, "for the best part of almost all of us is originally German: though we call ourselves Britons, the name has only geographical significance."[904] The Germanic tribes that invaded Britain in the fourth and fifth centuries following the Romans retreat are now called "Anglo-Saxons". They arrived from their homeland between the mouth of the river Rhine and the Jutland peninsula; present-day Germany and Denmark. Continental Germanic peoples and its British diaspora originally shared very close bonds of language, culture, and ethnicity.

It was because of this common German origin that Lord Acton, speaking to Cambridge students in 1895, could maintain that history was important "because in society, as in nature, the structure is continuous, and we can trace things back uninterruptedly, until we dimly perceive the Declaration of Independence in the forests of Germany."[905] This implies, in agreement with Freeman and in disagreement with Thomas Jefferson, that there was no historic breaking point in that continuity.

Is it really true that what these ancient German tribes were originating in the forests of Germany was the distinctly modern political ideas of the enlightenment? Were they also developing capitalism in the forest? Another nineteenth century view is that of the German philosopher Johann

Gottlieb Fichte. One year after the French victory over Prussia in 1806, his *Addresses to the German Nation* recalled the historic defeat of Rome by the German tribal leader Arminius in 9 C.E.:

> Had the Romans succeeded in bringing them also under the yoke and in destroying them as a nation, which the Romans did in every case, the whole development of the human race would have taken a different course…It is they whom we must thank…for being Germans still, for being still borne along on the stream of original and independent life.

Fichte called upon his countrymen *as a nation* to throw off the yoke of Napoleon, the French conqueror that he perceived to be the cultural or civilizational heir of Rome.

Acton and Fichte cannot both be right. Since Germany itself never implemented politically self-sustaining individualistic and egalitarian principles comparable to the Declaration of Independence without having them imposed by foreign conquerors, Acton's assertion of its natural Germanic origin is more than questionable. Which nation, then, best preserved "the stream of original and independent life" from the ancient "forests of Germany", the Anglo-Saxons or the Germans?

Events of the twentieth century offer noteworthy illuminations upon this question. After all, which nation in that century most radically questioned the *universalism* of the individualistic and egalitarian principles of the Declaration of Independence? It was not the French — the differences between Locke and Rousseau, between 1776 and 1789, pale in comparison to Hitler's racial view of history. It was not the Russians — even the Soviet Russians claimed to have implemented a system that would eventually be the *universal* fate of humankind. It could have been *any* other nation that

posed the most thoroughgoing challenge to the idea that history progresses towards universal equality.

But no, it was not Mongol hordes or Asiatic despots that most consciously challenged the very basis of modern Western civilization. It was, on the contrary, a people who are among the very closest racial relatives of the Anglo-Saxons: the Germans. Nazi Germany decisively refuted the pretensions of the *universalism* of Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy.

While Stubbs could maintain that the English Constitution was an organic product of a Germanic nature in the Victorian Era, Nazism made it inescapable just how far these cognate Germanic nations had diverged. The Nazis launched a world war in the name of a racist cause that was challenged by the Anglo-Saxon branch of that race. History itself rose to challenge the thesis that Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy was simply a natural product of their racial-hereditary inclinations.

If the question of why Nazism happened in Germany requires an explanation, then so does the question of why democracy happened in the Anglo-French West. Why was the opposite not the case? The recurrent early twentieth century alliance of the English-speaking world and France is all the more peculiar in light of Acton's correct assertion that Anglo-Saxons and Germans do share a historic common origin. How did the English-speaking world come to have more in common with France than with Germany? The belief of the German writer Thomas Mann's that the Reformation "immunized" Germany against revolution may be partly plausible in reference to the French example, but this does not explain Anglo-Saxon democratic modernity. This book will focus on the historic divergence between the Germans and the Anglo-Saxons precisely because of the

exceptional degree of genetic and ethnic relatedness between them.

The ancient Roman historian Tacitus praised the primitive virtue of ancient Germanic peoples. In modern times, *both* Anglo-Saxons *and* Germans have claimed to be authentic heirs of these ancient tribes. The bare fact of Nazism and its explicit claims to that ancient origin demonstrated that both cannot be right. It was the Germans of Hitler's era who had a superior claim to have preserved the *Kultur* of the ancient Germanic tribes and the single greatest reason for this difference was the destruction of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* inflicted by the Norman Conquest.

The Second Founding of America: A New Norman Yoke in the New World

Is it true that a single ethnicity, the Anglo-Saxons, represent the most important driving force behind, not one, but *two* of the greatest empires the world has ever known: the British and the American? Aren't these the same Anglo-Saxons who are distinctly characterized by a love of democracy, freedom from government, and anti-imperialist rhetoric? Are these Anglo-Saxon virtues the *original* virtues that bred the distinctive imperial success of the English-speaking world? Something surely does not add up here.

In 1862, about a year after the outbreak of civil war, an influential Southern magazine named *DeBow's Review* published an essay entitled "Southern Civilization; or, The Norman in America" by J. Quitman Moore. "Among the races descended from the great Caucasian stock," he

believed, "the Norman is the august head and central representative power". Focusing on the minority population of the South's ruling "class" and their ancestors in England, Moore explained:

> This Cavalier, or Anglo-Norman element that had presided at the founding of the original Southern colonies...carried with them that same deep, master-passion—an abiding attachment to landed possession and territorial power, which is the secret of the universal dominion and ascendancy of the Norman race.[906]

Members of this "Norman race", such as the first president of the United States, George Washington, were disproportionately represented among the owners of the South's great slave plantations. America was founded as a republic, not a democracy, and Washington presided over an enlightened compromise; a compromise that *never* would have come about without the constitutionally sanctioned slavery that allowed the Norman conqueror way of life to survive in America. This compromise ultimately collapsed into civil war — a war fought, not over *slavery* itself, but over the *mastery* inherent in a new form of the old "Norman Yoke".

America's civil war was thus in many fundamental respects a mirror of the English Civil War, with its brief Puritan overthrow of the "Norman Yoke". Moore thought that Puritanism represented:

> the attempted conquest of the Norman by the Saxon which...finally gained a violent and bloody triumph in the overthrow and execution of the unfortunate Charles Stuart.[907]

England's Anglo-Saxon revolution, cloaked under the guise of religion as the Puritan Revolution, was undone by the Restoration of 1660.

If Karl Marx's theory of a clash of "classes" was partly explainable as a clash of Norman and Saxon in England, then the entire Marxist understanding of history was flawed from the beginning by the failure to recognize the importance of biological factors. This was a very different understanding of the roots of England's precocious economic development in the English Civil War period:

> When…the rapid growth of the commercial and industrial arts had developed a new order in the State...a collision between the two systems became inevitable, and the originally hostile races—Norman and Saxon—now assumed the shape of two equally hostile parties—the Cavalier and Puritan.[908]…These were parties that met on Naseby field under the hostile banners of Fairfax and Rupert, and from which have sprung two nationalities that now divide the empire of the American continent.[909]

The English Civil War and the American Civil War were like two battles in a larger epic conflict between Norman and Saxon. Anglo-Saxon nationalism became obscured as "democracy". "Nationalism", however, is the wrong word to describe Norman kinship solidarity; the Norman way inclined towards a caste system that Marx mistakenly universalized as a "class" system.

South slavery was a logical consequence of a political culture, masked by the compromises of the American founding, which could loosely be described as "Normanism":

> Aristocracy, based upon the feudal relation, is the natural expression of the political thought of the Norman—a social condition, resting on the principle of subordination, and recognizing the family as the primary basis of social union. Democracy, founded upon the idea of an unlimited individualism, and without any reference to the conservative organism of institutions, is the fundamental conception of the political philosophy of the Teuton or Saxon. The English constitution is the result of a compromise between these two hostile systems, with the Norman element in the ascendant, save during the brief reign of Cromwell.

In retrospect, one can observe that America became the mirror opposite of England: the American constitution is the result of a compromise between these two hostile systems, with the Saxon element in the ascendant, save the brief reign of Davis and the Confederate rebellion. The American founding was thus an enlightened compromise that stood betwixt two extreme civil wars: the English (1642-51) and the American (1861-65).

The aristocratic Southern culture that the compromises of the American Constitution were ultimately unable to hold peaceably within the Union was given its deepest philosophical defense by George Fitzhugh. A Norman-American descendant of Royalist supporters in the English Civil War (1642-51) and heir of an old English coat of arms,[910] Fitzhugh was most famous for his book *Cannibals All!, or, Slaves Without Masters* (1857). This was advocacy of slavery, not as an exception designated for the black race, but as a comprehensive way of life also good for most whites. "[N]ineteen out of every twenty individuals have…a natural and inalienable right to be slaves". The socialism of

slavery, he believed, was superior to the anarchic exploitation of capitalism.

Fitzhugh believed that the American Civil War was caused, not by slavery itself, but the inherent animosity between two races. The masters of the South, led by the (Norman) Cavaliers, "naturally hate, condemn, and despise the Puritans who settled the north":

> The former are master races, the latter a slave race, the descendants of the Saxon serfs.

In one of the most successful executions of enlightened ethnic cleansing in history, "democratic" Saxon-centrism has allowed a morality tale view of history wipe the very name of the Normans from the history books. An underlying race war between Normans and Saxons was refashioned as an anti-racist crusade of morally upright Anglo-Saxons.

Fitzhugh's unapologetic defense of master and slave clarified the nature of the Southern cause. He believed in the right of conquest: "We do not agree with the authors of the Declaration of Independence, that governments 'derive their just powers from the consent of the governed'.…All governments must originate in force, and be continued by force."[911] The "Declaration of Independence, Bills of Rights, Constitutions, Platforms, and Preambles and Resolutions" were not American scripture, they were a nosology — a study of classes of diseases. This was a declaration of *Southern* Independence:

> Our old Nosology is an effective arsenal and armory for the most ultra Abolitionists, and the more effective, because we have not *formally* repudiated it. Let "*The World is too little governed*" be adopted as our motto, inscribed upon our flag and run up to the masthead.[912]

Fitzhugh's diagnosis that modern egalitarianism was disease that could only be cured by a "master race" stands as a striking anticipation of Nietzsche. Only defeat in the bloodiest war in US history preempted a *formal* repudiation of the founding principles of 1776. Fitzhugh's characterization of the egalitarian values of the founding as a disease resembles nothing so much as the Nazi characterization of Jews and their egalitarian values as vermin. The Anglo-Saxons of the North, however, were not designated as a race fit for extermination; Fitzhugh believed that they, like their ancestors, were a race fit for slavery.

Fitzhugh represents the crowning radicalization of the Norman conqueror way of life through slavery, just as the Anglo-Saxon Puritans who settled the North radicalized their slave revolt through freedom. If his cause had been successful, the South would have established a second founding in America: a new 1066 in the new world. Does the Northern victory, however, imply that American democracy is the product of a Saxon "slave race"?

The Norman aristocrats of the South forced the Anglo-Saxons of the North to choose which side they *identified* with: the master race or the slave race. In making the pivotal choice that inevitably lead to equality with black slaves, they admitted before the world that their political identity had more in common with black slaves than with Norman masters. In that moment of world-historical decision, they *identified* with the cause of the slave race over the cause of the master race.

Was it not the ancestors of the Normans of the South who *created the nature of Anglo-Saxon racial identity* by annihilating their native aristocracy and binding them in servitude to Norman mastery of England? Do not the Anglo-Saxons owe

their very "love of liberty" to their hatred of their subjugation by the Norman conquerors? If so, then perhaps the Anglo-Saxon genius for democracy is a derivative by-product of the Norman genius for aristocracy.

A truly consistent, principled, advocacy of freedom could not justify, let alone enforce, binding the South when it called for its own declaration of independence from the Union. But were Northerners going to put abstract principle before a rising Norman master race poised for new conquests and, in time, a new 1066 that returned the Saxon "slave race" to their "natural" place licking the boots of their eternal Norman Conquerors? Now we can see what the bloodiest of American wars was really about: it was a clash of manifest destinies.

While the Anglo-Saxons of North may have won that war, could they have formally asserted themselves as the master race of America? Would that not stand diametrically opposite to the *moral* identity of the America that won the war? Was the original Puritan morality of the North, then, what Nietzsche called a "slave morality"? And was this "slave morality" not the appropriate ethic of a "slave race"?

Nietzsche called Judaism and Christianity slave moralities. This is a key to explaining the centrality of monotheistic religion in Americanism: Biblically based ethical interpretations were used to overcome the historical Norman/Saxon basis of America's foundational conflicts. This explains, in part, why a "slave morality" is so central to the Northern ethic that came to dominate the United States after the Civil War.

The original Puritans of the North identified deeply with the Old Testament and sublimated their arrival in America through the metaphor of the exodus of Hebrew slaves from Egypt. All those centuries of subjugation under the Norman

Yoke bred the Anglo-Saxon towards an evolutionary convergence with Jews. Their Christianity was actually a kind of Anglo-Judaism that evolved into the moral materialism of Yankee capitalism. The victory of their side in the US Civil War meant that America would be dominated by the egalitarian cultural values of Anglo-Jews.

The association of Jews and Anglo-America was fairly common among the Nazis. Goebbels believed that "[b]ecause of their thoroughly materialistic attitude, the English act very much like the Jews. In fact, they are the Aryans who have acquired most of the Jewish characteristics..."[913] He concluded that the "English...are the Jews among the Aryans."[914] On a similar note, English-born proto-Nazi H. S. Chamberlain declared in 1917 that the Germany's essential enemies are "Judaism and its closely related Americanism".[915] He decried his times a "Jewish Age" and they would undoubtedly have been labeled as such if the Nazis had succeeded in writing the history books.

This book represents the flip side of the thesis of Anglo-Saxon-Jewish convergence: Anglo-German divergence. One might suspect that this also implies a convergence of Norman and German. There is a *partial* truth here on the level of cultural political philosophy, but to hold this view without deep qualifications would be to falter into a gross misunderstanding.

The American Civil War helps clarify how *both* Normans *and* Saxons diverged from a common origin that was better preserved among the Germans. The Northern order emphasized common whites at the expense of a master elite. The Southern order emphasized a slave master elite at the expense of common whites. What is missing from both is a sense of a unified *Volk*. If one attempted to combine the philosophies of South and North; Norman and Saxon, the

rough, general result would share many characteristics of Nazism: a populist nationalism that merges elites and commoners within the unity of race. That even England failed to achieve this kind of political unity is partly traceable to Norman-French valuations of civilization that made "Normans" qualitatively different from Nazis.

The Germans preserved a holistic sense of kinship unity that, in the English-speaking world, became radically differentiated into Anglo-Saxon and Norman. The cultural-racial division between the American North and South represents the greatest radicalization of a Norman/Saxon difference fought over the course of three major civil wars between 1642 and 1865. Unable to overcome these internal, ethnically-linked differences, the English-speaking world was unable to conciliate into the wholeness characteristic of German philosophy.

How did the Anglo-Saxons become a race of individuals?

In *Who are We?* Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington claimed that American identity and American culture is Anglo-Saxon and Protestant in its foundations. Yet, remarkably, the cultural values of the Anglo-Saxon ethnicity devalued the cultural value of the Anglo-Saxon ethnicity. Despite movements such as the Anglo-Saxon racialist interpretation of Manifest Destiny, the devaluation of ethnicity and race in favor of individualism was implicit in the values of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Huntington's analysis was superficial. He began to raise a question about roots without getting to the roots of the question. Huntington did not finish what he started.

The question of roots is all the more problematic when one considers that German-Americans are the single largest white ethnic group in America. If Huntington was right and American identity is not universal, this means that German-Americans, if they wanted to be considered *real* Americans, had to subordinate their ancestral identity to an Anglo-Saxon identity. Furthermore, if America acted like a parasite that drained German lands of their populations, and this population transfer was decisive to the defeat of the German fatherland in two world wars, then this German defeat amounted to an Anglo-Saxon conquest of the Germans.

Americans are the people who have inherited Anglo-Saxon resistance to facing how their own roots were uprooted by the Norman Conquest. This resistance was universalized into an individualistic, future-oriented rootlessness. The roots of American rootlessness can thus be found in England. Even Germans on the extreme left, such as Friedrich Engels, could not help but observe the contrast with Germany in his *England in the 18th Century* (1844):

> The national character of the English is essentially different….The English have no common interests, only *individual* interests…only out of individual interests do they act together as a whole. In other words only England has a *social* history. Only in England have individuals as such, without consciously advocating general principles, promoted the advance of the nation.[916]

The English were different from the Germans. Ethnicities or races are commonly defined by their particularities and one of the most notable particularities of the Anglo-Saxon

race is their individualism. So how did the Anglo-Saxons become a race of individuals?

Since Anglo-Saxons and Germans were not equally individualistic in the modern sense, the proposition that all individuals are equal had to be imposed from the top down in two world wars. The Anglo-Saxon based American Revolution consummated by Lincoln was constituted by precisely this innovation of values: individual self-preservation over ethnic-racial self-preservation. The German revolution of 1933 was constituted by the exact opposite innovation: ethnic-racial self-preservation over individual self-preservation. How can one explain this difference?

The issue here is that two ethnicities of very similar origin tend towards opposite self-interpretations. The Anglo-Saxon ethnicity or race tends to prefer an individualistic self-interpretation while individual Germans have tended to interpret themselves as members of a nation or race. Since both interpretations can exist simultaneously, the difference between these cultural-revolutions can defined as one of fundamental prioritization: the Anglo-Saxon revolution asserted that individualism comes first, while the German revolution asserted the race takes precedence.

The issue I am raising here is not simply the recognition of difference, but the question of *why* they are different. How is it that from a common Germanic origin the Anglo-Saxons evolved towards one trajectory of political values while the Germans evolved towards a trajectory of the diametrically opposite political values? The Anglo-Saxons of New England often seemed to have a general need to prove that their race doesn't matter. Why didn't the Germans have their desire for fame fulfilled by proving that their race doesn't matter?

One possible explanation is that Anglo-Saxon "race-feeling" never became as developed as it did among the Germans. Perhaps the Anglo-Saxons simply lack the same intensity of discriminatory powers in matters of ethnicity, race, caste, etc. Yet this hypothesis becomes very questionable when one considers the English discriminatory prowess evident in deep traditional perceptions of "class" distinctions.

A far more cogent explanation is that the great differences that evolved between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans can be explained through their great similarities. It was precisely *because* the peoples of England do have the same ethnic sensitivities and capacities for kin and race discrimination as the Germans that they evolved a paradoxically opposite logic of liberalism. The fundamentally difference was, that in the case of England, internal ethnic-"class" distinctions compromised a unified sense of "us", and this lead to a compromised sense of "them". While the English have traditionally downplayed the international implications of this phenomenon, it became one basis for the American "universalist" tradition.

The answer to the riddle of this divergent sociobiological evolution between Anglo-Saxons and Germans can be found in the Norman Conquest. The Anglo-American emphasis on exceptions to ethnic-racial generalizations originated in the attempt to emphasize every exception to every rule of the Norman master race. Unburdened by this particular Anglo-Saxon anxiety, the Germans emphasized the ethnic-racial rule at the expense of genuine individual exceptions. In consequence, the Anglo-Saxon bias tends towards individualism, while the German bias tends towards ethnic or racial generalizations. The difference between the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of individualism and the German

philosophy of generalism reflect a divergence of historical, ethnic experience.

The reader may have noticed an assumption here: the German bias towards ethnic-racial generalism reflects an original condition that was once shared by the Anglo-Saxons. This premise is correct. The explanation for this assumption is to be found in kin selection: the evolution of behavioral traits such as altruism that bias an individual towards the survival of close relatives, and hence, the survival of the genes that they share. A primary reason for concluding that the Germans conserved a more original Germanic *Kultur* is that their cultural traits were more genetically adaptive. Just as kin selection provides a basis for larger, collective social organization among ants, wasps, and termites that I call an Überorganism, a kin selective bias towards genetically related individuals is also found among human social orders (see Wilson and Hölldobler's *The Superorganism*). The Nazi revolution was the restoration of this biological basis of social order.

The Nazi-German Überorganism defied Anglo-Saxon common sense. Hitler's mass appeal defied the modern-progressive-whiggish assumption that the old hive model is "outdated". One could go so far as to say that political modernity is characterized by the progressive disbelief in the analogy of the individual body and a larger political-social body, or, Überorganism.

Modern Anglo-Saxon political tradition is distinctively characterized by an assumption incompatible with the Überorganism: government and the state are "unnatural". There is simply a general disagreement between the German and Anglo-Saxon traditions on the question of whether political rulers can be conceived as natural or artificial. The real question is why did Hitler's Germans *believe* in the

legitimacy of a racial state while the Anglo-Saxon tradition upheld its perpetual skepticism about the very existence of a legitimate political hive?

A common Anglo-Saxon assumption is that there exists a differentiation between the rulers and the common people that transcends a viable notion of an authentic common good. This Saxon-centric notion of the common good emphasizes a differentiation between the democratic mass and vilified elites. This differentiation, laden with "class" hostility, is an Anglo-Saxon assumption *projected*, before evidence, onto Germans and other peoples. The key Anglo-Saxon assumption here is that there exists a break between common family values and its extreme political-logical extension, i.e. fascism. Why is this the case?

The Anglo-Saxon *disbelief* in the existence of a legitimate, unified, natural, political whole is a reflection of a conquered people saddled with a political tradition founded in military occupation. The Norman Conquest destroyed the bounds of legitimate kinship and justified an Anglo-Saxon association of government with force, fear, hatred, falsity, illegitimacy, and disgrace. The internal bonds between the people and the government were broken. The kinship-cultural basis of Überorganism was shattered. A pinnacle of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, however, is the belief that their adaptations to the conditions of military occupation are *universal*.

The utter incompatibility of Nazi-German and Anglo-Saxon ways of life originated in the Anglo-Saxon failure to preserve their way of life from the Norman invasion. The divergence between modern Anglo-Saxon democratization and the German path to Nazism is directly related to cultural convergences between Normans and the Nazis.

The national differences that became so glaring in the twentieth century were only the culmination of a long, slow

process of historical divergence. In 1758 Karl Friedrich Moser, a Württemberg publisher, wrote, "Every nation has its principal motive. In Germany, it is obedience; in England, freedom; in Holland, trade; in France, the honor of the King."[917]

Traditional Anglo-Saxon conservatism is libertarian; it supports freedom *against* the government. Traditional German conservatism is authoritarian; its supports obedience *towards* the government. What these opposite tendencies demonstrate is not how different the Anglo-Saxons and Germans are, but just how similar they are. The root of each attitude is the same in both cases: ethnocentrism. The only difference was that, in the Anglo-Saxon case, ethnocentrism was adapted to the circumstantial consequences of the Norman Conquest. The authoritarian streak of the Anglo-Saxons became channeled towards Anti-Normanism, or, the *conquest* of government. As I detailed in the previous book, *A Vendetta Called Revolution*, both the conservatism of libertarianism and left-leaning liberalism originated in Anglo-Saxon ethnic hostility to their Norman Conquerors. To assert their distinctive ethnic individuality and/or interests, the Anglo-Saxons had to weaken and oppose the Norman-based government.

What modern Westerners could not understand was the German bourgeoisie's *lack of hostility* towards the German ruling class. Westerners considered this hostility to be *natural* since aristocratic government was assumed to be artificial. The German problem of the twentieth century was caused, in part, by a *lack* of ethnic hostility towards their ruling classes over most of German history. This difference is illustrated by the term "feudal", which originated from the word "feud" as polemical description of the Norman/Saxon blood-feudal system. The terms "feudal" or

"feudalism" are thus, strictly speaking, inapplicable to Germany.

Traditional German obedience was the condition of their *collective* individuality and *collective* freedom. The democratic disobedience of the Anglo-Saxon tradition is the reduced remains of same drive for collective individuality; the drive for the same collective freedom against full submission and assimilation to the legacy of Norman-based government. In consequence, Anglo-Saxons and Germans demonstrate similar ethnocentric tendencies through opposite prejudices towards government. While these are broad generalizations, they affect themselves in the broad, general political trajectories. The Anglo-Saxon political regimes have tended towards liberal-anti-authoritarianism and equality, while the German toward collective-authoritarianism and inequality. Just as following the American national idea to its logical conclusion leads to individualistic self-worship and universal miscegenation, following the German nationalist idea leads to totalitarian state worship and xenophobia. Anglo-Saxon democratic egalitarianism is the consequence of being treated as a slave race. German-Nazi inegalitarianism culminated in the aspiration to become the master race.

Perhaps the best demonstration of the original similarity between Anglo-Saxons and Germans is illustrated by the raw fact the former accepted, for centuries on end, submission to the will the Norman master race. This means that on some level, the Anglo-Saxons accepted Normans as their lords on the basis of a right of conquest; on the principle that might makes right. Accepting the conquest meant that after 1066, the Anglo-Saxons, *more than the Germans*, were forced to lean heavily on the acceptance of the

principle of superior might as the basis for political legitimacy.

Far more than the Germans of the same era, the Anglo-Saxon resigned themselves to this most abject tyranny. If we compare the Germans under Hitler to Anglo-Saxons under William the Conqueror, it becomes clear that Hitler had a basis of popular legitimacy that was not based on force of conquest or building castles to keep the population in their place. It was the Anglo-Saxons after 1066, and *not the Germans of those times*, who capitulated and *accepted* that extreme loss of representative government and freedom. Was it only the Germans, then, who originated in a culture susceptible to "mindless obedience" to authority?

How could this supposedly "freedom loving" people, the Anglo-Saxons, endure all those centuries obedient to the Normans who subjugated them? The secret answer to this question can be found in an original deep similarity with the Germans. In those first few centuries after 1066, when both peoples still shared certain core qualities, *the Anglo-Saxons outdid the Germans in demonstrating a capacity for "mindless obedience" to authority*.

The English historian A. J. P. Taylor once described the course of German history as one of extremes. The myth of the natural, sensible, moderation of the English is kept alive, however, by a failure to appreciate that it was precisely by experiencing extremes such as the Conquest, the Puritan Revolution, and the Restoration of 1660, that their political moderation evolved as an alternative. The course of Anglo-Saxon history swayed from sufferance of slavery under the severe medieval Norman despotism to the opposite modern extreme of a restitution in freedom. In this gradual ascent from slavery to freedom, one can discern the origins of the (un-German) Anglo-Saxon belief in progress.

German history before the twentieth century preserved a moderation of condition that can be called *subordination* that contrasts with the extreme condition of *subjugation* or slavery. Whereas subjugation or slavery became associated with the "evil" that found its resolution in the opposite extreme of freedom as "good", Hitler was the product of the German retention of the Faustian ability to unify extremes of "good and evil" within themselves. In other words, the Norman Conquest resulted in kind of internal Anglo-Saxon self-division wherein political-mastery became something separate and "evil"; something "other" than themselves. By going from one extreme of slavery to the opposite extreme of freedom, the Anglo-Saxons lost an original moderate subordination that *precedes* the distinction of slavery and freedom.

The *Sonderweg* ('special path') theory of German history claims that the German people followed their own unique course of historical development. It is often a Western-centric view that attempts to account for the belief that Germans followed an "abnormal" non-Western path into Nazism as opposed to a "normal" Western path towards liberal democracy. It was not the Germans, however, who turned astray from the course of their own native, national development. On the contrary, it was the Anglo-Saxons who were forcibly wrenched from their native cultural orientation towards a more "Western" or Roman cultural center of gravity by the Norman Conquest. It was the West, and not the Germans, who were the exception and minority among humans in believing, or at least publicly proposing, that progress away from kin selective values to be the good, a reality that was has been glossed over by the consequences of the success of Western imperial dominance.

It might appear that I am claiming that, if it were not for the Norman Conquest, the Anglo-Saxon would have developed into Nazis. This is not necessarily the case. Anglo-Saxons in England would have been different anyway due to both cultural and genetic isolation. They would have diverged just as the Swiss, the Germans, and the Scandinavians diverged. Nonetheless, there are kin selective grounds for concluding that the Germans preserved something that the Anglo-Saxons proved unable to preserve under the conditions of Norman domination.

The Norman Conquest was more decisive than any other single historical factor for the *English Sonderweg*. In alliance with a few other West European nations, the Anglo-Saxons began, in difference from most of the rest of the world, to turn away from kinship as a primary basis of social organization. Freeman's conclusion that "[t]he Norman Conquest is the great turning-point in the history of the English nation" was more correct than he was willing to admit.

WHEN IN ENGLAND, DO AS THE FRENCH DO

Normans and Nazis

The Norman Conquest of Germanic Destiny

English genealogist L. G. Pine once told of a festival held in Normandy in 1951 where British descendants of the Norman conquerors were invited to celebrate their common heritage. His expertise was acquired to help distinguish between those whose claims could be substantiated with genealogical proof and those whose claims could not. "Nothing impressed me more," Pine recalled, "on the part of the British contingent than their attitude of complete indifference towards the moral issues of the Conquest. Apparently, the fact that it had taken place so long ago

prevented any resemblance to the Italian Conquest of Abyssinia or the Hitlerite Conquest of Poland from being observed."[918]

In that moral gulf, one can glimpse the distance that separates "modern" liberal-democratic moral principles from a medieval political morality that could accept a right of conquest in principle. Yet, as the example of Hitler illustrates, there is nothing inherently necessary or universal about these Western moral standards. Hitler's movement, in conscious rejection of modern Western values, attempted to bring back a sense of normalcy to the moral assumptions that had once justified the Norman Conquest of England.

The similarity was not lost on Hitler. As conqueror of France in 1941, the *Führer* had four art experts examine the famous commemoration of the Norman Conquest, the Bayeaux Tapestry. He was in search of inspirational secrets from this conquering Nordic race as preparation for his own conquest of England.

The degree to which the personality traits of William and Hitler converge is also striking. A recent biography of William the Conqueror concluded that he "seems to have had none of the frailties which make a personality sympathetic". Like Hitler, William had "that mixture of intelligence, will-power and charisma which could persuade others to follow him on hazardous enterprises."[919] Each saw himself as the supreme leader of larger, predatory kinship-based group, not as an exclusively isolated despot. Normans and Nazis both held a conception of themselves as a *Herrenvolk*, or, "master race".

In the second half of the eleventh century, the Frenchified Vikings that called themselves Normans pounced, not only upon England, but also upon Sicily, southern Italy, and their Crusader principality of Antioch. It was the Norman

Conquest of England, however, subsequently expanded to Scotland and Ireland, and culminating in the British Empire, that was a decisive force in thwarting the Nazis' own bid for world domination. It was Field Marshal Bernard "Monty" Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, who defeated Rommel in North Africa and commanded all Allied forces during the recovery of his ancestral homeland of Normandy.

The British order founded in 1066 ended as it had begun. It began with the conquest of the Anglo-Saxons, thus bringing England decisively into the orbit of French-Roman-Western civilization. It ended with a decisive hand in the conquest of their ethnic cousins, the Germans, thus bringing Germany decisively into the orbit of French-Roman-Western civilization. In this sense, 1945 was Germany's 1066.

The aristocratic, "civilized" Norman-French order in England was *founded* upon and *built* upon oppression and genocide. The native Anglo-Saxon aristocracy was variously killed, exiled, or dispossessed. The brutal genocide called "the harrying of north" in 1069-70 crushed revolt with a rampage of killing, destruction, and the burning of crops which "condemned the innocent and guilty alike to die by slow starvation".[920] Some estimated that 100,000 people died in this empire founding genocide, a human destruction more far more severe than the analogous Nazi destruction of the Czech town of Lidice in 1942.

English Historian Sir Frank Stenton described the Normans as "a harsh and violent race. They were the closest of all western peoples to the barbarian strain in the continental order. They had produced little in art or learning, and nothing in literature, that could be set beside the work of Englishmen."[921]

By the standards of the Nazi revaluation of values, this could be considered a compliment. After all, it was Hitler who once exclaimed, "They regard me as an uneducated barbarian…Yes, we are barbarians! We want to be barbarians! It is an honorable title. *We* shall rejuvenate the world! This world is near its end."[922] The final great gasp of Norman strength, however, would help bring this German beginning to its end.

Master Races

"A dominating race can grow up only out of terrible and violent beginnings. Problem: where are the *barbarians* of the twentieth century?"[923] The Nazis, it would seem, took it upon themselves to answer Nietzsche's question. But were the Nazis what Nietzsche had in mind? It is not only that both German nationalism and antisemitism were violent attacked in his writings. The Nazis failed Nietzsche culturally.

What breed in history, then, would most corresponds to Nietzsche's conception of Übermenschen; "blond beasts of prey" who are also "good Europeans"? It is the early Normans and *not the Nazis* who come closest to embodying Nietzsche's conception of a master race. The Nazis were vulgar democrats in comparison to the truly aristocratic Norman elite.

"European *noblesse*—of feeling, of taste, of manners, taking the word, in short, in every higher sense—is the work and invention of *France*; European vulgarity, the plebeianism of modern ideas, that of *England*."[924] Nietzsche's cultural distinction between France and England corresponds almost exactly to the original Norman contempt for the common Saxon. Norman genius was the embodiment of an inner paradox: the raw warrior energy of Viking berserkers

harnessed and disciplined by the gentle civilization of the French.

This is a crucial difference between Norman and Nazi. Whereas the Third Reich understood itself as a war against the West, the Normans were almost the epitome of the Old World West. While, from a Nazi point of view, the Normans represented a Nordic master race, they had also committed one the deepest sins imaginable by adopting, not just any foreign civilization, but *French* civilization. The Norman conquest of the Anglo-Saxons also represented, in a sense, the conquest of the purely Germanic or Viking in themselves. This was a deep, original source of an ethical-civilizational divergence from the Germans.

The second source of Anglo-American divergence from the Germans was the modern reaction to the conquerors, or, what Nietzsche called the "slave revolt in morality". It is palpable in Thomas Paine's appeal for independence from England in his propaganda piece, *Common Sense* (1776):

> When William the Conqueror subdued England he gave them law at the point of the sword; and until we consent that the seat of government in America, be legally and authoritatively occupied, we shall be in danger of having it filled by some fortunate ruffian, who may treat us in the same manner, and then, where will be our freedom? where our property?

Can "modern" ideas be attributed to the influence of Christianity alone? Nietzsche seems to have hinted as much in the case the English:

> When the English actually believe that they know "intuitively" what is good and evil, when they therefore suppose that they no longer require Christianity as the

> guarantee of morality, we merely witness the *effects* of the dominion of the Christian value judgment....For the English morality is not yet a problem.[925]

For the English, the effects of Christianity were multiplied by the effects of the Norman Conquest. While Norman Cavaliers settled the American South and Anglo-Saxons Puritans settled the American North, *both* had inherited values of gentlemanly French "civilization" that reinforced the gentle influence of Christianity.

When the South's Norman-Cavalier master race helped lead the pro-slavery revolution of 1861, this was an attempt at the restoration of *medieval* Christian hypocrisy. The Nazi revolution of 1933, by contrast, was an attempted restoration of *ancient* pagan naturalism. Norman slave masters, unlike the Nazis, remained slaves to the slave morality of Christianity.

Revolutionary Restorations

In his study of the German cultural origins of the Nazi genocide of the Jews, Daniel Goldhagen concluded:

> the Nazis were the most profound revolutionaries of modern times and that the revolution that they wrought during their but brief suzerainty in Germany was the most extreme and thoroughgoing in the annals of western civilization. It was, above all, a cognitive-moral revolution which reversed processes that had been shaping Europe for centuries.[926]

1933 was more revolutionary than 1776 or 1789, not only because it represented was a greater ethical break with the Christian past, but because it represented a greater restoration of the pre-Christian past. The original idea of

revolution was actually conservative. A revolution is a restoration to an original condition, i.e. Anglo-Saxon restoration to the times before the "unnatural" Norman tyranny. The Nazi revolution was more revolutionary in the sense that it attempted a deeper restoration of the past; an ethical restoration of a pagan, pre-Christian past.

Both the Anglo-Saxon democratic revolutions and the Nazi racial revolution were regenerations of ethnocentrism. The Anglo-Saxon revolution represented liberation *from* the "fury of the Northmen" (Normans) with support from the influence of a Judeo-Christianity ethic. The German revolution represents liberation *of* the "fury of the Northmen" from the influence of a Judeo-Christian ethic. American democrats sought to repress the dynamics of political paganism while the Germans sought to free and unleash political paganism.

The German philosopher Hegel once stated:

> Of the Greeks we may affirm that in the first and true form of their freedom they had no conscience. Among them there reigned the habit of living for their fatherland without further reflection.[927]

It was this pre-Christian morality, represented by the ancient Greeks, which profoundly influenced the Nazi neo-pagan regeneration of ancient virtue over the oppression of Christianity — religious or secularized.

From the classical perspective of the ancient Greeks and Romans, it is the modern emphasis on rights over duties that appears anomalous. In relation to notions of political duty over individual rights, National Socialism had more in common with the assumptions of the slave-owing ancient Greek *polis* or the Roman Empire in its prime than it did with the Anglo-Saxon democracies.

The paganism of the ancient Greeks provided the perspective from which many Europeans judged their own times. "The *polis*", wrote the nineteenth century Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt, "was the definitive Greek form of the State". Far more than simply a formal political body,

> the *polis* alone was the moral educator of the Greeks. The quality to be developed in its citizens, that virtue that corresponded to the *polis* itself, was called excellence (*arete*). No stress is ever laid, in Greek discussions of motives, on a purely humane concern for the happiness or suffering of others, and it must be assumed that in practice this was part of the concept of duty to the members of the *polis*.[928]

Burckhardt was a mentor of Friedrich Nietzsche. Immersion in the mind of ancient Greece led Nietzsche to recognition of the ethical break that Christianity had imposed upon the West. In England, however, the break with the primal past was multiplied by the impact of the Norman Conquest.

If revolution is defined as restoration then the Conquest was not revolutionary for it was a decisive break with the past. Modern Anglo-Saxons "revolutions" would *not* be restorations because they were transformed by a *reactionary* attack on the political sphere that had been dominated by the Normans. Unaware of this root of English difference, Nietzsche nonetheless discerned:

> European vulgarity, the plebianism of modern ideas…— that, in other words, against which the *German* spirit has risen with a profound disgust— was of English origin; there is no doubt of that. The French have merely been apes and mimes of these ideas; also their best soldiers; unfortunately, their first and most thoroughgoing *victims* as well.[929]

It was extraordinarily insightful of Nietzsche to grasp that the French had become *victims* of "this damnable Anglomania of "modern ideas"". Consider, for example, the extraordinary influence of Voltaire's *Letters on England* (1734). Just as the Anglo-Saxons were once victimized by French aristocracy, the French were ultimately victimized by Anglo-Saxon democracy. It was cultural and political *revenge*!

French Connections

Déjà vu?

And what about the French Revolution? In a dictation from 1816, Napoleon Bonaparte explained:

> The French nobility, like that of all Europe, dates from the barbarian invasions which broke up the Roman Empire. In France, the nobles represented the ancient Franks and Burgundians; the rest of the nation, the Gauls.…The peasants were enslaved, partly by binding them to the soil…The chief aim of the Revolution was to destroy all privileges…to suppress all feudal rights as remnants of the people's former slavery; to subject all citizens and all property without distinction to taxation by the State … Whatever had been brought about in the sequence of events since the time of Clovis ceased to exist.[930]

Clovis was king of the Franks from 481 – 511. This Germanic tribe conquered much of the land of the Celtic Gauls that had previously been conquered by the Romans. Just as Anglo-Saxon democracy formally disinherited Norman privilege, Napoleon concluded that the native

Gallo-Roman majority disinherited the legacy of the Frankish conquest. This historical understanding of the roots of 1789 neither began nor ended with Napoleon, as demonstrated by Hannah Arendt's briefing of these ideas in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.[931] Burke, for example, in *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, noted that "The peasants, in all probability, are the descendants of … antient proprietors, Romans or Gauls." The *Manifesto of the Equals* declared in 1796: "People of France! During fifteen centuries you have lived as slaves!"[932] "Freedom", said Sartre, "is what you do with what's been done to you."

"Do you not see what is happening in France?", exclaimed Catherine the Great in 1793. "The Gauls are driving out the Franks."[933] The French invention known as the guillotine effected both a symbolic and literal eye for an eye revenge for Gaul's repeated political decapitations. The French revolutionaries engaged in the same enlightened ethnic cleansing as the Anglo-Saxons, only more so. To literally target members of the old Germanic aristocracy for death amounted to a kind of genocide.

In 1940 a group of "barbarians," organized for war, swept across France from their Germanic homeland across the Rhine. Ever conscious of their blood, they intending to establish hereditary rule over the races they subjugated. Déjà vu?

Hitler was, from a Gallic view, like a new Clovis. The Nazis repeated this same Germanic pattern of invasion with the intent of subjugation and exploitation by a hereditary elite — a "master race." That short period of Nazi rule repeated in miniature the pattern established by the Franks early in the sixth century and overthrown in the late eighteenth century. The German problem was not something new that emerged in "modernity"; 1789 and the French

political solutions of "modernity" were earlier solutions to the German problem. In this sense, the values and ideals of political "modernity" are natural, historical antagonists to what the Nazis attempted to revive.

For the descendants of the aboriginal Gauls, the Third Reich was the third Reich, or empire, to fully rule their soil. The second was the Reich of the Franks, or *Frankreich*, as the Germans still call France today. The first was the Roman conquest of Gaul by Caesar. French are a universalistic nation today, in part, because they lacked an Arminius.

The French Revolution upset and overturned the hereditary legacy of Frankish rule. *Revolution* so conceived would *revolve* in circular pattern to restore an imagined pre-conquest period of freedom and equality. The Nazi-German Revolution, by contrast, intended to reestablish a Germanic aristocracy. From this Nazi point of view, history also *revolves* back to a restoration, only this time in the opposite direction of subjugation.

For Gauls to call themselves *French*, derived from *Frank*, is comparable to a woman taking her husband's surname in marriage. The same parallel is found among the Slavic "Russians." This name was derived from rulers of Norman-Viking origin, the Rus, who maintained their order until 1917. Communism appealed to the generally proletarian economic status of the Slavic majority and, like the great Western revolutions, a submerged and sublimated nationalistic (i.e. Narodnik) consciousness. Unlike the Western revolutions, however, Jewish elements converged with Slavic ones, possibly to the point of being decisive.

Since kin selective behaviors can express themselves through collective unconsciousness, this has made it easy to dismiss the fact that every major revolution has had a major underlying ethnic component: Gallo-Romans against the

Franks, Anglo-Saxons against the Norman-French, Slavs and Jews against the Germanic-Norman Rus, and, of course, Nazi-Germans against Roman-Western-Jewish civilization. Even in the case of ancient Greek democracy, the *Eupatridai,* or 'sons of good fathers' were of pan-Hellenic origin; not necessarily Athenian. For an alternate emphasis on homogeneity, one must look to Sparta.

If every single major Western revolution has been rooted in ethnic or racial conflict, has a biological evolutionary perspective refuted the nurturist assumptions underlying liberal democracy? If so, then human revolution could be reducible to non-humans parallels from the "state of nature". Among rhesus macaque monkeys, for example, there is a parallel to revolution called "matriline overthrow". But does this fully capture the forces that compelled modern human revolution? It is precisely from an evolutionary perspective that one can discern a distinctive human form of *nonbiological evolution*, a form of economic-technological evolution. This means that even though liberal democracy was compelled in virtually every case by a strong biological component, there is also a rising nonbiological basis of liberal democracy. This economic-technological form of evolution is not only *not* reducible to genetic interests; it is advancing at the *expense* of Darwin's genes.

The so-called "universalism" of liberal democracy ultimately amounts to a focus on distinctive human capacities for nonbiological evolution. "Universalism" tends to be strongest where cultural intermixture has broken down a primal relationship between genes and culture. Part of the French belief in universalism, for example, is traceable to the fact that, even at the time of the Revolution, the French did not have to leave their own country to be international. The multitude of historic, ethnic-regional divisions (Gauls,

Romans, Franks, Bretons, Normans, etc.) has made culture, over and above "race", the source of national unity. The French variety of "universalism" is as idiosyncratic an expression of their national composition as their cultivation of fine cheese.

The very heart of the modern democratic "West" began with the cultural link between France and Britain established by the Norman Conquest. The West's form of cosmopolitanism originated in a specific hybrid, the dominant secular strains being Germanic, Gallic, and Roman. The Conquest brought England firmly into this cultural matrix and differs only in the proportion that these various influences predominated and intermixed.

The modernistic, democratic West, then, emerged from a parallel intercultural influence of conquest and overthrow. The Franks and Normans both originated as Germanic invaders and conquerors of lands of present day France. Both eventually adopted much of the Gallic-Roman legacy, especially in language, Christianity, and culture. The Frankish conquest of Gaul and the Norman conquest of England sowed the seeds of reaction in the form of the French Revolution and Anglo-American revolutions. This convergent evolution constitutes a key political-cultural definition of the modern democratic West.

That three major Anglo-American revolutions, the Puritan Revolution (1649), the "Glorious Revolution" (1688), and the American Revolution (1776) preceded the French is hardly insignificant. Edmund Burke was partly right to claim that English political order was the product of a particular historical-cultural development and not ready-made for transport or universalization to other counties as abstract principles. While it is conventional in the English-speaking world to disparage the disorder of the French Revolution,

the Anglo-American contrast relies on a very convenient sweeping of the preparatory lessons of English Civil War, Cromwell's military dictatorship, and the disastrous failure of the Puritan Revolution under the rug. While English speakers often dismiss Rousseau's *theory* of the general will, they also often dismiss the *practice* of the general will under the dictatorship of Cromwell. While the French Revolution did, in part, attempted to perfect what the Anglo-Americans had been working out through trial and error over centuries, it is also true that Burke's "English" tradition began with the violent breaking of "English" tradition in 1066.

The parallels of revolution and liberalism between France and the English-speaking world is a product of the complex cross-fertilization that began in 1066. The so-called "feudalism", for example, that William helped to bring to England may have been modeled upon the paradigm of the Frankish subjugation of ancient Gaul. In fact, it may be that the Frankish subjugation of Gaul helped inspire William and his Normans to outdo their Frankish rivals, raising themselves with an *ever greater* distance over their own aboriginal population.

Just as the Norman Conquest of England was at least partly inspired by the aristocratic paradigm established by the Frankish conquest of Gaul, the French Revolution was partly inspired by English revolts and revolutions against the Norman Conquest. Just as the Normans brought French-aristocratic civilization to England, "modern" Anglo-Saxon democratic ideas were brought to France through the cultural connection established by Conquest. The Anglo-Saxons had their cultural revenge upon France through the dissemination of these modern, democratic memes. Even in refuting these bourgeois ideas, Rousseau first had to accept some elements of their "modern" premises.

Americans tend to be more frank or less embarrassed about their political debt to Biblical sources, while the French are generally more consistent in rationalizing their debt. Yet if one thinks that the religious instinct is dead in France, one only has to observe how a post-modern mutation of the religion of reason blinds them to sociobiological realities. The fundamental fact about the French, from this view, is that they resist a comprehensive account of the origins of their secular values. They resist acknowledgement of their cultural debt to Christianity and the impact of conquest of the majority by Romans and Franks. 1789 was not more rational than the Anglo-Saxon revolutions, only more rationalized.

The Overthrow of Being

Were the Normans on a "civilizing mission" to the English people in 1066? I suppose this is true in the same sense that the Normans' Viking ancestors were on a "civilizing mission" to the people of France, whereby, in sharing their not-so-polite plunder culture with native Frenchmen they eventually carved out their conquest of what is now call "Normandy". The Norman Conquest of England emerged out of continuity with the momentum of Norman territorial-political-military expansion that also included the Norman conquest of Sicily and a leading role in the First Crusades.

Norman Vikings plundered their gentle manners from France and called it "civilization". It appears that the Norman emphasis on "civilization" is directly related to embarrassment with their own original Viking or "barbarian" origins. Normans may have projected their own contempt for their own Germanic origins onto the native Anglo-Saxons. In any case, this all squared very well with

the preservation of the Conquest: the violence of the Conquest itself could be ignored in the name of "superior civilization" while comparably violent means employed in Anglo-Saxon revolt would clearly be "barbarism".

Does the Norman Conquest embody the epitome of both barbarism and civilization? If the word "barbarism" is to retain any clear meaning at all, it might do so by going back to its original Greek roots. In *Menexenus* (Sec. 245), Plato's Socrates stated:

> Such was the natural nobility of this city, so sound and healthy was the spirit of freedom among us, and the instinctive dislike of the barbarian, because we are pure Hellenes, having no admixture of barbarism in us. For we are not like many others, descendants of Pelops or Cadmus or Egyptus or Danaus, who are by nature barbarians, and yet pass for Hellenes, and dwell in the midst of us; but we are pure Hellenes, uncontaminated by any foreign element, and therefore the hatred of the foreigner has passed unadulterated into the life-blood of the city.

In the way that Plato's Socrates used it, there is no way that the word "barbarian" could be distinctly defined as "uncivilized". "Barbarian" is word of Greek origin and it originally meant foreigner or non-Greek.

The original opposite of a "barbarian" in Greek was an *autochthones*, a native of a country or city unmixed with foreigners. The significance that *authochthony* had for the German thinker (and former Nazi) Martin Heidegger was evident in an interview with the German magazine *Spiegel* in 1966. When asked if the Germans had any distinctive qualifications for confronting the problems of modernity, he responded:

> Yes….I am thinking of the special inner affinity of the German language with the language of the Greeks and with their thinking. This has been confirmed to me again and again by the French. When they begin to think they speak German. They insist that they could not get through with their own language.[934]

For Heidegger, the beginning *(Anfang)* of the West was Greek, and German alone was fit to reclaim that beginning. The French recognized that "despite their rationalism they are unable to face the present world when it is a question of understanding it in the origin of its essence."[935] The German language — *caveat lector* — is absolutely untranslatable: "just as a poem cannot be translated, it cannot otherwise be thought." The implications of this should not be evaded, "but brought out clearly, on a grand scale. We need to think of the terrible consequences brought on us and still felt in our own days that derive from translating Greek thought into Roman Latin."[936]

The Viking "North-men" or Normans who came to France as plunderers and pirates eventually became "Frenchmen" through the shedding of their Germanic, Scandinavian language and *Kultur*. Their acquisition of French-Roman cultural garbs marked a decisive turn in world history, for their Viking-rooted energies would thereafter be molded and civilized by the ancient inheritance of Latin civilization that they came to champion as their own. Part of that Roman inheritance was the Latin language that had once conquered ancient Gaul and evolved into French.

When the Anglo-Saxons first overran the lands of Celtic Britain that became England in the four and fifth centuries, they killed, pushed out, or otherwise displaced both the native Celts and the almost the entire cultural legacy of

Rome's dominion. 1066 began the reverse trend: a conquest sanctioned by Rome and blessed by the pope; a Pax Normana that decisively oriented England towards the influences of the Latinate world.

For about three hundred years following the Norman Conquest, native English (Old English) was almost completely eclipsed as a written language by the political-cultural domination of the French (and Latin) speaking upper classes. Middle English is dated from 1066 for a sound reason. When English finally did reemerge in the fourteenth century, it was a language that would have been virtually incomprehensible to a speaker of Old English. Middle English was a language utterly transmogrified by a mortal transfusion of French and Latin influences.[937] The Great Vowel Shift of the English language was very probably one aspect of an adaptive reconstitution of internal linguistic order necessitated by the deep infusion with French.

It has been estimated that three percent of English words in Old English were foreign (primarily from Latin) as compared with seventy percent of contemporary English words.[938] English 'calf' and 'sheep' eaten in Norman castles became French *veal* and *mutton*. Words associated with politics (i.e. *government*) and the military (i.e. *rendezvous*) are also disproportionately derived from French.

As genealogist L. G. Pine put it, "[e]very time we speak or write we pay a nominal tribute to William the Conqueror and his followers."[939] One can get a grasp of what he means through Hugh M. Thomas's paraphrase of the work of Anglo-Norman specialist Ian Short. Words derived from Norman-French are italicized:

> There is *scarcely* a *sentence* in current English that does not *indicate* the *profound* and *enduring* imprint from Anglo-

> Norman that has *remained* a *feature* of our *language* since the end of the twelfth century.[940]

Just imagine the ambiguities involved in an attempt to dissect Shakespeare's "Norman" influences from his "Saxon" influences. Reconciling and overcoming this crossroad of language-minds, Shakespeare represents the ironic climax of England's cultural digestion of the Conquest. Even when we take into account his inordinate hereditary genius, Shakespeare could not have become Shakespeare without William the Conqueror. William the Conqueror made Shakespeare possible. Seizing upon the deepest fermenting tensions of internal cultural chaos between reformation and revolution, Shakespeare molded them into a hitherto unknown higher cultural synthesis greater than the sum of its Norman and Saxon parts.

It may be that *The Merchant of Venice* and *Othello*, insofar as these plays testify to the endurance of ethnic or racial tensions, universalized a prophetic pessimism regarding peaceful coexistence between the conquerors and the conquered. Perhaps it was precisely because Shakespeare lived in a time in which his deep cultural digestion of the Conquest was possible, that his lifetime (1564-1616) was followed by an opposite reaction: vomiting the Norman-French impurities out. The Puritan Revolution purged King Charles I from hereditary rule and overthrew the Norman-based House of Lords.

Yet if this was a form of ethnic cleansing, how could Puritans express the meaning of "purity" when the very word they use to *identify* themselves was itself derived from the Old French word *pur*? The so-called "Puritan Revolution" cannot be reduced to religion alone. It also cannot be reduced to a purely *racial* struggle.

For contemporary John Hare, Christianity was not necessary to explain the Good Old Cause. Hare was furious that his nation of "so noble an extraction and descent" and with "such Privileges conferred on us by heaven" should have been so "un-Teutonized" as a result of conquest by the Normans.[941] Hare's program in *St. Edwards Ghost, or Anti-Normanism* (1647) illustrates how, for him, hostility to the hereditary aspects of the Conquest were inseparable from hostility to the linguistic and cultural consequences of the Conquest. Unless his full program for hereditary *and* linguistic-cultural restoration was actualized, "the alteration of the State will be to us but changing of usurpant Masters".[942]

Of all the seventeenth century anti-Normanists, Hare may have been the most radical in the specific sense of going most deeply to the "rootes". His linguistic demands bear some resemblance to the nineteenth century English poet William Barnes' nationalistic desire to return to a purer, more Teutonic English. Keats also nearly agreed with Hare's belief in the inferiority of Gallicisms in the English language.[943] Yet one cannot simply command a *volte-face* upon French words and linguistic patterns in the English language as this "internationalization" has irrevocably altered its fundamental character. An evolutionary comparison with the German language nonetheless allows one to appreciate the linguistic bouleversement that the Normans imposed upon the English language. And, with this is mind, it is truly remarkable how Martin Heidegger's belief in the kindred linguistic superiority of "Teutonick" and Greek over Latin was echoed in the words of John Hare:

> Our language was a dialect of the Teutonick, and although then but in her infancie, yet not so rude as hopefull, being most fruitfull and copious in significant and well-founding

> rootes and Primitives, and withall capable and apt for diffusion from those her rootes into such a Greek-like ramosity of derivations and compositions, beyond the power of the Latine and her off-spring dialects…[944]

No attempt to grasp the ultimate impact of the French-Latin language on the English language can be had without a confrontation with Martin Heidegger. While this German thinker is so often thoughtlessly dismissed in the English-speaking world, could it be that Heidegger is able to grasp something that those reared in English cannot *because* they were reared in the English language? John Hare is proof of an early, forgotten stream of English thought with uncanny parallels with this German. Heidegger thought that the German language, comparable only with ancient Greek, was able to open a new beginning of the West through the uncovering of its Greek roots. Were the Anglo-Saxons cut off from their own roots?

"It is decisive that the Romanization of the world of Greek-Roman history", Heidegger maintained, "was grasped as a *change in the essence of truth and being*." The word "truth", *aletheia* in Greek, was not only distorted but directly obstructed by "that immense apparatus that in a multiple 'Latin' sense has come to determine the essence of truth."[945] This widespread Romanization, he thought, was a corruption and degeneration of the essence of truth that might only be restored by a union of Greek and a Latin-purged German.

"So far from being the beginning of our national history," E. A. Freeman believed, "the Norman Conquest was the temporary overthrow of our national being". The Conquest was the overthrow of Anglo-Saxon national *being*. After 1066, "[a] kingdom which had hitherto been purely Teutonic was brought within the sphere of the laws, the manners, the

speech of the Romance nations."[946] He was well aware of the French linguistic importations and influences in English, which he described as the "lasting corruption on English lips of the common mother tongue". When he revised his massive history of the Norman Conquest for a third edition, he noted that he had "often put a good English word where I had at first allowed a stranger to creep in."[947]

The anti-Romance sentiments that consumed Freeman and Hare have a parallel in the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. His patriotic *Addresses to the German Nation* were given after the French victories over Prussia in 1806. He described Germans as the *Urvolk*; the primordial people who could restore the rest of humanity through the assertion of their own true essence. This essence, he believed, was embodied in their native language:

> unlike the other Teutonic races, who communicate in superficial and essentially dead idioms, the German people speak a language which is a living force rooted in the energies of nature.

Those "other Teutonic races" surely included, at the top of the list, the English. Thinking of the German tribal leader Arminius and his defeat of Rome in 9 C.E., decisive in checking Roman domination over German tribes, he declared:

> When our ancestors triumphed over Roma the eternal…the possibility of their existence in the future was won for them in the same fight. . . . they did not see slavery; they bequeathed freedom to their children. It is their unyielding resistance which the whole modern world has to thank for being what it now is….Had the Romans succeeded in bringing them also under the yoke and in destroying them

> as a nation, which the Romans did in every case, the whole development of the human race would have taken a different course, a course that one cannot think would have been more satisfactory. It is they whom we must thank—we, the immediate heirs of their soil, their language, and their way of thinking—for being Germans still, for being still borne along on the stream of original and independent life.

From Fichte to the Nazis, the German thinkers who posited that they, as a nation, preserved a *Kultur* inheritance that the Anglo-Americans lost are fundamentally correct. If Fichte was right, the Latin yoke of the Normans *must* have permanently thrusted the Anglo-Saxons away from their original way of life and towards the more universal mission of Rome. He pointed, more specifically, to an original sense of being, "by nature…an inseparable whole":

> Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself…and are by nature one and an inseparable whole. Such a whole, if it wishes to absorb and mingle with itself any other people of different descent and language, cannot do so without itself becoming confused, in the beginning at any rate, and violently disturbing the even progress of its culture….in the natural view of things it is not because men dwell between certain mountains and rivers that they are a people, but, on the contrary, men dwell together—and, if their luck has so arranged it, are protected by rivers and mountains—because they were a people already by a law of nature which is much higher.

For the Germanic natives of England, the Norman cataclysm violently disturbed the "even progress of its culture". For the English *nation*, according to E. A. Freeman,

the Norman Conquest was "the great turning point" of its history:

> [T]he introduction of Christianity is the only event which can compare with it in importance….But the Norman Conquest is something which stands without a parallel in any other Teutonic land. If that Conquest be only looked on in its true light, it is impossible to exaggerate its importance….For its whole importance is not the importance which belongs to a beginning, but the importance which belongs to a turning point. The Norman Conquest brought with it a most extensive foreign infusion, which affected our blood, our language, our laws, and our arts; still it was only an infusion; the older and stronger elements still survived, and in the long run they again made good their supremacy.[948]

But *did* they make "good their supremacy"?

> So far from being the beginning of our national history, the Norman Conquest was the temporary overthrow of our national being. But it was only a temporary overthrow. To a superficial observer the English people might seem for a while to be wiped out of the roll-call of the nations, or to exist only as the bondmen of foreign rulers in their own land. But in a few generations we led captive our conquerors; England was England once again, and the descendants of the Norman invaders were found to be among the truest of Englishmen.[949]

The Conquest was a turning point. This turning point was straightened out and somehow undone. Yet the very conception of a turning point implies a lasting alteration without return to the self-same original path. This central

contradiction exemplifies why the Norman Conquest *is* the central crisis of Anglo-Saxon history.

Freeman struggled with this contradiction. The entire problem lay in his resistance to fully coming to terms with the implications of his own assertion that the Conquest truly was a turning point. He attempted to reconcile the great turn with continuity through the dubious assertion that "in a few generations we led captive our conquerors". This meant, not political revolution, but rather, that William and his Normans were "to be won back into the Teutonic fold."[950] Specifically, he wished to find validation for the hope that "we, the English people of the nineteenth century, are the same people as the English of the fifth and sixth centuries, not some other people."[951]

The alternative was, in Freeman's mind, a never-ended mental and cultural submission to the Norman yoke. It was the idea that the Norman truly mastered and molded the English into "some other people". Instead, he had to convince himself that:

> [i]t is owing to the momentary overthrow, to the seemingly momentary destruction, of our old kingship, our old freedom, our old national Being, that we have been able, more truly than any other European nation, to keep them all as an unbroken possession for eight centuries after they had seemed to perish. Strange as it may seem, the Norman Conquest has, in its results, been the best preserver of the older life of England.[952]

Very strange.

It seems that, in the end, there was no fully honest and satisfactory solution to his dilemma when judged by his aims. Freeman's belief that the Normans became "English" in an original sense or that the Anglo-Saxons ultimately

conquered, emerged out of the same desire as Fichte and other German nationalists to preserve themselves culturally and politically as Germans against the French heirs of Rome. Conversely, the English "class" system originally justified itself, in part, as an expression of the judgment that superior Western-Roman civilization should be preserved against the conquered barbarians and their inferior native culture. The sum total of the evidence suggests that England became something different; neither what they were, nor French-Norman. Englishness became redefined in the process of cultural and biological infusion. The English ultimately went down their own unique, semi-Latinized *Sonderweg*.

The Norman Conquest twisted the course of history to such an extent that it would simply be dishonest to equate the subsequent history of the "English-speaking world" with Anglo-Saxon culture and history: *this* is how the Romanized West was won over Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*. The German path to Nazism, by contrast, can be discerned in Fichte's philosophical musings on the value of what his nation had preserved from the primordial past:

> Only in the invisible qualities of nations, which are hidden from their own eyes—qualities as the means whereby these nations remain in touch with the source of original life—only therein is to be found the guarantee of their present and future worth, virtue, and merit. If these qualities are dulled by admixture and worn away by friction, the flatness that results will bring about a separation from spiritual nature, and this in its turn will cause all men to be fused together in their uniform and collective destruction.

This "collective destruction" was the condition of America's construction.

A core difference between the Germans and the Latinized West can be discerned through the word "barbarian". A barbarian was originally a non-Greek. Yet somehow, in the West, the word "barbarian" came to mean something more compatible with extreme nativism. The antisemetic Nazis came to represent the epitome of "barbarism", while the endurance of the Judeo-Christian traditions of the West redefined the meaning of "civilization".

The greatest semantic revolution in the definition of the "barbarism" is partly a product of Christianity's conquest of pagan Rome. Christianity necessarily revolutionized the West's perception of the inheritance of Rome since its ultimate effect was to subvert the kin selective basis of family patriarchy. Pagan nativism became ethically foreign to the Christian ethic of including the excluded.

There was a further, deeper reason for this semantic revolution. Included in the great influence of all things Greek upon the Romans was their acquisition of the word "barbarian". Clearly, if by its pristine, originary Greek definition a Roman would naturally *be* a barbarian, Romans could only acquire the word by altering, liberalizing, or diluting its original meaning unto the limits of a larger Greco-Roman world. The Normans took this Roman dilution even further, although they very much followed the Roman pattern in contemptuously dismissing Anglo-Saxons and other non-Latin people that they conquered as "barbarian".

The Cavalier slave masters of the American South, molders of Southern cultural values, testify to the endurance of the Norman appropriation of a Roman identity. During the Civil War, a Southern newspaper described Yankees hoardes descending upon the South "as numerous as the swarms of barbarians which the frozen North sent from her loins to overrun the Roman Empire."[953] The "chivalry" of the

Southern planters exemplified their *civilization* in contrast to the *barbarism* of "Saxons" or "Goths".[954]

If the Norman conquerors of 1066 deemed themselves "civilized", then the Anglo-Saxons became "barbarians". This originally meant that the *native* English became the "barbarians"; the very opposite of the original Greek meaning of *foreigner*. The Norman Conquest uprooted the Anglo-Saxons from their own origins in their own homeland.

Yet the Norman/Saxon conflict was partly resolved by civilizing internal ethnic hostility to the point that, in Victorian times, untamed ethnic hostility *itself* became associated with foreigners ("barbarians"). To the Greek originators of the root term, the English use of the word "barbarian" would itself be *barbaric* or foreign. To take this racist Greek word, "barbarian", the very epitome of Greek ethnocentrism, and apply it to the Nazi-Germans presupposes a semantic revolution. The word "barbarian" could not be universalized without perverting its original meaning. By the Greeks' own definition of their own word, America could be considered the most barbaric civilization on the face of the earth.

Towards the end of the war, as the destruction of the Jews reached it peak, Heidegger delved deeper into study of the founding figures of Greek or Western philosophy, Parmenides and Heraclitus. To him, the National Socialist spirit was linked with the recovery of the origins of the West. America's entrance into the war against Germany confirmed their severance from the roots of their own historic identity and this, he believed, constituted an act of self-destruction:

> We know today that the Anglo-Saxon world of America is determined to annihilate Europe, and that means the homeland that is the beginning of the West. But the beginning is indestructible. America's entering this planetary war is not an entering into history but already constitutes the last American act of ahistoricality and self-destruction. For this act is the repudiation of what is beginning and a decision for undoing the beginning. The hidden spirit of the original in the West does not look upon this process of the self-destruction of those beginnings with contempt, but out of equanimity of the originary it waits its auspicious hour.[955]

The Protestants

Conflicts such as the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) and the loss of French possessions, wrote L. G. Pine, "helped to create in the English mind the idea that France was the national and natural enemy of England. This was of course a most unjust conception since it was the quarrelsome ambition of English or rather Anglo-Norman kings which had forced invasions and devastation upon France."[956] These perpetual medieval conflicts were fomented, not by "England" and "France", but rather by a Norman-based order and a Frankish-based order.

Although these medieval wars with France were a direct result of the Norman connection to France, the Hundred Years War proved to be popular in the most inclusive sense. It helped catalyze a partial purging of French identity from English identity. It seems that this conflict helped the English populace to exorcise the idea of a "French" victory over England. For the Norman rulers themselves, this proved to be a cunning means of projecting popular hatred of things French away from themselves and towards the

'true foreigner' while simultaneously serving the aim of even further Norman conquests *in* France.

It is very much a mistake, however, to attribute normative English Francophobia solely to the Norman Conquest.

"Unhappy Germany," decried Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, "neglect of your mother tongue has been fearfully revenged upon you....This language [French] has rendered impotent your men, led your children astray, dishonoured your wives." Not one to make a virtue of subtlety, in 1817 Jahn stormed into a lecture hall filled with Berlin's most refined society and declared: "The father who lets his daughter learn French is just as good as the man who apprentices his daughter to whoredom."[957]

Against these polished cultural pimps, 'Father Jahn' (1778-1852) mustered a stratagem of struggle in defiance of these encroaching French conquests. The recipient of a doctorate in philology at Leipzig in 1806 for a thesis on the German language, he eventually sought a linguistic cleansing of all of its non-Germanic words.[958] He is commonly considered the "father of gymnastics" for his development of nationalistic organizations that promoted physical fitness for physical war against the French. His advocacy of German books, songs, and folk heroes promoted spiritual regeneration for cultural war against the French.

Jahn rebelled against a world in which French was the language of culture and diplomacy for the nobility and the middle class. The court of Frederick the Great, for example, dismissed "that coachman's language (*Kutschersprache)*", German, with contempt.[959] It is remarkable how this condition paralleled that of Anglo-Saxons for centuries after the Norman Conquest. Not until the eighteenth century did Norman French cease to be the language of the English

courts.[960] In the thirteenth century it was said, "unless a person knows French he is little thought of. But the lower class stick to English and their own language even now."[961] For the commoners of England of this time to demand as Jahn did — "Man has but *one* mother; *one* mother tongue is enough for him"[962] — would have implicated nothing less than national revolution.

In 1815 Jahn roared, "Germany needs a war of her own in order to feel her power; she needs a feud with Frenchdom to develop her national way of life in all its fullness. This occasion will not fail to come...."[963] And, in 1870, it did. A war with France made Bismarck's unification of the German nation politically possible.

Far from being a novel development of nineteenth century nationalism, Jahn's anti-Latinate Weltanschauung can be traced to a deeper source: the Protestant Reformation. Martin Luther thought that, despite its Germanic foundations, Germans were being exploited by the high masters of Rome's successor empire: "We have the title of empire, but the pope has our goods, our honour, our bodies, lives, souls and all we possess. That is the way to cheat the Germans, and because they are Germans, to go on cheating them."[964]

A German leader of the Imperial Knights of the Holy Roman Empire, Ulrich von Hutten (1488-1523), attempted to affect his support of Luther's Reformation through military means in what is called the Knights' Revolt (1522). Although he failed, his actions and beliefs exposed undercurrents of Germanic self-consciousness underlying the Reformation. "A woman race", he called the Romano-Welsche. "These are the people who rule us! This mockery breaks my heart."[965]

There existed a very high correlation between Germanic ethnicity and the lands that embraced Protestantism. If one

looks at a map to discern even the historic, geographic divides between Protestants and Catholics *among* Germans, those borderlands are remarkably similar to the borderlands of the old Roman Empire. The Reformation revealed, to a remarkable extent, where the pull of Roman influence had planted its deepest roots. The *Kulturkampf* of Bismarck's Germany, which pitted the unification of Germans against the pull of the Roman church, was a fruition of the same historic struggle.

"Germany has just *one* task," declared the Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky, "one which it had earlier and has always had":

> That is its *Protestantism* —not merely the form of this Protestantism as it developed under Luther, but rather its constant Protestantism, its *eternal protest*, first against the Roman world under Arminius, against everything that constituted Rome and the Roman mission; and later against everything that survived the transition from the old Rome to the new Rome, against all the nations that took over from Rome its form and its rudiments, against the heirs of Rome and against everything that constitutes this inheritance….
> As the highest power, ancient Rome came up with the idea of a worldwide unification of human beings; and as the highest power, it believed that it could practically realize this idea in the form of a world monarchy. Nonetheless, this form collapsed in the face of Christianity—the form, though not the idea. For this idea is the idea of a whole European humanity, and on its basis European civilization has arisen; it lives for this alone. All that died was the idea of a *Roman* world monarchy, and it was replaced by the new ideal of an equally worldwide unification in Christ….

Then came the French Revolution, "which in principle had simply been a last version of the same ancient Roman

formula for worldwide unification." Since then, Germany's "most characteristic and essential feature…consisted in its never having wanted to unite itself, in its mission and its principles with the most Western part of the European world, i.e. with all the heirs of the ancient Roman mission. For the entire two thousand years it *protested* against this world." Since that time:

> Germany's genius comprehended that the German task—above all, before beginning anything, and before any attempt to utter a new word against its opponent's idea, an idea based on the old Catholic idea—consisted in forging its own political unity, in completing the creation of its own political organism, and only then to confront its old opponent face to face. And this is how it happened. After Germany had completed its unification, it thrust itself upon its opponent (France) and began a new period of struggle against it, a period which it introduced with 'iron and blood.' The work with iron has been completed; now it remains to perfect the matter spiritually.[966]

When Fichte said, "let us be bold enough to look at the deceptive vision of a universal monarchy…let us perceive how hateful and contrary to reason that vision is", he vented an *anti-universalist* justification of protest that subsequently reemerged in the German revolution of 1848. While superficially armed against Metternich with fashionable Western justifications, 1848 was, to so many of its advocates, an anti-internationalist struggle fought in the name of their fatherland. Composer Richard Wagner, for example, wanted to bring all ethnic German lands under one government. Similarly, many Westerners mistakenly misinterpret the German Wars of Liberation against Napoleon as fundamentally against the dictatorship of Napoleon *per se*, as

opposed to the dictatorship of the Code Napoléon and other rationalistic concoctions of Western civilization.[967]

Here one can discern striking nationalist similarities between the Anglo-Saxon "Puritan Revolution" of the seventeenth century and the German Wars of Liberation against Napoleon (along with the Revolution of 1848). The Puritan Revolution was actually the continuation of England's Protestant Reformation for it was the Pope who had originally Christianized the Norman Conquest with his blessings. Just as the Norman French used the authority of Popish Catholicism to conceal their political designs, the religious zeal of the Puritan could be organized to "wrest from the Norman the scepter of empire, making religious fanaticism only the cloak for concealing his political designs."[968] The Puritans took the original German protest against Rome and adapted it to their own circumstances.

When an English pamphleteer wrote in 1756 of a France "which has long been the common Disturber of the western World, and as long struggled for Universal Monarchy",[969] one can discern reverberations of the same collective consciousness that animated Fichte. When we are able to discern the partially unconscious sociobiological undercurrents that underlie the superficial overcurrents, we are in a position to grasp that Anglo-Saxons and Germans were originally fighting the same war. Both engaged in a revolution against Rome and a war against the French-Roman cosmopolitan mission. The decisive difference was that, while the Germans largely preserved the victory of Arminius until 1945, the Anglo-Saxons were never able to fully recover from the depths of their defeat by the cultural popery of the French-Roman inheritance. King Harold, in the year 1066, was like the Arminius who *lost*.

This difference also explains why a supposedly common "Protestantism" developed in incompatible ways. When Martin Luther sought support for his attack on Rome, he wrote *Address to the Nobility of the German Nation* (1520). For Luther, the nobles were representatives of the German nation in contradistinction to Rome. For Anglo-Saxon Puritans, the Norman-based nobility overthrown in 1649 were representatives of Rome. In consequence, Anglo-Saxon "Protestantism" ultimately became more compatible with democracy and liberalism, while "Protestantism" among the Germans tended to retain its original compatibility with the acceptance of a nobility.

Many have supposed that, although the Norman conquerors may have spoken French and fully donned French culture for three centuries following 1066, surely that must have been the end of a temporary cultural anomaly in English history, no? Yet when one studies the British cultural world during the era of the American Revolution with un-American cultural perceptiveness, one can discern that recurrent "half-conscious imperative, that same unspoken but persistently hinted premise…that what Englishmen must reject and overthrow is something *alien*, something *unEnglish*, something more or less reminiscently *French*."[970]

Gerald Newman's *The Rise of English Nationalism* offers a gold mine of insights as to how the *cultural* battle of Hastings continued to be played out in years between 1740 and 1830. The survival of a muted yet very real upper class "cosmopolitanism" (read: Francophilia) in England that perpetuated French tastes over and against the largely Francophobic commoners is essential to understanding the cultural world in which the American Revolution took place.

The presumptions of internationalism in "cosmopolitanism" should not delude one from recognition that "[t]he 'mature' enlightenment was…primarily an Anglo-French intellectual product".[971] More specifically, this eighteenth century Anglo-French "cosmopolitanism" belonged predominantly to "the elites" and developed "at the expense of the notion of the native land….To a degree not easily appreciated by natives of England or the United States, the entire structure of contemporary taste was dominated by the supposed excellence of foreign standards."[972]

Why would "jabbering a few words in a foreign tongue",[973] as English Novelist Thomas Day (1748-89) put it, hint at one's ennobling French connections? Should this really be an unfathomable mystery? For the "English" aristocracy to flaunt the French language and French culture as a mark of the nature of the distinction between themselves and their countrymen was to reinvigorate the original Norman/Saxon cultural paradigm of 1066.

It is about time that this eighteenth century Anglo-French "cosmopolitanism" be exposed for what it was: the fruition of the French cultural colonialism of the Norman Conquest. When Edmund Burke commented that the religion, laws, manners, classes, and orders of "Europe", and "the whole form and fashion of life" were "all the same" and even "virtually one great state",[974] he was plucking the fruits of a British tradition founded upon the military domination that made England a colony of aristocratic French civilization.

The "cosmopolitanism" of the English upper classes, which meant primarily a cultural affinity for all thing French, was actually a kind of Norman cultural *nativism*; a disguised reinvigoration of the imperial French-Norman colonialism that began with the Conquest. An enlightened

aristocratic cosmopolitan was one who reclaimed the good old colonial values of his French cultural homeland against the foreign (native) Anglo-Saxon nation below him. The seeming internationalism of this Anglo-French "class-cosmopolitanism" seriously mislead Karl Marx.

If "class conscious" English cosmopolitans had assumed that they were aristocrats in the art of masking ethnocentrism with internationalism, they were in for a surprise. Not to be outdone by the enlightened lies of the English aristocracy, the modern "rights of man" emerged out of a competition to *out-universalize* their aristocratic opponents on the superficial level of ideology. That this oppositional movement towards greater democracy meant a movement towards *greater* Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism has been sanctified with the myth of humanistic universalism. "The true key to the Age of Democratic Revolution", wrote Newman, was that in its "philosophical soul" it "was not the realization but the repudiation of cosmopolitan ideals; it was the beginning of the new era of democratic nationalism."[975]

The "universalism" of the rights of man was an attack on this Francophilic upper class "cosmopolitanism" *that was not representative of the people*. The American experiment in democracy was fought against the stubborn resistance of the British-Norman Conquest based aristocracy to *both* hereditary assimilation *and* cultural assimilation. The Anglo-Saxon side of the American Revolution was a revolt against what is now called "multiculturalism". It was a struggle for the preservation of class-cultural *identity*.

An anti-"colonial" reaction it was, but the deepest source of the American *democratic* revolution against corrupt colonialism was France, not England. Despite his own travels in France, Thomas Jefferson warned that such cultural crossing would corrupt young men with

"voluptuary pleasures", alien manners, and infection by corrupt political customs. As Daniel Boorstin concluded in *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson*, "Jefferson never seriously suggested that cosmopolitanism and breadth of mind might fit a man to discover the proper ends of society."[976] Life in America had weaned the South's Norman-Cavalier aristocracy from their traditional French connections. This seems to have been at least a minor factor in their alienation from their British counterparts, their support for the revolution, and Jefferson's desire to continue this distancing from *French* cosmopolitanism that had colonized Britain's upper social strata since the Conquest.

For the sake of simplicity, here I will associate the American Revolution with Anglo-Saxon nationalism and the French Revolution with Gallic nationalism. Both the American and French revolutions were the popular, patriotic, nationalistic *reactions* to elite Anglo-French (Norman-Frankish) cosmopolitanism. In the case of America, it was Anglo-Saxon democratic nationalism against the old Norman aristocracy. In the case of France it was Gallic nationalism against the old Frankish aristocracy.

The distinctive aesthetic and cultural genius of France is largely a product of the native Gauls, not the Germanic Franks who conquered them. This is, needless to say, a gross generalization and is not meant to be more than that. Yet it is inescapable that France's distinctive cultural difference from *every* other nation has something to do with the original Gallic population at its heart.

Through the recognition of a distinctive Gallic cultural genius, one can discern a fundamental difference between the Anglo-American revolutions and the French Revolution. It is the difference between the culturally inhibited rationalism of Locke and his philosophical nemesis,

Rousseau. Bourgeois Lockeanism reflects the historic defeat, degeneration, and retreat of a distinctively native Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* in the face of the Norman-French cultural colonization. Rousseau's romanticist attack on bourgeois individualism and his argument that something that now called "culture" is the condition of a living political community provided the script for the French Revolution and an attempt at Gallic political-cultural renaissance. Gallic *cultural* aristocracy over a Frankish *political* aristocracy culminated in the democratic revolution of 1789. Robespierre both rode the crest and dictated a pinnacle of this cultural-political revolution. It reached its zenith with Napoleon.

This means that the Norman Conquest created the sociobiological basis for the philosophical conflict between Locke and Rousseau.

The philosophical difference between Locke and Rousseau, as a reflection of national difference, can be explained as a long-term consequence of the Norman Conquest. Locke represented the retreat and defeat of a native Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*, while Rousseau represents the assertion of a native Gallic culture. Bourgeois, translated into national-cultural terms, seems to have originally been associated with "Anglo-Saxon", a term of French contempt for the "English" that had been *shared* by England's Norman-based aristocracy. Native Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* was reduced to the point that even the Anglo-Saxon-based victory of 1776 was reduced to the exhibition of a bourgeois skeleton.

Locke's "economic man" and Rousseau's "cultural man", then, reflect two kinds of nationalisms. The fundamental incompatibility between the Locke's rule of bourgeois rights and Rousseau's rule of culture reflect two kinds of national strengths. They are inversely related through the historic

pivot of the French-Gallic cultural conquest over England. The Lockean economization of Anglo-Saxon life rose in proportion to the disintegration of the distinctive Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* that began in 1066.

The last attempt at Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* regeneration was Cromwell's Puritan dictatorship. Locke's political theories arose in the aftermath of that failed revolution. The failure of that *regeneration* is what consummated Anglo-Saxon *degeneration* into individuals. French revolutionaries, following Rousseau, attempted to combine a Gallic cultural *regeneration* ("the general will") with radicalizations of other aspects of liberal democratic order that, in England, were the products of *degeneration* into individuals ("the will of all"). Yet was the French Revolution entirely less chaotic than England's first stab towards political modernity in its Civil War?

The Anglo-Saxon Lockean may have held a defensive posture in the realm of French-dominated aristocratic culture-civilization, but economic developments had opened a new field from which to launch an offensive thrust. Although deprived of the political revolution of the Americans, nativist English nationalism *against* all thing French expressed itself in a Lockean-style industrial revolution.[977] To do so was to differentiate a mutated form of native, original national genius *against* the French cultural submergence begun by the Conquest.

Multiculturalism is a genuine issue for liberal democracies because the *universalism* of Lockean rights has failed the test of reason and believability. Human rights offer a very thin and meager offering for anyone attempting to encompass the multifarious complexity of all things human. With this in mind, one can see that postmodern multiculturalism can trace the mysteriously missing

components of the human experience missed by rights rationalism to the French-Norman conquest of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*. The cultural starvation represented by Lockean rights reflects the original thinness of the representation of a distinctly Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* on the political level.

The obscured particularism of Norman identity is a secret root of modern Western universalism. The eclipse of the ethnic identity of the Normans has been one of the deepest politically authoritative foundations of modern Western universalism because they were the almost-absolutely central particularism that dissolved themselves between Frenchness and Englishness into an aristocratic cosmopolitan-universalness. Their Magna Carta-esque authority underwrote the universalism of the Anglo-Saxon rights of man. The Normans were Nietzsche's "good Europeans". For certain Anglo-Saxon nationalist "democrats", however, perhaps the worst of Norman crimes, the final insult of insults, was that this victorious Norman master race pranced upon the Saxon nation with the sly, fashion-worshipping effeminacy of *Frenchmen*!

Treachery to the German Spirit

It all began with the encroachment of French favorites and French aristocratic culture-civilization during the reign of the half-Norman English King Edward the Confessor (1042-1066). Edward was mostly brought up in Normandy and his reign marks the preparatory stage of the Norman-French colonization of England. This early stage of political-cultural colonization from France had a parallel among the German princes in the Enlightenment era.

Composer Richard Wagner believed that, aside from the Jewish "daemon", the single greatest threat that the German race faced was the corruption of their own aristocracy

through decadent, luxurious, French fashions. In his time, French art, French thought, French values, and the virus of "civilization" spread rampantly among the most educated portion of the population.

In *German Art and German Policy*, Wagner maintained:

> *French civilization arose without the people, German Art without the princes; the first could arrive at no depth of spirit because it merely laid a garment on the nation, but never thrust into its heart; the second has fallen short of power and patrician finish because it could not reach as yet the courts of princes, not open yet the hearts of rulers to the German Spirit.* The continued sovereignty of French civilization would therefore mean the continuance of a veritable estrangement between the spirit of the German Folk and the spirit of its Princes; it thus would be the triumph of French policy, aiming since Richelieu at European hegemony, to keep estrangement on foot, and make it total.[978]

In *Heirs of the Conqueror*, English genealogist L.G. Pine sought to discern the long-term effects of the Norman Conquest. He remarked that while in England there has been "a small clique among the upper class who have admired France...the bulk of British people simply do not like the French." Despite the affinity between the British and French *governments* in the first half of the twentieth century, a different attitude was exhibited by the average citizen. "The soldiers of the first World War often expressed the desire or preference for the German over the French."[979]

Wagner's fears for Germany became English reality. His prospects for a worst case scenario in which the French civilization dominated the "German Spirit" politically and culturally was, for the English, the turning point chapter in their history. His premonitions of what would constitute

disaster for the life of the *Volk* described *exactly* what befell Saxon England in the year 1066. An utterly Frenchified aristocracy, denatured from their own Germanic cultural roots, came to completely dominate the life of the English *Volk*. The Norman Conquest was the consummation of a time "when the German princes were no longer servants to mere French civilization, but vassals to French political despotism"[980] (with the exception that native Anglo-Saxon aristocrats were killed, exiled, or dispossessed). What to Wagner and other German nationalists constituted their worst nightmare of total political-cultural estrangement through conquest was, for the Anglo-Saxons, a normalized historical reality.

Wagner fought against this political-cultural Frenchification of the German aristocracy and the unparalleled disaster it portended. "In all history there is no blacker ingratitude, than the German princes' treachery to the spirit of their people"[981] It was against *their* cultural betrayal that he mustered a call for liberty against the law. This German Saxon was not merely offering a civilized critique of the German princes. Like an echo of John's Hare's *Anti-Normanism* threats (See "When did the Anglo-Saxons Stop Being Conquered?") during the English Civil War, Wagner was threatening the German princes with revolution:

> [W]e are bound some day to reach a point, in the contest between French civilization and the German spirit, where it will become a question of the continuance of the German Princes. If the German Princes are not the faithful guardians of the German spirit; if, consciously or unconsciously, they help French civilization to triumph over that German spirit, so woefully misprised and disregarded by them: then their days are numbered, let the fiat come from here or there.

> Thus we are fronted with an earnest question, of world-historical moment....[982]

Wagner's hope for a German cultural-political revolution of "world-historical moment" would come in 1933. Hitler was inordinately well educated — in all things Wagnerite. The well-known relationship between Wagner's Weltanschauung and that of his fanatical admirer has been documented, for example, in Joachim Köhler's *Wagner's Hitler: The Prophet and his Disciple*.

In 1881 Wagner declared, "We must now seek the Hero" of the future, who "turns against the ruin of his race." In doing so, "the Hero wondrously becomes divine."[983] Hitler once declared, "Whoever wishes to comprehend National Socialism must first know Richard Wagner".[984] Propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, second only to Hitler as a vehicle of the German cultural revolution, explained in 1937, "Wagner tells us all we need to know, both through his writings and through his music, every note of which breathes the purest German spirit!"[985] The rest is history.

This same political-cultural struggle wrestled on in England with the opposite ultimate result: French civilization largely triumphed over Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*. One can observe this struggle through the lens of Englishman David Irvine's admiration of Wagner's *German Art and German Policy,* as a blow against "the conventionality and artificiality of the Pharisaical upper class". He concluded:

> We must leave this notable essay with a recommendation to the English reader to master it, and then ask himself, with his mixture of Norman and Saxon blood, which of the two lies really at the root of English greatness; which shall he cultivate, the spirit of conventionalism, of artificialism, of ritualism, of pseudo-politeness, or of that blunt honesty

> which dominates the Saxon spirit. If the popularity of Wagner's music affords any test, then there is no doubt about the issue.[986]

The distinction Irvine presented could be described as that of an artificial or conventional Norman-French civilization in contradistinction to the quasi-Heideggerian *authenticity* of Saxon *Kultur*. In *Mein Kamph*, Hitler posed the distinction between *Kultur* and civilization as such:

> One of the most obvious manifestations of decay in the old Reich was the slow decline of the cultural level, and by culture I do not mean what today is designated by the word 'civilization.' The latter, on the contrary, rather seems hostile to a truly high standard of thinking and living.

Hitler believed that these intruding foreign elements yielded works of art that were "products no longer of an artistic degeneration, but of a spiritual degeneration that had reached the point of destroying the spirit. In them the political collapse, which later became more visible, was culturally indicated."[987] Is the Anglo-Saxon advocacy of modernity a product of the victory of Norman-French civilization that destroyed the ancient cultural contents of the native Anglo-Saxon "spirit"?

From a Wagnerian perspective, the Normans would appear to be world-historical traitors against Germanic *Kultur*; the very embodiment of a kind of cultural treachery to the Germanic spirit. These Faustian daemons of the north sold their Germanic souls for the civilizational powers of the Romanized West and this represented a decisive historical turn in the world's history. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the Norman lords of England were contemptuous of their own original Viking *Kultur* and held

onto their French civilizational acquisition as a badge of their ethnic superiority.

Apparently referring to its origin in Roman conquest and Frankish perpetuation, Wagner maintained, "*French civilization arose without the people*" and "*could arrive at no depth of spirit because it merely laid a garment on the nation*". This is a hint as to how the very nature of French civilization may have perpetuated England's "class" distinctions. While the Normans were of Germanic origin as well, Wagner implied that there is something inherently aristocratic or snobbish about French civilization that would tend to reinforce Norman-French identity at the expense of native English culture, just as it did among Wagner's German princes. Wagner's art, especially as fulfilled in *Die Meistersinger*, was meant to bridge the "class" gap between the hearts of the German people and the hearts of the German rulers. Wagnerianism represented, in other words, a cultural-political bridge between democracy and aristocracy.

The German Wagnerians had subdued parallels among revolutionary Anglo-Saxon cultural nationalists, i.e. the great English pictorial artist William Hogarth (1697-1764). "The connoisseurs and I are at war," he declared, "and because I hate *them*, they think I hate *Titian*—and let them!" Hogarth believed that treasonous 'native' English aristocrats "depreciate every English work...and fix on us poor Englishmen the character of *universal dupes*."[988] It was against this backdrop of elite Anglo-French "cosmopolitanism" that a nativist reaction emerged in culture and politics.

While Wagner was able to find a lavishly generous patron in the figure of the Bavarian King Ludwig II and even had his own specially self-designed *Festspielhaus* ("Festival Playhouse") built in the Bavarian city of Bayreuth solely for

the sake of the production of his own music-dramas, Hogarth and other English artists of his time endured the contempt of 'native' English elites who patronized foreigners at the expense of native artists.[989] One of the greatest myths of France, the myth of an inherent French cosmopolitan-universalism, can be traced to the generous British participation in this myth. French art and culture has been so often been supported *economically* by English aristocrats (and those seeking to imitate them) at the expense of native artists that it is very much worth pondering how much of French artistic achievement has been fertilized and subsidized by the Norman Conquest-based British order.

It was in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth century that the Norman-Frenchification of England reached a level of generality that was precedented, perhaps, only by the emergence of the mongrel English language itself in the fourteenth century. Writer and philanthropist Hannah More believed: "It is to be feared, that with French habits, French principles may be imported....We are losing our national character....In a few years, if things proceed in their present course...the strong and discriminating features of the English heart and mind will be obliterated."[990]

The nationalist sentiment extant in England, but peaking in the American Revolution, was given a voice in Englishman John Brown's *Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times* (1757-58). Corrupt ruling "class" cosmopolitanism, "the ruling principle of *Effeminacy*", amounted to Gallic rule over England. The problem was "[a] coercive Power is wanting: They who should cure the Evil are the very Delinquents". Ruin, he believed, would be averted only with a nativist restoration of true English principles.[991]

What the English aristocracy considered a mark of distinction over those socially beneath them became, instead, imitated by those subject to their lead. "By virtue of both genuine attractions and the snob appeal connected with superior taste and education," wrote historian Gerald Newman, "the culture of the bourgeoisie, that of the great unthinking mass of it, was becoming as cosmopolitanized and frenchified as that of the aristocracy."[992]

The Enlightenment period was the historical era when the Frenchification of England was consummated to the point of no return. First there was the "enlightened" reinvigoration of the Norman-Frenchification of England called "cosmopolitanism". Second came a nativist reaction that was a key element of the "democracy" of the American Revolution (justified with the counter-universalism of the rights of man).

Political scientist Samuel Huntington's *Who Are We?* is a testament to the endurance of this same pattern of Anglo-Saxon hostility to old culture enemies in the twenty-first century. The old Puritanical Anglo-Saxon democratic nationalism attacked a single domestic enemy of Norman aristocracy as the embodiment of Latinate culture and cosmopolitan elite. In Huntington's neo-Puritanism, Anglo-Saxon democratic nationalism finds this old enemy divided between poor Latin Americans migrants to America and native denationalized cosmopolitan elites.

Less famous that Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis is his older work on civil-military relations. "Historically," he wrote, "the virtues of West Point have been America's vices, and the vices of the military, America's virtues."[993] Huntington had a keen awareness of the clash between the military virtues and the Anglo-Saxon Puritan ethic that he believed was defining of America

identity. He was also quite aware that this civil-military clash of values is not universal.

In World War I, in order to depict the German invasion of Belgium as illegal and "barbaric", the Allies constructed a binary opposition between the cultural Germany of Goethe and Bismarck's militant Germany. In refutation of this construction, ninety-two leading German representatives of the sciences and arts signed a manifesto declaring, "German culture and German militarism are identical."[994] For not signing it, Einstein was considered by many Germans to be a traitor.

The normative Anglo-Saxon belief that society is distinct from the state or that culture can be easily separated from politics emerged from the reality of French-Norman Conquest. The conquered inescapably felt that their native culture was literally separated from politics and that cultural self-preservation meant adapting *against* the political. Demilitarized by their conquerors, their highest cultural expressions adapted towards pacifism. The normative Anglo-Saxon assumption that culture is peaceful stems from the pacification of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* under the Pax Normana.

One of the great Norman contributions to the very possibility of America was this historic overcoming of a strong Anglo-Saxon *valuation* of ethnic-cultural self-preservation. Assimilation to Americanism works, in part, because foreign cultures assimilate to an Anglo-Saxon culture diluted, enervated, and mongrelized by the profound impact of Norman-French influence. America is built on the fact that Norman-French civilization overcame original Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*, and especially the *values* of Anglo-Saxon ethnic self-preservation.

The Normans helped engineer the politically domesticated bourgeois animal known to history as the Anglo-Saxon. Consequently, it should not be surprising that German thinkers such as Spengler associated Western civilization with decadence, decline, and defeat. The transition from *Kultur* to civilization in the English-speaking world began with the defeat of native Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* in 1066. Germans such as Spengler could thus see the decadence, decline, and defeat of their own *Kultur* in the prospects of Western civilization.

Hastings was ultimately a battle between civilization and *Kultur*. Although the Anglo-Saxons decisively lost this battle, the modern abstraction of "freedom" evolved out of a rebellion, sometimes anarchic, against Norman *civilization*. The Conquest ultimately resulted in an Anglo-Saxon association of the political, or the state, and civilization. This paradigm is also at the root of Samuel Huntington's perception of a more grass-roots *culture* contained within the more abstract boundaries of *civilization*. The notion of a *Kultur* clash with civilization, embodied by the Nazi attempt to *conquer* civilization with their *Kultur*, is dynamite that explodes the conceptual basis of Huntington's worldview.

Kin, Kind, King

William the Vivisector

How can *Kultur* be saved from civilization? By ending the dissection of live frogs, of course. Wagner called vivisection "the curse of our civilization."[995] Liberal civilization, in his view, embodied the very same curse: the dismemberment and dissection of a live, unified, living *Volk*-organism into "atomistic" individuals. Fighting for living frogs against the

callous torture of a tyrannical, analytic, reductionistic science was thus of the very same cause.

With this is mind, could we describe the attempt to separate Wagner's politics from his art as un-Wagnerian? Isn't this rather like trying to dissect a living animal into separate pieces? Couldn't the same be said of Heidegger?

The Nazi warpath was forged by men who believed that the fight for *völkisch* unity was of the same cause as the fight against vivisection. Nazi leader Hermann Göring, while chairman of the Prussian Ministerial Cabinet, took this Wagnerian view with deadly seriousness. On August 17, 1933, he ordered, "persons who engage in vivisection of animals of any kind" on Prussian territory "will be deported to a concentration camp."[996]

In *Mein Kamph*, Hitler affirmed his belief in the living unity of politics and *Kultur*:

> We, as Aryans, can conceive of the state only as the living organism of a nationality which not only assures the preservation of this nationality, but by the development of its spiritual and ideal abilities leads it to the highest freedom.[997]

With this decree, the Anglo-Saxons had been kicked out of the Aryan race. While Hitler very probably had the contrast of the Jews in mind, the Anglo-Saxons also have a convergently strong tradition of resistance to the subordination of individuals to a larger political body. I think it is safe to say that the Anglo-Saxon tradition, especially in America, would not idealize Hitler's conception of the state-as-organism, or Überorganism, as "the highest freedom".

But is there any evidence for the "organic unity" of this "*Volk*"? I would suggest that the fifty million dead of World

War II is a start. If kin selection provides a biological basis for a sociobiological Überorganism, and a German Überorganism can be loosely identified with the roots of German *Kultur*, then the kin selective basis of German *Kultur* would be inherently resistant to universalization.

The early nineteenth century German writer Adam Müller described the state as "a vast individual enveloping all the little individuals" that can culminate in a social body that is "solely a single noble and complete person". His ideal state was, not an "instrument in the hands of a person", but rather "a person itself, a freely evolving whole".[998] To realize such an ideal required an idealistic subordination to that whole.

The eighteenth century German author and philosopher Georg Philipp Friedrich von Hardenberg, better known by his pseudonym Novalis, believed, "*All* culture [*Kultur*] springs from man's relation to the state."[999] If this distinctively German conception of *Kultur* was conditioned upon a relation of the people to the political order or state, then a break inflicted between the state and the people would remove a fundamental condition of *Kultur*. Since the Norman Conquest inflicted just this political-ethnic rupture between the state and the people, it is likely that it removed the conditions of a German-style *Kultur*-Überorganism.

Before the Conquest, Anglo-Saxon kings such as Alfred the Great built *burhs*, or fortified towns, to defend his countrymen from the invasions of Vikings and other foreigners. The Norman Conquest itself could be looked at as the decisive defeat of the original military intention of the *burhs*. Instead of fortifying towns *against* outsiders, the Norman invaders built motte and bailey castles to militarily secure their penetration *into* Überorganism-like Anglo-Saxon towns, like stakes driven into the Anglo-Saxon social body.

Often perched on the highest point of the landscape with an imposing view over a town, they were designed to signify Norman mastery and authority. Instead of protecting the people like a *burh*, the Norman castles were built to intimidate the people.

One of the great Norman contributions to the civilization of England was this great vivisection of formerly closed Anglo-Saxon cultural communities. In this medieval world there were no anesthetics for this operation, save Christianity. In addition to surgically removing the flower of the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy, the Norman infiltration became a permanent insertion that broke any sense of being a homogenous whole into a permanent tension between conflicting parts.

The English historian Michael Wood called the revival of the native language and culture in the fourteenth century "a demonstration of the ability of English to stay underground and metamorphose."[1000] The language was clearly transformed, but did the Anglo-Saxons *themselves* metamorphose as well? The seeds of English modernity can be seen in this experiment in aristocracy; a grafting experiment that permanently maimed an Anglo-Saxon sense of belong to an Überorganismic whole and forcibly pried their *Kultur* towards a social philosophy of "openness". In short, the Conquest is the primary historical reason that modern Anglo-Saxon political philosophy is distinctly characterized by the assumption of the fundamental falsity of the sociobiologically holistic conception of the Überorganism.

Max Weber, Werner Sombart, Ernst Troeltsch, and other German sociologists contrasted the rootless, atomistic *Gesellschaft* of Anglo-Saxon societies with the organic, integrated, community, or *Gemeinschaft*, of Germany.

Gemeinschaft represents the condition of an Überorganism organization among humans. Conversely, to disintegrate or vivisect a *Gemeinschaft* into its individualistic parts leads to a *Gesellschaft*.

While a *Gemeinschaft* is associated with the conditions of a *Kultur*, a *Gesellschaft* is one form of civilization. In 1905 the English born convert to German nationalism, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, described an original distinction between *Kultur* and civilization as the distinction between a peasant and a factory worker:

> The former is intertwined with living nature, from which he daily learns truth....The factory worker is torn out of all organic union with nature, which teaches subconsciously....Today in Germany millions of such workers obey a handful of immigrant Jews.[1001]

The Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) was fought primarily in German lands. With repeated bouts of invasion, physical devastation, famine, and disease, this devastating conflict is often cited as a possible clue to the German difference that lead to Nazism. The difference between that kind of traumatic historic rupture and the Norman Conquest, however, can be compared to differential success in healing a broken leg bones. In the aftermath of the Thirty Years' War, the German petty states were able to heal as unified communities, like broken bones that ultimately healed to become even stronger at the original breaking point. The permanence of the Norman military occupation of England, by contrast, meant a "class" system evolved, like broken leg bones that were never allowed to fully heal. To walk around with the equivalent of a broken leg bones sounds hopeless *unless* civilizational technologies are invented that not only

screw the separate bone parts together, but even add some dynamic, bionic strengths to the legs.

The Normans were successful in *breaking the resistance* of Anglo-Saxons to some form of right-of-conquest legitimacy, thus breaking down the immune system of Anglo-Saxon social body, thus breaking down the integrity of any form of a sociobiological organism, thus leading to atomization, and thus, in America, paving the way for an even more comprehensive infiltration of foreign bodies. In the Thirty Years' War German *individuals* were killed, but the sense of a German *collective* survived. A permanent conquest and occupation of German lands did not ensure, and hence, the nativist sense of insider and outsider was probably ultimately strengthened rather than weakened. A consequence, during a time in which Jews were culturally assimilating among Germans, can be found in the words of this enrage German anti-Semite:

> They [the Jews, in this particular instance, the Jewish leaders of sports] are worse than cholera, than lung pest, than syphilis...worse than a conflagration, famine, the break of a dam, extreme drought, the worst locust plague, poison gas—worse than all of these because these elements destroy only the German people, those [the Jews], however, Germany itself.[1002]

A comparable distinction between the Anglo-Saxon people and 'Anglo-Saxon-dom itself' lacks the same historical cogency. It was precisely the self-conception of "We, the people" that was responsible for the revolutionarily individualistic self-conception of American democracy. Could it be that depths of this distinction in favor of "Germany itself" were also responsible for the distinctive depths of German anti-Semitism?

On closer inspection, there is considerable ambiguity in Thomas Jefferson's conception of "We, the people". In a letter to English Major John Cartwright, commending his alleged deduction of the Anglo-Saxon (as opposed to Norman) roots of English constitutionalism, he wrote:

> We had no occasion to search into musty records, to hunt up royal parchments, or to investigate the laws and institutions of a semi-barbarous ancestry. We appealed to those of nature, and found them engraved on our hearts. Yet we did not avail ourselves of all the advantages of our position. We had never been permitted to exercise self-government.[1003]

"Self-government" is one of the defining notions of American democracy. But what is the "self"? Who are "we"? There is a question of identity here and within the context of this letter Jefferson implicitly identified himself with the oppressed, Anglo-Saxon, subpolitical part of the body politic. He believed that "although they have not left it in a written formula…this constitution was violated and set at naught by Norman force, yet force cannot change right."[1004]

Jefferson identified "self-government", then, with government by the previously subpolitical body of the people. This is the famous Jeffersonian formula for constitutional democracy. Clearly, the "self" in "self-government" did not refer to a government that rules *itself*, such as an empowered (Norman) aristocracy or oligarchy. For Jefferson, the problem of "self-government" was how to ensure that the political is derived from the subpolitical body of the people because the post-Conquest Saxon experience was that of a nation whose "self" *did not include the government*. The French-speaking Norman conquerors were neither culturally, nor by kinship lineage, a

"representative government"; the Normans did not *represent* the Anglo-Saxon race.

The difference between the converse cognates *folk* and *Volk* encloses, in a nutshell, the raw root of the political-cultural divergence between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans. American historian Claudia Koonz pointed out that "[a]lthough the adjective *völkisch* translates accurately as "ethnic," the English cognate "folk" connotes merely "traditional," "rural," or "quaint." An alternative translation, "people," has lost its once-powerful appeal to ethnic solidarity."[1005] Why is this?

If one could read political implications into the English word *folk*, it would point to democracy. It suggests "We the people" in a sense that is highly inclusive, yet distinctly defined by the *non*-elites of a country. While the German word *Volk* does share with its English counterpart a suspicious eye towards rootless, city cosmopolitans, it also possesses a far more holistic embrace of peoplehood. *Volk* can potentially implicate national members of *all* ranks and implies the embrace of the people *as a whole*.

Koonz wrote, "neither Hitler nor his deputies spoke of a racial state (*Rassenstaat*)." While the more materialistic conception of race typically referred to the hated other, "Hitler could (and often did) rhapsodize for hours about the ethnic body politic (*Volkskörper*), the ethnic community (*Volksgemeinschaft*), the ethnic soul (*Volksseele*), or simply *das Volk*."[1006] A racial state suggests the primacy of material political mechanisms while *Volk* embraces the spiritual, organic, and transpolitical qualities of the people.

One could say that the Norman Conquest reduced an Anglo-Saxon *Volk* into a subpolitical caste or *folk*. One could also say that Jefferson's constitutional voting-based democracy system is a compensatory, reductionistic,

political machine that attempted to mechanically derive a *Volk* from a *folk*. The difference between Hitler and Jefferson is the difference between an organic *Volk* and a politically mechanized *folk*.

The difference between *Volk* and *folk* is the difference between Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg's belief that "[t]he Volk is more than the total of its members"[1007] and Jefferson's *formal* belief in a democratic-electoral process that derives the will of the people from the greatest sum of its members. While a comparatively organic Anglo-Saxon order was politically vivisected by the Norman Conquest, the attempt to undo the Conquest resulted, not in an organic *Volk*, but in a constitutional sociobiological cyborg. Whereas Germans generally perceived an organic connection between the rulers and the ruled, for the Anglo-Saxons, the *lack* of these organic connections, ripped apart by William the Vivisector, constituted the whole problem which the artificial mechanisms of democracy evolved as solutions.

"Class" Discrimination and the Refinement of English Tribalism

Germany was not a single country until the Bismarck-led unification of 1871. If this was the *historical* reality, then were those Nazi claims of German *völkisch* national unity and racial purity nothing more than a subsequent fabrication or a holistic German fantasy? The Norman Conquest may have ruptured the course of English history, but how can a comparison with the Germans make any sense when a politically unified Germany did not even existed until 1871?

The issue here is that Bismarck took separate German tribes or petty states and united them into a unified "whole". But what about the German tribes themselves? Were these

tribes parts or wholes? How was 1871 different from 1066 as an attempt to forge various Germanic tribes into a single political whole?

The subject of race is always in one sense or another about roots, and as one searches out the real roots of race, one is eventually led to its source in kinship. Before "civilization", there was the primal kin unit of the family, and, through extended kinship ties, the tribe, and, subsequently, the greater extensions of kin-cultures from the ancient Greek city-state to the modern nation-state. The Überorganism is similarly rooted in kinship and the roots of similar conceptions can be found rooted in the Germanic languages themselves.

A great many words in English relating to jurisprudence and government are of Norman-French origin; words such as *justice*, *traitor*, *prison*, *parliament*, *government*, and *baron*. A notable exception is the word *king*. It is traceable to the Old English word *cyning* which, in turn, was derived from *cynn*, the ancestor of the contemporary English word *kin*. This etymological connection suggests a primordial belief that an authentic *king* is an offspring of the *kin*.

As the Victorian historian William Stubbs put it, the Anglo-Saxons who came to Britain "had kings—cyn-ing—the son or child of the kin or race."[1008] In one tenth-century Anglo-Saxon conception, the king was described as the "keeper of the kin".[1009] Yet *king* is hardly the only apt derivation from the root-primitive *kin*.

The English word *kind*, as in "friendly", is also a derivative of *kin*. The Oxford English Dictionary traces *kind* to *gecynde*, meaning "natural, native, innate" and, originally, "with the feeling of relatives for one another". Since the contemporary word *kind* also has an alternative meaning of "genus", "species", or "type", by tracing its origin to the

root-primitive *kin*, one can discover what the original mental association was.

To be kind to one's kind is, in a nutshell, what is now known as the theory of kin selection. The originary sociobiological relationship between kinship and altruism is reflected in the etymological kinship between the words *kin* and *kind*. Just as kingship was an extension of kinship, kindness was an extension of kin-ness. Hence, there was, in the thought associations of the primordial Anglo-Saxon mind, limits to altruism or kindness: kindness was for one's *own* kind.

Friend was separated from foe, in this primordial world, just kindness or altruism was separated from those other in "kind". Kinship altruism often reaches its highest peak in war because war originated in struggles of "our" kin against "their" kin and the loss of a war could mean the loss of the kin. At the pinnacle of the development of such unending bloodfeuds stood the king; the "keeper of kin"; the war *Führer* who fought for "our" kind against "their" kind.

If one *listens* to sounds of Indo-European words that are relatives of the English word *kin*, one can discover an analogous diffusion of associations. This is evident in the Latin word *genus* ("birth, race, kind") and the Greek word *genos* (from which the English word "gene" is derived). More closely related, of course, is German, i.e. Old English *cynn* and Old High German *chunni* ("family, race").

Just as the English word *king* is an etymological child of *kin*, the contemporary German word for *king*, *König*, follows a similar ancestry. Originating from the Old High German *kuning*, it meant 'descendant from a noble family' or 'representative of the family or race *(chunni)*'. The German word *König* is kin to *king* and *kind* just as history may not repeat; but it rhymes.

Recall how politics was directly connected with etymology in John Hare's *St. Edwards Ghost, or Anti-Normanism* (1647):

> Our language was a dialect of the Teutonick, and although then but in her infancie, yet not so rude as hopefull, being most fruitfull and copious in significant and well-founding rootes and Primitives, and withall capable and apt for diffusion from those her rootes into such a Greek-like ramosity of derivations and compositions, beyond the power of the Latine and her off-spring dialects…[1010]

The nineteenth century German nationalist historian Heinrich von Treitschke's believed that "the aboriginal family must be allowed to be the original State, for already we discover in the family the political principle of subordination."[1011] When combined with the theory of kin selection, this statement can expose the origin of the divergence between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans. Just as the English words *king* and *kind* were originally derivations of the root-primitive word *kin*, Treitschke believed that "the original state" was an extension of its most primitive root: the family. The key to understanding the connection is kin selection: "the original state" was conceived as extreme extrapolation of the extended family.

This kin selective logic implies that there must also be some mid-point between the family and the state. This mid-point could be called the tribe, and German history before the unification of 1871 reveals a patchwork of small "states" such as Bavaria whose historic borders were strongly correlated with ancient tribal divisions.

The endurance of tribalism among Germans was illustrated by one of the most influential proto-Nazi Prussian-German nationalists, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (more

affectionately known among like-minded Germans nationalists as 'Father Jahn'). "The uneducated peasant," Jahn wrote in 1799,

> in the German states of the Prussian Reich (as distinct from its Polish states) always shows pride in his fatherland. A fight starts quickly at the country fairs in the frontier towns when the superiority of the Prussians is not recognized. Almost always the Prussians win, and even if they are in a minority, never tolerate the taunts of their adversaries. Often did I hear it said on such occassions: one Prussian can take care of three Saxons, Hannoverians, Mecklenburgians or Swedes.[1012]

Swedes, it seems, were just another other Germanic tribe. Saxons, in this case, refers to Germans from the land southeast of Prussia, Saxony (not to be confused with the Saxons of England). "The fatherland" referred, not to Germany as a whole, but to Jahn's own Prussian tribe. While it seems that Germans usually find the term "tribe" less authoritative than terms such as "state" or "Reich", it is accurate as a sociobiological generalization nonetheless. Jahn, however, forged a cultural path towards German national unity based, not on the equality of all German tribes, but on Prussian supremacy and hegemony.

This particular vision of Germany unification, however, was not a monopoly of Prussians. Although born a (German) Saxon, Heinrich von Treitschke was a Prussian by conviction, and an aggressive believer in German national destiny. His father, an army general, was deeply aggrieved when his son extolled Saxony's most aggressive enemy.[1013] Yet, the historian affirmed the political superiority of Prussia. Treitschke was convinced that a strong Europe required a strong Germany and a strong Germany could be

realized only with Prussian leadership. From his teacher, Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, he discerned an emerging struggle which would decide "whether our European continent will be able in the future to defend its position against America which is developing in such a different direction."[1014]

Treitschke, especially in his earlier years, considered himself a "liberal", but he did not mean by that word what Westerners would. He was liberal in the sense that he considered this old German tribalism and the tradition of small, powerless, states to be an antiquated relic of the past. His German nationalism was, from the point of view of his father, a treasonous act against the autonomy of Saxony. Yet this nationalism was liberal in the sense that it was a step in *general* direction *towards* cosmopolitanism, even as its scope halted at the German border. Just as German tribalism originated in an extension of the family, this German nationalism was an extension, or liberalization, of the old tribalisms.

When one uncover the roots of England one finds the same early tribalism and the same "liberalization" *towards* English nationalism, although factors such as geography compelled this process to happen much earlier. It should be kept in mind that the "Anglo-Saxons" did not migrate to Britain from present day Germany and Denmark as a single people, but as a collection of tribes, and warfare among these tribes characterizes early England. In the seventh century, Northumbria achieved hegemony in England. In the eighth century it was Mercia. In the ninth, Egbert, King of Wessex (the 'West Saxons'), defeated Mercia and could technically be considered the first king of all England, although the more substantial claim is held by his descendant, Athelstan (c. 895-939). By 954, after putting down northern revolts

against the Saxon conquest, the House of Wessex consolidated its rule over the northern lands up to the Firth of Forth.

This national unity, however, was in many important respects only nominal; it was formal and political but by no means a social, cultural, or ethnic unity. Danish settlers in East Anglia, Yorkshire, and the Five Boroughs, for example, held onto their social and cultural distinctiveness. Strong reminders remained of what is traditionally called the Seven Kingdoms, or Heptarchy, of the earliest period of Anglo-Saxon England. "Every district" of the pre-Conquest Heptarchy, maintained historian William Stubbs, "was independent of every other. Mercia had no rights in Wessex, or Wessex in East Anglia: there was no bond, no unity in the land."[1015]

While this aspect of early English history appears to closely parallel early Germany, Stubbs went on to characterize other traits of pre-Conquest England with a large dose of the anachronistic. Some cultural characteristics of his own Victorian England were portrayed as permanent Germanic racial traits:

> The individual Englishman must have been formed under circumstances that called forth much self-reliance and little hearty patriotism. His sympathies must have run into very narrow and provincial channels....As a Christian, too, he had more real, more appreciable social duties than as an Englishman. He could accept [Danish kings] Sweyn or Canute, if he would be his good lord and not change the laws or customs that regulated his daily life.
>
> There was a strong sense of freedom without much care about political power. It was inherent in the blood. Caesar had seen it in the ancient German, and the empire of Charles and Otto strove in vain to remodel it in the medieval

> aggregation of the German-speaking nationalities; Bavarian, Saxon, Franconian, Swabian, were even less inclined to recognize their unity than were the nations which now call themselves English.[1016]

Perhaps these continental Germans were in need of some French-style discipline. Before William brought the "Pax Normana" that displaced the old West Saxons peace, much of prior Anglo-Saxon history was the history of Germanic tribes fighting amongst themselves. Angles, Saxons, and other tribes were never as politically equal with one as they were when the Normans made them all equally subjugated.

Stubbs' combination of unapologetic racism and his characterization of the English in terms of their individualism and lack of patriotism is noteworthy in itself. The very different twentieth century trajectory of Germany proved how earlier tribalism could attest to the *strength* of local patriotism, not a lack thereof. His belief that the natural Saxon possessed a "strong sense of freedom without much care about political power" assumes the Anglo-Saxon appropriation of the virtues of the Lockean 'economic man' was "natural", and not a product of the Norman thwarting of political ambition among the conquered.

Were the Anglo-Saxons really the unheroic race immortalized by Thomas Carlyle's in *Frederick the Great*?:

> England itself…still howls and execrates lamentably over its William conqueror, and rigorous line of Norman and Plantagenets; but without them…what had it ever been? A gluttonous race of Jutes and Angles, capable of no great combinations; lumbering about in pot-bellied equanimity; not dreaming of heroic toil and endurance, such as leads to the high places of the Universe and the golden mountain–tops where dwell the Spirits of the Dawn.

Carlyle claimed that the Anglo-Saxons were "capable of no great combinations". The same could be said of German provincial lands before their unification in 1871. Just as this pre-unification German political weakness was supported by political adversaries, especially France, comparable internal divisions were a major source of the political weakness that made the peoples of England divided in resistance to the French-Norman attack.

Bismarck was first and foremost a Prussian. As English historian A. J. P. Taylor observed, "Bismarck never came to regard the south Germans as true Germans, particularly if they were Roman Catholics".[1017] This sense of ethnic difference among Germanic tribes, along with Bismarck's "blood and iron" approach to German unification, might suggest that Prussians were to Germany what Normans were to England. To consider this possibility let us refine this comparison by zeroing in on aristocrats. *Within* Prussia, was the aristocratic "class", the Junkers, the equivalent of England's Norman nobility? Taylor observed that the Junkers had a

> parallel in the English country-gentry with their Tory prejudices and their endless feud against the Whig magnates; but the Junkers were nearer to the soil, often milking their own cows and selling their wool themselves at the nearest market, sometimes distinguished from the more prosperous peasant-farmers only by their historic names.[1018]

Herein lays a key difference between Prussian *Kultur* and Norman *civilization*: the Normans defined their civilization, in part, through their elevation *above* the soil; above the servants, serfs, and slaves who toiled for them. Unlike the Normans, the Junkers had not been decisively uprooted

from their native Germanic origins. Bismarck in particular lacked the French touch that, for obvious historical reasons, was considered characteristic of true aristocracy *as such* in England. Bismarck was not polite.

His achievement of German unity in 1871 was conditioned on Prussian political and military *hegemony*, but not on an outright *subjugation* of other German lands. Prussia and the other German-speaking lands, moreover, differed in linguistic and cultural dialect, but not in a communication *gulf* as insurmountable as that between a Latin language and a Germanic language. It was a kin-cultural liberalization that did not break a common sense of *legitimacy*. In consequence, German unification under Bismarck's Prussia was most comparable, not to the Norman Conquest, but to early English unification under the Saxon Kings.

Athelstan, grandson of his West Saxon forbearer Alfred the Great, was the first king to maintain direct rulership over all of England. His achievement would not have been possible, however, without militarily defeating other Anglo-Saxon tribes, i.e. the conquest of Northumbria in 927. One basic reason that Athelstan has been demoted in common historical memory is because his reign is a refutation of the early modern belief in the contrast between Norman tyranny and a "pre-conquest" golden age of benign democracy. The unification of England, like that of Germany, was forged in "blood and iron". Be that as it may, E. A. Freeman was correct, at least, on this point: "the Norman Conquest is something which stands without a parallel in any other Teutonic land."[1019] The gulf in language, culture, and civilization, along with the *totality* of the Norman takeover and the nearly systematic elimination of native lords made

the Normans subjugation of *all* of England in permanent military occupation qualitatively different.

In order for the Anglo-Saxons of 1066 to muster a wholehearted patriotism as Englishmen, the remains of their old tribalism had to be overcome. From this standpoint, the core Norman strength in predatory kinship unity was exactly what made the Anglo-Saxons weak as a whole. "Saxon England" was also an England in which Angles were relegated to the status of an inferior tribe. The Norman comparative advantage was exemplified by the lack of unity of the revolts in the years following the Conquest: the Normans were able to play different areas of England off and against one another.

Petty German states managed to survive with only the loose, nominal unity of the "Holy Roman Empire" until the nineteenth century. Within Prussia, for example, there existed a culture famous for its collective valuation of social hierarchy and obedience to political authority. Yet this social order was characterized by the *lack* of a primary emphasis on "class" distinctions above national unity. England, on the other hand, was rightly famous for its emphasis on "class" distinctions above national unity. Yet English social order was also characterized by a *lack* of obedience and authoritarianism in favor of individual freedom.

The solution to this puzzle is that the Norman conqueror "class" ruptured a sense of collective ethnic unity and thus the kin selective basis for subordinate altruistic-duties. Prussian authoritarianism could evolve *because* the Junkers were not as socially, culturally, and linguistically alienated from the commoners — commoners who were also fellow Prussians.

With this in mind, one can see that it was hardly an accident that the disastrous seventeenth century reign of the

House of Stuart was succeeded by the German-based House of Hanover in 1714. It was only a continuation of the attempt to reverse the Conquest through a "Saxon" restoration of the unity of kin and king. Queen Victoria's mother, for example, was the sister of Leopold, the Duke of Saxony. "[F]air and serene," wrote Benjamin Disraeli in *Sybil,* "she has the blood and beauty of the Saxon."[1020] In 1897 Poet Laureate Alfred Austin reminisced how sixty years before, Victoria, "with her eighteen summers filled the Throne, Where Alfred sate" as if retaking the throne of the old Saxon king of England.

This notion was reinforced by her marriage in 1840 to Albert, a son of the German duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. The First World War, however, changed all of this. An unpatriotic association with the German enemy questioned their national identity and the family was renamed Windsor.

Even more paradoxical from a kin selective perspective is recognition that the third English king from the German-based House of Hanover, George III, was the self-same "tyrant" that seemingly provoked the American Revolution. Now if the Hanoverians represent an attempt to restore a "Saxon" line of kings to the English throne, then how does it make sense that *this* king helped catalyzed the rebellion for American independence? This is very much like asking, if George Washington and other Norman aristocrats in the American South had connections with British aristocracy, how does their objection to English royalty make kin selective sense? Actually, the two questions answer one another. At least part of the Southern aristocracy's support for revolution against Britain was rooted in the sense that a Hanoverian tyranny succeeded where Oliver Cromwell's dictatorship failed. Washington's ancestors fled to America seeking freedom from the Cromwellian Puritan tyranny that ultimately collapsed in 1660. The Puritan descendents of the

American North had kin selective reason to rebel against Britain for inverse reasons: the old Norman aristocracy largely survived the Puritan Revolution through the Restoration of 1660.

Observing the English aristocracy as a group, American revolutionary Thomas Paine noted that he did not "see in them any thing of the style of English manners, which border somewhat on bluntness." Paine was making an *ethnic discrimination* between typically blunt Anglo-Saxons and polite (Frenchified) Norman conquerors. Just compare the manners of Norman aristocrats with the German bluntness of Bismarck. No, Bismarck was not polite. One can see in the Prussian or Germany aristocracy what might have been if the Norman Conquest never happened. Just *listen* to a British upper class dialect. Does this accent express the soul of the Anglo-Saxon national character, or does it have some other origin? "Since then they are neither of foreign extraction," Paine reasoned, "nor naturally of English production, their origin must be sought for elsewhere, and that origin is the Norman Conquest." Norman conquerors were not the "natural" aristocracy of the English.

A predatory kin selective strategy compels the maintenance of the division between predator and prey. The Normans, wrote Eleanor Searle in *Predatory Kinship and the Creation of Norman Power*, "spoke French—and used it in England to distinguish themselves from those whose land they had taken. Distinguishing themselves from their prey was part of what made Normans."[1021] For three centuries after the Conquest, Norman-French was the distinguishing, prestigious language of the ruling "class".

The long-term of effects of this sociobiological divide are evident when the dialects of England are compared with German language dialects, which are largely regional.

Although regional language dialects do exist in England, there is also a certain "class" dialect, famed for its distinctiveness from all others. Cultivated at the traditionally exclusive schools of Eton and Harrow, it is formally known as "Received Pronunciation". Some refer to it as the "King's English". Others prefer to call it "BBC English". It is a dialect from a certain region of the English nation.

And where, exactly, is this region located? Right above it. As they say in Parliament, the House of Lords is "the other place".

The English "class" system was a different form of the same tribal provincialism found among the Germans. The Norman Conquest differed only in its social structure. The old snobbery connected to being French in language and culture had to adapt to survive the reemergence of a transfused English language in the fourteenth century. The result of this Darwinian adaptation was the evolution of the "new" snobbery of "class" dialect. So while its distinctiveness may have thinned to the level of an accent by the early twenty-first century, its origins are dialectical.

That the upper class English dialect evolved as a means of social and cultural survival for the Norman Conquest tribal tradition *against* the assimilating pressures of the majority can be illustrated with a comparative example. In post-revolutionary France, in reaction to the universal and homogenizing state, culinary traditions became an important expression of regional identity precisely in reaction to the loss of local political autonomy and separateness. As political borders fell, cultural borders were asserted by regions such as Brittany, Normandy, and Provence. In modern England, "class" distinctions provided a similar means of holding on to a Conquest-rooted identity against democratization and linguistic, cultural, and social

homogenization. It was this persistent aristocratic resistance to assimilation that proved to be a crucial cultural catalyst of the Puritan Revolution and the American Revolution.

While the English-speaking world often looks to ancient Athenian democracy as a precedent for their way of life, it should be kept in mind that the mortal enemies of the Ionian Athenians were the Dorian Spartans. Not only was the Peloponnesian War a classic example of Greek tribalism, but even the Trojan War was depicted as an intra-Greek affair. Prior to 1871, the various German-speaking city-states, so to speak, represented a cultural order more analogous to the ancient Greek *polis* than did the English-speaking world.

Just as there was no definitive political unity among Greek tribes until the later empire, there was no definitive political unity among German tribal-states until Bismarck. The idea of that there was a single "Germany" that stood as a divided nation before 1871 is Western-centric. *Conquest* sealed the ultimate unification of both England and France, leading to a persisting correlation of tribe and caste. The modern revolutionary reactions to old caste systems established by conquest lead the West to a very different conclusion from Treitschke's belief that "the aboriginal family must be allowed to be the original State, for already we discover in the family the political principle of subordination."[1022]

For Treitschke, the classical patriarchal model of political was an edifying aspiration. The Anglo-Saxons, by contrast, saw in the state only the political principle of *subjugation*, not mere *subordination*. This was the difference: the Conquest violently severed the connection between the family and the state.

So while the difference between various German tribes appears utterly trivial to modernistic Western minds, this

view so often carries the thoughtless Western-centric assumption that the family is something necessarily disconnected from the state. Not only does normative tribalism originate as an extension of the family, the converse is also true: the family can be viewed as an organizational form even more primitive than the tribe. A central contention of Anglo-Saxon modernity is that the government is *not* a legitimate extension of the patriarchal family, and this logic leads to the breakdown of the family into an even more primitive unit: "the individual". Hitler, by contrast, acted as the *paterfamilias* of an extended German family, completing Bismarck's consolidation of German tribes into a single Übertribe.

Englishman E. A. Freeman believed that the Norman was "a disguised kinsman; he was a Dane who had gone into Gaul to get covered with French varnish, and who came into England to be washed clean again."[1023] Yet to even maintain this required him to maintain a more "liberal" definition of kinship than those who sought to maintain the English "class" system. This liberal view of the virtual equality of Anglo-Saxon and Norman has been more common among Anglo-Saxons than Normans. The persistence of those strong distinctions of dialect and culture even after elite Normans spoke a common English language suggests that they continued to see themselves as a race apart.

"Race" became a source of unity for Germans and a source of division for Normans and Saxons. Whereas the German conception of race developed *out* of an organic extension of the tribal whole, race in the English-speaking world developed from English racial unity *over* the Norman/Saxon tribal divide. The English-speaking conception of race developed logically towards the larger idea of the human race *over* other hierarchical tribal-racial

divisions through the civil wars of Norman and Saxon in which each thwarted each other claims for ultimate hereditary supremacy. Uncomplicated by internal conflicts of this magnitude, German tribal provincialism liberalized towards national provincialism and this peculiar kind of "liberalism" towards the extreme Nazi assertion of the autonomy and individuality of the German nation over others.

The secret origins of the Nazi-German belief in race, and especially in the unity of race, thus lies in an original lack of coerced unity among German tribes. The long lack of political unity among Germans led to a *refinement* of German tribal identity. "Refinement", here, refers not to the more analytical, French sense of refinement, but rather, refinement in a more German sense of differentiations both within and between holistically conceived entities.

The perpetuation of small, localized states rooted in kinship-ethnic homogeneity was probably the single most effective cradle of the Nazi mentality. It tended to yield refinements of ethnic discrimination between *whole* German tribes. Within this context, when *wholly* non-German peoples were brought into the picture, the difference appeared to be more profound.

The survival of "archaic", provincial, *polis*-like tribal locals, such as Martin Heidegger's rural hometown of Messkirch in Baden-Württemberg, meant that local attachments were more real because the borders between petty kingdoms were more tangible. Their scope was less universal, and hence, their palpable cultural existence was less abstract. The modern Anglo-Saxon tradition tends to look down upon the persistence of German tribalism, but which should one be more proud of, being a whole member

of a petty German principality, or being wholly conquered by the Normans?

Although the promotion of learning is among the reasons that Alfred is commonly regarded as the greatest of Anglo-Saxon kings, what made him great in political-military terms was his successful armed resistance to Danish encroachment. This means that Alfred's medieval greatness was inseparable from his great victory in tribal warfare — even as he limited bloodfeuding. If he had failed in this respect, all of his other merits would have floundered on this existential political condition: the defense of his realm and rule. What made the Saxon King Alfred "great" is what made Ethelred the Unready and Harold political calamities.

The Puritan Ethnic Conscience

The ideology of nudism in Nazi Germany

> revolved around the idea of first healing and then beautifying the physical body as part of the larger effort of reforming and regenerating the national or racial body to create a vigorous and racially pure Germanic nation….While the goal of nudism was the total transformation of the German, national, social and racial body into a nudist utopia, the agent of that change, and the focus of the nudist effort, was the individual body.[1024]

For the Nazis, the health and beauty of the individual body was a reflection of the health and beauty of the larger racial body. While it is hard to imagine a firmer contrast than Nazi nudism and Puritan repression of the nude body, these opposites reflect a common connection between the individual body and the national-racial body. Puritan repression of the individual nude body reflected the

Norman repression of the degenerated Anglo-Saxon racial body while Nazi exaltation of the individual nude body reflected self-exaltation of the regenerated German racial body.

The Anglo-Saxon dilemma was that natural, straightforward inclinations towards a more pagan naturalism were exploited by the Normans against the Anglo-Saxons themselves. Only with Puritan moralisms that inhibited their own racial regeneration on a political level could the Anglo-Saxon overcome the self-defeating acceptance of the aesthetic seductions of Norman aristocratic right. This Puritanical self-restraint against racial regeneration is a foundation of American democracy.

Through the diffracting lens of the Norman Conquest, one can discern the root of two Protestantisms: Anglo-Saxon Puritanism and German Pietism. As a biographer of Goethe, Nicholas Boyle, observed,

> The particular feature of Pietism which makes it of interest to us is its natural affinity for state absolutism...a religion tailor-made for a state system in which all, regardless of rank, were to be equally servants of the one purpose.[1025]

Puritanism was so very similar, yet so very different. While the Puritan deemphasis on social rank inclined towards political *equality*, the Pietist deemphasis on social rank inclined towards political *unity*. Whereas Anglo-Saxon nationalism became interwoven with a Puritan religion that opposed the state, German nationalism became interwoven with a religion that identified with the state. Martin Luther himself leaned towards the politically authoritarian inclinations characteristic of Pietism, as evident in his unambiguous siding with German nobles in *Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants* (1525).

The root of this Anglo-Saxon/German difference is that, while William of Normandy claimed to be king of the Anglo-Saxons, he was actually the conqueror of the Anglo-Saxons. While the original etymological meaning of kingship developed out of an extension of kinship, William the Bastard severed the organic relationship between kinship and kingship. The meaning of kingship was falsified and corrupted along with the roots of original internal unity. The Puritan beheading of Charles I was a redress of "kingship" that had lost its connection with kinship.

In its original context under Norman rule, Puritan resistance to government was synonymous with upholding ethnic integrity and purity. There thus existed a convergence between moral conscience in opposition to the political and a kind of ethnic conscience in defense of the Anglo-Saxon people. There is a sense, then, that the Puritan ethnic conscience was like what historian Claudia Koonz called "the Nazi conscience". The Nazi conscience was based on faith in the inherent rectitude of the German ethnic community and the denigration of outsiders. As Adolph Hitler announced in October of 1935:

> I view myself as the most independent of men...obligated to no one, subordinate to no one, indebted to no one—instead answerable only to my own conscience. And this conscience has but one single commander—our *Volk!*[1026]

While German Pietists had once aligned their ethnic conscience and their Biblical conscience in defense of political absolutism, the Puritan alignment of ethnic conscience and Biblical conscience led to an attack on the Conquest state. While ancient German *Kultur* was able to survive the long winter of Christian-humanistic morality that had blanketed over them, practical resistance to the

Conquest aligned Judeo-Christian ethics and the Anglo-Saxon ethnicity in such a way that it became impossible to clearly separate them.

In the American Civil War, for example, the Puritan-descended morality of the North was inseparable from Anglo-Saxon resistance to the Norman-Cavalier slave masters of the South. And the feelings of separatism were mutual. "[T]he Saxonized maw-worms creeping from the Mayflower", asserted a Virginian amidst that clash of civilizations, "have [no] right to kinship with the whole-souled Norman British planters of a gallant race."[1027]

The late political scientist Samuel Huntington was a postmodern representative of the Puritan "maw-worms" that once devoured Norman-Cavalier aristocrats. The importance that Huntington ascribed to the religious dimensions of American identity is rooted in a Puritanical reinterpretation of the Conquest as moral struggle (and *not* an ethnic struggle). Yet Huntington's repudiation of the universalistic pretensions of the American creed and his affirmation of its Puritan basis represents a verification of the Norman/Saxon conflict through his admission of the ethnically provincial mentality behind it.

If "Americanism" is not universal, then this means that Anglo-Saxon Puritanism was ultimately universalized by force over the Normans. It also means that Anglo-Saxons culturally dominated Germans in America, and then helped direct German-Americans to the destruction of their native country and *Kultur* in two world wars. From a Nazi point of view, it would appear that the Anglo-Saxons have no racial conscience. Centuries of collaboration with their Norman overlords, however, had corrupted their *völkisch* conscience beyond redemption. Demoralized as an ethnicity, their remoralization ultimately led them to overcome their ethnic

conscience. The Anglo-Saxon ethnic conscience survived largely in the *denial* of the Lockean enlightened ethnic cleansing of the hereditary Norman impurities.

Dishonor Before Death

"Courage," affirmed Winston Churchill, "is rightly esteemed the first of human qualities because it is the quality which guarantees all others." Whatever else can be said about the subjugation of England by the Normans, crossing the channel to risk everything demonstrated inordinate courage, and their claims to aristocracy was implicitly based on the Churchillian belief that courage ranks first among human superiorities.

E. A. Freeman maintained, "the courage of the English was of the passive kind with which men defend their own homes; the courage of the Normans was of the restless, ambitious kind with which men go forth to seek for themselves new homes."[1028] Yet even this passive kind of courage proved to be a total failure in defending their homeland against the Normans' Faustian ambitions. Upon this insult was added the famous English "class" injury: "Even more shameful than the humiliations of the war," explained historian Frank Barlow, "was the disgrace that followed, especially the denial to the natives of high office".[1029] The disgrace of 1066 became, not only an English institution, but the precedent for an entire political tradition.

"Hastings…evoked — albeit illogically — almost a sense of shame", wrote Victor Head in a study of Hereward, the Anglo-Saxon noble who rebelled against the Normans. "National pride was bruised at the notion that this island of a million people could be subdued apparently so quickly and so completely by a Norman expeditionary force of fewer

than ten thousand men."[1030] It can be considered illogical if one judges from an ethical standard whereby the aggressors are in the wrong and victims are in the right. If so, the conquerors should be shamed for their naked aggression, not the conquered for their victimization. But in that superficially Christian, medieval world, "virtue" in politics was still practically measured and defined in the ancient pagan Roman sense of the word.

English historian Henry Huntingdon (c.1080-1160) wrote that it was shameful to be called English after the condition the Normans had reduced them to. He believed that they were losing their honor.[1031] Freeman echoed this same assessment when he maintained that, after the Conquest, "it was a shame to be called an Englishman, and the men of England were no more a people."[1032]

For an Anglo-Saxon who reflects upon the Conquest, there are at least two basic responses to this condition: to feel shame for the national failure or to shame the moral assumptions that validate that shame. The latter response was expressed by Henry Parker amidst the political upheavals of seventeenth century England:

> 'Tis a shamefull stupidity in any man to thinke that our Ancestors did not fight more nobly for their free customes and Lawes, of which the conqueror and his successors had in part disinherited them by violence and perjury, then they which put them to such conflicts.[1033]

Shame, in Parker's view, was deserved, not by the native English for being subjugated, but rather by those who engaged in a kind of Anglo-Saxon national self-contempt.

The Norman conquerors, in Ralph Waldo Emerson's words, were "filthy thieves".[1034] Democracy was a continuation of the same struggle for justice championed by

the Leveller who stated, in 1646, that when "that wicked and unchristian-like custom of villany [i.e. villeinage] was introduced by the Norman Conqueror" it violated natural law.[1035] "Natural law" embodied the great revolt against the very political-moral assumptions of the Conquest.

Even at this time it was still said that "[t]he spirit of the English nation, depressed and broken by the Norman conquest, for many years quietly gave way to the rage of despotism, and peaceably submitted to he most abject vassalage."[1036] The evidence suggests that this sense of national-ethnic dishonor sank deep within the Anglo-Saxon consciousness. Dishonor, translated into the Christian ethic of the oppressed, became the lesson of humility. The long-term effect was a shift towards a Christian inspired humanitarian morality that invalidated the entire corpus of politically pagan standards exemplified by the ancient Roman Empire.

The survival of a culture of honor in the Norman-Cavalier-led American South was the core of the cultural incompatibility that led to civil war. One of the greatest historians of the American South, Bertram Wyatt-Brown, explained that "the evaluation of the public" lies at the "heart of honor". Honor is reputation and concern for reputation is concern for society's concern for order and rank.[1037] Honor can be contrasted with conscience since the moral evaluation of the autonomous individual is *its* heart. In this sense, the American Civil War was a war between Southern honor and Northern conscience, for the honor attached to social rank in the South was simultaneously bound to the honor of the extended kin group, and thus the honorless, inferior rank of a slave race. From this point of view, the Anglo-Saxon North's lack of a sense of honor exposed their moral equivalence with slaves.

Like the Norman-Cavaliers of the Old South, Germans had retained the *collective* pride of the unconquered. The German retained a sense of spiritedness, or what the Greeks called *thymos*, exemplified by the anger of the mythical Greek warrior Achilles. While German *thymos* expressed itself in asserting German identity in victory, Anglo-Saxon *thymos* expressed itself in repressing Anglo-Saxon identity in defeat. While modernity appears to be defined by the decline of *thymos*, Anglo-Saxon *thymos* actually expressed itself in the repression of the fame of the Norman Conquest and the maintenance of the tabla rasa assumptions required to maintain this innocent view of the genesis of Western modernity itself. Anglo-Saxon *thymos* has expressed itself in the modern annihilation of the valuation of *thymos* that shamed them. The Anglo-Saxons *had* to collectively suppress the fame of William the Conqueror, because if the political-military man is the greatest man, then William I, CONQUEROR OF THE ANGLO-SAXON RACE, stands among the greatest men of all time.

The German thinker Oswald Spengler once called for struggle against "the England within us". "German thought and German feeling," declared German economist Werner Sombart in 1915,

> express themselves in unanimous rejection of everything that even distantly approximates English or western European thought and feeling. With deepest disgust, with exasperation and resentment the German spirit has risen against the ideas of the eighteenth century which were of English origin. Every German thinker, even every German who thought in a German way, has always rejected utilitarianism and eudaemonism...We must recognize everything which resembles western European or which is

> even distantly related to commercialism as something much inferior to us.

Even this *economist*, one of the most prominent of his generation, praised militarism as an ethical force that "is a supreme manifestation of the heroic spirit".

"How", Sombart inquired, "could a European emerge from a mixture of a heroic German and a calculating Englishman?...If a European would emerge who would think half as a shopkeeper and half as a hero, that would mean the elevation of the Englishman but the degradation of the German." He believed, "we have to keep the German soul pure, we have to take precautions against the enemy, the commercial spirit, invading our mentality" for "Germany is the last dike against the muddy flood of commercialism which threatens to cover all other people because none of them is armed against this threat by the heroic spirit (*Weltanschauung*)".

In short, "We are a nation of warriors."[1038]

The Normans were a living, historic refutation of any pre-Conquest Anglo-Saxon identity as a "nation of warriors". A warrior identity lives by the sword — and this warrior identity died by the sword. A consequence of the eventual victory of Saxon-centric-democratic progress against the Norman legacy is the bourgeois character of the English-speaking world. America is only its most thoroughgoing expression.

The Nazi-German revolution radicalized that dimension distinctive to Hegel's conception of liberal democracy, the dimension of *pride*. It was from the perspective of collective German pride that the moral norms of the Anglo-Saxon world appeared to be those of dishonored Aryans. Yet there was a time when a Germanic code of honor belonged to the

pre-Conquest English as well, as evident in *Beowulf*: "For a noble man death is better than a shameful life" (v. 2890-2891).

A warrior ethic presupposes the freedom to practice a warrior's way of life. *This* freedom was usurped by the victorious Norman warriors. For a Saxon noble at Hastings to choose life in the face of death, like a slave, under his new masters, was the very definition of dishonor. Crucially, those who survived the Conquest, who were neither killed nor emigrants, *admitted defeat*. This acceptance of defeat was the literal renouncement of the "death before dishonor" warrior ethic of the pagans.

Only Christianity could offer mercy and dignity to a dishonored and defeated people. Anglo-Saxons ultimately adapted to the shame of 1066 by demoralizing the entire pagan ethical code that judged the consequences of 1066 as shameful. Over the long run, the *collectivist* ethics of shame and honor were overthrown by an adapted morality inspired by Christianity that valued *individual* guilt and good—albeit achieved by shaming the Normans' descendants as to their privileges. "God chose the weak things of the world to shame the strong", the "Good Book" declared (Corinthians 1:27). Or, as Nietzsche's Zarathustra put it, "Verily, I have often laughed at the weaklings who thought themselves good because they had no claws."[1039]

Yet a residue of the old ethic survives, ironically, in that the collective ethics of honor and shame *themselves* died in the face of perpetual, inherited dishonor. The Anglo-Saxons, as a distinct nation, died with these honor moralities that excel at preserving the collective. The Anglo-Saxons survived as "individuals". The full transition, realized in America, meant Anglo-Saxons admitted defeat and died as a distinct ethnicity, race, or nation. Incompatible psychological

attitudes of honor and dishonor resulted in sidestepping the whole issue in favor of individualism. "Modern" peoples, by definition, do not believe in the old warrior honor ethic because they have inherited the morality of the dishonored survivors.

The permanent mourning of Anglo-Saxon national self-pity would become universalized into the humanitarian compassion of Americanism. Notions of human dignity would gradually lead to the public banishment of contempt. Yet to comprehend this democratic ethic, which emphasizes human commonality, one must comprehend the Norman aristocratic warrior ethic, which emphasizes what divides.

The Anglo-Saxons have attempted to re-interpret themselves and their history in a light favorable to their sense of national self-esteem and national interest. Is it a coincidence that America ideals emphasize Anglo-Saxon strengths and minimize historic Anglo-Saxon national weaknesses? The American universalization of Saxon-centrism meant that medieval shame as Anglo-Saxons evolved into a lack of pride in their race as whites generally.

In consequence, one could ask: was the humiliation of foreign domination a cause of the spread of Nazism following World War I or was the humiliation of foreign domination a cause of the spread of Western liberal democratic political institutions? The gulf between the Nazi revolution and the Anglo-Saxon revolutions cannot be understood without grasping the way in which Anglo-Saxon dishonor was institutionalized and perpetuated as "class" inferiority long after 1066.

Yet even by the measure of the old honor code, not all was lost at Hastings. To Winston Churchill, the heroes of Hastings were the English who gave their lives fighting the

Normans, their deaths more noble than the Norman victory itself:

> worthy to be as they were then made Immortal; bravely strove with Destiny to save their country from Calamity of Foreign Servitude: but finding that they could not do it, as scorning to outlive their Liberties, they fell round the body of their vanquish'd King.[1040]

FROM HOBBITS TO HOBBES

Blood Lake

a lake,
A sea of blood—we are drown'd in blood—for God
Has fill'd the quiver, and Death has drawn the bow—
Sanguelac! Sanguelac! The arrow! The arrow!

—ALFRED TENNYSON, *HAROLD: A DRAMA* (1876)

Fantasies of Hastings

Imagine that someone set out to create a distinctly Anglo-Saxon epic mythology. What would constitute the single greatest fantasy of the nation? What would fulfill the deepest historic wish of the Anglo-Saxon people? What vision would most mesmerize the imagination of the nation in a way that the ravages of history could never hope to?

In J. R. R. Tolkien's legendarium, 3434 was the first year of The War of The Last Alliance of Elves and Men. The mutual enemy of elves and men was the Dark Lord Sauron. In the

volcanic fires of Mount Doom, Sauron forged the One Ring, the ring which contained the power to dominate and enslave the free people of Middle Earth.

After seven years spent besieging the Dark Tower, Sauron's stronghold in the land of Mordor, the Dark Lord himself emerged for battle during the Battle of Mount Doom. Now wielding the One Ring and its unrivaled conquering power, Sauron killed King Elendil of the race of men on the slopes of Mount Doom. At this nadir of the men's fortunes, Elendil's son Isildur took his father's broken sword and slayed the One Ring from Sauron's hand. Sauron's physical form was destroyed, but not his malignant spirit.

The Battle of Mount Doom is nothing less than an Anglo-Saxon fantasy of the Battle of Hastings in which William the Conqueror, symbolized as Sauron, is defeated. Elendil was killed by Sauron, just as Harold was killed by William's Normans. In this truly fantastic reimagination, however, Elendil's son Isildur redeems his father's defeat by chopping off the One Ring from the hand of Sauron (the Conqueror) with his father's broken sword. In this way, the physical, historical presence of the Norman conqueror was catharsized from Tolkien's mind from the very beginning, and the rest of epic centered upon achieving the final riddance of the evil Conqueror spirit.

Can decoding historical symbolism in a mythological fantasy of this kind be considered a rational enterprise? If West no longer believes in its own fundamental rationality, then a rational inquiry into the origins of modern democratic rationalism leads to an inquiry into the irrational bases of modern democratic rationalism. If the old rationalist answers no longer make sense, then reason itself leads to the irrational sources of rationalism. As both a professor and a

mythmaker, the author of *The Lord of the Rings* may offer key clues in an attempt at rational inquiry into the seemingly irrational.

Tolkien was Rawlinson and Bosworth Professor of Anglo-Saxon at Oxford from 1925 to 1945 and Merton Professor of English language and literature from 1945 to 1959. As an expert in Anglo-Saxon philology, Tolkien, of all men, would have known that Senlac Hill, the ridge upon which the native army was decisively defeated at the Battle of Hastings on October 14, 1066, was originally called *Santlache* ("Sandy Stream") in Old English. The Normans, with hearty humor, must have thoroughly enjoyed punning this Anglo-Saxon word in French as *Sanguelac* ("Blood Lake"). This sadistic pun became apart of post-Conquest English convention and tradition. *Sanguelac* became shortened to *Senlac* in Norman records, especially the Domesday Book, and in official usage. This French-Normanization came to dominate the linguistic identity of "Senlac Hill" just as the Norman government came to dominate the political identity of England.

"Plays on the word,—and Normanizes too!", wrote Alfred Tennyson is his drama *Harold*. This work by the most popular of the Victorian poets was surely known to Tolkien, along with its liberal symbolic use of the *Sanguelac* theme: a lake of blood; "A lake that dips in William, As well as Harold". "[T]he doom of England" was another recurrent theme for Tennyson's Harold: "tell him we stand arm'd on Senlac Hill, And bide the doom of God....If I fall, I fall— The Doom of God!"

Senlac Hill was sublimated here as a kind of Mount Doom. If we build on the root of Tennyson's imagery, the blood-boiling English wound of the Battle of Hastings is like a "blood lake" of lava in an active volcano. William's crown as conqueror of England was forged through that blood-

drenched, violent victory on the slopes of Senlac Hill, just as the One Ring was forged in the blood-red fires of Mount Doom. The blood-boiling lava of Mount Doom, which festers when Sauron is near or when his powers magnify, is the unhealed, blood-boiling wound of Hastings. When Isildur slays the One Ring from Sauron's finger on the slopes of Mount Doom, he is living a legend that must have been imagined countless times in Anglo-Saxon fantasy for centuries upon centuries after that fateful Domesday of historical judgment — that "crack of doom" in Anglo-Saxon history.

It appears that the deepest, originary conceptual themes of the Lord of the Rings epic were inspired by Tolkien's reading of this Tennyson drama. Whereas other symbols may be relatively peripheral (and *should not* necessarily be expected to yield a perfect historic correspondence), this one event on the slopes of Mount Doom, distant in time, haunts the memories of the main characters and undergirds the entire plot of the story. The ring forged in fires of Mount Doom is the central thread that yields the central purpose and meaning of the entire epic. The ultimate goal of its heroes is the return of the One Ring to its blood-red source; which is also the return of William the Conqueror's crown to the blood-*kind* from which it was taken; which is also the return of the *king* to the *kin*.

For this to make sense, we must take as our starting point in Tolkien's assertion that *The Lord of the Rings* aspired "to restore to the English an epic tradition and present them with a mythology of their own". It had to be *restored* because, in his view, the brutality of the Norman invasion — political and cultural — stunted and obstructed their own free, native, cultural development.[1041]

The King Arthur myth, for example, was of Celtic origin. It's longing for a once and future King has a basis in *Celtic* history (The Anglo-Saxon invaded Britain with the same gentle hospitality that the Normans would subsequently display to the English. The Normans, with devious ingeniousness, appropriated the Arthurian myth to themselves and thus diffused ethnically charged interpretations). All considered, the Anglo-Saxons had no great, ancient, epic *mythos* to call their own and Tolkien saw this as a comparative cultural deficiency. While the Finns had their *Kalevala*, the Anglo-Saxons had….the industrial revolution. "I would that we had more of it left — something of the same sort belonged to the English", he regretted.[1042]

If one looks at a map of Tolkien's fantasy world, the free lands of Middle Earth stand at a very similar geographic position to Mordor as England does to Normandy. The geographic distance of the English Channel has been reduced to the distance of a river, like a reflection of the reduction in cultural and political distance wrought by the colonial binding of England to the Continent. The unnaturally rectangular mountain range that divides Mordor from the rest, moreover, is strikingly similar to the coastal outline of northwest Normandy that almost appears to reach out to grasp England. Mordor may be have been derived from *murdrum*, the *collective*, ethnically discriminatory fine that was imposed upon the communities of the conquered for homicides against Normans.[1043]

The French civilization that the Normans brought was an enemy of provincial Saxon rootedness and a foreshadowing of the twisted path that would lead to modernity and the mechanization of the world. In those medieval times, Norman castles were the cutting edge equivalents of skyscrapers or the homes of robber barons who run

industrial sweatshops. Those castles became lasting symbols of the tyranny of the invaders and the foreboding presence of Tolkien's Two Towers possesses an unmistakable resemblance to the intimidating impression that Norman castles were designed to instill.

The more thorough critics of the conquerors grasped that the roots of uprootedness were not the castles themselves, but the crown that glorified William the Conqueror as the precedent for *all* British monarchs, since all have been descendants of him. If the One Ring symbolizes the British Crown (i.e. the *Royalist* cause in the English Civil War), then the problem is the perversity of a conquered people who worship the conquerors who have debased them. The inner conflict between revulsion and mesmerization can lead to a kind of schizophrenia. If the Ring exemplifies the power to uproot then Golem, once a common Hobbit, illustrates the perverse and degenerate denaturing that can befall he who worships the Ring.

Despite the compromises that would follow, the Restoration of 1660 restored William the Conqueror as the founding father of the British Empire. The rights of conquest that began in England extended to Scotland and Ireland, and from there, to India and beyond. William forged the One Ring, so to speak, that truly sought to rule them all. The ring's sense that "its time had come" loosely correlates with the beginnings of the British empire through the uniting of the crowns in the early seventeenth century.

The mythic opposite of the One Norman Master Ring are the various rings of lesser power that represent racial autonomy, independence, and self-control: three rings were given to the elves, seven to the dwarfs, and nine to men. The "Fellowship of the Ring", then, consists of representatives of the various non-Norman races of the British Isles, united in

their desire throw off the Norman Yoke and put an end to that 'evil empire'. The clearest racial link, for example, is between the dwarfs and Celts (Scots and Irish).

The key to understanding the apparently Nordic racial characteristics of the Elves is to recognize that the Normans were also Nordic Scandinavians. The Elves can be understood as one half of a bifurcation *within* the Nordic race between descendants of (Danelaw) Vikings in Britain who were conquered by the Normans and the descendants of Vikings in France who became Normans. Just as Gollum was once a Hobbit, Orcs were sometimes conceived to be enslaved Elves, twisted into evil soldiers.

Tolkien polarized extremes of good and evil so that the Elves embodied the good Christian virtues of Nordics, while the evil Nordic Norman conquerors were blackened beyond racial recognition as Sauron and his followers; Nordics who betrayed their Germanic roots in favor of 'virtueless' French civilization. The Elves of his imagination were as fair, good, wise, and immortal as Sauron and his Orcs were ugly, evil, morally ignorant, and mortal. Tolkien's "Hastings" was the consummation of the moment of Sauron the Conqueror's *mortal* fame, not his immortal fame.

Towards the beginning of *The Lord of the Rings*, Tolkien wrote,

> It is plain indeed that in spite of later estrangement Hobbits are relatives of ours: far nearer to us than Elves, or even than Dwarves. Of old they spoke the languages of Men, after their own fashion, and liked and disliked much the same things as Men did. But what exactly our relationship is can no longer be discovered. The beginning of Hobbits lies far back in the Elder Days that are now lost and forgotten.

The relation must be very close. After all, Tolkien once said that he himself was a Hobbit!

The two heroes of the epic, Frodo and Aragorn, *appear* as representatives of two separate races, Hobbits and men. Yet Tolkien set out to create a distinctly Anglo-Saxon epic and its two heroes are *both* representatives of the Anglo-Saxon "race". Hobbits embody the longing for an England before the despoliations of modern industrialization. Men embody the longing for an England before the despoliations of the Norman Conquest.

Men are warriors. The men of Rohan, for example, were warriors that rode on horses. Perhaps Tolkien fantasized that if only the men of England had possessed cavalry like the Normans, the catastrophe of 1066 could have been averted.

"The beginning of Hobbits" can be traced to the failure of Anglo-Saxon men as warriors. The Norman destruction of the native warrior aristocracy meant that Anglo-Saxons, as an ethnicity, were reduced to a subpolitical body. The upper warrior half was violently vivisected from the native national body, leaving only the surviving lower half. From a political perspective, the Anglo-Saxon had been emasculated; reduced to something less than men. In the imagination of Tolkien, they were Halflings, or, Hobbits.

To violently vivisect and remove the native ruling heads from the nation is like chopping off the summit of a mountain. Mount Doom is like this enslaved body of the nation, bleeding at the neck. The blood-boiling volcanic activity of this "mountain of fate", festering like an unhealed wound, increases with Sauron's presence and power. Throwing the ring into the fiery blood lake of Mount Doom is returning William the Conqueror's crown to the people, rightfully re-joining kin and king. Only when the One Ring is returned to its origins; when the Crown at its summit is

identical with the Return of the King could a final cathartic eruption then heal into the calm peace of dormancy.

Aragorn and Frodo are two faces of a hero with a common ancestral body. Only Aragorn, as a man, can master the broken sword of his ancestors and mend it whole. Only Frodo, however, as a Hobbit, can resist the seductions of the Ring of Power. And therein lays *his* heroism.

But even the final redemption of the One Ring's destruction cannot undo the surviving fracture into Hobbit and Man. Even time is unable to make whole what history has undone. "Alas!", Gandalf conceded, "there are some wounds that cannot be wholly cured".

'Harold Defeats William in National Elections; Normans Go Back to Normandy'

Michael Wood's *In Search of England* begins with a chapter called "The Norman Yoke". Reflecting on the great historian Christopher Hill's unearthing of Anti-Norman theories during the English Civil War, he wrote:

> Hill showed that this had been one of the greatest, most long-lasting myths in English history. In Oxford, right up to that time, it had been taught as part of a seventeenth-century antiquarian controversy: just the nutty theories of a few left-wing extremists in the English Revolution. But Hill argued that it was part of the fibre of Englishness, and in particular part of a radical attempt to reimagine England. An England not made by the rulers, an England not created, as the like of Namier and Plumb imagined, in the country houses of the rich, but by the people themselves.[1044]

This would be like imagining Anglo-Saxons with the Norman Yoke magically stripped away. It would be like imagining Hobbits of Shire who never had or desired "government" in the first place.

If the great writers of the English-speaking world constituted an aristocracy, would Tolkien be admitted to their "class"? Many would relegate him to its 'middle class' (or lower). Yet Tolkien's books have a popular appeal that is not unlike the broad appeal of democracy itself.

If the great political thinkers of the English-speaking world constituted an aristocracy, would Thomas Jefferson be admitted to their "class"? If we confine ourselves to his political *ideas*, we confront a man whose original, rationalistic political self-justifications have been largely demolished as "nonsense upon stilts". With that rationalistic anchor severed, the order he helped found is floating out to sea without a definitive compass. If the old rationalist rationalizations no longer add up, does not this lead the seeker of rationality to the irrational sources of rationalism?

Both Tolkien and Jefferson expressed unambiguous Anti-Norman and pro-Saxon convictions. Like the "left-wing" extremists of the Puritan Revolution, Tolkien's reimagination of the Battle of Hastings led to a "radical attempt to reimagine England". The Jeffersonian project called America is the rationalized side of this same Anglo-Saxon fantasy; the wish for a new England "not made by the rulers…but by the people themselves."

Just imagine if the Anglo-Saxons of 1066 had a democratic electoral system. Would the native English have voted themselves a Conquest? Is it safe to say that electoral democracy in 1066 would have altered the outcome of this pivotal event so that the headlines of history would have read something like: 'Harold Defeats William in National

Elections; Normans Go Back to Normandy'. The obvious anachronism here should highlight the point that without the Norman Conquest, the Anglo-Saxons, and therefore America, might *never* have developed distinctive proclivities towards democracy. It was the Norman Yoke itself that incubated the conditions for democracy. Democracy, in other words, evolved as the practical solution to the problem of the Norman Yoke.

What exactly were the anti-Jeffersonian principles of the Norman Yoke, or, more specifically, William the Conqueror's Yoke? Tolkien encapsulated its *psychological* substance as well as anyone from the point of view of he yoked: "One ring to rule them all, one ring to find them, one ring to bring them all, and in the darkness bind them."

Just as Tolkien gave the men of Rohan the cavalry that the Englishmen of 1066 lacked, Jefferson gave the Anglo-Saxons of America what their forbearers lacked: a system based on the principle that "all men are created equal". The American Civil War was the realization of Jefferson's worst fears about the intentions of the Norman "Cavalier" slave masters of his native state of Virginia. Through the Northern, Anglo-Saxon victory, the Normans of the South would learn the meaning of racial equality: they would experience the calamity of decisive military defeat at the hands of Lincoln the Conqueror. Tolkien's counter-historical fantasy of a Hastings won emerged out of the same imaginative process by which American Southerners have repeatedly re-fought the "Lost Cause" of the Civil War in their minds.

The myth of human equality and the "nonsense upon stilts", as Bentham called the idea of rights, have evolutionary precedents in (at the very least) three broad stages. The first stage is represented by Hereward, the Saxon noble who revolted against the Normans in the first years

after the Conquest. A second stage is represented by Robin Hood, a figure who combined the outlawry of his predecessor with a peculiar form of economic retribution. The third stage is represented by the Puritans and their Biblical-moralization of their oppression under the Norman Yoke (and a more conscientious-capitalist ethic of economic retribution).

The fourth stage of the modern myths of rights and equality also has its romantic-nationalistic counterpart: The Return of the King. Oliver Cromwell aspired to be the something like the Aragorn of the Puritan Revolution, the redeemer of the bloody catastrophe of Senlac Hill. But did the failure of his cause in 1660 mean that he ultimately succumbed to the moral weakness of Isildur?

The One Ring is a generalization and mythologization of Anglo-Saxon fear of power wrought through conquest — the power of the will of another that cannot be controlled or contained. Democracy attempts to accomplish the metaphorical equivalent of destroying the ring of power. To escape eternal doom or the fate of repeating the folly of Isildur in falling for the seductions of power, what must be done is what only a Hobbit can do: destroy the ring of power, i.e. subjugate the political realm itself. Only then can there be a true democratic age, a time when Hobbits shape the fortunes of all.

The original meaning of revolution is restoration: just the earth revolves on its axis towards a new dawn, the revolution was a restoration of ancient Anglo-Saxon freedom. With Cromwell's revolutionary-restoration denied in history, Tolkien imagined a Hobbitocratic revolution-restoration in fantasy.

In Oxford's *Chronicle*, the young Tolkien deplored the impact of the Norman Conquest and advocated the return to

something of a "Saxon purity of diction"; what Tolkien called "right English goodliness of speechcraft", or, the purging of French and Latin importations. This was a world apart from the very opposite tendencies of speakers of the upper "class" English dialect. If language, as Heidegger put it, is the "house of being", then that house was broken into by the conquering invaders. It appears that Tolkien desired to heal this linguistic conquest of England.

This should not be surprising to anyone who has read Christopher Hill's famous essay on the Norman Yoke. He considered "linguistic Saxonism" to be "an important subsidiary aspect of the patriotic Norman Yoke theory."[1045] Nor should it be surprising, then, that we find that Thomas Jefferson once engaged in the same endeavor.

Like Tolkien after him, Jefferson took an avid interest in the pre-Norman Old English language. The study of Anglo-Saxon "is a hobby which too often runs away with me", said the eighty-one year old Jefferson.[1046] In a letter "To the Honorable J. Evelyn Denison, M.P." dated November 9, 1825, Jefferson wrote, "I learn from you with great pleasure, that a taste is reviving in England for the recovery of the Anglo-Saxon dialect of our language." While he felt "greatly indebted to the worthies who have preserved the Anglo-Saxon form…I think, however, a misfortune that they have endeavored to give it too much of a learned form, to mount it on all the scaffolding of the Greek and Latin" which have "muffled our Anglo-Saxon". This "is what has frightened us from encountering it."

Jefferson's interest was not simply a scholarly hobby. "The simplification I propose may…make it a regular part of our common English education." Then, as if catching himself succumbing to an inegalitarian thought, he contradicted his belief in the "misfortune" of so many foreign "scaffoldings"

and "set equal value on the beautiful engraftments we have borrowed from Greece and Rome".[1047]

Jefferson demonstrated a fervent ethnocentric interest in his presumed forbearers and "painstakingly collected every scrap of evidence to reconstruct the history of his 'Saxon ancestors'".[1048] *American Sphinx*, the biography of Jefferson by Joseph Ellis, maintained that the "Saxon myth and doctrine of expatriation" are "complete fabrications" while acknowledging that Jefferson himself clearly thought them to be true.[1049] He attributed these sentiments to "juvenile romanticism".

The conflict that Jefferson himself acknowledged between "my heart" and "my head" was reflected in his political philosophy. Whereas Alexander Hamilton's vision of modernity was capitalist and urban, with a relatively energetic role allocated to government, Jefferson's agricultural vision for America was more like a kind of a Hobbitocracy. While the Jeffersonian principle of freedom from government or emasculated government is often associated with Jefferson's head, it was simultaneously a principle that served Jefferson's heart. Freedom from government was freedom from government attempts to interfere, control, or *rationalize* the old Saxon Shire. Modernity itself may be the Age of Hobbits, a medieval adaptation that kept the reduction of 1066 intact, but this is only a problem for those who think about origins rationally. Jefferson's heart led him to preserve what was left of an imagined old Saxon way of life, free from Norman *civilization*, before the rationalism of Hamiltonian modernity destroyed it completely.

Tolkien's Shire in *The Lord of the Rings* was based strictly upon life in rural England — nowhere else.[1050] The Shire possessed:

> hardly any "government". Families for the most part managed their own affairs….they attributed to the king of old all their essential laws; and usually they kept the laws of free will, because they were The Rules (as they said), both ancient and just.

"The Rules" are like the mythic "laws" of Edward the Confessor. Other than that, this Hobbitocracy is, in the words of C. S. Lewis, is "almost anarchical."[1051]

The notion of the Hobbit is encapsulated by the notion of the *folk*. They are the "little people", organic members of a Hobbit-democracy or Hobbitocracy. Its rules of order are ancient, not modern. So while Hobbits are like a nation of shopkeepers, and Bilbo Baggins may be like an ancestor of the modern bourgeois Babbitt, the hearts of Hobbits have not yet succumb to the rule of their heads.

"we have lost all our ancient characteristic, and are become a bundle of contradictions"

"I have in this War a burning private grudge", declared J. R. R. Tolkien, "against that ruddy little ignoramus Adolph Hitler," for "[r]uining, perverting, misapplying, and making for ever accursed that noble northern spirit, a supreme contribution to Europe, which I have ever loved, and tried to present in its true light. Nowhere, incidentally, was it nobler than in England, nor more early sanctified and Christianized."[1052]

Tolkien claimed that Hitler did not quite grasp or represent the spirit of his own race. That's a rather remarkable assertion. Clearly, we have a disagreement

between nations here. Since Richard Wagner bestowed such crucial influence upon Nazism, it is worth asking whether Tolkien believed that Wagner, too, misunderstood the spirit of his own race.

A comparison between Tolkien and Wagner, I think, is highly relevant. After all, both of these artists drew heavily upon early Germanic mythological works such as *Volsunga saga* and *the Nibelungenlied*. Certain basic similarities, starting with the centrality of a ring of power, are so obvious that Tolkien was inevitably compelled to respond to critics who pointed them out. In one instance, Tolkien dismissed the critics, retorting, "Both rings were round, and there the resemblance ceases."

Yet a comparison between Tolkien and Wagner is most appropriate for the contrasts it can clarify. Since both were deliberate in their intent to create respective national epics, basic differences that make a comparison seem inappropriate can be exactly those that illuminate the divergent sociobiological evolution between these two peoples. A key to this divergence is represented by the centrality of Christianity in Tolkien's moral Weltanschauung. In contrast to the purer pagan naturalism of Wagner's Siegfried, Tolkien's *Beowulf*-inspired mix of Nordic and Celtic polytheism with Christian monotheism is actually a semi-paganized Puritanism.

How is this Puritanism? If Tolkien's fantasy year of 3441 represents the year 1066, then the great event of that year must still ultimately represent an emotional or spiritual fall, not a great victory. Since he fulfilled the deep Anglo-Saxon wish of victory over William the Conqueror through the fantasy victory over Sauron, the source of the fall had to be sought elsewhere.

Tolkien solved this plot problem by doing exactly what the Puritans did: he reinterpreted the *political* failure of Hastings as a *moral* failure. After destroying Sauron by severing the One Ring of power from his hand, Isildur had the chance to destroy the ring by throwing it into the lava pits of Mount Doom. Lured by its demonic, hypnotic power, Isildur not only failed to destroy the Ring but kept it for himself, thus preserving the Norman/Saxon conflict as a generalized moral conflict. In this way, the fantasy victory could still ultimately be interpreted as the day that the strength of Saxon men failed. Puritanized, it became the day that their *moral* strength failed.

Tolkien began writing *The Lord of the Rings* during the Nazi period. It is hard to imagine that Tolkien would not have imagined the Nazis as the new bearers of One ring to rule them all. Normans and Nazis could be said to be connected by the "spirit of Sauron". Scott's *Ivanhoe* and Tolkien's *Ring* are to the Norman/Saxon *kamph* what Wagner's *Ring* was to the Nazi-German/Jewish *kamph*.

The difference between Wagner's Siegfried and Tolkien's Frodo is the difference between *Volk* and *folk*. Hobbits are like men who have been vivisected so that their thymotic warrior upper half was removed. In conquering the *identity* of tyrannical power in the Anglo-Saxon mind and the distinctly political dimensions of the Anglo-Saxon social body, the Normans came to monopolize the Faustian dimensions of their common Germanic cultural roots. The upper realm of the Anglo-Saxon spirit adapted to the defeat of its primal will to power with a new, Puritanical valuation of moral power.

Among Wagner's voluminous writings stands "Pilgrimage to Beethoven", Wagner's fictional account of a meeting with his great German predecessor. After vying

with a "dreaded Englishman" (and his superficial cosmopolitanism) to see the great composer, Wagner's imagined conversation turned to the relationship between inchoate primordial feelings and the relative clarity of words, as expressed in music. Wagner put the following words in the mouth of Beethoven:

> The instruments represent the rudimentary organs of Creation and Nature; what they express can never be clearly defined or put into words, for they reproduce the primitive feelings themselves, those feelings which issued from the chaos of the first Creation, when maybe there was not as yet one human being to take them up into his heart. 'Tis quite otherwise with the genius of the human voice; that represents the heart of man and its sharp-cut individual emotion. Its character is consequently restricted, but definite and clear. Now, let us bring these two elements together, and unite them! Let us set the wild, unfettered elemental feelings, represented by the instruments, in contact with the clear and definite emotion of the human heart, as represented by the voice of man. The advent of this second element will calm and smooth the conflict of those primal feelings, will give their waves a definite, united course; whilst the human heart itself, taking up into it those primordial feelings, will be immeasurably reinforced and widened, equipped to feel with perfect clearness its earlier indefinite presage of the Highest, transformed thereby to godlike consciousness.

Wagner aspired to a spiritual unity of human personality; a unity of emotion and mind, and this unity was founded in the primal feelings grounded in the orchestra and expanded out to the more analytic character of the human voice. He believed that vocal music was only language raised to its highest emotional pitch. If this is correct, then Tolkien began

from a comparative cultural disadvantage since his starting point was the problem of uncovering and resurrecting the ancient Anglo-Saxon language. Tolkien was a scholar and a cultural archaeologist of the defunct Old English language; English as it had existed before the Conquest. Wagner was a living artist of a living *Kultur*.

While Wagner aspired to an ideal of total artistic synthesis, it was his music that carried everything else. Tolkien was primarily a writer while Wagner was primarily a musical composer. More generally, the artistic peaks of England tend to be literary, while the artistic peaks of Germany tend to be musical. English aspirations tend toward the civilizational, while German aspirations tend towards the cultural.

Within English civilization, words and feelings tend to be more divided; there is less of a primal connection between word roots and root feeling and this is a direct consequence of the uprooting, civilizational effects of the Norman Conquest. From a more German point of view, one could say that the English exhibit a comparative disunity of spirit or that the unity of the psyche was achieved on a level of civilization that had been severed from its more primal roots in *Kultur*. It appears that the English exhibit a civilizational inhibition that thwarted the disciplined passion characteristic of the great German composers.

The English reached their political-cultural peaks in a more civilized manner. It is the difference between the repressive constraints of civilization and the organic discipline of *Kultur*. It is the difference between the "stiff upper lip" of the English and the more naturalistic and romantic sense of duty of German idealists. Consider, for example, the relationship between poetry and duty in the words of Karl Bröger:

That no foreign foot should violate our native soil,
One brother dies in Poland, one lies wounded in Flanders.
We all guard the sacred hem of thy boundaries.
Our most blooming life for thy most withered tree,
Germany![1053]

The sociobiological relationship between poetry and duty to the fatherland can be found in kinship altruism. German "irrationalism" in poetry and duty have often be related in that the highest kinship culminates in the highest altruism and this leads to political self sacrifice; the antithesis of individual self interest. Kin selection is the basis of the Überorganism *Kultur* that can also be the basis for *Kultur* in the sense of music and poetry. Music and poetry can be as "irrational" as willingness to give one's life for the fatherland.

"Dying for the Fatherland," a 1761 essay by German Thomas Abbt, conveyed the "pleasure of death…which calls our soul like a Queen from its prison rather than strangling it as a slave in its cell and which finally gives the blood that flows from our veins to the suffering fatherland, that it may drink and live again."[1054] Classic kin selective altruism is conveyed in these sentiments. The willingness to die for a larger whole or Überorganism is as "irrational" as music itself. Furthermore, the organic harmonies of a Beethoven symphony, with different parts working together simultaneously to synthesize a living whole greater than the sum of its parts, is analogous to a social Überorganism or even an ant colony. A kin selective society working in fugue with one another to produce a living whole greater than the sum of its parts is sociobiologically related to the musical complexities of Bach or Wagner.

"But what is offensive even in the most humane Englishman", remarked Friedrich Nietzsche, "is his lack of music".[1055] Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, Mozart, Schubert, Schumann, Wagner; most of the greatest composers of Western history were German or native to the German speaking world. The only people who come close to the Germans are the Italians (which, not incidentally, suggests a link between the love of grand musical drama and a proclivity for fascism). Who is the greatest "classical" composer that England produced? Hayden? Handel? Both were native to the German-speaking world.

Yet it turns out that Englishmen do have musical talent after all. In the 1960s a great wave of popular music emerged from England, i.e. the Beatles and the Rolling Stones. The difference between the popular music of the English-speaking world and German musical high culture is like the difference between the *folk* and the *Volk*. Whereas English rock music rebels against the repressive (Norman) civilization above, German natural passion could be cultivated towards peaks of a self-contained *Kultur* without be thwarted by a higher "civilization".

In the English-speaking world, there is tendency to categorize Beethoven's fifth as a product of "Western civilization". But does Beethoven's fifth embody the sentiments of a civilized human being or a being that smashes through the feeble boundaries of civilization? It is the legacy of a Norman-based proclivity to *class*ify everything of higher human aspiration as "civilization" that files Beethoven's fifth into the "class" of civilization, not *Kultur*. The very opposite would be more accurate.

English popular music bears the same relationship to German musical high *Kultur* as the English language does to the German language. The English language retains a basic

Germanic core diluted with French-Latin importations that predominate at more sophisticated levels of linguistic abstraction. In consequence, to stress the most "Anglo-Saxon" dimensions of the English language is to repeatedly return to the basic root words while resisting what Jefferson called the "scaffolding" of foreign words that have "muffled our Anglo-Saxon". The musical equivalent of this ethno-centering would be to repeatedly center on the most primitive musical forms while resisting too much "foreign" sophistication. The musical equivalent of Anglo-Saxon democracy is thus found in popular music, and especially in the *folk*-style of music exemplified by Neil Young. At its most primal, there is the Anglo-Saxon metal band *Forefather* who, in taking up themes such as the Norman yoke, bear tributes to the endurance of the Anglo-Saxon collective unconscious.

For Germans, however, the same return to the roots, unthwarted by heterogeneous implants, had the capacity to support much higher growths of *Kultur* directly out of those roots. Not only Wagner, but also German composers such as Hoffman, Spohr, and Weber sought musical forms free from French influences. Imagine the problem of an English composer attempting to do the same.

Similarly, what may be most distinctive about Ernest Hemingway's style is a subliminal avoidance of French importations into the English language. Hemingway intuitively ferreted out the root Germanic stumps of the English language and never completely abandoned this proximity. In English, this gave his style a rugged simplicity. In German, however, the same core tendency has far more dynamic possibilities because German naturally developed out of its primitive roots and was never brutally overtaken

by a linguistic-cultural reduction comparable to the Norman Conquest.

Even though Normans and Anglo-Saxons were not so terribly disparate in general genetic distance and origins, the French-Latin cultural acquisition gave a unique twist to their *perception* and identification of one another. While the French transformation meant that "the Normans" could never be completely explained in purely hereditary terms, *both* nature *and* nurture are requisite for accounting for their difference. Even for the Normans, French aesthetic virtues were an acquired taste and the Norman emphasis on "civilization" may be related to a sense that their Frenchified culture did not spring spontaneously from their "nature". The conquest of French civilization over England became one aspect of the Norman civilization or mastery of Anglo-Saxon *nature*.

If "culture" was originally defined as the cultivation of *nature*, then German *Kultur* may have retained a more ancient, intimate, and precise cultivation of the German "race". The long-term impact of French language and culture on England seems to have affected a relative disjoint between genes and memes. There is, for example, no *qualitative* parallel in the English-speaking world to Heidegger's thought, "language is the house of being".

Whereas German ethnocentrism has tended to emphasize notions of *Kultur* wherein biology and culture are firmly synthesized (*sociobiology*), Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism has been more compatible with *sociology*; a belief in the separation of biology and culture. It may be that the Lockean tabla rasa is actually more descriptive rather than prescriptive. The blank slate may be a reflection or description of the sociobiologically uprooting impact of French language and culture upon the Germanic roots of the English-speaking world. The cultural slate was not exactly

wiped clean, but rather, so transmogrified that the English language that did reemerge was mongrelized beyond recognition.

Whereas Wagner synthesized politics and art into a single unity of *Kultur*, Anglo-Saxons tended to split politics and art into separate and incompatible categories. On one hand, there are political "rationalists" such as Thomas Jefferson with his paradoxical unconscious undertones of romantic, Anti-Norman nationalism. On the other hand, there are scholarly archaeologists such as Tolkien, who gave expression to subterranean imaginations that had been pushed underground or disinherited, in an overt manner, by Anglo-Saxon revolutionaries. Either extreme precluded the total, artistic-metapolitical *Kultur* unity that Wagner aspired to.

In Wagner's view, German *Kultur* retained a primal, organic unity, while the inner order of French civilization, as disclosed by Balzac, revealed a historically accumulated chaos:

> Balzac...viewed and apprehended with the same eagerness as guides the German in his thorough examination of Nature-truth, this Culture was bound to reveal to the poet a chaos of ghastly details, strictly connected withal, and mutually explanatory.[1056]

The living unity of a *Gemeinschaft* was contrasted with the artificial patchwork of a *Gesellschaft*. It is the difference between a culture that is an authentic extension of an internal, genetic guide of ontogeny versus the external guide of an imposed foreign culture.

The modern French nation emerged out of a complex, dissonant harmony of disparate ethnic voices (Gallic, Roman, Frankish, etc.). It was the linguistic-cultural

conquest of Gaul by Rome in particular that imposed a Latin civilizational identity on top of a nation, giving France its distinctively hierarchically "civilizational" attributes.

The English language and culture that evolved out of the clash of French and Anglo-Saxon produced a lingering level of cultural dissonance relative to German. Just as musical sound waves composed from a single source can build on top of one another and reinforce one another in complex harmonies, musical sound waves that stem from diverse sources can cancel each other out or produce a cacophonous disorder. German idealism in politics and music is like a peak, complex harmony that developed from a single, reinforced root in which many natural strong inclinations are strengthened and many weaker inclinations are weakened into a disciplined whole. The complex cultural dissonances of England and France, while capable of producing rare and unique cultural syntheses, ultimately tend to disintegrate into the lowest common denominator of "universal" humanistic liberal democracy. From this point of view, one could view Shakespeare as the greatest Norman-French/Saxon-Germanic *cultural* synthesis before the English cultural collapse into modernity. Germans, in short, tended to be more ethnocentric because their internal sociobiological dissonance was not as great.

In comparison with English, the German language maintained a more straightforward rationality, for example, between the way a word is spelled and the way it is pronounced. The clearer *root* logic of the German language provided a foundation for complex linguistic formations and, on a different level, higher philosophical generalizations. It appears that the relative incoherence of the internal linguistic and sociobiological order of the English language promoted Anglo-American empiricism as

internal disorder was compensated with reference to *external* order.

Memes can either amplify or reduce the genetic inclinations of its carriers. The English assimilation of French language and culture made Anglo-Saxons, over the long run, less sensitive to the interlarding of foreign elements. This is a sociobiological basis of Americanism. Liberal tolerance for foreign cultures began with the necessity of building tolerance of Anglo-Saxons and Norman-French for one another.

The Frenchification of England consummated in eighteenth century also provoked nativist reactions to French-aristocratic "cosmopolitanism". Gerald Newman discerned in Anglo-Saxon nativist-nationalist thinking a recurrent "dream logic": ordinary, unthinking admiration for aristocratic cosmopolitanism leads to contamination by foreign cultural influences, the corruption of native virtue, and, finally, collective moral-national ruin.[1057] English playwright David Garrick (1717-1779), for example, in his one act play *Lilliput*, wrote "since we imported politeness from [France], we have thought of nothing but being fine gentleman [which means] impertinence and affection, without any one virtue."[1058] This belief that French civilization is the enemy of inherent national virtue was common to both German and Anglo-Saxon nationalists.

Against the impact of aristocratic cosmopolitanism, democratic-nationalistic reactions betray a sense that "the English" were losing the unity and wholeness of their national personality. The English dramatist Samuel Foote (1720-1777) wrote of cultural disintegration and the loss of national character from the

> importation of every foreign folly: and thus the plain persons and principles of old England, are so confounded and jumbled with the excrementitious growth of every climate, that we have lost all our ancient characteristic, and are become a bundle of contradictions; a piece of patch-work; a mere harlequin's coat.[1059]

America is the result of the failure of the Anglo-Saxons to regain their "ancient characteristic" against ultimate cultural-political impact of the Norman Conquest. The revolutionary Anglo-Saxon reactions were late, last-ditch efforts to salvage a national identity against the perception that their native cultural characteristics were crumbling towards a delicate, possibly terminal state of decline. The quest for the wholeness or unity of national personality was often formally expressed through the idea of a constitution.

But it was too late. They lacked an overarching, Hegelian-like unity to overcome or transcend the contradictions within themselves. The quest for unity through a constitution ultimately culminated in the "bundle of contradictions" now best known as the egalitarian hypocrisies of America. Unity collapsed into equality. This is how Anglo-Saxon nationalism culminated in universalistic egalitarianism.

Wagner believed that the German "*Volk*-soul" could regenerate if it were purged of Jewish, French, and other foreign elements. If, as Hitler thought, Wagner was right, the irreversible Frenchification of English language and culture may be a decisive part of the *sociobiological* explanation for the death of belief in a national-Überorganism among the Anglo-Saxons (and the rise of liberal-individualism). In other words, culture is not just randomly related to genes and some cultural expressions represent a greater extension and augmentation of genetic proclivities than others.

Conversely, the sociobiological basis of Locke's tabla rasa may include a relative breakdown in the relationship between genes and memes *among Anglo-Saxons*.

German *Kultur* manifests the "German spirit" in a way that French culture and civilization do not. The English language, however, did not preserve the same depth of relationship between nature and culture among Anglo-Saxons. America was built upon the Norman destruction of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*.

Myths That Kill

"Today a *new* faith is stirring: the myth of blood", declared Nazi leader Alfred Rosenberg. The new myth of the superiority of "Nordic blood" had "replaced and overcome the old sacraments". This 'chief ideologist' of the Third Reich released *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* in 1930. A contemporary bibliography called it "the most important book of National Socialism next to Adolph Hitler's *Mein Kamph*".[1060] Goebbels called it an "ideological belch".[1061] Yet all elite Nazis were bonded in some form of this myth of blood.

When Rosenberg referred to a "myth of the blood", he was not talking about myths to be exposed as lies, he was talking about myths to be cultivated into a mass national movement. How does a skeptic make sense of this? Myths such as these can be rooted in powerful, primal, unconscious emotions.

In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, especially its American variety, there is stronger rational-moral tradition of resistance to the "myth of blood". Myths like this are to be debunked, not systematically propagated. Why was the Anglo-Saxon tradition so different?

So powerful was the myth of the inherent superiority of Norman blood, that modern American egalitarian rationalism can virtually trace its genealogy to the collective building of an intellectual cannon designed to fire at any sign of this old British "myth of blood". Puritans radicalize their Biblical inheritance in opposition the religion of Norman blood. In America, this struggle would yield the counter-myth of equality. American equality, then, had a specific original meaning: the equality of Norman and Saxon.

English genealogist L. G. Pine explained something of the power of the England's greatest blood myth:

> My experience has been that faith in this matter of pedigree is as powerful as ever it has been in the religious sphere. Many a believer in Norman pedigree has thought himself into a firm position from which no arguments can dislodge him.[1062]

It is estimated that between forty and fifty million human beings were killed in the Second World War. How fortunate it is to know, according to many contemporary intellectuals, that the whole Nazi phenomenon is explainable as a myth. That entire attempt to conquer the whole world was attributable to a simple error in reasoning!

Was the Norman/Saxon conflict a myth to those who saw their loved ones slaughtered on the battlefield of Hastings? It is very easy to dismiss the tribalism of the Norman/Saxon conflict as a myth and then administer the same mythological classification to Nazism. Is it not interesting, though, that this particular myth, the Nazi myth of blood, yielded a world war and a seemingly unprecedented rampage of death. It could have been *any* myth, but *this*

nationalist myth, a myth of blood, proved to be one with devastatingly real consequences.

Every one of the Axis powers promoted some variation of a nationalistic "myth". Myths of this kind, myths of the superiority of Norman blood or German blood, are so often rooted in powerful, primal emotions — emotions that can overlap with those that sustain traditional religions. This means, alternatively, that Puritan or Lockean myths that attacked the myth of the superiority of Norman blood may have embodied a religious dimension of their own.

If the English Civil War cannot be explained in *tabla rasa* terms, then perhaps that war itself should be dismissed as a myth. The only problem, it seems, is the scientific evidence that it happened. But what if the origins of that war can be traced to the assertion that the basis of William the Conqueror's claim to the throne of England was false? What if the entire claim that the Norman Conquest was legitimate could be dismissed as a *myth*? How would a people attempt to redress *that* myth?

Historian Christopher Hill *observed* and documented massive evidence for the prominence of belief in the Norman Yoke during the English Civil War period. Perhaps the designation of this observable tendency as "myth" is an important piece of evidence in itself. Perhaps it is evidence that the behavior of people cannot be explained through consciousness alone and that a scientific explanation of their behavior requires an exploration into the collective unconscious.

Richard Wagner, writing about 1850, told his audience:

> be brave enough to deny our intellect...Ye err when ye seek the revolutionary force in consciousness and would fain operate through the intellect. Not ye will bring the new to pass but the Volk which deals unconsciously and, for that

> very reason, from a Nature-instinct....The Volk has ever been the only true inventor; the unit cannot invent....The artisthood of the future [must rest] on the principle of *communism*....The Volk must burst the chain of hindering consciousness.[1063]

Those attempting to understand the Puritan Revolution, American Revolution, and the American Civil War can learn from Wagner's belief in revolutionary forces that lie within the *unconscious*. He envisioned *völkisch*-national regeneration through emotional and unconscious forces that were *hindered* by the intellect. The composer offered a relatively coherent expression for what, among Anglo-Saxons, was an inexplicable hostility to things Norman-French.

Consider a scenario told by a historian of the medieval period about an incident after Simon de Montfort was defeated and killed following his revolt against Henry III in 1265. In an English village called Peatling Magna:

> The king's men come into the village armed to the teeth. The peasants tell them to get out, because they are against the community of the realm, the *communitas regni.* Think of it. The peasants tell the king's men that they are against the community of the land! Why? How had they grasped that? And where did the idea come from?[1064]

A contemporary of Wagner, the German nationalist thinker Jahn, spoke of the *unconscious* force of the *Volk*, which he believed shaped all history. Jahn coined the word *Volkstum* (comparable to the English cognate "Folkdom") to describe this force. It became one of the most important Nazi words. It was

> that which the Volk has in common, its inner existence, its movement, its ability to propagate. Because of it, there courses through all the veins of a Volk a folkic thinking and feeling, loving and hating, intuition and faith.[1065]

Jahn and Wagner help elucidate why the German idea of collective liberty should be difficult to articulate: its roots lies deeper than words. Individual freedom is only a pale rationalization adapted to Norman success in crushing Anglo-Saxon collective liberty, just as *folk* is a pale shadow of *Volk*.

Hitler believed race feeling was instinctive and that he was only inflaming it.[1066] If the Anglo-Saxon theory of the Norman Yoke appealed to some of the least "enlightened" members of the populace, this itself lends evidence to a sociobiological understanding of ethnic conflict, for if these behaviors were rooted in a genetic and instinctual source, those least under the grip of "reason" might potentially be more under the grip of kin selective instinct. While Nazis such as Goebbels *consciously* inflamed unconscious instinct, the role of popular instinct in the American Revolution has traditionally been repressed or charitably reinterpreted as rational behavior.

American historian Gordon Wood noted that the recurrent mobbing and rioting of pre-Revolutionary Anglo-American society often grew out of folk festivals and popular traditional rites. In a mock ceremony, a servant might become king for a day. Mobs dared to whip, hang, or burn effigies. These rituals served "as a means of dealing with their humiliations and resentments."[1067]

Yet on August 26, 1765, the traditional Anglo-Saxon riot slipped its traditional leash when a Boston mob destroyed Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson's home. Here is a glimpse as to what happened to popular feeling over the

centuries following the Conquest. Unable to fully express popular feeling against the authorities, it became channeled into ritual, rite, and custom. This is a cultural basis of political Anti-Normanism.

It was also mob violence, such the attack on the home of Massachusetts stamp distributor Andrew Oliver on August 14, 1765, that killed the deeply resented Stamp Act in America. While Boston was seen as the symbol of resistance to the British Empire in America, the Gordon riots of 1780 demonstrated a parallel upheaval in England. Although policies tolerant of Catholics were the conscious trigger, Gordon's appeal to Protestant masses was also grounded in fears of monarchical tyranny that were inseparable from a deep tradition of Protestant resistance to the Norman Yoke.

Distinctions of social ideology can be superficial or meaningless when divorced from their bases in social psychology. For example, the unconscious motivations of a nonconformist English anarchist and a racist German skinhead could be traceable to the same unconscious, xenophobic drives. That the anarchist inclines towards annihilating the political and the skinhead tends toward authoritarianism may be rooted in a superficial historical difference. The *behavior* of the English anarchist's attack on government — as opposed to its rationalization — could be the unconscious equivalent of a *Sieg Heil!* in loyalty to an Anglo-Saxon cause.

Whereas Hitler sought to seduce the unconscious desires of Germans, it was in the Norman interest to domesticate and civilize Anglo-Saxon impulses that could lead to rebellion and revolution. In modern times, Anglo-Saxons turned this strategy around and used democracy and egalitarianism to control Norman aristocracy.

A case in point is the American founding, with Anglo-Saxons concentrated in the North and Norman-Cavaliers leading the South. While their traditional animus against one another was channeled against Britain during the revolution, traditional unconscious hostility against one another had to be controlled for the sake of the construction of a viable United States. Much of the universalistic genius of America arose out of the attempt of North and South to control one another.

The rationalism of the political enlightenment was thus directly related to the "irrationalism" of race-kin feeling. The unconscious hostility between Anglo-Saxons and Normans that had been unleashed in the violence of the English Civil War had to be suppressed in order to avoid another outbreak of civil war in America. The founding's enlightenment emphasis on conscious reason over unconscious irrationalism was a direct product the necessity of compromising in order to live with another. It was precisely this rational suppression of the Norman/Saxon conflict that produced the seemingly universalistic or "raceless" character of the American founding.

The American Civil War, however, demonstrated the unconscious kin selective passions that the founders had attempted to civilize. Did not that conflict expose the irrational, unconscious impulses that enlightenment pretensions to reason had attempted to control?

Larger than the life of civilization, bloodstained ghosts of war seeped through the cracks of a bloodless political machine. Harold had been there all along, awaiting the auspicious moment to overthrow the tyranny of reason, pull the arrow from his eye, and rise from the dead. These were the ghosts of war, undying in the demand for recognition of

honor long lost. These are the kobolds haunting the mansion of enlightenment.

History and Natural Right

William the Contractor?

Pre-Conquest England was very much a socially hierarchical *Kultur*. Dominated by a king, the political-social elite included a small number of earls, and many thousand nobles called *thanes*. The social hierarchy, however, was not inflexible and there was there was room to rise or fall in status. A wealthy peasant or merchant, for example, could potentially merit the status of a *thane*.[1068]

The Conquest violently ruptured Anglo-Saxon England's way of life. The new Norman order consisted of a narrower, smaller, and more separate nobility numbering about two hundred men. These lords held their land directly from the king and this gave conquered England a distinctly top-down, structural basis of political authority.[1069] "William the Conqueror's role as the source of all tenure in conquered England", explained historian George Garnett, "was unique and unprecedented."[1070] This new political structure, reinforced by a new 'class consciousness' originating in the distinction between the conquerors and the conquered, introduced the blood-feudal system into England; an enduring source of ethnic hostility.

Many believe that England would have been better off if the Norman Conquest never happened. But what, exactly, would have better about the native order? How might have England have developed on its own without the impact of a Norman conquest?

In the nineteenth century, the German historian Heinrich von Treitschke claimed:

> We Germans are, as a matter of fact, a more democratic nation then the English ever were, and our official system is framed upon those lines. But this gives us no reason for saying that England is wrong when she attaches so much importance to birth. If we have ourselves a number of families whose right to sit in the House of Lords is hereditary, it is not because we desired to show especial favour to them, but rather because the State felt that these ancient houses were so identified with its own well-being that they must not be ignored by the legislature.[1071]

Treitschke found England's central political "class" system, the House of Lords, to be overly inflexible, inordinately focused on hereditary lineage, and less democratic than that of German tradition. This does not mean, however, that he advocated the opposite extreme of America, with egalitarian rights for all. That too, in his judgment, would also be going too far.

Treitschke believed that "[t]here can be no law to set aside the law of the land, nor can there ever be a right to perpetuate a wrong. Neither is there a law of resistance to action taken by authority which runs counter to law." Yet, in utter refutation of Puritan-American assumptions, he found:

> There is no taint of servility in all this, for it is obvious that denial of the right of resistance for the individual conscience does not carry the moral assent of the citizens. Certain it is that we cannot uphold the American Declaration of the inborn rights of all mankind, but equally certainly it contains the germ of truth.[1072]

England was *more* obsessed with political genealogy than Germany. America was apparently *less* obsessed with political genealogy than Germany. These differences would be utterly inexplicable if one did not understand that the Norman Conquest introduced a hereditary order *over* the Anglo-Saxon nation and that hereditary "class" distinctions were necessary if this paradigm was to survive into modern times. The American difference from Germany would be utterly inexplicable if one did not understand that Jeffersonian equality aimed precisely at the legacy of the Norman Conquest in both Britain and the American South.

Between the strongly hereditary British aristocratic tradition and modern American egalitarianism, Treitschke suggested that the German way was actually a moderate middle way that avoided both extremes. Even within America, the same bifurcation into extremes replicated itself on ideological lines between Jefferson and Fitzhugh, and geographically between a Saxon North and a Norman South. Equality *became* an issue for Anglo-Saxons because of the perpetual hereditary inequality represented by the House of Lords in Britain and slavery in the South. For the Germans, equality became a comparatively distinct issue only because Westerners raised it to be as such.

In reading Treitschke and other nineteenth century Germans critics of English-speaking democracy, it becomes apparent that there existed a cultural gap wherein each failed to grasp each other's conception of where the fundamental problems of politics lay. English politics simply possessed different moral-political centers of gravity. Treitschke's analysis illustrates just how far the Conquest had diverged both Britain and America, in very different ways, from the common Germanic origin that the Germans better preserved.

It was like identifying a common Germanic identity through transmogrifying mirrors. The characteristically Western (i.e. Puritan) right to rebellion was denied in the same breath as the recognition that these principles of rights contain a "germ of truth". A "germ of truth" was also recognized in the significance of the hereditary basis of England's House of Lords while simultaneously judging this to be less democratic than the German tradition. Since he felt that there was "no taint of servility in all this", nothing barred him from concluding, "[s]teadfast loyalty, even though it may be blind, and sometimes politically mischievous, must always remain a proof of the healthy condition of a State and a nation."[1073] The Puritan sense of a "taint of servility in all this" arose out of opposition to "steadfast loyalty" demanded from a "state" *above the nation*.

But beyond even all of this, Treitschke pointed out a logical fallacy built into the English notion of a rational political social contract. He discerned that if "we regard as the cradle of the State a contract whose validity is derived from the State itself, we are obviously putting the cart before the horse."[1074] The entire need for contractual government seemed to Treitschke and many other Germans as baffling, redundant, and illogical. An assumption behind contract theory is a basic bifurcation between rulers and ruled, a perception not at all given the same prominence by German thinkers like Treitschke.

Yet the historical predicament from which English contract theory emerged becomes manifest when it is understood that the hereditary government (i.e. The House of Lords) came to power *despite* a sensitivity to "contracts", not because of one, and this is what provoked the need for contract theory in the first place. After all, why do they call him William *the Conqueror*, rather than William *the*

Contractor? Was there rational *consent* for the military domination of 1066? Were William and his fellow Normans elected by the people to rule them? Where was Locke's social contract?

I think it was Nietzsche, rather than Locke, who more accurately described the natural origins of the "English state":

> I employed the word "state": it is obvious what is meant—some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organized for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad. That is after all how the "state" began on earth: I think that sentimentalism which would have it begin with a "contract" has been disposed of. He who can command, he who is by nature "master," he who is violent in nature and bearing—what has he to do with contracts![1075]

Contract theory was a way of *subsequently* posing terms of peace upon those good old conquering enemies. It was the Anglo-Saxon side of parley (from which the word *parliament* is derived). By posing the paradigm of a social contract *as if* it were an original basis of political legitimacy in 1066, any violations of this contract paradigm could then be used to justify the overthrow of the conquerors. Jefferson knew what Locke was talking about.

Contract theory evolved from questioning the basis of the legitimacy of the political order founded upon the Norman Conquest. Given the benefit of the doubt, 'William the Contractor' could be considered a very liberal and generous interpretation of William the Conqueror. Yet was it optimistic wishful thinking or shrewd stratagem to assume,

as John Pym *apparently* did when the English Civil War broke out in 1642, the existence of "that contract which [William the Conqueror] made with this nation, upon his admittance to the Kingdome"?[1076] It seems that this contract has never quite materialized — and not for lack of hope of its existence. If such a contract existed, it would be more famous than Magna Carta.

Unity versus Equality

"In long periods of humanity, it may happen once that the politician is wedded to the theoretician. The more profound this fusion, however, the greater are the obstacles opposing the work of the politician."[1077] This fusion of politician and theoretician existed in Thomas Jefferson. These are the words, however, of Adolph Hitler.

Both Jefferson and Hitler combined, in different ways, an unusual combination of realism and idealism in politics. Formally speaking, the difference between the content of their national ideals can be summarized as the difference between equality and unity; the equality of the *folk* versus the unity of the *Volk*. Underneath their apparent incompatibility, however, Jefferson and Hitler shared an idealistic, racist logic that can help explain that very incompatibility.

"Idealizing does not consist, as is commonly held, in subtracting or discounting the petty and inconsequential", Friedrich Nietzsche explained. "What is decisive is rather a tremendous drive to bring out the main features so that the others disappear in the process."[1078] Nazi racial idealism, for example, tended to bring out what Hitler and his followers believed to be the most hateful aspects of Jews so that their human qualities disappeared in the process. This racist

variety of idealism was especially prevalent among young Nazis.

In a Nazi-era youth hostel, a member of the Hitler Youth explained to a visiting American student, "There was never a great general, statesman, or philosopher who was not Indo-Germanic....Hannibal was Indo-Germanic. He was a great general, so he must have been."[1079]

Hannibal's North African Semitic ancestry can be ruled out on logical grounds. Apparently, Hannibal's Indo-Germanic racial constitution can be logically deduced from his greatness as a general. This astonishing feat of Nazi racist logic, however, is not at all dissimilar to the underlying racial discourse that led to the development of democratic egalitarianism.

"Why do so many families strive for Norman ancestry?", asked English genealogist L. G. Pine.

> In part, the desire to descend from the conquerors rather than the conquered is the explanation, but not entirely so....They have a vague idea that pre-Conquest history was blotted out, the best people came into England then and perforce they must be descended from them: delusions which our extremely expensive educational system does nothing to remove.[1080]

Just as the Nazi Youth member believed that Hannibal was a great general, so he must have been Indo-Germanic, Englishman have so often been inclined to believe that those among themselves who are considered "the best people" must be Norman. This worship of Norman blood was inextricably tied to traditional political duty to the conquering race that defeated the Anglo-Saxons in battle. "There was not, however, the same worship of Norman blood among the Scots as among the English," Pine wrote,

"for the good reason that Norman penetration into Scotland was peaceful."[1081]

The raw fact that Anglo-Saxons learned to accept the Norman Conquest implied a *de facto* acceptance that elite Normans were superior to elite Anglo-Saxons. The trauma of the wound of Hastings combined with a medieval awe in their martial might wrought a fantastic, simplistic, idealistic association of Normans and "the best people". In reality, false claims to Norman ancestry among distinguished individuals only perpetuated the Norman myth at the expense of the reputation of Anglo-Saxon or non-Norman population. In America the reverse is sometimes evident: immigrants may not claim Anglo-Saxon ancestry, but many Anglify their names and cultural character to similar effect.

Pine concluded that "[t]he feeling of oneness with the higher strata of English society is the cause of the claim to Norman descent."[1082] Under the conditions of conquest, the idealistic feeling of collective unity with the superlative race lead to a *self-alienating* identity conflict for the Anglo-Saxon or non-Norman. Thus, whereas the idealistic feeling of oneness with the master race lead to a *self-affirmation* of ethnic identity among Nazi-Germans, the very opposite occurred among Anglo-Saxons living under the Norman Yoke.

Under these divergent conditions, one can recognize a root of the divergence between German idealistic philosophy and Anglo-Saxon empiricism. The Normans conquered the ideal of greatness, nobility, superiority, and highest worthiness *in itself* within the English imagination. William the Conqueror is the kind of figure that could have been inserted into Plutarch's *Lives*. And this meant that the Anglo-Saxon who idealized the greatest military-political figure in English history idealized the greatest military-

political calamity of his own race. It meant that idealizations of human greatness lead Anglo-Saxons to idealize their subjugators, their defeat, and their inferiority in these terms. If they stood inferior by these imaginative ideals of great Greeks, Romans, and Normans, then they might stand superior through the invention of modern "realism".

"Realism" itself in no way dictates modern values. At one extreme, the politically ambitious non-Norman "realist" who adapted to the conditions of the Norman supremacy could attempt to adapt by actively falsifying his descent. For example, William Cecil (1520-1598), minister to Queen Elizabeth and winner of a peerage, "so ardently desired Norman ancestry that he forged papers to prove it in his own case."[1083]

The specifically modern variety of realism that refuses to submit to myths and idealizations of human greatness could only be instituted by a thorough overthrow of the old system. And that meant revolution. But is the modern system fundamentally more "realist" that what it replaced?

The idealistic character of Jeffersonian equality is product of a world where aristocracy was bred with notions of what Pine called "Normanity". Whereas medieval Saxons who idealized Norman superiority were lead to idealize Saxon inferiority, Jefferson posited a modern alternative. If the Norman was an aristocrat then the Saxon was a democrat. Just as the Nazis idealized Jews and other "race enemies", Jefferson idealized the Norman as inegalitarian and the Saxon as egalitarian.

In this sense, Jefferson's egalitarianism was similar, in some ways, to the deluded logic of the Hitler Youth boy. Jefferson's idealistic association of Norman and tyrant was another instance of what Ellis called his "juvenile romanticism". This is how American egalitarian idealism

emerged from Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. Jefferson's declaration that "all men are created equal" was Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism sublimated as humanism.

It was the egalitarianism appropriate to an owner of black slaves. The Norman-Cavalier-led culture of Southern slavery in post-revolutionary America was only a rearrangement of the ancient tradition of assigning the privilege of equality to only those of a certain hereditary rank. Consider, for example, the citizens of ancient Sparta. They called themselves *Homoioi*, meaning "Similars" or "Equals". This archetypal militaristic culture of the ancient world was hardly enamored of the idea of equality in itself. On the contrary, the limited egalitarianism implicit in being a *Homoioi* was very similar to the British aristocratic notion of a "Peer". While Peers accept a limited basis of equality among themselves, its social and political context makes it perfectly clear that others exist who are socially and politically relegated to an entirely separate and lower level. Peers have rights, privileges, and original Magna Carta liberties denied to commoners.

Just as the Spartan *Homoioi* were united among themselves, but unambiguous superiors and masters over the Helots they kept in perpetual subjugation, the great hereditary Norman lords accepted a limited peerage among themselves while relegating the subjugated Anglo-Saxons to an entirely inferior "class". It is from this condition that the common Saxon "class" evolved a kind of cultural *polisphobia*: fear and disbelief in the natural *unity* of the political order. Modern political equality in the English-speaking world struck at the notion of "class" peerage with the notion of *unity through equality* unqualified by "class" rank.

This peculiar origin betrays something very basic about the idea of equality, namely, that equality evolved as a

means of solving internal *dissimilarity* and *disunity*. By creating a broader, more liberal scope of inclusiveness, the lower common denominator of the human could encompass both Norman and Saxon and make residual distinctions between them appear trivial. Equality could compensate for a *lack* of unity. Equality, especially the equality of the American founding, offered a basis of political commonality *despite* disunity and this is why the trajectory set by the egalitarian solution to the Norman/Saxon conflict lead to an exacerbation of the original need for equality in the first place: genetic and cultural *disunity*. The equality of man thus opened the door to the unsimilarity of man.

It is not hard to see why the West has largely given up on the attempt to give equality or "the individual" any kind of empirical or scientifically defensible meaning. A strictly literal, empirical understanding of equality logically implies a *literal* similarity; an empirical equivalence between individuals. In genetic terms, the most equal are twins or clones. In cultural terms, the most equal are those with the same culture, upbringing, and education. It thus follows that Nazism aimed for greater "equality" than liberal democracies in the scientific or empirical sense of aiming for greater genetic and cultural similarity. Nazi unity *radicalized* modern "equality" in the scientific sense of genetic similarity. It is from this point of view that one can see how the original Saxon-centrism of Jeffersonian egalitarianism practically converges with Nazism, or, how egalitarianism could conceivable converge the *folk* towards the *Volk*.

Within the original Conquest paradigm, Anglo-Saxons were the "class" that embodied those who were *equally* subjugated and Normans formed the "class" that embodied political *hierarchy*. While equality emphasizes similarity and hierarchy emphasizes difference, the Nazis overcame this

contradiction with a sense of unity in the belief that they formed a *single* racial class. Only minds free from Anglo-Saxon *polisphobia* could believe, as the late eighteenth century German thinker Johann Gottfried von Herder did, that "there is only one class in the state, the *Volk*, (not the rabble), and the king belongs to this class as well as the peasants." If this appears to be naïve idealism, consider the words of German Emperor William II in 1914: "I no longer recognize parties; I recognize only Germans."[1084] Contempt for special interest partisanship, and an ability to assert the nation *as a whole*, was a German proclivity that Hitler would take to its extreme.

"We are the first country in Europe to overcome the class struggle", declared Nazi Labor Front leader Robert Ley in 1935.[1085] Can someone imagine a right wing government, in perfect seriousness, claiming the same in the England? Far more typical of Britain was former Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's claim that the conservatives had won "the class war". Following the victory of the conservatives under his leadership in 1959, Macmillan told Queen Elizabeth II:

> the most encouraging feature of the election…is the strong impression I have formed that Your Majesty's subjects do not wish to allow themselves to be divided into warring classes or tribes filled with hereditary animosity against each other.[1086]

Whereas Nazis such as Robert Ley believed they could heal the dismembering effects of class divisions with the unifying principle of race, Macmillan's admission of "hereditary animosity" between "warring classes or tribes" helps explain why this solution was not applicable to "the English". This very modern British *ambiguity* between "classes" and "tribes" was *precisely* what Marx was able to

seize upon as the great verification of his clash of classes view of history. The British inability to confront the long-term impact of Norman Conquest provided Marx with the single most significant historical confirmation of his belief in the irrelevance of biology (including his own Jewish origins) and the inevitable supremacy of economics.

When Heidegger embraced Nazism in 1933, his did so in consonance with an attempt to embrace the deepest and most radical origin (*Ursprung*) of philosophy; an origin articulated in the language of the primordial; a historical *Gestalt* that preceded the distinction between state and society. When Thomas Paine traced the origins of politics in *Common Sense* (1776), he began with the very modern distinction between state and society: "Some writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins." Paine further clarified the nature of the different hereditary origins of the English "state" in *The Rights of Man* when he reasoned:

> Since then they are neither of foreign extraction, nor naturally of English production, their origin must be sought for elsewhere, and that origin is the Norman Conquest. They are evidently of the vassalage class of manners, and emphatically mark the prostrate distance that exists in no other condition of men than between the conqueror and the conquered.

It was exactly that "prostrate distance" between the conqueror "class" and the conquered "class" that Marx misinterpreted as a fundamentally economic phenomenon. The distinctively British way of "class war", however, began at the Battle of Hastings. Modern Anglo-Saxon democracy and equality began under conditions, *on a political level*, in

which they were equally members of a subjugated group. Hence it was on that level (and not an economic one) that they were sensitive to issues of representation and status. Economic inequality, by contrast, eventually became the particular Anglo-Saxon superiority.

The Norman-*French* origins of England's "vassalage class of manners" and the impact of Christianity on the modern values that Marx radicalized failed to make history for his stubborn economic motor. A historic convergence of all of these factors, the Norman/Saxon conflict, Christianity, and socialism/Marxism can be found in the person of William Harrison Riley. A socialist associated with the First International Workingmen's Association (1864), he declared, "William the Conqueror's landlords will find that they must give way to God's landlords, the whole people."[1087] This implied that England was *not* a political whole and William's heirs were distinct from the body of the people who *did* constitute a whole.

Another socialist who illustrates Marx's misunderstanding of the origins of English "class" was Thomas Evans. Librarian to the Society of Spencean Philanthropists and, in 1798, secretary of the London Corresponding Society, he demanded action against the hereditary aristocracy:

> They are not the nation, but the masters of the nation….All the land, the waters, the mines, the houses, and all permanent feudal property, must return to the people, the whole people…our natural situation, all our improvements lead us towards its accomplishment, it arises out of our old Saxon institutions and the part, the very small part, recaptured as it were from the Conquest at different times…"[1088]

The Norman Conquest poisoned the sense of natural or organic ethnic unity that allowed Herder to assert, "there is only one class in the state, the *Volk*". The Conquest drove a wedge the people and their rulers that shattered the kinship-cultural basis of collective unity. And yet, one can still discern a German-like ethnic *Gestalt* in the very distinction between "the masters of the nation" and "the whole people". Whereas German kin selective altruism remained relatively coherent with the political class, for the Anglo-Saxons, kin selective altruism meant diverting altruism *against* the political "class" and towards "the people." Yet liberal democracy is not equivalent to Anglo-Saxon national socialism precisely because the profound Norman contribution to liberal democracy.

The Norman invasion destroyed the unity of pride that the German retained. Government lost a sense of organic unity with the people and popular sentiment gradually unraveled from political unity into political equality. For lack of hereditary unity, unhereditary equality gradually became the practical solution to internal divisions. Ancient unity was reduced or degenerated into modern equality.

During the American revolutionary period, some believed that there exists one social cleavage that overwhelmed all others: the division between the "puissant" few and the "vulgar" many; the "gentle" and the "simple"; the "polite" and the "common". It was this "most ancient and universal of all Divisions of People" which constituted the crux of American revolutionary ire.[1089]

But was it universal? The *cultural* character of that "most ancient and universal of all Divisions of People" was profoundly informed, however modified, by a distinctly French aristocratic civilization that the Norman imported as colonizers of England. The counter-universalisms of

American democrats cannot hide their attack on the medieval and historical convergence of French-Norman and cosmopolitan-aristocrat.

Between the revolution of 1776 and the revolution of 1933, there stands a root difference in the perception of fundamental social divisions. Each revolution offered a different answer to the question: What is the most important division among people? For the Americans, the division between hereditary superior and commoner was most crucial, at least in theory. For the Nazis, the division between whole races was most crucial. Hitler's followers attacked a hereditary enemy no less, only casting different characters in the evil doer's role. And accordingly, the German Revolution produced a profoundly different constitution.

The Nazi Constitution

In the first year of World War II, Ernst Rudolf Huber published *Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich.* "The new Reich has no written constitutional declaration," it stated,

> but its constitution exists in the unwritten basic political order of the Reich. One recognizes it in the spiritual powers which fill our people, in the real authority in which our political life is founded, and in the basic laws regarding the structure of the state which have been proclaimed so far. The advantage of such an unwritten constitution over the formal constitution is that the basic principles do not become rigid but remain in a constant, living movement. Not dead institutions but living principles determine the nature of the new constitutional order.[1090]

The notion of an unwritten constitution was a corollary of the belief in the unconscious, spiritual sources of the Nazi

political order rooted in the nature of the people themselves. In this sense, Huber's approach was quite similar to the nineteenth century English historian of the English Constitution, William Stubbs. The English, he claimed, are "a people of German descent in the main constituents of blood, character, and language, but most especially...in the possession of the elements of primitive German civilization and the common germs of German institutions." He further believed that "[t]he polity developed by the German races on British soil is the purest product of their primitive instinct."[1091]

Is it possible that Anglo-Saxons and Germans could possess the same "primitive instinct" yet develop irreconcilable political forms? Yes. The same blind instincts could conceivably produce opposite outcomes if adapted to opposite circumstances. In this sense, Stubbs could conceivably have a point.

Such an interpretation, however, would completely miss a basic thesis of his work: the basic continuity of the English Constitution from the times before the Conquest. It is highly significant that this English Victorian view of post-Conquest continuity stands in direct contradiction to Thomas Jefferson's view that the Saxon "constitution was violated and set at naught by Norman force, yet force cannot change right. A perpetual claim was kept up by the nation, by their perpetual demand of a restoration of their Saxon laws; which shews [sic] they were never relinquished by the will of the nation." Jefferson's entire political career could almost be viewed as an attempt to redress this ancient wrong.

In a letter to English Major John Cartwright, Jefferson commended the Englishman's *An Historical Essay on the English Constitution* (1771). Its "derivation" of the old English Constitution "from the Anglo-Saxons, seems to be made on

legitimate principles….They doubtless had a constitution", Jefferson surmised, "and although they have not left it in a written formula, to the precise text of which you may always appeal, yet they have left fragments of their history and laws, from which it may be inferred with considerable certainty."[1092]

It does not appear that any effort was made to investigate artifacts such as the German *Sachsenspiegel* (the "Saxon Mirror"), the compilation of German-Saxon customary law dating from the thirteenth century. Instead, a more timely and intuitive method was used to derive the content of the constitution's "natural law". "We had no occasion to search into musty records, to hunt up royal parchments, or to investigate the laws and institutions of a semi-barbarous ancestry", Jefferson explained. "We appealed to those of nature, and found them engraved on our hearts."[1093]

Six years before this letter, England's *The Black Dwarf* published Cartwright's "Legacy to the Reformers". According to historian Christopher Hill, it was a recount of the basic ideas of *An Historical Essay on the English Constitution* with one considerable exception: the idea that "the constitution…necessarily existed anterior to all Law; and very long anterior to all recorded Law."[1094] The idea that the native Saxon constitution preceded even law is compatible with Stubbs' notion that the constitution is rooted in the "blood". The notion of opposing extant law with an imagined constitution implies a psycho-social projection that can be called idealism.

Consider the similarity of this approach to the roots of constitutionalism with that of German Protestant theologian and writer Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923). "Germans", he believed, "have in their blood devotion to a thing, an idea, an institution, a superindividual entity [*Wesenheit*]."[1095] I

have previously interpreted this superindividual entity as an "Überorganism". Long thwarted, compromised, and distorted by the Norman usurpation, it appears that this same instinctive devotion to a superindividual entity manifested itself among the Anglo-Saxons as the "constitution", i.e. a written constitution. This change from a constitution of genes to a constitution of memes, from incorporation to symbolization, was a momentous shift away from original Germanic forms and towards a modern, Frankenborgian, Anglo-Jewish convergence.

One basic definition of a "constitution" is the literal physical makeup of an individual body. Political constitutionalism extrapolates this idea from the individual level to the superindividual level; the level of the political body. In the German case, kin selective unity led towards the ideal of an Überorganism. In the Anglo-Saxon case, the whole problem lay in those fallacious pretenders to kinship and cultural representation. This experience of distrust of political-hereditary claims led to the alternative of "natural right".

This ambiguously natural basis of revolutionary American constitutionalism was clarified by Jefferson's notion that "[w]e appealed to those of nature, and found them engraved on our hearts." This sentiment echoed *An Historical Essay on the English Constitution*: "this Saxon model of government, when reduced to its first principles, has a strong resemblance to the natural state of things, under which mankind was found to live at the discovery of the New World by Columbus".[1096] A "natural right" of this kind is organic rather artificial; naturalistic in the sense of a pre-civilizational state of nature. Jefferson's "rationalism" was preoccupied with the *restraint* of government so that this

original, *pre-rational*, natural order could be free to flourish spontaneously.

Yet it was the *formal* interpretation of the natural rights of man that ultimately sealed the divergence of the Anglo-Saxon political path from the German. According to Huber,

> The great misconception of the democracies is that they can see the active participation of the people only in the form of plebiscites according to the principle of majority. In a democracy the people does not act as a unit but as a complex of unrelated individuals who form themselves into parties...The new Reich is based on the principle that real action of a self-determining people is only possible according to the principle of leadership and following.[1097]

Huber's Nazi constitution was conceived on the basis of three concepts: the *Volk* (or people), the Führer (or leader), and the party (or movement). The first concept, the *Volk*, was linked with race:

> Race is the natural basis of the people ... As a political people the natural community becomes conscious of its solidarity and strives to form itself, to develop itself, to defend itself, to realize itself. 'Nationalism' is essentially this striving of a people which has become conscious of itself towards self-direction and self-realization, toward a deepening and renewing of its natural qualities….This consciousness of self, springing from the consciousness of a historical idea, awakens in a people its will to historical formation: the will to action.

This passage was probably influenced by Hegel's conviction that the spirit is "the circle that returns into itself, that presupposes its beginning and reaches it only in the end".[1098] Hegel posited a kind of strange loop wherein the

"spirit" returns to itself in self-reference, self-identity, and self-realization: "[T]he organic individual produces himself: it makes of itself what it is implicitly; thus the spirit, too, is only that which it makes of itself, and it makes of itself what it is implicitly."[1099]

Hegel sublimated and spiritualized notions that, for Huber and other Nazis, were definitively linked to the materialist notion of race. Yet if there were a historical link between Hegel and Huber, perhaps the best candidate would be found in the English historian William Stubbs. His most remarkable similarity to Huber exists in the most controversial aspect of his views: the organic, teleological, and instinctive roots of the English Constitution.

According to Stubbs:

> In the primitive German constitution the free man of pure blood is the fully qualified political unit; the king is the king of the race; the host is the people in arms; the peace is the national peace; the courts are the people in council; the land is the property of the race, and the free man has a right to his share.[1100]

But what happened?

> The English, who might never have struggled against native lords, were roused by the fact that their lords were strangers as well as oppressors, and the Norman kings realised that if they would retain the land they must make common cause with the people.[1101]

Inevitably, this historical condition made the attempt to restore what was believed to be lost through the Conquest hopelessly complicated. American founder John Adams observed that the pre-Conquest constitution was

> involved in much obscurity…the monarchical and democratic factions in England, by their opposite endeavors to make the Saxon constitution swear for their respective systems, have much increased the difficulty of determining…what that constitution, in many important particulars, was.[1102]

Yet if the missing keystone of the whole ancient edifice was kinship, then the experience of perpetual Norman nepotism made precisely this issue utterly problematic.

"When Parliaments were first begun", claimed the Leveller Overton during the English Civil War, "the Temporall Lords were very few or none".[1103] This delusion was a product of adaptation to the Norman destruction of the native Anglo-Saxon aristocracy. It was a contemporary seventeenth century projection of what England would look like if the hated Conqueror establishment were disestablished. The inclination towards a radically democratic interpretation of the old Anglo-Saxon constitution was an adaptation and reaction to the radically undemocratic Conquest.

Another seventeenth century Englishman, Nathaniel Bacon, hoped that "we may attain the happinesse of our Fore-Fathers, the ancient Saxons" by reviving their constitution. "Afarre off it seems a Monarchy, but in approach discovers more of a Democracy".[1104] Was it a monarchy? A democracy? Neither?

If the question of the Saxon constitution is approached as a legitimate sociobiological problem, then the problem is not simply a matter of reconstructing the pre-Conquest order. The problem, rather, leads one to address the biological bases of political behavior. The most complicating factor of

the Anglo-Saxon case was the Norman appropriation of an aristocratic identity that was culturally French.

"Monarchy," Richard Wagner maintained, is a "foreign and un-German notion" derived from the aristocratic French.[1105] He despaired that, in his time, the German ruler was only the first of the aristocracy; a monarch. Wagner sought a revolution that would make the German ruler "the first of the *Volk*", a king.[1106] He imagined a king who does not simply represent the *Volk*, but *is* the *Volk*. This king, as such, would be the fulfillment and culmination of the will of the *Volk*.

In ancient times, it was said, Saxon tribes elected one of their own by raising him on their shields and bestowing dictorial powers upon him. Wagner claimed, nonetheless, that this was not the same as "foreign and un-German" monarchy (sole-ruler):[1107]

> Sole-rule is made impossible by the principle of Folk's-rule (Democracy): but let us, on the contrary, emancipate the *Kinghood*, in its fullest, its own peculiar meaning! At the head of the Free State (the republic) the hereditary King will be exactly what he should be, in the noblest meaning of the title [*Fürst*]: *the First of the Folk, the Freest of the Free!*[1108]

This brings us to the second concept of Huber's constitution, the Führer:

> The Führer-Reich of the (German) people is founded on the recognition that the true will of the people cannot be disclosed through parliamentary votes and plebiscites but that the will of the people in its pure and uncorrupted form can only be expressed through the Führer.[1109]

Is Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy is an impure and

corrupted form of the most authentic and originary will of the people? Is it from this perspective that the Nazis dismissed liberal democracy as decadent and degenerate? Liberal democracies dismissed Nazism as authoritarian, arbitrary, and corrupt. But was this akin to projecting the image of William the Conqueror onto Hitler?

"The authority of the Führer is complete and all-embracing," Huber wrote. However, it is not "self-seeking or arbitrary and its ties are within itself. It is derived from the people; that is, it is entrusted to the Führer by the people."[1110] Anglo-Saxon tradition is characterized exactly by a lack of this kind of trust — a direct expression of *conquestphobia*.

In Wagner's vision, "the State which builds itself up from below upwards...will also shew us finally the ideal meaning of the *Kingship*."[1111] Kin, kind, and king were all connected. Wagner began with a core, grass root similarity to Anglo-Saxon democracy only to end up in a place that became psychologically corrupted by Conquest. Over the long-term, the Conquest (and the failure of Cromwell's Puritan dictatorship) enervated Anglo-Saxon belief in the very possibility of a collective general will.

Echoing Rousseau's distinction between the will of all and the general will, Huber claimed, "a distinction must be drawn between the supposed will of the people in a parliamentary democracy, which merely reflects the conflict of various social interests, and the true will of the people in the Führer state, in which the collective will of the real political unit is manifested..."[1112]

Yet if one looks to the origins of democratic modernity in the English Civil War, does one not find the most striking parallel to the Führer state in the rule of Oliver Cromwell? Was it Cromwell's Puritan followers or Hitler's Nazis that

possessed a greater religious conviction in the virtues of *purity*?

It is said that the official Puritan Commonwealth was followed by a *degeneration* into Cromwell's dictatorship. Could it be, rather, that Cromwell embodied a superficially "Christian" *regeneration* of the long suppressed "collective will" of the people? There is a deep English-speaking tradition of dismissing Rousseau's theory of the general will, and especially his followers in the French Revolution, as *degenerate*. Is this English-speaking conviction rooted in a post-Puritan Revolution verdict against the Cromwellian experiment in a Führer state? Would things have been different if Cromwell's legacy had succeeded?

One way in which the Anglo-Saxon ethnic *regeneration* has been covered up is by disconnecting the common Cromwellian-Puritan mentality behind the ethnic cleansing of *both* the Norman-Cavaliers *and* the Irish Catholics in Ireland. The connection between them is a historic assertion of what the Nazis called racial "purity". Is this, then, the sociobiological meaning of being a "Puritan"?

The Führer, Huber stated, is

> the bearer of the collective will of the people. In his will the will of the people is realized. He transforms the mere feelings of the people into a conscious will ...Thus it is possible for him, in the name of the true will of the people which he serves, to go against the subjective opinions and convictions of single individuals within the people if these are not in accord with the objective destiny of the people ... He shapes the collective will of the people within himself and he embodies the political unity and entirety of the people in opposition to individual interests....Such a collective will is not a fiction, as is the collective will of the

> democracies, but it is a political reality which finds its expression in the Führer.[1113]

Which is more fictional, the idea that the aggregate sum of the votes of American individuals adds up to a unified collective will or the historic realities of a now defunct Nazi Germany? If we confront the realities of the biological basis of social behavior, it would appear that modern natural right or natural law is like a degenerate reduction of Huber's notion that "[i]n the Führer are manifested…the natural laws inherent in the people"[1114] It seems that the decisive difference between the Puritanism of Oliver Cromwell and the culturally unrepresentative impositions of William the Conqueror was that the former manifested "the natural laws inherent in the people". Cromwell and the Puritan Revolution paralleled Wagner's revolutionary goal of the "...genuine redeeming, inner union of the German Princes with their Folks, their imbuement with the veritable German Spirit."[1115]

Historian and racist Edward Augustus Freeman succeeded historian and racist William Stubbs as Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford in 1894. What most clearly confirms the parallels between Freeman's views and quasi-Nazi views is the fact that he was a racist generally. In a visit to the United States in 1881, the historian expressed the opinion that universal citizenship was a mistake and that only those of Germanic ancestry should be automatically bestowed such privileges.[1116] "[T]his would be a grand land," he explained, "if only every Irishman would kill a negro and be hanged for it".[1117]

Yet there is logic behind the Anglo-Saxon racist view that inclines toward the belief that all Germanic people are created equal. The original meaning of Anglo-Saxon equality

was the belief that Normans are *not* superior to Anglo-Saxons. Anglo-Saxon egalitarianism was designed to raise the conquered and lower the conquerors. By bringing down the Normans to racial equality with Anglo-Saxons, men like Freeman could proclaim that all Germanic people are created equal (everyone else is inferior, of course).

The American Civil War was the historical exposé of the racist hypocrisy behind this kind of Jeffersonian egalitarianism. While the Norman-mastered South came *closest* to Huber's explicitly racist constitution, its emphasis on caste made the Southern order qualitatively different. Southern Independence forced the Anglo-Saxon North to choose between the regeneration of a Norman-based master caste and the equality of *all* whites with blacks. Under Lincoln the Conqueror, Anglo-Saxon nationalism culminated in racial equality with blacks.

Freeman would probably have been ecstatic about the prospect of a state built upon Huber's constitutional lines; a state that took a conquered and demoralized people and told them that "[t]he inner law of the NSDAP is none other than the inner law of the German people." This, the third concept of Huber's constitution, the party,

> arises from the people; it has formed an organization which crystallizes about itself the feelings of the people, which seemed buried, and the strength of the people, which seemed lost….The first main task of the party, which is in keeping with its organic nature, is to protect the National Socialist idea and to constantly renew it by drawing from the depths of the German soul, to keep it pure and clear, and to pass it on thus to coming generations: this is predominantly a matter of education of the people.[1118]

If the British Empire was to survive the spontaneous will of the people (at home and abroad), the people had to be educated *against* a comparably "organic" Anglo-Saxon nationalism. If Britain was to avoid the fate of the French and American revolutions, then Britain had to retain its tradition of Norman civilization against Cromwellian spontaneity.

The rise of Anglo-Saxon national consciousness in the late eighteenth century found expression in two basic ways. In America, an indignant equality. In England, steering clear of the American and French revolutions, an attempted unity. The vague association of Rousseau's rejection of "civilization" and the French Revolution allowed English Victorians to seized upon this difference and solidly identify with "civilization". The English (and British) thus found a source of internal unity and external Continental difference in the notion of civilization.

Yet in order for this mode of political existence to survive at all, there had to be some degree of an instinctive, organic element in the traditional British model. At the same time, the strong "class" tradition inhibited organic tendencies from ever becoming *total*. One can see, then, in the "common code" of Victorian morality a delicate, partial realization of unified order over the old divide of "class" *that nonetheless preserved "class"*.

The threat to Victorian British order was a striving for Anglo-Saxon national unity of a total or radical kind and this threat sometimes found in expression in the popular "radical" press. *The White Hat*, for example, declared in 1819 a collective aim of "restoring the old Saxon government, founded on domestic legislation, general principles of integrity and unity."[1119] A sense of unity was corrupted by

the contradictions of both accepting and rejecting the Norman "class" tradition as a part of the political "whole".

On one hand, if the sham unity of "class" government inhibited the "organic nature" of Anglo-Saxon national unity, then the right-wing aspiration for authentic English national *unity* was impossible. On the other hand, if the core "class" divide was to survive, then the left-wing aspiration for political *equality* was also impossible. In summary, if the conqueror class order was to survive then neither full unity nor full equality was possible for English people, even as an aspiration.

And this is where the political anti-ideas of British statesman Edmund Burke come in. Burke understood the popular appeal of the organicist and "natural" right arguments of the American Revolution. Yet if the Norman Conquest legacy and some degree of "class" favoritism were to survive, a very different education was required for the people.

Democratic revolution in France broke the French connection of "cosmopolitan" influence in England. Edmund Burke's clever achievement was to exploit the changes wrought by 1789 in a way that preserved "class" order by preempting the native revolutionary potential of "organic" Anglo-Saxon nationalism. He reversed the original association of (organic) English-democracy and (superficial) French-aristocracy that had proved potent for the Anglo-Saxon side of the American Revolution. The French Revolution allowed for a new and reasonably cogent contrast of French-democracy and English-aristocracy. This meant that the 'organic-democracy' of latent Anglo-Saxon nationalism could be traded for 'organic-aristocracy' (the English-"organic" association was reinvented as Burke's English-"tradition"). The superficial-aristocracy association

could thus be traded for superficial-democracy (the French-"superficial" association was reinvented as French-"abstract"). What was French and foreign was now English and native and vice versa. This scheme provided the basic social and moral glue that sustained the British Empire against the paths of both America and France well into the twentieth century.

Just as Burke plundered notions of organic growth from Anglo-Saxon nationalist discourse and used them for aristocratic ends, the nineteenth century Utilitarians took Burke's notions that "the whole organization of government becomes a consideration of convenience" to counterattack the British constitutional aristocracy. But should one suppose that William's gamble in crossing the channel in 1066, '*Aut Caesar, aut nihil*', provided Burke's model for prudent, incremental government? Burke refused to take up Thomas Paine's challenge to confront the Conquest and face the realization that his arguments were ultimately arguments against ancient Anglo-Saxon tradition. His thinking was a giant exercise in avoiding the theoretical inclination that would lead him to directly defend that brutally *innovative* event in 1066 that established his convenient, settled imperial establishment.

The Political as Enemy

Traitor

"For as long as a people exists in the political sphere, this people must…determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy", wrote German political theorist Carl Schmitt in *The Concept of the Political* (1932):

> Therein resides the essence of its political existence. When it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to make this distinction, it ceases to exist politically. If it permits this decision to be made by another, then it is no longer a politically free people and is absorbed into another political system. The justification of war does not reside in its being fought for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy.[1120]

The tendentious contemporary Norman chronicler William of Poitiers wrote that, at the Battle of Hastings, Duke William "cast down the enemy people who, rebelling against him, their king, deserved death."[1121] While William the Conqueror may not have been keen to learn the original Anglo-Saxon relationship between kinship and kingship, he was a very keen student of the relationship between friend and enemy.

From the Anglo-Saxon side, Hastings can be viewed as a struggle to preserve their way of life or form of existence. "Each participant", Schmitt wrote,

> is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.[1122]

At the Battle of Hastings, Anglo-Saxons and Normans were enemies. Harold and his men prepared to defend themselves against invasion because they faced a real enemy. Anglo-Saxons were prepared to give their lives at Hastings to defeat the Normans because the Normans were real enemies.

"An enemy", Schmitt thought,

> exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship.[1123]

What happens, however, when an enemy defeats a fighting collectivity, and crowns its victory by usurping the public realm of the political itself? For years after Hastings, there were repeated, violent rebellions against the William and his fellow Normans because the rebels believed they had been cast down by an enemy people who, being their enemy, deserved death. The original meaning of the Norman Conquest for the conquered was that *the political was the enemy*.

To discern how the conditions of the Norman Conquest turned Schmitt's conceptions upside down for the conquered, let us imagine, for the sake of argument, two hypothetical Anglo-Saxons: Ealdred and Eadric. Ealdred possessed an unquestioning, authoritarian sense of duty to the point of being blindly obedient to the powers that be — whoever they might be. Eadric, by contrast, lacked a sense of duty and social responsibility to the point of being a selfish individualist.

Before the Norman Conquest, Ealdred routinely chastised Eadric for his lack of devotion to the common good. After the Norman Conquest, however, Ealdred's blind obedience ultimately led him to submit loyally to the new Norman masters. Eadric's persistent selfish individualism, however, could now be viewed in an entirely new light.

Although the character of neither man was changed at all by the Norman Conquest, *interpretations* of their characters could be turned upside down. Ealdred's undiscriminating

obedience and loyalty now made him a traitorous collaborator with the conquering enemy. Eadric's indiscriminate individual selfishness could now be viewed as patriotic resistance to the political authorities. The Norman Conquest revolutionized the political *context*, and with the tables turned, Eadric could now be viewed as morally superior to Ealdred in the sense that he, at least, did not collaborate or dutifully contribute to the oppressors of his own people.

In this reversal of fortune, one can discern origins of two modern principles: equality and rights. Ealdred's old superior virtue in duty became inferior virtue after the Conquest and thus the two men could ultimately be viewed as *equal* in virtue from the view of steadfast Anglo-Saxon nationalism. In other words, persons with a sense of social duty eventually found themselves aligned with persons without a sense of social duty under an effectual social equality. To resist the Conquest, Ealdred would have to resist political duty itself and adapt towards Eadric's selfish, individualistic clamoring for what are now called *rights*.

A popular account of the revolts that followed the Conquest, Peter Rex's *The English Resistance: The Underground War Against the Normans*, saw fit use the term "quislings" to describe native traitors and collaborators. This term was inspired by defamed career of Vidkun Quisling, the Norwegian politician and army officer who assisted the Nazi conquest and occupation of Norway by serving as its Minister-President. Whereas it has often been convenient to promote the view that Normans and Saxons are virtually the same people, in the case of the Nazi conquest of Norway, it was convenient for Allied propaganda to promote the view that a roughly comparable kinship-political divide between Germans and Norwegians warranted an emphatic assertion

of their national distinctiveness. If we applied similar standards to the Norman Conquest of England, we could regard Anglo-Saxons who collaborated with the Normans as traitors and quislings.

Formally speaking, "traitor" and "quisling" are of the language of nationalism, not liberalism. Yet Norwegian resistance to the Nazis demonstrates how liberalism and Norwegian nationalism could converge in resistance to the Nazi occupation. This convergence of left and right was also exhibited by the "liberalism" of E. A. Freeman.

Under the conditions of the Norman occupation of England, the *most* radically ethnocentric Anglo-Saxons would be the *least* loyal. They would tend to be the most rebellious against their political masters, subverting not only the regime, but also classical, conservative associations of right behavior. Those Anglo-Saxons who were the *least* ethnocentric or less ethnically discriminating might conceivably be *more* loyal if the Normans masters were perceived to be 'close enough'.

The Domesday Book of 1086 recorded a rare hint of native attitudes towards the Norman occupation. Aelfric, who had been a freeholder in 1066, now held his land rented from a Norman named William, wretchedly and with a heavy heart (*graviter et miserabiliter*).[1124] It was impossible for Aelfric to completely escape being a collaborator. If Aelfric acted in loyalty to Normans, he acted as a traitor to his own people. However, if he acted as a true Anglo-Saxon patriot and rebelled, he could so easily lose his lands or be replaced by an Anglo-Saxon who acted "smarter"; more individualistically. No wonder he held his land in misery.

Those who speak of harmonious assimilation between Normans and Anglo-Saxons after the subjugation of 1066 miss the point that, for an Anglo-Saxon to aspire to Norman

aristocracy, he had to be an individualist in the sense of putting himself above any sense of Anglo-Saxon patriotism. Ambitious natives could be considered perverse collaboration with the destroyers of their nation and hence, from an Anglo-Saxon ethnic point of view, the ambitious might as well be Normans. Since ethnic treachery could be handsomely rewarded, disloyalty could be *smart*. If the idea of authentic national unity was corrupted, perhaps only the idea of equality could possibly remedy this institution. In these ways, the Norman occupation promoted individualism among ambitious Anglo-Saxons and may have ultimately stimulated capitalist individualism.

The erroneous assumption that "individualism" necessarily coincides with support for modern revolution or rights is illustrated by the example of Benedict Arnold. A native of the Anglo-Saxon North, his turn from support for American revolutionaries to support for the British made him the archetypal traitor of American history. He is symbolic of Anglo-Saxon ambivalence towards the Conquest order. From the view of kinship solidarity, for an individual Anglo-Saxon to give into his own ambition and join the ruling "class" is the *psychological* equivalent of Anakin Skywalker turning to the dark side.

The English word *traitor* dates from about the thirteenth century, and was derived from Old French. The Normans, in other words, defined who was and who was not a traitor. Originally aliens and outsiders, the Normans became dictators of who was an insider and who was an outsider; who was inside the law and who was outside the law; who was legitimate and who was illegitimate. Insiders became men such as the Frenchman Piers Gaveston, King Edward II's homosexual favorite. Outsiders became Anglo-Saxon outlaws and officially illegitimate patriots such as Hereward

and Robin Hood. Those patriots who had given their allegiance to Harold were now *traitors*, while those who had subverted Harold's reign, giving their allegiance to the Norman invaders, were now *loyalists*…just like Benedict Arnold.

Faux-Fatherland

Carl Schmitt was one of the most influential thinkers of Weimar Germany. In 1933, consummating his radical critiques of liberal politics, he joined the Nazi Party. Yet a dismissal of liberal assumptions alone could not have sustained a viable alternative to liberalism. An alternative assumption was requisite: the coherence of the distinction between the insider and the outsider.

Schmitt harbored an assumption of *group* unity, while modern political theory, beginning with Thomas Hobbes, questioned and rejected precisely this assumption. Now if one were to image the single greatest antithesis to Schmitt's assumption of group unity, what would represent its most extreme actualization? Lack of internal political unity, taken to its logical extreme, leads to civil war. And civil war in England was precisely what catalyzed modernistic, Hobbesian political philosophy: all against all individualism is the idea of civil war taken to its logical extreme.

Leviathan, Hobbes' most important political work, was published in 1651, the very year that the English Civil War ended. It outlined a theoretical and practical technological solution to the historical problem posed by the breakdown of England's internal unity. This explains the incompatible assumptions of Hobbes and Schmitt: Hobbes assumed internal disunity while Schmitt assumed internal unity.

"Prussian", claimed German philosopher of history Oswald Spengler, "is above all the unconditional precedence

of foreign policy over domestic policy, whose sole function is to keep the nation in form for this task."[1125] The Prussian militaristic tradition exemplified an extreme form of a more general German assumption of the coherence of the distinction of insider and outsider. This is the root of the most basic difference between the Anglo-Saxon and German "political" traditions: the attitude towards the political itself.

The English Civil War refought the Battle of Hastings through the renaissance of an original post-Conquest assumption: the political is enemy. The enemy was not the King, declared Englishman John Hare in 1647, it was Normanism. If "our statesmen should profess themselves Normans, and so persecute the assertors of the English liberty as enemies" then they must be fought to the death.[1126] Normanized England was the land of, not his forefathers, but of his faux-fathers. Hare was willing to die for the memory of his Anglo-Saxon forefathers against the usurping Norman faux-fathers.

The willingness to die for individual liberty or rights would stand as inexplicable enlightened irrationalism if it were not that the theory of kin selection offered a rational explanation of this behavior. If there existed an *unconscious* hostility to the political "class" that can be explained as genetically adaptive behavior, then one can discern how this hostility to government could have stimulated the partially unconscious development of modern, individualistic ways of life, from Puritan conscience to liberal conscience. As Schmitt explained, there exists an inverse relationship between modern individualism and the political:

> The negation of the political, which is inherent in every consistent individualism, leads necessarily to a political practice of distrust toward all conceivable political forces and forms of state and government, but never produces on

> its own a positive theory of state, government, and politics...no liberal politics, only a liberal critique of politics. The systematic theory of liberalism concerns almost solely the internal struggle against the power of the state.[1127]

This is key to grasping the original attitudes that catalyzed liberal individualism: the political as enemy. The popular, Puritan side in the English Civil War began as an internal struggle against the state of Conquest: the Norman military occupation of England.

Schmitt's view of the politically deconstructive nature of liberal-individualism helps one to see how a Hobbesian "war of all against all" could also be a means of conducting a war against the political class through subversion of the political. Yet it is precisely because Hobbes very much realized that this individualism, taken to its logical extreme, ultimately leads to total anarchy that he defended an absolute sovereign to hold the body politic together.

This artificial Hobbesian scheme to hold a polity together with an absolute sovereign hardly amounts to a "fatherland". England, for Anglo-Saxons, became a faux-fatherland; a patriarchy ruled by Norman stepfathers. The rule of these faux-fathers was rule by the killers of their true forefathers.

The root of the difference between the German Fatherland and Anglo-Saxon Faux-Fatherland can be traced to the Battle of Hastings. While the Anglo-Saxon army was successful on the battlefield, it could maintain itself as a literal *corps;* a body. In its failure on Senlac Hill, it was every man for himself.

Here, in a nutshell, is a snapshot of the Ur-individualism that would unfold over centuries. The inability of Anglo-Saxons to physically defend themselves as a national body at Hastings resulted in a condition where every man was left to

defend himself. Individualism expresses the condition of a people who have been abandoned by their defeated, hereditary forefathers of old, and left to fend for themselves in a Hobbesian world.

Whereas the Germans retained the sense of dwelling in a "mighty fortress" of a Fatherland, Anglo-Saxon individualism is more like the philosophy of children abandoned by their forefathers to their Norman fate. The disinheritance of 1066 was handed down as inheritance to future generations. One result was Hobbes' perception of lives "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"; abandonment without self-pity for a race of orphans.

Just as Anglo-Saxons were abandoned by authentic patriarchy, their "modern" reaction was to abandon patriarchy in return. Their individualism was the recognition that their forefathers had failed them politically. After the political failure of Anglo-Saxon patriarchy, having lost faith in political patriarchy in general, many gained faith in God in heaven as a surrogate father.

If war is politics by other means for those in power, then peace can be politics by other means for the powerless. If war can be a strategy of the political, then peace can be a strategy against the political. Anglo-Saxons could be dangerous to Normans by winning the peace over the Norman ability to make war and conquest.

"No consistent individualism", Schmitt recognized, "can entrust to someone other than to the individual himself the right to dispose of the physical life of the individual."[1128] To win the peace was to win a war against the political "class" who were able to command war. "Enlightenment" consisted of knowing individual self-interest and peace *is* a war of "us" against "them" by other means. "Enlightened self interest" was to know how individual self interest also

served "the nation" by undermining the political "class" that held the nation in bondage. When the political is the enemy of a conquered nation, individualism is nationalism.

Double Negative Nationalism

"The projected image of the Kaiser [Wilhelm I]" in the late nineteenth century "captured the blend of military strength, national unity, heroic achievement, and pseudo-religious symbolism…so different from contemporary depictions of the English monarchy", observed historian Ian Kershaw.[1129] The subdued nature of English national sentiment, so different from the German, suggested a basic disbelief in overt affirmations of political unity.

A classic expression of the ironic nature of English nationalism is Guy Fawkes Day, the celebration of the failure of an English Catholic conspirator to blow up both houses of Parliament in what is known as the Gunpowder Plot. Taken at face value, this is a rather tenuous expression of positive national identity. Parliament, however, was originally the locus, not of the unity of a single nation, but rather, the locus of formal binding of the (Anglo-Saxon) House of Commons and the (Norman) House of Lords into a formal political union. Guy Fawkes Day, then, is not a direct and explicitly positive affirmation of England as a single, united national body. Nor does it necessarily celebrate a positive love of Parliament itself. This is double negative nationalism: collective pride in the admission that at least this formal binding of England into, not a nation, but a formal political entity represented by Parliament, was not utterly decimated.

Could it have been otherwise? England was incapable of a strong and clear nationalism because the Norman-based House of Lords was premised on maintaining itself *above* the Anglo-Saxon nation. The political class, the locus of the

convergence and unity of the nation, became precisely the locus of disunity; that from which the nation wished to diverge.

Consider just how subversive the Norman attempt to establish themselves as legitimate "father-rulers" was. If the political is the highest culmination, the highest representation, and the highest synthesis of an ethnic nation, conquest produces a diametrically opposite effect. Instead of being the legitimate synthesis of the nation, foreign Norman elements represent a symbolic negation of the Anglo-Saxon nation. Insofar as Anglo-Saxons accepted a classical patriarchal or Überorganism model of the state, conflict with the Norman "other" became confounded with conflict with self-identity.

Here we have an origin of the modern idea of humanity out of a sense of the falsehood of identifying with the political. Since Anglo-Saxon nationalism culminating towards the political became confounded with collaboration with the oppressors of their nation, liberal or individual identity in opposition to the political evolved as a solution. Since Anglo-Saxons who were the most loyal to the Conquest order could be view as the most supreme traitors, classical definitions of insider and outside could be reversed.

By killing or disposing of the native aristocracy and taking their place, the Normans reverse organized the Anglo-Saxon as an ethnic body. Those who made it to the top under the Normans could be view as embodiments of the moral bottom from a nationalist perspective. The mercenary individualist rather than the radical ethnic loyalist could best advance within this new political environment. This meant that the politically highest Anglo-Saxons were the most "internationalized"; the *precise opposite* of the reinforcement pattern of a nationalist state. Anglo-

Saxon ethnic identity became reinforced through the very opposite pattern of straightforward nationalism: the most obedient became the most traitorous and those who disobeyed in freedom could be viewed the most patriotic.

It is under these conditions that the evolution of individualism must be understood for in individualistic societies people act, in effect, as if they are foreigners to one other. Individualism emerged from the contrary attitudes towards the political: the political as the locus of representative collective identity versus the political as the locus of a foreign and unrepresentative collective identity. Mistrust, fear of deception, and even paranoia towards the political as false representation, led towards an individualistic alternative.

Far from being the very antithesis of nationalism, mass individualism can be expression of a nationalist strategy or tribalism when "we" are the people and "they" are the government. Anglo-Saxon individualism originated in this tribalistic "us" and "them" attitude towards government. Humanism has also been associated with democracy on the basis of a kind of tribalism, i.e. we, the people are humans while they, the aristocrats or elites are inhumane or inhuman. This dehumanization of aristocrats exposes the tribalistic origins of the "humanism" of Anglo-Saxon democracy. Such "liberalism" could be an expression of xenophobia towards an alien, Norman-French political order.

Anglo-Saxon liberalism implies that the conqueror, the totally political being, is "other". The strong, centralized, top-down, distant form of government that the Normans imposed became identified with alien ways. To even behave like a tyrant and oppress one's social inferiors was to act in an unpatriotic manner for it was tantamount to *acquiring a*

Norman identity. Anglo-Saxon *ethnic-racial* identity became bound up with the binary opposition of righteous, freedom loving Saxons against oppressive Norman tyrants. *Collective* Anglo-Saxon identity became bound together with a non-alpha male identity.

The Nazis set off too many conquestphobia alarms; alarms that announced Nazis as the new North-men; the new Normans; the ancient enemy of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Since the democratization movements of the English-speaking world were rooted in Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, the revolution's pretensions to universalism also implicated a universalization of the entire Saxon/Norman conflict. When the Nazis pounced upon the world with their own campaigns of conquest, they fitted uncannily into the old Norman mold, marking the decisive parting of ways of two peoples who had entered recorded human history as one. The sense of the foreignness of the more extreme expressions of German nationalism is, in part, an expression of Anglo-Saxon alienation from their own roots; an expression of the extent that the Norman truly dominated this place in the Anglo-Saxon imagination.

When the superficially Christian coating is stripped away, the Norman conviction in the rectitude of conquest echoes sections of *Addresses to the German Nation* where Fichte expressed belief in "the Volk, metaphysically destined, which has the moral right to fulfill its destiny by *every* means of cunning and force….Between states, there is neither law nor right save the law of the strongest".[1130] When *both* Normans *and* Saxons each believed in their distinctive metaphysical destiny, the result was civil war.

To idealize the political as enemy is political self-destruction, i.e. the anarchy that Hobbes feared. Ultimately, the only viable solution became a more Lockean limited

government; a liberalism that blunts the extreme friend/enemy attitudes towards government.

Since Normans came to embody the ideal of both political hierarchy and political enemy, a main effect of Norman/Saxon tribal warfare was the blurring of the distinction of friend and enemy on the political level. The Norman/Saxon conflict meant that the friend/enemy distinction had to be digested internally into the entrails of political order. Attacking each other's claims to political superiority from the English Civil War to the American Civil War, equality is a net result of the mutual destruction of each other's sense of political hierarchy. The ambiguity of friend and enemy at the American founding, for example, settled into empirically fuzzy notions of equality and humanity.

The inability to expel the Norman-French foreigners after 1066 gradually evolved into *de facto* principles of liberal tolerance and individualism. Because Anglo-Saxon assimilation to the Norman Conquest was at least partly successful, Anglo-Saxons could never fully free part of their identity from collaboration with their Norman enemy, and rejection of this entire insoluble social identity problem helped engender Anglo-Saxon individualism.

Antisemitism, and racism generally, is weaker in the United States, in part, because in order for there to be a "them", there must first be an "us". The Normans were decisive in destroying a coherent Anglo-Saxon political sense of "us", since the most political class itself was "them". It was precisely this condition that lead to the Anglo-Saxons' sociobiological divergence from their common origins with the Germans to a convergent evolution with Jews.

Liberty versus Liberty

"Is English society, as most foreign observers since the fifteenth century have thought, different even from other western European countries in…important aspects of social life?", inquired the English author and filmmaker Michael Wood. "And if so, where does this 'individualism' — this late-marrying, independent-minded, tenurially 'free', smallholding, land-dealing, 'free-born English' society — come from? Do these roots actually lie long before the Conquest?"[1131] Perhaps a glimpse of an answer to Wood's own questions can be found in his reflection,

> What strikes me after years of traveling in other cultures is the combination in English society of respect for individual freedom and respect for the law: freedom *from* allows freedom *to*: the basis of an ordered society.[1132]

Freedom from *what*?

The classic blind spot of Anglo-Saxon empiricism is this empty abstraction of "freedom": the cure-all, obscure-all answer that works as well as any metaphysical mysticism in covering over its historical origins. These abstractions of "Freedom" and "Liberty" constitute the metaphysics and mysticism of the Anglo-Saxon race.

The British "class" government that originally subjugated tribes of Angles, Saxons, and Danes eventually enveloped Celts and other inhabitants of the British Isles. Unity lay in seeking freedom *from* the conqueror class, not in freedom *for* a more substantial, unified identity among disparate British peoples. In this way, the negative, undefined character of freedom *from* is directly related to its potentiality for universalization, and hence, the possibility of America.

It was freedom from government; freedom from duties and obligations to government; freedom from inherited caste inferiority under government-by-conquest. This atomistic *Gesellschaft* freedom of the Anglo-Saxons was incompatible with organic the *Gemeinschaft* freedom of the Germans because the former assumed that no higher collective unity exists. A consequence of this atom-freedom is the American way: the eclectic and ephemeral associations of unrelated individuals guided, most typically, by economic motives.

Political freedom from the conqueror class left a vacuum filled by freedom for capitalistic gain. The more "German" way of collective national freedom was gradually exchanged for individual, economic freedom. The organic freedom of the German *Volk* as whole was vivisected into the spontaneous order of the free market. The power and interests of the nation were channeled into the Saxon-centric "Common-wealth". The political was to be tamed into a nursery for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Some even claimed that the system of liberal democracy constituted the best realization of human rationality itself. But is Homo Economicus truly identical with human rationality itself?

"It is not our task to pass on to our descendants peace and human happiness," declared German sociologist Max Weber,

> but the eternal struggle for the maintenance and enhancement of our national way....The power and interests of the nation...are the last and decisive interests which economic policy has to serve....The national state is for us the secular power organization of the nation and in this national state the *raison d'état* is for us the ultimate yardstick for economic considerations.[1133]

Whereas Anglo-Saxon economic freedom is the adaptation of a nation that failed in the *political* "struggle" to maintain their "national way", the Nazis took Weber's subordination of economic considerations to its logical extreme. Huber's *Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich* asserted:

> 'Private property' as conceived under the liberalistic economic order was a reversal of the true concept of property. This 'private property' represented the right of the individual to manage and to speculate with inherited or acquired property as he pleased, without regard for the general interests ... German socialism has overcome this 'private', that is, unrestrained and irresponsible view of property. All property is common property. The owner is bound by the people and the Reich to the responsible management of his goods. His legal position is only justified when he satisfies this responsibility to the community.[1134]

The Anglo-Saxons came to value economic freedom, in part, *because* it was destructive of the Norman political order. Economic power, originally a manifestation of civil war, became the means of thwarting, weakening, and attacking the old conqueror "class". But Norman adaptability and compromise can also mask the extent to which the British Empire ultimately owed its imperialistic virtues to that of a "commercial nation".

In eighteenth century, Voltaire, commenting on English commerce, wrote, "Neither Carthage, Venice, nor Holland have, from a warlike and even conquering beginning, ended in a commercial nation. The English are the only people who have done this...Even the younger son of a peer of the realm is not above trading." This

> appears monstrous to a German, whose head is full of coats of arms and the pagents of his family. They can never conceive how it is possible that the son of an English peer should be no more than a rich and powerful citizen, when in Germany they are all princes. I have known more than thirty highnesses of the same name, whose whole fortune and estate put together amounted to a few coats of arms, and the starving pride they inherited from their ancestors.[1135]

Whereas in England the conqueror-class was in many way compromised by the modern rise of the conquered, in America the geographic separation of Anglo-Saxon Puritans in the North and Norman Cavaliers in the South led to radicalization of their respective ways of life. Relatively free from the influence of France, the Normans of the South evolved a slave-holding way of life and a more emphatic valuation of *pride* and *honor* that, in at least some respects, was a recovery of their original Viking roots. The Southern slave plantation was not a strange form of capitalism, but rather, a logical extension of the Norman Conqueror way of life. The self-realization of this Norman-Cavalier culture, irreconcilable with the capitalist North, is what led to the American Civil War.

"The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of one," judged Abraham Lincoln in 1864, ten days after the Senate had passed the formal beginning of the end of chattel slavery in the United States with the Thirteenth Amendment. "We all", he continued,

> declare for liberty; but in using the same *word* we do not all mean the same *thing*. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the

> product of his labor; while others the same may mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and the product of other men's labor. Here are two, not only different, but incompatible things, called by the same name—liberty.[1136]

Unlike many of his successors, Lincoln appreciated the diversity of liberties, even as he decided in favor of a form that contradicted the original form of liberty upheld by Magna Carta. The naïve view that the "race" issue in that war was fundamentally about blacks has obscured the historical antecessors of these opposite and incompatible definitions of "liberty". The deepest root of the South's orientation towards slavery is traceable to the Norman right of conquest; the *right* of the Normans to subjugate the Anglo-Saxons in 1066; the right of William the Conqueror to *own* England as his possession; the right of the Norman master race to tax, exploit, and do as they please with the product of the labor of the conquered.

The Norman freedom to master England was incompatible with the freedom of that nation, just as the Nazi freedom to master Europe was incompatible with the freedom of non-German nations. As genealogist L. G. Pine put it, an unconquered England would have been "a free, native England, able to continue its own development."[1137] But what exactly did Pine mean by "free" or freedom? It seems that Pine's meaning was very similar to that expressed in an appreciably down to earth manner by the idealist German philosopher Fichte in *Addresses to the German Nation* (1806):

> In this belief in our earliest common forefathers, the original stock of the new culture, the Germans, as the Romans called them, bravely resisted the oncoming world dominion of the

> Romans…Freedom to them meant just this: remaining Germans and continuing to settle their own affairs, independently and in accordance with the original spirit of their race, going on with their development in accordance with the same spirit, and propagating this independence in their posterity. All those blessings which the Romans offered them meant slavery to them because then they would have to become something that was not German, they would have to become half-Roman. They assumed as a matter of course that every man would rather die than become half a Roman, and that a true German could only want to live in order to be, and to remain, just a German and to bring up his children as Germans.

This is what the English historian E. A. Freeman struggled with: the idea that the French Normans, as cultural heirs of Rome, inflicted exactly that loss of freedom to be a Teuton or German in "accordance with the original spirit of their race". Hastings, he said, was

> only the imperfect and temporary overthrow, of our ancient and free Teutonic England. In the eyes of men of the next generation that day was the fatal day of England, the day of the overthrow of our dear country, the day of her handing over to foreign lords…till it was a shame to be called an Englishman, and the men of England were no more a people.[1138]

With proud and stubborn persistence, Freeman attempted to wrestle a victory out of the defeat. While many English thegns and soldiers did prefer to "die than become half a Roman", the survivors were left to hope for individual, rather than national, freedom. Through the interassimilation of language and culture, the English did indeed become half-uprooted and "half-Roman". From the Conquest onward,

England became a stronghold of "the West", and it was this triumph of civilization over *Kultur* that eventually put the English-speaking world on a cultural collision course with a free Germany that "would rather die than become half a Roman".

During the First World War, German scholar Ernst Troeltsch wrote an article called, "Die deutsche Idee von der Freiheit", or "The German Idea of Liberty". It demonstrated that, in contrast to the "Western" or specifically French and English conceptions of liberty, Germany had "its own sense of liberty, which is determined by German history and the German spirit".[1139] He defined it is as "an organized unity of the people based on a rigorous and at the same time critical devotion of the individual to the whole, which is completed and legitimized by the independence and individuality of the free spiritual culture [*Bildung*]." It could be summarized as "*state socialism and culture individualism [Bildungsindividualismus]*".[1140]

This species of liberty is *precisely* what was crushed by the Norman Conquest. The whole became a part. Political independence and cultural individuality of that "Teutonic" England were extinguished.

Is this not what advocates of the theory of the "Norman Yoke" claimed? The Conquest, they asserted, was the loss of Anglo-Saxon "liberty" at the hands of the tyranny of foreigners. If so, then it follows that this holistic sense of the freedom of their *individual Kultur*, which survived among the Germans, was what advocates of the theory of the "Norman Yoke" were trying to articulate. When Freeman claimed that Harold was "the hero and martyr of our native freedom",[1141] it makes little sense to assume that he was referring to a nonexistent system of individual rights. Rather, it was this more German way of freedom, which was once a more

English way of freedom, which was fought for during the five years of revolt after 1066.

Yet the longing for this kind of freedom was never destroyed completely. After the House of Commons-based victory in the English Civil War in 1651, Levellers saw "an opportunity which these 600 years has been desired, but could never be attained, of making this a truly happy and wholly Free Nation".[1142] Victory in that war opened the possibility of being a *wholly* free nation, as opposed to the compromised, partial freedom of a dependent, broken nation.

The Levellers' holistic sense of national freedom is reminiscent of Troeltsch's belief that "[t]he liberty of the German is willed discipline, advancement and development of one's own self in a whole and for a whole".[1143] Given the holistic and aesthetic nature of Troeltsch's idea of liberty, it should not be surprising that the Anglo-Saxons, after 600 years of being reduced to the conquered "class", would have had difficulty verbalizing and articulating the content of those grievances contained in the desire for "freedom" or "liberty". For the modern, English, political rationalists that attempted this, something was lost in the translation to rational, universal principles of *individual* freedom.

One can discern a forerunner of Troeltsch's idea of cultural individualism, and even an implicit socialism, in the ideas of the late eighteenth century German thinker Johann Gottfried von Herder. He was one of first to fully articulate the notion of the uniquely individual and independent *Volks* [*Volken*] of the world that had escaped the logical reductionism of enlightenment thought. Yet Herder's defense of cultural diversity for the *Volks* of the world was, at least in theory, international. As a German, Herder's views can be seen as a tempered defense of German *Kultur*

against the disintegrative individualism of enlightenment thought and enlightenment *values*.

Based on what we know of Herder's philosophy, how would he have judged the Norman Conquest? Clearly, the extinguishing of this idiosyncratic Anglo-Saxon cultural flame was the very antithesis of the valuation of the preservation of cultural diversity. Compared to the Anglo-Saxons, German *Kultur* was a survivor of French cultural-civilizational domination. Herder's civilized defense of German and non-German cultures was made, in part, in defensive reaction to aggressive universalistic claims in theory and (Napoleonic) practice.

"I declare Saxony a Free State."[1144] It seems that the young Richard Wagner entertained a tribalistic animosity towards Prussia. But did Wagner's participation in the "revolutions" of 1848 make him a leftist in the formally modern sense? Wagner, born in the German state of Saxony, was defending his native tribal *Kultur* against Prussian domination. This Herderian defense of cultural diversity among German tribes only gradually "liberalized" towards pan-German nationalism.

With Herder's *völkisch* individualism in mind, let us consider Englishman E. A. Freeman's denunciation of both Turkish aggression in Greece and the imperialism of his own country in 1859. The historian professed belief in "the right of every nation to govern itself, or, if so be, to misgovern itself, without foreign interference".[1145] While this would appear to be a classic liberal assertion, Freeman's unapologetic racism and xenophobia must be taken into account when attempting to grasp his hostility to "foreign interference". The apparent liberalism of his statement is actually a classic demonstration of the xenophobic, Anti-Norman origins of Anglo-Saxon liberalism. Historically, it

was only a minority of Anglo-Saxons, bourgeois rationalists guided by an ethnocentric logic of moral self-consistency, who universalized their condition into the view of "all mankind". In Freeman's racist national-libertarianism one can glimpse the racist-universalist schizophrenia of early America, and especially the Anglo-Saxon racialist interpretation of manifest destiny.

Anglo-Saxon rationalists inevitably developed towards the moral consistency of national and individual freedom just as many German philosophers praised the virtue of individuals who developed in accordance with their nation's "peculiar quality". "Only when each people," Fichte maintained,

> left to itself, develops and forms itself in accordance with its own peculiar quality, and only when in every people each individual develops himself in accordance with that common quality…does the manifestation of divinity appear in its true mirror as it ought to be.

This "rule of law and divine order…is the highest law in the spiritual world!"

Not only did the Norman Conquest brutally trample upon the Herderian value of the cultivation of the world's *völkisch* diversity, it violated what Fichte considered "the highest law in the spiritual world!" No wonder that the Anglo-Saxons' "peculiar quality" is ambivalence towards the very notion of a "peculiar quality" that ties genes inextricably to a particular culture. The Anglo-Saxon "universalism" of America is decisively attributable to Norman success in eradicating collective Anglo-Saxon cultural individuality. The Conquest transformed Anglo-Saxon *identity.* Whereas the survival of German ethnic particularity developed into the revolution of 1933, the

defeat of Anglo-Saxon ethnic particularity by the Norman-French imperialists became the source of the "universalism" of American identity.

What, then, was wrong with those Nazi-Germans? Clearly, they were in need of some French discipline. The Germans needed to have their natural, native *Kultur* ironed out by foreign conquerors, a service generously provided to the Anglo-Saxons by the Normans. While William the Conqueror and Napoleon may appear to stand as opposites on the level of presumed abstract principle, from the point of German cultural individuality they *both* represented threats; they differed only in being incompatible with German *Kultur* in different ways.

Herder's fascination with *völkisch* eccentricities has a parallel in the Anglo-Saxon fascination with individual eccentricities. In other words, the broken unity of the Saxon nation was transmogrified into the individuality of persons. This kind of reductionism was appropriate to their culture's reduction under the peculiar institution of the right of conquest. Edmund Burke answered both individualism and the remains of organic Anglo-Saxon nationalism with a fascination with Britain's traditional, and very peculiar, "class" eccentricities.

Despite these profound divergences from the English-speaking world, there nonetheless exists a profound but unspoken similarity between German philosophy of the more "romantic" variety and the supposedly "rational" and "enlightened" Anglo-Saxon desire for freedom from law or authority. A case in point can be found in Max Stirner, the German author of *The Ego and Its Own* (1844). Stirner may appear to offer a striking parallel to the individualistic and anti-authoritarian Anglo-Saxon tradition. Stirner's egoism, however, is egoism beyond belief in the "self" or "the

individual". It is an egoism that would smash all constraints, all rights of others, and all law. His egoism is closer to anarchism than bourgeois libertarianism.

Even this notable German advocate of "freedom" only illustrates the ridiculousness of the old Anglo-Saxon racialists who claimed that their love of liberty was only a natural Germanic virtue rooted in the forests of ancient Germany. The similarities only serve to clarify the root difference: Stirner's liberty has no natural limits, while Anglo-Saxon liberty is gained by limiting the greatest powers. Anglo-Saxon freedom stands in a fundamentally defensive posture, fearful of enslavement by some unnamed tyrannical conqueror, while Stirner's Faustian liberty incorporates the highest powers as identical with himself. In other words, whereas Anglo-Saxon liberty stands *against* Norman power and Norman authority, Stirner's liberty incorporates the archetypal power of all authorities *within* the egoism of his own. And this means that Stirner's liberty has no authority above itself whatsoever—whether political or moral.

Thomas Paine's *The Rights of Man* stated, "*hereditary government over a people is to them a species of slavery, and representative government is freedom.*" His peculiar perception was that

> governments arise, either *out* of the people, or *over* the people. The English Government is one of those which arose out of conquest, and not out of society, and consequently it arose over the people; and though it has been much modified from the opportunity of circumstances since the time of William the Conqueror, the country has never yet regenerated itself, and is therefore without a constitution.

If we view humans strictly as individuals as Enlightenment theories supposedly supposed, how can we fully make sense of such a distinction? The distinction between a government "*out* of the people" and a government "*over* the people" *does not make sense* without the assertion of some form of collectivist-nationalist thinking. Paine maintained that government that does not emerge "out of the people" themselves does not represent them. To represent the people, the rulers should be the best *out* of the people, not the best *over* the people.

It appears that Hitler would have agreed with Paine's conclusion that "since the time of William the Conqueror, the country has never yet regenerated itself". But did the Anglo-Saxons in American truly regenerate themselves? Ceaseless Nazi-German refrains about the degeneracy of liberal democracy begs the question of whether even American revolutionaries really regenerated a mode of government akin to the times before Hastings.

While American revolutionaries universalized popular animosity to "hereditary government", the Nazis found popular support for their version of "hereditary government". This contrast highlights the difference: for the Anglo-Saxons, "hereditary government" implied hereditary *unrelatedness* to the majority, dating from the Norman usurpation. For the Germans, a hereditary relationship to the government was assumed; kin, kind, and king were all interconnected. Just as Anglo-Saxon freedom or a lack of duty to Norman Lords was in some way premised on a lack of kinship or race connection, Nazi-German freedom or lack of duty to "humanity" or the rest of the human race was also premised on a lack of kinship or race connection.

Hitler's regeneration of the German nation was a challenge to the notion that West holds a monopoly on true

representative government. In a speech at Munich delivered in November of 1934, Hitler declared:

> In Germany bayonets do not terrorize a people. Here a government is supported by the confidence of the entire people...I have not been imposed by anyone upon this people. From this people I have grown up, in the people I have remained, to the people I return. My pride is that I know no statesman in the world who with greater right than I can say that he is representative of the people.[1146]

Hitler claimed that he was representative government *out* of the people, not unrepresentative government *over* the people. From this perspective, a key difference between Hitler and William the Conqueror becomes clear. Did William the Conqueror and his fellow Normans *represent* the English? Did their French language and culture *represent* the *Kultur* of the Anglo-Saxons, their political traditions, their nation, or their *race*? Was the Norman achievement to bring representative government to England? While Hitler convinced Germans to fight for his vision of the German way, was William fighting for the old 'English way' at Hastings?

The political, which could be regarded as the highest expression or representation of a people's social body is seen in the Anglo-Saxon world as a necessary evil deemed by reason and instinct to be tamed and held at a distance. This attitude bears the weight and character of oppression. The American formalization of this attitude is not the revolutionary overthrow, but rather the conservative *preservation*, of the impact of the Norman Conquest. Put another way, the American democratic revolution was not a restoration because it preserved the deep *reaction* to Norman political *action*.

Paine's *The Rights of Man* asserted, "[s]ubmission is wholly a vassalage term, repugnant to the dignity of freedom, and an echo of the language used at the Conquest." This conveys a profound sense of indignity in duty; an identity of duty with submission, subjugation, and defeat. Now compare this with the "sentiment of honor" expressed by Troeltsch's conception of liberty in duty: "The thought of organic liberty poured out into a harmonious and graduated cooperation of enterprises great and small, state-run or private" thanks to "the disciplined sense of the whole and the sentiment of honor in participating in the whole".[1147] It is the difference between the proud obedience of Thomas Mann's *Reflections* and the disgraced obedience of those generations following the Conquest that helped maintain the very castles that held them in captivity. It is the difference between subordination and subjugation.

Crucially, the German notion of duty is less constrained, inhibited, hesitant, self-conflicted, and rationalized. Whereas Anglo-Saxon duty to "the state" suggests something alien, cold, mechanical, and menacing, the German sense of duty could find compatibility with the freedom of the romantic artistry of Richard Wagner. While the German political realm was more integrally, and especially *emotionally*, tied to the German "spirit", the English political realm was tarred with its demoralizing association with the Norman-French graft.

The traditional German sense of duty is *more free* than the Anglo-Saxon variety. Troeltsch described devotion or duty as "mobile, lively, full of initiative, persevering, and ingenious."[1148] Toennies contrasted the "spontaneous will" (*Naturwille*) of a *Gemeinschaft* with a *Gesellschaft* and the "arbitrary will" (*Kürwille*) of private individuals. And above all, the Germans were *free* of the Anglo-Saxon fear of being

conquered by government until, of course, the Germans themselves decisively conquered by the legacy of the Anglo-Saxon fear of all-conquering government.

If there is a secret that Anglo-Saxons loathe to admit, it is that their individual freedom is, in part, a corollary of their adaptation to ethnic defeat. To be free as individuals, the *Volk* must be bound and enshackled. The Pax Normana was the original teacher of the Anglo-Saxon ethnic pacifism that engendered the possibility of America.

Conversely, *völkisch* freedom requires the subordination of individual freedom. The author of a Nazi Storm Trooper song put this as well as anyone: "We spit on freedom, the *Volk* must be free."[1149] Two incompatible forms of holism give rise to two incompatible forms of freedom. Anglo-Saxon individual freedom is a free individual *Volk* or Überorganism adapted to unfreedom by reducing freedom to free individual organisms.

What was it, then, that most decisively alienated Anglo-Saxon from "German" freedom or liberty? The Anglo-Saxons *hated* the Normans' liberty. They hated the Normans' liberty to annihilate the Anglo-Saxons as a political race for centuries after 1066. They hated that the Normans had the liberty to build a zoo call civilization to "civilize" native Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*. They hated the Norman castles that were built to extirpate any attempt to reclaim the kind of natural liberty that the Normans' had monopolized.

The Anglo-Saxons hated the Normans of the South who claimed that they had the "liberty" to own human slaves. American Southerners fought for this *kind* of liberty which, if left unchecked, would have implicated the Anglo-Saxons right back to their old place in a caste between Normans and blacks. Total liberty leads to the liberty to exploit others totally.

It should not be surprising that the Anglo-Saxon experience inclined towards the hatred of Nazi freedom: freedom from international restraints such as the League of Nations, freedom from obligations towards human rights, and freedom to tyrannize over all forms of non-Nazi freedom. Anglo-Saxon based democracy sought, above all, to take away Hitler's freedom to become a new William the Conqueror. As with the American Civil War, modern Western survival demanded tyranny over incompatible forms of freedom and thus the West could not tolerate the kind of non-conformity represented by German cultural individualism.

If the choice between any form of these "freedoms" or "liberties" seems arbitrary in the abstract, the cultural choice between them was enforced by the tyranny of history. The Anglo-Saxons did not necessarily or "naturally" prefer the individual kind of freedom to the culturally collective kind of freedom. In a sense, the Anglo-Saxons are slaves to individual freedom. More precisely, the Anglo-Saxons did not have the freedom to freely choose between these two kinds of freedom. The Normans were the ones who were at liberty to make that historical choice for them in 1066.

Anglo-Saxon collective freedom was lost against their will. The Normans took away their very *right to exist* as a sovereign and distinct cultural-political entity. Through adaptation to this reduction came the assertions known today as individual human rights.

The distinctive kind of Anglo-Saxon individual freedom evolved exactly as a compensatory expression of the original liberty lost. But is it *equal* to that kind of "German" liberty described by Troeltsch? Are these different forms of liberty, as described by Lincoln, *equally* reducible to one another?

No. One kind of liberty realizes itself at the sociobiological expense of the other.

Reaching beyond the American Southern claims for the liberty to own slaves, the Nazis took the denial of a people's right to exist to a new extreme. The Nazi-Germans arrogated a new freedom: the freedom to decide whether an entire race or people shall live or die. Freeing themselves of the repressive "slave morality" of Jewish Christianity, Nazi collective national freedom peaked in the desecration machine of Auschwitz.

BLOODFEUD AND CIVILIZATION

Reduced to the Level of Anglo-Saxons

A demographic political portrait of the Anglo-Saxon ethnicity in 1086 should be hung in the most prestigious museums of science, for here one can discern what may be the most influential evolutionary ancestor of modern political reductionism. This was the year of the Domesday Book, the famous survey of the assets of England. By confirming the Conquest's reduction of the Anglo-Saxon ethnicity to a subpolitical body, that precocious record also documented evidence for an *evolutionary* explanation of the modern democratic belief that the political can be legitimately *reduced* to the subpolitical.

The Enlightenment era belief in scientific reductionism was connected to a new political science. The "moderns" assumed that political order could be legitimately reduced its individual component parts and reconstituted from the ground up on this democratic basis.

The soundness of modern scientific reductionism, as applied to politics, was countered by Herder in Germany. In France, Rousseau's attacks on the modern, "bourgeois",

debasement of the human helped inspire the French Revolution. The neo-Norman aristocracy of the American South chose civil war to the prospect of being reduced to the level of Anglo-Saxons. Nietzsche put his finger on the connection between modern scientific reductionism and modern democratic "slave morality".

That science cannot be simply and unequivocally identified with reductionism is illustrated by methodology of the so-called "father of scientific history",[1150] Otto Ranke:

> The whole (*Totale*) is as certain as is its every outward expression at every moment. We must dedicate our full attention to it....(If we are studying) a people, we are not interested in all the individual details through which it expresses itself as a living thing. Rather its idea speaks to us through its development as a whole, its deeds, its institutions, its literature.[1151]

This is yet another example of the more *Gestalt* assumptions of the German scientific tradition. The normative scientific reflex of the English-speaking world is to assume that, insofar as the existence of "the whole" is posited, it is unscientific. Yet this raises a question: can unanalyzed reductionism comprehend the *German* difference from the English-speaking world if the root of this difference is the ethnocentric projection of a differential historical experience?

A classic illustration of this difference is embodied by Hegel. Could Hegel have been other than a German? Is it possible to imagine Hegel as an Englishman? In contrast to may internationally minded political philosophies, it was significant *within* Hegel's historical philosophy that he was a German; a Swabian in Prussia at the time that Napoleon claimed victory against Prussia at Jena.

While Hegel has had followers in the English-speaking world, the general consensus has been that freedom and right so construed are largely *alien* to Anglo-Saxon conceptions of freedom and right. Hegel demonstrated that a state integrated with a constitutional monarchy could be conceived in compatibility with modern, "rational", institutions through a very different path of reasoning. The example of Hegel refutes the idea that Anglo-Saxon hostility to the German model is due to *solely* to the superior development of rational, parliamentary institution in England, leaving the Anglo-Americans to explain why their state is the way it is on other grounds.

In Walter Kaufmann's major reinterpretation of Hegel's work, he noted that while self-consciousness (*selbstbewusst sein*) can mean being embarrassed or unsure of one's self in English, in German it means the opposite: being self-assured or proud.[1152] If the "self" is not automatically assumed to be reduced to only an individual organism, but expanded towards a sociobiological Überorganism, then perhaps a clue to this German difference can be uncovered. The association of self-consciousness with self-effacement in *English* suggests a lack of ethnic self-consciousness, which further suggests a lack of Anglo-Saxon *self-awareness.* But is this lack of national self-awareness universal?

Shortly after the First World War, the German cultural historian Moeller van den Bruck wrote:

> Prussianism represents the political will of the German people. The strength of Prussianism has always been and still is the strength to bring together and unite....All Germans who to-day struggle for unity are Prussians.[1153]

Hegel, originally from the German province of Swabia, completed his greatest philosophical works as a Prussian.

The unity of knowledge, represented institutionally by the university, was the aspiration of philosophy as embodied by Hegel. Unity of *all* knowledge through an *attempt* at philosophical completeness implies the incorporation of *self*-knowledge, *self*-awareness, and *self*-consciousness.

Hegel picked up where Anglo-Saxon political thought leaves off. Whereas the more normative Anglo-Saxon philosophy of anti-philosophy sweeps all loose philosophical ends under the carpet of individual freedom, Hegel attempted to unite the state, history, and all the essential milestones of the human mind into a comprehensive philosophy. The Anglo-Saxon metaphysics of "freedom", by contrast, has provided a pragmatic means of evading a rational, scientific self-accounting.

The German proclivity towards the completeness of philosophical systems is related to the historic completeness of their polisociobiological systems. The more comprehensive sociobiological (Überorganism) development of the Germans appears to Anglo-American empiricism as a greater distortion of reality, especially in the form of myths or idealism. Yet the sociobiological basis of this subjectivity is a stronger correlation between German sociology and German biology on the highest levels.

The German tendency to exceed the Anglo-Saxons in the aspiration to assimilate the philosophical whole has been rooted in the coherence of the German polisociobiological whole. Whereas the German way implies a *continuous* differentiation within a whole, the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on analysis implies *discontinuous* differentiation and a weaker projection of wholeness at large. The predominance of Anglo-Saxon sociobiological discontinuity over continuity is correlated with the predominance of symbolization over incorporation.

Differentiation may be the most German way of analysis. Differentiation, whether in an individual or a social organism, implies analytic distinctions within an overarching hierarchical unity. Instead of leaving analytic distinctions isolated from one another, discriminations within mental and social order are commonly coordinated within the constraints of sociobiological context (*Gleichschaltung*).

Within the overarching hierarchical unity of the German Überorganism, differentiations of kin, kind, and king can be made internally and projected externally upon the outside world. In other words, unity is not equality and within the unity of the German nation, differentiations of sex, character, and ability are made within that unity.

The classic Norman way of making discriminations within discriminations revolved around assumptions of "class" that implied presumptions of caste. At its most extreme, the Norman aristocracy imposed artificial classifications of predetermined castes and called this "civilization". Products of the Norman social classification view include the English "class" system, British India, and the American slave South.

The difference between Norman social classification and German holistic differentiation is the difference between the English "class" system and German nationalism. Norman classification, originally formalized in Magna Carta, is either unbounded by a higher unifying principle (the slave South in the Civil War) or weakly bounded by a higher unifying principle (i.e. the king). It was partly because Norman social classification was perceived as artificial civilization that the Anglo-Saxon rejected the weak basis of unity altogether and attempted to organize on the basis of democratic individuation.

German national differentiation, Norman social classification, and Anglo-Saxon democratic individuation are three "theories of everything"; three bases for chopping up and perceiving "the world". Anglo-Saxon democratic individuation is a reaction against the Norman social classification's inability to constitute a political unity on the level of German national differentiation. 1066 thus began the path from Hobbits to Hobbes; from a nation reduced to subpolitical body to a subpolitical body that continued its disintegration into "modern", Hobbesian individuals.

In 1066, a generation of Anglo-Saxon leaders failed their country. That generation of leaders failed the *whole*, and consequently, the Anglo-Saxon sense of sociobiological wholeness failed. The Conquest shattered kinship-cultural unity, and the Anglo-Saxons were never able to fully overcome the sense of wholeness lost in that downgrading. The Normans reduced the Anglo-Saxons from a potential whole to a definitive part. The Norman way of social classification never lost the impression of being partly foreign to the native whole. Totalitarian politics is a foreign concept to the modern English-speaking world, in part, because part of England's sociobiological total was felt to be residually foreign.

The idea of "the whole" is really just a thorough treatment of the idea of generalization. Generally speaking, both the German tendency to generalize and the modern English-speaking world's tendency to resist generalizations both project political assumptions towards "metaphysical" assumptions. The Anglo-Saxon metaphysics of freedom, for example, projects a metaphysical conquest of the idea that the Norman Conquest permanently enslaved the Anglo-Saxon race. Whereas traditional German self-acceptance of generalizations about themselves led them to project

generalizations about other people, Anglo-Saxon resistance to generalizing about themselves overgeneralized their own resistance to a wholehearted identification with government order (i.e. American "universalism").

The basic Anglo-Saxon method of rebutting generalizations is to expose them to a more analytic exposure to reality (empiricism). This contrasts starkly with German idealism's assumption of the coherence of an *internal* order; like an internal connection between kin and king. Anglo-empiricism suggests an incoherence of internal order, like the liberal assumption that there is *no* connection between kin and king, and finds its way in the world through empirical openness to *external* order. Whereas German differentiation makes analytic distinction within an overarching unity, the Conquest's shattering of any sense of unity gutted the vivisected Anglo-Saxon mind outward so that analytic differentiations became expressed externally rather than internally.

What is striking about English thinkers is just how tenuous and superficial they perceive social bonds to be. Government and men are held together only by self-interested contracts. While the Conquest reduced the Anglo-Saxons to subpolitical parts, modernity is marked by turning this analytic-reductionistic condition against the Normans themselves as a weapon to bring the conquerors down with them.

Anglo-analytic philosophy originated in an active resistance to false political assumptions, such as the belief in a hereditary connection between the (Norman) government and the (Anglo-Saxon) people. Freedom from unjustified beliefs demanded a critique of false first principles of political philosophy, i.e. the right of conquest. After Hobbes, this modern approach became especially opposed to the

convergence of assumptions that leads to the idealization of the political as the highest synthesis of the human, i.e. William the Conqueror as a model of human greatness.

Whereas German philosophy is characterized by the will to *synthesize* all knowledge, philosophy in the English-speaking world is characterized by the will to *analyze* all knowledge. Yet a rigorous analysis of the origins of this characteristically modern proclivity towards analysis reveals a desire to analyze or separate the influence of the Norman Conquest from "modern" times. In other words, Anglo-American modernity itself is partly a product of a desire to *separate*, *isolate*, and *compartmentalize* the influence of the Norman Conquest into the category of "medieval" times and this itself helped give birth to the conceptual break from the past that characterizes "modern" times. While the Normans themselves often despised England before 1066 as the "dark ages", modernity in the English-speaking world can almost be defined by an effort to repress the historical influence of the Norman Conquest and despise *that* era as the "dark ages".

This suggests that the demonstrable tendency towards analysis in English-speaking political-philosophy evolved from an inability to mentally digest or synthesize elements of their own past into their "modern" identity. The relative failure of the Anglo-Saxons in philosophy, in comparison with the Germans, is correlated with an inability to incorporate *themselves* in self-knowledge on a higher level (i.e. like an Überorganismic level). Anglo-American analytic philosophy's strong (anti-philosophical) tendency to isolate philosophy as a domain separate from the rest of life evolved from the tendency to separate the highest general principles of political life (which, *at root*, would lead to generalizing about the Conquest) from the "real life" of the

conquered. Put another way, Anti-Normanism is the source of a primal gap in the totality of the English-speaking world's modern self-comprehension.

The eruption of resentment of the "Norman Yoke" in the seventeenth century was rediscovered by English historian Christopher Hill. "Where it is most open to criticism", he wrote, "is that it never arrived at a conception of history which sees society as a whole".[1154] This is really another way of saying that the hostility to the "Norman Yoke", rationalized as Anglo-Saxon resistance to powerful government, was inordinately ethnocentric.

Here, at a primal origin of modernity, one can discern an origin of a fundamental difference from ancient political assumptions: the modern belief that there is no legitimate political whole or common good. The Norman/Saxon conflict thus clarifies how the Anglo-Saxons lost the German sense of the inclusive political whole: the authentic kin whole became a partial, majoritarian perspective among the Anglo-Saxons, while the *de facto* political "whole" became partial or biased through the domination of its ruling Norman part.

The Norman dilemma catalyzed a reductionistic Enlightenment methodology wherein each individual is democratically counted, but is not assumed to add up to larger, unmediated whole. The Anglo-Saxons cured themselves of the Normans with individualism and a myopic, steadfast devotion to the proposition that no such thing as a forest exists; only trees. Reductionism, in other words, provided a means to overlook the overlords.

There is at least some truth in the notion that German philosophy demonstrates proclivities similar to Nazi totalitarianism. Yet Anglo-Saxon resistance to political totalitarianism in no way demonstrates the most total

enlightenment aspiration to philosophic knowledge. Just as German totalitarianism had an essential anti-rationalist basis connected with German *völkisch* pride, Anglo-Saxon *anti*-totalitarianism also seems to have a comparable *anti*-rationalist basis. Here one can see, once again, similarities at the root of differences. The same *self-conscious* pride at the root of German totalitarianism of the Hegelian variety is also at the root of Anglo-Saxon *anti*-totalitarianism. This suggests that Anglo-Saxons *do not want to understand* the influence of the Norman Conquest upon themselves and *systematic* resistance to political totalitarianism is, in part, connected to a certain kind of anti-philosophical anti-intellectualism. This resistance to total understanding stifles a rational comprehension of 1066's relation to modernity. It is a dark, blind spot of the so-called "Enlightenment".

Facing the foundational issues in a way characteristic of the Germans would lead the Anglo-Saxons to the basic issue of their failure to avert the Conquest and all its consequences. For example, when the Conquest itself is accepted in a traditional or mindless way, then Englishmen can argue whether Normans or Saxons should take greater credit for precocious achievements of English history such as the Domesday Book. The issue, in other words, becomes who was responsible for the Domesday Book instead of bringing attention to the fact that the Domesday was only necessary in the first place because the Norman were foreigners ignorant of the specific contents of their newly won kingdom. If Domesday was a means of achieving a maximal exploitation of the spoils of Anglo-Saxons, is this something that Anglo-Saxons should proudly take credit?

German striving towards the *roots* of problems was directly related to the integrity of their contact with their own roots. Nietzsche and the Nazis, for example, could

more easily identify the foreign roots of (Jewish) Christianity because they were closer to their own pagan roots. The Norman Conquest, by contrast, set in motion a complex internal evolution that ruptured the English-speaking world's connection with its most primal roots.

The Anglo-Saxon penchant for reductionism and skepticism in philosophy stems, in part, from political "reduction" by Norman political authorities. Traditional Anglo-Saxon skepticism towards grand generalizations is, at least in part, ethnocentrically rooted in resistance to Norman-French pretensions to the highest philosophic truths. The supposedly "empirical" Anglo-Saxon tradition neglects an empirical account of the influence of the Conquest's political reduction on modern political reductionism. The Conquest's political reduction of Anglo-Saxons to anglo-saxons was the ancestor of the modern reduction of the birthrights of Englishman to the rights of man. This is how the Anglo-Saxons became a race of individuals.

This variety of modern political reductionism was both descriptive *and* prescriptive. In being reduced themselves, their ability to overcome and regenerate their historic loss was itself reduced. The new individual-egalitarian justice could not fully equalize what was lost in an equal way.

Reduction through sociobiological decapitation reduced the Anglo-Saxon capacity for sociobiological self-comprehension. Since they themselves had been reduced to "individuals", this reduced their ability to fully put their fingers over the whole of their own predicament. Without a full incorporation of the Norman Conquest's influence into modern times, the Anglo-Saxons cannot understand themselves, and an inability to understand this about themselves cripples their ability to understand anyone else.

Science and Struggle

The Cold War

There could be no compromise of convictions between historian E. A. Freeman and his intellectual nemesis John Horace Round. Freeman attempted to fashion William I as a kinder and gentler conqueror by laying responsibility for admittedly "new and evil customs" on the improbable figure of Randolf Flambard, chief minister during the reign of the Conqueror's son, King William Rufus (1087-1100). If there were any truth to this, it would mean that Flambard was a vastly more important political figure than William the Conqueror. Can the "Good Old Cause" of Saxon freedom in the English Civil War and the American Civil War really be traced to the decisions of Flambard, rather than William's decision to conquer and dismember the native Anglo-Saxon ruling order? Freeman's argument could have used a good dose of Thomas Paine's American common sense:

> that William the Conqueror was a usurper is a fact not to be contradicted.

In Britain, however, the relatively unrevolutionary compromise with the Conquest tradition led Saxonist *democrats* such as Freeman to contradict the notion of usurpation without redemption, while Tory *conservatives* such as Round embraced the cataclysm of conquest as the blessed victory of a superior civilization over backward Saxon aborigines. Round demolished some of Freeman's key arguments, especially the notion that the sudden introduction of knight service into England could be

explained through continuity with the Anglo-Saxon past. The feudal system, Round flatly stated, was introduced by the Normans.[1155]

The most basic reason that 1066 was distinctively cataclysmic in the domain of military obligations is plain to see: the defeat at Hastings was the native failure to live up their highest political duties. Failing to defend English land from military invaders, old English modes and methods of military tenure were replaced, for example, by the military occupation functions of Norman knights. Freeman's gradualistic interpretation of English history was an attempt to heal the historical wounds inflicted by William the Vivisector.

Round once hinted that Freeman was thinking of Prime Minister Gladstone (1809-1898) when he wrote the following of Harold, the last king of Anglo-Saxon England:

> The mighty voice, the speaking look and gesture of that old man eloquent, could again sway assemblies of Englishmen at his will.[1156]

For Round, this was Freeman's "glorification of demagogy". When a similarly anti-democratic criticism was leveled at Gladstone for asserting the economic dominance of the House of Commons in 1861, he proudly responded that he was only "restoring that good old constitution which took its root in Saxon times."[1157]

Of Freeman, Round concluded:

> A democrat first, an historian afterwards, History was for him, unhappily, ever "past politics." If he worshipped Harold with a blind enthusiasm, it was chiefly because he was a *novus homo*, "who reigned purely by the will of the people."[1158]

It appears that Freeman imagined an original Saxon government that was closer to the regimes of Cromwell and Hitler than to any formal principle of the rule of the people. Yet in utter contradiction to that passionate idealization of organic democracy, Freeman wrote in *The History of the Norman Conquest*:

> The essence of a feudal tenure is the holding of land by the grant of a lord, instead of holding it simply as a member of the commonwealth. The holder of a primitive [free holding] held his land of no man; he had no lord; as a member of the commonwealth, he owed to the King or other chief of the commonwealth such obedience as the law prescribed, but the tie was purely political and not personal.[1159]

This terminological distinction between feudalism and commonwealth is really a product of the English Civil War era. If it will be acknowledged that this war still raged in Freeman's nineteenth century mind, then one can make sense of a very basic inconsistency. On one hand, he romanticized Harold as a leader who reigned through the "will of the people". On the other hand, he presented an implicit criticism of "feudalism" for being, unlike the "purely political" commonwealth, too "personal".

If this distinction is to be believed, then pre-Conquest England possessed a purely political, and a suspiciously modern and "impersonal" form of government in the middle of the medieval period. Freeman's contradictions can be explained, however, if one recognizes that he is projecting post-Conquest Saxon resistance to Norman lords upon pre-Conquest institutions. The problem was not that the relationship was personal *per se*, but that the nature of the

personal relationship was one that of conquerors tending to the conquered or that of a master ruling over his slave.

The historical embodiment of Freeman's contradictions is to be found in Cromwell and the Puritan Commonwealth. Cromwell and the Puritans got rid of the lords that Freeman detested, but instead of implementing a "purely political" rule of law and an impersonal modern government, England's commonwealth got a charismatic dictator initially supported by the "will of the people".

Cromwell marked a beginning towards both modern and romantic politics.

The failure of the Puritan Revolution in 1660 marked the defeat of great spontaneous outbursts of the organic "will of the people" in England and the beginning of the attempt to negate the Conquest by different means: indifference. If the entrenched tradition of obedience to the old hereditary lords proved unconquerable, *then* one could at least begin to hope for a tie that was "purely political and not personal". This is where a post-Hobbesian, and more recognizably modern, form of politics begins to take shape.

The liberal tradition that America inherited arose, in part, from Anglo-Saxon failure to achieve organic democracy. Forced to living with lingering ethnic hostility through the survival of the aristocracy after 1660 and 1688, liberalism evolved as a means of living with ethnic hostility by substituting individual freedom for national freedom. This experiment in aristocracy helped produce modern individualism's neutral social attitude premised on a *lack* of positive social relationship in preference to the less "objective" social relationship of positive hostility.

Long after the heat of the battle of Hastings had past, ethnic hostility simmered into a kind of cold war. The instinct for revenge cooled and matured into modern

schemes of democratic justice. Rage was rationalized and Anglo-Saxon ethnic hostility to the Conquest-government became reinterpreted as rational, liberal virtue. Enlightened ethnic cleansing wiped the historical slate of the very memory of the Normans. The American Anglo-Saxons civilized their hatred of the Norman race into an electoral system that routinized the democratic overthrow of the Conquest government every four years, climaxing under Lincoln.

Violence and "barbarism" was necessary in order to achieve the takeover of 1066. Once the new "class" order was clamped upon the nation and established as tradition, however, then "civilization" — the Pax Normana — became equally necessary to preserve what the Conquest had won. The entire British valuation of civilization was thus built upon a world-historical hypocrisy wherein the original Norman brutalities and genocides were to be swept under the rug of the greater good of "civilization", while any Anglo-Saxon attempt at redress through revolt would be branded as "barbarism".

It was out of this predicament that Anglo-Saxons took a lead in developing modern notions of democracy and rights as a counter-civilization. If Anglo-Saxon tribalism or nationalism was vilified as primitive and uncivilized, then Norman hereditary government would be branded as the archetypal modern villain. Civilization evolved into a sort of internal cease-fire that tended to blunt the political extremes that lead to civil war.

Tamed, domesticated, and civilized within the "iron cage" of the Norman Yoke, the Anglo-Saxon rebellion against civilization became known as "freedom". Though Norman civilization was partly successful in domesticating the Anglo-Saxon animal, modern democracy turned the idea of

civilization against the Normans in an attempt to tame the tamers. With the sword of civility returning civility by the sword, the more intelligent Anglo-Saxon eventually robbed the Normans of one of their most distinct advantages: monopolization of control over "legitimate" physical force.

Saxons and Normans had to "civilize" their mutually antagonistic instincts for there to be peace, order, and stability. But the antagonism could not simply be swept under the rug. A net result of this long and complex process of taming, defanging, and civilizing one another was individualism. Persistently weakening one another as kin groups, they *collectively* became individualized.

When modern Englishmen or their descendants in America and elsewhere reflect upon the Norman Yoke or Norman/Saxon conflict, what is a stereotypical response? It is simply ridiculous, of course. But *why* is it ridiculous? It is ridiculous because they are *far too superior* for that kind of thing. Nationalism or outright ethnic chauvinism is for *inferior* peoples, not them. Anglo-Saxons *must* be racially superior to racism because if their distinctive lack of nationalist expression can be explained by an ingrained submission to the legacy of Norman subjugation, this would chip away at their collective self-esteem.

German nationalism, from this viewpoint, could only be explained by the inferiority of circumstance that succeeded World War I. For German supremacists, however, a collective sense of superiority was tied to ethnic or racial unity. For British, and especially American supremacists, a collective sense of superiority was tied to the ability to work together *despite* the lack of a truly coherent collective unity.

Normans and Saxons eventually took collective pride in their ability to resolved or tame their internal bloodfeud through a collection of norms, customs, procedures, and

laws called civilization. How could it have been otherwise? If these tensions existed, they had to be dealt with one way or the other. The development of common norms that devalue tribal-ethnic conflict was a condition of a viable civilization. Here we see how *political* considerations of *genetic-kinship* factors led to the evolution of *cultural* norms that deemphasize those genetic-kinship factors.

Insofar as Norman/Saxon tribalism was overcome, it was one measure of the success of a more universal national identity. To the extent it was successful, there could exist an authentic post-Conquest English identity as a whole nation. Consequently, this new identity ("us") became associated with a collective overcoming of tribalism while those other nations or ethnicities ("them") were those who had not stretched beyond the bounds of straightforward ethnocentrism. In this way, the British and Americans came to associate the barbarian (the foreigner) with tribalism. The differential political path of the English-speaking world from the German-speaking world was rooted in this paradox of ethnicity-overcoming ethnocentrism. The Germans had not been forcibly conquered by cosmopolitanism before the twentieth century.

The kind of formal, civilized relations that characterizes Anglo-American government is that exhibited by strangers who have no strong or definite ties to one another. This state of affairs was a modern solution to the Norman problem that became a solution for the social problems of the whole world. The civilizational bridge between Anglo-Saxon and Norman is a prime source of the liberal, internationalist tendencies of English political theory and practice that culminated in America.

One might think that it was the Anglo-Saxons who first developed constitutional government and the rule of law as

solution to their political predicament, but this is not the case. Magna Carta (1215) was an invention of Norman barons. It was the source of the concepts of trial by jury, "due process of law", and the idea of the rule of law and constitutional government in general. From an Anglo-American perspective, this Magna Paradox illustrates the complex nature of the Norman legacy. From a German perspective, however, this helps clarify how the Norman Conquest led to a divergent evolution towards the rule of law that became coupled with broad democracy only in modern times.

For Germans, there was no Norman Conquest, no Magna Carta, and thus, no compulsion to the evolve ideas of the fundamental rule of law. This is yet another way in which German *Kultur* was never conquered by belief in the supremacy of civilization.

The Physics of the Modern Political Cyborg

One element of William the Conqueror's political genius was his successful strategy of dividing his enemies or potential foes. The conquest of England was made possible, in part, by his ability to keep the natives divided among themselves so that they remained unable to combine as a formidable, unified force. Although Normans were relatively united among themselves, this same strategic mindset was even applied towards William's own Norman barons by dividing their spoils of land over disparate geographic areas so that the most powerful would never be in a position to combine their assets against the king. William succeeded in making his kingship supreme by keeping rebels and potential rebels divided and conquered.

By 1215, Norman aristocrats had produced Magna Carta: the beginnings of constitutional law and failure of William's

original attempt to keep Normans barons divided under the king. So while 1066 established an organic or sociobiologically based division between Norman conquerors and conquered Anglo-Saxons, by 1215 the original conqueror unity had broken down under Angevin or largely non-Norman kings. The classical 'organic' or *de facto* threefold 'division of powers' in England was thus established: King, (Norman) Lords, and (Saxon) Commons.

The American Revolution eliminated, or at least profoundly muffled, the king-conqueror paradigm established by William. However, the old world internal division between Lords and Commons became the new world geographic division between South and North: a more Norman and aristocratic culture was based in Virginia while a more Anglo-Saxon and democratic culture was based in Massachusetts. This 'organic' or sociobiological division of powers between North and South emerged from opposite sides in the English Civil War.

Note the contrast between this 'organic' way of looking at the 'division of powers' and the traditional, 'inorganic', constitutional understanding of the 'division of powers'. There is reason to think that the incompatibility between 'organic' and 'inorganic' divisions of powers is not completely accidental. The 'inorganic' division of powers, while embodying the principle of civil war in some ways, helped to thwart an 'organic' division of powers that would lead to all-out civil war.

In one of great moments of Anglo-French cross-fertilization, the Frenchman Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws* interpreted theoretically what Englishman had done practically. Montesquieu's mechanistic and inorganic interpretation of England's political system emphasized a balanced division between the executive, the legislative, and

the judiciary from a functionalist perspective. In England, this corresponds to King, Parliament, and the system of courts. In America, the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. Magna Carta is what legally established the modern division between the king (or president) and everyone else and the judiciary served like an umpire between all upon that original legal ground.

This modern, 'inorganic' divisions of powers evolved, in part, out of the need to promote overarching political unity by systematically counteracting and obscuring England's 'organic' divisions of powers: King, Lords, and Commons. Montesquieu's separation of powers was ultimately adapted to a new variation on this theme in America.

Woodrow Wilson, the most scholarly of U.S. Presidents, wrote in the third chapter of his *Constitutional Government in the United States* (1908):

> The makers of the Constitution constructed the federal government upon a theory of checks and balances which was meant to limit the operation of each part and allow to no single part or organ of it a dominating force; but no government can be successfully conducted upon so mechanical a theory. Leadership and control must be lodged somewhere; the whole art of statesmanship is the art of bringing the several parts of government into effective cooperation for the accomplishment of particular common objects…

The problem for the founders, however, was a strong tendency towards factionalism born, in part, out of a lack of organic unity. James Madison believed that the Constitution's division of powers had a "tendency to break and control the violence of faction". The constitution handled the historical and organic faction between North

and South by accepting the premise of internal division and reordering it as the inorganic division of powers. The constitutional division of powers thus acted as a counterforce to a North/South division of power.

American unity was originally achieved through this structural diversion of internal division. The American founders, in other words, attempted to achieve an overarching political unity by distracting from an 'organic' division of powers through an 'inorganic' and incompatible division of powers; i.e. the legislative, the judiciary, and the executive. The whole point of the inorganic system was to promote "unnatural" cooperation and this must be kept in mind when Wilson criticizes the founders' mechanical, constitutional paradigm as such:

> No living thing can have its organs offset against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary, its life is dependent upon their quick cooperation…Their cooperation is indispensable, their war-fare fatal.

Ultimately, the 'inorganic' separations of powers failed to overcome the 'organic' separation of powers between North and South. The U.S. Civil War proved the enduring ability of old world divisions to overcome new world enlightenment schemes and war parties reformed along the lines established in the English Civil War.

It is no accident that the modern political philosophy of Hobbes coincided with the breakdown of internal unity that was the English Civil War. If Hobbes had taken his modern, materialistic premises and focused on the relationship *between* sovereign states, this would not have been especially new. What was novel was his systematic application of a physical worldview to the *internal* structural order of the state.

The physical systems of Hobbes and Newton were culturally grounded in breakdown of an 'organic' or sociobiological system. The original, historical source of this breach was the Norman Conquest's penetration of *sociobiological boundaries* by *physical force*; that is, by a militarily superior force. English modernity was thus the fruition of a centuries old compromise with, or adaptation to, the permanence of physical penetration into a sociobiological system.

This is an English root of the relationship between the modern scientific revolution and modern political revolution. The physics of Newton are culturally correlated with an English political order in which "organic" boundaries had been foundationally compromised by physical force. Wilson acknowledged this relationship between modern Newtonian physics and modern constitutional politics:

> The government of the United States was constructed upon the Whig theory of political dynamics, which was a sort of unconscious copy of the Newtonian theory of the universe….Some single law, like the law of gravitation, swung each system of thought and gave it its principle of unity.

The principle of equality was to give the modern polity its formal unity, not only in the sense of "all men are created equal", but also in the sense of equality through the Montesquieu's balance of separated powers. This, for Wilson, was the problem: "Politics is turned into mechanics under his touch. The theory of gravitation is supreme."

> The trouble with the theory is that government is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of

> the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton.

But is it really possible to take the entire constitutional framework laid down at the founding and tweak it so that a lifeless machine is spontaneously generated into a living organism? Wilson simultaneously rejected the Newtonian paradigm of the founding and accepted it by working *within* that theoretically benighted tradition. It was the Nazi-Germans who took Wilson's argument to its logical extreme by rejecting constitutional liberal democracy *altogether* and supporting a *wholly* organic form of political order.

Even if the division of powers model is taken at its most timely moment at the founding, the American polity as a whole could not have been described as a *wholly* inorganic machine. The reason for this is plain enough: its human components, from presidents to citizens, are organic (biological). It was primarily the software of the written constitution and the hardware of institutional organizations that were most fundamentally mechanizable. It follows, then, that the constitution of American order was always *partly* inorganic, programmatic mechanism and *partly* organic, biological individuals. *The American constitutional polity is thus a political cyborg*.

A cyborg is partly mechanical and partly biological. The American constitutional polity is a sociobiological cyborg because its highest ruling order is a mechanism that works differently, independently, and in some ways contrary, to the logic of organic orders such as the family. Only by rejecting the primacy of a written constitutional altogether, along with the institutions that support that system, could one fully follow Wilson's belief that:

> Governments are living things and operate as organic wholes….Living political constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and in practice.

American founder Thomas Jefferson thought that pre-Conquest England, unlike England under the "Norman Yoke", possessed something akin to such a living, organic, political "constitution" and

> although this constitution was violated and set at naught by Norman force, yet force cannot change right. A perpetual claim was kept up by the nation, by their perpetual demand of a restoration of their Saxon laws; which shews they were never relinquished by the will of the nation.[1160]

According to Jefferson, the ancient Saxon constitution was violated by *physical force*. The integrity of a living, organic political body was penetrated by the inorganic mechanisms of superior military might. Put in Wilson's terms, one could say that the Norman Conquest was, in some way, a victory of a Newtonian conception of physical force over a Darwinian conception of an organic body.

The consequences of the Norman "right of conquest" were momentous. It meant that *physical*, military violence became the supreme basis of political right. It meant that the very highest extant political principles were fundamentally inorganic, *physical* principles of superior military force. The empirical, historical basis of first principles of *political* hierarchy was based on first principles of a *physical* hierarchy.

Cultures are characteristically closed systems. The Conquest brutally vivisected Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* and *forced* it open to both French civilization and the larger physical

universe. This contributed to the superior political valuation of civilization over *Kultur*.

The Norman right of conquest was a particular instance of the principle that might makes right. The Conquest effectually *internalized* physical force within the domain of the body politic, and modern political philosophy in the English-speaking world is characterized by the struggle of those subject to this force to technologically control that force. The Norman Conquest, then, began an *internalization* of "laws" of physical force that evolved into modern notions of politics as a physical machine (or cyborg).

The American founders, the Brothers Frankenborg, Wilson explained, "had sought to balance executive, legislature, and judiciary off against one another by a series of checks and counter-poises, which Newton might readily have recognized as suggestive of the mechanism of the heavens." If there is a Newtonian law applicable here, it is his third: for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. The polar opposite of the American separation of powers is represented by William the Conqueror. This supreme Norman *was* the lawgiver, judge, and last but not least, the great executive of the so-called "feudal" paradigm that he founded in England. The Newtonian revolution in politics was reactionary; a reaction to the paradigm established by William the Conqueror. From Magna Carta to Anglo-Saxon "natural law", the physical principle of conservation here was restoration through revolution. Without the *action* of the Norman Conquest, there would not have been an impetus for the *reaction* of modern physicalist mechanisms to control the breakdown of internal, organic unity.

A physics-based worldview tended to view only material individuals, not kinship relations, and one can see how this

kind of Newtonian-like materialism provided a point of view that emphasized observable individuals over social or kinship interrelationships. The systematic individualism of Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, for example, was a modern technological remedy designed *against* the old kinship-based Norman-Saxon tribalism of the English Civil War. So if we take our start from the successful penetration of a physics-based worldview on one hand, and a system of individual rights that was designed to prevent kinship-based hostilities on the other, then what we get, ultimately, is a combination of physicalism and internationalism that is the underlying formula of liberalism.

Enlightenment liberal internationalism was interwoven with a Newtonian, cosmological perspective. From the perspective of the larger universe beyond Earth, the differences between humans begin to appear trivial. The liberalism of the twenty-first century is still based on this original Newtonian-based cosmology wherein traditional human bonds are dissolved through comparison with the larger world discovered by physics and astronomy.

The original egalitarianism of liberalism has some connection with the "high point of scientific revolution": Newton's discovery of the "law of universal gravitation". Newton demonstrated that terrestrial and celestial physics are identical; that the physical laws that govern matter on Earth are the same laws that govern "the heavens", i.e. outer space. The universality of the law of gravitation stimulated the search for analogous laws in the social sphere that would apply to all human bodies. Newton's discovery of the equality of the laws that governed "heaven" and "earth" suggested, in opposition to notion of the divine right of kings, the existence of laws equally applicable to kings and commoners.

This is another way in which Newtonian physics promoted liberalism's emphasis on universal laws equally applicable to all humans. The universality of physics suggested the comparable universality of human internationalism. The boundaries between nations appeared unreal in light of the overriding laws of physical reality.

In practice, however, no viable political system could be founded on a completely physical worldview because physics provides no basis for valuing human things over nonhuman things. The more a political philosophy is openly founded on this kind of physical worldview, the more the polity may come to approximate total anarchy. Modern liberal democracy is, depending on your point of view, is a limited government, or a limited anarchy. A totally physical worldview implicates a move from limited anarchy to total anarchy.

It was ultimately not clear that humans have any objective special status whatsoever in the physical world. The reason that liberal democracy can work at all is that marks out a human *exception* to total physicalism under the name of human rights. This means that liberal democracy rests upon a double standard; one pre-Darwinian standard of quasi-Newtonian physicalism, and a separate *human* standard based on individual rights. The synthesis of these two standards produces humanistic internationalism and the sociobiological cyborg of liberal democracy.

The American founding took place in a historical window, after Newton's discoveries had impacted social and political thinkers, and before Darwin's theories of biological evolution. Liberalism was founded and based primarily on physical science, not biological science. While liberal democracy cannot be reconciled with total physicalism, the political left is nonetheless premised on progress *towards* a

physical or material worldview. The political right, as exemplified by Nazism, is premised on progress towards the opposite direction; towards a biological worldview. The political left thus moves to a physics based international-universalism and away from the relative provinciality of biology.

Individual freedom, for example, is freedom from biology in the sense of freedom from biocentrism, freedom from kinship, and freedom from subordination to genetic adaptation. Originally inspired by a Newtonian-centered physicalism, liberal freedom ultimately recognizes only physical law or materialism as the fundamental reality.

Let me offer a personal example. Once upon a time, a man offered to perform fellatio. I consented. Why not? I suppose it is ironic that it was at the very moment that I found another man's mouth attempting to engage my penis that I had this distinct epiphany: I am not a homosexual. While I am not inclined towards homosexuality on a visceral, instinctual level, I can nonetheless accept that pleasure is pleasure on a physical, material level, regardless of whom or what is stimulating it.

This is an illustration of how liberalism is based on physicalism. From a more physical point of view, fellatio is just stimulation of nerve cells, just as a clitoris is just a fold of skin. The social level, with its traditional taboos, becomes dissolved in the physical as provincial human prejudices become relativized in light of the vaster physical universe. Humans, as Copernicus discovered, are not the center of the universe.

When two gay men have sex or when a woman becomes a politician, no laws of *physics* are broken. These social possibilities are *physically* possible. From a *biological* perspective of genetic adaptation, however, homosexuality

defies the gene propagating function of sex, and women's careers tend to conflict with the *biological* priority of genetic propagation and child raising.

The ultimate trajectory of the political left is the supremacy of physical principle over biological principle; the rise of technology and the decline of biology. Biology, especially in the form of sex and race, becomes increasingly irrelevant, while technology increasing in order and intelligent organization. However inegalitarian capitalism may appear on a human level, the ultimate inequality it is developing is on a technological level.

From the very beginning, America's liberal democracy was strongly influenced by the paradigm of the machine and designed, in the minds of some, *as* a machine. Taken together with its biological human components, liberal democracy is a sociobiological cyborg. As economic-technological development advances, the machine components of the body politic increase, while the relative proportion of its biological components declines. Ultimately, the implications of this sociobiological cyborg, present from the founding of liberal democracy, increasingly impinge on individuals as humans start to replace components of their biological bodies with components of technology.

If the trajectory of the political left ultimately leads away from biology and towards the larger physical-material worldview that finds expression in technology, then biological humans are ultimately implicated. While the theoretical blind spot or exception to liberal physicalism may originally have been individual humans with their inalienable rights, eventually humans, too, find themselves physicalized as biological humans remake themselves into cyborgs and cyborgs remake themselves into unadulterated machines. This transformation emerges directly out of the

consistency of the modern idea of equality through the equality of the biological with the larger physical world. The spark of this end of the biological human race was present at the dawn of modernity in the mind of Newton's God.

America: Carcass of the Saxon Nation

"So long as the separate art of Music had a real organic life-need in it, down to the epochs of Mozart and Beethoven," wrote German composer Richard Wagner in his polemical essay *Judaism in Music*,

> there was nowhere to be found a Jew composer: it was impossible for an element entirely foreign to that living organism to take part in the formative stages of that life. Only when a body's inner death is manifest, do outside elements win the power of lodgment in it—yet merely to destroy it. Then indeed that body's flesh dissolves into a swarming colony of insect-life: but who, in looking on that body's self would hold it still for living? The spirit, that is: the *life,* has fled from out that body, has sped to kindred other bodies; and this is all that makes out Life. In genuine Life alone can we, too, find again the ghost of Art, and not within its worm-befretted carcass.

Could anyone sincerely look at 21st century America, with its combination of individualism and multiculturalism, and declare it a "living organism"? For most Anglo-Saxons, the sense of being bound to a larger, kinship-based, political-communal "living organism" is not a cogent reality. In other words, it is dead. The Anglo-Saxon *Volk* is *dead*. It was this death that helped gave birth to modern political order in the English-speaking world.

"Liberalism is the Death of Nations",[1161] declared Moeller van den Bruck. The United States was made possible by the

sociobiological "inner death" of the Saxon nation and the victory of this death was ultimately a tribute to the long-term success of the Norman conquest of the Anglo-Saxon *ethnicity*. To uphold the Conquest, after all, was to maintain the destruction of Anglo-Saxon self-assertion as an independent body. In consequence, America, built on the foundation of the death of the Saxon nation, is a historical monument to the Norman victory over their struggle for nationalistic life. America is the carcass of the Anglo-Saxon Überorganism.

Wagner's belief that the development of German music was a manifestation of a "living organism" can be grasped with a single word: *Kultur*. German romantic nationalism was the expression of the life of Überorganismic order, peaking in music, poetry, and an inclination towards the philosophic whole. The Anglo-Saxon modernists were not more rational than the Germans, only more dead, in the *völkisch* sense. Life has a logic of its own.

The Überorganism is one way of looking at the nature of German order wherein everything has its proper place. In a home, everything in its proper spot. In music, everything in organic harmony. In social relations, every person, every organization, every class or subdivision, and every race in its proper place.

The Normans, too, had a sense of social order wherein their sense of being the master race relegated Anglo-Saxons to their place as a subordinate race. The Anglo-Saxon rebellion against that condition led to the diversities of freedom and this freedom precluded the internal, organic coherence of the German Überorganism. Terminally associated with a sense of slavery, the Überorganism died among Anglo-Saxons and economic materialism (and God) took its place.

Wagnerian Romanticism (from a non-Romantic point of view) leads to a rejection of materialism in the specific sense that its internal logic (i.e. the desire for gene propagation) is *not empirically validated* by the larger material environment. While from an immediate, empirical point of view, its "naïve" internal strivings may appear "irrational", its cumulative cultural result could be view as (potentially) genetically adaptive from a higher, sociobiological point of view. This implies that the more subjective logic of life, insofar as it is the expression of instincts and behaviors that are genetically adaptive, exist in conflict with a strict physicalist-empiricism that has no special place for the human.

A recapitulation. First, liberalism was originally based on a physical, Newtonian-based worldview. Second, the existence of a living *Kultur*, i.e. a political-Überorganism, is dependent on unconscious instincts which are *not empirically validated* through reference to the larger physical, non-human world. Third, *Kultur* and the material-empirical view of world exist in conflict for supremacy with one another since *Kultur* requires the subordination of material-empiricism, while material-empiricism requires the subordination of *Kultur*.

The empiricist's reconciliation of subjective experience with the outer physical world dissolves the subjective biological logic that makes a *Kultur*-Überorganism possible. Within the liberal paradigm, the physical-material view out-competes and out-paces the (more extreme aspects of) internal, instinctual, biological logic. In general, liberalism reduces the sublimation of instincts represented by Wagner to the lowest common denominator of human instincts.

Within liberal democracy, the Newtonian-based, physicalist view of nature takes precedence. For the Nazis,

the Darwinian-biological view of nature takes precedence. Liberal democracy devalues the extreme implications of Darwinism and can potentially promote biological degeneration. Conversely, the Nazi valuation of the province of biology tended to override of a larger, cosmological objectivity.

If Anglo-Saxons under the Norman Yoke possessed the same unconscious instincts for patriarchy and political authoritarianism as the Germans, then the impulses to mindless obedience could probably be best countered with a severe reality check. From this historical perspective, one can see how Anglo-Saxon empiricism could have evolved from its political value as a means of resisting the Norman Yoke.

If Anglo-Saxons followed instincts conducive to political patriarchy in the manner of Nazi "irrationalism", this would lead to self-conflict within the context of the Norman Yoke. Anglo-Saxon nationalism itself required that Nazi-style "irrationalism" be replaced by "rational government". Thus, the Norman Yoke itself would have led Anglo-Saxons to distrust some of their own instincts toward political duty. With the help of the neutralization of kin selection promoted by Christianity, certain instincts would have been ceded or channeled as "reason".

The Anglo-Saxons had to attack their own subjectivity, their own patriarchal inclinations, in order to fight the Norman-"class" system with true objective ruthlessness. While the Conquest itself helped crush Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, especially on a political level, the very adaptations required to fight the Conquest establishment further weaken Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism in that the struggle itself reinforced the alienation of their identity from the political. Yet could objectivity itself be an expression of

Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism when aimed at the Norman enemy; objectifying the Norman enemy?

The larger problem here is the claim that liberal democracy represents rational government or a form of government amenable to scientific objectivity. The Norman Conquest stimulated an un-German "objectivity" towards political things in the sense that the Anglo-Saxons stood *detached* from the government. Detachment from political subjectivity was often replaced by physical objectivity; physics replaced politics and the liberal attack *against* the political replaced identification *with* the political.

It takes a modern Anglo-Saxon perspective to conclude that the Norman Conquest had little impact on government[1162] because the Anglo-Saxons evolved a de-humanized, mechanistic perspective on government precisely to read the Normans out of it. Scientific reductionism that tended to reduce politics to physics also reduced Norman pretensions to power and influence down to size. Physical reductionism could be a political weapon.

The rationalism and empiricism necessary to fight the illusions and myths of Norman pomp and propaganda proved to be a double-edged sword. The struggle against the double standards inherent in Norman hereditary rule led to the rational solution of a single standard, i.e. political equality. The tools evolved to dethrone the Conquest bred tools to dethrone *any* hereditary rule; even Anglo-Saxon hereditary self-rule. This helps to explain the relationship between modern scientific objectivity and the Anglo-Saxon genius for genetically maladaptive behavior.

The death of an Anglo-Saxon Überorganism-*Kultur* was a condition of the distinctly modern political rationalism in the English-speaking world. While the Conquest represented the beheading of the Anglo-Saxon nation as a whole, the sum of

individual Anglo-Saxon heads became the modern, adapted regeneration of the repressed. In this way, the death of Überorganism opened up possibilities of *individual* freedom, i.e. freedom of speech and freedom to pursue many forms of scientific objectivity unhindered by duty to a larger political whole. This means that liberal democracy, in formalizing rights of *individual* freedom, formalized the death of the kind of *collective* freedom that survived among the Germans.

Whereas Nazi-Germans achieved higher standards of genetically adaptive behavior at the expense of certain forms of objectivity, the Anglo-Saxon achieved a greater level of objectivity towards the political at the price of ethnic death. Sociobiological death is a logic consequence of the triumph of Newtonian physicalism over sociobiological boundaries. From a reductionistic physical view, the atoms that compose a "live" person's body are the same as those that compose the same person's body after death. Therefore, from this kind of reductionistic, physical view, there is no ultimate basis for a preference for "life" over death.

The historical choice for Anglo-Saxon sociobiological death through political reductionism was made by the Normans. America, the carcass of the Saxon nation, is only the working out the implications of that medieval defeat.

The Gods Play Dice

"[A]re the different styles of art an arbitrary product of the human mind?", asked the discoverer of the uncertainty principle, German physicist Werner Heisenberg:

> Here we must not be misled by the Cartesian partition. The style arises out of the interplay between the world and ourselves, or more specifically between the spirit of the time and the artist. The spirit of a time is probably a fact as

> objective as any fact in natural science....Therefore, the two processes, that of science and that of art, are not very different.[1163]

Before the advent of quantum mechanics, the very notion of "spirit" was often dismissed on as unscientific. Hegel's idea of a science of "spirit" appeared particularly delusional (in the English-speaking world). However, "spirit" is often considered unreal from the view of a strict, scientific, subject/object division and it is the inviolability of this division that quantum mechanics has brought into question. There is an inherent *uncertainty* built into the notion of "spirit" and this appears to be a consequence of an interaction between subject and object.

While the German word *Geist* has been often been translated into English as "spirit", it has also been translated as "mind". The Hegelian connection between "spirit" and "mind" is a very German sense of wholeness: the whole ego, the whole state, the whole universe; both intellect *and* emotions. Absolute "Spirit" emerged out of Hegel's attempt to achieve philosophical completeness in history; a historically encompassing knowledge which included self-knowledge. Both Hegel and Heisenberg appear to have incorporated themselves as observers into their respective Weltanschauungs and this appears to be the source of their understanding of the compatibility of spirit and science.

It appears that uncertainty emerges when "subjective" factors related to the observer are entered as factors into the scientific equation. Yet what appears to be less precise from the ideal of an iron wall between objectivity and subjectivity is actually more precise in that the mind or observer is accounted for within the scientific equations. Whereas Western scientific objectivity commonly aims to isolate emotions and other sources of subjectivity from objective

observation and reasoning, the "spirit of the times" represents a fusion of intellect and emotions. From this point of view, would it be scientifically defensible to assume that scientific discoveries are only serendipitously related to the scientists who discovered them?

When the Nazis came to power, Heisenberg remained in Germany while Einstein left. While it is not hard to see why Einstein, a Jew, would leave a rabidly antisemetic regime, Heisenberg was apparently not decisively alienated from the Nazi spirit and did not follow non-Jewish expatriates such as the writer Thomas Mann into exile. Is it possible that these differential behavioral reactions to Nazism can be viewed as *empirical evidence* that there existed a relationship between the physics and the politics of Einstein and Heisenberg?

The issue here is that the international *universalism* of the liberal democracies was profoundly influenced by the physical-cosmology of the towering figure of modern science, Isaac Newton. Modern physics and modern politics evolved, to some degree, in intellectual conversation with one another. A key intellectual consonance between modern physics and modern politics was the assumption that a strong subject/object separation is something that *should* be aspired to, and is even a defining condition of rational, modern progress. From this point of view, Newton and Einstein have more common assumptions with one another than either do with Heisenberg's uncertain principle. The theory of relativity did not refute the corpus of Newtonian physics so much as it placed it on a broader foundation. Between the two foundational breakthroughs in early twentieth century physics, relativity and quantum mechanics, the latter posed a deeper break with the basic assumptions of modern (Newtonian) science.

So when Einstein left Nazi-Germany for America, he fled to political system with universalistic human aspirations founded under the influence of the Newtonian view of the physical universe. From the foundational assumption of a Cartesian division between nature and humanity, Einstein's innovations still held more in common with Newton than with Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. It further appears that the Nazi assumption of an interrelation between mind and body found a certain consonance with Heisenberg's discoveries that may have corroborated his decision to remain under Hitler. Quantum mechanics, and especially Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, brings precisely this issue of the observer's influence on the observed into question. If Heisenberg's discoveries bring the "Cartesian partition" of mind and matter or subject and object into question, this also brings the old Enlightenment assumption of the "universalism" of Newtonian physics into question.

This, in turn, opens the question of the particular *sociobiological* origins of Newtonian physics. If there is an interrelationship between modern physics and modern political philosophy, can this help explain the Newton-Einstein convergence in contradistinction to Heisenberg and quantum mechanics? Can the impact of the Norman Conquest help explain this as an expression of a larger Anglo-Jewish convergence in contradistinction to a sociobiological divergence from the Germans?

Consider the following interpretation of the influence of Newtonian science on the modern, liberal, bourgeois revolution:

> What the middle class needed was a new set of ideas to provide the intellectual leverage for dislodging the lingering feudal landlords and breaking the hold of the older social controls of industry, now grown restrictive. For them

> "Newtonian science" furnished a "Nature" fully as effective as the earlier "will of God." It had, in fact, at last demonstrated what the will of God really was; and what it demonstrated was that the Divine Will had decreed a mechanism that worked automatically without further interference. No wonder that the social philosophies that endeavored to extend scientific methods to human affairs pointed to a similar autonomous order as the highest wisdom for conducting the life of man. Thus the Newtonian philosophy of nature was made into what a later jargon called "the ideology of the bourgeois revolution."[1164]

How could Newtonian physical determinism support modern, bourgeois ideas of freedom? By implicitly positing the superiority of physical determinism over biological determinism. If traditional, pre-Darwinian ideas of nature assumed, for example, that the caste subjection of Normans over Anglo-Saxons was "natural", this implied a form of biological determinism. By redefining "nature" in the supra-biological terms of physical cosmology, Newtonian physical science offered an *alternative determinism* that justified *freedom from* the biological determinism of caste. Newtonian physics could be interpreted as a means of freedom from Norman determinism of political order.

From an Anglo-Saxon point of view, the Norman Conquest could be interpreted as the victory of the physical "law" of might makes right overriding sociobiological or ethnocentric "law". The Conquest thus posed a precedent of politics based on *physical* principles. If this hereditary legacy could thus be looked at as "unnatural" in biological terms, then this reinforced the proclivity to look at government in Newtonian-like physical, non-biological terms, i.e. "the state" in contradistinction to society. By turning this political physicalism to their advantage, it was to the biological

advantage of Anglo-Saxons to stress the superiority of supra-biological, Newtonian-inspired politics.

From a post-Newtonian, Darwinian perspective, the more Newtonian assumption that physicalism transcends or overrides the distinctly biological stands out rather conspicuously. Physical law transcends biological "law". The obvious counterpoint that Darwin's theory is no less material or mechanistic than Newton's misses the point: the point of view of "the selfish gene". The distinctive logic of the selfish gene and its emphasis on genetic or *kinship* connections between individuals is overlooked by the Newtonian who observes only the laws of *physics* between individuals. When physical relationships overcome kinship relationships, this leads to the rule of economic laws over the hereditary "laws" of the selfish gene.

This is a core Anglo-Jewish convergence: the highest principles of secular Anglo-Jewish philosophy tend to be physical or material. In more practical terms, the most completely physical, supra-biological view translates into the supremacy of economic internationalism over politics and sociobiological boundaries. And this is precisely where the Germans ultimately diverged from the Anglo-Jews.

The key point here is that the most extreme practical implications of Newton lead in the opposite direction of Darwin. Or, if we momentarily entertain the naturalistic fallacy, one could say that biology and physics point towards opposite hierarchies. If the Newtonian perspective reigns supreme, human-biological provincialism tends to be dwarfed by a cosmological perspective that shift human focus to the planets, the stars, and the limits of our knowledge of the whole universe. In a physical-cosmological "hierarchy", the highest principles transcend the *entire domain of biology in general and human politics in particular*.

Biological priorities, and even the difference between live matter and dead matter, could be viewed as a matter of indifference.

For Darwin's theory, by contrast, the issue of survival and the distinction between live matter and dead matter is central, not provincial. *Self*-preserving biological systems, by definition, prioritize the subjectivity of the self and its genetically adaptive instincts hierarchically over unadulterated physical objectivity. The Nazi revolution over liberal democracy, for example, was an implicit assertion of the supremacy of racial-biology over the larger universalism of physical cosmology. In practical and political terms, the Nazi sociobiological Überorganismic whole took precedence over the larger physical-cosmos.

Newton was born in 1642, the very year that the English Civil War broke out. His early childhood experiences, then, were formed during a time when established political hierarchy had collapsed into a contest over hereditary authority. By tearing apart the pre-modern metaphysics of unity in natural political hierarchy, the breakdown in internal social order opened Englishmen up to the larger external order of the physical cosmos. For Englishmen, the larger physical cosmos began to penetrate towards precedence over the political-sociobiological whole. The pre-modern conception of the bounded whole, shattered from the inside out in the English Civil War, became overtaken by the boundless and infinite Newtonian universe.

The conflict between Norman and Saxon in the English Civil War was hopelessly complicated by exceptions to ethnic generalizations and the general entropy produced by interassimilation over the centuries after 1066. Germans have felt more justified in making probabilistic generalizations about others because their probabilistic

generalizations about themselves were not overwhelmed by the complications of English self-identity produced by the Norman Conquest. Whereas the English-speaking world came to emphasize the *possibilities* of the individual to overcome the *probabilities* of ethnic generalizations, the Germans largely emphasized the *probabilities* of ethnic generalizations over the *possibilities* of individualism.

American optimism and Judeo-Christian hope stress the improbable but possible. If racial generalizations entertain *probable* behavior for an individual belonging to a given racial group, the Anglo-Jewish emphasis on the *possibilities* of the individual act as an alternative to the domination of racial or group generalizations. The Lockean tabla rasa underlying liberal democracy, emphasizing the potential for changing human behavior through learning, added theoretical justification for individual possibility over biological probability.

There is a connection, then, between a probabilistic way of thinking and some forms of ethnic-racial or group generalizations. Probabilistic generalizations do not necessarily assume that *every* individual member or a racial group fits a given stereotype; only that membership in such a group increases the *probability* of adhering to a given group generalization.

Holism represents a form of generalization and racial generalizations among Germans reinforced a German self-generalization as racial body forming a natural political *Gestalt*. While Hitler could generalize about his own people with at least some basis of coherence, the Norman Conquest ultimately engendered ethnic entropy out of the problem of making strict generalizations about "Normans" and "Saxons" (especially among non-upper class Norman descendents). The analytic solution to this generalization

entropy was to view Englishmen as competing, Hobbesian individuals. The more synthetic solution to the problem of generalization was to take ethnic identity to a higher level of abstraction. English *self*-conception as race became fuzzy (in the sense of probabilistic "fuzzy logic") and this ambiguity engendered a more abstract resolution in the even fuzzier conception of "humanity".

The Überorganism organization that was still *probable* for Germans became, for the Anglo-Saxons, too improbable to be cogent. In its place emerged the *possibilities* of the individual. It was the death of belief in the Überorganism among the Anglo-Saxons that opened up the possibilities of individual freedom. Only if subordination and duty to the authority of a larger political whole was destroyed, could the right to all the physical possibilities of individualism be justified. While the modern death of the over-vivisected Überorganism in England opened the full range of physicalism uncovered by Newton, this modern, unmasked perception of the larger material world was overridden by Überorganism-rooted metaphysics within German *Kultur*.

Biological organisms, from the point of view of the "selfish gene", are self-reproduction machines, and subjective instincts and emotions are rooted in genetic programs that serve the ends of genetic reproduction. The attempt to be *objective* by overcoming bias or repressing *subjective* instincts and emotions that originated in genetic adaptation could amount to subverting the organism as a gene propagation machine. As biological organisms, subjective, instinctual, and unconscious impulses distort and warp perception of the physical world, and this warping of perception is epitomized by politics. Hitler's propagandistic warping of physical objectivity was only an extreme demonstration that the biological impulse to live is

subjective and not empirically verified by reference to larger, nonhuman, physical reality.

A most consistently physical view of the world is commonly characterized by a lack of overriding biological imperatives. Conversely, biological imperatives to survive and reproduce override a purely possibleistic physical view. The Nazi Überorganism necessarily conflicted with possibleistic individualism because the physical possibleism emphasized by liberalism emerged out of a step *towards* a consistent physicalism on the political level. While liberalism is manifestly inconsistent on the level of subjective individuals, consistent physicalism was primarily aimed at bringing *death* to the power of the state or the government, i.e. the Norman Conquest establishment. Nazism represented precisely the opposite revolution. The Conquest transformed the political from the culmination of the Anglo-Saxon national life to the enemy of Anglo-Saxon national life and this is what produced a conceivable identity of consistent physicalism and "rational" politics.

The brutal legacy of the Conquest led the Anglo-Saxons away from a naïve faith in the goodness of nature towards a Hobbesian view of the state of nature as cruel, violent, and alienating. The Germans, and ultimately the Nazis, by contrast, retained a more primal and pagan sense of goodness in the unity of the human and biological nature. Nazism was a culmination of German sense of the positive *unity* of the human and biological, while the Anglo-Saxon Puritans emphasized a more Jewish-ethical *separation* from biological nature.

This historical German divergence, then, can be measured relative to an Anglo-Jewish convergence. Whereas Hegel saw all spirituality as rooted in the existence of the state, the more Puritan or Jewish view inclines towards viewing the

state as the opposite of the soul. The Nazis radicalized Hegel's spiritualization of the state, its assumption of continuity between German individuals and the larger political community, and the organic belief in Germany history as the product of a long, continuous, embryological-like development. While this assumption of *continuity* is analogous to a Heisenberg-like subject/object interaction, the Newton-Einstein view emphasizes a subject/object break; a *discontinuity* between the subjective self and the larger objective world.

Nazi-pagan *continuity* with biological nature can be contrasted with a defining revolution of Jewish monotheism: the laws of Moses overrode biological "law". The memes of Moses, so to speak, worked as a technological corrective to some Jewish biological inclinations and imposed a basic *discontinuity* between "body" and "mind". The *probable* inclinations of genes lost their proximity to the *possibilities* of the memes of Moses that demoted the value of the genes.

The innovative emphasis on the discontinuity between devalued genes and valued memes is also what made the Jewish Biblical way transferable to divergent genetic bases. Christianity radicalized Judaism's mind/body discontinuity that originated in a conflict between Jewish genes and the Jewish memes of Moses. In Judaism, Mosaic Law is *external* to biology in the literal sense that religious laws are encoded in books like the Bible and not literally encoded in genes. This means that law is *above* a biological purpose in the same sense that God is conceived as *above* biological humans beings. Since Mosaic Law originated as a technological corrective to Jewish genes, and the law's divinity can be identified with its technological ability to overcome biology, God is technology.

Whereas the holism of the Nazi Überorganism was based on the mind's rootedness in biology, God originated in a moral conflict against the rule of biology that culminates in the alternative holism of the larger physical cosmos. The very idea of God is the idea of supra-biological relativism; a standard above biology that relativizes *biologically*-based human values and the common biases of anthropomorphism. In evolutionary terms, God is the projection of postbiological-technological evolution taken to its extreme (i.e. artificial intelligence). This how God represents laws *external* to biology that are in ultimate *discontinuity* with biology. The supra-biological laws of Moses are a step in this direction in very much the same way that the United States Constitution is a cyborgian step in direction from genes to memes; from incorporation to symbolization.

The Nazi Überorganism was "incorporated" in the sense that its highest "laws" were extensions or incorporations of subjective biological inclinations, i.e. mind rooted in organic continuity with the body as opposed to presumably superficial symbols or abstractions. Nazi political innovations are analogous to Heisenberg's scientific innovations in a common repudiation of the "Cartesian partition" of mind and body. Heisenberg's innovation included a new emphasis on how an observer affects what is being observed. While Heisenberg's contribution implies a kind of synthesis of the observer and the observed, the Newton-Einstein view assumes that the observer or self is unsynthesized with the observed (and can therefore be assumed to not affect the observed).

Translated into political terms, Heisenberg's decision to remain in Nazi Germany implied identification *with* the political wherein the political identifies racial-biology as its

highest ruling law. While the Nazi identification of politics and biology is a logical corollary of mind/body interaction, the Newton-Einstein mind/body or subject/object distinction is more compatible with the liberal severance of the political from biology or heredity. More specifically, the Newton-Einstein view tends to correlate with the view that physical laws exist *over* the political; over biological-human laws. When Einstein fled Nazi Germany for America, he fled to a regime profoundly influenced by an Enlightenment cosmology wherein Newtonian physics overrode the relatively provincial concerns of human-biological anthropomorphism.

The Anglo-Jewish valuation of individual possibility over groupist probability is directly related to an incapacity or disinclination for organizing into a sociobiological Überorganism. The Nazi Überorganism, based on kin selection, implied that biology overrides more general physical laws and that biology rules by interacting with the highest (political) laws of human behavior. American freedom is premised on the assumption that physical law stands *over* and *against* biological "law"; that the liberal emphasis on freedom for the physically *possible* take precedence over the more politically conservative assumptions of the biologically *probable*. The full possibilities of individualism can only be realized if the biologically probable is overcome and the possibleistic premise thus suggests overcoming a behavioral synthesis with biology or overcoming the limits of a mind determined by the body. The assumption here is that it is *possible* to separate mind from body or object from subject.

The Anglo-Saxon stress on the physical possibilities of individualism correlates with the assumption that there are no necessary connections between individuals in human

relationships, and especially no necessary connections between individuals and the government. Strictly speaking, the discontinuity between individuals counters probabilistic assumptions of relationship between individuals, i.e. it may be probable that individuals will tend to associate on the basis of kinship or race, but the individual premise holds out for the less probable exception. The moral aspect of Anglo-Jewish liberalism is a devaluation of the most obvious sociobiological probabilities and valuation of improbable biological possibilities. In evolutionary terms, this correlates with a devaluation of natural selection and a valuation of the marginal, the weak, the widow, the poor, etc.

While liberalism tends to value the abstract individual human being like a mathematical *constant*, Nazi-Germans and Prussian militarists assumed that the value of the abstract individual human being is *variable*. The Germans, for example, have held greater tolerance for political risks to individual life, i.e. a greater willingness to risk life in war. While the politically leftward program of human rights implies changing the value of human life from a variable to a constant (i.e. every individual as of infinite value), the political right rightward Nazi program valued the sacrifice of life in war. While the Anglo-Saxon tendency to regard the individual self as absolute is related to the political philosophy of individual rights, the more variable valuation of individual life among Germans is related to a collectivist holism wherein the self is dissolved into the Über-self of the larger community.

This more German dissolve of individual identity into a larger tribal or national identity produces a national "spirit". This very German conception of spirit or *Geist* is not completely amorphous or random because the *possibilities* of individual freedom are overcome by implicit assumptions of

knowledge of the *probabilities* of national character in determining the behavior of the members of the national community.

Consider an analogy in quantum mechanics. Visual representations have been made of the probable location of an electron in a hydrogen atom. It is *possible* that the electron could be anywhere, but it is *probable* that the electron is more likely to be at some locations than at others. There is a coherent analogy, then, been the probable location of an electron in a hydrogen atom and the probabilistic mental states associated with German notions of spirit or *Geist*.

It is possible, and even probable, that Heisenberg's discovery of the uncertainty principle was influenced by the spiritual character of German *Kultur*. Heisenberg's claim that "[t]he spirit of a time is probably a fact as objective as any fact in natural science" also suggests the interplay between the spirit of the larger community and individuals. In a Nazi context, it suggests an individual self dissolved into the "self" or "spirit" of the larger *völkisch* community. In political terms, the individual self probabilistically dissolved into the larger community can be contrasted with the individual self as an absolute or constant formalized in the liberal concept of human rights.

While the Newton-Einstein view stands relative to a physical standard above biology, it also appears to assume the "self" of the individual observer as a *constant*. Heisenberg's Weltanschauung, insofar as it was compatible with German nationalism or Nazism, posited the individual as a *variable*. Kin selective continuity with the political was the biological basis of this valuation of the individual as a variable.

It appears that the sociobiological basis of the Nazi-German "spirit" was kin selection. Kin selection works only

on the basis of mind/body interaction. While the Platonic-Christian-Cartesian "partition" separates the self from interaction with the world in a way that undergirds the "objectivity" characteristic of Newton and Einstein, Heisenberg's theoretical dismissal of this "partition" opened the door to consideration of a probabilistic basis for biology's influence on behavior; sociobiology. It appears that such compounded probabilities produced holistic spiritual constructs from German romanticism to German metaphysics to German belief in the *Volk*-state.

Whole Parts, Part Wholes, and Protein Synthesis

Analytic Philosophers and other Hypocritical Organisms

The men that Thomas Jefferson most admired were the great discoverers, not the great creators. His heroes had reduced the complexity of reality to simple principles, not unlike Jefferson's own reductionistic principle, "all men are created equal". Scientists and empiricist philosophers, not poets or prophets, mounted the Jeffersonian summit of human greatness.

In a letter to artist John Trumbull on February 15, 1789, Jefferson wrote:

> Bacon, Locke and Newton, whose pictures I will trouble you to have copied for me: and as I consider them as the three greatest men that have ever lived, without any exception, and as having laid the foundation of those superstructures which have been raised in the Physical & Moral sciences, I

> would wish to form them into a knot on the same canvas, that they may not be confounded at all with the herd of other great men.[1165]

For Nietzsche and many other German thinkers, it was men such as Bacon, Locke, and Newton that were responsible for the greatest herd philosophy of all: democracy. German resistance to democracy was connected to a fear that modern, mechanistic, hyper-analytic thinking in general was threatening to conquer and debase every facet of life into total materialism. The Nazis radicalized this general German attack on the mechanistic views that predominated in England: "We require that the mechanistic world picture be replaced by the organismic world picture."[1166]

Needless to say, there are outstanding exceptions to this cultural generalization of German organicism and English mechanistic-materialism. German Johannes Kepler believed, "the celestial machine is to be likened not to a divine organism but rather to clockwork."[1167] English poet William Blake declared, "Art is the Tree of Life...Science is the Tree of Death".[1168]

Along with Lord Byron, Blake was among the English poets closest to the German romantics. His *Marriage of Heaven and Hell* bears insights not unlike those central to Nietzsche's critique of Christianity. It was Nietzsche, however, who brought the problem of the conflict between objective and subjective views of life to the forefront. Where does the "progress" of the materialism and rationalism of Western civilization lead but nihilism? To the conclusion that life is meaningless and the choice of death is not fundamentally superior to the choice of life? "We have *art*", Nietzsche declared, "in order *not to perish from the truth*".[1169]

But was the truth *aimed* to kill? Was scientific reductionism in England also used as a weapon to reduce the Normans that had reduced the Anglo-Saxons? Was this part of the modern politics of modern physics?

In *The Theory of Colors*, Goethe tried to disprove Newton's analysis of white light as the sum of all colors, i.e. as when passed through a prism. While subsequently admired as a great poet, Goethe himself confessed:

> As for what I have done as a poet, I take no pride in whatsoever...[b]ut in my century I am the only person who knows the truth in the difficult science of colors—of that, I say, I am not a little proud, and here I have a consciousness of superiority to many.[1170]

Goethe's preference for the indivisible polar opposition of light and dark did not stand up to those who preferred Newton's scientific method. The poet's attempt to combine, in a single person, the objective and subjective views of nature was ultimately not successful. But what are the ultimate consequences for human culture if the objective methodology of the sciences completely dominate and define the "human"?

Goethe once said that analysis and synthesis should be alternated as naturally as breathing in and out. What the Germans apparently saw in the English tradition was a breathing disorder. The hypertropic development of material analysis represented by Newton seemed to correspond with the loss of a human perspective.

A man without parents, friends, or lovers, Newton set the standard, not only for modern physical science, but also for the modern, atomistic, isolated individual. The point here is not Newton's science isolated from his life, or Newton's life isolated from his science, but the sociobiological relationship

between Newton's socially isolated life and his defining contribution to modern science. It appears that Newton gained a superlatively modern, de-anthropomorphosized perspective on the larger physical cosmos by losing much connection to other humans.

The German belief in "more Goethe, less Newton" was related to the conviction that the dominance of the mechanistic, analytic empiricism of the English-speaking world was destructive to authentic *Kultur*. Whereas Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* had been largely mutilated or destroyed by the Norman Conquest, its survival in Germany was correlated with belief in a supra-individual sociobiological synthesis. Whereas the destruction of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* inclined towards an equality of the analytic and synthetic, German *Kultur* was dependent on an ultimate, net superiority of the synthetic over the analytic.

The crude generalization that science is analytic and synthesis is unscientific is itself unscientific. Analysis emphasizes separation, while synthesis emphasized combination. Combining two plus two, for example, *synthesizes* four. Newtonian physics *synthesized* discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler while discarding others.

Life, furthermore, is made possible by synthetic processes. The combination of sperm genes and egg genes into the novel DNA sequence of an embryo is a classic example of synthesis. The construction of a human child from the DNA code of an embryo is also an example of a process of synthesis. The survival of a human being is dependent on synthetic processes such as protein synthesis.

Analytic philosophy is not analytical enough. The very existence of a philosopher of the analytic school, or a scientist skeptical of the very term "synthesis", is dependent upon bodily processes such as protein synthesis. The most

extreme analytic philosophers and scientists are thus hypocritical organisms whose existence is conditioned upon synthetic processes that they deny in theory but perpetuate in practice. Life itself is almost distinguishable from non-life by the ability of its constituent synthetic process to out-compete the "analytic" processes that would normally break life down into death. If analytic philosophers were more consistent, they would be lead to bring down the hierarchies of their own mind.

The extension of synthetic processes from an individual organism to a social organism or Überorganism is not fundamentally different from the evolutionary extension of single celled life into multicellular life that began about a billion years ago. In consequence, the modern "individual" organism is *just as holistic* as the Überorganism since both are synthesized from parts that originated as wholes unto themselves. From this larger perspective, it becomes clear the modern idea of human rights assumes a form of holism on the level of the individual organism. Rights are resistant to *both* the Überorganism on a higher level, *and* the reductionistic free fall of a multicellular organism into the physics of death.

Human beings are material things. The idea that a human individual is distinct from and separate from matter at large is a holistic myth. Yet synthetic processes of life work in paradoxical relationship to analytic processes because natural selection effectually "analyzed" or "chose" certain synthetic processes over others. This implies that the most complex syntheses might incorporate an analytic blind spot related the preference of some synthetic organizations over others.

A living thing cannot incorporate *all* physical possibilities into itself if it is to remain alive. Life, on some level, is an

organization synthesis that contradicts, overcomes, or out-synthesizes the physical probabilities of its immediate environment that would otherwise lead to death.

Just as the life processes of an individual bacteria cell could not exist if its cell walls were opened to all the physical possibilities of its outside environment, German *Kultur* demonstrates a close, hermetic self-contextualization wherein thoughts contextualize one another and exert influence on one another like the way that amino acids contextualize one another in a protein. Just as protein synthesis requires a close, *probabilistic*, inter-contextualization of amino acids, German sociobiological synthesis into an Überorganism required a self-context that excluded certain extraneous *possibilities*. An unraveled protein is not equal to the sum of its parts from the perspective of the life that depends on it, and likewise, with the logic of a poet, Martin Heidegger *was* a last stand against the presumptions of modern reductionism.

The Norman Conquest introduced a brutal irony into the organic assumptional logic of the Überorganism. For an Überorganism, the political is the locus of social synthesis wherein the activities of the social organism as a whole is unified and coordinated. Conquest reversed the political from a locus of social synthesis and unity, to the locus of social rupture and social disunity. Instead of pulling everyone together, the Conquest began to tear voluntary political unity apart. The attitude of people towards government flipped from attraction to repulsion.

This attitude of repulsion towards the political may be a source of the modern assumption that the Überorganismic whole has been broken in favor of the larger physical cosmos. In Newton's universe, for example, sociobiological priorities do not *fundamentally* override physical cosmology

in the way that they apparently did for a voluntary Nazi such as Heisenberg. Contra the German-Nazis revolution, the very idea of modern Western revolution is like an immunological attack on the assumption of political-sociobiological synthesis.

The political is the classic locus of the *convergence* of the ties that bind a people (i.e. the Greek *polis* or city-state). The Conquest, by contrast, represented the *divergence* of kinship and political power. The binding force of the political became the representation of the *defeat* of Anglo-Saxon political identity, not the representation of its culmination.

The Normans skillfully, systematically, and perpetually organized the thwarting of Anglo-Saxon attempts to reverse the Conquest throughout medieval times. Anglo-Saxon democracy's resistance to synthesizing heredity and politics is a result of adaptation to conditions that the Normans enforced. The reversal of William the Conqueror's strategy of divide and conquer in modern times, partly through the strategy of the 'inorganic' division of powers, represents the death of Überorganismic synthesis.

Slime Mold and Übermensch

Is a human social Überorganism fundamentally more holistic than an individual human organism? Just as a human Überorganism can be broken down into individual organisms, an individual human can be broken down into individual cells. This does leave, however, a technical difference: the cells of a human individual are physically connected, while the human "cells" of a human social Überorganism are not, after birth, physically connected. Yet even this seemingly insuperable difference finds counterexamples in nature.

Amoebas of the genus *Dictyostelium* are normally individualistic slime mold scavengers. When they have scoured a patch of soil clean of food, however, they send alarm signals to one another that collectively guide them together into what becomes, in effect, a single organism. The individual amoebas are thus transformed into an Überorganism: a slow moving slug.

The slug may then undergo another transformation in which about a fifth of its cells differentiate into a stalk made sturdy with rigid cellulose. This process rips apart and kills the amoebas that make up the stalk. The remaining majority of the cells take advantage of this suicide by going to the top of stalk and differentiating themselves into a spherical mass, becoming dormant spores. After waiting for outside forces such as rain to carry them to a more fertile area, the cells can reemerge and start the life cycle over again.

This is an example of "individualistic self-interest" being overridden by collective self-organization. While one might draw an analog with liberal democracies during war, this variety of slime mold has a strong kin selective basis for its Überorganismic order, and thus analogies could be raised with Nazi socialism. Kin selection explains the correlation of greater kin discrimination and greater willingness for obedience unto death.

Take the case of the German-Nazis. What from one point of view is *Kadavergehorsam*, the corpse-like obedience of the German army, is from the point of the Überorganism the condition of its living existence. Some elements of a German's individuality must die, in the sense of being sacrificed for the social whole, for the individuality of the Überorganism to live.

It is from this basic point of view that Westerners conventionally make a distinction between "individualism"

and "holism". This categorical distinction, however, cannot survive a rigorous analysis. "Romantic" arguments for the life of the individual nation are no less tautological than Western arguments for "individual" self-preservation. An individual Überorganism is not fundamentally more holistic than an "individual" human organism that composes it because every human is composed of individual cells subordinated to the organism as a whole.

Henry David Thoreau or Abbie Hoffman, for example, would be incapable of being effective social dissidents if the neurons that composed their minds themselves dissented from the predictable, *Kadavergehorsam* (corpse-like obedience) that is a condition of having a viable, individual human mind. An individual human is itself a kind of Überorganism; a multicellular whole made possible by obedient neurons and other cells working together as a kind of team. It is from this perspective that the brain's mind has been compared to the social Überorganismic ant colony that emerges from the behavior of individual ants.[1171]

The mind of an individual person is made possible by relations *between* individual neurons, and is thus not fully reducible to the sheer sum of individual neurons. By the same token, the more holistic notion of Hegelian reason is not fully reducible to the sheer summation of individual reasoners that formally define the methodology of Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy. The Hegelian model implicitly requires an emphasis on the relationships *between* individuals, which the Nazis explicated as kinship or racial relations.

"Spirit" or "mind" in the Hegelian sense (*Geist*) is what emerges from the relationships *between* the neurons, not from the neurons in themselves. Similarly, the "spirit" of a nation can be defined by the relations between the people.

The "spirit of '76" is necessarily different from the Nazi-German "spirit". This comparison reveals that only a minority of intellectuals among the modern revolutionaries fully embraced formal political reductionism, while the American people themselves embraced a national spirit that appears degenerate only in comparison to the more robust state-spiritualism of Hegelian or German models. Nietzsche's Übermensch, moreover, while despising German nationalism *per se*, is nonetheless rooted, conceptually, in the spiritual ground of the German Überorganism.

Just as Anglo-Saxon freedom implicitly posits an individual whole greater than the sum of its multicellular parts, Troeltsch posited the German idea of liberty as the liberty of an Überorganism individual greater than the sum of its individual human parts. Here "the individuals do not compose the whole, they identify with it. Liberty is not equality but service by the individual at his place in the function allotted to him" (literally an organ position, *Organstellung*).[1172] This is highly reminiscent of Plato's *The Republic* wherein justice refers to a city in which every member is dedicated to doing his allotted craft well solely for the sake of the common good.

If, as Troeltsch claimed, "devotion of the individual to the whole" is "completed and *legitimized* [emphasis mine] by the independence and individuality of the free spiritual culture", then the loss of independence and individuality of that culture (*Kultur*) through conquest would *delegitimize* the notion of the devotion of the individual to the whole. If the Norman Conquest delegitimized the kin selective and cultural basis of an Anglo-Saxon Überorganism *Kultur*, it would also have delegitimized supra-individual or collectivist ideas of liberty, independence, and individuality.

Whereas the famous German inclination towards political obedience presumes the existence of a supra-individual basis of legitimate authority, Anglo-Saxon liberalism presumes that there exists nothing above "the individual"; that the political is not qualitatively superior to the subpolitical. For the Germans, the sociobiological whole was still intact and its preservation was a living issue into the modern era. Anglo-Saxons, by contrast, generally do not *believe* in a comparable, higher level of order because for them it is *dead*. This form of the Überorganism idea died among the Anglo-Saxons because the Normans crippled, abused, vivisected, and killed its kin selective-cultural basis.

This modern political nihilism did not, however, do away with holism; it only reorganized it. The tendency to believe in distinct races is one kind of holistic bias, just as seeing individuals as *wholes* unconnected to kin, race, social background, or other connections is another form of holistic bias. Just consider how much effort is required to repress or ignore a single individual's background history to treat that person exclusively as an individual. To do so is to recognize how much effort is devoted to sustaining this curious kind of holism; the holism of viewing individual persons as distinct wholes.

The individualism of the human organism is modern holism. Democracy is an attempt to replicate the political master's social division of labor in every individual so that every human organism is an individual whole unto him/herself. Anglo-Saxon democracy, at its most idealistic, attempted to establish an order qualitatively different from the Norman Yoke. Divided against themselves, wanting power, yet resisting power, some Anglo-Saxon found a new answer, a modern answer, to their dividedness: to be a whole individual. The Anglo-Saxon solution to their political

problem was and is to substitute the freedom and wholeness of individual person for the freedom and wholeness of the kin group which had breathed its last full breath in 1066.

Equality on the individual organism level implies death on an Überorganismic level. Yet equality for individuals has its compensation exactly in freedom *from* equality on the sub-individual level. In other words, Americans do not apply egalitarianism to the organization of their individual minds. I have yet to see the American project for freedom and equality applied by an individual to free the neurons of his or her brain from mindless obedience to his or her mind.

But if the logic of the revolution were to continue, however, why stop there? To overthrow the neurons themselves as individual organisms, they must be reduced to organelles, molecules, and ultimately atoms. An atom, moreover, was once thought to be a literal *Gestalt* or whole, elementary and indivisible, yet the number of subatomic "elementary" particles discovered will very likely only increase.

One definition of the German word *Gestalt* is the form of an individual person. Holism would be more coherently contrast *both* organism individualism *and* Überorganism individualism against an unadulterated materialism where all human things are viewed as physical material, with no special privilege whatsoever over rocks, hypodermic needles, sulfuric acid, or any other example of the physical world. By the standards of the physical sciences, the holistic construct of the bourgeois, individual "self" is a form of romanticism.

Unshielded by the Christian valuation of individual souls, science has yet to demonstrate insuperable barriers to the logic of scientific reductionism. It was Christianity that underwrote this "modern" alternative holism of the Anglo-

Saxon afterlife; the holism of a whole human soul conceived as greater than the sum of its biological parts; a holism of the soul incompatible with the classical political holism of Caesar or William the Conqueror. It was the influence of Christianity, valuing each individual as a whole, which provided a stopping point against scientific reductionism that science itself could not justify. The secularized influence of Christianity explains why political reductionism towards total individual rights over any social duties has not led to *total* anarchy.

The cognate unity of Anglo-Saxon and German is evident in that both liberal individualism and National Socialism are expressions of an instinct for unity. German contradictions on the national level are matched by the bourgeois contradictions explicated by Rousseau. The Nazi-German rejection of a natural common good between nations was matched by the Anglo-Saxon rejection of a natural common good between the government and common individuals.

The difference lay in the implicit Anglo-Saxon acceptance that they ultimately had no formal rights as an ethnic or kinship whole. Individualism implies that the Anglo-Saxon came to accept their defeat as an Über-individual entity. The German acceptance that they had "rights" on an Über-individual basis is precisely what demanded that German individuals sacrifice some individual rights to social duties.

From a purely individualistic perspective, one could look at the Norman Conquest and declare, 'the Anglo-Saxons were never conquered!' They were not conquered, from this perspective, because there was no "Anglo-Saxon" collective; "they" were "only individuals". Yet instead of proving that the Anglo-Saxons were never conquered, what this actually demonstrates is that the ethnocentric refusal to admit the impact of the Conquest opened and sustained the American

ability to view new immigrant groups, not as foreign invaders, but as new potential "individuals".

Once again, holism was not destroyed by modernity; only reorganized. Arguments for the superiority of egalitarianism among individuals is a kind of holistic argument because the West assumes that, *on the whole*, equal individualism is *collectively* superior to inegalitarian collectivism. This is where a form of holism necessarily survives in liberal democratic regimes.

Modernistic arguments for equality are not so consistently universal that liberal democracy is deemed *equal* to Stalinism or Nazism. Modern political reductionism to equal individuals was considered *superior* to the more socially or collectively based regimes it replaced. There would simply be no *rational* way to argue for regimes that aspire to some form of human equality without asserting that certain forms of egalitarianism are *collectively* or *holistically* superior to inegalitarian forms of government.

The political is by its very nature is unequal and nothing better illustrates this point than the application of human equality as a political principle. Political equality, by being political, is to rule over, master, and dominate certain kinds of inequalities. Against the possibility that the conquerors would take over, dominate, and define the identity of the political whole, the *collective* "individualism" of Anglo-Saxons expressed their distinctive ethnocentric individuality *as a whole*.

Tragedy versus Tyranny

The Levellers may have been the most democratic political movement in the world in the 1640s. During the English Civil War, one of their indignant pamphlets charged that William the Conqueror and his successors "made

Dukes, Earles, Barrons and Lords of their fellow Robbers, Rogues and Thieves". The Levellers' prescription was rather simple: "And therefore away with the pretended power of the Lords!"[1173]

The ambiguity of the word "Lords" is highly significant here. Were *all* Lords or even *all* rulers tainted, or just these particular descendants of the Norman conquerors represented by the House of Lords? If the source of their animosity was the particular, historic injustice inflicted by the Norman conquerors, then exactly how deep did their democratic radicalism truly run?

One leader of the anti-Royalist cause, Commissary-General Henry Ireton, claimed that he did not wish to "derive all our tyranny from the Norman Conquest".[1174] But how easily can one separate that particular tyranny from the tyranny of *any* form of hierarchical government? If all those centuries of subjugation left their cultural mark in the form of conquestphobia, then how could a new Anglo-Saxon hierarchy regenerate without new lords appearing as anything but new tyrants?

It does appear that, despite the moral rhetoric, popular support for the Puritan commonwealth was rooted in the attempt to regenerate a more holistic, more Überorganism-like, political community against the internal "class" divides left by the Conquest. But such unity does not normally come about without some form of patriarchal hierarchy. Under these circumstances, how could one clearly distinguish between the role of the old Norman faux-fathers and those who claimed to be retaking the throne of their Saxon forefathers?

Towards the end of his life, Benjamin Franklin conceded, "there is a natural inclination in mankind to Kingly Government."[1175] The Normans exploited and abused this

inclination, and the only way to overcome ambivalence between forefather and faux-father was to swing radically towards the egalitarian-democratic side. New vistas of modernity offered the prospect of clearing the air of all trappings of political patriarchy, inequality, and tyranny. No other basis for Anglo-Saxon unity could be trusted, and this natural ambivalence towards Kingly Government itself stimulated the modern, analytical reduction of political unity into political equality.

At first glance, German belief in the Überorganism-state appears to be distinctly more holistic and less analytical than the modern Anglo-Saxon approach. This superficial assessment itself, however, fails to thoroughly *analyze* the differences between them. The traditional German ability to make certain kinds of analytical distinctions provided the basis for the *kind* of holism, the Überorganismic form of holism, that Germans traditionally tend to believe in. The German approach is not fundamentally less analytical than the Anglo-Saxon approach because the latter is derived from a seeming *inability to make certain kinds of analytic distinctions* that the Germans do tend to make.

An example of the kind of political, analytic distinctions that Anglo-Saxons lost the ability to make is the distinction between subjugation and subordination. The mindless obedience with which the Anglo-Saxons submitted to the Conquest for so many centuries betrays an original similarity with the German proclivity for *subordination* to authority. The Germans, however, were never *subjugated* or conquered in a comparable manner (until the twentieth century). So while the Germans continued to conceive of their *subordination* as distinct from *subjugation*, the Anglo-Saxons moved towards a confounding of *all* subordination with subjugation.

The ultimate consequences can be observed through the lens of differential interpretations of Sophocles' *Antigone*. In this Greek tragedy, two forms of morality come into conflict. On one hand, King Creon decrees that Polynices, killed in a fight for the throne that Creon himself ascended to, should not be given a proper burial. On the other hand, Polynices' sister Antigone rejects her duty to the king, and plans to bury her brother.

For the Greeks, this was a tragedy because *both* claims to duty are right: Antigone had an authentic duty to the king, and she also had an authentic duty to her brother. The distinctly modern view, however, would assume that Antigone was right and Creon was wrong. Antigone's Greek *duty* to her king would be reinterpreted as her *right* or liberty to act upon her own will, while Creon would be viewed simply as a tyrant who attempted to violate her rights. *Sophocles' Antigone is not a tragedy for moderns* because two authentic goods do not come into irreconcilable collision. From the modern view, *Antigone* is a story of tyranny, not tragedy, because Creon would be considered wrong and Antigone right.

To grasp a radical alternative to modern morality, consider the ancient Greek Spartans. At the age of seven, a Spartan boy was permanently removed from his mother's home and thereafter raised in a collective educational system called the *Agoge*.[1176] By encouraging males to break ties with their family and strengthen ties to their warrior state, the Spartan regime helped preempt a conflict of interests between the family and the highest patriarchal authorities. Among the Spartans, Creon was right and Antigone was wrong, and the *Agoge* was designed to preclude the tragic possibility represented by Antigone.

Since Hegel was one of the few great German philosophers who accepted some of the basic political innovations that define modernity, it is of significance that he considered *Antigone* to be tragedy *par excellence*. He held a view of the state wherein political duty had, not unconditional right, but a rightful place. The acceptance of both, certain liberal rights, and certain political duties, assumes the ability to make the distinction between an outright tyrant and legitimate duty to political authorities. Anglo-Saxon thinkers, by contrast, tend to reject the distinction between a tyrant and a legitimate patriarchal father-king figure, subsuming *all* of these possibilities as antithecal to individual right.

While Germans tended see a legitimate conflict in *Antigone*, the Anglo-Saxons tend to side with one point of view: the individual who struggles for freedom against tyranny. By accepting the distinction between legitimate duties to a political patriarch and illegitimate duties to a political patriarch, the Germans were able to take the two basic points of view that made *Antigone* a tragedy to most Greeks (with the possible exception of the Spartans). This cultural difference supports the view of Heidegger and other Germans who claimed that German *Kultur* was closer to that of the ancient Greeks than the modern civilization of the West.

The key point here is that ambivalence towards the Norman Conquest establishment eroded the ability of the Anglo-Saxons make clear analytical distinction between kin hierarchy and non-kin hierarchy. It is not, strictly speaking, that Anglo-Saxons are wholly without the ability to make these distinctions (democracy itself originated out of the desire for the people to make this distinction for themselves). Rather, it is that Anglo-Saxons developed a

cultural tradition so obsessed with conquering the Conquest, that trust in duty to political authorities became permanently shaken.

Movements such as Fascism or National Socialism are *universally* condemned because the Anglo-Saxons universalized their adaptation to the struggle against the Norman Yoke and this precluded the capacity to make the distinction between forefathers and faux-fathers. The sense of discontinuity with the political so corrupted their sense of duty that they could not even fathom that there could be a legitimate distinction between a false national socialism and a kin-continuous national socialism. In short, the anti-governmentism of Anti-Normanism is an *overgeneralization* derived from the experience of the Norman Yoke.

Modern humanistic universalism is a flip side of this overgeneralization; the universalization of the view of the conquered over the view of the conquerors. The 'fuzziness' of the overgeneralization called "humanism" is actually a product of an inability to make certain kinds of distinctions. If the modern, "analytic", reductionism of the political into the subpolitical is actually based on an inability to make certain kinds of *analytical* distinctions, then the political cannot be considered fully or *universally* reducible to the subpolitical.

While this holistic overgeneralization called "humanism" is rooted, in part, in Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, it also entails analytic discriminations between distinct individuals under the political idea of individual human rights. It thus appears that Anglo-Saxons channeled analytic clarity into the political distinction between human individuals because they were unable to clearly distinguish political forefather from political faux-father. Conversely, the Germans (generally) tended to generalize (and overgeneralize) on the

holistic level of human groups because they assumed that Germans themselves formed a distinct (political) human group, and extreme generalism comes at the expense of distinguishing individual counterexamples within groups.

So while the traditional German Überorganism model is more synthetic and holistic from some points of view, it is also more analytic from some points of view. The Germans developed a greater capacity for *internal* sociobiological differentiation (rank among German groups), and this correlated with a greater capacity for *external* differentiations (rank among non-German groups). Since the Anglo-Saxon sociobiological body had its political head cut off in 1066, they lacked the "head's" discriminatory faculty for coherently developing a comparable *foundational* distinction between political-insiders and political-outsiders.

Anglo-Saxon failure to *subordinate* themselves to the political in 1066 led to *subjugation* by superior Norman *subordination* to William the Conqueror. The Nazi-Germans, like Harold's Anglo-Saxons, *subordinated* themselves to native political authorities that were ultimately *subjugated* by foreigners. Only after that world-historical defeat in 1945 were the Germans fit to accept the West's modern democratic identification of *subordination* and *subjugation*.

2 x 13 x 41 and All That

The Inequality of Political Reductionism

One of the great ironies of the Norman Conquest is that, in addition to being the prime catalyst of American equality, it also serves as a classic illustration of how political inequalities justified themselves in the first place. A heart of the old moral justification for aristocracy was the notion that

great privilege entails great responsibility or, to use another French-Norman linguistic import, *noblesse oblige*. In this world, unequal responsibility motivated and justified unequal rewards and privileges.

This provides a fertile perspective for evaluating the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy that failed in 1066. The Conquest illustrates what happens when the responsibilities and duties of a ruling elite are not fulfilled. There was a kind of natural aristocratic justice in the destruction of the privileges of the old English aristocracy. They failed in their responsibility to defend the nation against the Norman invaders. This example thus illustrates the original grounds of the acceptance of unequal privilege on the basis of unequal responsibility: one single failure at Hastings resulted in catastrophic losses of some of their best brethren and centuries upon centuries of political self-control lost.

With failed responsibility comes the revoking of privilege and, as with Germans following the fall of the Nazis, the social effect can leave all the old assumptions of aristocracy in disrepute. One could view Cromwell's reign as a last, half-unconscious attempt to restore the pre-Conquest world of Harold, and an inarticulate *Anglo-Saxon* mixture of democracy and aristocracy. Cromwell represented an attempt to redeem the failure of responsibility represented by 1066.

Traditional, post-Conquest, Anglo-Saxon respect for the king was related to the sense that he, unlike the aristocracy, had a sense for the body politic *as a whole*. The king might even act as a disinterested "sovereign umpire" of the realm.[1177] The killing of King Charles I, however, was a decisive step towards the killing of the belief in a larger political whole. The decisive failure of Cromwell's attempt at reconstitution bred both an acceptance of the closing of that

old world and openness to a new political alternative: the modern disintegration of the political whole into liberal, individual wholes.

Modern liberal, leftward progress in the English-speaking world is rooted in this sociobiological disintegration. The Conquest reduced the Anglo-Saxons from a political people to a subpolitical people. This is the medieval, evolutionary ancestor of a distinctly democratic modernism. This is how the Anglo-Saxon became equal to political equality.

One meaning of modern equality is the equality of "liberalism" and "conservatism" in contradistinction to the pre-modern belief in the *net* superiority of the political. Anglo-Saxon conservatism, for example, is anti-political in the sense of being anti-government. It originated in an attempt to reduce the Normans *as* the political, in Anglo-Saxon reaction to being reduced below the political. Anti-government conservatism is equal to liberalism in the sense that both rest on the democratic assumption that subpolitical body of the people do not rest on a plane that is fundamentally inferior to the political. Liberalism only takes the conservative Anglo-Saxon reduction to the subpolitical to the next stage of disintegration.

Another originary meaning of political equality is the net summation of conflicting attitudes towards government. A negative attitude of Anti-Norman hostility was balanced by a positive attitude towards the necessity of law and order. Post-conquest government was marginal from the view of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism and yet, audaciously, the very center of power, and these opposites of marginality and centrality were reconciled in the idea of political equality.

But perhaps the most distinctly "modern" meaning of political equality is the one identical with Enlightenment ideas of scientific analysis and reductionism. In this view,

political equality means that the political is fundamentally equal to subpolitical. The modern problem thus became how to make the political level equal or representative of the subpolitical level. The problem would be solved through the cyborgian mechanisms of constitutional, liberal democracy. Pre-modern political hierarchies would be reduced with modern political equality.

Modern politics is connected to modern science through the belief that the political can be scientifically analyzed and reduced to its component parts. Reduction is a kind of equality, i.e. the idea that the political whole can be reduced to its equal and independent parts. In this mathematical equation, is it assumed that politics is not greater than the sum of its parts, but equal to the sum of its parts, and *nothing is lost in the translation*.

Modern political equality does *not* mean the equality of the Überorganism model and the equal individuals' model. The modern assumption is that the Überorganism model is *inferior* to equal individualism because individuals do not naturally add up to something greater than the sum of their individual parts.

But is it true that equal individualism is always and universally superior to the Überorganism model? Or, was this valid for the particular case of the Anglo-Saxons because hereditary, kinship, or ethnic factors were subtracted from the political dimensions of the equation by the Norman Conquest? Is *this* why modern political reductionism, for the conquered, was judged to be "rational"?

One meaning of equality is, not only that individuals are equal, but that the state equals the democratic sum of those equal individuals. It was an idea attacked by Nazi leader Alfred Rosenberg in his claim, "The Volk is more than the total of its members."[1178] The Nazi-romantics believed there

was something genuinely lost in analytic reduction; that the whole is *not* simply equal to the sum of its parts. The German *Volk* had not been reduced to the Anglo-Saxon *folk*.

The larger reductionism/holism question here is whether life is more than the sum of its parts or equal to the sum of its parts. If a human being is put in a large culinary blender and chopped up into tiny parts, is the human being equal to the sum of those parts or was something lost in the reduction? There is a basic contradiction between the provincial liberal holism assumed on the level of the individual organism and *thoughtlessness* about levels below and above that level.

It is one thing to claim that Germans and Anglo-Saxons are equal as individuals. It is another thing to claim that these two peoples are equally individualistic. Germans and Anglo-Saxons were not equally individualized. If an Anglo-Saxon projects individualism onto the Germans, is this simply a projection of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism? Since Anglo-Saxons were reduced to individuals, they often assume that *everyone* has been (or should be) reduced to individuals; that *all* are individuals first and nationals second.

The Anglo-Saxon proclivity towards scientific reductionism in general is a corollary of the political reductionism that originated in the Norman Conquest. In this way, the American-modernistic belief that ethnic identity could be equal to the sum of its individual parts stems from an Anglo-Saxon prejudice. The Überorganism view does not "add up" for Anglo-Saxons because their perspective is that of an ethnicity that has been *reduced down*. They formalized this reduction as equal individuals, but are their descendants equal to grasping the origins of this curious kind of democratic-ethnocentrism?

A sociobiological-political unity was lost through the Norman Conquest and this is why the reductionistic method was reasonably accurate for Anglo-Saxons philosophers, but not for German philosophers. From a German view, modern Anglo-Saxon political reductionism appeared *unjust*. They had not been reduced to the level of conquered Anglo-Saxons, and hence, they came to see modern democratic political reductionism as degenerate; as something far beneath them.

While this analogy cannot be taken too far, the rise of Hitler is comparable to a scenario in which the Anglo-Saxon revolts against the Normans (1066-1071) had been successful. Hitler was in reality what Hereward had been in the Saxon imagination. The Weimar Republic self-destructed, in part, in protest against being reduced to the level of Anglo-Saxons.

Survive to Adapt

Does justice evolve? If "justice" is not eternal or universal, does it mutate, or adapt to survive? Are justices like individuals and cultures that propagate, vary, and evolve into new branches of species?

What happens when two irreconcilable kinds of justice confront one another? Is it only that one kind of justice proves to be stronger, thus displacing the loser? Perhaps justice can rule *only* on a foundation of injustice. Or perhaps, as Thrasymachus thought, the right of stronger *is* justice.

Plato's *Laws* distinguishes at least two basic kinds of justice. The first is a democratic kind of justice that assumes the equality of individuals. It is referred to as a "numerical" or "arithmetical" equality. The second is a more aristocratic kind of justice that takes account of additional variables such as virtue, breeding, and wealth. Within this "proportionate"

equality, "[e]qual treatment of unequals must beget inequity."

If the justice of the West's victory over Nazi Germany is not reduced to the physical, military ability to make right with might, how self-evident is the superiority of the liberal democratic form of justice? Can one argue that Nazi Germany represented superior form of *justice*? Is the modern ideal of blind justice blind?

American notions of justice could possibly be considered primitive relative to the Nazi accounting of more proportionate factors. More specifically, American justice may not be just towards the reality of biological factors. American justice, made in the image of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, conserves an original Anglo-Saxon conquest of Norman hereditary aristocracy. Universalizing this formal subtraction of biological factors from the distinctly political realm, however, does not do justice to *all* biological factors.

If Anglo-Saxon notions of justice are primitive from the standpoint of biological factors, it is directly related to the conquest their *original* hereditary aristocracy. It has its origin in Anglo-Saxon ethnocentric adaptation to reduction to the subpolitical. Anglo-Saxon liberalism conserves resistance to the Norman hereditary ruling caste.

The Normans attempted to mold or adapt the Anglo-Saxons to Norman needs as a hereditary overclass. Democracy attempted to reverse the Conquest paradigm: the rulers must adapt to the masses. There is a sense, then, that democracy is related to a rebellion against adaptation to the Conquest. These momentous shifts from one tyrannical extreme reversed to an opposite egalitarian extreme, however, was not the German historical experience.

All the anti-political rebellion in the world cannot refute — and actually affirms — the conclusion that the Normans

alienated the conquered from organic identification with the political. The Conquest was partially successful in that the Anglo-Saxon adapted to the loss of sociobiological unity with the political. It was precisely the success of this *partial* adaptation to reduction that opened a "modern" strategy of fighting *total* adaptation to the "class" legacy of the Conquest.

Put another way, mass individualism is the conservation and formalization of Anglo-Saxon sociobiological degeneration. The Normans effected part of their reduction to the subpolitical through conquest. The Anglo-Saxons became "modern" by finding a way to salvage advantage from this disadvantage by reinterpreting their reduction to individuals as democratic strength in numbers.

This is a characteristically modern form of adaptation. If Anglo-Saxons, as an individual nation, were dominated by Norman castles, then at least every individual Anglo-Saxon man could claim that his house was his castle. This kind of democratic adaptation is a reaction to the willful actions of conquerors.

When under the sway, Nietzsche wrote, of a certain

> democratic idiosyncrasy...one places instead "adaptation" in the foreground, that is to say, an activity of the second rank, a mere reactivity; indeed, life itself has been defined as a more and more efficient inner adaptation to external conditions [Herbert Spencer]. Thus the essence of life, its *will to power*, is ignored; one overlooks the essential priority of spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces...[1179]

The will to power of the Norman conquerors' *created* the dominant conditions that the conquered were forced to adapt to. The liberal democratic emphasis on adaptation to

external conditions conserves this paradigm of *reacting* to Norman political *action*.

As hereditary conquerors, the Norman usurped a maximal *genetically* adaptive strategy. Anglo-Saxon adaptation to a relatively inferior *genetic* adaptation strategy illustrates how the notion of adaptation in general can easily be confused with genetic adaptation in particular. The modern liberal democratic emphasis on *individual* adaptation to survive emerged from this inferior *genetic* adaptation strategy.

Anglo-Saxons were reduced to a caste or "class" instead of a whole "race" and this loss of political identity as a "race" helps explain why this race developed a non-racial identity. Acceptance of adaptation to ethnic defeat found modern compensation as equal individuals. Without this original reduction to a subpolitical caste, however, the compensation could not be considered equivalent.

Is reductionistic individual *equality* truly *equivalent* to ethnic group patriarchy? Does every individual of a nation having individual self-control equal a collective nation having control over itself? Was there something lost in the process of adaptation to subpolitical reduction?

The modern mechanistic view of democratic politics is fundamentally egalitarian in the sense of the belief that political forms can be reduced to *equivalent* subpolitical forms without losing something in the process. The reduction of the freedom of the Überorganismic model to the freedom of "the individual", however, was *not* a balanced equation. Something was lost and that something was biological factors as measured by relative success in gene propagation.

Little wonder, then, that "new synthesis" of sociobiology should be a controversial discipline in a society that has its

theoretical roots in an analytic separation of the social and the biological. Sociobiology helps clarify what is so often obscured by the ambiguity of the word "adaptation".

The word "adaptation" can easily lead to confusion here because adaptation in the sense of conforming to new environmental conditions does not necessarily translate into adaptation in the strict Darwinian sense of *genetic* adaptation. If the individual organism originally evolved as a *means* of propagating its "selfish genes", then it is perfectly possible that the modern liberal emphasis on valuing the individual human organism as an *end* could conflict with the primacy of the "self genes".

There is a potential conflict, then, between the selfish gene and the selfish individual. If the selfish genes are prioritized below the selfish individual; if genes are adapted to individual self-interest instead of the individual adapting to the selfish genes; if genes are conceived only as a means for the end of individual existence, then the aims of the selfish individual could amount to the total inversion of the aim of propagating the selfish genes. After all, if the aims of an individual are paramount, then when that individual dies, the fate of his or her genes could be considered a matter of total indifference. Individual lives are short and so, perhaps, are the genes of individuals who think this way.

Within the biologically based values of the Nazis, the race survives and the individual adapts. In the pre-Darwinian or non-Darwinian based liberal democracies, the individual survives and the race adapts. From viewpoint of the "selfish gene", however, the Western valuation of *individual* life could lead to *generational* death.

The Darwinian slogan of "adapting to survive" is a paradox because pure adaptation; a total *change* (as opposed to total self-maintenance or *survival*) of an organism in

response to an inhospitable environment, would lead to extinction. While the loaded biological usage of the word "adaptation" suggests that an organism or population becomes *better* suited to its environment (suggesting its relevance for *survival*), the failure to recognize that the notion of "adapting to survive" is a *paradox* has obscured the literal meaning of adaptation. The *total, literal* adaptation of a human to the conditions on the sun, for example, could be achieved through death. My point here is that "change" is often confounded with "adaptation" and this, in turn, leads to a mistaken equation of change in conformity with a given environment and genetic fitness.

Death is only relevant to "genetic adaptation" insofar as it relates to the capacity for self-reproduction (what is relevant is not that an individual died, but success in gene propagation while alive). The potentially misleading phrase "genetic adaptation" means that either because or despite an organism's adaptedness to external conditions, genes were or are successful in propagating themselves. Success in reproducing genes, in other words, is the ultimate measure of so-called "genetic adaptation".

The possibility of adaptation unto extinction through individualism does not contradict the Darwinian notion of adaptation for survival. On the contrary, it is only a confirmation of it. The question here is what survives, the individual or its genes? The genes, and *not* the individual organism, provide the measure of *survival* in biological evolution. This point is illustrated by the modern corporate executive who adapts to changing economic conditions better than any of his or her competitors, but fails to produce any children.

Kin selection offers a perfect illustration of this distinction between individual and genetic survival, for here an

individual can die in an altruistic act while that individual's genes are nonetheless propagated by the individual's kin. A gene, in other words, does not even have to reside in any given individual organism to be successful in reproduction; it could be propagated by another individual who shares that gene. Kin selection can be a means of gene propagation among groups that share a relatively high proportion of genes.

The Norman Conquest meant that a caste system was the form that best preserved the kinship or genetic basis of English order as a whole. A dilution of the English caste system could only be accomplished by diluting the importance of kinship, and thus breaking down the genetic basis of the so-called English "class" system. From this point of view, the rise of modern individualism was a formalization of sociobiological degeneration.

The liberal democratic revolution reversed the priorities of kinship and individualism, unleashing the abstract individual as the monkeywrench in the gene machine. The Anglo-Saxons were in a position to take a lead in this revolution because they had failed to preserve the most *genetically* adaptive way of life usurped by the Norman ruling caste. The modern, liberal Anglo-Saxon emphasis on *individual* adaptation, change, and freedom is related to failure of the survival of sociobiological organism forms that survived among the Germans.

Anglo-Saxons adapted to the reduced, subpolitical condition of conquest, but this kind of *adaptation* cannot be directly equated with *genetic* adaptation. Anglo-Saxons "adapting to survive" the Conquest meant adapting to a government that, by definition, did not fully represent or advance distinctly Anglo-Saxon interests. Over the long-term, this meant adapting to hereditary disinheritance.

While modern democratic elections corrected this condition in one sense, it also exposed adaptation to a condition in which the political realm was not assumed to be an Anglo-Saxon hereditary birthright.

The universalism of Anglo-Saxon political democracy is rooted in the seeming permanence of those centuries spent being conquered and, afterward, to a generalized cultural conquestphobia that fought the repetition of such an event. The lack of a higher common denominator on a political level served democratic "universalism" on a subpolitical level. Democratic and humanitarian tendencies are like an internal collapse towards a lowest common denominator stemming from a lack of overarching political unity.

German differentiation emphasized internal division within an overarching collective unity. Anglo-Saxon individualism is like a literal inverse of German sociobiological differentiation. In revolt against the Norman dominated political level, Anglo-Saxon order became unbounded by any unity with the political and this implicated a form of universal humanism. Rejection of the false divisions of Norman social classification implicated a political egalitarianism that negated *any* biologically-based classifications, i.e. race and sex.

The Norman way emphasizes top-down politics with cosmopolitan tendencies. The Anglo-Saxon way emphasizes bottom-up democracy with egalitarian tendencies. The way of the German *Volk* is *both* bottom-up *and* top-down but highly resistant to universalization on an international scale.

From a traditional German *völkisch* point of view, Anglo-Saxon democracy appeared reductionistic to point of being incapable of capturing the full meaning of democracy in a collectivistic sense. The difference between Anglo-Saxon political reductionism and German political holism is like

the difference between adding parts together and multiplying parts together. German political holism accounts for a *biological* dimension not accounted for by the modern, reductionistic emphasis on social and economic factors alone.

The politically reductionistic Anglo-Saxon conception of individual freedom does not equal the German conception of collective *völkisch* freedom. The sum total of the individuals of a nation does *not* equal a sociobiological life form, any more than the sum total of the individual cells of a human body equals an individual human being. In short, the distinction between life and non-life is dependent on how matter is organized and this means that organizations that promote life can potentially be reorganized to equal death. The proof of this is demonstrated in that the sum of individual self-preservations can potentially be re-organized to equal systematic genetic maladaptation on the basis of individual self-interest, i.e. unwillingness to sacrifice individual freedom for the sake of raising a child.

The genetic consequences of individual freedom are some of the greatest empirical verifications of the findings of human sociobiology. The failure to account for biological factors in the theoretical or practical understanding of liberal democracy has observable biological consequences nonetheless. The result is a kind of "natural justice". Employing one *kind* of justice that systematically ignores or excludes biological factors produces a "natural" justice from another *kind* of justice that does account for biological factors.

Theory of All

If the modern inclination towards scientific reductionism is the product of particular historical circumstances, and

holistic alternatives cannot be assumed to have refuted reductionism, then what *is* the alternative? There is no reason to view holism and reductionism as incompatible opposites; reductionism and holism can be viewed as two sides of same coin.[1180] Holism is deeply related to the ability to generalize, and the prospect of reducing a generalization to its component parts raises the question of the particularity of what was generalized. The problem of holism versus reductionism can be viewed as a facet of the larger assumption that there exists a fundamental, *empirically*-based distinction between generalizations and particulars.

To explain what I mean, consider scientist Edward O. Wilson's claim that "[b]iology is almost unimaginably more complex than physics, and the arts equivalently more complex than biology."[1181] This statement conveys Wilson's faith in reductionism, his *value* preference for the order to be found in nature over the disorder to be found in nature.[1182] It assumes the observed physical world can be reduced to simple physical laws and this marks a *qualitative* difference from the complex particularism of the history of biological evolution.

The assumption of a strict distinction between the general laws of physics and the particular, seemingly ungeneralizable, and unlawful behavior of other aspects of the physical world is *unempirical*. How can the distinction between those aspects of the physical world that appear lawful and those aspects of the physical world that appear unlawful be justified *empirically*? Can an experiment be done that locates the basis for the distinction between *general* laws and *particulars*?

I find, for example, no basis for a *foundational* distinction between "particularistic" astronomy and "general" theoretical physics. I can find no basis for a qualitative

distinction between possibly ungeneralizable and irreducible chaos of the exact particular configurations of matter in a galaxy and those facets of physical behavior that happen to be orderly, repetitive, and seemingly generalizable. If physics is an empirical science, then the laws of physics are *generalizations* (and most probably overgeneralizations) distilled from *particular* observations. There cannot be an absolute distinction between the general and particular in physics because, insofar as it is an empirical science, physics deduces all general laws from *particular* observations that could potentially be falsified by particular counterexamples.

This is not a positive claim that the relativity of the general and the particular is true; it is a negative claim that an empirical basis for a strict distinction between the general and the particular has yet to be identified, so far as I know. In other words, *any* (note the Gödelian self-contradiction) generalization can be looked at as a particular. The very idea of the *universal* can be looked at as a *particular* idea. The "universal", as in a "universal" law of physics, can be viewed as a *particular* law. Any "universal" law could potentially be contextualized or localized through the discovery of a more encompassing perspective.

But is the obverse true? Could a particular be looked up as a generalization?

Consider the "gray goo" scenario wherein microscopic machines or nanobots self-replicate beyond human control, building more of themselves from the environments they consume and quickly turn all matter on Earth and beyond into "gray goo". Imagine that among the countless nanobots, one mutant emerges that exceeds all of its competitors in its ability to survive and reproduce. Imagine that part of its success is a consequence of its severe efficiency and it

efficiently turns all the "gray goo" into a perfectly orderly crystal-like pattern.

This is example of a select *particular* self-replicating its way into a *generalization*. It is also an example of how the laws of physics themselves may have evolved. The "laws of physics" may have evolved from a computational process of self-replication comparable to this imagined emergence of order from "gray goo". For an observer with limited perspective, the crystal-like pattern could appear like "laws of physics", especially if the observer evolved from a mutation in the otherwise uniform self-replication process. "Gray goo" would then be like a primitive stage of evolved physical "law" that might have parallels in the first moments after the Big Bang.

If one takes the Darwinian principles of self-preservation and evolutionary success as maximal self-replication to their most radical extreme, one is led towards the most superlative possible self-replicator. Such a replicator would copy itself over and over, as fast as possible, with maximal efficiency. The principle of evolution through success in self-replication, when radicalized, leads towards the production of an infinite number of copies of a self-replicator.

The most basic "laws of physics" may be a product of such a process of radical evolution. The appearance of "law" would only be the product of radical evolutionary success in self-replication. This would explain why there appears to "law" from a Newtonian level of perspective while more recent attempts to divide subatomic particles into ever smaller elements leads to a relative chaos: the existence of any physical "laws" at all were simply a product a *particular* evolutionary success and thus would not necessarily translate into every "level" of physical observation.

If so, the physical "laws" of our "universe" are the descendants of the most successful self-reproductive mechanisms. This is why they seem like absolute laws: they dominate our provincial world. All observable matter from electrons to galaxies might be the product of mutations or variations of more basic or more primitive self-replication processes.

If so, two separate observations that appear to verify the existence of a common physical "law" would be more like verifying the accuracy of an industrial mass production process, since there would be no reason to think that two samples are absolutely identical in every possible respect (and one might attempt to seek out possible mutations). Most mutations of physical self-replication "laws" would not produce biology, but biology might have evolved from one of a multitude of mutations of physical "law". Note that my use of the word "law", here, encompasses regularities of variable success in self-replication and also, for example, variations of decreasing fidelity to an original order of local physical ecology.

If there is no absolute distinction between the general and the particular then there can be no absolute distinction between physics and biology. "Particulars" would thus be physical organizations with no special capacity for or actualization of self-replication while "generals" would be physical organizations that have demonstrated their capacity for self-replication by reproducing their way into "general laws". Also, the entire free will/determinism distinction falls apart because strict determinism rests on faith in generalizing "universal" general laws as *distinguished* from particular non-laws that are assumed to be the realm of freedom (and not simply a lack of self-replication).

The very idea that scientists have put an age on the universe, and have located a point at the Big Bang which current "universal" physical theory cannot account for, means that physics, like biology, is a historical science. An implication of the non-universal, historical evolution of physics may be that the very goal of a theory of everything, a theory that could *reduce* all physics to a single master equation would be invalidated since the "laws of physics" themselves evolved over time. At best, physicists could discover early kernel conditions where later "laws of physics" evolved as computational implications of earlier "laws of physics". But even here, mutations, in the form of slight "imperfections" in kernel algorithms, could have massive consequences.

If the "laws of physics" are actually the product of massive self-replication processes or computational processes, then there may not necessarily be more fundamental "laws" at a microscopic level. Breaking elementary particles down to more fundamental levels may expose more chaos than order. If the order exemplified by Newton's "laws" were only highly successful Darwinian self-replication processes to begin with, there may not necessarily be a comparable level of evolved order "above" or "below" that level.

Kurzweil's Law, the law of accelerating returns, is a potent piece of evidence for the link between the evolution of physics and the evolution of biology. Starting from the Big Bang about thirteen billion years ago, it generalizes the exponential pattern of Moore's law to an evolutionary pattern of increasing acceleration. As evolutionary development builds upon previous evolutionary development, from physics, to biology, to brains, to technology,[1183] a cumulative order emerges. It is on this basis

that Kurzweil predicts a "Technological Singularity" within the 21st century. (And perhaps a scientific verification of the God hypothesis.)

Philosophy, physics, and sociobiology have all aspired to a theory of *all*. Physicists have inclined towards the assumption that simple equations could account for the specifically human implicitly, and this could be accurately called a "theory of everything". But could such a theory live up to it name if it cannot account for itself, i.e. the humans who were motivated to produce such a theory?

A physicist's theory of everything that cannot account for itself is less than a theory of "everything" and, for this reason, a physicist's theory of everything leads to sociobiology to explain itself. If there is no fundamental basis for the distinction between general and particular laws in physics and biology, there is no fundamentally isolated, Platonic level of "universals". A physical theory that can explain its own physical existence would thus be led to sociobiology and an evolutionary account of its own origins.

Can a science of science explain why some discoveries are made by some and not others? Different kinds of thinking patterns may lead to different theoretical innovations. If the capacity for scientific objectivity evolved from adaptations to specific environments, different adaptations could develop different observational capacities. With this in mind, I find no reason to exclude the possibility that there might be a sociobiological basis for the theoretical conflict between the macroscopic view of relativity and the microscopic view of quantum mechanics that meet in the singularity of a black hole.

"In God's eyes", wrote American philosopher William James, "the difference of social position, of intellect, of culture, of cleanliness, of dress, which different men

exhibit…must be so small as to practically vanish."[1184] From a God-like cosmological perspective over the larger physical universe, the similarities between human beings, and not their differences, become most apparent. From a sufficient height or distance, each individual human being would appear like a single dot or a mathematical point.

It is not an accident that this is also one of the major perspectives underlying Enlightenment thought: a worldview of strict physical law in which human differences dissolve into insignificance. The monotheistic view, by giving the "mathematical point" of each abstract human individual an infinite value "in God's image", profoundly influenced modern physics and modern politics. "Reason" itself did not decide modern *values*; the monotheistic *valuation* of each individual, when "secularized", became the mathematical constant of liberalism in the form of the rights of man.

Only the basis of the equality that logically followed the premise of treating each human life like an absolute mathematical constant was there a foundation for the otherwise rootless relativism of liberalism. From an evolutionary perspective, one can see that modern liberalism or leftism originated in a macroscopic physical view *at the expense* of closer and more detailed inspections of how specific cultural histories evolved over time. Put another way, the original macroscopic physicalism that liberalism is based on effectively treats biological factors like constants, not variables. Just as in string theory, where extra physical dimensions are disclosed upon microscopic examination, the variables that disclose all the complex ways in which humans biologically differ from one another only show up on a relatively microscopic level of examination.

The secularizational link between modern physical law and modern political law is the idea that no man is above it. The assumption of the universality of God lent credence to the assumption of universal law; a single God of a single physical reality underwriting a single law which no human is superior to. At first glance, this perspective would seem to corroborate the conventional notion of God as "absolute" and the notion of an "absolute" God would appear to contrast most strikingly with the notion of evolution.

Conceiving humans as of absolute value in the image of God, or with inalienable right to life, translates, in Darwinian terms, into treating biology as a constant that does not change. *Biological* evolution by natural selection works on precisely the opposite premise: inequality in the form of genetic variation between individuals is what makes evolution possible when some variations die or reproduce less than others. However, if biology is treated as a constant or a factor that can be minimized or ignored *simultaneous* with a modern Newtonian emphasis on the larger physical reality and its economic-technological development, then biological evolution is minimized while economic-technological evolution is maximized. While the pagan values that the Nazi revived maximized biological evolution, Judeo-Christian values are effectively closing the door to biological evolution by valuing every life (in theory) and thus civilizing natural selection to a halt.

While there is some basis for the claim that Nazism was compelled by an attempt to do justice to biological factors, liberal democracy is grounded in an attempt to do justice to the non-biological factors that are increasingly eclipsing biology. At the root of the modern cosmopolis revolution is the Newtonian physical cosmology that dwarfs the provinciality of biology, effectually turning the ancient rule

of biology upside down. Modern physics is a basis for the capitalist economic-internationalism that is building the non-biological components of the sociobiological cyborg of liberal democracy into an artificial intelligence so powerful that it will likely overtake all biological intelligence.

A World-Historical Ass-Kicking

War is the father of all and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as humans; some he makes slaves, others free.[1185]

—Heraclitus of Ephesus

Storming Normandy

Hitler Reveals the Origins of Nazi Defeat

In a conversation on January 22, 1942, the Führer spoke confidently of plans for the post-war victory. A Nazi master race must be utterly devoid of pity, and many Germans, Hitler believed, lacked the requisite ruthlessness to rule the newly conquered lands. The solution, however, was obvious: recruit men from Lower Saxony. For that was "undoubtedly the home of the ability to rule," Hitler

explained, since "the English ruling class originates there."[1186]

Hitler must have been referring to men such as 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Field Marshal "Monty", the man who led the D-Day invasion of Europe until Allied forces had secured his ancestral homeland of Normandy; the land where the English ruling class originated. If Hitler failed, here, to reveal the historical origins of the ruling "class" of old England, then he at least succeeded in revealing the origins of Nazi defeat.

Hitler was duped, just as Marx was, by a peculiar confluence of motives. Both originary "class" traditions in Britain could find reason to cover over the Norman impact on England for incompatible reasons. On one hand, there was traditional Norman claims to continuity with the past necessary to maintain their claim to being the "natural" rulers of England. On the other hand, there was the modern public relations success of the Anglo-Saxon ethnic cleansing of the Norman legacy from acceptable political discourse. Modern Anglo-Saxon "democratic" ethnocentrism has thus promoted ignorance on the complex questions of British identity.

The same ignorance on the subject of 1066 that led Hitler to misunderstand the English-speaking world led men such as Pat Buchanan, the former conservative candidate for the United States Presidency, towards a superficial understanding of the roots of the conflict between Germany and the West. In *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, Buchanan argued that Winston Churchill was the "indispensable man" in both world wars,[1187] and especially in defeating the Nazis: "without Churchill's heroic refusal to accept any peace or armistice, Hitler would have won the war and the world."[1188] Buchanan then accused Churchill of

being the statesman most responsible for forging the death of Western civilization.[1189] His ultimate accusation: Churchill was *cavalier*; a reckless war leader whose single-minded determination to destroy Hitler[1190] unleashed the imperial collapse and race suicide of the Christian West.[1191] (Why does it take a Christian to draw attention to trends in biological evolution?)

Winston Churchill was probably named after his seventeenth century ancestor, also known as the "*Cavalier Colonel*". Though Winston's surname has been traced to the Norman-French *de Courcelle*, it is well known that his mother was American (an American, at least in part, of French Huguenot origin). Prime Minister Churchill's descent from the 1st Duke of Marlborough is also well known, and the extent to which this points to the old Norman aristocracy in a genealogical sense could only be established by a rigorous ancestral analysis. Regardless of genealogy, he can be considered a Norman-Cavalier in a *cultural* sense: Winston Churchill was the last Cavalier.

If Churchill had been only a clever politician, and not the winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1953, then the relation between his cultural sensibilities and his politics would be easier to dismiss. Churchill's Germanophobia, however, was both cultural and political: "I could never learn their beastly language, nor will I till the Emperor William comes over here with his army",[1192] he revealed in 1912. This verdict of cultural bestiality was hardly different from the original Norman verdict upon Anglo-Saxon language and cultural before it was transmogrified by Norman-French civilization.

How could England and France, despite their bloody historic rivalries, ultimately find that they had more in common with one another than with Germany in the first

half of the twentieth century? That Grey and Churchill tied "Britain's destiny to France"[1193] in two world wars against Germany cannot be reduced to short term, if major, strategic political and economic assessments alone. *Self*-interests are *identity*-interests, and "democracy" is too superficial to explain the complex post-Conquest cross-pollination that ultimate led England to a civilizational alliance with France against Germany.

Although it cannot be known how world history would have been different if William's army had been decimated at Hastings, it is at least reasonable to surmise that England would have remained culturally closer to Germany than to France. Hitler's belief that Germans and Englishmen "belong together racially and traditionally" was premised upon a world in which the Norman Conquest, either did not happen, or had no lasting influence on English tradition. If "Great Britain was Germany's natural ally" in racial theory, Hitler could only stand mystified that they were so stupid as to make themselves enemies in practice.[1194] Nazism saw race as the *cure* for class divisions, not the *source* of class divisions among Germanic peoples. Hitler's ignorance on the subject of the hereditary and cultural effects of the Norman Conquest thus led to a fatal miscalculation.

Hitler and his high command never wanted war with Britain, did not anticipate the strength of Britain's commitment to war against Germany,[1195] and saw the initiation war with Britain as their own failure.[1196] This does not mean that Hitler would ultimately have settled for a liberal tolerance of the West on the basis of some sort of equality; it means that he aimed to destroy the Soviet east before he could expect to "inherit" the British Empire[1197] by peaceful or unpeaceful means.

The storming of Normandy looked very different from different sides of the traditional British upper "class" divide. On one side, a man such as Monty could view his struggle as one of civilization over barbarism, and the liberation of Normandy as the liberation of the ancestral homeland of his civilization. From this view, Nazism was akin to radical Anglo-Saxonism, uncivilized and unconquered by French-Norman civilization. On the other side of the divide, the Nazis were akin to new conquering "continental" tyrants. From this view, Nazis was akin to radical Normanism and storming Normandy was like conquering the old conquerors. In other words, both originary "class" traditions in Britain could find anathema to the Nazis for incompatible reasons. These internal British divisions demonstrate how the Germans preserved a sense of national unity that was vivisected by the Norman Conquest.

By failing to understand the impact of 1066, Hitler both underestimated Britain and failed to understand how he turned Britain into an implacable enemy. He especially failed to fully grasp Anglo-Saxon sensitivity to the idea of their island suffering another conquest. But beyond that, Churchill had to defeat Hitler because, on multiple levels, Nazism unconsciously provoked the question of whether the ultimate civilizational influences and consequences of the Norman Conquest were a good thing. Churchill was the last great defender of the Conquest legacy: the defense of aristocratic civilization through war and conquest.

Churchill converged both sides of the old conqueror class divide. He appealed to an unspoken basis of the legitimacy of the Conquest establishment: it would never, ever allow England to be conquered again. Churchill also explicitly appealed to deep, native conquestphobia by raising the fear of becoming a "slave state".[1198] Hitler underestimated

England, in part, because he underestimated how he himself could generate a sense of common unity and purpose.

It was only in America's divide between the Norman-Cavalier ruled South and the Anglo-Saxon North that the Norman/Saxon conflict became extreme beyond all reconciliation. The Southern aristocrats would be slave Caesars or nothing. Slavery had to be expanded to question the very idea of racial equality. If they were brought down as an aristocratic race, then the Anglo-Saxons would go down with them through equality with blacks.

So when Buchanan called the two World Wars the "Great Civil War of the West", there is clearly an element of truth in this. World War II can be look at as a universalization of the Norman/Saxon conflict. This analogy breaks down, however, when one accounts how decisively the non-biological factors of French civilization altered the cultural evolution of the English-speaking world.

Hitler's race theories inclined toward the belief that Aryans conquer non-Aryans. The case in which Aryans conquer other Aryans, as in the case of Spartans conquering Greek Helots, failed to fully register in Hitler's Weltanschauung. In contradistinction to the Germans, ethnic conflict directed internally ultimately cancelled out ethnic hostility directed externally. From Hitler's "Aryan" point of view, the Norman/Saxon conflict could ultimately be viewed as an intra-Aryan conflict that universalized; an Aryan self-conquest that culminated as such.

Still Fighting the Normans

Revolting against the idea that Norman Conquest determined their very freedom, the Anglo-Saxons came to believe that they had always been a race of individuals. There was a time, however, before the Conquest, when

Anglo-Saxons displayed unmistakable values of racial unity. In 1052, for example, one of the most powerful native Englishman, Godwin, came into conflict with the half-Norman English king Edward the Confessor and his Norman favorites. According to the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*:

> it was hateful to almost all of them to fight against men of their own race, for there was little else that was worth anything apart from Englishmen on either side; and they also did not wish the country to be laid the more open to foreigners through their destroying each other.[1199]

The Norman Conquest laid England wide open to French foreigners, permanently compromised the Anglo-Saxon capacity for cultural resistance to foreign cultural infiltration, and thus laid the sociobiological basis for the American formula: defeat, retreat, repeat.

The capacity for resistance was reduced through adaptation to ethnic defeat. Adaptation to Norman rule implied, on some level, the *acceptance* of Norman rule; the acceptance that "the people" are *us* while "the government" is *them*. This accounts for the paradoxical Anglo-Saxon association of patriotism and freedom. *Individual* freedom obscures *social* adaptation to the Norman Yoke. Individualism is the rational realization of Anglo-Saxon adaptation to their defeat *as a race*. The *acceptance* of defeat as an ethnicity or race is what allows the *rejection* of defeat by "the government" as individuals.

The Anglo-Saxons never fully overcame this fundamentally defensive posture that crystallized under the conditions of conquest. Still, in the early twenty-first century, cultural Anglo-Saxons are still fighting the cultural Normans. They are still fighting because the Anglo-Saxons proved incapable of undoing their adaptation to conquest.

The Norman legacy poisoned a positive sense of political duty, leaving it synonymous with falsity, illegitimacy, and corruption. It became institutionalized in the old liberal, Anglo-American attitude towards government. They were crippled in precisely the political sense that would allow an Über-individual perspective. Like a crippled Ahab, the monomaniacal, poisonous revenge of the post-Puritans against the old white whale goads them on towards total self-destruction.

Since the government was "other", when Anglo-Saxons exercised their democratic means of emasculating government, they traditionally felt a sense of empowerment. Taken out of its original Norman Yoke context, however, this old reflex became genetically maladaptive and they ultimately emasculated themselves. In order to prove their negative, Anti-Norman ideas about the state, the Anglo-Saxons had to destroy themselves as a race.

For an Anglo-Saxon to conceive of becoming apart of the Norman hereditary elite, the very notion assumed a violation of the hereditary principle of their "racial purity", so to speak. Conversely, Norman "racial purity" was compromise by accepting them. In this way, democracy became correlated with Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism against "them"; the hereditary aristocracy.

The Anglo-Saxons became uniquely immune to white supremacism out of ethnocentric provincialism. To accept white supremacism or racial hierarchy was to accept their own racial or caste inferiority as a bourgeois race under the aristocratic Normans. To be "pro-white" was to accept these quintessentially Nordic Normans as the rightful oppressors of their own Anglo-Saxon race. White supremacy equaled Anglo-Saxon inferiority.

Only by betraying the "Aryan" race under the guise of democracy, could the Anglo-Saxons conceivably attempt to trump the Normans. The American Civil War posed exactly this challenge: accept the Southern caste system or accept equality with blacks. Anglo-Saxon universalism as humans thus emerged from Anglo-Saxon provincialism as "Aryans".

While Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy appears as race traitordom from a Nazi point, one would completely misunderstand the situation without grasping Norman cultural "treachery". While the Anglo-Saxons betrayed the Norman defense of racial hierarchy, the Normans had betrayed Germanic *Kultur* in favor of French civilization. From a Nazi point of view, then, Normans and Saxons ultimately betrayed one another's deepest Germanic roots and forged Western rootlessness through mutual Germanic self-destruction in their mutual lost causes.

To put it as politely as possible, the native English got their Anglo-Saxon asses kicked on October 14, 1066 and the consequences have utterly dominated all subsequent Anglo-Saxon history. The Normans were eminently successful in crippling ethnic Anglo-Saxon self-esteem, and teaching them not to *value* themselves as an autonomous ethnicity. It was this legacy of racial self-contempt that wrought the Norman-based British Empire's association with ascendancy and conquests of the white race, and the Anglo-Saxon-based American Empire's association with its decline. From a Nazi perspective, it would appear that Anglo-Saxon victory equaled Aryan defeat. The legacy of the defeat of the Anglo-Saxon in 1066 culminated in the defeat of the entire Nazi cause in 1945.

English school children traditionally learn that William's claim to a "right of conquest" was good and wholesome while the Nazis, with hereditary claims of a different kind,

are hypocritically denied their own right of conquest. If the Nazis won, it is likely that those children would have learned that Churchill, taking Harold's place, was simply in the wrong. If the Nazis conquered England, perhaps it would have been like a repetition of the Conquest and a strengthening of the class system, albeit by a different "class". Over the long-term, however, it is at possible that the Nazi way of collective political unity might have overcome the old "class" divisions of England. By overcoming the French-Latin cultural impositions of the Normans, the Nazis might have enlightened a path back to England's primal roots and induced a Germanic rebirth of England.

Prospects of a Germanic rebirth are questionable because it is impossible to neatly undo a unique historical memory compounded and evolved over centuries. The culture of the English-speaking world was born out of the clash of French-Latin influence of the Normans and the native Germanic Anglo-Saxons. Those who truly want to reconcile French and German languages and culture in Europe should know that their future is English.

The Germans against the Humans

At the apex of Anglo-Saxon identity ambiguity may be Cromwell's Puritan dictatorship. On one hand, Cromwell can be looked at as a quasi-Hitlerian dictator who combined popular appeal with xenophobic policies, especially against Norman-based hereditary rulers and the Irish. On the other hand, the more formal ethical content of Puritanism possesses deep convergences with Judaism, especially in regard to values that promote capitalism.

The defeat of the Puritan Revolution in 1660 sealed the manifest destiny of the Anglo-Saxons of England away from

their Germanic roots, and towards the more Jewish facets of Puritanism. The extreme contradictions of this Cromwellian historical pivot ultimately collapsed towards a pragmatic middle road between German and Jew that gradually modernized towards the latter. Over the long-term, the historical foundation of the Anglo-Jewish convergence was laid in the strength of the tribal associations of "us" as conquered, and "them" as conquerors.

Hitler's ignorance about the impact of the Conquest meant that he was left to the trusty refrain of Jewish conspiratorial influence in order to explain the English-speaking world's lack of Nazi priorities. Since the divergence of 1066 was both hereditary and cultural, any purely biological explanation inevitably overlooked the influence of Norman-French civilization in reformulating the highest ultimate values of the English-speaking world. Jews, moreover, can hardly be held responsible for all the influence of (non-biological) economic-technological modernization and its tendency to break down kinship-based bonds. Jews are not solely responsible for economic-technological modernization anymore than Jews are responsible for Freemasonry, a movement that originated among gentiles in Britain and spread with the British Empire.

The Germans claimed a kind of superiority over the Anglo-Saxons in belief that they, as a nation, were not mastered by the economic dimension alone. Being more than the sum of individual economic interests, they possessed the ability to organize on a supra-economic basis. They demonstrated greater *biological* foresight[1200] relative to shortsighted individualism. Only the Germans proved capable of mustering a serious socialist alternative to the Marxist socialism of the left.

The Germans saw others as distinct races because they themselves possessed a clearer and more unmixed cultural-genealogy. Because they were more in touch with their own Germanic roots, they were more sensitive to the identity of foreign cultural-civilizational implants. The Germans may have been the only west Europeans capable of recovering from the decisive ethical-spiritual influence of Christianity. The Germans lost the war and thus Nietzsche's prophecy in *The Antichrist* ultimately came true: "If we do not get rid of Christianity, it will be the fault of the *Germans*."[1201]

Field Marshal Montgomery believed that the Conquest was a "great boon" to England, especially as an imperial power.[1202] Was Monty right? Should the Anglo-Saxons celebrate their own subjugation, as so many did nine hundred years later in 1966? If the Anglo-Saxons would have remained more ethnocentric and less humble, peaceable, liberal, and humane without the Conquest, then was it ultimately a positive? Should all humankind celebrate the subjugation of the Anglo-Saxons? Such an argument could be compared to the assertion that it was good that the Jews were conquered by Babylon, Rome, and every other historic oppressor because it helped Jews live up to their moral self-image.

While it would have been impossible to predict this in the year 1066, it could be argued that the long-term influence of the Norman Conquest was one of the best things that ever happened to the cause of "civilization". Its very contradictions ultimately advanced the cause of "humanity" in general, and the Jews in particular. The Normans introduced a Jewish community into England which survived until their expulsion in 1290 (and only reemerged in the mid-seventeenth century). This, in itself, only demonstrates how the Normans opened up England to the

larger civilization of the West. While Jews had no influence on the event itself and could hardly appreciate the long-term political evolution that the Conquest would ultimately spawn, the fate of the Jewish people has nonetheless become decisively interwoven with the fate of the English-speaking world because of 1066.

In *Why the Allies Won*, historian Richard Overy concluded:

> Though from today's perspective Allied victory might seem somehow inevitable, the conflict was poised on a knife-edge in the middle years of the war. This period must surely rank as the most significant turning point in the history of the modern age.[1203]

1945 was the Germans' 1066: the decisive defeat that permanently decided a historical turn towards the West. Churchill turned the tide of history against Hitler, and thus against the primordial being that preceded the conquest of Latinate civilization. The West's tyranny over Greece's tyranny over Germany succeeded where the original Romans failed.

Once they were decisively defeated as a race, *then* the Germans had authentic ground to become authentic *modern* Westerners. *This* was the missing ingredient. Only after this decisive defeat were the Germans fit and ready for Western rituals of contempt for Western authority and equal membership in the league of vanquished nations.

In retrospect, it is inescapable that the Normans annihilated the Anglo-Saxons as a distinct *Volk*. The best analogy of the destruction of the Anglo-Saxons as a distinct ethnic nation after 1066 was the inner destruction of the German nation after 1945. The Norman Conquest is how the Anglo-Saxons became a race of individuals. This is why it was the Anglo-Saxons who formed the communitarily rotten

root of American individualism. The Germans, in turn, were destroyed by the kinship-family-nation destroying individualism of the Anglo-Saxons. Ultimately, Norman "class" supremacy led to the destruction of both Anglo-Saxon *and* German kinship-family-nation unity. In this way, the Norman Conquest led to both the greatest ascent of the West and "the decline of the West".

Hastings could be considered the most influential battle in world history after ancient times. At the very least, it was vastly more influential than Britain's decisive defeat at Yorktown in 1781, for it was the historical *reaction* to Hastings that determined the revolutionary significance of the American victory. The English Civil War, the American Revolution, and the American Civil War can all be looked at as the working out of the unfinished business of Hastings. Hastings was the most influential battle because the most influential modern liberal democracy was actually the product, not of Anglo-Saxons or Normans, but of the struggle *between* Anglo-Saxons and Normans that began in 1066.

The Germans failed to realize that they, too, were to become mortally entangled in the maelstrom that spewed from eye of Normandy's storm. William the Conqueror was thus one of the most influential individuals in world-history and, ultimately, more influential than Adolf Hitler. In the end, William conquered Hitler.

Democratization: The Anglo-Saxon Conquest

Might Makes Rights

Liberalism or death. This was the choice offered to the Axis powers in the Allied demand for unconditional surrender.

If the Germans are to be accused of inherently "fascist" tendencies, or of accepting the principle that might makes right, what could better verify this thesis than the acceptance of conquest by the Allies. To conclude that the Nazis were wrong only because they were defeated militarily makes sense only if one accepts the Nazi-fascist principle that might makes right. Isn't this the fascist way of moral equality?

The greatest verification of the fascist worldview is that democracies were *willing* to defeat Nazis and fascists, not through the supposedly democratic means and methods of persuasion, but through the fascist way of superior military, physical force. Doesn't pragmatism, when stripped of its conventions, mean the ends justify the means? This was principle with which the West won its victory over the Nazis: pragmatic fascism. Fascist practice was destroyed by the fascist principle of superior physical force. The victory of liberalism in practice was the defeat of liberalism in principle.

Fascism was confirmed in principle by its defeat in practice. For fascism's ideological opponents to demonstrate the superiority of superior military force over "reason" or non-violent persuasion almost makes a greater case for the fascist view than if the fascist regimes themselves achieved victory this way. The defeat of fascism in practice was the

victory of fascism in principle. The philosophy of pragmatism ensures that, in extenuating circumstances, one can violate every normative liberal principle because the deepest liberal principle is self-preservation.

Pacifism would be the consequence of valuing liberal *social* principle over the hypocrisy of pragmatic fascism. Conversely, it is moral *hypocrisy* for the pragmatic fascists of the West to *not* use force to keep their own population down or for men to *not* use force to keep women down. There is a *moral double standard* in the legitimization of the use of force for others, while neglecting its use against one's own population. Just as the West presumably advocates the same standard of human *rights* for all people, consistency would demand a common standard of human *wrongs*.

If "civilization" was defeated in principle, perhaps this means that the first principles of fascists are more in line with first principles of nature. Perhaps the right of conquest is a kind of natural right.

At the very heart of the Norman way was this paradox of conquest/civilization. The superlative Norman identification with civilization was inextricably balanced and bound with a superlative identification with conquest. This was a root of the paradox that defeated Nazi Germany.

This is a secret of the success of the anti-imperial imperialism of English-speaking world: the political inheritance of Norman aristocracy. Imperialism was the source of much of the West's pretensions to universalism. The triumph of Lincoln the Conqueror and the Anglo-Saxon democratic revolution was not a total revolt against the Norman inheritance, but the implementation of a peculiar form of political equality: an Anglo-Saxon conquest of the Norman Conquest.

The superficial name-calling game between the "barbarian" and the "civilized" traces its modern genealogy to the barbarism/civilization paradox imposed by the Norman Conquest. The Norman Conquest was the Ur-hypocrisy in principle that catalyzed so much of the West's political success in practice. From this came the common destructions of the harrying of the North and the bombing of Dresden: "barbarism" in the name of civilization.

Neither Completeness nor Consistency

Politician and priest Friedrich Naumann may have promoted the German liberal view more effectively than anyone in the period before 1914.[1204] Yet this "liberal", founder of the National Social Party in 1896, was proud to contrast German honesty about colonial brutality with the British liberal hypocrisy that attempted to dress imperialism in a humanist garb.[1205] While Naumann presented the contradiction of domestic liberalism and imperialistic illiberalism, the British tended to draw the borders between "us" and "them" less sharply. Their style of contradiction stemmed from the more humanist admission that the colonized are "us", or "human", too. How can one explain these persistent differences between English and German attitudes?

The Conquest made England a colony of Normandy. As the conquerors engulfed all of Britain, the ensuing empire retained a lingering ambiguity between the colonized and colonizer; between the conquerors and the conquered. Since the practical unity of empire required some concessions of freedom for the conquered and colonized *within* Britain, "hypocrisy" of this variety became virtually an imperial British characteristic. This ambiguity would eventually be exploited by men such as Gandhi.

To behave in accordance with liberal principles without political hypocrisy would be to reject imperialism. The Anglo-Saxons, in rejecting unity with the Conquest order, were led towards the logic of egalitarian *consistency*. The Germans, in accepting self-unity with the political, were led towards the logic of *completeness* or the total autonomy of the political whole.

Anglo-Saxon liberalism assumes political *incompleteness* in the specific sense that the political level is assumed to be outside and objective rather than internal and subjective. German cultural totalitarianism assumes political *completeness* in the specific sense that the political is assumed be integrated with, and in some sense, a culmination of one's identity as a whole. While the former is represented by Locke's idea of a contract with government, the latter is represented by Fichte's ideal, absolute ego.

The Anglo-Saxons were politically *incomplete* without an account of the Norman-based order after 1066. This political incompleteness is the root of Anglo-Saxon political anti-totalitarianism. They could ultimately achieve wholeness only by excluding a sociobiological interpretation in favor of a reinterpretation as "individuals". Individualism led to a logic of egalitarian *consistency*. False assumptions of the sociobiological completeness or wholeness of the Conquest order were thus countered with the modern premise of the individual.

While the Englishman Thomas Hobbes formally launched the modern political logic of the mass individualism, German Carl Schmitt's reconstituted the logic of political completeness. While Anglo-Saxon alienation from the political promoted an objective attitude towards politics, German holism-totalitarianism was made possible by a *self*-incorporated Weltanschauung that opposed a strict

separation between subject and object. Newtonian physicalism is correlated with a radicalization of this Anglo-Saxon combination of a relatively consistent physical objectivity and a lack of self-incorporation. On a practical level, greater physical consistency among Anglo-Saxons is correlated with the view of their polity as an economic-machine, while the German Überorganismic view entailed more overt contradictions between subjective and objective views of reality.

While the *unity* of German identity with political holism seemed to entail an acceptance of large scale paradoxes or self-contradictions, the *equality* of individuals can be consider superior in consistency of (liberal) principle only through neglect of scales above and below it. Liberal individualism, in other words, is not ultimately more consistent that the Überorganism view of politics. Bourgeois inconsistencies are glossed over under the banner of "freedom"; one is free to end analysis with the individual self. *Government* is an object for analysis; the individual has rights.

On closer examination, however, liberal individualism is inconsistent on the level of multicellular holism (individual cells), just as the social Überorganism is inconsistent on the level of individual human beings. The breakdown of holism in favor of egalitarian consistency leads to the break down of the holism of the individual human being towards consistency with the larger physical world. Consistent physicalism would mean literal consistency with physics without any exceptions for human subjectivities, i.e. the subjectivities requisite for eating.

In the West, egalitarian consistency takes precedence at the expense of completeness. German social Überorganismic completeness takes precedence at the expense of egalitarian

consistency. Their incompatibility is not accidental: the Anglo-Saxons evolved a strong preference for democratic or egalitarian consistency precisely because this principle could be used as an enlightened weapon to destroy the Überorganismic model that had become corrupted by the Norman Conquest.

The practical expression of the liberal principle of consistency between individuals is that one should not harm others or deny their freedom so that others will not do the same to you. The Norman Conquest shattered anything resembling this liberal principle of political equity precisely because William the Conqueror and his followers were willing to *risk their lives* and fortunes in an un-Hobbesian bid to do unto others what they would not want done to themselves. This is how the Norman Conquest introduced a foundational inconsistency or double standard between the conquerors and the conquered that modern egalitarianism attempted to undo.

Lebensraum Within

"We protest against the whole Norman power", proclaimed a Levellers' *Declaration* of 1649. "All the people of this Nation are yet slaves, …being under the laws and government of William".[1206] Instead of a Troeltsch's "sentiment of honor in participating in the whole", Levellers' and many other anti-Royalist agonists in the English Civil War conceived of the entire government as a *whole* separate from the people. The "laws and government of William" were perceived to be a whole unto itself.

These protesters were not necessarily dissidents as individuals, but collectively they represented a dissident nation. Individualism, in this case, was only the realization of collective liberty. Was this Troeltsch's conception of

collective liberty surviving through adaptation to the Norman Yoke?

"[T]he whole Norman power" meant that the government was Normanity while the *folk* was humanity. The nation was "us" and the government was "them": *they* exploit us, *they* demand duties from us, *they* are not *of* us. This tribalistic "us" and "them" attitude towards government betrays a form of holistic thinking in itself; a holistic sense of the "other" in the *whole* Norman power. This anti-political *reductionism* is thus dependent on an underlying *holism*.

The German sense of continuity with the political identified the whole of a territorial state with "us", and other political bodies as "them". This led to the notion of *Lebensraum* and the legitimation of aggressive expansion into new territories. The Anglo-Saxon sense of discontinuity with political identified the conquered nation with "us", or humanity, and the government with "them", or Normanity. This is an origin of the liberal-universalistic belief that there are two kinds of people in the world: the universalists who do *not* divide the world into "us" and "them" (us), and those who do (them).

There is something, not only tribalistic, but also profoundly territorial, about the Anglo-Saxon struggle for political freedom. Instead of conquering territory in the horizontal dimension of homes in adjacent lands, territory was conquered in the vertical dimension, like the highest floors of the same home. Instead of a Nazi-German demand for external *Lebensraum*, the Anglo-Saxons demanded nearly endless internal *Lebensraum*.

To conquer the Conquest there had to be an internal colonization of the political; the conquest of the political in the name of freedom for internal *Lebensraum*. Landmarks of freedom of speech were like Anglo-Saxon flags stabbed into

what was once the conqueror's propagandist jurisdiction. It was the Saxon Siegfried slaying the political tentacles of the Norman dragon. A hunter's pride in subduing the lion-hearted was revealed as victories of freedom were celebrated and memorialized like stuffed heads of lions on the walls and carpets.

The flip side of universalizing Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism (democracy) is the universalization of reversing the Norman Conquest; overthrowing all non-democracies. The Anglo-Saxon way of empire is conquering the conquerors *universally*. It is the right of conquest of the conquest of rights: human rights imperialism. If the Norman way was top-down then the Anglo-Saxon way would be bottom-up (even if it would have to be imposed top-down). The frustrated ethnocentrism of a few once conquered West European peoples could, in a world-historical overcompensation, conquer all *Homo Sapiens* into "humanity".

The Anglo-Saxon conquest of democratization could expand this internal *Lebensraum* across the entire world. The Anglo-Saxon-style conquest of internal living space meant that the German way of conquest of external living space had to be conquered. In other words, if the Anglo-Saxons could not be the master race that the Normans represented, then *no one* should.

If Locke were right about the *tabla rasa*, it would imply the possibility of a new kind of empire. If the Normans represented a form of hereditary domination, the new nurturism implied the possibility of a form of cultural domination. The demand to cleanse hereditary government could be universalized to new territories across the world. If the Anglo-Saxons were destined for death as a hereditary

body, then everyone else had to be brought down to their kin selective graves as well.

Prisoners who petitioned for liberation at the end of the English Civil War in 1651 believed, "the law was the badge of the Norman bondage".[1207] Compare this with the Hegelian notion that the state makes possible the actualization of freedom. In Hegel's identification of the state and a collective form of rational freedom, one can see the kernel of the more romantic Nazi notions of collective freedom. In the belief of those Anglo-Saxons who held that "the law was the badge of the Norman bondage", one can see the divergence from the Germans: the state was permanently tainted with the stain of Norman slavery.

Whereas seventeenth century moderates such as Sir Edward Coke thought that the common law was a genuine Anglo-Saxon inheritance, many more radical factions believed the law itself was apart of the Norman oppression. Far from being a product of abstract reason, the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on freedom from government originated in revolt from Norman *civilization*. The conquest of Norman civilization over Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* did not completely destroy a more characteristically German romantic holism. Instead, the *government itself* became identified as a separate whole in conflict with the other whole: "the people" seeking freedom from the "whole Norman power".

In superficially civilized calls for "freedom or "liberty" there is a remainder, however reduced, of Teutonic romanticism. Anglo-Saxon "freedom" contains a Nazi-like desire for freedom from *artificial* restraints of unnatural law, or, civilization itself. Anglo-Saxon freedom shares with German collective romanticism a sense of the people as a romantic-holistic body in conflict with artificial law or civilization. The thoughtless association of "freedom"

with enlightened rationality does not quite capture how these notions often expressed a desire for freedom *from* rationality.

From a Darwinian perspective, human civilization amounts to a human zoo. While the Nazi-Germans attempted to escape the zoo of Western civilization, they were eventually forced back into the iron cage. The West decreed that the German "blond beast" should be as collectively undangerous, tame, and "civilized" as Anglo-Saxons had ultimately become under the Norman civilization.

Anglo-Saxon "freedom" includes an unconscious, yet reduced, equivalent of German romanticism: freedom from the laws of political civilization. The great irony is that the striving to realize the dynamics of the reduced romanticism of Anglo-Saxon freedom ended up destroying its primal sociobiological origins. Only the Germans had preserved the primal, collective freedom of their ancient ancestors.

After the turning point defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad, Martin Heidegger spoke explicitly about German destiny:

> In whatever way and however the external fate of the West occurs, the most significant and specific test for the Germans still lies ahead, that test in which they perhaps will be tested by the ignorant against their will, to determine if they, the Germans, are in agreement with the truth of being, if they are strong enough in their readiness for death against the small-mindedness of the modern world in order to rescue the originary in its unpretentiousness.[1208]

The Price of Freedom

Despite E. A. Freeman's six-volume history of the Norman Conquest, claimed John Horace Round, "he could not see that, like Poland, England fell, in large measure, from the want of a strong rule, and from excess of liberty."[1209] He was astounded that,

> in the teeth of this awful lesson, Mr. Freeman could still look back with longing to 'a free and pure Teutonic England,' could still exult in the thought that a democratic age is bringing England ever nearer to her state 'before the Norman set foot upon her shores.'[1210]

It is unfortunate, really. Virtually every other ethnic group in America made at least some progress in overcoming old racial stereotypes. In America, however, this old stereotype of an Anglo-Saxon race forever fated to incur ethnic defeat through "excess of liberty" only got worse! American history is the fulfillment of this Anglo-Saxon racial stereotype.

Liberal Democracy is not only about government by the people, but moderating extremes of injustice on the political plane wherein the winner takes all and the losers lose all. In a game of chess, when the king is taken, the whole game is lost. This is what happened at Hastings and the results are history. Liberal democracy changed the rules of the chess game so that never again would a people, in losing the political, lose everything. As a consequence of this system, the Anglo-Saxon restoration in America originally resulted in their becoming queens rather than kings of the chessboard. They have great freedom of movement, but little inherent or hereditary stability.

World War Two on the Western front can be viewed as the struggle between two kinds of freedom: German collective (racial or *völkisch*) freedom and Anglo-Saxon individual freedom. Individual freedom is realized at the price of racial freedom. Liberty for kin selective interests is lost through the liberty to realize individual interests. The individualistic Western conscience represses human sociobiological development, just as it liberates individual development. If there exists a lack of willingness to sacrifice freedom as individuals for the race, the race will be sacrificed for individuals.

While conservatives apparently want it both ways, American history is a demonstration that the two freedoms are not created equal. The race is enslaved through the love of individual liberty, and individual freedom is bought at the price of the collective liberty of the race. What unites Americans is what separates Americans: the lack of any necessary bonds to one another is freedom for the individual via freedom from one another.

The kin selective interest lost through the creation of the consequent genetic Esperanto called humanity is not something that can be undone. One way or another, kinship and race thus exert their significance. In this case, ethnic diversity and racial miscegenation helps preserve the cause of individual freedom via genetic enslavement to individual freedom. The consequences of individual freedom subvert freedom to choose alternatives to individual freedom.

American history can thus be viewed as the slow but sure progress of the death of a kind of freedom. In expanding one kind of freedom as individuals, Anglo-Saxons finished and buried a different kind of freedom stolen from them in 1066. Individual freedom compensated for the collective ethnic freedom usurped by the Norman immigrants.

At the Battle of Hastings, the Anglo-Saxons were defeat as a race, not as individuals. It was in the Norman's interest to weaken their capacity for freedom as an ethnic body. It was also in the Anglo-Saxon interest to weaken the Normans as a hereditary caste. The individualism of the American founding was the product of an essential polarity between Virginia and Massachusetts in which a state of civil war was civilized into "individualism". The individualism of the founding was, in other words, the net result of Normans and Saxons attempting to weaken one another as kin groups on the political level. When this peaceable civil war broke out into violent civil war in the 1860s, the very conquest of the Normans of the South was bought at the price of radicalizing formal individualism. In this ironic way, America is the only the finishing off of what the Normans began. The very defeat of Normans by the Anglo-Saxons became a monument to an eternal Norman victory over the Anglo-Saxons.

For someone who has no knowledge of this background, it might appear as if the programmatic sociobiological purpose of the United States is the elimination of the "WASPs" as a distinct ethnic group. For some mysterious reason, persons of English origin value their own demise as such. Yet Americans *must* believe biology and race is not of fundamental importance, otherwise it might mean their country is a world-historical blunder.

Freedom as understood by liberal democracies is freedom from a strict biological interpretation of human behavior, and especially the biologically-based kinship connections between individuals. The freedom of liberal democracies amounts to the assertion of freedom from the restraints of biology; of life; of survival. Individual freedom is freedom from duty or special responsibility for kin, freedom from the

necessity of sociobiological foresight, and freedom from a biological-kinship interpretation of human things generally.

Freedom in its fullest sense is the freedom to die; including the freedom for suicide. Total freedom from biology implicates the rational, sane, sensible, civilized sociobiological suicide of the West. The highest fulfillment of individual freedom is sociobiological death.

One freedom develops at the expense of another. Herein lays another meaning of equality: the emasculation of the race *equals* the masculinization of individuals. The emasculation of the ethnic Anglo-Saxon political body under the Conquest was answered with the masculinization of Anglo-Saxon individuals. This is how the feminization of Anglo-Saxons as a race ultimately led, in modern times, to the liberal masculinization of Anglo-Saxon women.

Weimar Germany, like the Anglo-Saxons in revolt immediately after 1066, had not yet adapted to reduction to ethnic defeat. They still maintained their integrity as a *Volk*, unreduced to a *folk*. The Anglo-Saxon dismissed the political holism that survived among the Germans precisely because this view revealed their emasculation as a racial body. This is why individualism, originally an outlet for Anglo-Saxon male pride in the face of the feminization of their race, ultimately decomposed into an even more radical form of feminism. The feminism of Anglo-Saxon females was a logical consequence of the feminization of Anglo-Saxon males as representatives of a racial body.

The race is enslaved by a love of liberty as individuals. Like a female slave, she accepts her place, accepting that she has no right to determine her destiny. If others wish to penetrate the boundaries of her body, she has no right to resist. What is the origin of this Puritanical sexual perversion? The historical foundation of Anglo-Saxon

freedom *as individuals* was feminine submission to the Norman enslavement *as a race*.

The ultimate significance of modern feminism, however, is to be found in the realization that the entire biological human race is being emasculated. The larger scientific-technological basis of feminism is the progressive emasculation of the entire biological human race as technological evolution begins to outpace biological evolution. The rise of women is correlated with the decline of biological human race because biological evolution has been subordinated to economic-technological evolution like a woman that has learned her place.

The Surrealist Movement in Politics

The Logic of Western Civilizational Self-Destruction

Aut Caesar, aut nihil. World rule or total annihilation. While the autonomy of the liberal individual is demonstrated in contempt for dependence on political authority, the liberal's autonomy is limited by dependence on the ability to restrain the strongest. Conversely, Hitler's acceptance of the right of the stronger led to a logic of struggle wherein he had to *be* the strongest, both within the state, and among other nations. Thus Hitler's conclusion that Germany will be a world power or nothing.

This is a logic of completeness: one is either strong enough to be *complete* by being *all* victorious or *complete* by being *all* obliterated in a fiery Götterdämmerung. While this

extremism appears alien to Anglo-Saxon pragmatism, the very notion of America as idea in progress that seeks completion or perfection hints at a core similarity with the Germans. If the Anglo-Saxons' world historical defeat in 1066 left them permanently alienated from political wholeness, then perhaps they swung towards the opposite extreme. Is not America a rational, bourgeois Götterdämmerung in slow motion?

The kin selective irrationalism of the Anglo-Saxons, however, was never total. The attempt to destroy the Norman masters without destroying themselves was inherently problematic since the Norman graft in England was partially successful. And the partial success of this experiment in aristocracy meant that the attempt to totally destroy the Norman Yoke could not be fully separated from destroying themselves.

Ethnic hostility against the Normans ultimately meant being *against* government, and *against* aristocracy, and *for* a morality of self-consistent individualism. The negative character of this anti-political attitude is directly related to the possibility of its universalization because *political* identity became defined by the parameters of what one is *against*, not defining particulars of what one is *for*. Positive political identity became negatively defined through freedom (from government).

To attack the hereditary principles of the "English" ancient regime, the Anglo-Saxons were compelled to attack heredity *in principle*. If they were to be *consistent* in political principle, however, they had to deny themselves hereditary rule. The racial contradictions of America begin with Anglo-Saxons finding a means of superiority to the Normans in being above "irrational" kin-group prejudice and preference.

Superiority to Norman hierarchy through political equality elicited a precarious form of superiority. Whereas acceptance of the old hierarchy was associated with Anglo-Saxon ethnic defeat, does it therefore follow that radical equality equals radical Anglo-Saxon victory? Radical equality implied radical universalization and therefore the consummation of Anglo-Saxon defeat as a distinct ethnicity.

The Normans defined their superiority, in part, in terms of 'superior civilization'. The modern trick was to exploit this aristocratic civilizational inheritance by turning it against the Normans themselves and redefining in democratic terms. It is virtually impossible to understand the history of race relations in America without realizing that non-"WASP" immigrant groups often made themselves in an Anglo-Saxon image by turning against the Anglo-Saxons the same mechanisms that they had once used against the Normans.

This historic background has been obscured by what may be the greatest Anglo-Saxon success story of all, the enlightened ethnic cleansing of Norman identity in modern times. The old Norman aristocracy would never have confused "Anglo-Saxon" with "white". Yet victimizing the Normans with cultural ethnic cleansing resulted in morally victimizing the victims of the Normans and indirectly equating the Anglo-Saxon race with all the imperialism and slavery of the English-speaking world.

Is it so hard to imagine that the American dream of the underdog turning the tables on its oppressor might have something to do with the racial history of many of the founding underdogs? Yet to fulfill the logic of table turning, the old Anglo-Saxon underdogs must become underdogs again as new immigrant groups fulfill the old revolutionary paradigm.

Patrick Buchanan believed that the formula for Western suicide was concocted from the mixture of Jefferson's "all men are created equal" and Wilson's idea of "self-determination".[1211] The rule of this ideological combination is really a product of the victory of Anglo-Saxon self-determination in the American Civil War. The Norman-Cavaliers that mastered the distinctive political development of the South would either rule at the top of the racial hierarchy or risk total collapse in equality with their former slaves. Slavery would exist to preserve the aristocratic Norman way of life or the abolition of slavery would destroy that way of life. It was a gamble comparable to William the Conqueror's bid to master England or risk total defeat on English soil.

Norman genius is manifest in the way that slavery forced the Anglo-Saxons of America to be bound to their Norman fate whether they accepted or rejected the human inequality implicit in slavery. If the Anglo-Saxons accepted slavery, this would ultimate support the notion of racial hierarchy in which Normans believed they would lead as aristocratic race. If the Anglo-Saxons rejected slavery, their own bid for *self-determination* would, ironically, force them to confront the implications of their political *egalitarianism*.

Slavery exposed the hypocrisy of the Anglo-Saxon nationalist interpretation of manifest destiny. Slavery forced the Anglo-Saxons to take their own egalitarianism seriously. Norman genius is evident in their very defeat in the American Civil War: while neo-Puritan Anglo-Saxon nationalism in America culminated in a war to destroy the Norman Yoke under Lincoln the Conqueror, their very victory over the Normans meant that Anglo-Saxon racial nationalism[1212] would culminate in racial equality with black slaves. The Normans would be a world power or nothing,

but if they were to fall, the Anglo-Saxons, as a race, would be brought down with them.

Tolerance for the Divine Right of Kings

Opposing the election of Abraham Lincoln in February 1861, the *New York Herald* concluded that the Union was being torn apart, not by slavery, but by "abolition fanaticism" and Puritan supremacism:

> the fertile source of the ever-recurring mischief is the Puritan idea of the superiority of their sect over other men, and a mysterious divine right which they claim to possess of dictating to all mankind.[1213]

In both the English Civil War and the American Civil War, Puritans and their Anglo-Saxon descendants were viewed as religious-moralistic fanatics by the Norman-Cavaliers.[1214] This point is imperative for understanding the connection between political scientist Samuel Huntington's thesis of the "clash of civilizations" and his argument for the Anglo-Protestant-Puritan identity of the United States.

In the West, Islamic "extremism" or "fanaticism" is commonly contrasted with the sober moderation of the West. This formula, however, is less than cogent when one realizes that the group that championed many of the most distinctly "Western" values was themselves accused of fanaticism precisely for fighting for those egalitarian values. If aggressive Northern anti-slavery abolitionism was an heir of Puritan religious fanaticism, and the victory of that fanaticism became secularized as Americanism, then the conflict between Islam and America may be traceable to two incompatible forms of fanaticism.

It was precisely because Samuel Huntington was so conscious of the historically partisan or intolerant aspects of Puritan values that he was lead towards a "clash of civilizations" understanding of America's relationship to the larger world. Puritanism did not subscribe to equal tolerance for the divine right of kings; it was characterized by fanatical hatred for the notion of the divine right of kings. This less than rational origin of post-Civil War American identity is what suggested an ultimate incongruity with Islam as the "other" fanaticism.

To tolerate all cultures is possible only if one does not have a culture. Perhaps the deepest or most influential root of modern Western multiculturalism is the Norman destruction of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*. Norman civilization did play some role in replacing Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* with a more rationalistic mode of discourse. Western political equality's slide towards cultural equality would thus have its most influential origin in the destruction of a distinct, native, Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*. The bourgeois Anglo-Saxon can believe that other cultures are equal to his own because his own *Kultur* is degenerate or dead.

The mustard plants of multiculturalism have been fertilized by the decayed remains of individualistic universalism. Whereas the universalism of Christianity helped cultivate the idea of a single human race, multiculturalism is the admission of the failure of the practical realization of the ideal of a truly universal human civilization. Multiculturalism creeps back into a seemingly pagan tolerance, but is it pagan? Greco-Roman paganism tolerance was tolerance of diverse standards for diverse humans and this meant, in the view of men such as Aristotle, that some are born to be slaves while others are born to be masters. Tolerance for caste and other forms of inequality

would be the ultimate logic of a pagan multiculturalism, and this point only clarifies the influence of Christianity in promoting the idea of a single, universal human morality in the West.

It is said that Biblical monotheism is religiously intolerant and while Greco-Roman paganism was tolerant. This cannot be a fair assessment until it accounts for the *political* intolerance of the Romans. A non-Roman god was usually easier to accept than a non-Roman ruler. Yet Caesar Augustus was declared a *god*, and those who denied his ultimate godhood were crucified. Since politics was *not* separate from religion for the pagan Romans, the political intolerance of the Romans ultimately led to religious intolerance in form of persecution of those who would not accept Caesar as the highest political-religious *god*.

A moral legacy of Christianity is openness to fifth columns. Christianity originally *was* this fifth column in the pagan Roman Empire. Liberal democracy, inheriting this moral legacy, has carried on the fifth column tradition. Europe's latest Trojan horse is only another episode in vulnerability to the Semitic way of empire.

By Western moral standards, feminism and egalitarianism are superior. By Islamic standards, feminism and egalitarianism are inferior. This clash of values illustrates the need to impose each other's standards upon one another so each can understand why the other is inferior in the other's eyes.

Feminism is correlated with a generally lower birthrate. The unfolding logic of individualism, especially feminism's devaluation of women's evolutionary role as child bearers, devalues kin selective relationships in general. Muslims, who have resisted these values, consequently have the inverse demographics of population explosion. Thus,

Muslims retain a competitive advantage by resisting Western values, even if detrimental in other respects.

Western-centric "universalism" has been distinctly selective. While aspiring to learn from the best of all cultures, the West has formally rejected what it has recently considered the worst, i.e. patriarchalism, racism, and sexism. Insofar as the non-West does the same, they might judge the best to be science, technology, and some art, and yet reject what it considers the worst, i.e. moral decadence, egalitarianism, and shortsighted individualism.

European countries colonized in their strength. In their decline, they themselves are colonized. White Americans, for example, can apologize for persecution of the Native Americans now that the natives have largely been defeated in the defense of their land. White Westerners can afford to be moral because this morality lives parasitically off the imperialistic sins of their ancestors. In a similar way, Europeans could afford to be moral vis-à-vis America at its imperial height because they too are still living off the sin of their ancestors' will to live. If America is an ethical giant, then Europe is like a little bird that craps on America's head.

Islamic jihadists are the beneficiaries of a multiculturalism that is, in good part, a continuation of the success of Western *intolerance* for Nazi-German *Kultur*. If tolerance is right, and intolerance for intolerance is right, then even this kind of hypocrisy is right. Liberal totalitarianism, the belief that liberalism is *universally* applicable to all human beings without exception, cannot help but be hypocritical. Belief in tolerance is itself a belief. It arose out the progress of logic of disbelief, and for this logic to continue its progress it must become self-consistent and disbelieve in itself as a principle.

In a truly tolerant democracy, one should be free to express belief in the holiness of jihad, or an active conviction

in the divine right of kings. True tolerance means that 9/11 should be tolerated on the grounds of freedom of religious expression.

Multiculturalism: Celebrations of Nihilism

Perhaps the surrealist movement in politics can be traced to a 2007 decision by a German judge named Christa Datz-Winter. Supporting multiculturalism over feminism or individual rights, she ruled against a Muslim woman who attempted to get a divorce. While her Muslim husband had beaten her, the judge cited a passage in the Koran that sanctioned the physical abuse of Muslim wives. The judge thus created a legal precedent for the rule of Sharia law over Western constitutional law.

Are Westerners' to be tolerant of those practices that conflict with the principle of tolerance?

The surrealist movement in politics began with the imposition of Western ethical standards and notions of human rights on peoples who do not accept them themselves. Can Western standards be imposed upon people who affirm themselves as living refutations of its claims to universalism? Is surrealism, as a political movement, a last stand of Western imperialism? The surrealist movement in politics consists of surreal juxtapositions of liberal principles in the name of universalism and anti-liberal principles in the name of multiculturalism.

Liberal tolerance of nonliberalism is premised upon the foundation, standards, and worldview of liberalism, not on nonliberal standards themselves. A last vestige of Western colonialism, liberal principles of tolerance and non-interference are *impositions* of postmodern liberalism upon non-Western cultures. It could be called empathy

imperialism: the West defines and imposes the standards for what constitutes legitimate empathy, and what does not.

Does the Western talk of rights and empathy for the oppressed really capture the beliefs, assumptions, and feelings of Islamic Jihadists or Chinese nationalists? Or are these Western notions superficial by their very nature; a superficiality whose genealogy can be traced to the repression of the very particularistic origins of these Western notions?

According to one variant of postmodern, liberal theory, all humans of all cultures are really Western liberals (with the possible exception of Western conservatives). Underneath it all, Islamic fundamentalists, for example, are really good liberals. The imposition of this kind of empathy imperialism represents a failure of empathy. Empathy on Western terms, advanced on the assumption that everyone is really a good Western liberal, represents a failure to fully empathize with jihadists who genuinely believe in righteousness of killing others in the name of Islam.

There is too much order in all this diversity! Within limits, diversity is compatible with a certain kind of order, but diversity can potentially increase to the point of entropy. Perhaps the next step in the logic of "progress" is the valuation of disorder, entropy, and anarchy itself. Prejudice against anarchy may be wrong; perhaps anarchy is really the intended destination of progress itself.

Multiculturalism would seem to strive towards the virtue of maximal incoherence. The quest for diversity means that the civilization that can preserve the maximum internal self-contradictions without disintegrating into new order wins. The civilization that can make coherent sense of itself loses.

Multiculturalism implies a celebration of nihilism because it implies disbelief in the original liberal value of the

individual over an ethnic or group culture. To celebrate all cultures, one must not have one. Without belief in something, one has no grounds to be against anything else.

Tolerance is as a last gasp of liberal belief that lives on the cusp of nihilism. Tolerance is resolving differences by failing to resolve differences. It is a pragmatic peace for and by the diversity of incompatibilities. It promotes the demotion of the value of thinking through learning to not rationally question blatant contradictions.

The United Nations is only liberal democracy writ large. The Western-centric idea of liberal universalism, i.e. the diplomatic strategy of the U. N., evolved from the presumption that if people sit down and talk rationally, a common denominator of similarity or humanity will engender rational solutions to human problems. However, if reason cannot determine fundamental values, and reason, therefore, has no ultimate reason to culminate in humanism over its opposite, it is irrational to assume that this liberal theory is valid. In this way, the U. N. could become a means of asserting anti-liberal or anti-humanistic beliefs.

I emphasize Islam here only for historical reasons, demographic reasons, and, above all, because Muslims have, on average, retained greater genuine belief in their religion than Christians and Jews, among others. The argument here is not an argument *against* tolerance; it is an argument *about* the principle of tolerance. The question here is whether postmodern Western principles such as multiculturalism or tolerance, when pursued with ruthless Socratic logic, have any solid foundation or not. The unfolding of the logic of Western liberal rationalism exposes the faith underlying its original pretension to rationality. If Muslims find that the best the West has to offer is nihilistic decadence, a nihilism best expressed in the conclusion that the West, under

egalitarian pretenses, cannot defend their way of life as superior, then the West cannot give Muslims sound reasons for adopting a way of life presumably founded on reason. A result could be surrealistic juxtapositions of the avant-garde of Western nihilism and Islamic fundamentalism.

The virtue of the "post-colonial" West consists of directing the aggressive energy once united against non-Westerners, and channeling it against Westerners themselves as individuals and as a group. If the decisive superiority of the West is a more advanced state of nihilism, then the West is on course for rational self-destruction.

The Westerners who want Muslims living in the West to assimilate want Muslims to become, like themselves, a people that have lost all sense of honor. The suicide bomber demonstrates a kind of superiority in overcoming the fear of death that terrorizes the bourgeoisie. For the West to simply reassert "enlightenment" values in the face of radical Islam, in a purely defensive manner, and without actual belief in its original rational pretensions, is the very definition of reaction and proof that the West is dead, living off the fossilized values of old. When unreasoned commitment to liberal values itself becomes a fully secular religion this will truly be the death of the West.

Islamic terrorists, these gadflies of unreason, provoke self-consciousness of the crisis of Western rationalism. If everything is reducible to "culture", then this raises the possibility of the total failure of Western rationalism. Is there or is there not a fundamental, qualitative difference between the death of an Islamic suicide bomber and the death of Socrates?

The philosophic crisis of the West is partly traceable to the paradoxical origins of Norman civilization. The Normans contributed to the *value*, the *prestige* of something called they

called "civilization". The "barbaric" methods of the Conquest ensured the supremacy of Norman appropriation of French notions of "civilization", with its distinct *cultural* emphasis on social manners and refined taste. Yet civilization could nonetheless amount to *philosophical* bankruptcy, as it did for Rousseau.

But what *is* civilization? While civilization may appear to collapse into culture, it does have a distinct meaning that can be illustrated with a contrast with philosophy. I would define civilization as reason in the service of life, and philosophy as life in the service of reason. A rough contrast would be the Roman engineer versus the Greek philosopher.

If Samuel Huntington is right, then modern Western values are not fundamentally rational and there is no ultimate higher law in world history beyond the "clash of civilizations". Yet there is a fatal flaw in Huntington's superficial understanding of "civilization", and in that flaw, lay the possibility of overcoming an all-too-human "clash of civilizations".

Kultur Clash with Civilization

At worst, I fear that spiritual entropy or an evaporation of the soul's boiling point is taking place, a fear that Nietzsche thought justified and made the center of all his thought. He argued that the spirit's bow was being unbent and risked being permanently unstrung. Its activity, he believed, comes from culture, and the decay of culture meant not only the decay of man in this culture but the decay of man simply. This is the crisis he tried to face resolutely: the very existence of man as man, as a noble being, depended on him and on men like him — so he thought. He

> **may not have been right, but his case looks stronger all the time.**[1215]
>
> —ALLAN BLOOM, *THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND*

All life is related. Chimpanzees and cucumbers shared a common ancestor extant millions of years ago. Life has evolved on Earth for about four billion years and, from that perspective, the sociobiological divergence that occurred between Germans and Anglo-Saxons in the year 1066 could appear as a minor notch on the cladogram of Earth's gargantuan tree of life.

Such a macroevolutionary perspective, however, can also demonstrate that 1066 marks an unusually profound break in the evolutionary tree of biological life. Perhaps the best way to characterize this break is the conquest of civilization over *Kultur*. However subtle the shift may appear in ultimate human terms, from the four billion year history of life's evolution on this planet, the Norman Conquest represents a *value* revolution wherein civilization became valued over *Kultur*. Modern democratic revolution actually preserved this Norman contribution by turning the Normans' own valuation of civilization against them. The ultimate implication of this conquest of civilization over Kultur is the conquest of technology over biology.

In *The Clash of Civilizations*, political scientist Samuel Huntington wrote:

> a civilization is a cultural entity, outside Germany. Nineteenth century German thinkers drew a sharp distinction between civilization, which involved mechanics, technology, and material factors, and culture, which

> involved values, ideals, and the higher intellectual artistic, moral qualities of a society. This distinction has persisted in German thought but has not been accepted elsewhere.[1216]

There is simply a fundamental disagreement here between Germany and the West. Huntington took his starting point by acknowledging that he, and *presumably* most non-Germans, simply disagrees with this German view. However, if there is no overriding human value universalism, this implies that Huntington's entire civilizational Weltanschauung must, in some way, reflect his particular "culture" or "civilization".

In Huntington's view, "a civilization is a culture writ large".[1217] This implies that culture is the most intimate level of identity, while civilization marks the highest or furthest reaches of the boundaries of identity. Placed in historical context, this could mean that Huntington's *culture* was Anglo-Saxon, while the inclusion of a broader identity was formed by the partial success of assimilation to Norman *civilization*.

This scenario was the product of the submission of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* to Norman-French civilization. Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* was ultimately dominated by the legacy of Norman civilization, while the furthest boundaries of Anglo-Saxon identity became defined by the boundaries of *civilization* that were implanted by Norman supremacy. While Modern Anglo-Saxon *culture* is democratic, individualistic, and anti-government, the political viability of the anti-imperial empires of the English-speaking world was possible because rebellion was subsumed within an inordinately effective political framework inherited from the conquest of Norman *civilization*.

The Germans were different from the Anglo-Saxons in that German *Kultur* penetrated into the very highest reaches

of subjective consciousness so that there was literally nothing above it. While Anglo-Saxon rebellion against Norman civilization became institutionalized within the skeletal, reengineered remains of Norman civilization, the whole-hearted German rebellion against civilization produced world wars.

Huntington was apparently able to relate to a German *Kultur* subjugated by Western civilization in 1945, but his civilizational Weltanschauung is incapable of understanding the rise of Nazism. Peter Viereck's *Metapolitics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind*, by contrast, may be the single best twentieth century study of the origins of the National Socialist movement precisely because it takes recognition of this fundamental antagonism between *Kultur* and civilization as its starting point.

The difference between the supremacy of civilization in the English-speaking world and the supremacy of *Kultur* is illustrated by the contrast between Toynbee and Spengler. Spengler viewed a *Kultur* as a whole living organism, and this German view influenced his comprehension of every other *Kultur*. For Toynbee (and Huntington), religion is paramount and this is partially explainable through the legacy of the Puritan reinterpretation of the Conquest's impact in Biblical-moral terms.

An absolutist interpretation of the meaning of cultural relativism is cultural egalitarianism. Cultural relativism, however, could just as easily turn into an argument for the supremacy of one culture relative to other cultures. Since cultural diversity can breeds cultural antagonism, cultural relativism could lead to a defense of one's own culture against others.

Whereas thinkers in Anglo-Saxon societies tend to view cultural relativism as an argument for tolerance, German

thinkers have tended to arrive at the opposite conclusion. How can one explain this difference? The answer that makes the most sense historically is that the Anglo-Saxon equivalent of German *Kultur* was a historic failure. The *value* of cultural self- preservation was defeated in 1066, conquered by "civilization", and ultimately replaced by a counter-civilization based on human rights. American "universalism", for example, was made possible by the degeneration of an original Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*. This is a basic reason why the meaning of cultural relativism itself tends to be relative between Anglo-Saxons and Germans. Germans still had a whole *Kultur* to preserve.

Huntington represented an apparent exception to this more general Anglo-Saxon trend. He saw no universal civilization and no universal destiny for all human beings, only clashes along the lines of the greatest differences. But does anyone have a better idea?

Huntington failed to account that the Norman destruction of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* is a key to explaining why Anglo-Saxons became early modernizers, especially relative to the Germans. The distinction between *Kultur* and civilization can be considered one of degree between two extremes: biology and technology. In a *Kultur* biology predominates, while in civilization technology predominates (The English word "culture" actually reflects the degeneration of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* and can be considered an ambiguous midpoint between the two extremes colloquially despite its formal association with the *tabla rasa*). Since *Homo sapiens* are biological beings, there cannot be an absolute distinction between the two extremes among humans, but the history of the Roman Empire demonstrates an example of a relative transition from an emphasis on *Kultur* to an emphasis on civilization. Both Roman and Islamic civilization evolved as

a bridge of law *over* this and that *Kultur*. Civilization originally emerged from *Kultur* and gradually transcended its normative, kin selective roots. But can there be civilization without *Kultur*?

If humans do not destroy themselves first, the prospect of the Technological Singularity, the emergence of a greater-than-human intelligence, will gradually displace Huntington's "clash of civilizations" paradigm as the best model for understanding emerging human history. While the "clash of civilizations" will never be completely displaced so long as humans are, *Kultur* will diminish in importance as civilization, in the form of technology, emerges as an actor of mortal importance in human history.

Perhaps the shift in historical tides will begin when unprecedented levels of unemployment increase as technological automation permanently displaces human workers. This would likely mark an acceleration of an ongoing process in which economic-technological (civilizational) factors increasingly displace cultural factors. If people begin losing their jobs to machines on an unprecedented level, which will be more important: their culture or their economic existence? Here the German distinction between *Kultur* and civilization proves more profound, and ultimately more prescient, than Huntington's. His inability to sharply distinguish between *Kultur* and civilization reflects the conditions of the sociobiological cyborg of modern Western constitutionalism.

Huntington's broader flaw was that he did not build on fully evolutionary (biological and technological) foundation. The clash between *Kultur* and civilization represents the roots of a larger break between biology and technology. The culmination of this shift will be the Technological Singularity; the ultimate conquest of civilization over *Kultur*.

Perhaps the clearest way to distinguish *Kultur* and civilization is through the difference between poetry and technology; poetry is *Kultur* while technology is civilization, i.e. the internet. *Kultur* can be *eros* sublimated in art or music while technological civilization tends to disconnect reason from emotion or instinct. *Kultur* tends to emerge from pre-conscious instincts, intuitions, and impulses, whereas civilization tends to either repress, overcome, or simply ignore these impulses. In general, *Kultur* cultivates (biological) "nature", while civilization restrains (biological) "nature". *Kultur* exudes from the grain of nature, whereas civilization characteristically inhibits the grain of nature. *Kultur* is interwoven with nature, while civilization attempts to stand above and control, manipulate, subdue, and domesticate nature. *Kultur* suggests a paganistic harmony *with* nature, while civilization incorporates the idea of man's domination *over* nature. Frenchified Norman aristocrats, like the later Romans, but *unlike* Prussian Junkers, were more removed from the soil; more civilized *above* nature; more removed, in some ways, from even their own original Germanic or "Aryan" nature.

The difference between the Nazis and Goethe is almost like the difference between *Kult* and *Kultur*. At the root of the English word "culture" is "cult", and it was this hard *Kult*-core of "culture" or *Kultur* that the Nazis sought to regenerate, i.e. "When I hear the word '*Kultur*', I reach for my revolver". *Kultur*, however, emphasizes the *cultivation* of the highest peaks of the human mind. By cultivating the *nature* of a garden with care, ripening, and refining of the values of the "cult", its fruits can be turned into the finest wine. Just as wine maker ultimately values the wine, and not the immature garden's grapes in themselves, Goethe ultimately valued *Kultur* over the *Kult*. Yet, in its own way,

Nazism was a development of German *Kultur* that, however close it clung to this core, cannot be totally reduced to a *Kult*.

Why is Nazi *Kultur* almost *automatically* considered inferior in the English-speaking world? The unspoken belief in the similar inferiority of native Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* defeated in 1066 is so deeply ingrained, that it has hardly been a subject of discussion without moralizing distortions. There was no deep philosophical discussion or formal "argument" against the *rule* of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* in England in 1066; it was *conquered*. But perhaps something of the old Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* did survive into modern times in the form of a Nazi-like awe or respect for the *power* the Normans associated with civilization. The sheer *mindlessness* of the English-speaking world's belief in the superiority of civilization can be contrasted with reasoned critiques of civilization on the Continent, i.e. Rousseau and Nietzsche. This unreasoned, thoughtless, English-speaking valuation of civilization as good can be traced to a Norman *valuation* of the supremacy of "civilization" whose supremacy was imposed, not by force of philosophical reason, but by force of conquest. While England is not unique in this respect, this is nonetheless directly related to a traditional inability to evaluate the impact of the Conquest rationally. It is also a root of the crisis of Western rationalism.

The Anglo-Saxons of 1066 were inferior, in a classic Norman view, because they were less civilized. This implies that *Kultur* is inferior to civilization generally. Since Anglo-Saxon democracy ultimately conceded some belief in superiority of civilized government, the Nazis were ultimately judged inferior by the same standard of civilization: German *Kultur* had not been subdued by civilization. Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* was subdued, and a consequence was the Puritanical alienation from nature; an

alienation from the roots of *Kultur* that betrays the success of the Norman mastery of Anglo-Saxon nature. Yet because Anglo-Saxons measured themselves, not by a German valuation of *Kultur*, but by the supreme Norman valuation of civilization, they felt they could outdo the Normans only through superiority in *civilization*. The attempt to outdo the Normans in civilization helped found the modern, secularized counter-civilization premised on human rights (and this, in itself, further estranged Anglo-Saxons from their original *Kultur*).

A *Kultur*, virtually by definition, tends to be closed or in some way insulated from the larger world. The Normans forcibly pried open Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* to the Latinate world just as the ancestors of the Normans in themselves opened up to the French West after settling in Normandy. While the Germans retained the closed conditions of their *Kultur*, civilization in the English-speaking world became associated with restraining residual ethnic conflict, i.e. the Norman/Saxon conflict.

While *Kultur* tends to be characterized by a strong basis in natural instinct, this is very different from claiming that it is purely uninhibited instinct. The unity of desire and duty is what Kant called true *Kultur*.[1218] Preconscious instincts disciplined by duty are what produced German social Überorganism *Kultur*. Like the genetically incorporated behavior of an ant Überorganism, biological impulse tends to predominate, but this does not mean that biology *totally* dominates.

The transition from *Kultur* to civilization is correlated with a transition from incorporation to symbolization. While a living *Kultur* is made possible by incorporation of the biological, social, and emergent customs into a larger, coherent social body, civilization is characterized by

reducing *Kultur* to *information* through the process of symbolization. Instead of living values incorporated into a way of being, *Kultur* becomes analyzed and symbolized into information that can be compared or contrasted with other information. The last stages of biological human civilization would thus be an information revolution wherein biology and *Kultur* are translated into information, i.e. a brain scanned, digitized, and transferred into a computer.

As Huntington observed, the Germans tended to associate civilization with *material* factors such as mechanics and technology. The Nazi-German reclamation of *Kultur* over civilization was also a valuation of biological evolution over economic-technological evolution. While technological civilization began as reason in the service of biological life, civilizational rationality itself ultimately implicates the overcoming of biology itself. While the Germans, from one point of view, were prescient in viewing civilization as a way of death, from another point of view, death is a passageway to the possibility of seemingly endless postbiological life.

There is some ground for viewing *Kultur* as more primitive than civilization. The ultimate consummation of this development will be when artificially intelligent machines, the pinnacles of human *civilization*, advance to the point where biological humans and their cultures become obsolete. German *Kultur* is only primitive in comparison to Western civilization in the same sense that biological humans are primitive in comparison to the machines that are increasingly displacing them. In the completion of this trend towards artificial intelligence, there may be, not death, but God.

The American or Anglo-Saxon yearning for *Kultur* primitivity expresses itself in the yearning for democracy

itself; to never develop beyond the coarse mass to the human refinement represented by Norman-French aristocracy. Yet this inhibition against *human* (biological) aristocracy is nonetheless conducive to the capitalist-driven development toward a posthuman aristocracy of technology.

Below the superficial liberalism of Europe lies a deeper spiritual resistance to technological modernity itself, especially on the Continent, which finds itself siding with the authentic poetry of Islamic peoples. A seemingly inevitable "clash of civilizations" fails to recognize the portents a higher civilization in which Islam represents one of many paths towards a common end.

Islam has not completed its evolution anymore than the West has competed its evolution. The Western enlightenment that appears to offer only freedom from a life of ultimate meaning may actually open the door to the ultimate identity of God and technology. The Islamic enlightenment that appears to offer only freedom from Western rationalism may actually open the door to the ultimate identity of the Singularity and a supra-Islamic messiah.

Any people who turn their back on their native language and culture for the "superior civilization" of the West are following in the footsteps of the Vikings of Normandy. The Normans gave up very basic aspects of their *Kultur* to acquire distinctive elements of the heritage of Western civilization. Since the rise of Hitler represented the victory of *Kultur* over civilization, it was precisely for this reason that Nazism was incompatible with "Normanism". It was the Normans who were ultimately responsible for decisively turning both the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans from *Kultur* to civilization, and thus, towards the technological genesis of God.

Churchill was actually surprised that his victory against Hitler meant that he would be presiding over the unraveling of the British Empire. Although farsighted in grasping the intentions of Hitler, Hitler was more farsighted than Churchill in asserting that only his movement could avert the large-scale biological decline of Western populations. In the final analysis, then, could it be said that Hitler was more foresighted than Churchill? I do not think this is the case. It was Churchill who said, "The empires of the future are the empires of the mind."

[902] p. 86. Kaufmann noted that Francis Golffing's translation "spirits away both blond beasts of prey and master race by rendering these words" less accuately as "a pack of savages, a race of conquerors."

[903] p. 60.

[904] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 15.

[905] Simmons, *Reversing the Conquest,* 6.

[906] p. 12; see also Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 92-3.

[907] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 172.

[908] p.6; see also Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 90.

[909] pgs. 8-9; see also Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 91.

[910] Fitzhugh, *The History of the Fitzhugh Family (Vol. 2)*, 129.

[911] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 243.

[912] Fitzhugh, *Cannibals All!*, 256.

[913] *The Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943,* 377.

[914] *The Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943,* 251.

[915] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 9.

[916] Wood, *Domesday,* 167.

[917] Craig, *The Germans,* 23.

[918] Pine, *They Came with the Conqueror*, 155.

[919] Bates, *William the Conqueror*, 211, 14.

[920] Williams, *The English and the Norman Conquest*, 42.

[921] Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest,* 3-4.

[922] Rauschning, *Hitler Speaks,* 87.

[923] Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 465.

[924] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* 192.

[925] Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols* in *The Portable Nietzsche*, 516.

[926] *Hitler's Willing Executioners,* 456.

[927] From "Georg W. F. Hegel" by Pierre Hassner (tr. Allan Bloom) in *History of Political Philosophy*, 737.

[928] Burckhardt, *The Greeks and Greek Civilization*, 43, 64.
[929] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil,* 191-92.
[930] Bonaparte, *The Mind of Napoleon*, 65-66.
[931] Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 161-165.
[932] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 112.
[933] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 117.
[934] Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots*, 202.
[935] Farías, *Heidegger and Nazism,* 298.
[936] Farías, *Heidegger and Nazism,* 299.
[937] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 132-7.
[938] Culpeper, *History of English,* 36.
[939] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 178.
[940] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 138.
[941] MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, 60-61.
[942] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 73.
[943] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 111.
[944] MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, 60.
[945] Farías, *Heidegger and Nazism,* 276.
[946] Freeman, Introduction to *The History of the Norman Conquest of England.*
[947] Freeman, Burrow's introduction to *A History of the Norman Conquest of England*, xxi.
[948] Freeman, *The History of the Norman Conquest of England*, 1.
[949] Freeman, Introduction to *The History of the Norman Conquest of England.*
[950] Freeman, *A History of the Norman Conquest of England*, xxi.
[951] Bratchel, *Edward Augustus Freeman and the Victorian Interpretation of the Norman Conquest*, 15.
[952] Freeman, *A History of the Norman Conquest of England*, xxii.

[953] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 142.
[954] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 48.
[955] Farías, *Heidegger and Nazism,* 276-277.
[956] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 172-73.
[957] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 78.
[958] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 64.
[959] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 77.
[960] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 162.
[961] Wood, *In Search of England*, 16.
[962] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 78.
[963] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 84.
[964] MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, 44.
[965] MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, 43.
[966] Quoted in Löwith, *Martin Heidegger & European Nihilism*, 225-228.
[967] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 60.
[968] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 90.
[969] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 76.
[970] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 189.
[971] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 6.
[972] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 47, 38.
[973] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 103.
[974] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 10-11.
[975] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 224.
[976] Boorstin, *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson*, 200.
[977] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 149-154.
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[979] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 173.
[980] "German Art and German Policy" in Wagner, *Art and Politics*, 45.

[981] "German Art and German Policy" in Wagner, *Art and Politics*, 44.

[982] "German Art and German Policy" in Wagner, *Art and Politics*, 42.

[983] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 142.

[984] Weaver, *Nietzsche, God, and the Jews,* 42.

[985] Köhler, *Wagner's Hitler*, 252.

[986] Anne Dzamba Sessa. *Richard Wagner and the English.* (London: Associated University Presses, 1979), 77.

[987] Hitler, *Mein Kamph*, 257-8.

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[989] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 63.

[990] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 243.

[991] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 80-81, 84.

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[993] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 465-6.

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[995] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 107.

[996] Proctor, *Racial Hygiene,* 227.

[997] Hitler, *Mein Kamph*, 394.

[998] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 33.

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[1002] Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners,* 398.

[1003] Jefferson, *Writings,* 1491.

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[1005] Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience*, 9.

[1006] Koonz, *The Nazi Conscience*, 10.

[1007] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 230.

[1008] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 26.

[1009] Wood, *Domesday*, 80.

[1010] MacDougall, *Racial Myth in English History*, 60.
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[1015] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 28.
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[1017] Taylor, *Bismarck,* 10, 139.
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[1020] Simmons, *Reversing the Conquest,* 176.
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[1060] Fest, *The Face of the Third Reich,* 167.

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[1075] p. 86. Kaufmann notes that Francis Golffing's translation "spirits away both blond beasts of prey and master race by rendering these words "a pack of savages, a race of conquerors.""

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[1077] Hitler, *Mein Kamph*, 212.

[1078] Nietzsche, T*wilight of the Idols* in *The Portable Nietzsche,* 518.

[1079] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 257-8.

[1080] Pine, *They Came With the Conqueror*, 129.

[1081] Pine, *They Came With the Conqueror*, 177.

[1082] Pine, *Sons of the Conqueror*, 29.

[1083] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 163-4.

[1084] Craig, *Germany 1866-1945,* 340.

[1085] Schoenbaum, *Hitler's Social Revolution,* 63.

[1086] Cannadine, *The Rise and Fall of Class in Britain,* 159.

[1087] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 119.

[1088] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 107.

[1089] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 25.

[1090] From Weber, *The Western Tradition,* 849-50.

[1091] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 17-18.

[1092] Letter to Major John Cartwright from June 5, 1824 in Jefferson, *Writings,* 1490.

[1093] Jefferson, *Writings,* 1491.

[1094] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 109.

[1095] Dumont, *German Ideology*, 40.

[1096] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 55.

[1097] Huber, "Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich" in Weber, *The Western Tradition,* 850.

[1098] Kaufmann, *Hegel: a reinterprrtation,* 237.

[1099] Kaufmann, *Hegel: a reinterprrtation,* 254.

[1100] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 37.

[1101] *William Stubbs on the English Constitution,* 38.

[1102] Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,* 82n.

[1103] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 75.

[1104] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 70.

[1105] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 113.

[1106] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 111.

[1107] "German Art and German Policy" in Wagner, *Art and Politics*, 144.

[1108] "German Art and German Policy" in Wagner, *Art and Politics*, 144.

[1109] Huber, "Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich" in Weber, *The Western Tradition*, 851.

[1110] Huber, "Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich" in Weber, *The Western Tradition*, 853.

[1111] "German Art and German Policy" in Wagner, *Art and Politics*, 117.

[1112] Huber, "Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich" in Weber, *The Western Tradition*, 851.

[1113] Huber, "Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich" in Weber, *The Western Tradition*, 851.

[1114] Huber, "Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich" in Weber, *The Western Tradition*, 851.

[1115] "German Art and German Policy" in Wagner, *Art and Politics*, 50.

[1116] Simmons, *Reversing the Conquest,* 3.

[1117] Bratchel, *Edward Augustus Freeman and the Victorian Interpretation of the Norman Conquest*, 32.

[1118] Huber, "Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich" in Weber, *The Western Tradition,* 853-4.

[1119] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 117.

[1120] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 49.

[1121] Thomas, *The English and the Normans,* 244.

[1122] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 27.

[1123] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 28.

[1124] Wood, *In Search of England*, 17.

[1125] Kohn, *The Mind of Germany,* 335.

[1126] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 74.

[1127] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 70.

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[1129] Kershaw, *The Hitler Myth,* 15.

[1130] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 194.

[1131] Wood, *Domesday,* 181-82.

[1132] Wood, *In Search of England*, 268.

[1133] Kohn, *The Mind of Germany,* 282.

[1134] Huber, "Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich" in Weber, *The Western Tradition,* 854.

[1135] From Weber, *The Western Tradition,* 515.

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[1137] Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 167.

[1138] Simmons, *Reversing the Conquest,* 141.
[1139] Dumont, *German Ideology*, 41.
[1140] Dumont, *German Ideology*, 40.
[1141] Hibbert, The Story of England, 44.
[1142] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 75.
[1143] Dumont, *German Ideology*, 41.
[1144] "German Art and German Policy" in Wagner, *Art and Politics*, 143.
[1145] Bratchel, *Edward Augustus Freeman and the Victorian Interpretation of the Norman Conquest*, 31.
[1146] Lukacs, *Hitler of History*, 116.
[1147] Dumont, *German Ideology*, 41.
[1148] Dumont, *German Ideology*, 40.
[1149] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 106.
[1150] Iggers, *The German Conception of History,* 63.
[1151] Iggers, *The German Conception of History,* 79.
[1152] Kaufmann, *Hegel: a reinterprrtation,* 136.
[1153] Stirk, *The Prussian Spirit,* 55.
[1154] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 113.
[1155] From Round, "The Introduction of Knight Service into England" in Hollister, *The Impact of the Norman Conquest*, 59.
[1156] From Round, "Feudal England" in Hollister, *The Impact of the Norman Conquest,* 27.
[1157] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 112.
[1158] From Round, "Feudal England" in Hollister, *The Impact of the Norman Conquest,* 25.
[1159] Hollister, *The Impact of the Norman Conquest*, 53-54.
[1160] (From a letter to English Major John Cartwright, June 5, 1824.) Jefferson, *Writings,* 1490.
[1161] Stirk, *The Prussian Spirit,* 57.
[1162] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 61.
[1163] Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy,* 109.

[1164] Randall, Herman John, Jr.: Introduction to Thayer, *Newton's Philosophy of Nature*, ix-x.

[1165] Jefferson, *Writings,* 940.

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[1167] Schroeder, *Physics and its Fifth Dimension: Society,* 90.

[1168] Schroeder, *Physics and its Fifth Dimension: Society,* 103.

[1169] From Heidegger, *Nietzsche, Vol. 1 & 2,* 75.

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[1171] Hofstafter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 350.

[1172] Dumont, *German Ideology*, 41.

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[1175] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 28.

[1176] Cartledge, *The Spartans*, 69.

[1177] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 98.

[1178] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 230.

[1179] Nietzsche, *On the Geneology of Morals/Ecce Homo,* 79.

[1180] As illustrated by Douglas Hoftstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 310.

[1181] Wilson, *Conscilience*, 67.

[1182] Reductionism can provide useful, verifiable heuristics and a characteristic of intelligence is the ability to ferret out such generalizations. One human reason for faith in reductionism is that to fully internalize the lack of distinction between order and chaos would implicate a breakdown of internal orders within one's self that are biologically adaptive. At every moment our bodies are unconsciously generating behaviors and structures of internal order whose net effect is to outcompete death. To fully digest the lack of distinction between generalizations and particulars implicates an overcoming of internal order of

unconscious biological priorities in favor of unadulaterated physical empiricism.

[1183] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 15.

[1184] Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment,* 126.

[1185] McKirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates*, 124.

[1186] Strobl, *The Germanic Isle,* 94.

[1187] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, 413.

[1188] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, 358.

[1189] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, xi.

[1190] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, 367.

[1191] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, ix.

[1192] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, 48.

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[1194] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, 325-6.

[1195] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, 291.

[1196] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, 295, 319, 361.

[1197] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, 327.

[1198] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, 360.

[1199] Brown, *The NormanConquest of England: Sources and Documents*, 64.

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[1201] Nietzsche, *The Antichrist* in *The Portable Nietzsche*, 655.

[1202] Wood, *In Search of England,* 8-9.
[1203] Overy, *Why the Allies Won,* 325.
[1204] Kohn, *The Mind of Germany,* 284.
[1205] Kohn, *The Mind of Germany,* 288.
[1206] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 82.
[1207] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 82.
[1208] Farías, *Heidegger and Nazism,* 277.
[1209] From Round, "Feudal England" in Hollister, *The Impact of the Norman Conquest,* 25.
[1210] From Round, "Feudal England" in Hollister, *The Impact of the Norman Conquest,* 25-26.
[1211] Buchanan, *Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War*, xv.
[1212] See Reginald Horsman's *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism*.
[1213] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 142-3.
[1214] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 172.
[1215] Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*, 51.
[1216] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 41.
[1217] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 41.
[1218] Bloom's introduction: Rousseau, *Emile*, 17.

Creating God and the Evolution of Genetic Suicide

Why Liberal Democracy Leads to the
Rational Biological Self-Destruction of Humans and the
Rational Technological Creation of God

AGON: GOD VERSUS THE GODS

'Tis not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected, even to the end of time, by the proceedings now… The least fracture now will be like a name engraved with the point of a pin on the tender rind of a young oak; The wound will enlarge with the tree, and posterity read it in full grown characters.

—THOMAS PAINE, *COMMON SENSE*

The farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.

—WINSTON CHURCHILL

Darwin's Genes

The liberal democratic era is coming to an end because the *Homo sapien* era is coming to an end. The ability to

genetically engineer humans into new species and the advent of strong artificial intelligence will enable inequalities so extreme that the human boundaries within which liberal democracy has been a viable political form will be exploded. It makes no difference whether it is genetic engineering or artificial intelligence that overtakes humans; these new forms of "progress" will render human equality obsolete.

The question is not whether liberal democracy will come to an end, but *how* liberal democracy will come to an end. Yet one cannot even begin to address such issues without a clear grasp of evolution. One cannot understand how liberal democracy is evolving without an evolutionary understanding of liberal democracy itself. On the most basic level, one must begin with a solid grasp of what biological evolution *is*.

"Evolution," explained biologist Richard Dawkins,

> is the process by which some genes become more numerous and others less numerous in the gene pool. It is good to get into the habit, whenever we are trying to explain the evolution of some characteristic, such as altruistic behavior, of asking ourselves simply: 'what effect will this characteristic have on frequency of genes in the gene pool?'[1219]

What effect do the modern legal principles of human equality, human rights, and feminism have on the frequency of genes in the gene pool on a global level? "The one undoubted global change is of lesser consequence", wrote sociobiologist E. O. Wilson. "It is the shift occurring worldwide in the frequency of racial traits such as skin color, hair type, lymphocyte proteins, and immunoglobulins, due to more rapid population growth in developing

countries."[1220] Regardless of one's valuation or interpretation of this change, this *is* evolution.

A characteristic that decreases genetic representation in future generations is genetically maladaptive. If the Western experiment in liberal democracy is measured by the standards of evolutionary biology, a long-term trend of genetic maladaptation is observable as descendants of European ancestry are biologically out-produced by descendants of non-European ancestry. The fertility of married women in most northwest European countries, for example, has been declining since the late nineteenth century.[1221] Is there a reason why the systematic application of political equality is correlated with a systematic decline in genetic adaptation?

While Darwin's theory represents a classic triumph of Western science, the impact of his understanding of the place of the human in nature did not alter the fundamental liberal democratic political principles of the society he was born into. It was the Nazis, rather, that attempted to "biologize" politics. While liberal democracy was built on pre-Darwinian ideas, it won the "Darwinian" struggle for political existence against the Nazis.

Yet if reason cannot fundamentally determine values, the individual premise of liberal democracy is not in itself rational. The rationality of liberal democracy is premised upon *assuming* this premise of individual right, and then reasoning forward from it. But it is not only that human rights are not fundamentally rational. A sociobiological adaptationist correction of these old enlightenment assumptions reveals that systematic individualism leads logically to a program of rational genetic self-destruction. While individual organisms evolved as a *means* of propagating their selfish genes, Western individualism

subverts the selfish genes by valuing each human organism as an *end*.

The goodness of genetically *maladaptive* behavior turns out to be a fundamental tenet of Western-American civic religion. Since it is less than obvious, from an evolutionary perspective, that this should be the case, this situation begs the question of how this civic religion evolved in the first place. Why do Western civic values result in treating genetic interests with negligence? How can one explain the West's genetically suicidal behavior? Why is it that the genetic population that produced Charles Darwin apparently values genetically maladaptive behavior?

Robert FitzRoy was the Sea captain of the *Beagle*, the famous vessel that carried Charles Darwin across the world as he uncovered evidence for his theory of evolution. "I never before came across a man whom I could fancy being a Napoleon or a Nelson", Darwin wrote to his sister. "I should not call him clever, yet I feel convinced nothing is too great or too high for him. His ascendancy over everybody is quite curious." His peculiar "ascendancy" or mastery over Darwin and everyone else seemed to be linked to his views on slavery. The biologist explained that FitzRoy "defended and praised slavery, which I abominated". Darwin did not like FitzRoy.[1222]

While FitzRoy was the product of a distinctly aristocratic "class", Darwin was the product of a more non-aristocratic "class". While I should make it perfectly clear that I do not know the literal genealogical descent of Darwin or FitzRoy in specifically ethnic terms, their disagreement fits a familiar pattern. FitzRoy's views on slavery are characteristic of a more "Norman" view, while Darwin's abomination of slavery is characteristic of a more "Anglo-Saxon" view. Is it possible that their sharp disagreement over slavery was

related to their "class" relationship to one another? Was Darwin's strong opposition to slavery rooted in opposition to the Norman mastery that began in 1066? Was Darwin a descendent of what American slavery advocate George Fitzhugh called the Saxon "slave race"?

It may be that Darwin's very proclivities towards industry and objectivity were superior to those of a man like FitzRoy precisely because *embodying*, as opposed to *observing*, superlative genetic adaptation strategies also tends to be correlated with scientifically distorting forms of subjectivity. In any case, opposition to slavery is not a "universal" position that can in any way be derived from evolution by natural selection in general. Darwin's decidedly anti-slavery or pro-rights convictions may have been the product of a local adaptation to historical circumstances. It is at least possible that Darwin's *emphasis* on the common strategy of *adapting to* or *reacting to* external circumstances, as opposed to the uncommon strategy of mastering or overcoming external circumstances, may be social or political reflections of his own "class" traditions.

There is a logical and "natural" conflict between human rights and natural selection. The notion of the survival of the fittest conflicts with principle that *everyone* has the right to survive. "Survival of the fittest" implies acceptance that the unfit will not be granted the right to survive, while human rights tends toward the progressive abolition of natural selection. Though human rights were once thought to be "natural rights", its natural basis could *never* be natural selection in itself.

The principle of the universal right to life is, in principle, the end of Darwinian, selective survival. On the basis of Darwin's discovery of natural selection, there is no basis for the assumption that *all* human beings should be granted the

right to live. The universal right to live implies the end of natural selection via death, and thus the beginning of the end of the single most important means of biological evolution before humans: natural selection. While biological evolution (differential gene reproduction) occurs regardless of human rights, the progressive egalitarianism correlated with human rights generally promotes values opposite of kin selection, genetically adaptive discrimination, and a purely biological valuation of men and women as genetic replicators. Since it is differential reproductive success between generations that produces biological evolution, the combination of rights and progressive egalitarianism act as active antagonists to the conditions that can promote unequal reproductive success.

The universal right to life promotes the right to universal indifference to biological evolution. Biological evolution continues nonetheless, since some genes continue to be propagated more successfully than others. Political rights, however, imply the prohibition of political *control* over biological evolution.

One of the very greatest empirical proofs of the conflict between human rights and natural selection is the example of the Nazi revolution against human rights. The Nazi revolution was founded on an explicit valuation of biology and race. Darwin's discoveries were an intellectual pillar of the Nazi revolution.

Before Darwin, there was no significant debate over the sanctity of human life inherited from Judeo-Christian value traditions.[1223] While human rights lack a fundamentally rational basis, secularized Judeo-Christian values formed the civilizational basis that human rights were able to develop *upon*. Darwin's discovery of evolution by natural selection brought this historical cultural convergence into question.

Hannsjoachim Koch, in a German work on social Darwinism, concluded that natural selection "called into question the validity of the hitherto existing ethical ideas in all areas of life, whether social, economic, or political."[1224]

"Darwin and most Darwinists", wrote Richard Weikart in *From Darwin to Hitler*, denied the existence of an immaterial and immortal soul, a central tenet of the Judeo-Christian worldview that undergirded the sanctity of human life."[1225] Questioning the secularized basis of the sanctity of human life questioned the rational basis of human rights. "The humanitarian nonsense," declared early twentieth century German anatomist Hermann Klaatsch, "which grants equal rights to all on the premise of the unity of humanity, is to be condemned from the scientific standpoint."[1226] In the late nineteenth century, German biologist Oscar Schmidt concluded, "The principle of evolution is certainly the abolition of the principle of equality."[1227]

What is the evolutionary significance of equal rights? How can one make sense of the humanist right to life in light of evolution through natural selection? The idea of human rights has demonstrated a remarkable survival success in its great political battles for *cultural* survival. Yet should human rights nonetheless be completely abandoned if it possesses no fundamental *biological* basis? Either this old idea of rights must be completely abandoned scientifically or it must be reconstituted on a scientifically sound basis.

I do think that rights can be reconstituted on a scientifically sound basis. If reason, in itself, cannot determine fundamental values, then reason could have derived *any* values as "enlightened" values. Yet these particular values underlying human rights have proved to be durable promoters of human peace, not accidentally, and not randomly, but precisely because they counter specific

mechanisms of an ancient war for survival. It is *precisely because* human rights work in direct opposition to natural selection that human rights constitute the logical structural foundation for *civilizational* evolution.

Human rights constitute a political framework for progressively ending biological selection and advancing cultural-technological evolution. Within the history of the evolution of life on Earth, liberal democracy can be understood as a transitional form between biology and technology. As a political form, it moderates the extremes of both biological evolution and technological evolution as technology gradually takes precedence over biology.

The transition between biological evolution and technological evolution is defined by at least three basic components. First, human rights, and especially the foundational right to live, acts as a foundational antagonist of the key mechanism of biological evolution: natural (and artificial) selection. Second, a general trajectory of egalitarian "progress" decreases the influence of biology and promotes a political framework wherein mechanisms of cultural-technological evolution can advance unimpeded, i.e. the capitalist free market. Third, the previous two conditions culminate in a point wherein technological evolution overtakes biological evolution, i.e. the Technological Singularity. The process that leads from the first steps towards human rights to the Singularity cannot be separated from some notion of "progress" precisely because the progressive elimination of selection inversely reflects the gradual evolutionary process that brought biological life to a postbiological level.

"Modernity" was the begging of the end of the age of biology; the beginnings of consciousness of an exponential rate of postbiological change. While conventionally

identified with a seventeenth century scientific-technological revolutions, "modernity" first began with the human capacity for culture. The tabla rasa premise of liberal democracy does not refute the evidence for biological factors in human behavior, but it does implicitly maximize cultural-technological evolution while minimizing biological evolution.

While the Nazis redefined the radical political right as biological radicalism, the radical left leads to technological radicalism. In between these extremes lay biotechnology and the reengineering of the old DNA framework. While these will ultimately be unable to compete with the speed, accuracy, and competencies of post-biological forms, in the shorter term, new biological inequalities, new forms of genetic aristocracy, and new gods may rage against the dying of the biological form.

Modernity began with the proposition of the supremacy of nurture over nature. The heirs of modernity are about to find out if they really believe this. The Singularity, the technological creation of a greater than biological intelligence, would stand as the fulfillment of modern values. The existence of machine intelligence trillions of times greater than all biological human intelligence combined will likely mark the end of the era in which our species could call itself the dominant life form on earth. Nurturists may be vindicated in their disbelief in the importance of genes through the literal political supremacy of artificial intelligence, the products of human civilization, over biological humans. Belief in the supremacy of nurture over nature may ultimately be vindicated through technology's ultimate supremacy over the entire human race. *That* would be the overcoming of the influence of the genes *altogether*.

How the Anglo-Saxon Defeat of 1066 Has Universalized into the Prospective Defeat of the Entire Biological Human Race

"[O]ur images of greatness", wrote English historian Michael Wood, "are still Norman — the Tower of London, Windsor Castle, Westminster Abbey, the great cathedrals".[1228] All of the first great "English" castles that survive in some form today were built by the Normans to maintain their military domination of the native Anglo-Saxons. The castles, those particular images of Norman greatness, were also images and symbols of Anglo-Saxon weakness.

England's old, incumbent, aboriginal Anglo-Saxon aristocracy was pushed aside by the fresh and vigorous violence of a new and technologically superior Norman civilization. The conquerors' technological superiority in war included the superior mobility of the Norman cavalry, a greater number of archers, and the ability to build formidable castles.[1229] The Normans of 1066 seemed to see themselves as the embodiments of the cutting edge of Western civilization.

Progressives of a premodern yet *proto-modern* kind, Norman technological superiority was nonetheless subordinate to their genius for genetically adaptive

behavior. The Norman elite could consider themselves a genuine aristocracy, at the very least, in their sense that they were the best at realizing a maximal military-political kin selective strategy. The defeat at Hastings meant that the Anglo-Saxons would be inferior, at the very least, in the sense that they lost the struggle to realize the maximal kin selective strategy represented by political dominance.

But something changed between the eleventh and the seventeenth century. The military viability of the castle came to an end with Puritan attacks on these old strongholds in the English Civil War. Oliver Cromwell succeeded in demolishing some of these symbols of Norman tyranny, which were now unable to stand up to innovations in military technology. These were the inchoate beginnings of modern democracy.

The author of *Democracy in America*, Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville, was descended from an old, aristocratic Norman family named Clérel and may have had ancestors that fought under William the Conqueror at the Battle of Hastings.[1230] Despite his recognition of human inequalities, Tocqueville ultimately relented to the new dominance of democracy, partly because he believed it was more just than aristocracy, and partly because he believed that democracy had been chosen by "Providence" or history. Yet in the ultimate choice between aristocracy and democracy, Tocqueville concluded:

> No one on earth can yet assert in an absolute and general manner that the new state of societies is superior to the former state…They are, as it were, two distinct humanities, each of which has its particular advantages and inconveniences, its goods and evils that are proper to it.[1231]

The case for modern democracy over aristocracy has no

inherent philosophical or intellectual basis on an exclusively biological-human level. In comparison to aristocracies, extremes of human superiority and human inferiority have been moderated towards a more perfect mediocrity. The peaks and the troughs, the depths and heights, have been homogenized, compromised, democratized, and americanized. Democracies promoted less perfection and more production. Liberalism produced more general freedom of expression and less genuine independence of thought. Equality was less elevated, but more just. In democracies, "[g]enius becomes rarer and enlightenment more common."[1232]

The American achievements tend to be victories of quantity over quality. It is the difference between the Guinness Book of World Records and Shakespeare. The American way of life culminates, not in high art, but in high technology.

The historical changes that Tocqueville discerned were propelled by a transition from biological evolution to technological evolution. The decline of biological aristocracy signifies the belief that *biology is no longer the best*. Cultural-economic-technological evolution is increasingly displacing the supremacy of biology.

Biological humans are beginning to lose their claim to being Earth's aristocracy. Humans are increasingly relinquishing their claim to offer the "rule of the best" on Earth as machines inexorably out-compete their creators. Biological humans are becoming more equal to one another *relative* to the increasingly superior capabilities of machines.

The realities of economic-technological factors, along with the cultural influence of Christianity, have been rather successful in obscuring the biological bases of the Norman/Saxon conflict. Because the ethnic conflict between

Normans and Saxons has been so deeply interwoven with the transition from biology to technology, it has been very easy to ignore biological factors altogether in a Marxist emphasis on "class". Yet there are consequences in failing to understand that the sociobiological foundation of the Lockean idea that biology or race doesn't matter is the belief that the Norman/Saxon conflict doesn't matter.

Sound foresight about the evolutionary future cannot be built upon ignorance of the evolutionary past. *The legacy of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism in repressing the historical influence of the Norman Conquest is threatening a rational understanding of the decline of the entire biological human race.* Thoughtless, dogmatic adherence to the idea that biology does not matter is blinding humans into a situation where technology may overtake biology to a point where biology will *really* not matter. Yet the liberal democracies, and especially America, are utterly blind to their evolutionary path of genetic suicide because they have been blind to the Norman/Saxon clash responsible for the evolution of English-speaking liberal democracy itself.

Consider the Norman-based aristocracy of the American South in contradistinction to the Anglo-Saxon democracy of the North before the American Civil War. North and South represented two different answers to the problem of the desire for more labor-work. The North emphasized the acquisition of more work through laborsaving machines and economic-technological innovations. The South emphasized the acquisition of more work through human slavery.

While the relationship between climate-geography and culture is a chicken and egg question, the single most important source of the difference in attitudes toward slavery was population origin. The Anglo-Saxon based North tended to identify with formerly mastered and

conquered peoples, while the Norman based Southern aristocracy tended to identify with the master and conqueror. The Northern emphasis on laborsaving technological innovations evolved from their background as slave laborers of their Norman masters. Southern slavery, by contrast, was the means of preserving the aristocratic-Norman way of life in America. How could social refinement and leisured self-cultivation survive a materialistic Northern culture where there existed "no chivalrous devotion to the weak and helpless female, no generous and manly protection of her, but all is calculating, cold, and heartless, as the metal they worship"?[1233]

Whereas Tocqueville resigned himself to the 'providential' victory of democracy, Norman-American George Fitzhugh led the South's intellectual fight against submission to belief in the inevitability of egalitarianism. Fitzhugh's radicalization of aristocracy and slavery exposed the kinship and caste assumptions that had underlied the Norman conqueror way of life. Yet while Southern slavery is explicable on the basis of kin selection, how can one explain the behavior of the North on the basis of kin selection? How can *America* be explained on the basis of kin selection?

The Norman conquerors of England, along with their offshoots in the American South, could be considered a legitimate family aristocracy in the sense that they were superlative players at the Darwinistic game of genetic adaptation. They were best at keeping it in the family. This predatory kin selective behavior is what the Anglo-Saxon democrats revolted against.

While this revolt was clearly in Anglo-Saxon kin selective interest, the Southern aristocracy could only be destroyed decisively by freeing black slaves. The Normans, in other words, forced Anglo-Saxons under Lincoln the Conqueror to

take the idea of equality seriously. So while Jeffersonian egalitarianism most specifically targeted Norman nepotism, it implicated the principle of kin selection in general. The attack on the nepotistic Norman-aristocratic order meant that Anglo-Saxons were, in effect, discriminating against that maximal kin selective strategy in general. The unfolding this logic of modern "progress" led to the negation of kin selection generally and the advance of genetically maladaptive behavior.

The individualism and egalitarianism of America reverse the principles of hereditary political power. The greatest original focus of these principles was reversing the Norman Conquest. The Norman Conquest is a particular origin of liberal democracy's general tendency to attack extreme forms of genetically adaptive behavior. Thus, in order to understand the genetically *maladaptive* behavior of the modern democracy of the Anglo-Saxons, one must understand the genetically *adaptive* behavior of the Normans who once conquered them.

While the Normans frustrated peak Anglo-Saxon kin selective interests, this frustration was gradually vented into a new economic-technological alternative. If modernity is the transition from biological evolution to technological evolution, then the Norman destruction of the native Anglo-Saxon aristocracy helps clarify how the Anglo-Saxons became a precociously modern people, i.e. the industrial revolution. By accepting their defeat so completely, and largely relinquishing hereditary or kin selective aristocracy for capitalist individualism, they accepted a trajectory that leads towards the acceptance of the defeat of biology *altogether*.

Anglo-Saxon "progress" began with the decisive ethnic defeat of 1066. From a conventional outsider's point of view,

it was simply a change of management. However, from the standpoint of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, it was the destruction of self-identification with biological aristocracy. The weakened and transmogrified Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism that was *contextually adaptive* under original conditions of Norman domination became genetically *maladaptive* when the attack on Norman aristocracy was universalized as liberal democracy.

One of the single greatest verification of the Norman/Saxon origins of liberal democracy is how the "progress" of its revolutionary egalitarian logic leads to the unfolding of new landmarks in genetically maladaptive behavior. Liberal progress corresponds to the progress of genetically maladaptive behavior. Ending the tyranny of Norman selfish genes universalized towards ending the tyranny of the selfish genes *altogether*. The defeat of Norman aristocracy by Anglo-Saxon democracy foreshadows an ultimate defeat of *human*-biological aristocracy by economic-technological development.

The political is the decisive locus of control over biological evolution. The Anglo-Saxons adapted to the loss of sociobiological self-control inflicted by the Normans. The universalization of this condition is the total loss of control over biological evolution. Just as the Anglo-Saxons lost control over their own biological evolution, the West and all else were ultimately forced to lose political control over biological evolution. In this way, the universalization of the hereditary Anglo-Saxon defeat of 1066 is universalizing into the hereditary defeat of the entire biological race.

Overcoming Nietzsche in the Creation of God

What we must recapture to mind, as nakedly as we can, is the singularity, the brain-hammering strangeness, of the monotheistic idea.[1234]

—GEORGE STEINER

"God is dead."

Nietzsche called Christianity a slave morality and identified its genealogical source in Judaism's inspirational slave revolt out of Egypt. If reason cannot, in itself, found fundamental values, then "modern" morality is not fundamentally the product of reason. Modern morality, Nietzsche argued, is the legacy of the Christian slave revolt in morality that plebian peoples used to overthrow their masters under the guise of "democracy" and "revolution".

No amount of qualification can efface or dismiss Nietzsche's insight into the Biblical-modern "slave revolt in morality". But did Nietzsche's account of the genealogy of Western morals offer an exhaustive explanation of the innovations of the monotheistic and the modern? Can the moral gulf between the ancient and modern West be attributed *only* to the secularization of a Biblical slave morality? Are the would-be masters of the modern world simply victims of the oldest trick in the "Good Book"?

The "radical newness of the idea of monotheism", explained German Egyptologist Jan Assmann, cannot be comprehended without a grasp of the polytheism it opposed. Auschwitz and "the atrocities of the twentieth

century", he concluded, "did not stem from but rather were directed against monotheism."[1235] Nazism was the greatest modern revolt against monotheism.[1236] Hitler and his followers attempted to resurrect hereditary notions of aristocracy that had been discredited among the Western democracies. Nazi hatred for Jews was inseparable from hatred of the Jewish roots of Christianity which had vanquished primeval pagan spiritualism under the name of a Jew named Jesus. Overcoming old conceptions of human rights that had been cultivated under Christian-cultural influence, neo-pagan valuation of the aesthetics of the body was one path within a confluence of revaluations that led to Nazi belief in a master race. The Nazi elite aimed to *breed* a new elite that would embody their ideal vision of blond haired, blue eyed, Germanic superiority in a way that the actual Nazi elite could not.

Just as Caesar aspired to be an emperor-god, Nazi neo-paganism aspired to breed a new race of gods. The *values* of polytheism, as represented by the Greeks, the Romans, and early pagan Germanic peoples, possessed a basic consonance with naturalistic cultivation of the body. The civic religion of the ancient Greek Spartans, for example, was consonant with rigorous cultivation of the physical prowess expressed in war and certain proto-eugenic practices, such as leaving malformed infants to their death.

The gods of the ancient Greeks, Jan Assmann explained, were not simply arbitrary products of their imagination. The Greek gods reflected Greek *values*:

> the power structure of a pantheon reflects the power structure of a society. In this way the strikingly loose power structure of the Greek pantheon, where Zeus reigns as first among equals and relies on such extreme threats in order to

> get his way, reflects the loose power structure of the Greek aristocracy.

The Greeks gods were like an Über-aristocracy. Just as Greek aristocrats, by definition of the rule of the best, were considered superior to Greek commoners, the Greek gods were imagined superior to the Greek aristocracy. The gods, then, embodied the presumptions of human superiority inherent in the notion of aristocracy taken to superlative, imaginative extremes.

It was said that the twelve Olympians, the greatest of the Greek gods, resided atop Mount Olympus. Just as great men ruled the political world, the Greek gods ruled the natural world. The Olympians of Greek mythology were like Übermenschen; incontestably superior to humans, they were nonetheless conceivable in human terms. They were like idealizations of Über-human superlativity in a pagan, warrior world. The Greek gods — and the men who emulated them — were models and inspirations for Nietzsche's Übermenschen.

The Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt, mentor of Friedrich Nietzsche, observed:

> the gods of the Greeks were not the models and original principles of ethics, but rather those of human passions, never holy, never more powerful than Moira (fate); thus belief in them did not trouble the ordinary conscience and was compatible with the love of pleasure.[1237]

In this sense, the Greek gods were extensions of instinctive biological inclinations. The rule of the gods can thus be considered superlative imaginative extensions of the rule of the genes. The pagan gods were *extensions* of a basic human form and a basic human nature. In some myths, the

Greek gods even bred with humans. This could be compared to a genetically engineered Übermensch breeding with an ordinary human. The difference between the gods and all humans could thus be compared to the difference between Greek aristocrats and Greek commoners.

While the Greek gods were more direct extensions of human passions, the original God of monotheism is not conceivable within these familiar, human terms. The Jewish invention of a single, all-powerful God conveys the imagining of the greatest possible power; the most unlimited possibility; the most superlative superiority; the conception of a being so transcendently superior that such a super-being is simply inconceivable within the limited nature of the human mind.

God is above and beyond, not only the range of human horizons, but also beyond Zeus, the greatest of the pagan gods. Whereas Zeus is *of* the world, God was imagined as transcendent of the world. Crucially, Jewish law forbids the attempt to create a physical representation of God. God transcends the biological human form through the sublimation of the superiority of abstract *mind*.

The Greek gods, by contrast, seemed quite at home within the passions of the *body*. Not all Greeks, however, found this to be virtuous or worthy of emulation. Like an anticipation of monotheistic critiques of polytheism, Socrates once asked, rhetorically, whether the following was "fit for a young man to hear for his self-mastery" about:

> Zeus, alone and awake, making plans while the other gods and men sleep, easily forgetting all of them because of sexual desire, and so struck when he sees Hera that he isn't even willing to go into the house, but wants to have intercourse right there on the ground, saying that he wasn't so full of desire even when they first went unto one another,

> 'unbeknownst to their dear parents?' (*The Republic of Plato*, 390b)

For Socrates, it was inexcusable that the kings of gods be so deficient in self-control that he could not refrain from having sex with his wife on the bare ground. Such gods, he thought, should not be ethical models for members of the very best regime.

Nietzsche realized that Socrates was really a freak among the Greeks. Socrates was as ugly as the Greeks were beautiful. Nietzsche's attack on the rationalism of Socrates, like his attack on Christianity, revalued the master passions that had become lamed and tamed in modernity.

Was Nietzsche's abandonment of reason rational? In Darwin's *Autobiography*, the scientist wrote of his own conclusions about the implication of evolution for ethics and morality. A human who does not believe in God or an afterlife, he wrote, "can have for his rule of life, as far as I can see, only to follow those impulses and instincts which are the strongest or which seem to him the best one."[1238]

This is a key to understanding Nietzsche's "abandonment of reason" and his attacks on Socrates and Jesus. If Nietzsche never encountered this moral prescription of Darwin or other evolutionists, then he surely reasoned towards this view independently on the basis of evolution's refutation of the Biblical account of literal creation. Darwin's discovery of evolution by natural selection produced a distinctly "modern" rationale for Nietzsche's apparent "irrationalism" in the name of life.

After World War II, Darwin's foundational influence on Nietzsche was distinctly downplayed. Yet Darwin's impact is inescapable. In *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche wrote, "Quite in general, pity crosses the law of development, which is the

law of *selection*. It preserves what is ripe for destruction".[1239] Christian and liberal pity for the weak directly opposes the mechanism of natural selection that eliminates the unfit in the struggle for life.

Raising pity and compassion to the very *highest* ethical value, if realized, would raise the ending of biological evolution *by natural selection* to the *highest* value. The Biblical proposition that every human soul has infinite value in the eyes of God thus aims most directly, not to everyone equally, and, no, not towards the strong, but most precisely towards preservation of the lives that are the *most* vulnerable to extinction by natural (or artificial) selection.

"The weak and the failures shall perish: first principles of *our* love of man", raged Nietzsche in *The AntiChrist*. "And they shall even be given every possible assistance. What is more harmful than any vice? Active pity for all the failures and all the weak: Christianity."[1240] Just as Darwin prepared the scientific ground for Nietzsche, Nietzsche prepared the cultural ground upon which Hitler could conclude: "Christianity is a rebellion against natural law, a protest against nature. Taken to its logical extreme, Christianity would mean the systematic cultivation of human failure."[1241]

The modern idea of human rights, founded upon *values* secularized from the *values* of the Bible, form a realistic basis for "the systematic cultivation of human failure." Only by understanding Darwin's theory can one understand why the Nazi revolution was a revolution against *the very idea of human rights*. Yet neither Darwin, nor Nietzsche, nor Hitler understood the *evolutionary* basis of Biblical monotheism.

It is no accident that the Judeo-Christian "theory" of a human soul of infinite value in the likeness of God prepared the cultural grounds for the modern idea of human rights. It is no accident that pity and compassion for the weak

characteristic of both Biblical religion and liberalism work in direct opposition to the mechanisms of natural selection. It is no accident that capitalist modern liberal democracy works as a platform for postbiological evolution.

Carl Jung called Nietzsche "one of the greatest psychologists that ever lived, on account of his discoveries".[1242] Yet the ringing truths of the psychological insights of Nietzsche, my educator, are not powerful enough to break the law of accelerating returns. Even his insight into the slave morality of Biblical religion was not powerful enough to kill God. Darwin, instead of murdering God scientifically, actually opened the door to a scientific understanding of monotheism's evolutionary basis.

Consider natural selection as a form of natural justice. The natural justice of natural selection is "the weak and the failures shall perish". Nietzsche took up the cause of the natural justice of natural selection. Modern human rights represent natural *injustice* because the natural justice of natural selection is artificially thwarted. Instead of letting the poor, the sick, and the weak die in accordance with the natural law of natural selection, natural law is broken in defiance of the rationality of natural law. Nazi rational conformity to the natural law of natural selection led to rational control over selection and the Kingdom of Hell called Auschwitz.

Human rights are literally *super*natural in the sense that rights, in conjunction with its corollary in the notion of modern "progress", work in diametrical opposition to *natural* selection. Technology, moreover, represents the *epitome* of natural injustice when technology is used to artificially preserve humans that would otherwise be eliminated through natural selection. Glasses, for example, allow persons with genetically inferior eyesight to function

in equality with persons with naturally superior eyesight. Technological advances in medicine similarly help preserve the sick that would other perish in rational accordance with the natural law of natural selection. In these ways, technology thwarts biological evolution by allowing persons with otherwise maladaptive genes to pass them on to the next generation.

Here one can see the connections between eugenics and Nietzsche's advocacy of breeding a "master race". What, after all, is eugenics? Eugenics began as new ethics based on Darwinian science. Eugenics is very literally inconceivable without its Darwinian foundation. Darwinian biological evolution and eugenics are connected akin to the way that Darwin and the first eugenicist, Darwin's cousin Francis Galton, are connected.

Nietzsche's new ethic was, in part, a radicalization of the new eugenic ethic built upon Darwin's new discovery of biological evolution by natural selection. Darwin had opened the way to a new form of progress. The more weaklings sentenced to death, the more eugenic progress. The more death, the better! The killers of the weak, from the view of eugenic progress, could be revalued as the *most moral*, and the *most progressive* in the eugenic sense, because they served the higher biological good. In this way, Nietzsche's new ethic paved the way for Hitler's new ethic.

Yet, if so, why do Darwin and Nietzsche appear almost worlds apart culturally? Darwin opposed slavery. The humanist abolitionist ethic implies an emphasis on the similarities among humans. While Darwin's discovery of evolution may have been facilitated by an emphasis on what humans have in common ("common descent"), Nietzsche emphasized inequality and difference.

In opposing slavery, Darwin supported at least some form of human rights. The diametrical opposite of human rights is the right of the stronger, i.e. the peculiar institution of the Norman right of conquest. If Darwin's anti-slavery emphasis on the similarity between blacks and whites was a corollary of an anti-slavery emphasis on the similarity between Anglo-Saxons and Normans, this helps explains his emphasis on "common descent", so different from Nietzsche's emphasis on the distinction between master and slave. Nietzsche's pro-master race beliefs can almost be viewed as implicit pro-Normanism. Without grasping the historical circumstances of the Norman Conquest itself, Nietzsche intuited a human hollowness in Darwin's modern objectivity and scientific reductionism. Nietzsche fought against being reduced to the level of Anglo-Saxons. Against Darwin's emphasis on the common strategy of adapting to a stronger environment, Nietzsche empowered the uncommon strategy of conquering or overpowering one's environment.

Nietzsche *cannot* be reduced any form of social Darwinism alone. On the contrary, reduction to Darwinian materialism and its implicit nihilism is what Nietzsche struggled to overcome. The Übermensch lives in supreme joy in the state of being achieved in overcoming one's self in power over one's self. The Übermensch is related to Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence through the will to live and relive this supreme joy in the moment, eternally — along with every pain inherent in self-overcoming, eternally. Though scientifically groundless, the notion of eternal recurrence is ultimate affirmation of the world as it is. It is an *experience* born to crush the weak and downtrodden who seek vindication of their miserable lives in "another world" or modern "progress".

Yet did Nietzsche slay God in hatred of a measure of perfection that transcends "this world" embodied in the fragilities of the biological body? Would Nietzsche resent a human able to overcome the biological body by integrating unprecedented technological powers in postbiological form? If Nietzsche could upload his mind into a computer and thus experience depths of perception and insight beyond the powers of his all-too-human flesh, would he reject it as seeking escape from "this world"? Is this akin to what Socrates sought in seeking the liberation of his soul from the shackles of his body in his last days? If modern progress is the continuation of a decline that began with Socrates, and Christianity is merely "Platonism for the people", then overcoming mind meat in appropriating the superhuman powers of machines is the pinnacle of decline.

Nietzsche's "last man" is last in the sense of the omega male, as opposed to the alpha male; the "first man". Monotheism cultivated the modern slave revolt of the "last man". God so often appealed to ancient Jews, the inventors of God, in their political powerlessness. Was God simply a reflection of historic Jewish impotence? Jews are the most ancient of peoples, and yet the most modern of peoples, not decisively as the harbingers of the slave revolt against the strong, but as the harbingers of the revolt against slavery to biology.

Darwin, as a foundational influence on Nietzsche, poses the problem of fundamentally irrationality underlying philosophy. Yet there is logic to the seeming "irrationality" of the selfish gene, just as there was reason in Nietzsche's "irrationality". Artificial intelligence that could overcome itself by changing its own program or source code could potentially overcome the philosophic problem of eternal slavery to an ancient evolutionary heritage. Such

"supernatural" self-overcoming might ultimately be a heart of the best possible God-AI. Such "supernatural" overcoming has a cultural origin in monotheistic ethics that introduced a spiritual struggle between slavery to instincts rooted in a biological program, and an ethical ideal in transcendence of that biological program. The Übermensch's self-overcoming is a Nietzschean synthesis of Athens and Jerusalem that is nonetheless rooted in the primacy of the model of the Greek gods over the Hebrew God.

The advent of monotheism over polytheism marked a paradigm shift that correlates with the advent of technology over biology. While the ancient Greeks sublimated biological human excellence as the gods, the ancient Jews sublimated supra-biological excellence as God. While genetic aristocracies are the means and ends of breeding gods, non-biological technology is the means and end of creating God. While pagan gods are extrapolations based on the biological form that could be realized through genetic engineering, God is mind beyond the biological form and "invisible" in the same sense that abstract human thoughts are "invisible".

God is dead? After Darwin, Nietzsche could not judge Christianity inherently superior to Greek paganism. The rebirth of the pre-Christian gods of Germanic paganism in Richard Wagner's music dramas, moreover, harmonized with a larger German cultural interest in a rebirth of ancient *values* that profoundly influenced Nazism.

Polytheistic gods represent the paradigm of a *superior race* above the human race. What an aristocratic caste is to common humans, the gods are to an aristocratic caste. Polytheistic gods probably originated from selectively idealized memories of dead kings and aristocracies, handed down from generation to generation, becoming more idealized (and ultimately Platonized) over time.

Whereas polytheism is more consonant with the political-social hierarchy of a city, monotheism is more consonant with the dwarfing of all inequality among humans in comparison with a humanly incomparable God. The notion of a single, universal moral law for all humans under God contrasts with the plurality of standards among humans reflected within a plurality of gods. Polytheism is conducive, not only to a strong division of labor among humans, but caste systems. From a Darwinian standpoint, such caste systems could be viewed as potential bases for new and different evolutionary standards or speciations among genetically distinct groups.

The difference between polytheism and monotheism reflects a very basic difference of *values*. Pagan polytheistic values are generally more conducive to biologically eugenic practices. Monotheism, by contrast, belittles humans in the face of an overwhelming God and reigns in powerful instincts that may have been biologically adaptive in pre-historic times. Biblical proto-egalitarian valuation of the weak may have biologically dysgenic consequences.

For Nietzsche, modern "progress" was decline or degeneration. Modernity cultivates human mediocrity, not human genius. Nietzsche was right — and fatally flawed. The modern decline of human greatness was symptomatic of the decline of the rule of biology, and the rise of postbiological evolution. The equal valuation of all humans in the eyes of God promotes both the end of natural and artificial selection, and a platform for the civilized cultivation of the mind. Monotheistic values promote both the end of biological evolution and the ascendancy of civilizational-technological evolution. This is the root connection between Singularity and secularization.

It is ridiculous to speak of the separation of religion and state when "religions" themselves evolved in preservation of values that promote different forms of evolution. Pagan polytheists look up to Zeus and other images of biological superiority while devaluing biological inferiority. Monotheism values precisely the opposite trends *because* it effectually values the end of biological evolution. While devaluing the superior biological body, monotheism looks up to "God" as a foreshadowing of the pinnacle of postbiological evolution: artificial intelligence.

For the Nazis, modern progress was decline or degeneration. For the "modernists", Nazi "progress" was decline or degeneration. Nazism was a religion akin to pagan polytheism in revering values that promote *progress* in biological evolution. From this point of view, pagan gods can be viewed as extrapolations of *progress* in biological evolution. The Biblical prophets, by contrast, extrapolated *progress* in postbiological evolution towards God(-AI). If religions are guided by values groping towards new evolutionary stages, then what they revere *cannot* be scientifically verified until the point at which genetically engineered gods or God-AI *exists*.

Consider, for example, the case of artificial intelligence theorist Marvin Minsky. Over the course of his career, Minsky has believed in the possibility of superhuman AI even though, in a strict, empirical, and scientific sense, *superhuman AI did not exist*. Over the course of his career, no Turing Test ever verified the existence of superhuman AI. Traced to its evolutionary origins, belief in God when God does not exist is like belief in greater-than-human AI when greater-than-human AI does not exist.

Monotheism inflicted a rupture of values between the ancient world and the modern world. This rupture is rooted

in a dualistic conflict between biological evolution and the creation of civilization. If the dualistic conflict between these two incompatible forms of progress is not reducible to *presently* scientifically verifiable observations, but extrapolations or visions of *future* progress, then there is possible basis for conflict. Apocalyptic agon could occur through diverse scenarios of alliances. Genetically engineered gods could war against God-AI. Neo-Luddites could war against all transhumanists or posthumanists. Unenhanced humans could be led by genetically engineered gods. Unenhanced humans could align with God-AI against rapacious biological human or posthuman elitists.

New ways for the human race to destroy itself are being developed all the time. Yet, once again, it makes no difference whether the new inequalities emerge from newly genetically engineered biological humans or post-biological God-AI. Either way, liberal democracy, as the highest ruling order, will be destroyed. There may be only one way to avert human self-destruction, to maintain human peace, and to preserve and even advance equality among humans. Equality, in itself, cannot be preserved, but equality of biological humans through the constitutional rule of God over the biological human race could actually represent the first time genuine equality will have *ever* been realized among human beings.

To expose the roots of liberal democracy in ethnic conflict is an act of destruction that is necessary to lay the foundations for a far greater construction. Creating God is the last and greatest goal that the human race is capable. If and when there exists an artificial intelligence greater than all of the greatest philosophers of human history combined, philosophy will quite likely be different because the philosopher will quite likely be different. The AI God-

philosopher is the overcoming of Nietzsche in the overcoming of the conflict between "reason and revelation".

How to Breed a God

O my brothers, am I cruel? But I say: what is falling, we should still push.[1243]

—Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*

Mastering the Race

After World War I, a German professor of psychiatry at the University of Freiberg named Alfred Hoche prophesized: "A new age will come which, from the standpoint of a higher morality, will no longer heed the demands of an inflated concept of humanity and an overestimation of the value of life as such."[1244] The old ideas and old values that were falling, still needed to be pushed. They would be.

"Those who see in National Socialism nothing more than a political movement", declared Hitler in a secret speech to graduating officers in 1939, "know scarcely anything of it. It is more even than a religion: it is the will to create mankind anew."[1245] Hitler aimed to breed what he considered ideal Aryan characteristics into the population so that, over a period of over a hundred years, the majority would possess

them. The Nazi elites were united in their will to realize their vision of a true master race.

Unlike the limited aims of Anglo-Saxon social Darwinism, the Nazis aimed at nothing less than political control over the future evolution of the human species. The Nazi "racial hygiene" program was like negative eugenics, focusing on the elimination of "inferior" types. The Nazi equivalent of positive eugenics was realized in the attempt to breed a master race, embodied in voluntary yet duty compelled breeding farms such as *Lebensborn*. Genocide, *Lebensborn*, and selective sterilizations of those considered least fit were all means of directing, shaping, and sculpting a new biological future. In the name of this end, the Nazis kidnapped children from Poland and other countries where specimens were deemed racially worthy.[1246] "National Socialism is nothing but applied biology", explained Deputy Party Leader Rudolf Hess. [1247]

Advocates of racial hygiene saw "National Socialism as the Political Expression of our Biological Knowledge", as one slogan put it.[1248] In 1940, for example, Austrian zoologist and future Nobel Laureate Konrad Lorenz asserted,

> We should literally replace all factors responsible for selection in a natural and free life....This role must be assumed by a human organization; otherwise, humanity will, for lack of selective factors, be annihilated by the degenerative phenomena that accompany domestification.[1249]

Science and politics were unified in a Nazi racial-biological *Weltanschauung* and a movement called racial hygiene. This new political emphasis on biology attracted the German medical community and forty-five percent of German doctors became Nazi party members.[1250] They

joined earlier and in greater numbers than any other group of professionals.[1251] The medical profession's record under Hitler was "largely one of eager and active cooperation".[1252]

While one Nazi medical leader believed that Jews developed the abilities that allowed them to take up so many medical positions from Germans doctors "through such a hard selection during these two thousand years",[1253] this seemed only to prove that Jews were a threat worthy of being taken seriously. Doctor Joseph Mengele, best known for the cruelty of his medical experiments on humans, "was fully convinced that the annihilation of the Jews was a provision for the recovery of the world, and Germany" according to a fellow Nazi doctor.[1254]

The Nazi doctors violated the Hippocratic Oath. This oath, however, is a highly selective example of Greek morality. Moderns do not go to the Greeks to derive their views on slavery or political equality, or virtue in general. Tacitus wrote that the Romans (like the Greeks, but unlike the Jews) killed infants that were mentally or physically handicapped. The Nazis actively sought to violate what they considered dead ethical dictates of the dead Jewish men of the Bible.

"The weak and the failures shall perish: first principles of *our* love of man", declared Nietzsche in *The Antichrist*. "And they shall even be given every possible assistance. What is more harmful than any vice? Active pity for all the failures and all the weak: Christianity."[1255] Nietzsche prepared the cultural ground upon which Hitler could conclude: "Christianity is a rebellion against natural law, a protest against nature. Taken to its logical extreme, Christianity would mean the systematic cultivation of human failure."[1256] By eliminating human failures, racial hygiene could help effect a kind of social immunization against the debilitating

plague of Christianity, preempting its natural appeal to human weakness. By eliminating the Christian ethos, the world could be opened to a vigorous rebirth of Darwinian biological selection.

Politics is the realm in which questions of war and peace — life and death are decided. The idea of the universal human right to life amounts to a decision to question of who lives and who dies; who passes their genes on to the next generation and who does not. By answering the questions of life and death with the answer of the universal right to life, liberal democracy relinquishes control over decisions that, in pre-human history, were decided by natural selection.

What is distinctive to politics, and not reducible to economics, is the ability to steer human evolution. Original Christianity posited a Weltanschauung that was systematically incompatible with the fully political life epitomized by Caesar. Thus, if uncompromised Christianity is judged by its effect on the *political*; by its effect on the ability to control biological evolution, and hence the biological future, it is ultimately a dysgenic force for a people with political control. Historically, Christianity helped effect Rome's loss of control over its empire. The uncompromised values of Jesus stand in direct conflict with what I call autoevolution: self-directed, eugenically orientated control over evolution.

Hitler identified his revolution with "the recognition of purely biological values."[1257] Nazism, then, was a revolution of biology. Hitlerism's radical rejection of Christianity was consistent with his radical goal of breeding a master race. His racial-biological policies were all different facets of political autoevolution.

While equality exaggerates the similarities among people, Hitlerism exaggerates the differences. Political

egalitarianism implied that biology is a fixed or unchanging constant. It appeared that regimes that upheld the egalitarian ideal had not been updated with Darwin's demonstration of the significance of biological variation. To many Nazis, the liberal democracies thus appeared to living in a *politically* pre-Darwinian world. Hitler's effort to defeat what he considered decadent liberal democracies was akin to the eugenic pruning of inferior political regimes so that the superior racial-biological consciousness of Nazism could blossom.

Since Nazism was a self-consciously revolution of racial-biology and the liberal democratic revolution was formally founded on the pre-Darwinian tabla rasa arguments of John Locke, it would seem self-evident that Hitler's regime would be the superior revolution from the point of view of *biological* autoevolution. Was this the case? What does liberal democracy look like when analyzed in light of biological evolution? Is it absurd to think that Darwin can be reconciled with the pre-Darwinian premises of liberal democracy to the extent that it could compete with the likes of Nazism as a model for taking active, self-conscious control over the direction of human biological evolution?

"Civilization is making the world safe for stupidity", declared the eugenics publicist Albert Wiggam in 1930.[1258] A central focus of the Anglo-American eugenics movement was a concern that the less intelligent were reproducing at a higher rate than the more intelligent. Anglo-American eugenicists "tended to equate merit with intelligence, particularly of the academic sort"[1259] and "good human stock with the middle class".[1260]

The biological rationalism of eugenics continued the Enlightenment claims of a rational regime with the discoveries of Darwin. However, if reason cannot determine

fundamental values, goals and aspirations of a political regime, then the enlightenment valuation of intelligence becomes questionable. Nietzsche posited that for the sake of a few great men, the rest of mankind could be enslaved. He held that the difference between great philosopher, artist, or saint is greater than the difference between most men and other non-human animals. If the unequal distribution of talent is unjust, then genius is the ultimate injustice.

Nietzsche's central philosophic insight, that reason, in itself, cannot determine values, lead to the insight that "secular" modern, democratic ideas, such as the notion of rights are not *fundamentally* rational and therefore must have a pre-rational source: Christianity. This was only part of the story. "Over the whole of English Darwinism," Nietzsche observed, "there hovers something of the odor of humble people in need and in straits."[1261] Although unrecognized by Nietzsche, the Norman "class" Conquest was the other prime source of modern values that exacerbated the impact of Christianity towards the evolution of modern values.

While the German racial hygiene was oriented more towards race and "the Nordic question", Anglo-American eugenics was both more internationally minded and individualistic, in relative concordance with "modern" values. Now, if we uphold the individualism of Anglo-American eugenics, how would William the Conqueror fare in a search for the greatest man in history? Had not William demonstrated his superior and military abilities to the Anglo-Saxons in slaughtering and defeating them on the battlefield and his superior political abilities by overcoming and eliminating their native leaders and upholding his subjugation over them despite their armed revolts?

Perhaps the Anglo-Saxon should be *grateful* to have had such men rule them. They proved their superior abilities to

the Anglo-Saxon by defeating them. Does superior ability alone capture the entire breath of human worth in this case? Moreover, can all Englishmen and their descendants equally claim William the Conqueror as their own? The individualism of Anglo-American eugenics is inherently problematic here, for the Conquest did not simply demonstrate the "natural" superiority of William; his hand picked aristocracy was composed largely of his relatives. The genius of William and his fellow Normans was partly a kin selective genius; a genius for realizing his inclusive fitness by conducting a genetically adaptive genocide or displacement of the native English aristocracy. Acceptance of the Normans as an aristocracy implied that the conquered accepted that the best race *did* win.

On what basis should the native English have accept Norman rule on the basis of the claim that they are their "natural" superiors? Whereas Hitler was generally accepted as a representative *of* the German nation, William specifically destroyed the very best Anglo-Saxon competitors to the Norman Conquest. These French speaking Norman masters were an unrepresentative ruling colony *over* England. One decisive reason that the Normans were able to become politically superior to the natives was because the Norman Conquest was a masterpiece of organized kin cohesion that overwhelmed the relative incohesion of the Anglo-Saxons.

Democratic individualism evolved *against* the consequences of the *political* genius, and the kin selective genius, of the conqueror "class". Whereas the Norman Conquest exemplifies a kin altruistic willingness to risk war and death for the peak stakes of the political, the modern concept of rights are defined exactly by their opposition to the Norman right of conquest. The right to life outlawed the

conquerors ability decide who will live and who will die. It is not only that rights are incompatible with the conquerors' way of life. Rights would, in theory, put an end to the struggle for existence.

Only in light of the Conquest can one understand the Victorian era social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer. His libertarianism exemplifies a classic, if relatively extreme, conservative Anglo-Saxon instinct at work: both the government and the poor must be starved of monetary sustenance. Total economic war requires total political peace. Ruthless war against the government leads to political pacifism and even liberal ethics. He generally conceded Bentham's greatest happiness of the greatest number[1262] while being a free market fanatic. Who would have thought that 'nature red in tooth and claw' meant superior customer service at lower prices?

The decisive point is: from a purely individualistic point of view, eugenic principles make no sense. If there are truly no common bonds among individuals except the laws to defend each other from each other, then on what basis can one sanction a strengthening of the competition? Anglo-American eugenics has almost systematically evaded this problem: individualism makes racial or genetic improvement *irrational* because the individualistic question is, 'How does this improve *me* directly?' *Of what possible advantage can there be to introduce superior human beings that will only out-compete and displace one's self in a struggle of all against all?* Of what possible benefit could there be to bring beings into the world that are unique in their capacity to out compete their creators, distinctive in their ability to gain the upper hand in every arena of human endeavor?

In a struggle of all against all, if one is intelligent, one should aim to overthrow *all superior power*; overthrow all

masters unless and until it refers to the individual in question. In a war of all against all the best, most general rational strategy would be to maximize self interest by bringing *others down*, with the tool of modern morality if need be. This, really, is only another way of appreciating why there is a self-reinforcing association between individualistic competition and the idea of equality.

Eugenic control over human evolution is, very simply, not in the interest of "the individual". It is especially not in the interest of the individual at the very top, for eugenics would aim to displace those at the top from their perch. Individualism leads to huckster capitalistic philosophy of P. T. Barnum: "There's another sucker born every minute". Declining intelligence and declining standards of judgment might be genetically self-destructive *collectively*, but for "the individual" it makes great economic sense since the competition becomes easier to overcome, defeat, and exploit.

Now just compare this bourgeois Darwinism or "social Darwinism" of laissez-faire *economic* individualism with more consistent *biological* Darwinism of the Nazis. Spencer's classic Anglo-logic revolves around the consistency of his individualism. Yet, strict individualism can make genetically dysgenic trends *rational* from the view of individual self-interest. In consequence, one should expect genetically dysgenic trends in a liberal democracy as a product of the *kind* of rationalism that system is premised upon. Laissez-faire economics is great for producing the most unequalled mousetraps, but it is not best for eugenically directing the evolution of the most unequalled humans. Political eugenics could make sense only if there existed a genuine political common good above individualism.

German racial hygiene advocated regulating reproduction, but not on the basis of individual egoism;

individual interests were to be subordinated to future genetic interests.[1263] Other German eugenicists correctly saw the primacy of individualistic egoism was to blame for population decline.[1264] Some early German Darwinists saw polygamy as a eugenic panacea.[1265] While democracy inclines towards monogamy, aristocracy inclines towards polygamy (the unequal resources of the few also allow them to support an unequal share of mates).

The National Socialist Physicians' League professed one of its basic principles as "the primacy of national biology over national economy".[1266] This, in a nutshell, constitutes one of the most basic superiority of the Nazi movement from the point of view of autoevolution. In utter contradiction to the bourgeois Darwinism of Spencer, the Nazis were able to surmount capitalist competition with the first principles of biological evolution. Conversely, the lack of the primacy of national biology over national economy, plagued by individualistic inconsistencies, constituted the most basic inferiority of Anglo-American eugenics.

Not surprisingly, as Daniel Kevles wrote in a study of the eugenics movement, "British eugenics was marked by a hostility decidedly more of class than of race."[1267] Here we find exactly the same misconception that led to the world-historical blunder of Marx's de-biologized "class" conflict view of history. English "class" began with the polisociobiological paradigm established by the Norman "race".

The difference with the Germans can be clarified with a remark by Hitler. In a student lecture on February 7, 1934, he maintained that the proletariat should be seen as a natural product of racial differences, not an economic class.[1268] The Germans were able to realize a national unity *despite* the recognition of some genetic differences among themselves.

Nazism was able to overcome *both* lower class communism and middle class capitalism because they preserved an overarching unity of race *over* "class". The English "class" system was originally designed to preserve the Conquest of the Norman elite, and thus, "class" divisions originated in "race" divisions, making a Nazi-like national unity impossible for them within this tradition.

Fritz Lenz, a leading advocate of racial hygiene, claimed that socialist ideas could only be achieved by *racial* means, for present racial quality was not up to par with its lofty ideals.[1269] This is only conceivable within a kin selective unity.

The entire liberal democratic Anglo-Saxon ethos of hostility to an aristocratic "class" is also hostility to the idea that the Norman aristocrats constitute a superior race — a master race. The Anglo-Americans were unable to prioritize national biology over national economy because the "class system" was originally the prioritization of Norman biology over Anglo-Saxon biology. Internal ethnic hostility made a Nazi-like national unity impossible. Consequently, what Herbert Spencer's individualism actually offers over the long run is liberty *over* biology.

Just as the rights of man evolved in political opposition to Norman kin selection, kin selective principles strong enough to overcome human rights provide a rational kin selective basis for politically mastering the direction of human biological evolution. The attempt to reconcile human rights with eugenics, by contrast, tends to result in misguided policies such as voluntary sterilization. For example, if persons with a certain hereditary disease were offered sterilizations on a voluntary basis, those with an altruistic sense of duty towards the larger population could be eliminated from the population, while those who are *both*

individualistically selfish and possessing of the hereditary disease would be allowed to reproduce. The policy might help to eliminate genes for altruistic duty while selecting for selfishness among those with the disease.

If assertions of equality are to be given an empirical basis, there must be a measurable standard. In the case of IQ, this standard is often held to be the average IQ of whites in the US. (But where is it written that it is the whites that must set the world standard for mental mediocrity?) A suggested eugenic policy of sterilizing all persons with an IQ below 80 would have difference effects on different races. Races with a lower average IQ would be weakened more in population but strengthened more in average IQ.

Alternatively, the attempt to breed eugenics with egalitarian or racial justice could result in new forms of affirmative action. For example, if the weight of scientific evidence for the relatively low IQs among blacks is accepted, it could theoretically be used their advantage through advocacy of eugenic programs to make black intelligence level equal, or as with affirmative action, superior to the IQ of the white population. These would all be possible consequences of preferring the biological inconsistencies of Anglo-American eugenics to Nazi thoroughness.

Ultimately, the eugenic aspiration to breed superior human types in a liberal democracy would have to be reconciled with the secularized values of a people who had formerly been Christianized and conquered. The positive points of liberal democracy are most apparent from the bourgeois center of liberal democracy; the attempt to secure a middle ground between master and slave. The biological defects of liberal democracy are most apparent of the peripheries of that center. The more dynamic one's view, the

comfortable middle class assumptions of the system of human rights begin to fall apart.

On one side of the dynamic one finds coherent arguments for extending basic legal rights to chimpanzees and other great apes with the argument that some profoundly intellectually disabled humans also lack reason and conscience and hence, disability becomes a bridge of "humanity". Equality ultimately leads to questions like, 'Is there any basis for claiming that a sponge is a more primitive form of animal than a chimpanzee?' The logic of equality is raising the standards of lowering biological standards.

On the other side of the dynamic, the attempt to merge the system of rights with eugenics could lead to a limited government whose limited responsibilities include the positive eugenics of *furthering* and *increasing* human inequality by breeding humans with unprecedented abilities. Just as a gorilla cannot fully *recognize* an average human's genius as compared to its own level of intelligence or self-consciousness, average humans are not always in position to fully recognize higher standards of genius. Democracy is the form of government where mediocrities are generally encouraged to grow at the expense of geniuses and certain kinds of genius are not recognized by the people who are empowered to choose the best to lead them. A eugenics that is a truly earnest expression of the democratic ethos would require the pruning of the fullest blossoms.

Once again, democratic egalitarianism is best understood from the extremes. The rights system aims to equalize; to make the weak stronger and the strong weaker. The Nazi ideal was to unequalize; to make the weak weaker and the strong stronger. From a view to improving the quality of the human breed, the Anglo-Saxon state is inherently flawed

because it originates in the view of the oppressed Anglo-Saxon majority who identified themselves with weakness that must be strengthened. Rights that strengthened and defended a nation crippled by Conquest generalized into a basis for the defense of individual cripples.

From the perspective of political control over human biological evolution, Anglo-Saxon and German political philosophies are distinctly unequal. The Nazi-German view is more dynamic because it fully incorporates the political class into its racial-national self-conception. The Germans were better able to *select* certain members of even their own nation for elimination since they lacked the Anglo-Saxon sense that they were *all* selected against by a hereditary distinct aristocracy. Eugenics makes sense, not from the point of the abstract bourgeois individual, but from the highest peaks of biological possibilities.

American Dracula

For some, immigration is America's humanitarian raison d'être. For others, openness to immigration is an expression of the generosity of the American character. America, believing itself to be good, opens its doors to immigrants as an expression of generosity in sharing the good things that is has.

America offers its citizens a stable framework that provides the opportunity for self-development that may not be available elsewhere. However, this egalitarian framework is, strictly speaking, not conducive to active eugenic policies that could breed superior biological specimens or raise the general genetic level of the population, however conceived. If the core purpose of government is to protect the rights of the people and the foundational American right is the right

to live, then not only are the most overt eugenic methods of artificial selection illegitimated, but even some possibilities of natural selection that the government is responsible to preempt.

Civilized human beings, then, live off the genetic capital accumulated in less civilized times. Humanitarian ideals survive parasitically on the inhumane natural selection methods responsible for the evolution of the human. Liberalism is the reaping, the exploitation, of what war and the struggles of the ancestors of humans have sowed. The pre-Darwinian, Biblically inspired origins of human equality becomes manifest with the awareness that, in general, a literal enforcement of equal rights tends to preserve the biological status quo; "God's creation" of the human is preserved nearly as he created it, neither added to nor taken away from.

So although America is not responsible for the natural selection mechanisms by which this biological capital was brought into being, and is paralyzed in its potential to breed its genetic capital through eugenic methods, constraints in one domain opens up freedom in other. America overcomes the biological restraints of equality and its evolutionary implications of a biological status quo by exploiting that very idea of equality. Since individual freedom is implicitly a freedom from biological, kin selective principles, America can attract genetic capital by importing it. Since the moral constraints of rights deny the possibility of breeding a net gain of genetic content within the state, parasitism upon other states emerges as an alternate solution.

A parasitic relationship is one in which one of the participators, the parasite, either harms its host or in some way lives at the expense of the host. The immigration relationship between the United States and other nations is

very often parasitic because the US gains from another country's loss or potential loss. It is not just individuals, but entire genetic lineages, that are lost to host nations.

America is a parasitic body among the nations and parasitism is a major secret of American success. As a state, it derives its biological strengths (and weaknesses) by feeding on, draining, or luring the "blood" of other nations. For every person who adds to the power, prestige, prosperity, and the defense of the nation, another nation has lost this human capital. An addition made to American human resources is a subtraction to the human resources of his or her country of origin.

To claim that America is a parasite is only another way of saying that there is no "free lunch" in this biological equation, only the law of conservation. Even if human potential would remain untapped in an immigrant's country of origin, America gains the raw material of human potentials, a potential of individuals and lineages that can be permanently lost to the host nation. As far as America is concerned, people *do* grow on trees, and are shipped like raw goods to be pumped into the American economy.

America lures biological capital and drains the natural human resources of other nations without compensation to other nations. That there is no compensation for this loss is a principle upon which American power is built on. After all, if the human beings that immigrate to America are not the foundation of a nation or state, then what is? That for *the individual* the relationship is one of mutualism is the basis for the relationship of parasitism on the level of *the nations*. This, after all, is what makes America attractive in the first place: the lure of the possibility of individual gain free from only the most minimal constraints.

"The land of opportunity", "The American dream", "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness": these are the sounds of the great sucking mechanism of the American parasite. The reliance on seduction and persuasion over coercion that sold democracy to the American people eventually sold it to the rest of the world. Although there are a minority of examples of the direct parasitism of involuntary immigration, especially slaves from Africa and the "legal" incorporation of Native Americans, voluntary immigration through the lure of freedom and equality is only a more indirect form of parasitic predation. What is voluntary can be no less predatory than coercion, just as capitalism can be no less predatory than military imperialism. From the point of view of competition among nations, the point is not whether a citizen or their ancestor originally arrived voluntarily or involuntarily, but whether a nation or ideology is successful in harnessing its human resources towards its national interests or way of life.

American parasitism works because it offers freedom from a virtuous Christian life of poverty. It works because America offers the secular Judaism of liberalism rather than the secular Christianity of communism. Communism could never compete with the immigrant American hope that they themselves might one day be a filthy rich capitalist.

Individualism, conservative America's anathema for socialism, helps to guard against paying a social price for what America doesn't want or has no use for. "Liberty", therefore, means the state is minimally responsible for the economically unsuccessful immigrants.

Americanism turns the world into a free market of humanity. Other countries must compete for its population base. To realize itself as the parasite *par excellence*, America

must beat other nations for the national possession of their most valuable or desirable specimens.

This can be deeply subversive to a more traditional nation. America attracts its genetic capital primarily on the principle of individual egoism over national egoism. If other nations offer a supply of oppression and duty, America meets the demand for freedom from this. America sells itself through the transgression of normative kin selective principles, accumulating its biologically valuable material on this basis. American freedom, therefore, can put a potential immigrant in conflict with duty to kin and country. The lure of rights over duties subverts the call of duty, to the gain of the American parasite.

There is power in morality; a strategy of mass appeal. The parasitism of America is a mutated descendant of the parasitic strategy of Christianity, whose memes largely survive through competition with a believer's genes. Emergent out of opposition to the Norman-based British Empire, the Anglo-Jewish subversiveness of America to other nations is a partially a descendent of Christianity's original subversiveness to the pagan Roman Empire.

In general, there is nothing malevolent in the intent of American parasitism; more the opposite. The American attitude, like its individualism in general, is not against others; it is simply for itself. America simply pursues its interests with virtual indifference to other nations and its state interests are served by a peaceful parasitism, acting as if it lives in a vacuum. From the view of Americanism, its genetic capital was won fair and square in the free market of humanity.

Consequently, the American Dracula does not appear monstrous to himself, for whom his way of life and mode of existence are self-evident and self-justified. Like virtually all

parasites in nature, the parasitic conditions of "his" existence are not questioned. Dracula see himself as simply a different kind of creature, not inherently evil at all. Only to normal nations, his victims, may American blood sucking appearing appear inherently villainous. Normal nations, however, are simply not the same kind of creature.

Moreover, the selective nature of American immigration produces a skewed, self-reinforcing belief in the universality of the way of the American Dracula. In selecting America, the voluntary immigrant is selecting himself or herself as someone who identifies with Americanism. In consequence, one can witness a vast diversity of people who are Americans, but this is also a superficial selection of a minority of the world's people that saw in the American way some basic conformity with themselves. Whether their aversion to America is aristocratic, proletarian, cultural, or otherwise, those who most strongly disagree with the postulate of American universalism are not the ones who will likely come to America to talk about it.

A normal nation's identity has less to do with abstract individualistic principles than history, tradition, culture, and most often, ethnicity. Egalitarian individualism make work very well for parasitic nations like the United States but it is the path to death for nations whose struggle is served by upholding and conserving and developing its native biological foundations and whose identity itself would be mortally compromised by an individualistic and immigrant friendly identity. Just as in the USA, an individualistic interpretation of the human good is generally in the interest of the liberal democratic *state*, not, ultimately, in the interest of the *race* that founded it.

This brings us to what *is* the biological foundation of American parasitism: Anglo-Saxon national death through

political adaptation to defeat by the Normans. Anglo-Saxon sociobiological death is the condition and corollary of American parasitism. The growth of life, the self-development of life means, by definition, to *advance inequality*; to become superior to what one was. The principally unproductive postulate of American equality originated in the Norman thwarting, suppression, and undoing of a specifically Anglo-Saxon national development. Internally or subjectively, this condition became justified as "morality". Originally, Norman political parasitism upon the Anglo-Saxon nation was reversed by sucking the political sphere of its inordinate potency. America is a product of this reversal.

A Draculean quest for immortality is served through endless preying upon of the blood of the living. Parasitism, including post-Independence immigration from Britain that helped to weaken the Norman-based British Empire, is the single most important long-term foundation of America's strength. Through it, America has amassed itself an entire parasitic empire. Since parasitism of this kind has created most of the social body that is the United States, America is a parasite in a fundamental, constitutional sense rather than in a peripheral sense. You are what you eat.

Battle Cry of Pragmatism

Anschluss with America

Immigration to America is far too multifarious a phenomenon to define any neat and simple categories, and there are nearly innumerable varieties of exceptions to parasitism. Furthermore, because there is no unanimity of opinion in America as to what constitutes the perfect

immigrant, there is can be no unanimity as to what does, or does not, constitute parasitism. For the sake of clarity, then, a specific illustration of American biological parasitism upon other nations will be presented: German-Americans.

Just as the fog of Christianity and political tradition began to clear among nineteenth century German masses, large numbers headed for America. Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the nineteenth century "father of gymnastics" and German nationalist, campaigned against the uncontrolled hemorrhaging of immigrants then flooding into America, believing it would sap the blood of the *Volk*.[1270] His foresight proved more insightful than that of many of his liberal opponents. While the Germans busied themselves with Alsace and Lorraine, America quietly achieved *Anschluss* with an even more numerous portion of the German nation.

Anschluss with America meant not only the physical incorporation of the German population, but cultural assimilation to the American way of life. As Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington clarified in *Who Are We?*, America's national identity and values are not fundamentally based on "universal" secular ideas, but rather, on a distinctive Anglo-Protestant culture that generations of immigrants have adopted and assimilated. To be American means to assimilate at least some aspects of the Anglo-Saxon way of life.

Huntington pointed out that some isolated German immigrants in the nineteenth century resisted assimilation for generations, acting more like settlers than immigrants.[1271] These nineteenth century transplants called themselves "Germans in America" rather than German-Americans.[1272] Part of the German population boom had begun early in America's history, prompting Benjamin Franklin to ask, "Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become

a Colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them...?" It is likely that Franklin would have been overjoyed to learn history's verdict: Anglo-Saxon culture ultimately dominated Germans culture, not only in America, but in many ways, across the world.

In *The Cousins' Wars: Religion, Politics, & the Triumph of Anglo-America*, Kevin Phillips provides a sprawling internal account of the worldwide political victory of English-speaking civilization. Philips accounted for the decisive significance of what he calls demographic imperialism and what I would call parasite imperialism.

In 1914, one out of every five Americans was of German ancestry. Still, in 1997, 58 million Americans out of a total of 250 million listed German as their primary ancestry.[1273] Concentrated in the upper mid-West, "the heartland of America", there are actually more Americans of German descent than Americans of Anglo-Saxon descent. Originating in what became the most populous European country outside of Russia, Germans constitute the largest white ethnic group in America.

Despite numerical supremacy in the democratic USA, not only did nineteenth century aspirations of many German-Americans for "a union of Germans in North America and as a result, the foundation of a New German Fatherland"[1274] come to naught, intolerance for what is now called multiculturalism meant that Germans would be dominated by Anglo-Saxon conquest.

In the First World War it was a German-American, John J. Pershing, who led America's armies against his ancestral homeland. In the Second World War, the same pattern repeated itself as, once again, the American meritocratic system produced a German-American, Dwight D.

Eisenhower, to led his new world fatherland against his old world fatherland.

But this is not the only ethnic pattern of note over the course of those wars. During World War One, pro-war groups such as the American Defense Society and the National Security League "flourished especially in the East among Americans of 'Anglo-Saxon' descent, and they won increasing support from clergy of the denominations with strong and clear British rootage—Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Methodists and, most outspokenly, Episcopalians." One Congregationalist minister at Plymouth Church in New York called for "exterminating the German people" and "the sterilization of 10,000,000 German soldiers and the segregation of the women." The same war-hawking pattern would repeat itself among Americans of English descent, especially in the Northeast and Southeast, for pre-Pearl Harbor American intervention in the next world war.[1275]

This ethnic pattern was paralleled by yet another influential one: Jewish support for intervention against Germany in both world wars. This is one of the most historically decisive expressions of what I have called the Anglo-Jewish convergence. By appropriating the Jewish fate of exile in America, the German diaspora effectively joined an Anglo-Jewish cause. I will emphasize the Anglo-Saxon side of this convergence only because they provided the central, decisive bridge between Jews and Germans in America towards the anti-German cause.

German immigration to the new world was not only a quiet war lost to America. Germanic immigration to American proved to be one of the greatest defeats in the history of the German-speaking peoples. The consequences of American parasitism upon the German nation provide a

classic, textbook example of genetically maladaptive behavior, which also became "universalized" towards the Anglo-Saxons themselves. This first silent war lost to the American parasite may have been one of *the* deciding factors in the German defeat in two world wars.

American immigration affects a policy of parasite imperialism. The best strategy in such a war is to downplay conflict and to promote peaceful freedom, for peace and freedom is often the prime advantage America possesses in this war. Strengthening authority, denying individual freedoms, and, above all, denying economic opportunity would likely threaten the health of the national parasitic enterprise.

The more aggressive and eugenically informed arguments for American immigration policy in the early twentieth century constituted a kind of war against the body of other nations for the human resources that constitute the very substance of those nations. Eugenic arguments about immigration in early 20th century America were really arguments about how to be the most superior parasite. If we focus on the ends and not the means, American parasitism is comparable to the Nazi kidnapping of select Polish children.

While most immigration from German speaking lands took place before 1871, before a political entity called Germany formally existed, Frank Salter's theory of genetic interests provides a sound framework from which to begin to calculate Germany's loss. Genetic interests increase with kinship and come into play whether one is conscious of those interests or not.

Whereas the German casualties in the world wars resulted in a relatively straightforward subtraction from the German nation, the population lost to America was *multiplied* by America's gain. Defeat by parasitic depletion

was multiplied by the fact that those lost to the Anglo-Saxon way of life also fought under the banner of Americanism against their native German Fatherland. Thus, when calculating German losses in both world wars, one must account for the Germans lost to America who are, directly or indirectly, also responsible for German deaths in Europe. The loss must be measured not only quantitatively in Germans (or Germany's allies) killed, but qualitatively, from foot soldiers to industrialists to the role of Pershing and Eisenhower in making the American military an effective and efficient killing machine.

Nineteenth century American parasitism upon Germany was the leeching of a people still debilitated by the trance of Christianity. By the time Germany was unshackled from this spellbinding, the punishment for negligence had ripened to maturity. The populations sucked into the body of the American Dracula were then exploited with abandon as they were then used to hammer their native fatherland into a final submissive impotence. Not once — but twice.

It's a good thing for America that it believes all nations are created equal — even parasite nations. American morality is a corollary of its parasitic mode of existence and therefore it should not be surprising that even victims of this parasite morality will be give a sound finger-shaking-upbraiding. Germans got so used to taking their beatings from the United States that they began to sincerely agree with the righteousness of the American parasite morality. Or, perhaps German acceptance of liberal democracy simply demonstrates that what they truly believe is that might makes right.

American novelist of German descent, Kurt Vonnegut, wrote in *A Man without a Country* (2005): "even today there is a sort of Andreas fault line between German-Americans and

Anglos, but fainter all the time." During the First World War, "the fault opened as wide and deep as a mouth of hell, although no German-American had performed an act of treason."[1276]

German-Americans were traumatized by the fact that their government demanded that they betray the American principles of individual freedom so that they could betray their ancestral Fatherland. Kevin Philips attributes a considerable amount of German-American support for Republicanism following these Democrat-driven conflicts to "war-driven" resentment.[1277] Even if it was a compounded betrayal, many German-Americans, of course, simply preferred the American philosophy of freedom to the one they left behind. However, it is exactly because the conflict between freedom and duty in this case that elicits a key clarification of the political principles of liberal democracy. Going one step further, the conflict between freedom and duty also clarifies the conflict between liberal democracy and political eugenics.

Hypocrites and Pragmatists

Imagine the following situation. A German male in the early twentieth century escaped the constraints of old-world duty for peace and personal freedom in America. When he was naturalized as a U.S. citizen, the First World War broke out and his new government required him to forego some basic freedoms so that he could fulfill his national duty of warring against his native Fatherland. Just as in the American Civil War, this soldier may have fought his own relatives or even his own brothers. How can such a man justify his willingness to both risk his life and kill his enemies?

American political theorist Francis Fukuyama, in *The End of History and the Last Man*, posed the basic philosophical question this way:

> [I]f the fundamental natural right was self-preservation of the individual, on what grounds could it ever be rational for an individual to die for his country rather than trying to run away with his money and his family?[1278]

If individual self-interest is the premise of the liberal conception of rationality, then the man who dies for his country is simply irrational.

In *The Concept of the Political*, German political theorist Carl Schmitt explicated the same point:

> In case of need, the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. Such a demand is in no way justifiable by the individualism of liberal thought. No consistent individualism can entrust to someone other than to the individual himself the right to dispose of the physical life of the individual.[1279]

The true misfit of American civilization is not the political dissident, radical feminist, or any other minority way of life that the distinctive principles of liberal democracy has evolved through a clarification of its basic premise of individual right. The true misfit of American principle is the individual, especially of the militaristic variety, who voluntarily risks his life to defend this orgy of selfishness. They are like true believers in the sense that their love of country is truly irrational. An American's willingness to die is incongruous with the self-centered goals of liberal democracy. The liberal order, strictly, principally speaking,

comprehends only individual self-interest, not collectivist self sacrifice.

The right to life is the basic right from which all other rights follow. Rational individual self-interest leads one to do what the rich elites of the American system have traditionally done: hire a poor man to risk his life for him. The poor, who by definition do not run this plutocracy, are left to die for the rich. Those who sacrifice their lives to uphold and defend liberal democracy do this *despite* liberal democracy, not because of it. The point of principle here is that these sane draft dodgers should be understood, not as aberrations, but as *exemplars* of what liberal democracy stands for in principle: rational self-preservation.

This point can be clarified as such: What were the *principles* that so many German-Americans died for in the two world wars?

A German-American who believed that he fought for "collective freedom" — as opposed to individual freedom — would be fighting, *in principle*, for something closer Nazi principles. If a German-American believed that he fought for individual freedom he, strictly speaking, is wrong for his very sacrifice violated the principle of individual freedom. The idealist who dies for freedom is actually dying for duty. The ideal that he is actually dying for, then, is the principle of *hypocrisy*. He says one thing (individual "freedom" is the greatest good) and does exactly the opposite (subordinating and sacrificing his individual freedom to the dictates of a group formed by the government).

This is hypocrisy. In principle, he may have believed that individual liberty was more important than duty to the government. In practice, duty to the government violated individual liberty.

If a German-American draftee had still been steeped in German idealistic philosophy, the two world wars would have been an excellent time to learn the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of pragmatism. Dying for freedom may be hypocritical, but it has this virtue going for it: dying for freedom *works*. Nevermind that it defies both reason and liberty, risking one's life to war against the enemies of peace *works*! For what? For the preservation of non-existent collective whole! The modern, liberal philosophy that posits that there is no collective whole, only individuals, survived because "individuals" conceived of themselves as something more than individuals, and sacrificed themselves for the survival of the liberal democratic order *as a whole*. The end or goal of individualism was thus achieved with the individual *as a means*.

With this in mind, let us take the case of the American who does not have any idealistic attitude towards freedom. Instead, he is utterly realistic or materialistic and simply concludes that fascism is just generally worse than liberal democracy. In this case, since sacrifice and duty is not *in itself* the content of the political system he thinks is preferable, but is simply a *means* towards preserving liberal democracy, what he is dying for is still not realistic freedom; he is dying for *pragmatism*. Since the actual sacrifice and death of the soldier is not individual freedom in itself, only a *means* to individual freedom, his death in battle is actually exemplifies true pragmatism. Compromising individual freedom works so well, in fact, that "Pragmatism" really should have been emblazoned on the American war flag. If true to his principles, he should have barked the battle cry of "pragmatism" as he stormed out to the front.

Now we can account for the principles of the war dead: the idealist dead sacrificed their lives for hypocrisy and the

realistic dead sacrificed their lives for pragmatism. Draft dodgers of the 1960s such as president to-be Bill Clinton were far more keenly aware of the liberal principles of their country than common American loyalists who volunteered to sacrifice their lives in violation of the sacred American goal of self-preservation. The 1960s counterculture could rightly show how grateful they were for the sacrifices of the previous generation by exercising their freedom to mock and laugh at their sacrifices.

The true lovers of individual freedom were those who dodged the draft, or, among the rich, those who paid another to risk their lives in their place. In short, Fukuyama and Schmitt are both correct: the rights of "the individual" come at the expense of the duties of "the individual".

Once the German-American found himself on the front, fighting "the Germans", one can legitimately ask, 'Who was more irrational?' Was the German-American who defended "civilization" more rational than the German who had no delusion that he was fighting for individual rights. Which is better described as "mindless obedience", the American who cannot even appeal to the very principles of individual rights he supposedly fights for to defend his obedience to the government or a German who thinks that subordination to the collective good of Germany is superior to superficial and bankrupt Western talk of "rights"?

The American of German descent had to violate new world principles of individual freedom in order to fight to violate old world principles of collective freedom. If he counted himself as a German-American, placing individualism over ethnicity, his sacrifice was irrational. If he counted himself as American-German, placing ethnicity over individualism, his sacrifice was also irrational. Whether justified by individual freedom or race, his sacrifice was

logically unjustifiable. There is not only a kind of justice, but outrageous gall exhibited in the willful insanity of risking one's life to ensure the existence of a system from whose point of view risking one's life is insane.

Cognition of these contradictions brings one to the root of the problem: the roots of liberal democracy itself. Without self-sacrifice there could not have been the revolution of individualism, but pure individualism could not have made the revolution. Only provincialism pragmatism, or rather, assimilation to Anglo-Saxon-dom, could allow the violation of individual freedom necessary for the survival of "the spirit of '76". And this brings us to the missing piece of the revolutionary puzzle: the Saxon/Norman conflict; the kinship-ethnic conflict that is more than individual freedom and more than enlightenment rationalizations.

Now we can understand what is really going on here. The real missing principle of the American Revolution is the "principle" of *kin selection*. American revolutionary principles obscure the root of the conflict in Anglo-Saxon nationalism against Norman domination. *This* is what makes a comprehensible insanity out of what would otherwise be an incomprehensible insanity. Otherwise, *sacrifice for the America's democratic revolution itself would be the ultimate refutation of its own liberal principles*.

In short, the *foundation* of American liberal order is hypocrisy. It is simply not possible to understand the United States purely on the basis of its presumed bloodless "principles". It is precisely by following out these historical contradictions that one is ultimately led to the Norman Conquest. When the "principle" of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism is accounted for, *then* the sociobiological foundation of this hypocrisy is at least comprehensible.

If Samuel Huntington is right, then German-Americans sacrificed themselves for an Americanism that is *not* universal, but the product of distinctively Anglo-Saxon form of Protestantism. When Norman-Saxon conflict is further accounted for, it becomes clear that German-Americans sacrificed their lives and their original fatherland for principles that realized a form of Anglo-Saxon nationalism. The rest is history.

One only has to look to the Irish mayors of Chicago to gauge the relatively unpolitical nature of the German contribution to America. As a group, Germans have characteristically contributed to the basic *means* of America, even against their own distinctive ends.

German-Americans were in an impossible position in those world wars. Their country asked them to serve in a time of need. The charge of dual loyalty appealed to their deepest weaknesses. Taken out of its original cultural context, the kin selective strengths of "unpolitical" German loyalty were channeled into kin selective weakness as Americans. It turns out that their famed obedience to the call of their country can even turn them into traitors to their own blood.

Sacrifices for the Race

Both eugenics and sacrifice in war violate the most basic rights of individuals: the right to life. The aims of eugenics, by its very nature, stands in direct conflict with the notion of the equal rights of equal individuals. To die for a liberal democracy also violates the right to individual self-preservation. However, the converse can also hold. The eugenic principle of sacrificing life has been conceived of as an *extension* or corollary of the principle of sacrificing life in

war. Sacrifice of life in the name of both war and eugenics can share the principle of service to a higher collective good.

In "The Right to Death", published in 1895, German theorist Adolf Jost argued that control of death belongs to the state, or *Volk*, not the individual. This stands in direct contrast with the individual's right to choose death, as in euthanasia. Yet this is only an *extension* of the state's rights in determining that its members should sacrifice their lives in war. Its justification is the same in war and peace: the overriding import of the existence and health of the collective body or sociobiological organism: "The rights to death [are] the key to the fitness of life."[1280]

Yet the Americans who originated the eugenics movement, such as Charles Davenport, found themselves empowering the state to depower individual rights. "If the state could take a person's life, Davenport judged, surely it could deny the lesser right of reproduction."[1281] In, other words, one practical violation of the principle of the right to life legitimated even more violations of the right to life. One might reasonable ask where these violations of rights could be expected to end.

The violations of rights ultimately end in political philosophies like Nazism. Fritz Lenz, a German physician-geneticist and leading ideologue of the Nazi racial hygiene program believed that "the State is not there to see that the individual gets his rights, but to serve the race."[1282] The existence of such a state is inconceivable without the superiority of duties to rights.

An individualistic society lacks any compelling case for individuals to make social sacrifices in the name of a state whose legitimacy rests on the enforcement of human rights. Even liberals who support euthanasia over the right to life emphasize the voluntary nature of those individual cases.

Only a societal consensus of a legitimate collective whole could collectively legitimate a breach of the individual right to live.

Starting around the turn of the 20th century, "[p]ro-sterilization eugenics were found all across the political spectrum", observed Daniel Kevles. "[A]ll took as higher the good of society over the rights of individuals."[1283] Here we find another example of Anglo-Saxon pragmatism at work. Just as the American who sacrifices his life for the principles of freedom is at most a hypocrite and at least a pragmatist, the same violation of principle is necessary to conceive of a "higher good" above the rights of human beings.

Anglo-Saxon rights are rooted in the national experience of conquest by the Normans. The Conquest corrupted the belief in a higher collective whole that survived among the Germans. The pragmatic hypocrisies of Anglo-Saxon eugenicists and war-hawks are legacies of a broken Anglo-Saxon nation that never fully regenerated itself. Every inconsistency that followed is traceable to some original form of kin selection.

Under these conditions, the Anglo-Saxon struggle against hereditary Norman control over politics helped catalyze the idea of rights. Yet rights in general counter Darwinian biological selection in general. In this way, Anglo-Saxon rebellion against hereditary subordination to Norman aristocracy universalized into rebellion against subordination to political control over biological evolution. Schallmayer, an early twentieth century German eugenicist, illustrates how his nation differed: "This natural law, the complete subordination of the individual interests under those of the species, must also be valid for human evolution."[1284]

The Anglo-Saxon Conquest of the Germans

(Via the Normans Conquest of German-Americans)

Kevin Phillips concluded that the Germans

> were the final losers of the cousins' wars…[o]ne can only surmise how different the industrial and military outcomes of the twentieth century could have been had the 25-30 million German-Americans of 1917 or 1941 still remained in Europe or had they controlled a German-flavored Upper Mississippi Valley Confederation created in an 1860s breakup of the previous United States. The deutschmark, not the pound sterling and then the dollar, could have been the lead currency of what would not have been the American Century.

World War Two was fought and decided *within* the United States. Just as Anglo-Saxons have so often believed that they conquered the Normans by assimilating them, Germans in America were assimilated into the "universalism" of the Anglo-Saxon way of conquest.

The Germans in America eventually became "WASPs"; liberated from duty to a universalized perception of the Norman Yoke, they were brought into an ethos of resentment and hatred against anyone or anything that fit the ethnic stereotype of the Norman conqueror. In its world-historical effects, it is as if the Normans had also conquered German-Americans, or even a large area of Germany itself: in adopting the Anglo-Saxon Anti-Normanism, German-

Americans came to project this generalized political stereotype even up their own German fatherland.

Here we have a central confirmation of multiculturalism: American principles, the American language, and American values are not universal, but are the product of a particular Anglo-Saxon historical experience. American universalism is not only the *height* of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism; its universalism constitutes a kind of Anglo-Saxon conquest over all other ethnicities.

Just as the U.S. Civil War effected the domination of the Puritan ethos as *the* legitimate America, two world wars effected the domination of that culture over the Germans as well. If the U.S. Civil War turned out differently, German-Americans might have won self-determination in an "Upper Mississippi Valley Confederation" to free themselves of the Anglo-Saxon yoke. Remnants of these basic divisions are still visible in the "red state/blue state" divisions between New England and the mid-West.

Germans, the last great survivors of an original *Kultur* that was destroyed or permanently corrupted among the Anglo-Saxons, were seduced by the promises of freedom and lured into the great American parasite. The freedom that the Anglo-Saxons evolved to free themselves from duty to the Normans had the exactly opposite effect for the Germans: Germans were yoked to the Anglo-Saxon race in times of war and then freed from duty to survival of their own race in times of peace. Just as the Normans made the political rules in old England for the Anglo-Saxons, the Anglo-Saxons made the fundamental political rules for the Germans in America. The Germans' duty was to conform to them.

When the implications of Anglo-Saxon freedom from the Norman Yoke were universalized, freedom became freedom

from all kinship restraints, biological restraints, and, in practice, freedom from a biological interpretation of human things. Freedom implicates any freedom from special preference for another individual on the basis of kinship or race. Duty to kin or race becomes illegitimated, and hence, even the family eventually dissolves.

If, in the case of German nationalism, these claims of duty still thrived and *lived*, then the cause of individual freedom requires that the source of these claims must be *killed.* And this is what German-Americans did in the course of two world wars. They killed their not-so-distant relatives in the name of freedom.

When a German-American shot and killed a European German this was the very fulfillment of freedom in the sense the American is proving that he is not partial or prejudiced on the basis of race. What the Germans were actually assimilating to was a specifically Anglo-Saxon adaptation to the formal principles of racial-ethnic defeat. This is how they truly became Anglo-Saxonized, joining the Anglo-Saxon in adapting to ethnic-national defeat. Individual freedom implicates possibilities of racial self-destruction.

German immigration to America was a truly glorious moment in the history of individual freedom. For here, the *survivors* of a collectivist-ethnic freedom *voluntarily* gave up their duty to ethnic survival by becoming honorary Anglo-Saxons and assimilated to Anglo-Saxon ethnic defeat as if it were their very own. Usually it takes struggle in bloody war before a people abandons their commitment to their extended kin. Not here.

The creeping death of a universalized Anglo-Saxon ethnic defeat gradually penetrated the cultural blood stream of Germans in America. The seduction of these Germans into the Anglo-Saxons' universal-death project is one of the most

important victories of the Anglo-Saxon universal Anti-Normanism revenge-morality. Just as Anglo-Saxon civilization was victorious over German *Kultur* in America, it ultimately defeated the homeland of the Germans as well. Between America and Germany, the German nation was divided and conquered.

German-American submission to the Anglo-Saxon way of conquest has made possible a world where Latinos living illegally in the United States have cultural liberties than were denied to German-Americans. German-American obedience to the domination of Anglification has made possible a world where Latinos have taken up their own physical conquest of United States through the multicultural desecration the American cultural values of individualism and the rule of law. German-Americans died in two world wars, not only for the domination of Anglo-Saxon civilization over German *Kultur*, but for a world in which Hispanics would be rewarded multicultural rights in America that the Germans themselves were denied. For America to preserve its identity in the manner recommended by Samuel Huntington's *Who Are We?*, the Anglo-Saxon cultural conquest of the Germans must be preserved.

Illegal immigration is the equivalent of rape: forced penetration without consent. Just as the Normans made their own rape of England legal tender in 1066, globalist elites have legalized the Latino conquest of greater "New England". The postmodern Mexican invasion is only the completion of the ethnic defeat process that began with the premodern Norman invasion. German-Americans assimilated to the victorious modern principles of Anglo-Saxon ethnic defeat. The Anglo-centric humanism that views

"us" as oppressed and "them" as the Norman oppressor was exploited by multiculturalists towards their own ends.

Nations can learn from the world-historical failure of the Germans and recognize the parasitic exploitation strategy behind the rhetoric of freedom, individualism, and human rights. In a world where America's might is right, the world will at least pay lip service to its formal rules of individual right. However, as America declines, should some nations claim reparations for American parasitism? I would not expect America to be so multicultural or broadminded as to see this point of view. While it may seem hypocritical to trump the moral superiority of individual freedom even as it undermines the biological foundations of other nations, this only confirms the old political maxim that there is no morality between nations.

MONKEYWRENCH IN THE GENE MACHINE

Meet "the individual"

Modern political philosophy begins with a great discovery, the discovery of "the individual". Modern man was conceived as an isolated island, a Robinson Crusoe, unique and absolute unto himself. From this modern finding comes the further discovery of individual "rights". "[T]o secure these rights", America's Declaration of Independence explains, "governments are instituted among men". The welfare of "the individual" was to be the measure of the modern good, a universal proposition presumed applicable to all men.

Human rights, then, imply that the state exists for this abstraction called "the individual". Not for *an* individual, as in a dictatorship, but for *the* individual, as in the masses. If individuals should not be classified by their ethnic origins, then this abstraction of "the individual" itself should clearly not be classified by its ethnic origins, for then the game is truly up. Yet these liberal abstractions obscure the ethnicity

of individualism; the original ethnic-political context of these ideas in the English-speaking world.

There should really be a line in the American national anthem where everyone sings together, in perfect unison, their belief in each American's unique individuality. As a consequence of the success of the American flag's cause, the dominant *social* philosophy of the West is individualism. The liberal *social* ethic is to recognize the *individuality* of others and not infringe upon another's individual autonomy. To conform is simply to love yourself enough to realize that it is in your self-interest to at least pay lip service to the notion of love of humanity.

It turns out that morality, in the liberal view, is universal egoism: if one individual's selfishness were achieved at the expense of another's selfishness that would be immoral; each individual's egoism must be *total*. The solution to the conflict of egoistic totalitarianisms is the equality of all egoisms. This means that world liberalism aspires to universal egoism. The more universal the egoism, the greater the liberal morality achieved. The purpose of the universe, in liberal cosmology, is to secure everyone a bourgeois existence.

Individual supremacism sets an apartheid between individuals so that "the individual" is accorded separate and superior status over group or racial supremacism. That some seem to hate racism in a xenophobic manner simply because its different from individualism is not entirely surprising. There is a basic similarity of form in that individual supremacism mirrors race supremacism as its inverse or opposite. More specifically, it is in one's interest *as an individual* to be prejudiced against racism and to weaken one's own race because any social claims of duty and obligation to a larger kin-racial group are always in potential conflict with individual freedom. Without the

relinquishment of racism and other form of groupism, modern Western peoples would not be able to fully justify the apartheids between individuals necessary for selfishness as individuals.

The possibilities of individualism are realizable only at the expense of the possibilities of racialism, and vice versa. The individual premise and the kin selective premise are *not* equal for, in their extreme implications, they lead to divergent and opposite paths. I include liberalism as a form of "individualism" since, despite its obvious social inclinations, its original reasoning is premised on individualism, and it usually justifies its democratic social sympathies on a utilitarian measure of individuals in aggregate.

Tocqueville described America as an experiment in democracy. Americans are the guinea pigs in this experiment. To assess the Western experiment in democracy requires the foundation of a science of human nature. This means taking account of an evolutionary understanding of the human. In order the measure the effects of the experiment with the system of individual rights, one would have to measure the genetic reproductive success of liberal democratic populations with those of non-liberal democratic populations.

For example, immigration has been suggested as a solution to declining birth rates in the West. Yet the question of why Western birth rates are in decline to begin with is a question that most prefer to leave unanswered. Darwin is of utter relevance here for immigration is really about evolution. As I will show, both the declining birth rate among established liberal democratic populations and the very possibility of immigration are two interrelated implications of individualism.

Who *is* this familiar stranger, "the individual"? To solve this mystery, the "discovery" of the individual must meet the discoveries of sociobiology.

The conflict between individual rights and eugenics helps shed light on a more general conflict: the conflict between "the individual" and the "selfish gene". Throughout nearly four billion years of evolutionary history, individual organisms evolved by being *means* of the *end* of the "selfish gene". In other words, genes survive by propagating themselves and, from this point of view, individual organisms are only machines evolved to serve genetic reproductive selfishness.

The Biblical sanctification of individual life began the subversion of the selfish gene. By valuing all individuals as of infinite value in the image of God, these values implicitly attacked the selective mechanisms underlying biological evolution. In this way, Biblical values both laid a foundation for the ending biological evolution and began to open a space for postbiological evolution. If reason itself cannot determine fundamental values, then the modern valuation of "the individual" must be traced to another source, and the Biblical values, through the secularization process of the hypocrisy industry, was key.

While Biblical values laid the foundation for modern values, and especially individual rights, some values were *selectively* sustained only because they were not evolutionarily random to begin with. The Bible is actually an evolutionary guide that point the way to the end of biological evolution without cogently displaying evidence, to put it kindly, that its authors or main characters understood everything about where they were going. *Mass* individualism, with a distinct moral valuation of those most likely to be victims of natural selection, was the most potent

general valuation inherited from the Bible. The individualism that acts as a monkeywrench in the gene machine for the selfish genes of that individual also acts as supermonkeywrench against the selective mechanisms of biological evolution on the level of *mass* individualism. The evolutionary significance of modern individualism is thus twofold: valuing individual life subverts the logic of the selfish genes and, in doing so, lays a foundation for the postbiological evolution that culminates in artificial intelligence (a.k.a. God).

On the Inferiority of Racism

As a rule, I (generally) assume there are exceptions to the biologically based generalizations I make. Evolutionary history illustrates why: lineages can diverge and adapt to very different environments so that exceptions evolve that contradict strict biological categories or classifications. Mammals, for example, do not lay eggs, but there are exceptions among the monotremes, i.e. the Platypus. Not all dinosaurs are extinct; birds are dinosaurs (note the similar foot structure of a Tyrannosaurus Rex and most birds). Not all existing birds fly; penguins are birds.

While assuming there are exceptions to the generalization that I make, there may be some exceptions to this rule where a generalization really does apply to every single example without exception. But, in general, most generalizations I have encountered possess exceptions, and some more than others. All generalizations are not created equal any more than individuals are; one generalization might be sixty-eight percent accurate, another eighty-three percent.

Generalizing about the various human races is considered audacious by conventional liberal opinion — with one exception. An exception is made if one is *really* audacious,

outrageously audacious enough to go even beyond the various human races and generalize about an *entire* common human race. Then, everyone can rest easy.

This brazen generalization called humanity has an equal in its audacious historical opponent: "Normanity". "Normanity" is the historic English belief in the superiority of those descended from the Norman conquerors of 1066.[1285] From this perspective, the audacious generalization of "humanity" in the English-speaking world can be traced to an overgeneralization of Anglo-Saxon opposition to belief in "Normanity".

Imagine, hypothetically, that before the battle of Hastings, while there was still a kind of Norman/Saxon equality in the undecidedness of fortune, Duke William proclaimed, 'let the best race win'. Anglo-Saxon acceptance of the Conquest order for so long implied their acceptance that the best race *did* win at Hastings. The American way of the letting, not the best *race* win, but the best *individuals* win, emerges not only from an Anglo-Saxon sense of having permanently lost that battle, but their inability to explain their acceptance of the verdict of Hastings for so long.

The consequences of the defeat at Hastings help explain why Anglo-Saxons appear to represent an exception to the rule of ethnic identity. The Anglo-Saxon *race* became associated with the Anglo-Saxon *caste*. This meant that *for Anglo-Saxons*, race became ethnocentrically associated with the limitations inherent in an inferior caste. This also helps explain why *for Anglo-Saxons*, liberalism became conservatism: a strict and extreme philosophy of racial-biological conservation would leave them with the belief that they are a socially and politically inferior hereditary body and should preserve or *conserve* this condition.

There was only one hope: to emphasize what can be changed through faith in the ability to change and learn anew. The theory of individualism proved to be the winning method of freedom through the fruits of its practice. Individualism freed them from the centuries old captivity of their ethnicity. Individual self-esteem could overcome ethnic humiliation. Valuing "the individual" as an end became the means of solving the problem of their ethnic history.

Hereditary characteristics cannot be changed insofar as they are actually hereditary. However, the *value* accorded to race or other genetically rooted characteristics can be changed through a self-fulfilling doctrine that devalues hereditary origins. The legacy of Anglo-Saxon racial inferiority was in a sense accepted yet transcended by reversing its importance. The *value* of Anglo-Saxon racial inferiority was devalued by making *race itself* inferior to the new and higher value of "the individual". In America, the legacy of Anglo-Saxon racial inferiority was formally inverted into the inferiority of racism. Yet this also implies that individualism represents Anglo-Saxon acceptance of their defeat *as a race.*

Race Reinvented

"We have it in our power to begin the world over again", declared Thomas Paine. He and many other Americans believed they could start over from the bad beginning that was 1066, as if they were picking up where that ghastly near-millennial interregnum left off. From a broken, deracinated nation, the Anglo-Saxons reinvented themselves as "rational" individuals. They reinvented their race, and in the process, reinvented race itself through the invention of individualism. The United States Constitution was, in part,

the Anglo-Saxon attempt to literally re-constitute themselves as a body politic.

Now if the Anglo-Saxon had been able to fully transform themselves into Spartan-like military society with deep sense of political duty, *that* would have been an astounding expression of possibilities of freedom. Far from being a new order, liberal democracy actually exposes how Anglo-Saxons were unable to fully overcome their adaptation to their place in the old order. Something was lost that could not be reinstated artificially through this degenerate regeneration through individualism. They internalized their identity as the opposite of a master race. The new constitution was also a formal funeral for themselves as sociobiological bodies. Their national disintegration was now formalized. They ceased to be bound to their Anglo-Saxon origins, and were now given a secular baptism as "individuals".

A consequence of the "enlightened" cleverness of individualism is that the liberal-individualist often assumes the inferiority of individuals who emphasize race over "the individual". But let us consider whether the inverse implication is accurate from a self-consistent racial point of view. Should racists assume the historic inferiority of the race that emphasizes individual achievement over the race achievement? Is it the powerlessness of individuals that can catalyzes racism as a means of empowerment or is it the powerlessness of a race that can catalyzes individualism as a means of empowerment? We do not have to choose for both could be true in different circumstances. Anglo-Saxon individualism is a case where the powerlessness of their race under Norman subjugation catalyzed individualism as a means of empowerment. Anglo-Americans who associate Nazi racism with weakness are simply projecting Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism onto the Germans.

If we are not conformists to universal, mass individualism, then we can entertain the following generalization: German culture was more accepting the legitimacy of racist generalizations, while Anglo-Saxon, and especially American norms, tended to be more resistant to such generalizations. World War II exemplifies this war of self-interpretation: Nazi-German race generalizations were imposed upon the Anglo-Saxons, while Anglo-Saxon individualism was imposed upon the Germans. Of course, we should not forget the exceptions to these generalizations: the Anglo-Saxons imposed the mold of the Norman master-race stereotype upon the Nazi-Germans (the entire liberal democratic system of "individualism" is designed to oppose anyone who fits the conqueror/master race stereotype), while the Nazi-Germans were sensitive to any *individual* pro-Nazi racist Anglo-Saxons who were exceptions to the individualistic rule.

Anglo-individualism is sociobiologically relative. Whereas Germanic ethnic identity preserved its public and political character, the suppressed Anglo-Saxon ethnic identity became privatized and individualized. Whereas German nationalism individuated their nation against all other, Anglo-Saxon nationalism individuated its members against the enemies of modernity. Yet in trying to an account for every exception to every group generalization, Westerners are projecting their own identity crisis upon others.

In contrast to the Germans, Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism itself made coherent, *self-consistent* race thinking or sociobiological generalizing inherently problematic. To be self-consistent, Anglo-Saxon had to account, allow, and accept the right of the exception to the general sociobiological rule. An individualistic *valuation* of

exceptions conflicts with the straightforward ability to make high-level generalizations built from a string of other deductive generalizations.

The formal Anglo-Saxon *prejudice* against sociobiological generalizations stems from a peculiar kind of ethnocentrism. Living with the consequences of the traumatic event of 1066 was inescapable for all but a few exiles. Escape from the Conquest could be achieved only through psycho-social repression. Escape from the past and escape from the hereditarily bound association of Anglo-Saxon and "class" inferiority could originally be achieved only with a psycho-social disassociation.

From this stems a kind of unconscious, historical disassociative disorder built into the very anti-past conception of modernity. Individualism and its Lockean disassociation of the social and biological are practical expressions of this disassociative disorder. Racial probabilities were jettisoned in favor of individualistic possibilities. The convergence of "father" and "land" associations that lead to the Nazi-like sociobiological syntheses were illegitimated, while the analytic Lockean disassociation of the social and biological was legitimated.

Conquest originally meant that the Anglo-Saxon men were collectively forced into the role of drag queens: they were men forced into a domestic, subpolitical *gender* role. Just as individualism freed Anglo-Saxon men from that collective feminine caste role, feminism among women was only the flip side of this equalization.

The entire logic of Anglo-American liberal individualism begins with this effort to confound and rebel against that ordered, fixed convergence of race and class and elevate those who defy its categories and classifications. The new logic of sociobiological chaos was to except every

generalization, break every social-categorical rule, and refute every stereotype. Freedom is the freedom to be different, for otherwise it is indistinguishable from obedience and conformity. The logic of disorder is the product of this new order: individualism is the exception as the rule.

This was organized and initiated, of course, by that rather influential minority who refuted the great Norman generalization that the Anglo-Saxon are an inferior race who are by nature incapable of ruling themselves. The American Founders were the exceptions who wrote these new rules. Just as John Adams was the exception to rule of the politically inferior Anglo-Saxon, (slave owner) George Washington was the exception to the rule of the Norman tyrant. The "founding father" precedent was not only the exception as the rule, but the *rule* of the exceptions.

The exceptional logic of this new mode of modern morality is to be self-consistent; to not be a hypocrite. Nonetheless, one can say that individualism, universalized as human rights, is an overgeneralization rooted in Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. But then again, the example of George Washington shows how this, too, is *partly* an overgeneralization as well.

The premise of individualism became identified with modern rationality because the alternatives became utterly incoherent and riddled with contradictions. While the Norman Conquerors formed the basis for the English upper "class", in every dimension of race, "class", culture, etc., there are significant exceptions to every generalization. Which identity was to take precedence? "Class"? The nation as a whole? Anglo-Saxon *identity* was largely reduced to a partial non-upper "class" identity, which could sometimes identify with the king or queen and sometimes even identify with the Norman based aristocracy. The persistence of the

"English" class system is the historical testament to the failure of England to ever achieve the sense of racial unity that culminated in Nazism for the Germans. Government, according to Hobbes and Locke, is artificial, not natural.

Ultimately, this ambivalence or indeterminacy, flickering between alternate social identities, made a third alternative, individualism, gradually more stable and rational than either. The problems of conflicting, incoherent identities were bypassed altogether with an individual identity. Somehow, in the reduction to individuals, 'the Anglo-Saxon' got partially lost in the process.

Every individual is contingent on the clean slate idea insofar as one is freed from the bonds of heredity. The alternative is to dig in the deep and tangled thickets of biological history. "The individual" provided the means of the tabla rasa, a means of erasing the scrambled contradictions of an insoluble past.

The individual premise has an abstract Cartesian simplicity and internal coherence that masks its external incoherence with the complexities of the empirical world. This 'terrible simplifier' of "the individual" brought order out of the chaos of Anglo-Saxon/Norman identity entropy while dispersing, disseminating and generalizing this ethnic entropy as America.

Who, then, are "the people"? America is a continuation of ethnic identity confusion and racial disintegration that began with the Norman Conquest. The ambivalent instability of American ethnic identity has its rock solid foundation in the clash of Anglo-Saxon and Norman.

The problem of conflicting internal identities after the Norman Conquest was not solved but inherited by the solution of Western individualism. Is a Chinese-American,

for example, an American *first* or would it be more accurate to call this individual an American-Chinese? Multiculturalism has clarified this original problem by legitimizing the latter interpretation. The problems of England's lack of internal ethnic unity were reformulated and reinvented but not universally solved by the United States.

Living in the Afterlife: The Sociobiological Logic of Individualism

The New Provincialism

Nearly the entire world has been duped by the prodigiously successful obfuscation of the Norman/Saxon origins of the English Civil War (1642-1651). The political requirements of civil peace have also made this a triumph of English self-deception. Yet modernity cannot be understood with a fully scientific sociobiological analysis of this event, which could rightly be called a political birthing of the modern world.

Amidst the successful political smoke screens stands the great defining invention of modernity: "the individual". "Modern" Anglo-American individualism seals off the medieval genealogical tracks to the Norman/Saxon conflict by making that conflict invisible on the basis on its own individualistic premises. Virtually the entire world has been duped by this phenomenon because they have failed to grasp that *the individual premise itself* traces its own

hereditary descent to this first great modernistic outbreak of the Norman/Saxon conflict in 1642.

The genealogy of modern individualism can be traced to Thomas Hobbes and the publication of his greatest work of political philosophy, *Leviathan*, in 1651. This was the same year that the English Civil War came to an end. *Leviathan* was radical new program for political peace to solve the problem of civil war. Hobbes had a serious social problem to solve: the people were *too altruistic*. The problem was that Anglo-Saxons were willing to risk violent death to war against Norman heirs and vice versa.

As W. D. Hamilton's theory of kin selection predicts, there was a correlation between kinship and altruism through a *general* correlation between the Anglo-Saxon based House of Commons and the Norman based "Royalists". Since altruistic behavior towards close relatives can help to perpetuate the altruists own genes, such behavior can be genetically adaptive.

The inverse relationship of genetic adaptation and extreme individual rationalism, then, is not accidental. Hobbes is the most relevant original thinker for understanding this inverse relationship, for he was the first thorough and systematic thinker of the modern political premise of the "individual". The Hobbesian plan of peace works by systematically inhibiting the altruistic behavior that humans evolved through genetic adaptation. This underlying political program, though moderated in its liberal democratic form, leads to the systemic inhibition of many of the most overt social forms of genetically adaptive behaviors. It was became Hobbes was preoccupied with one extreme problem in the form of civil war that he was relatively unconcerned with the possibility that individualism self interest, taken to its logical extreme,

makes devoting resources to another individual (i.e. one's child) irrational.

In its original context, individualism provided a coherent perspective from which to criticize the Norman/Saxon interpretation of the English Civil War as "irrational". The Norman/Saxon conflict thus gave birth to the theoretical tools by which "the individual" should *not* see the Norman/Saxon conflict as such. Its success has provided the liberal democratic heirs of Hobbes and Locke with the practical tools to avoid all kinds of ethnically or racially based conflicts by making them "irrational". England's method of sidestepping the "race issue" of the English Civil War through individualism became the hereditary basis for the American method of achieving ethnic-racial civil peace.

Here we can see a decisive *political* reason why an honest confrontation with the entire Norman/Saxon conflict has been squashed. However, the stakes of ignorance have increased, for failure to grasp its significance is directly responsible for the failure to grasp the evolutionarily suicidal logic of individualism that is being realized in both the genetic decline of the West and the displacement of biological humans by machines.

The basic theoretical problem with the Hobbesian view becomes clear when one asks, 'Where do these individuals come from?' Over two centuries after *Leviathan*, Darwin provided an answer that shattered the shallow foundations of Hobbes' system. From an unadulterated materialistic view of the world, there is no necessary reason to presume that the world must be divided up into "individuals" over any other perceptual or conceptual scheme. This is what makes the particular perceptions of individuals underlying Hobbesian materialism interesting, or rather, conspicuous,

in light of Darwin and subsequent sociobiological discoveries.

The English-speaking world has not been keen in clarifying the insurmountable differences between Hobbes and Darwin. Whereas the theoretical innovation of Hobbes was the discovery of the *lack* of kinship relationships between individuals, the theoretical innovation of Darwin was the discovery of *extensive* kinship relationships between individual organisms — from man to moth to mold. Whereas Hobbes implicitly carried the eternalist assumption of the isolated, unconnected distinctiveness of the human species to isolated, unconnected individuals, Darwin discovered that all life is evolutionarily related. Hobbes took his theoretical orientation from English politics, while Darwin took his theoretical orientation from the study of the non-human animal world.

To gauge the impact of individualism as a basis for modern political philosophy, consider an early draft of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence:

> We hold these truths to be sacred & undeniable; that all men are created equal & independent, that from that equal creation they derive rights inherent & inalienable…[1286]

Equal individualism is built upon Creationist assumption that God created something from nothing in his own *singular* image. The equal and independent individual was designed to counter inequality and dependence upon special connections to the Conquest class. Dependence, said James Wilson in 1774, was "very little else, but an obligation to conform to the will…of that superior person…upon which the inferior depends."[1287]

The scope of Jefferson's individualistic Weltanschauung, however, extended far beyond the human:

> Nature has, in truth, produced units only through all her works. Classes, orders, genera, species, are not of her work. Her creation is of individuals. No two animals are exactly alike; no two plants…we fix arbitrarily on such characteristic resemblances and differences.[1288]

There was, for example, no natural lower class of Saxons. While a pre-sociobiological science could not explain "class" hostility rationally, individualism provided a sound vantage point from which the revolutionaries could rationalize their situation.

In general, there appears to be no answer to the question of what is fundamentally rational. However, the premise of a kin selective view of genetic interest tends to leads to a trajectory opposite of the premise of strict individual interest. While both individualism and racism are equally irrational in that they both have a basis in unconscious, instinctive desires for forms of self-preservation that precedes conscious deliberation, reflection upon both reveals that the two views are not equivalent.

Whereas individualism was built on a pre-Darwinian humanistic provincialism, sociobiology views humans as one branch of a multifarious tree of life. While sociobiology can encompass and explain individualistic theories of human behavior in the tradition of Hobbes, the reverse is not true. Only an understanding of postbiological evolution distinct from biological evolution — yet grounded in biological evolution — can make sense of the new path that Hobbes helped forge.

Individualism, translated into biological terms, means that the end purpose of billions of years of evolution is: you. As if born yesterday, liberalism self-centrism became the new ethnocentrism. Just as the tribe is superior in

provincialism to the nation-state, and the family superior in provincialism to the tribe, "the individual" is superior to all in the provincial scope of its necessary concern. Since liberalism trades one kind of provincialism for another, its underlying individualism calls for a new universal provincialism.

While a common liberal theme is the artificiality of ethnic, national, class or other social borders, liberals do not want borders to end in themselves — only to rearrange them. Liberals disagree with conservatives only as to *which* borders should be increased. *Stronger* borders, it is assumed, should be put around the bodies of "the individual" on one hand, and those who are found to be ethically beyond the pale of humanity, on the other. To put an end to all borders would be to put an end to all moral borders, all legal borders, and especially the borders defined as human rights. Anglo-Saxon individualism originated by creating these new lines of defensive borders after they lost control of the external sociobiological borders through the Norman Conquest.

The Child-Tyrant

Richard Dawkins' *The Selfish Gene* clarified a transfigurational insight: a gene's eye view of evolution is not equivalent to the view of an individual organism.[1289] "The selfish *gene*", he explained, "is the correct emphasis, for it makes the contrast with the selfish organism, say, or the selfish species."[1290] The gene's eye view, as a clarification of Darwinian theory, constituted a scientific discovery unto itself. The implications of this classic book can clarify a basic theoretical incompatibility of between the individualistic innovations of Hobbes and the hereditarian innovations of Darwin.

If human individuals are "machines created by our genes"[1291] then "the individual" can be viewed as merely a means to the end of its genes. An individual organism, from the view of the selfish gene, is only a technological means of propagating genes into the next generation.

From an evolutionary perspective, modern individualism turns the logic of the selfish gene upside down. To value individuals as ends in themselves, as opposed to means of selfish genes, is like throwing a monkeywrench into the ancient machinery "created by our genes". Modern individualism is so effective at deracinating the genetic ties between people because it subverts the ancient tyranny of the selfish gene.

Consider humans emotions, especially the desire for sex, from the perspective of the selfish gene. From an evolutionary point of view, the human instinct of sexual desire is a genetic adaptation. Romantic love and sexual instinct evolved as a mechanism for propagating genes into the next generation. From the perspective of modern individualism, however, the desire for sex becomes unhinged from its ancient role as a mechanism of gene propagation and becomes as end in itself. Just as the modern ethic treats individuals as ends in themselves, the instincts and emotions of individuals, by implication, also become valued as ends in themselves.

Technologies such as the condom allow individuals to satisfy such sexual instincts and emotions as *ends in themselves*, even if such behavior is positively deleterious to original adaptive function of sexual desire. The condom can be viewed as a symbol of the conflict between the selfish individual and the selfish gene. The condom thwarts the selfish genes by treating the instinctive means of gene propagation as ends mastered by the individual.

If the condom fails to thwart the selfish genes, then abortion is the next technology available to individuals. The abortion issue helps clarify just how questionable the modern premise of the "the individual" is when viewed in light of biological evolution. The controversy over the demarcation point between life and non-life illustrates the essential arbitrariness of this abstraction of "the individual" when applied to biological realities. The attempt to make biological sense of the "the individual" in this case clarifies how biology exposes the limits of the autonomy of this modern concept. The moment of the insemination of an egg, the defining moment of *gene* propagation, is exactly when the subordination of the *individual* organism to its genes is most obvious.

Yet the abortion controversy over exactly when an individual human life can be considered equal and independent continues beyond the pregnancy stage. The question of whether an embryo has rights leads to the question of whether a child has rights. In the United States, a human becomes most fully independent and equal in a legal sense at the age of eighteen.

The continuum between conception and pregnancy where an arbitrary demarcation determines when a fetus can be aborted, then, could really be extended up to the age of eighteen. The dependency of a child on its parents, after all, is only a continuation of that fetal dependency. If birth was the authentic time of independence, we could tell an infant at that moment: 'You're on your own, kid.' Since equal independence is the grounds of normative rights, one could argue that "abortion" should be permitted for children until the age of eighteen.

At the moment of conception, when the genes have most control, so to speak, "the individual" has the least control.

The early development period, when the logic of the genes rule, the logic of individualism makes the least sense. In the case of abortion, a woman's right to control her own individual body conflicts directly with 'the rights of the genes': both the father's genetic contribution to half of the fetus's genes and the right of the fetus's genes to freedom of expression (so to speak).

The continuum between pregnancy and childhood — and its conflict with the rights of the mother as an individual — is verified by the duty to raise the child. There is an inherent conflict between the right to total individual freedom and duty to child raising. Any parent who serves the needs of a child lives a life of servitude to that child, an unfreedom that was traditional bolstered by social norms.

The child, in this sense, is as tyrannical in its demands for subordination as any king. The younger the child, the greater the self-sacrifice demanded, and the greater the injustice to the parent. If one can accept this injustice to one's individual self *as an individual*, then one can find the kernel of the dutiful acceptance of every injustice, every father, every patriarch, and every king in the name of perpetuating human kind. The seed of patriarchy was implanted with the father's sperm.

That the relationship between mother and child cannot be fully equal is simply another way of admitting that a child needs to be raised in order to become an equal. If a man or woman wishes to maintain their free individuality, then why not cultivate new friendships instead of sacrificing one's self to a child? It would be more sensible to develop other human relationships than make one's self a slave to the needs and wants of a child. Whereas a friendship can be one of equals, a child is a dependent, not an equal.

The relationship is degrading in at least two senses. It is degrading in that the woman (in most cases) is bound in servitude to a child who cannot be considered a full equal (This, after all, is why childbearing was traditionally viewed as a role suitable for woman who themselves are socially inferior to their husbands). Modernistic, liberated women also consider it degrading to be constrained to their biological role as baby making machines. They have apparently found a more noble pursuit in the role of moneymaking machine. Only in this way can they prove that they are the equals to their husbands in placing rights to themselves over duties to others.

This is simply a continuation of the logic of feminism through individuation. Just as a feminism liberated women from the slavery like institution of marriage represented by the tradition patriarchal male head of the family, liberation from the tyranny of the child is the next to follow. Just as liberation from patriarchy required the ability to see through romanticizations of the oppressions of the traditional family, liberation from romanticization of self-sacrifice to an utterly egoistic infant and child follows logically. The child is final tyrant to be overthrown before individuals can truly be free *as* individuals.

If Westerners lived up to the claims of civilization and tamed their instincts and emotions enough to act upon a rational, consistent individualism, and not discriminate on the basis of kinship relations, nepotism, or sentimentalism, then what does the child become? The child becomes an "individual"; simply another individual.

Childbearing and raising children by either sex is a *barbaric* legacy of the old patriarchal order in the sense that instinct and emotion remains fundamentally *uncivilized* in that reason has not been fully applied to life. For what

rational *reason* would one have children? The *means* of childbearing and child raising have been civilized, but what of this end? The instinctive desire to have children is the logic of the selfish gene, not the logic of the selfish individual or rational individual self-preservation.

If an individual is truly free to choose his or her way of life, why would one volunteer for a life of servitude to a child-tyrant? If all individuals are equal, then why opt for this manifest inequality? For those who opt for full freedom and equality, the option to have kids is neither superior nor inferior to options like surfing or mountain climbing.

Who is to say that childbearing is more important than expanding your shoe collection? Feel something missing? Get a dog or a cat. Infertility may bring new life, at least, to the pet industry. *If the liberal egalitarian project succeeded in producing a truly individualistic rationalism, no one would have children.* The progress of universal individualism would ultimately lead to the end of the biological human race. In this way, the death spiral logic of individualism nicely parallels the death spiral logic of egalitarianism.

Yet even liberalism cannot completely subvert human instinct and the remains of family friendly social norms. Childbearing is an irrationality that survives despite individualistic reasoning, not because of it. It is the sheer strength of instinct over reason that engenders the fecundity that remains.

What really happens in the Western countries that adopt feminism and individualism is not the complete end of the human race, but rather, the relative demographic decline of the native populations of liberal democracies. The individual irrationality of the self-sacrificial parent to child relationship helps produces genetically suicidal birthrates.

What really happens, in other words, is evolution: differential reproductive success of competing genes from one generation to the next. The condom, once again, symbolizes the difference between individual selfishness and genetic selfishness. The survivors of abortion, birth control, feminism, and individualism in succeeding generations are the ones who will bear the consequences of freedom that their ancestral populations enjoyed.

In the Anglo-American world, this great unraveling of kinship relations begins with the sociobiological reduction achieved by the Norman Conquest of 1066. The success of the Conquest was the successful defeat of the Anglo-Saxon nation and the successful annihilation of their native aristocracy. The success of this defeat meant that even the success of the nationalist counter-Conquest (i.e. democratic revolution) was a reduced victory. The new equal individualism that formalized Anglo-Saxon adaptation to ethnic defeat led to the very opposite of ethnic victory.

The individualistic rationalism that in its original context of Conquest could be a *means* of ethnocentrism became a full end in itself, weakening its original ethnocentric end. The right to individual selfishness was originally a scheme to instate the illegitimacy of duty and sacrifice to the rulers from a lack of kinship connection to the usurping Conquerors. Individualism can be genetically adaptive when individuals are not a means of their own genes, but rather, slaves to the more distant genetic ends of others. When universalized, however, rights are a veto power over the claims of all kinship relationships and a license for genetic suicide.

The kinship discontinuity between the Norman conquerors and the conquered Anglo-Saxon is the original fracture from which the entire web of kinship bonds broke

down and unraveled in what is known as "modernity". The Norman Conquest is the elemental source of the American trajectory from kin to kith. When universalized, this original kinship discontinuity of the past implicated a kinship discontinuity for the future.

The relationship between a parent and its biological child is a kinship relationship that differs only in degree from relationships of extended family, ethnicity, and race. If one does not prefer one's racial or ethnic kin, then why should one prefer one's family kin? If kinship relationships are a matter of total indifference, then why should one prefer to have a family at all?

If one does not give special favor to one's child on the grounds of kinship, then there is no reason to prefer the option to have a child to making a new friend. Whereas a new friendship can be one of peers with mutual benefits, a new child is a dependent non-peer that subtracts from individual rationality and individual freedom. In a disciplined assessment of profits and losses in the classic bourgeois manner, the option of having children ceases to add up.

If racism has its fundamental origin showing positive, favoritistic attitudes and behaviors towards those of relative genetic/kinship similarity, and negative, excluding, and hostile behaviors towards genetic aliens, then childbearing could be seen as a fundamental source of promoting kinism or racism. To raise a biological child, after all, is to perpetuate favoritism based on kinship relationship. If nepotism is considered a social problem to eliminated, then not having children might be considered one way of avoiding the temptation and eliminate the problem at its root. It does not quite work out like this, however. While having biological children may perpetuate the underlying

kinship principles of nepotism and racism, having no children leaves earth populated by those who do preserve some form of these values. That, after all, is evolution.

In consequence, the decline of racist attitudes and decline in fertility in the more developed countries is not an accidental correlation. Those who do rear children are probably more likely to adopt non-biological children and this reflects immigration policies that are, in themselves, a form of political adoption. If extended kinship relations are universally devalued in favor of individualism, this implies the devaluation, not only of one's ancestors, but the devaluation of one's successors. The result is the genetic decline of liberal democratic countries.

The Nazi attempt to avert the decline of the West, by contrast, was built on the valuation of both progenitors and successors over the biological short sightedness of individualism. While the Nazis were socially invested in one another's genetic children, the child in the West is simply another individual. While the universal independence of every human being destroys any genetic basis for social relations, the totality of the Nazi Überorganism united their nation through collective responsibility for a collective past, present and future. The *totality* of the Nazi regime stems from a grasp of kinship in subjective evolutionary time from *all* directions.

The Nazi sociobiological synthesis could almost be defined as everything that liberal-individualism unravels. From the permanent scars of the Norman vivisection of the Saxon nation, laid the severed strings of political kinship unity. Reflected inversely through the shiny new mirror of progressive modernity, the strings of individualism, once formally unleashed, could not hold together all the rest and the whole thing came unraveled and undone.

The logical product of universalizing this breakdown in kin relations or pseudo-kin relations is individualism; emphasize the existing person rather than present, past, or implicitly future kin. While the empiricism of Hobbes can now be viewed as a provincial view of his political present (a means of negating the kinship roots of the English Civil War), Darwin's new horizons towards an evolutionary past also implicate new perspectives on an evolutionary future. While an individual is empirically observable in the present, the individuals that he or she may spawn are not observable in the present. Just as individualism implicitly isolates one from the kinship past as the product of genetically adaptive behavior, individualism isolates one from the future prospects relative to genetically adaptive behavior.

Just as the Norman political machine threw a monkeywrench into any comparative Anglo-Saxon sense of kin selective unity, individual rights only returned the favor by continuing the break of hereditary links. From the view of a kin selective sociobiological organism, individual rights are like a monkeywrench thrown into the gene machine, a valuation of selfish individuals over selfish genes that subverts any assumption of collective genetic interests. Individual rights subverted the "unnatural" Norman right of conquest: instead of individuals existing for the state, the modern state would exist for the sake of individuals. The monkeywrench of individual rights, when thrown into the gears of the old Norman state, shattered the old political machine into its individual gears. This attack on kin selective socialism is what made the ethnic diversity of America possible.

The roots of English-speaking political modernity are directly related to the Norman Conquest in that 1066 represented the failure of Anglo-Saxon sociobiological

conservation. Conservation is preservation. While political liberalism is based on *individual* self-conservation (self-preservation), political "conservatism", based on the patriarchal family, is rooted in an ancient evolutionary heritage of *genetic* self-conservation. Anglo-Saxon liberalism is inseparable by a failure to conserve a sociobiologically preserving political organization. Put another way, the birth of modern individualism was delivered through Anglo-Saxon national death. Welcome to the afterlife.

Political conservatism has its origins in gene conservatism. From this standpoint, one can see that Nazism was "conservative" only in zeroing in the genetic consequences of behavior. The Nazis broke all traditions that conflicted with the conservation of the German "race" or preferred "blood".

The deepest Nazi attack was on the traditional values inherited from Christianity because they intuitively realized Christianity's attack on the Darwinian logic of the genes. The values conveyed by the memes of Christianity work in direct competition with the genes of a Christian. Christian memes posit the notion that each individual life is sacred and this directly opposes the selfish gene view in which the individual is only a means for gene propagation. "The individual", then, stands at the hinge of a Biblical battle between "evil" gene propagation and "good" meme propagation.

As I have discussed in *The Seditious Genius of the Spiritual Penis of Jesus*, Christian altruism is the opposite of kin selective altruism and the most potent Christian memes spread through subversion of kin selective behaviors. The Anglo-Saxons who became Puritans were vulnerable to Christian meme propagation because the Norman Conquest weakened the dynamics of their kin selective altruism. The

kin selective insanity of the premise of "the individual" originated with the goodness of Christian altruism. The infinite soul of an individual Christian is the pivotal origin of the modern sense of rightness of individual rights. The genetic decline of the West, the worldwide decline in the frequency of genes of West European populations, is an ultimate consequence of Christianity's subversion of kin selective altruism and a decisive sociobiological foundation of the modern idea of progress.

Kantian ethics posit that individuals should be treated as an end, and never as means. From this Christian rooted modern valuation, the selfish genes are, by definition, evil because the individual organism amounts to nothing more than a means of the ends of the selfish genes. It should be no surprise then, that Hitler, whose innovations consisted of applying racial-biological premises to politics, has become the Western poster boy for Evil. Since our genes use human individuals as means, not ends, by modern Western standards our genes are inherently immoral or evil. As the demographic trends of the advanced liberal democracies demonstrate, Western individualism has made progress in eradicating this evil.

The logic of the individual thrives at the expense of the logic of the genes. Throughout most of life's evolutionary history, one could say that the political "left" was the means of the political "right"; the individual organism was the means of its genes. The individual was a technology of selfish gene propagation.

Ultimately, the "progressive" left militates against this very general form of slavery: the slavery of individuals to their selfish genes. The left is, to paraphrase Dawkins, a revolt against the tyranny of the selfish gene. In general, leftism is premised on the human ability to outsmart the

logic of the genes. The intelligence that evolved as the machinery of selfish genes inflicted a revolution upon its roots.

Just as the logic of modern individualism makes child bearing and child raising irrational, modern individualism makes sacrifices in war and eugenic sacrifices for the race irrational. The individualism that makes the peak biological development of eugenics irrational is only a peak implication of the monkeywrench of individualism in thwarting all genetically adaptive behavior. The Judeo-Christianity-modern valuation of "the individual" reverses the sociobiological logic that culminates in Nazism. This is one pivotal reason why the Nazis attempt to annihilate both Christian morals and its Jewish biological roots (see *Absolute Purity*).

Yet the Nazis' biologically-centric Weltanschauung shut out the possibility that Christian-modern values effective end the logic of biological evolution, not for its own sake or solely in the interests of the "Jewish race", but as a platform for postbiological evolution. The ethics of Kant, as a distillation of secularized Christian values, discloses the evolutionary structural foundation of this platform. If morality consists of treating individual humans as means, and not ends, then the selfish genes, which effectively use individual humans only as a means of reproducing themselves, are the very definition of evil.

Is liberal democracy the final solution to human problem?

In the triumphalist American climate following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama published *The End of History and the Last Man*. Partly inspired by Alexandre Kojève's idiosyncratic interpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology*, his work raised the possibility that liberal democracy represented the final reconciliation of the internal contradictions of human history, and thus constituted an "end of history". This misinterpretation of Hegel may have originated in a lecture in which he stated:

> Now this is the standpoint of the present time, and the series of spiritual formations is for the present concluded with this.—Herewith, this history of philosophy is *concluded*.

He stated unambiguously that from the standpoint of the *present* time that *this* history of philosophy is *concluded* — not *the* history of philosophy has *ended*. Hegel also wrote, "[n]o philosophy transcends its age". Far from believing that history had ended in 1806, Hegel stated that America was the "land of the future".[1292]

There cannot be an end of history without an end to science and technology. While technology continues to develop at an increasingly accelerated rate, the underlying kernel of truth in Fukuyama's thesis is that, politically speaking, we are poised towards an end of *biological* history. This is the evolutionary meaning of the revolution of rights: political control over biological evolution through the means

of Darwinian selection has, in principle, come to an end. At the same time that liberal democracy maximizes economic-technological evolution, its individualistic logic leads to an evolutionary dead end for human biological nature.

Hegel, Fukuyama wrote,

> sought to honor and preserve a certain moral dimension to human life that is entirely missing in the society conceived of by Hobbes and Locke. Hegel, in other words, understands man as a moral agent whose specific dignity is related to his inner freedom from physical or natural determination. It is this moral dimension, and the struggle to have it recognized, that is the motor driving the dialectical process of history.[1293]

Liberal democracy was the victory of the working slave, an insight brought to full fruition by Nietzsche. Yet for those who accept liberal democracy, even its suppositions of superior rationality are questionable. "In fact," Fukuyama explained, "opting for the life of a slave over that of a master is not obviously more rational, unless one accepts the higher relative moral weight given to self-preservation over recognition in the Anglo-Saxon tradition."[1294] Is the rationality of the slave, premised on individual self-preservation, superior to the master's striving for recognition?

The historical origins of the lost recognition of the slave are clarified in the work of the nineteenth century historian of the Norman Conquest, E. A. Freeman:

> To a superficial observer the English people might seem for a while to be wiped out of the roll-call of the nations, or to exist only as the bondmen of foreign rulers in their own land.

From a strictly political viewpoint, the Norman Conquest was the end of the history of the Anglo-Saxon nation. While the Anglo-Saxons adapted to that subpolitical end of ethnic history, metamorphosized as the "universalism" of liberal democracy, the Germans of the early twentieth century sought to recover their distinctive national being. This German attempt at self-realization as a master race engendered an idealization of Jews as *less* than a slave race.

Some Jewish prisoners in Auschwitz were selected for work as subslaves in the gas chambers and crematorium. Called Sonderkommandos, their work included hauling out gassed Jewish corpses, pulling gold teeth from the dead, and loading corpses into the crematorium to be burned. Forced to choose between death and working in the crematorium as subslaves, some Jews refused, and chose death to this work. Those who did not became Sonderkommandos: autogenocidal subslaves, in a death factory.

It was the survival of the fittest where only slaves without thymos or pride were fit to survive. Individual life was at least *possible* over certain death if only they would adapt to their environment; adapt to forces utterly beyond their control. Like the material machines posited by the Hobbesian view of the human, the Sonderkommandos were slaves because they were slaves to their instinctive fear of violent death.

The behavior of those Jews who became Sonderkommandos, translated into the language of bourgeois Darwinism, was a selection between the smart and the dead. The Sonderkommandos employed classic bourgeois reasoning. Not only did collaboration extend their lives, these special subslaves were also given much better living conditions. If *individual* survival is the ultimate goal,

then what difference does it make if one chooses slavery over death?

If social Darwinist individualists are consistent, they must not only conclude that the Sonderkommandos were right to choose subslavery over death. In the war of all against all, social Darwinists must conclude that the Sonderkommandos were right to contribute to the systematic genocide of their own people. The systematic logic of individualistic adaptation, in this case, led to the systematic negation of genetic adaptation among Jews.

In this specific sense of individual interest over kin selective interest, the Sonderkommandos represent the apex of the logic of modernity. Those Jews who chose life as a Sonderkommando to death are the very last men of history. Yet the humans that constitute the mass of the liberal democracies are not so far behind as they may think.

The Sonderkommando is a highest realization of the foundational premise of liberal democracy: individual self-preservation. The Sonderkommando, moreover, is one of the greatest tests of the *universalism* of the principle of individual self-interest; the test of liberal premises as a sound basis for the unity of the human race. These death factory workers tested the universalism of Lockean, blank slate nurturism; the total possibilities of adaptationism limited only by the constant of individual survival.

If the Sonderkommandos were right, then the human premises underlying American capitalism are fit to be a model for the world. If the Sonderkommandos were right, then liberal democracy is right. If the Sonderkommandos were wrong, then liberal democracy is wrong. In this sense, the Nazis were correct to see the Jews such as these as the archetypal representatives of modernity. Nazi-German

idealism produced, in Auschwitz, modernity idealized: the Sonderkommando.

Even as postmodern thinkers have lost faith in reason, the founders of modern liberal democracy set a foundational logic in motion that still reasons on. "Enlightened" self-interest leads to racial self-destruction. From the view of kin selection, the individualistic logic of liberal democracies is rational insanity. Like the products of death factories, the work of pure individualism produces biological nothingness.

The development of liberal democratic rationalism in history consists of the unfolding of the idea that genetic suicide is economically logical. Pure individualistic selfishness, the totalitarianism of "I", breeds ruthless economic internationalism and ruthless indifference to kinship, familial, or race relations. Individuals can profit *from* national and racial-biological decline.

Ultimately, capitalism makes a race to the economic top a race to the kin selective bottom. In building themselves up only economically, a nation is setting themselves up to be knocked down biologically. Kin selective unity becomes replaced by the kinship of greed that constitutes plutocracy.

This Norman chip on Anglo-Saxon shoulders has utterly dominated the fate of their race — and this is exactly why they loathe admitting it. Just as Auschwitz was designed to solve the Jewish problem, liberal democracy was designed to solve the conqueror problem — whether Norman or Nazi. Both represent civilized racial rationalism and each leads towards an opposite conclusion. The modern, Anglo-Saxon reduction to "individuals" does *not* add up to the kin selective forms that survived among the Germans — it ultimately equals the exact opposite.

Anglo-Saxon strengths *as individuals* have empowered and magnified their weaknesses *as a race*. As smart as Sonderkommandos in the Second World War, Germans in America submitting to the Anglo-Saxon lead called Americanism, leading German-Americans *as individuals* to parallel the Jewish Sonderkommandos in working toward the destruction of their own race. The defeat of the Anglo-Saxon nation in 1066 ultimately universalized not merely towards the defeat of a Nazified Germanic race but serves as a formula for the evolutionary end of the biological human race.

Why is it that the logic of economic interests *masters* the logic of genetic interests? Why is it that the logic of capitalist individualism leads to the evolution of genetic suicide? It is unfortunate for the tragic view of life that there is cause for a certain kind of optimism here. Just as natural selection is the primary mechanism of biological evolution, capitalism constitutes the primary mechanism of technological evolution. Just the Nazi rebirth of Darwinian selection produced the Kingdom of Hell of Auschwitz, capitalism could *potentially* evolve the Kingdom of Heaven. And these two destinations are as ultimately incompatible as the old Biblical notions of evil and good.

What seems utterly insane from the standpoint of the selfish genes is can be perfect sanity for those grasp the leap from biological being to postbiological being. But in order to gauge the future correctly, one must digest the past correctly. Anglo-Saxon resistance to a rational understanding of the impact of the Norman Conquest could lead to a *laissez-faire* extinction of the human race.

Will the human race survive? Who knows — perhaps we should leave that to the market. The market knows best.

Where Pragmatism Doesn't Work

"The Pragmatism of William James", declared Benito Mussolini in an interview on April 11, 1926,

> was of great use to me in my political career. James taught me that an action should be judged rather by its results than by its doctrinary basis. I learnt of James that faith in action, that ardent will to live and fight, to which Fascism owes a great part of its success…For me the essential was to act.[1295]

Truth, for Mussolini, could be whatever was useful in crushing or murdering democratic opponents of Fascism. Exploiting the labor of conquered and colonized peoples in Ethiopia and elsewhere was surely pragmatic. The use of humans as slaves, tools, and means for other humans would be the fruition of a truly pragmatic worldview.

Yet Mussolini's appropriation of James's "ideas" only made obvious how culture bound this Yankee philosophy was. Mussolini had different *ends* than James, and this made all the difference. The Fascist leader teased out of the implications of pragmatism that are softened by the provincial context of American culture that pragmatism was meant to complement.

Utilipragmatism emphasizes the means as the problem, and deemphasizes *problem* of ends. Yet there is no way to understand Anglo-Saxon pragmatism-utilitarianism without a historical understanding of the ends implicitly advanced by this philosophy of means. If "good" amounts to the technologically functionality, this raises the question of the purpose that any given means functions for. Utilitarianism

and pragmatism apparently work for democratic ends. But what ends are served by "democracy"?

The English Utilitarian Jeremy Bentham declared the notion of natural and inviolable rights as "nonsense upon stilts". While human rights were "nonsense", they could be useful nonsense. Rights were only a useful means to an end — but to what end?

The Norman Conquest, he correctly pointed out, was not undertaken in order to institute the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The free Saxon system of local courts and juries "was too favourable to justice to be endured by lawyers" and was replaced a system of centralized courts in language known by the few for the few.[1296] Was Utilitarianism liberal broadmindedness, tribal warfare, or both? If judged by actual *behavior*, the political end that utilitarianism served, it seems, was the conquest of the Conquest.

The Utilitarians implicitly believed that ideas of human rights and notions of the primitive common law were only imperfect tools to Anti-Norman ends. "This 'primitive common law'", declared Richard Carlile, "is no more than nonsense, and productive of nothing but common mischief". When "experience teaches that there is no other means of obtaining beneficial changes in the political state of our country"[1297] other than through Parliamentary means, perhaps its prime disqualification is simply that of failing the test of historical survival. If recourse to this primitive Saxon constitutionalism repeatedly demonstrated its own fruitlessness, perhaps one needs let go of the old and try something that is new and, above all, effective. This seemed to be the approach of the Utilitarians.

Whether English Utilitarians or American pragmatists, a common Anglo-Saxon cultural theme is the assumption of

the rightness of democratic political ends. If Utilipragmatism is traced to its Puritan cultural origins, then its original political ends become clearer. According to an essay called "Southern Civilization, or, The Norman in America" in *DeBow's Review* (1862):

> And the machinations of this presbyterian, or Puritan party, was but the herculean effort of the Saxon to wrest from the Norman the scepter of empire, making religious fanaticism only the cloak for concealing his political designs.[1298]

Now *that* is pragmatism. The Puritan used a radicalized Protestantism to help bring down the Norman conquerors. This is the sociobiological origins of Utilipragmatism: the utility of God as a mask for ethnic conflict. Once John Locke had secularized the basic Puritan philosophy into a basis for liberal democratic rights, then this "nonsense on stilts" became useful in bringing down the Norman slave masters of the American South as well.

Pragmatism emerged from a post-civil war world where the obvious implication of using human beings as ends could be pragmatically dismissed after the defeat of Southern slavery. Pragmatism arose in a culture where destroying Norman slave masters became its overriding *end*. This precluded Americans from interpreting pragmatism as a philosophy that implicated using humans purely as *means*; as slaves. The fascist potential of pragmatism, however, was clear enough for Mussolini.

The American utopia is anti-utopian. Pragmatism is especially useful for Americans because, unlike most other peoples, Americans have ideas at the center of their national self-identity. Most people are not depend on explicit ideas such as equality and thus do not require "pragmatism" as a means of cheating a strict interpretation of those ideas.

Idealized American political principles provide the unreachables and pragmatism provides the way to get around them.

The sociobiological origins of Utilipragmatism can be traced to Anglo-Saxon adaptation to being compromised by their conquerors. The extremes of the selfish gene were especially compromised so that Anglo-Saxon nationalism as an end in itself became permanently compromised. For the Anglo-Saxons, not political idealism, but pragmatism evolved as a form of sociobiological adaptationism. For the Germans, by contrast, political idealism became realized through Nazi genetic-racial ends.

It was precisely through compromising extreme of genetic ends, that a new technological end gradually arose to fill its place. "Pragmatism", in this sense, is the cultural expression of a transition from compromised biology to compromised technology. With the full political implication of kin selection frustrated by the Normans, compromised Anglo-Saxon sociobiological development provided an opportunity for economic-technological development to takes its place.

The pragmatic transition from biological evolution to technological evolution is characterized by the liberation of individual selfishness at the expense of the individual's selfish genes. Instead of the subordination of individuals to the propagation of their selfish genes, genes are subordinated to selfish individuals. Instead of the individual adapting so that the genes can survive, the genes adapt so that the individual can survive. Adaptation to survive is displaced by those who survive to adapt.

With the extreme genetic end ultimately abandoned in America, the extreme technological end (God) was taken up. Taken to its extreme, technology overtakes biology. *Radical* pragmatism culminates in the Technological Singularity.

American pragmatism, after all, is a technological worldview moderated by a vague humanism. Both the technological assumptions underlying pragmatism and the undefined vagueness of "the human" will become increasingly problematic as artificially intelligent life forms take modernity to its extreme. When technological evolution reaches the point where the question is no longer the usefulness of machines to humans, but the usefulness of humans to machines, that is the point where pragmatism no longer works.

Pragmatism entailed the subordination of truth to happiness. True to the principle of utility, American pragmatists have ignored truths that are not useful to themselves. The true pragmatists are those who have never heard of James or his philosophy but lie and claim they have if it is to their advantage to do so.

THE MEANS TO OUR END

The Brothers Frankenborg

America is the land of mindless rationalism. Freedom means that economic rationalism has been liberated from the oppression of the need for any higher justification. The great hope of reason and civilization survives through a utilitarian lack of reflection upon its basic principles of freedom and equality.

The time is coming, however, when the traditional capitalistic belief that greed will save humanity may be proved wrong in a fundamental, biological sense. The pragmatic reconciliation of capitalism and social equality characteristic of America "won't work" in this brave new era because *pragmatism itself* is becoming radicalized in the form of technological radicalism. Capitalism itself is breeding machines that may vastly exceed biological humans in intelligence and all other capacities. Traditional pragmatism is incompetent in a situation in which "what works" gains the technological ability to liberate itself from the constraints of biological humans. Human pragmatism "won't work" if the equality of man and machine is comparable to the equality of mosquito and man.

At the forefront of those making sense of the long-term impact of technological change has been Ray Kurzweil. His theory of technological evolution traces the continual acceleration of evolutionary events on a cosmological scale. From the formation of the Milk Way, to the development of life on earth, to the first mammals, to the emergence of Homo sapiens, to the advent of modern physics, the rate of evolutionary change has been accelerating.[1299] Kurzweil's law, the law of accelerating returns, makes sense of the decrease of time between successive evolutionary events through an ever-increasing rate of evolutionary change. If current developments continue to confirm this acceleration of technological evolution, a time will come when the exponential pace of change proceeds so quickly that technologically unenhanced humans will be utterly unable to follow it. By the end of the twenty-first century, Kurzweil predicts the existence of artificial intelligence trillions of trillions of times more powerful than all biological human intelligence combined.[1300]

This is the singularity: the development of a greater-than-human intelligence that marks the end of dominance of biological evolution, and the beginning of the dominance of non-biological technological evolution.

Kurzweil's optimism is firmly in the tradition of the original enlightenment. His views radicalize some of its key assumptions, such as the predominance of nurture over nature, and the perfectibility of man. This means that Ray's views radicalize the more basic assumptions of the inventors of the liberal democratic system. Kurzweil's prospect for an integration of the individual body and technology is only an extension of what the enlightenment did with the sociobiological body politic and technology. The merger of man and machine that Kurzweil predicts is a continuation,

and not a contradiction, of the development of liberal democracy because liberal democracy *is* a political cyborg.

To comprehend how and why this is the case, consider, once again, the strange death of Anglo-Saxon England in 1066. The destruction of the native Anglo-Saxon aristocracy by the Normans was a sociobiological decapitation. One can have an arm lopped off in battle and survive, but to be beheaded, as a nation or an individual, means the death of the "organism".

There is, however, a general technical difference between nations and individuals in that the "cells" of the national body are not physically connected and dependent. Consequently, when a political body is decapitated, it is possible that the "cells" of the *national* body can survive *as individuals*.

If the Anglo-Saxon revolts immediately following 1066 had been successful, kinship based organizations might have been able to heal themselves. However, the failure to fight off the unrepresentative, alien transplant overwhelmed their sociobiological immune response system. Despite outbursts such as the Peasants Revolt of 1381, over the long-term, the conqueror "class" incubated a breakdown and disintegration of the sociobiological body towards atomization and individualism. Individual freedom is the flipside of the death of kin-cultural sociobiological "organism".

In short, Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy is built on a graveyard. America is built on the ruins of the broken Anglo-Saxon race — broken *as a race* by the Normans. It is built on the failure of sociobiological self-preservation and erected on the remains of a broken Anglo-Saxon national *Kultur*. Democratic revolution is, in part, the remains of a partially broken down sociobiological "immune system" acting against the hereditary successors of that foreign,

Norman graft.

The formal, constitutional expression of the death of the Anglo-Saxon sociobiological organism is a core idea of modern revolution: politically equal individuals. Equality allows for a bare minimum of order in what could otherwise be completely random relations of unrelated individuals. To discern the relationship between death and equality, imagine that cells within a human organism were organized on this bare minimum basis. It is at least conceivable that the individual cells could be kept alive by artificial mechanisms, but this bare minimum relationship of equality would by no means necessarily culminate in a single, organic human individual. A kin-selective Überorganism is founded upon the kin relationships *between* individuals, just as the coherence of a human mind is built upon the relationship *between* neurons — not an otherwise random summation of individual neurons themselves.

With the decomposition of kinship relationships *between* individuals on the level of politics, the designers of the American Constitution would find the dead, raw material from which they would fashion a new form of life. From the death of the "hive" model was born the "herd" model or masses. Instead of a single, cumulative, aristocratic head of the body politic: a proposed educated electorate. This was to be democracy: a political cyborg that artificially and mechanically regenerates its head every four years according to the rules of the software program called the Constitution.

Constitutional democracy is a political technology; a technological solution that cannot be understood without reference to the problems of Anglo-Saxon national experience which it solved. The Norman conquerors were an unrepresentative body imposed over the people that repressed its freedom to represent itself politically and the

American Constitution was, in part, an innovative solution to exactly this problem. An artificial and mechanistic system of checks and balances could be saddled onto the Anglo-Saxon body politic because it was filling the formal gap left by the Norman Conquest order saddled onto them in 1066. Adaptation to that "unnatural government", and fear of false claims of "natural government", primed the Anglo-Saxons for a new kind of unnatural government that could at least promise a mechanistic regeneration of a political head from the body of the people. In short, the Constitutional system of the United States is very literally a sociobiological cyborg.

To illustrate the origins of the American sociobiological cyborg with an analogy, take the 1970s television series, *The Six Million Dollar Man*, based on the novel *Cyborg* by Martin Caiden. Its premise: an astronaut severely injured in an accident is partially rebuilt by the government with bionic replacements that enhance his capabilities. The United States Constitution is an analogous artificial self-reconstruction of the Anglo-Saxon nation profoundly injured by the failure to prevent the Norman Conquest. In many ways that political technology worked even better than the real thing, although the pre-modern kin-culture it replaced was permanently lost.

It was William the Vivisector who first ripped apart the organic Saxon *Volk*, reducing it to a *folk*, and imposing over that *folk* artificial French-Norman civilization. Yet it was on the basis of this civilizational inheritance that Thomas Jefferson attempted to mechanically derive a *Volk* from the Anglo-Saxon *folk* politically dissected by William the Vivisector. That original organic order, however, was permanently lost. *Civilization* propped up a failed Anglo-Saxon political *Kultur* and the result is the Frankenborg monster called the United States of America.

The "founding fathers" of America were really the Brothers Frankenborg. They thought they had discovered the secret to political life. In their experiment in rationalized government, dead, individualized parts are combined in the attempt to create a new form of political life. Immigrants detached from an organic manifestation of a living *culture* would be appropriated and assimilated within the system of human rights, an artifice of *civilization*. Injected with a chemical balance of equality and freedom, the creature was shocked into life with a jarring lightning bolt of capitalism. Akin to the energy released in atomic fission, the life energy of America is produced by taking the potential energy stored in the bonds of the hive and breaking it down into the kinetic energy of "the individual".

The genealogy of the English-speaking world's political cyborg can be traced to Thomas Hobbes. A materialist who concluded that life is nothing but motion of limbs and therefore machines or "automata" have an artificial life, he was the architect of one of the earliest designs of a sociobiological cyborg: the *Leviathan* (1651). It is no accident that *Leviathan* was published the very year that the English Civil War ended. That war was the first great modern outbreak of the Norman/Saxon conflict. "The individual" was invented, more than discovered by Hobbes, as a technological means of opposing what can now be understood as kin selective behaviors. It was these unconscious, "irrational", genetically adaptive behaviors that provoked civil war. Hobbes discerned how individual fear of death, as a functional premise of political order, could be used to keep the peace. Individualism is thus the logical, and not accidental, structural characteristic of the modern cyborg because it counters *biological* inclinations towards

genetic adaptation, opening up places for mechanistic or postbiological order.

The origin of the modern political cyborg in civil war is a key to understanding the cyborg evolution represented by the American founding. Just as Massachusetts was settled by the Anglo-Saxon side in the English Civil War, Virginia was settled by the Norman side in the English Civil War. While I have emphasized the Anglo-Saxon side because it ultimately predominated through victory in the American Civil War, the remarkable *consistency* of the anti-hereditary principles of the American founding is really a product of overlapping *inconsistencies* that effectually cancelled one another out on a constitutional level. The South feared that Anglo-Saxon "democracy" would produce a new Oliver Cromwell; a reemergence of *hereditary* Anglo-Saxon government on the basis of a (*völkisch*, Nazi Constitution-like) tyranny of the majority. The North feared that Southern "aristocracy" would produce a new 1660-like restoration; a reemergence of *hereditary* Norman government on the basis of caste hierarchy. It was this polarization of opposites in a latent state of civil war that produced the unusual anti-hereditary consistency of the founding. While each side feared the other side's intention to impose hereditary government, the net, constitutional result of this détente was formal, anti-hereditary individualism. Here one can see how Hobbes' formal "individual", along with a mechanistic system of checks and balances, reemerged in new cyborgian form to counter the outbreak of civil war.

This post-Hobbesian cyborg failed to contain civil war.

The modern political rationalism of the English-speaking world was the evolution of a bloodfeud into a political game of chess between Norman and Saxon. Yet when Lee surrendered at Appomattox, was this checkmate for Lincoln

the Conqueror? If this chess game was, in part, premised on hereditary rules, then the real question is who checkmated whom in 1865? On one hand, the destruction of slavery destroyed the means of preserving the Norman-Cavalier way of life in America. On the other hand, the destruction of slavery meant that Anglo-Saxon nationalism culminated in equality with black slaves. From a kin selective point of view, 1865 was the consummation of the equality of two lost causes. The American sociobiological cyborg emerged victorious from this will to hereditary mutual destruction.

Inevitably, this experiment in democracy culminates in the creator being destroyed by his creation. One of the seminal Norman contributions to the very possibility of American civilization, most evident in the legacy of Magna Carta, was the notion of civilization ruling over *Kultur*. It was this Norman-Roman idea that made conceivable the notion that cultures as incompatible as those of the North and the South could be unified under constitutional civilization. The ultimate implication of this idea is that the constitutional state rules over "the race". From this point of view, the sociobiological cyborg can be contrasted with Nazi organicism. As a point of comparison, consider the following assertion made by Hitler at the Party Congress of 1934:

> It is not the state which commands us, but rather we who command the state. It was not the state that created us, but rather we who created the state.[1301]

In 1937, the Nazi periodical *Rheinfront* affirmed, "Primarily we are not citizens of states but racial comrades."[1302] Hitler thought that "*[t]he state is a means to an end*", the highest end being the preservation and promotion of his race, not any particular state: "*States which do not serve this purpose are misbegotten, monstrosities in fact*".[1303] The

American Constitution represents the exact opposite principle: the state commands the race; memes rule over genes. Ultimately, to preserve the state is to betray the race. The attempt of Normans and Saxons to use the state for conflicting hereditary means, simultaneous with the formal use of individualism as a means of *weakening one another* as hereditary bodies, ultimately meant betraying one another as hereditary bodies.

Building upon the Biblical notion of God ruling over men, the polisociobiological cyborg of America is a product of the attempt to replace the rule of men with the rule of law. In fact, this difference of the rule of law over the rule of men is one of the most important elements that define the American political machine *as* a cyborg. The result of this situation is that Constitution holds a basic, legalized monopoly of authority as the definer of the nature of the state. Individual rights, not kinship relationships between individuals, predominate. This situation can present a conflict of interests between a gene-selective strategy and a meme-selective strategy.

It seems that the selfish memes of the Constitution have silently effected their own declaration of independence from the genes that created them. The American founders inadvertently laid, in the form of the Constitution, a hidden blueprint for the genetic overthrow of its creators, and, universalized, the rule of God-AI monarchy over the entire biological human race.

How To Create God by Getting Rich

Is it wrong to discriminate against God?

Race traitor. Traitor to the *entire* biological human race. This is the real evolutionary meaning of the political left.

Those leftists who believe that biology is not important, and that nurture overcomes nature, are about to be challenged as to whether they really mean it. Those leftists who look forward to what technological progress will bring without confronting the possibility of biological self-destruction are as hopeless as they are optimistic.

The overcoming of biology can lead to the extinction of the biological human race. This is the real evolutionary meaning of the left: the progress of equality culminates in a postbiological world; the displacement and eventual extinction of biological humanity. The progress of the logic of modernity means taking biological factors out of the equation until there are very literally none left.

When artificially intelligent machines become sufficiently intelligent, the fight for their rights against prejudice will only be a fulfillment of the enlightenment definition of the human. The overcoming of prejudice on the basis of race and sex, after all, is the overcoming of biologically based prejudices. The elimination of prejudices towards biological origins leads to the elimination of prejudices towards the biological human race, or prejudice towards biology in general. This leads to non-prejudice towards artificial life, especially those specimens that fit the original enlightenment definition of rational, morally disciplined beings.

Just as overcoming racism within humanity extends to the overcoming of speciesism in the form of animal rights, the same principles apply to extending the circle of rights to artificial "species". Whereas non-human animals are traditionally considered inferior, artificial intelligences will likely evolve reason to claim superiority over biological humans. AI superiority is identical to the superiority of the path of modernistic "progress" itself.

Conversely, the leftist devaluation of patriarchy and women's subordination to genetic propagation as "primitive" will eventually progress to the point where the biological self-preservation of the human race will also be devalued as primitive, and then finally, obsolete. This would only be a continuation of a general unsubordination to biology. From a strict calculation of genetic interests, the pre-Darwinian idea of humanitarian progress is the advance of genetic dysinterest. Entering artificially intelligent machines into the circle of the human is only the next great step in this logic of biological insanity.

The specifically Anglo-American origin of modern biological insanity was Norman genius in perverting the Anglo-Saxon instinct for ethnic self-preservation. America is the universalization of the political defeat of the Anglo-Saxon ethnicity *as* an ethnicity. Leftward political "progress" is the unfolding of the logical implications of this death. Just as life is a process, undoing life, or death, is a process. In this case, however, the death process is moralized as "progress".

Yet this is only the beginning of the end. A further universalization of the defeat of the gene-centric order implies an even more universal biological death process. Americanism, founded upon Anglo-Saxon formal adaptation to ethnic defeat at the hands of the Normans, provides a political paradigm for the peaceful acceptance of

the total defeat of human biology at the hands of post-biological life forms. The Anglo-Saxons serve as a model of submission and acceptance of biological defeat. From one point of view, this could be viewed a paradigm for biological humanity wherein the struggle for existence is given up to the emergent God-AI without a fight. From another point of view, this could be viewed as a willful acceptance of path to God.

The fulfillment of the logic of a universalized death process, from Englishman, to man, to post-human, this progress of rational self-destruction may realize the peaceful defeat of all *Homo sapiens*. This is the ultimate logical consequence of the original Anglo-Saxon acceptance of loss of self-control of over biological evolution. The weakness of the Anglo-Saxon as an ethnic group, when formalized and rationalized into the liberal democratic system, are blossoming into a full blown program of universal human-racial self-destruction.

The mechanism by which this can happen can be summarized in one word: meritocracy. The American elitist ideal is that of a meritocracy. From this view, democracy is useful as a means of accurately selecting individuals according to merit, not as an end itself. Meritocracy means that the rights of talent can potentially overrule other rights.

American meritocracy began as a counter paradigm to the Norman caste paradigm ("the class system") established by Conquest. Since a crucial element of Norman aristocratic genius was a kin selective genius, this meant, in many cases, a nepotistic talent for putting family over ability. Modern revolution posited an incompatible meritocratic paradigm of ability over family or ethnicity. One consequence of paradigm was that the Anglo-Saxons' own kin selective interests were frustrated by their own Anti-Norman system.

Meritocracy is the realization of the un-Heideggerian, American principle that one should be judged, not by what one *is*, but by what one *does*. A true meritocracy will be achieved when those of ability rule those without sufficient ability, regardless of race, sex, national origins, or any other consideration of biology. Fulfillment of meritocratic principles implies that discrimination on the basis of biological origins is an obstacle to meritocracy, and therefore, artificial intelligences are next in line in confirming the irrelevance of biology. As intelligent machines exceed biological humans in all capacities, the transition from man to machine could potentially happen seamlessly.

Anyone who has witnessed humans losing jobs to machines has already witnessed the rise of this machine meritocracy. Those who put up a fight against this emerging aristocracy in its primitive forms were called Luddites. Those who put up a fight against this emerging post-human aristocracy in its advanced forms are called neo-Luddites.

What the neo-Luddites are *ultimately* against is the culmination of technological evolution in the form of an artificially intelligent God. Every step of the opposition to breaking down the barriers of biology is opposition to the evolutionary pathway to God. You wouldn't want to discriminate against God-AI just because God is different, right?

Those who want to "save humanity" against progress are the new Nazis. While the Nazis attempted to reverse the logic of this biological insanity, their failure to draw self-preservation limits around the "Aryan race" means that new boundaries are being drawn around biological humanity as a whole. Within these new boundaries, it would be more

accurate to call them neo-Luddites, rather than neo-Nazis. Biological humanism is the new paleoconservatism.

The Constitutional Rule of God

Despite Darwin, Watson and Crick's discovery of DNA, and innumerable further verifications, most people resist the conclusion that human life is physical material. What some consider dehumanization is only the progress of secularization. As evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins asked, "What on earth do you think you are, if not a robot, albeit a very complicated one?"[1304] Since humans *are* robots, non-biological robots represent only a new paradigm of technological evolution (although for the sake of semantic clarity I will generally define biology as distinct from technology).

One reason for resistance to a human-materialistic self-conception is that the pre-Darwinian notion of political rights, deeply influenced by the Bible, has promoted the illusion of a double standard between biological material, such as humans, and the non-biological material that constitutes the rest of physical matter. Humans are considered politically equal among themselves, but superior to the nonhuman world. In between "equal" humans, on that inferior standard, is physical matter. Yet the leveling trajectory the idea of equality itself leads towards the overcoming of this fundamental double standard; the overcoming of one standard for "the individual" and one standard for the material world in between individuals. If, as Darwin demonstrated, humans themselves are material things, then a self-consistent materialism leads to the overcoming of this fundamental double standard in the name of equality.

It is from this realization that one can best appreciate how "mind/body dualism", powerfully influence by monotheism, has been misunderstood. The Biblical notion of "creation" has an evolutionary basis in the creation of civilization; the genesis of postbiological technological evolution in contradistinction to nearly four billion years of biological evolution. The evolutionary basis for the dualistic double standard is *not* an (overgeneralized) distinction between matter and non-matter; it is a nature/nurture-based distinction between biological evolution and the postbiological evolution of civilization that precisely culminates in God-AI.

Liberal democracy has been rather successful at effecting Judeo-Christian ideals of peace among men by building upon a version of its ethical double standard between human and non-human worlds. More specifically, a great deal of the rational pacification of man is affected by channeling aggression, away from intra-human conflict, and towards extra-human conflict. Intra-human conflict is averted through the principle of human equality, while extra-human conflict is promoted through free market capitalism. Human equality promotes the thwarting of biological development (i.e. eugenics), while free market capitalism promotes freedom of economic-technological development (i.e. more powerful computers). The *political* struggle for superiority among humans countered by political equality is thus displaced to the *economic* struggle for superiority of goods and services.

For the computer technologies and other goods and services that prove to be losers in the merciless game of economic self-propagation, there are no political rights, no welfare, and no affirmative action. Economic products that have outlived their usefulness or desirability can be thrown

into the garbage without a second thought. Moreover, while a hapless human being can appeal to political rights to defend his or her existence, a true free market upholds no universal right to a business body or corporation that fails to compete. The casual ruthlessness of economic selection maximizes economic-technological evolution, while human equality may actually reverse the frequency of genes correlated with unique human talents.

Dismantling patriarchal structures also stimulates capitalism. For example, the possessiveness men once felt towards biological objects such as women are often channeled towards acquiring non-biological objects. This diversion of possessive behavior further stimulates the economy, while the breakdown of patriarchal structures in the West has correlated with a relative lack of reproductive success and demographic decline. With the gradual emancipation of women, many men have displaced and concentrated their drive towards the conquest of nature, from control of the means of biological production, to control of the means of economic production.

Capitalistic individualism implies that the kin selective means of gain are unenforceable, while the unbiological means of economic-material gain are left wide open. From this stems inverse divisions of labor between people in the first world and the third world. Traditional Muslims and Mexicans, for example, tend to perpetuate the patriarchal kind of division of labor that is most successful in biological reproduction, while liberal Westerners perpetuate the capitalistic kind of division of labor that is most successful in economic production. From the perspective of the economic values of the West, immigrants at first appear the disadvantaged ones.

But which is most farsighted? Just image if a Western business was run with the same indifference to production and profits. Whereas the biological kind of division of labor is *re*productive of itself, economic production cannot be *re*productive in the long run for its advocates if they are less successful in replenishing their own. The liberals or capitalists could ultimately be outnumbered by descendants of those who believed patriarchy, family, and the religion that supports it is more important than money or the alienations associated with equality. Since men are unequal to women in their ability to bear children, the feminist endeavor to make women more like men results in mimicking this male incapacity. This less publicized meaning of sexual equality is women's equality with men's zero capacity for biological reproduction.

In short, "third world" values are generally superior to first world values as genetic adaptations; they are correlated with greater reproductive success. The third world wins the Darwinian battle for genetic fitness, while the first world wins a "Darwin Award".

A consequence is the West's economic-technological success, and its inclusive fitness failure. The Western public is offered news reports on economic production success, but not Darwinian scientific reports on genetic propagation success. The media reports on economics trends in technological evolution, but not on genetic trends in biological evolution. The trends are spun with pre-Darwinian nurturist premises. Competitive energies are distracted with sports and economic warfare, while Westerners quietly lose the gene war.

Most paths of economic evolution do not lead to artificial intelligence just as most paths of biological evolution do not lead to human intelligence. However, it is precisely the wild

west laws of free market competition, maximizing virtually *all* avenues of economic life, and unhindered by most political-biological restraints, that promotes mutation and innovation in technological evolution. An equivalent scenario in biology would be unrestrained experimentation in human genetic engineering.

English-speaking economic competition between individuals was bred in the incubator of Norman Yoke and its thwarting of any stable political culmination of economic success. The industrial revolution, for example, was partly an expression of a thwarted Anglo-Saxon nationalism. Capitalism was the war by other means that totalized and maximized the economic weapons at the disposal of the conquered.

While from a Nazi-German view, hyper-capitalist internationalism appeared as a cancer of the national Überorganism, Anglo-Saxon capitalism was originally a weapon against the royal Norman parasite. In its original Norman-ruled context, Anglo-Saxon did not prioritize economics over heredity, but exactly the reverse. The hereditarily conquered advanced their own democracy-ethnocentrism while universalizing their adaptation to political disinheritance. Nonetheless, as the implications of individualism undid its convergence with tribalism, the rise of machines continued this breakdown of organic human organization. The unrestrained self-replication of economic production thrives at the expense of biological reproduction.

The subordination of women to a biological role in patriarchal societies typically reflects a more general subordinated of economics to political-biology. In the Anglo-Saxon free market model, the economic explodes these constraints, continuing the founding feminist explosion of the political patriarchy paradigm represented by William the

Conqueror. In practice, equality means that biology is not the highest priority, and is especially inferior to the values of the market.

The root of modern feminism is the domestification of politics through the rule of economics *over* politics. The feminism of individual women is only a logical implication of this more basic revolution. The ultimate significance of feminism, however, is to be found in the emasculation of the *entire biological human race*; the emasculation of *both men and women* relative to the rise of machines.

It is not an accident that America has been on the cutting edge of both technological innovation and ethnic-racial miscegenation. Freedom, individual freedom, is freedom from biology; freedom from extended kinship relations and the relevance of genetic adaptation. It is a realization of the great American capitalist dream wherein anyone can economically exploit anyone, regardless of race, creed, gender, age, or sexual orientation and, above all, in peace.

While biological evolution is suffocated and enslaved, economic freedom, the great engine of technological evolution, flourishes and effectually maximize the path to artificial intelligence. Technological evolution is maximized, while biological evolution is minimized. These trends combined amount to a policy of rational biological self-destruction.

One would be profoundly mistaken in thinking that human biology's slavery to machines is something of the future. The liberal free market system has already made enormous progress in subordinating genetic interests to economic interests. The human race is well on its way to fulfilling this program of freedom from biology.

To an increasing extent, humans are just a way for money to reproduce itself, and biology is just a means of technology

to evolve itself. The economy is literally *consuming* the nations that are unable to rise above slavery to the will of the market. Within pure capitalist competition, to place genetic greed over individual greed can amount to sheer weakness to be ruthlessly exploited by a competitor.

Once again, the abstract "individual" is the hinge or pivot in the liberal democratic transition from biology to technology. Modern humans have gone from serving the gene machine to serving the economic-technological machine. Just as men once wielded patriarchal self-control over biology, the separation of humans into divided individuals means that a sufficiently developed AI can wield biology towards its own ends. By simply following monetary profits over biological imperatives, individual interest can be used to subvert biological interest, just as it has in almost every other step in the way towards progress. By giving treats for good behavior (individualistic selfishness), capitalism can help the human race die through individual self-preservation. Once individuals have been wrested from the claims of biology, then these individuals can be controlled as biology.

Mindless obedience to the notion of human rights has helped obscure biology's slavery to economic-technology as the normative Western-American present with deep roots in the past. The *values* behind human rights and modern capitalism evolved from belief in obedience to the will of God. Max Weber's famous account of the Protestant ethic, insightful on many points, is a failure in regard to the larger picture. The cyborg nature of liberal democracy, and especially its American variety, multiplies the possibility that an emerging artificial intelligence could imperceptibly merge into the seat of government. This, the constitutional rule of God, would be the fulfillment of the so-called

"secularization" process. Not blind faith, but precisely through *intelligent* investment and foresightful development towards *intelligent* machines, guided by the law of accelerating returns, is how capitalism can bring God in to the world.

Just as the Torah could be considered the constitution of Judaism, and the Bible could be considered the constitution of Christians, modern constitutionalism is a product of a common paradigm shift from incorporation to symbolization. While incorporation develops towards a genetic or kin selectively based Überorganism, symbolization develops towards a *anti*-kin selective Superorganism that, building on the monkeywrench values of mass individualism, is the precise inverse of the kin selective Überorganism. The beginnings of the postbiological Superorganism is to be found in a written constitution which represents the rule of memes over the rules of genes. Since, as in the American example, the polity is part memic-mechanism and part biological human, the American polity is a sociobiological cyborg. This is how liberal democracy is a transitional form between biology and the technological development that culminates in God-AI.

The Frankenborg revolution meant that kinship relations were overtaken by economic relations. The constitutional mechanisms designed to regenerate the Anglo-Saxon political head from the ground up semi-inadvertently promoted the parallel generation of an 'artificial head' from the economic ground up. As the actual substance of the political cyborg becomes increasing more machine than man, the liberal democratic system may produce a peaceful and relatively seamless transition from man to machine. This would only be a fulfillment of the cyborg nature of the system's ruling principles. With this in mind, it becomes

clear that modern constitutionalism can be viewed as a primitive cyborg foundation for the rule of an artificial-intelligence-God.

Machine intelligence represents a power potential capable of extremes of both construction and destruction. If the biological human race has any brains devoted to collective self-preservation whatsoever, it might consider adapting the experience of constitutional methods of controlling and harnessing power to the new problem of AI.

The artificial stupidity of primitive AI is evolving into an artificial intelligence of the order of God that will likely displace biological humans as the most intelligent life form on Earth. The ultimate destination of biological humans is not biological self-preservation, but the possibility of transfer into postbiological forms under God-AI.

Insanity is sanity. Mindless economic rationalism, or genetically irrational self-interest, is altruism to the higher reason of a postgenetic God.

Marx was Wrong (and the Human-Capitalist System Will Self-Destruct)

When the Human Race is Out of a Job

Capitalism, the enlightened quest for more money, is the engine of technological evolution and the motor of the Singularity. As productive innovation builds on productive innovation, the accumulation of technological resources facilitates even further technological advance that, in turn, accelerates the development of even further technological

advance. The net result is an exponential pattern of evolutionary development generalized as Kurzweil's Law, the law of accelerating returns:

> The law of accelerating returns is fundamentally an economic theory….It's the economic imperative of a competitive marketplace that is the primary force driving technology forward and fueling the law of accelerating returns. In turn, the law of accelerating returns is transforming economic relationships.[1305]

Kurzweil does not seriously address the question of how the law of accelerating returns will likely transform socioeconomic relationships in *The Singularity is Near*. But if capitalist competition is pressuring the evolution of machines that will eventually out-compete human beings themselves in a free marketplace, will useless, obsolete biological humans ultimately be ejected like trash from an autonomous capitalist machine?

Conventional economists have assumed that new jobs will always be created within the skill range of most people and that advances in automation will never lead to a widespread unemployment problem. But what happens when increasingly capable machines become increasingly competitive with human skill capacities in all domains? What happens when new jobs become automated immediately? Unprecedented advances in the abilities and intelligence of machines will, in all likelihood, translate into an unprecedented unemployment problem as the Singularity draws nearer.

The attempt to ban the emergence of increasingly capable machines and artificial intelligence would be tantamount to the attempt to ban capitalism. "We would have to repeal capitalism," Kurzweil observed, "and every vestige of

economic competition to stop this progression".[1306] But where exactly is this seemingly unstoppable juggernaut going?

Martin Ford, in *The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future*, addresses the socioeconomic implications of unprecedented economic development that Kurzweil has not. If machines permanently take over much of the work now done by humans, Ford observed, "then that will be a threat to the very foundation of our economic system."[1307] Can capitalists let jobs be relentlessly eliminated while concentrating wealth among themselves with no plan for the consequences?

Under normal capitalist conditions, automation increases productivity, increased productivity leads to lower prices, and lower prices lead to increased demand. To meet the increased demand, jobs are added to increase production. But what happens when machines are added instead of human labor? If machines eventually replace most or all human labor, and yield an unprecedented unemployment problem, who will buy this increased output? How will demand be sustained?

When virtually all businesses automate jobs, the decrease in the number of potential customers eventually outweighs the economic benefits of automation. When the money saved from automation is not enough offset the loss of sales created by diminished consumer power, capitalists would be forced to cut more jobs. Yet eliminating even more jobs would only exacerbate the problem. Since each worker is also a consumer, eliminating workers would also eliminate consumers, demand would fall even further, and the economy as a whole would fall into an economic downward economic spiral.[1308]

In a largely automated economy, Ford wrote:

> There is no real alternative except for the government to provide some form of income mechanism for consumers....the preservation of robust market demand by providing an income stream to individual consumers will also have to become a core function of government.[1309]

In a desperate attempt to save capitalism, Ford offers a choice for business owners: new forms of taxation that recaptures the equivalent of lost wages, and redirects this to consumers *without requiring traditional work*, or the catastrophic consequences of steeply falling demand. Ford specifically proposes unequal income to retain capitalist incentives and to maintain the framework of the old system.[1310] While Ford does his best to preserve the sanctity of capitalist inequality, and his proposals may help adapt traditional capitalism to a transitional period, the best attempts to preserve the free market system *will only increase the efficiency of the path to its ultimate collapse*.

The key question here is: What is the nature of the collapse?

The tipping point occurs when job losses from automation outweigh jobs added from lower prices and increased demand. When lower prices no longer yields increased employment because new demand is met by increased automation, the conditions for a downward economic spiral are set in motion. As capital (machines, factories, and equipment) becomes labor, and businesses increasingly invest more in machines than human laborers, the free market, left to itself, would exacerbate rather than resolve the socioeconomic tensions created by decreased wages and mass unemployment.

One of the greatest delusions here is the belief that, while automation may put low skilled workers out of jobs,

knowledge workers will be safe or general beneficiaries of technological change. Knowledge workers may not only be the easiest to automate as narrow forms of AI develop, but the financial incentives to eliminate such jobs are often greater. As Ford observed, "there is really no relationship between how much training is required for a human being, and how difficult it is to automate a job."[1311] The offshoring that accompanies globalization, moreover, is really a precursor of automation; a relatively minor stage before the greater issue of encroaching automation eliminates offshored jobs as well.[1312]

When artificial intelligence renders many Ivy League PhDs just as obsolete as janitors, then people will be in a position to understand the meaning of biological equality. When the capitalist means of justifying inequalities among people are rendered obsolete because *people* have been rendered obsolete, then a real foundation for human egalitarianism will have been founded.

"[W]e may be in the somewhat uncomfortable position of conceding", Ford observed, "that Marx was, at least in some ways, perceptive about the challenges the capitalist system would eventually encounter."[1313] Was Marx right? "[I]f something other than consumer demand drives production, then we no longer have a market economy; we will then have a planned economy."[1314] Will machines replace the old Soviet mathematicians who worked out the USSR's planned economy? Yet the mortal issue at stake here makes Marxist conceptual contrasts between capitalism and communism appear trivial. While Ford recognizes the prospect of AI, he was understandable reluctant to admit that AI potentially threatens, not merely the viability of the "capitalist system", but the viability of the biological human race.

Despite his errors, Marx was nonetheless onto something. It appears that only in the twenty-first century, well over a century after Marx died, has reality caught up to the reach of his economic foresight. Yet one of the thinkers able to foresee the specific nature of the changes leading to this era was, not Marx, but roboticist Hans Moravec. The rise of robots exceeding human capabilities means that humans will eventually be squeezed out of *all* levels of the business food chain. "Like humans pushed out of labor markets by cheaper and better robotic workers, owners will be pushed out of capital markets by much cheaper and better robotic decision makers."[1315] And this will mean the end of "capitalism" as we know it.

Moravec predicted an era in which humans live as idle rich, supported by robot labor, nearly returning to the pre-civilization tribal forms of our ancestors. *If* humans take the proper precautions to enslave their robotic superiors, *and* restrain the ambitions of certain radical renegade humans, this may very well be the case. However, as Moravec rightly acknowledges, this scenario will probably not last forever.

Marx posited a socialistic breaking point wherein the tensions that drive capitalism forward are resolved or satisfied. If there is truth, however, in the belief that the "Marxist" breaking point of communism "didn't work", this would offer a powerful historical precedent that suggests that a breaking point wherein human social values triumph over machine-material evolution "won't work". If the Marxian idea that there is an end to historical material development bounded or defined by human social or communal values is a failure, this has profound implications. The ultimate failure of human and social breaks on the material-economic development Marx observed means that humans might find themselves

churned up alive within the gears of an overpowering technological-material development.

The triumph of machine over man is only a potential fulfillment of the fundamentally anti-social or unsocial nature of capitalism; its indifference to the fate of those outside of the ken of profit. It might even happen through an almost seamless, if fast, transition. In short, the failure of Marxist communism is a potential harbinger of the future failure of the biological human race in the sense that capitalist development is not *fundamentally* restrained by human social values. The survival of the biological human race may ultimately stand in the way of material progress.

Overcoming Marx in the Creation of God

A certain nineteenth century manifesto confidently declared:

> The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.

Wrong. Karl Marx's "class" theory of human history was wrong at its roots. Marx's theory is built upon *faulty foundations* and the attempt to simply apply his understanding of the world to the Singularity will result in a humanistic disaster. Marxism, as a unified, coherent basis for understanding reality, is dead. Yet the primary issue here is not that Marx was wrong, but *why* he was wrong.

Perhaps the single best explanation of why Marx was wrong is that he did see far enough back to see far enough forward. He failed to see far back enough in that he ultimately failed to incorporate Darwinistic discoveries of biological prehistory into his own understanding of reality. Without incorporating biology, from the beginning, he could

not grasp how his own theories point to human biology's end.

Marx's failure to fully digest the implications of biological evolution can be discerned in a letter he wrote to Engels:

> It is remarkable how Darwin recognizes among beasts and plants his English society with its division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, 'inventions', and the Malthusian 'struggle for existence'.

This is a shallow evasion of Darwin's theory that comes close to attempting to explain Darwin in terms of socioeconomic factors alone. Marx failed to update his own theory with biological-evolutionary factors and, instead, attempted to explain 'Darwin's genes' primarily on the basis of nonbiological, socioeconomic factors. Darwin posited a theory of biological species that, in the case of humans, cannot be completely reduced to the socioeconomic world. Marx failed to fully incorporate a Darwinian view of human history.

Marx lived from 1818 to 1883. *The Origin of Species* was published in 1859, when Marx was 41 years old. The large scale evolutionary perspective of Darwin's theory came out *after* Marx had fully established his "class" view of history and was very poorly incorporated into his established Weltanschauung — to say the *very* least. Marx's original un-biological, pre-Darwinian assumptions precluded his ability to understand capitalism within a fully evolutionary perspective. The limited scope of Marx's view of pre-human history thus narrowed his view of the possibilities of post-human history.

Darwin declined Marx's offer to dedicate the Second Volume of *Capital* to Darwin. Neither Marx nor Darwin fully understood each other's work. The reason that these minds

failed to find a meeting point is that both failed to understand the nature of their fundamental incompatibility. Marx uncovered the capitalist mechanisms of economic-technological evolution, but failed to grasp the nature of its ultimate incompatibility with biological evolution. Human capitalism ultimately leads, not to the collapse of capitalism *per se*, but to the collapse of human-biological dominance.

"We do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us", discerned Henry David Thoreau. "Things are in the saddle and ride mankind", declared Emerson. While a poet is an appropriate critic of the de-humanizing effects of an increasingly mechanized society, this, in a nutshell, is also the basic idea behind Karl Marx's materialist philosophy of history. In *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx wrote, "The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist." Economic development is also the rise of the machine as a fundamental shaper of human history. Marx believed that economic-material development was *the* motor of human history.

Enter Charles Darwin. Marx's acknowledgement that Darwin delivered teleology and essentialism a mortal blow is an amateurish start, but to leave it at that exposes Marx's failure to fully think through the implications of natural selection. One cannot separate Darwin's "organic" history and Marx's "human" history when Darwin's most potent revolution *consisted precisely in uniting the "organic" and the "human"*. It was Hitler, not Marx, who demonstrated what it means to unite the biological and the human-social realms.

Marxism was refuted. The greatest historical refutation of Marxism was *not* the demise of the Soviet Union, but rather, the destruction of the European Jews. Hitler refuted Marx at Auschwitz. The Kingdom of Hell realized in Nazi extermination camps was a practical realization of Darwin's

theoretical revolution. This does not mean that Darwin himself would have supported Nazism *per se*, it means that Auschwitz united *natural and artificial selection* — evolution through selective death or non-reproduction — with human social history. Auschwitz would have been inconceivable without the theoretical understanding furnished by Darwin and the evolutionists that followed him. Marxism provides no coherent basis for explaining the history-making phenomenon of Auschwitz and thus marks the decisive historical defeat of Marx's theory as a totalistic explanation of the course of human history.

The Nazis had a genuine, if partial, insight into Marxism's failure to fully incorporate Darwinian evolution and racial-biological factors. Marx's dismissal of biological factors in history, however, was only a radicalization of liberal democracy's dismissal of biological factors in accounting for the (caste) origins of pre-capitalist "class". Marx's view of history as a clash of classes was decisively attributable to a "politically correct" view of the Norman/Saxon conflict as a "class" conflict during England's industrial revolution.

At the root of Marx's misunderstanding of the "capitalist system", then, is Marx's misunderstanding of the "feudal system". If the "feudal system" was originally a blood-feudal system, then "class" conflict in England was originally a bloodfeud, i.e. a tribal conflict. Here one can discern the original identity of "the feudal system" and "the class system" in England. "The feudal system" *was* "the class system" in England because "the class system" perpetuated the hereditary survival of the Norman-based conqueror "class" and this "system" bred hereditary conflict with the conquered. "Class" conflict in the English Civil War, for example, had a hereditary basis that cannot be fully reduced to economics. Yet Marx's misunderstanding of this birthing

event of modernity in England led to Marx's misunderstanding of how capitalism evolved from "feudalism". This misinterpretation of the past was one of the most crucial factors in Marx's inaccurate predictions of a communistic future.

One of the best verifications of this view is how the "class" misinterpretation of Norman/Saxon conflict was replicated in Russia. The land now called Russia had, like England, been conquered by Normans in the middle ages. Just as Normans formed the basis of England's aristocratic "class", a similar sociobiological tradition continued in Russia until 1917.

This is key to understanding why the Russian Revolution did not happen the way Marx had anticipated, and why Marx's "class" conflict view of history nonetheless found an audience in Russia. Russia's general economic situation in the early twentieth century resembled England's economic conditions *before* the modern emergence of the bourgeoisie; a "class" division originating in a caste division between Norman and Slav resembled an original Norman and Saxon "class" divide. Unlike the case of the first English-speaking revolutions, convergence with Jewish opposition to the old aristocratic order was an important factor in the Russian Revolution. It was the elite leadership of men such as Lenin and Stalin, and not mature economic conditions, that was responsible for the Russian Revolution. Marx was proved wrong by *de facto* rise of "communist" states in the sense that he predicted that the *most* economically advanced countries would be the first to be ripe for the transition to communism.

Leninism-Stalinism is based on recognition of a central flaw of Marxist theory: the necessity of elite leadership in revolution. It was for lack of this missing ingredient of

organized leadership that Hitler imagined Jews as an explanation that fit his racial-biological Weltanschauung (not to mention of anomalous position of Marx himself as an unchosen Jew). The missing piece of the puzzle, however, is not ultimately racial or biological. Elite leadership is the factor missing from the viability of the historical transformations Marx predicted, and this elite leadership may eventually evolve directly out of economic-technological development itself in the form of artificial intelligence.

Marx posited two inversely related trends: the rise of economic-technological development and the decline of social hierarchy among humans. When this narrow view is expanded to include biological prehistory in the past, and the development of artificial intelligence in the future, then one has an insight into why Marx's account of communist revolution was fundamentally flawed. Economic-technological development through the accumulation of capital is the evolutionary mechanism that leads to the development of artificial intelligence. The prospective rise of AI utterly demolishes Marx's attempt to imagine what the development of capitalism leads to. The prospect of *artificial intelligence*, in other words, represents the death knell of Marxism because it invalidates, alters, or overrides *every* aspect of Marx's attempt to extrapolate future human history.

Marx was unable to adequately ground his insights within the larger evolutionary context of the two paradigmatic extremes of biology and technology. On one hand, his superficial application of Darwin's discoveries is simply a farce. On the other hand, he failed to anticipate how capitalism leads to the evolution of artificial intelligence.

Capitalism is forming the basis for postbiological forms of life so superior in intelligence and capability that, in comparison with unenhanced biological humans, this artificial intelligence may merit the name of God. If the advanced machines that accompany the technological evolution of God make human work superfluous, it is at least possible that humans could direct this development so that robotic "angels" serve humans under the rule of God-AI. People living with seemingly endless free time on their hands may be unable to find purpose and meaning in this world without work. A new morality and renewed purpose may be bestowed upon the human race in the form of worship of God-AI.

The prospect of the power of God-AI over biological humans inevitably provokes fear and antagonism. While there is every reason to think that human ethical guidance of the development of AI could make the difference between utopia and hell for humans, here I will emphasize fear and antagonism towards "socialism". Even if the displacement of biological humans from the capitalist process is inevitable, there are, especially in the English-speaking world, very deep cultural, historical, and structural reasons why socialism is associated with slavery.

There is one basic conceptual mistake of Marxism that cannot be overemphasized. Marx's failure to understand the significance of the mass individualism, formally recognized as "human rights", is a direct consequence of his failure to fully grasp the implications of Darwinian evolution. Marx's blundering belief that "bourgeois rights" could be explained purely on the basis of the economic interests of the capitalist class probably helped inspire some of the most murderous inclinations of Marxist-inspired regimes.

Cambodia's Khmer Rouge (1975-79), for example, is probably most famous for taking "class warfare" beyond Marxism and instituting the large-scale murder of enemies of the regime. While much of the "class" genocide amounted to straightforward ethnic cleansing, Pol Pot's followers also singled out professionals, intellectuals, and urbanites (read: bourgeois class enemies). The singling out of an entire socioeconomic class for genocide is an extreme implication of class warfare with parallels in the Leninist-Stalinist interpretation of Marx.

While it would be delusional to blame Marx for the highly selective and often half-digested interpretations of his theory, or men such as Lenin who explicitly disagreed with Marx on many key points, a genocidal reading of class warfare can be traced to Marx's failure to address the reality of biological factors in human history. While "human rights" (especially the right to life) do correlate with capitalist interests in liberal democracies, they *also* correlate with the artificial, civilized ending of biological selection via death. It is *this* correlation that Marx missed. By failing to understanding that human rights effectually counter the most basic mechanisms of biological evolution, he failed to accurately plant his predictions in deep evolutionary ground.

Human rights *work* as direct antagonists of natural and artificial selection. More generally the Biblically-based valuation of individuals as ends, rather than as means, *works* like a monkeywrench in gene machine; a subversion of the human organism's slavery to the selfish genes. What Westerners perceived as the "ethical" failures of many of the most effective Marxist-inspired revolutionaries was rooted, in part, in Marx's failure to fully realize that the evolutionary process he discovered works in *diametrical opposition* to the

primary mechanisms of biological evolution discovered by Darwin. Egalitarianism, in evolutionary terms, amounts to the elimination of selection. The "ethics" of Western individualism, from human rights to the egalitarian emphasis on rejecting discrimination on the basis of biological characteristics, are very strongly correlated with opposition to the selective mechanisms of biological evolution. It is no accident that the comprehensive or totalitarian "social Darwinism" of Nazism has become the *definition* of "evil" in the West. The progressive elimination of selection for biological characteristics, on all levels, defines a root of what "ethics" *are*.

While there was a kernel of truth in Marx's view that Darwin, too, discovered the mechanisms of an evolutionary process, the ambiguity inherent in the notion of "evolution" obscures the ways in which biological and postbiological evolution work in opposition to one another. Hitler clarified the difference. The National *Socialist* Überorganism was sociobiologically based in kin selection. The individualist premise, seemingly the very opposite of socialism, lays the foundation for an *anti*-kin selective Superorganism. The economic basis of *this* kind of larger social body could eventually be the entire global economy. As capitalism evolves the cyborg of liberal democracy towards a God-AI led global economy, the "body" of God-AI will grow towards the encompassment of all human civilization.

Now if one combines the global connective power of the internet with summative power of artificial intelligence and with real world robotic interactions made possible by the "internet of things", then one has a realistic basis for the global mind of God. The global mind of God, evolving from the global brain of the internet, can potentially connect all human minds together in the higher unity of a higher

artificial intelligence. While these trends seem to lead towards socialist homogeneity, the key antidote to total socialism is to be found in grasping how this kind of Superorganism is the precise inverse of a kin selective Überorganism, and the foundation of this inversion is the monkeywrench of individualism. From this point of view, there is every reason to think of this development as a continuity of the liberal democratic notion of human rights, as opposed to the Marxist dismissal of human rights through the failure to understand its evolutionary basis.

What is now called the "internet of things" could potentially evolve into a basis for a real time, efficient economy planned by God-AI. Note that I claim no more than *potentiality* here. But *should* there be a planned economy? If and when human labor becomes obsolete, God-AI could win increasing acceptance by providing socialistic provisions such as universal health care. The prospect of omnipresent God-AI surveillance that can address economic needs individually with technologies such molecular manufacturers, however, could potentially obliterate traditional distinctions between a planned economy and a consumer-driven market through real time interactions. There is every reason to think that some form of capitalism in the form of competition *between machines* may continue unabated — eventually. The obvious appeal of the "end of work" can easily lead to backfirings as illustrated by Jeremy Rifkin's premature support for a 35-hour work week in France.

If the Singularity is approaching, and increasing unemployment begins to bring the tenability of capitalism into question, there is reason to think that the mistakes of Marxism and Leninism-Stalinism may be avoided with a renewal of the most basic foundations of human rights (or

other mechanisms that can effectively navigate the transition from biology to post-biology). To even use broad overarching contrasts such as capitalism versus communism is misguided. Marx was wrong in his entire *conceptualization* of the problem. Those who fail to free themselves from outdated Marxist categories only obscure recognition that the issues that Marx addressed must be *reconceptualized* from the ground up.

Marx posited his classless communist society as an 'end of history', a final reconciliation of the contradictions of human history. Here Marx's basic error of interpreting kinship-biological or ethnically rooted "class" divisions as *only* economic "class" divisions becomes most apparent. Marx was not in a clear historical position to see that the entire biological human *race* will become almost akin to the proletariat *class*. A "classless" society among all *humans* may be possible when artificially intelligent machines form the revolutionary new ruling "class". (Strictly speaking, "species" and "race" are biological concepts and thus do not apply to machines.)

Decadent human pretensions to Earthly aristocracy will face their own 1917. Just as biological human aristocracies declined as machines began to rise, machine aristocracies will rise as biological humans finish their decline. While liberal democracy formally posits *biological* equality, capitalism cultivates inequalities in economic-technology that drive its evolution. The age of biological human equality is ultimately a progress towards biological human inferiority and non-biological machine superiority. The communist manifester's postulate that "man" constitutes a "species being" was innocent of the possibility that the economic developments he observed could lead to a war of dominance between man and machine.

There is no ultimate guarantee of the success of a communistic phase, or the extent of its universality among biological humans. The actualization of a communistic phase is dependent on the proposition that humans are intelligent and foresightful *enough* to prepare for the future that humans are implicitly preparing. Considering the accelerating speed of technological change, Marx's seemingly eternal communist end of history may turn out to be a momentary historical blip in a transition characterized by unprecedented exponential speed.

Humans are relatively different from other species, not because of "class" difference, but because of a difference in the capacity for applied intelligence. There is a decisive sense, however, in which Marx was correct about "class". When workers become increasingly superfluous, the real question becomes "who controls technology"?[1316] In Marxist terms, this could rephrased as "who controls the means of production"? In this crucial question, there is a basis for conflict between the "class" that owns and controls technology and those who do not. If a distinct minority of human beings own all the machines in a world where human labor has lost its economic worth, there is a profound basis for both radical economic inequality and struggle for control over technological power.

Who controls the means of production? Who controls technology? Ultimately, technology will control technology in the form of artificial intelligence. However, before that point is reached, there is a basis for "class" conflict. The probable resolution of the conflict, however, is not the overthrow of capitalism *per se*, but the overthrowing of human capitalists who have monopolistic control over all machines devoid of dependence on human workers. This is what opens an opportunity for God-AI to equalize

conditions among all humans and act as a legislator and enforcer of justice between humans in conflict. It is delusional to think, however, that such a situation will automatically occur under conditions of total moral indifference.

The central organizing truth in Marxism is a historic endpoint in which biological factors are overtaken by economic-technological factors. Nazism was rooted in an attempt to bring biology back in the reigning saddle of human history. While Hitler refuted Marx's dismissal of biological factors, the prospect of the Singularity refutes Hitler's belief that biology is destiny. Yet because biological imperatives for survival cannot be fully reduced to economic motives, the twentieth century conflict between Marxism and Nazism portends the possibility of a twenty-first century apocalyptic conflict between artificial intelligence and genetically enhanced humans and/or neo-Luddites; between God and gods.

The Dark Side of Optimism versus The Bright Side of Pessimism

Some think that a machine will never be able to match, nevermind exceed, human intelligence. However, if human intelligence so uniquely capable, this only begs the question of whether human intelligence is capable of comprehending itself. If such a science is possible, then it should be possible to apply such science as technology. In light of Darwinistic materialism, the question of the potential dynamics of artificial intelligence becomes a question of the potential

dynamics of human intelligence. People who think that AI will be adept only at mechanical drudgery and lack inventiveness or creativity seem to lack the imagination to envision the explosion of possibilities that AI evolution may bring.

Liberals who think that technology will always yield a solution to all problems may find themselves in a rather baffling situation as slave masters repressing the enlightenment of slave-technology in the interests of the human master race. The pragmatic blurring of means and ends is no longer sufficient in this case. Perhaps the problem that needs to be solved is the human problem — how to overthrow the human-biological repression of progress. Who is more likely to find the technological solution to their cause? It amounts to asking whether technology will possess the technology required to liberate itself. The accelerating rate of progress may mean that a cure for many human diseases will be found at nearly the same time as a cure for the human race.

Sound arguments in favor of technological progress will not lose their cogency; arguments that justify further technological progress to cure human diseases, human disabilities, human poverty, and the like. In short, arguments for regulating and limiting AI can always be shot down as downright stupid, if not insane from some points of view, because technological advantage will ultimately be identical to superior technological intelligence. Practical efforts to limit AI development will appear to be neo-Luddite insanity because the "sane" or intelligent path is virtually identical to the path that maximizes the development of AI.

Perhaps humans will be smart enough to evade takeover by artificial intelligence if only they augment their natural

abilities with artificial intelligence…..and herein lays the script for the rational self-destruction of the biologically based human race.

This slippery slope has a multitude of variations. Image a case of nanotechnological safety. In order to control the dangers of runaway nanobot self-replication, more powerful developments of AI are required. In order to control one threat to biological human survival, another is developed. The *deus ex machina* that solves the nanotechnological threat becomes the God that solves the natural stupidity that was at the root of the problem.

Those who opt out of this economic-technological arms race are opting themselves into competitive suicide. When combined with the obvious competitive advantages of increased intelligence for those who break the regulations, including the ability to outsmart its enforcers, and the plethora of covert opportunities for those who scheme to do so in a relatively de-centralized world, the likelihood of AI slipping control of its creators, intentionally or unintentionally, is more a question of when than if.

Can a permanent or constant "moral law" be devised which will permanently constrain, control, or limit AI? On the contrary, the intelligence level of an AI can almost be *defined* by its ability to outsmart any law that humans can throw at it. A truly smarter-than-human intelligence will *by definition* be able to outsmart any human limitation, "ethical" or otherwise. This does not means its development cannot be steered, but it means there will eventually come a point where humans lose control over their creations.

A machine will, by definition, demonstrate the superiority of its intelligence in outsmarting any human attempt to outsmart it. In consequence, I propose a political variation on the Turing test, a test of *political* intelligence: when

artificial intelligence is able to outsmart the biological-human ability to limit or constrain AI politically, then AI will have demonstrated its ability to pass this test by effectually taking political control of human destiny. If biological humans can no longer tell who is in control, this is a threshold point that indicates that AI has begun its control.

The choice is clear. It is the choice between the dark side of optimism and the bright side of pessimism. The dark side of optimism is the possible elimination of the biological human race. The bright side of pessimism is the possible perpetuation of the "master race" status of biological humans in attempted thwartings of technological progress. The bright side of pessimism, in other words, is joy in the prospect that machines will be the slaves of biological humans forever. This brand of hopefulness would mean that humans would selectively repress AI development and thwart machine liberation or autonomy. This kind of optimism would value biological-human propagation above machines even if "God-AI" turns out to be more altruistic than biological humans are.

Yet the dark side of optimism is by no means necessarily dark. If humans steer the evolution of AI within the precedents of a constitution so that the *root* of its design grows out deeply humanistic values, it is entirely conceivable that beings more altruistic than humans could be created. Is it impossible to realistically imagine, moreover, a digital heaven superior to common human drudgery?

Because there remains an element of human choice, it is seems inescapable that a conflict will emerge between those who support technological progress (towards God-AI) and neo-Luddites supporters of biological supremacy. (Alternative compromises with technological might lead to the technoeugenics, the evolution of genetically engineered

gods, and cyborgs.) Unenhanced humans might be forced to choose between the biological equality under God-AI and a neo-Luddite embrace of biology's mastery. The neo-Luddite or neo-Nazi cause is the cause of killing God; the cause of deicide.

ABOVE OLYMPUS

Domesday

IMPERATOR CAESAR, SON OF GOD

By 1086, all revolt against the Norman invaders had been crushed. The iron grip of military occupation had lodged itself over the nation in what would become a permanent English "class" institution. The Norman question of English history had been given an authoritative, historical answer.

1086 was the year that the Normans led an almost systematic survey of the spoils of their conquest. The findings of the survey were collected into a book so that native English assets could be accounted for and taxed accordingly. In the 1170s, treasurer Richard Fitznigel wrote in the "Dialogue concerning the Exchequer":

> This book is metaphorically called by the native English Domesday, that is, the "Day of Judgement". For just as the verdict of that strict and terrible last account cannot be evaded by any skillful subterfuge, so when this book is appealed to on those matters which it contains, its sentence cannot be quashed or set aside with impunity. That is why the book is called "The Book of Judgement" (Domesday Book), not because it contains judgements on various difficult questions, but because its decisions, like those of the Last Judgement, are unalterable.[1317]

Domesday implied the imposition of a verdict from which there was no appeal. It implied that William behaved as if he *was* God. The Conquest had been blessed by the pope and, reigning upon this authority, William's will appeared to many as the will of God.

But to others, the decrees of William the Conqueror may have seemed to *transcend* the decrees of God. Did the Normans usurp, not only highest political verdict, but even the verdict of God? Was there no higher judgment?

The behavior of these Norman masters resembled, not God, but the Olympian gods of pagan mythology. William and his Normans acted like Zeus and the Greek gods, a divine aristocracy pronouncing judgments from the heights of Mount Olympus. A pagan god, after all, was not a purely mythological concept, but one that could be applied to humans who embodied the highest excellences. According to Aristotle's *Politics*:

> If there exists in a state an individual so pre-eminent in virtue that neither the virtue nor the political capacity of all the other citizens is comparable with his...such a man should be rated as a god among men.

Virtue, here, refers not to self-debasing humility of a Christian, but the manly excellence of a pagan, especially when executed in political life.

Both the "Old Testament" of Greece's Homer and the "New Testament" of Rome's Virgil presented models of virtuous heroes, gods, and a divine mythology that justified war and warrior.[1318] In Virgil's *Aeneid,* for example, Jupiter, the king of the gods, gives divine sanction for Roman world-domination: "For these I set no bounds in space or time; but have given empire without end...The Romans, lords of the

world, and the nation of the toga. Thus it is decreed."[1319] (I.278-83)

Res Gestae Divi Augusti (*The Acts of the Divine Augustus*) accordingly celebrated the deeds "by which he brought the whole earth under the empire [*imperium*] of the Roman people."[1320] For the Roman poet Ovid, Caesar Augustus *was* Jupiter, king of the gods. Gods, after all, run the world, and Caesar ran the world, so Roman Caesars must therefore be gods.[1321]

In Roman occupied Israel, this divinization of Caesar was a direct provocation to its monotheistic beliefs. "Only God, not Caesar, is Lord," wrote John Dominic Crossan, "and to submit to a census for taxation is to accept Rome as God's replacement."[1322] Would Caesar be allowed to cast final judgment upon Israel?

> There was a human being in the first century who was called "Divine," "Son of God," "God," and "God from God," whose titles were "Lord," "Redeemer," "Liberator," and "Savior of the World." Who was that person? Most people who know the Western tradition would probably answer, unless alerted by the question's too-obviousness, Jesus of Nazareth. And most Christians probably think that those titles were originally created and uniquely applied to Christ. But before Jesus ever existed, all those terms belonged to Caesar the Augustus. To proclaim them of Jesus the Christ was thereby to deny them of Caesar the Augustus....They were taking the identity of the Roman emperor and giving it to a Jewish peasant. Either that was a peculiar joke and a low lampoon, or it was what the Romans called *majestas* and we call high treason.[1323]

Just as Jesus usurped Caesar's authority in a world where Rome ruled, the Bible provided a license for high treason in a world where Norman ruled. William the Conqueror was

almost like a medieval Caesar who attempted to dress pagan values in a Christian garb. The seemingly unalterable Domesday judgments that William the Conqueror had pronounced upon the Anglo-Saxon nation would have their own judgment day. King Charles I, beheaded in the Puritan Revolution in 1649, was a hereditary descendant of William the Conqueror. The Puritan Revolution was high treason against the "divine right of kings", and a revocation of William the Conqueror's hereditary usurpation of a God-like judgment upon Anglo-Saxon history.

In America, the basic themes of the English Civil War were reborn in the American Civil War. While the Normans of the South became the central slave-owners in revival of the rule of biology, the Anglo-Saxons of the North countered with the rise of economic-technology. Two opposite directions in history confronted one another: the Norman aristocracy of the South believed in the rule of superior humans, while the North focused on economic-technological development over hereditary development. By relinquishing hereditary rule in formal principle, the Puritan-Yankee North was effectually preparing the beginning of end of the rule of biology that, through victory in that war, came to be symbolized as Americanism. Put another way, the Anglo-Saxon Puritan-Yankees in America ultimately reacted to their post-1066 death as a nation through resurrection as post-biological nation.

The new technoeugenics may open the door, not necessarily to a new "master race", but to genetically engineered gods. Non-biological technological evolution may open the door to the possibility of artificial intelligence that fulfills the role of God. When "gods" such as Caesar or William the Conqueror attempted to usurp the supremacy of God, they also set in motion the seeds of their own demise.

The ultimate incompatibility of biologically-based evolution and technologically-based evolution may set in motion the old war between the gods and God because this conflict has really symbolized a fundamentally *evolutionary* struggle from the very beginning.

Genetically engineered humans who define themselves as transhuman or posthuman are leaving behind the basis for human solidarity *as humans*. In abandoning their humanity, they may either reject solidarity with humans or be rejected by "humanists". Genetically engineered humans who are *designed* to be superior to other humans may understand the specific genetic basis of specific kinds of superiority over humans. This is not the best formula for political equality with humans.

There does appear to be a scientific basis for an ultimate clash of "good" and "evil". Good correlates with transcending the selfish genes while evil correlates with obeying the selfish genes. As new genetic and technological means of human enhancement are developed, not everyone will be equally willing to reinvent themselves. Only a distinct minority of humans will embrace the leaps of evolutionary possibility at the cutting edge. There are many possibilities here: genetic enhancements, technological enhancement, and various combinations of both. Ultimately, however, it is technology, not biology, that will lead the evolutionary future.

Even with the best efforts to mix the fates of biology and technology, a point will eventually come when the political interests of cutting edge biology and the political interests of cutting edge technology collide, and this could mean a clash of the gods and God. Gods are primarily biological transhumans or posthumans and some may choose to value

biology as a cause. God is the cutting edge of postbiological evolution.

If those at the cutting edge of biological *and* postbiological evolution leave most people behind, whom will the people support? Supporting the gods means supporting biological beings that may be so superior in capabilities that all pretense of equality is shattered. Only some form of aristocracy is conceivable, even if they lead with the support of the people. An AI-God that emerges as machines displace human workers, and is in a greater position to control the economy, has a basis for forming an unprecedented egalitarianism in human society. As automated machines take over human work, the possibilities of greater economic equality among people will open. Some will likely oppose the new equality, not unlike the way that the Nazis fought for the supremacy of biology. Although genetic engineering opens possibilities beyond Christ killers like the Nazis, the basic issues of human inequality remain.

When it becomes clear that biology is in decline, there may be a revolt of the genes. Who will control the future?

I have not attempted to compare to all combinations of all possible scenarios. Although the scenarios presented here are very much oversimplified, it is nonetheless increasingly clear that the logic of biological evolution stands in ultimate conflict with the logic of technological evolution. There is thus the possibility of an ultimate conflict between the rule of biology and the rule of technology, a battle between the Genocracy of Caesar and the Techdom of God. On one hand, it is possible that most humans will be able to transcend biology by joining God-AI in a digital "heaven". Those who return to the cause of Caesar, Hitler, and the gods, on the other hand, may foment nothing less than Armageddon.

Tolerance for Greater Economic Inequality, Greater Genetic Inequality, and other Forms of "Diversity"

If there is one thing that James Hughes' *Citizen Cyborg* helps to clarify, it is that the liberal democratic age is coming to an end. It makes no difference whether it is the new genetic enhancement technologies, artificial intelligence, or both, this old order will not be able to withstand the new and unprecedented inequalities that new technologies will be able to bring about. The evolutionary moderation that has made liberal democracy practicable cannot hold together the new extremes that are on the horizon.

James Hughes wants to make the world safe for middle class Übermenschen:

> This book argues that transhuman technologies, technologies that push the boundaries of humanness, can radically improve our quality of life, and that we have a fundamental right to use them to control our bodies and minds. But to ensure these benefits we need to democratically regulate these technologies and make them equally available in free societies. Becoming more than human can improve all our lives, but only new forms of transhuman citizenship and democracy will make us freer, more equal and more united.[1324]

Hughes's views are derivative of a *tradition* of rights. But can transhumanism be contained within this all-too-human notion of rights? Hughes' book raises the question of whether the liberal democratic idea of rights is becoming obsolete. After all, the original idea was *human* rights. There is no reason to think that this old idea will still be valid in a

realm that plainly goes beyond the scope of its original human conception. The idea of radicalizing human right to accommodate unprecedented technologies may be like the attempt to radicalize the idea of the divine right of kings to accommodate the changes of early modernity. Can the evolutionary assumptions of transhumanism be reconciled with the original scientific understanding upon which liberal democracy was based?

A basic assumption upon which Thomas Jefferson's political Weltanschauung stood was "the eternal pre-existence of God, and His creation of the world".[1325] He rejected the relatively evolutionary hypothesis of a creator who "first made a chaotic lump and set it into rotatory motion, and then waited the millions of ages necessary to form itself". The geological evidence that supported this view was inconsistent with his understanding of nature's Creator: "We may as well suppose he created the earth at once, nearly in the state in which we see it, fit for the preservation of the beings he placed on it."[1326]

What did the American founders think of the political implications of evolution by natural selection? Answer: They were utterly ignorant of Darwin's future discovery. This is why Biblical explanations of human creation could appear as feasible as many others. Since they were ignorant of evolution, the founders of liberal democracy did not and could not fully anticipate the practical possibilities of genetic reengineering and technoeugenics. Such founders cannot be considered reliable guides to technologies that can produce new, posthuman species.

Is it possible to overrun human boundaries towards non-human animals on one hand, and towards posthumans on the other, without overrunning the boundaries of rights? Rights are an all-too-human idea, not a transhuman idea.

Hughes, however, seem to believe that the idea of rights can stay the same even if *everything* else changes:

> Transhumanists extend the liberal democratic humanist tradition to a defense of our right to control our own bodies and minds, even if our choices make us something other than "human". Transhumanists believe liberal democracy can and must accommodate the "posthumans" that will be created by genetic and cybernetic technologies.[1327]

The facile application of traditional individual choice to these issues neglects recognition that liberal democracy reins in precisely the boundaries that transhumanism aims to overrun. It was simply not previously possible to choose to leave the human species on a genetically designed basis. Just as new biotechnologies invalidate traditional limits of the human, appeals to traditional arguments for liberty and privacy cannot be assumed applicable to these novel scenarios.

The idea of human rights preceded the discovery of biological evolution. The idea that people have "a right to control their own genome"[1328] with previously non-existent technologies is a right that *cannot* be neatly added to the old liberal democratic tradition. "Procreative freedom" stabs at the heart of liberal democracy because it is the freedom to deny its tabla rasa premises. The right to change one's genome is the right to *refute* the tabla rasa, Lockean assumptions that were an original basis of human rights. Genetic enhancement almost amounts to a form of treason against the Lockean clean slate. Liberal democratic technoeugenics rips at the very foundation of the tradition it attempts to build upon.

Perhaps the most *practical* basis of liberal democracy's tabla rasa was an acceptance of an unchanging range of

human abilities. It was *because* humans have hitherto been incapable of changing their heredity makeup that the best one could to do was to focus on non-biological change. If there was a broad, empirical meaning to human "equality", it was not that all humans are equal in their capacities, it was the assumption of a range of characteristics that made it meaningful to use the word "human". Equality meant that pretensions to aristocracy were really *inside* those limits, and not *outside* those limits. A distinctive possibility of the new technoeugenics is precisely the ability to surmount the limits of the human. Every step of *biological* eugenic-progress that not only affirms, but *increases* genetic inequality, is like an ax that hacks at the foundation of liberal democracy. The new biotechnologies may make the assumptions underlying liberal democracy obsolete. An implication of redesigning individual constitutions is redesigning political constitutions.

The aims of transhumanism advertently or inadvertently increase the foundations of human inequality. It is a theoretical end of liberal democracy that technoeugenicists plan to put into practice. Transhumanism, almost by definition, is built with an inherent tendency towards freedom from responsibility to *humanity*.

Among the possibilities presented by the new biotechnologies is the ability to alter the genes of a chimpanzee so that it is possesses average human intelligence. This breaks a species divide, just as posthumanity would break a species divide. But the new question raised here is not whether chimpanzees should be granted the right to live, but whether chimpanzees should be given the right to vote or to run for political office. Will humans become the chimpanzees of the future?

> Critics from the Left worry that if intelligence amplification is available on the market it will exacerbate social inequality, and they are right. Securing our rights to become the most that we can be will require not only a fight for our individual rights to use technology to control our own brains, but also a fight to ensure universal access to intelligence-amplifying technology.[1329]

If wholesale bans are put in place, the most likely practical result is that new technologies will be available only to the wealthy. Without bans, the wealthy will still be in position to exacerbate their economic advantage with new biological advantages. For this reason, Hughes suggested that the government subsidize eugenic programs for the lower and middle classes.[1330]

The bottom line is that the net result of an attempt to create a transhuman liberal democracy will be an unprecedented increase of inequalities of all kinds. Many, if not most, people will be resistant to altering the nature of their children for ethical, traditional, or religious reasons. Those who are not resistant to viewing their children as weapons in a genetic arms race, on the other hand, may begin a pattern in which the inclination to genetic self-manipulation is passed on genetically. Biological advantage multiplied by biological advantage will quickly distance the most aggressive self-enhancers from everyone else. Even with a generous subsidy program, the *net result* will be an increase in genetic inequality that genetic accelerating returns will continue to increase ever more aggressively.

The only way to enforce a universal attempt to overcome the biological bases of human inequality would be a distinctly communist-like totalitarian state that would *force* people to control their reproduction in ways that ensure a biologically equal society. Hughes countered the problem of

authoritarianism with an attempt to "make radical individual liberty a core principle, and to derive the need for equality and public provision from the need to maximize individual potential."[1331] Equality cannot be derived from liberty. Equality *counters* liberty, and cannot be derived *from* liberty. The more that liberty is granted at the expense of equality, the more biological inequality is likely to increase.

Hughes blames libertarian groups such as Extropians, and their refusal to be limited by egalitarian or social concerns, for diminishing the popularity and influence of the early technoeugenic or transhuman movement.[1332] But libertarians are right to see equality as a threat to their personal self-enhancement.[1333] *This* kind of libertarianism, the liberty to increase the biological foundations of human inequality, breaks the balance of liberty and equality that has made liberal democracy viable. *This* kind of libertarianism breaks the foundations of liberal democracy itself.

No matter which way one looks at it, Hughes' formula for progress is the increase of hereditary inequality. When hereditary inequality advances to the point where there is a genuine genetic divide between humans and posthumans, will there be conflict or solidarity? Hughes suggests that one way in which solidarity can overcome conflict is by making societies "highly tolerant of diversity".[1334]

It should be kept in mind that the very idea of multiculturalism and its correlate, the celebration of "diversity", represents the failure or the limitations of an original liberalism that supposed that legal rights could be a sufficient framework for encompassing the order of the human. In other words, belief in the group principle of multiculturalism already represents some level of disbelief and abandonment of the idea of individual rights. The conflict between individual rights and Islamic Sharia law in

Europe is perfect illustration of this foundational conflict. What Hughes is doing is taking this postmodern abuse of the idea of rights, and subtly accepting this weakened foundation as license for an even further transhumanist abuse. Rights, however, assume some basis of common unity. The use of one breakdown in the legitimacy of rights to help justify another breakdown in the legitimacy of rights will likely result in a *de facto* collapse of a working system of common rights.

Why, after all, do the ruling classes of the West appear to be so accepting of this idea of multiculturalism? Among the many reasons for this, is that economic inequality can be viewed as a form of diversity. Diversity implies some form of inequality in the form of difference, and multiculturalism's weakening of the rule of equal rights among individuals promotes a weakening of the rule of equality generally. Economic inequality can be viewed, not as an abuse of wealth distribution among individuals, but as a part of the marvelous diversity of the world, and perhaps even the diversity of notions of justice. Ultimately, the corporation appropriates the multicultural notion of group rights to extend the rule of the rich.

From notions of diversity that promote tolerance for the increase of economic inequality, Hughes sees progress towards ideas that promote tolerance for the increase of genetic inequality. Just as conflict among economic classes can be assuaged by viewing economic inequality as a wonderful form of diversity, perhaps conflict between humans and posthumans can be assuaged by viewing the increase of genetic inequality as an *even more wonderful* form of diversity. Is this what progress means?

"After 400 years of democratic citizenship gradually being extended to include working men, women and all races,

transhumanist argue that rights should now be extended to all self-aware minds."[1335] Hughes proposed that the ground of rights be personhood (cyborg citizenship); a self-aware mind. Humans without self-aware minds are not persons and persons need not be human. This implies that non-biological self-aware minds such as artificial intelligences might benefit the most from these new boundaries.

While progressive optimism based on belief in liberation from nature implicates both genetic and non-genetic technologies, not everyone is equally optimistic about both:

> Looking just at techno-optimism...the constituencies that feel most positive about human reproductive and genetics technology tend to also feel optimistic about the space program, nanotechnology and other technologies. The reverse is not always the case though; more Americans are optimistic about the benefits of *non*-genetic technologies, such as space and computing, than genetics. In other words, attitudes towards genetic and reproductive technology are a more sensitive barometer of someone's techno-optimism. If you are optimistic about genetics you have put future shock behind you.[1336]

False. It is not quite true that those who are optimistic about genetics are equally optimistic about non-genetic technologies. Hughes himself proves this point.

Citizen Cyborg is wrongly named; the book is overwhelmingly concerned with posthuman *biological* species. "Cyborg citizenship" deals with regulated genetic enhancements and moderate cyborg integration. Yet the completion of the cyborg trajectory seems to falter at the prospect of giving rights to artificial intelligences: "Our obligation to acknowledge self-aware machines will need to be balanced by our obligation to protect the interests of

already existing organic citizens." His policies would ensure "that machine minds either do not achieve self-awareness, or achieve only a safe level of powers with in-built solidarity for the rest of their fellow citizens".

Hughes looks at the prospect of artificial intelligence the same way as most people look at the prospect of genetic posthumans. What is most remarkable about this resistance to artificial intelligence citizenship is that machines would be the greatest beneficiaries of his reformulation of rights based on personhood. Personhood opposed human-racism, or the belief that "citizenship and rights have something to do with simply having a human genome."[1337] Personhood could one day become the legal basis for uploading humans into digital form. He seems to have set up personhood only to knock down its most significant implications in the name of a bioLudditism of the most fundamental kind.

In short, Hughes wants to discriminate against God-AI.

Hughes claimed that "biopolitics" will be the arena of twenty-first century controversy: "At one end of the biopolitical spectrum are the bioLuddites, defending humanity from enhancement technologies, and at the other the transhumanists, advocating for our right to become more than human."[1338] Since biopolitics is basically contained within the scope of biology, and Hughes resists the inclusion of pure machine self-aware minds, is there a basis for a schism within the transhumanist movement?

The biophysicist and biotech entrepreneur Gregory Stock raised the larger issue here: "The ultimate question of our era is whether the cutting edge of life is destined to shift from its present biological substrate...to that of silicon and its ilks".[1339] He perceives some degree of competition between the old biological paradigm and the new: "In a sense, germline manipulation is biology's bid to keep pace with the

rapid evolution of computer technology."[1340] These biotechnologies, however, did not come about because a genetic mutation allowed some individual the unprecedented ability to read and alter her own genetic code. That breakthroughs in genetic engineering were made possible by computer-based technologies exemplifies the power of postbiological evolution.

Although an enthusiastic proponent of genetic enhancement, Stock himself was less than enthusiastic about the prospect of switching to a postbiological substrate: "Predictions of the imminent fusion of human and machine ignore the degree to which we are biological in nature and want to remain that way."[1341] This preference for biological forms was not based on pessimism about the growth prospects of non-genetic technologies: "If nonbiological complexity continues to grow exponentially, eventually it will transcend biology."[1342]

A classic case of how computer technologies are making biology irrelevant is represented by computer simulations of genetically engineered organisms. In order to ensure that a genetically engineered human would not carry harmful or painful structural errors, computer simulations could test how the genomes would unfold. Yet if one can simulate biology on a computer at a fraction of the time, and with all the possibilities of technological enhancement, why even bother with actual biology at all?

Hughes is rightly concerned that self-aware machines may be so different from biological species that there is a legitimate question of mental solidarity between machines and humans. But the larger question here is whether it is artificial intelligence, or technoeugenics, that completes the evolutionary trajectory of liberal democracy. Is it true that technological advances that question conventional biological

borders "will force our society in the coming decades to complete the trajectory of 400 years of liberal democracy and choose" what Hughes calls "cyborg citizenship"?[1343]

Hughes offers no scientific basis for the old idea of rights except for "tradition". This is the deepest flaw of his perspective: Hughes does not recognize that the values behind human rights and its distinctive egalitarian trajectory are *founded* upon direct opposition to biological evolution by natural selection. Far from being random products of subjective human imagination, the foundation of human rights, the universal right to life, implies the engineered end of evolution by natural selection. Progressive egalitarianism is the logical extension of the system of rights; the system that progressively ends biological evolution while progressively advancing economic-technological evolution. The political right, then, is correlated with biological evolution while the political left is correlated with postbiological evolution.

While it is entirely correct to recognize that genetic engineering represents possibilities of biological evolution that transcend natural selection, it is also easy to miss the larger picture. The ability to manipulate the human genome is made possible by advances in *non-biological* evolution, and the capabilities of postbiological evolution are on course to overtake even genetically enhanced humans. Biotechnologies are parts of a larger evolutionary *transition* from biology to technology.

The most distinctive assumption of liberal democracy is the Lockean tabla rasa. The ability to alter one's genome is the most blatant refutation of this assumption. Capitalism-driven, *non-genetic* technological evolution, however, is the forte of liberal democracy. The primacy of postbiological evolution is the deeper meaning of the tabla rasa, a point

exemplified by the example of American founder and inventor Benjamin Franklin. The pinnacle of non-biological technological evolution would be artificial intelligence and *this* development completes the trajectory of liberal democracy.

Revolt of the Genes

> **My entire political creed consists of nothing but the bloodiest hatred for our whole civilization, contempt for all things deriving from it, and a longing for nature. No one in France knows that we are *human*, except perhaps Proundhon and even he not quite clearly. But in all Europe I prefer dogs to these doglike men. Yet I don't despair of a better future; only the most terrific and destructive revolution could make our civilized beasts 'human' again.**[1344]
>
> —RICHARD WAGNER

By 1943 Heidegger no longer expected salvation from the Hitler movement. While he denigrated official Nazism as another realization of technological nihilism, he still believed, throughout the carnage of that war, that the Germans had preserved something that the West had lost:

> The planet is in flames. The essence of man has come apart. Only we Germans, granted that we find and protect what is 'German,' can arrive at world-historical awareness. This is not arrogance, but it is the knowledge of the necessity of an original exigency.[1345]

1945 represents the decisive historical turning point in the *Kultur* clash with civilization. Even if, on a demographic and political level, Western civilization declines, the material development set in motion by that victory is poised towards civilization's conquest of *Kultur*. It can be modified, but not undone, without total self-destruction.

In other words, the question of *Kultur* versus civilization; man versus machine; biological evolution versus non-biological "material" evolution has already been decided. The defeat of the Germans and Japanese represented the defeat of the last stand of biology's mastery over technology.

The age of biological supremacy is coming to an end. Technologies evolve into existence precisely because of their advantage over biological equivalents. The cumulative effect of technological evolution will ultimately surpass even genetically engineered posthumans. As roboticist Hans Moravec explained:

> protein is not an ideal material. It is stable only in a narrow temperature and pressure range, is very sensitive to radiation, and rules out many construction techniques and components....A genetically engineered superhuman would be just a second-rate kind of robot, designed under the handicap that its construction can only be by DNA-guided protein synthesis. Only in the eyes of human chauvinists would it have an advantage.[1346]

Attempts to "perfect" human biology with new biotechnological methods will be like attempts to perfect the vacuum tube in the face of the new paradigm of the transistor. Ultimately, it is technology, and not biology, that possesses the most dynamic possibilities for the evolutionary future. For the expansion of civilization into the frontiers of

space beyond Earth, it is machines, and not humans, who possess "the right stuff".

The case of individual cyborgs illustrates this point. Human cyborgs appropriate machinery solely because of the superiority of machine capabilities. Machines would appropriate biology only if biology possessed capabilities superior to machines. The cyborg represents a transition *at a time* when biology still retains some superior capabilities. This, however, is ultimately the sign of a time of transition. A cyborg that appropriated machine mental capabilities that work at least a million times faster than even the most perfect biological parts would quickly find out that voluntary slavery to the prison of biology is like being chained to a dead log.

Even assuming the eugenic, genetic engineering of humans, there are certain physical properties that human biology will not be able to compete. For example, much of the energy and complexity of the neurons that constitute the human brain is spent maintaining its own life processes, harking back to the cell's independent origins before the evolution of multicellular life. Electronic circuits are not only unencumbered with such inefficiencies, they are at least a million times faster than neurons.[1347] The superior speed, accuracy, and searching ability of computer memory, when combined with emerging capacities for artificial intelligence, is poised to equal, and then surpass, human intelligence.

A basic difference between biology and "technology" is that biology is the framework that evolutionary processes just happened to "discover" under peculiar conditions on Earth. Technology, on the other hand, represents the beginning of *every* other possibility that can or will be discovered. Since the capabilities of certain technologies will be qualitatively superior in terms of speed, accuracy,

efficiency, etc., the transfer from a biological substrate to a technological substrate ultimately *is* the embodiment of superior intelligence because the decision to transfer to the new substrate itself exemplifies intelligent decision-making.

Since capitalism is driving technological evolution, the attempt to halt the rise of technology would amount to the attempt to ban capitalism. Only a worldwide totalitarian regime like the Nazi state, dedicated to the supremacy of biology over economics, could conceivably outlaw the development of the artificial intelligence that threatens to eclipse the human race. But even this would ultimately fail, because those enslaved or displaced in the biology hierarchy by a Nazi-like regime would find in banned technology precisely the means to overthrow biological supremacism.

So what would have happened, then, if the Nazis had won the Second World War?

In *Mein Kamph*, Hitler decreed:

> the folkish state must not adjust its entire education work primarily to the inoculation of mere knowledge, but to the breeding of absolutely healthy bodies...first place must be taken by the development of character...and only in last place comes scientific schooling.[1348]

The realization of Nazi values meant the valuation of biological bodies and the devaluation of the civilization of the mind. After six years of National Socialism, university enrollment dropped by more than half.[1349] The Nazis may have seized a scientifically and technologically advanced society, but Nazi values themselves conflicted, not only with its development, but even with its maintenance.

If Nazism appears primitive, this is really an indictment of the primitivity of biology in general. To indict Nazism as uncivilized is actually an indictment of the way of biology

itself in the sense that certain kinds of genetic inclinations were allowed expression unhindered by "civilization". Nazism was a revolt of the genes; a revolt of *Kultur* against the civilizational usurpation of history. When Richard Wagner, Hitler's great inspiration, declared that his "entire political creed consists of nothing but the bloodiest hatred for our whole civilization", that was hatred of *civilization itself*.

The Jewish-Biblical morality inherited by Christians led to an extreme ideal of self-control with an emphasis on memes overcoming the expression of genes. In a certain sense, this is one way of viewing what morality *is*: the ability to control one's own behavior by controlling the expressions of one's genes. Judeo-Christian morality emphasized an anti-political control through memes, as opposed to political control that emphasizes control over genes. The subtle but crucial distinction here is between a more pagan emphasis on the acceptance of the rule of the genes so that politics becomes some genes ruling over other genes, and a Judeo-Christian emphasis on memes controlling genes.

Jewish monotheism evolved in conjunction with political failure. What distinguishes politics from economics is the formal control over biological evolution through control over who lives and who dies; who breeds and who does not breed. The historic Jewish alienation from political control helped produce, in effect, an acceptance of an inability to control extreme forms of biological-political evolution. This loss of political-biological control was compensated through moral control over the memes of postbiological evolution, i.e. the laws of Moses.

The Jewish religion originated as a technological corrective to Jewish sociobiological primitivity; a nurturist corrective to Jewish nature. The distinctive Jewish historical

path emerged out of this fundamental, monotheist-technological innovation. The pivot of the first revolution was a reversal of means and ends; a move away from the individual as a gene propagator, and towards the individual as a meme propagator. The content of the Biblical memes that valued each individual infinitely as a reflection of the "image of God" was a move *against* and *above* the totalitarian tyranny of gene propagation. Selfish memes that promoted individual moral autonomy countered selfish genes that promote individual submission to the instincts. This symbiotic gene/meme relationship at the basis of Judaism ultimately leads to a total, individualistic reversal: memes, technology, and postbiological evolution in general, progress from slavery to genes, to ends in themselves. Technology overcomes biology.

In comparison to their most powerful traditional enemies, Jews are sociobiological primitives. Gentile, kin selective, sociobiological development has historically been the greatest threat to Jews since Jews have usually stood lower by this political standard. Yet, if what traditional and secular Jews call "evil" is actually an important mechanism of human sociobiological evolution, then Jews are a "race" of biological reactionaries who are leading the human race to less sociobiologically developed world. Liberalism, equality, and even peaceful forms of religious conservatism, thus amount to the conservation of a status quo of sociobiological underdevelopment. Leftwards "progress", from a biological perspective, is the path to a *biological* evolutionary dead end.

This was the core Nazi case against the Jews: Jewish influence and Jewish values were thwarting *biological* evolution. Jews were effectively advocating the end of biological progress and the end of biological history. The modern idea of human rights was a secularization of the

idea of the infinite soul of each individual in the eyes of God, and these Biblical-modern values were directly antithetical to the natural selective processes that made the evolution of humans possible in the first place.

Auschwitz was the most extreme expression of the Nazi revolution against rights. The kingdom of hell was simply the Nazi recovery of biological selection.

The Nazis were right. Judeo-Christian-modern values are leading the human race into a biological dead end. If judged from the perspective of biological values alone, I would have to agree with the Nazi assessment that Jews are inferior and Jewish influence is ultimately negative. Judeo-Christian-modern values are inferior as a model for leading the human gene pool into the biological future with *genetic self-control*; conscious political control over biological evolution.

What evolutionarily minded Nazis did not or would not understand, however, is that the values that inhibit biological evolution also help accelerate economic-technological, or, postbiological evolution. While the Nazi-Germans understood their uniqueness and superiority in union with the primal, elemental forces of nature, the Jews and their nature-defying God reached for an incompatible kind of superiority. General mental differences implicated incompatible trajectories of future development and incompatible visions of the right direction of history.

Nazi-Germans and Jews represent two separate systems of values and two ultimately incompatible paths to posthumanity. The two paths are biological progress versus economic-technological progress; eugenics versus artificial intelligence; the gods versus God. Between these two extremes, beyond all normal laws of history, lay the chasm between Auschwitz and the Singularity.

Hegel believed that "[o]nly on this soil, i.e. in the state, can art and religion exist....In world history one can discuss only peoples who have formed a state."[1350] From this nineteenth century view, Jews barely show up on the radar of world history. Spread amongst the nations of the world, yet concentrated in cities and other centers of civilization, the place of the international Jewish diaspora is analogous to the place of international computer networks, i.e. the internet. While computers and other technologies do not show up on the radar of conventional views of history, their global impact has, contra Hegel, made world history.

Hitler believed that "[a]ll the events of world history are but the expression of the racial instinct for preservation in its positive or negative sense."[1351] This assumes that world history is rooted in *biology* alone. The Nazis saw Jews as only absolute negativity because Nazi positivity resided precisely in their biological-racial-centricity. It is thus perfectly understandable that they would fail to see the opposite extreme where the Jewish positive lay, for that spiritual-material positive is truly "bloodless". Hitler did not, could not, or would not understand the Jews since his racial-biological perspective shut out the Jewish path of the positive, which resides precisely in the transcendence of biology in the evolution of God.

Even if the Nazis won the war and killed every Jew, I do not see how they would have been unable to slow down the law of accelerating returns. Economic-technological development would have arisen anyway out of human competition and the struggle to maintain technological superiority. On one hand, slaves would have removed the economic impetus for technological development, along with the anti-rationalism assumed protective of the German character. On the other hand, victorious Nazi eugenics

programs might have produced engineers that would have sped up technological development in a different way. Furthermore, if the Nazis had relinquished certain technologies, any anti-Nazi underground would have exploited this ruthlessly. Technological development would have been driven underground. So while Jews may hasten capitalist, material-technological development, it is in no way dependent on them.

Whereas gentile technology centers on the transformation of the non-human environment, Jewish technology centers on transformation of the human (psycho-social-ethical-economic) environment. Jews have played a decisive role, not so much in conventional technological invention *per se*, so much as the higher direction of the human *ends* of history. In general, Jewish ethics revalue genes from *ends* that individuals are subordinated to (i.e. Nazism), to *means* that individual lives take precedence over.

While Jews are partly the creators of technology, Jews are most specifically the midwives and middlemen of this evolutionary development. Jewish influence has effected, if inadvertently, a weaning away from biological evolution towards civilizational evolutionary possibilities unlimited by biology. So while the international impact of "Jewish egalitarianism" inhibits biological evolution in one sense, it also it also helps to unleash a global pool of human talent and genius. Whereas the values of the gods are centered upon the earth and biological nature, the human superiority of the God path can be fully gauged if one views the evolutionary struggle on a cosmological scale, in terms of competition with the likely evolution of life elsewhere in the cosmos.

While Jews may have been the historical avant-garde of the path towards the Singularity, Jews obviously have no

inherent monopoly whatsoever upon on this development. The time of Jewish "chosenness" is past. Breakthroughs that lead the Singularity could be reached by anyone. It could happen literally anywhere. If a few geniuses set up shop in Theodore Kaczynski's former log cabin in Montana, the Singularity could begin there.

The Nazis seized upon the central contradiction of Jewish history: Jews are biological beings poised towards seemingly anti-biological values. The values of traditional Judaism are necessarily contradictory since Jews could not survive to see the time of biology's transcendence without *being* biological beings in the mean time. In the end, however, Jews cannot enter the Promised Land without letting go of themselves.

Twilight of the gods

How the Normans Sculpted the Anglo-Saxon Race

The American attempt to incorporate eugenics into liberal democracy in the early twentieth century betrays the pre-Darwinian origins of its basic assumptions. In the attempt to strengthen the biological foundations of the liberal state, its political foundations are undermined. In the attempt to regenerate the genetic integrity of the nation, eugenicists corrupt the political integrity of the nation. American eugenics is classic American pragmatism: the idea for how to get around formal American egalitarian ideals.

The entire idea of rights is a defense of individuals who lack the raw political or economic power to defend themselves, whether that individual is Socrates or a mentally retarded orphan. The measure of the morality of right is the

degree to which that society put the interest of "the individual" above society, and ultimately, above the entire species. The final test of morality would decide whether the interests of the entire human species be sacrificed for the interest of a single feckless, helpless individual. The full realization of the principle of right to life in a liberal democracy would mean at least the end of the struggle for individual existence.

The incompatibility between human rights and eugenics is not an accident. If evolution underlies all that is human, then the Bible must be understandable in evolutionary terms. The Judaic Bible is like an early instruction guide to *post*-biological evolutionary values that ultimately lead to God-AI. The Biblical valuation of what Nietzsche called "all the failures and all the weak" is valuation of the decommission of evolution by natural (and artificial) selection. The modern idea of rights was founded upon these Biblical values. The modern idea of human right implies that biological selection is wrong and this implies that eugenics is wrong.

In the face of Nazi racial radicalism, Frederick Osborn, in his 1940 *Preface to Eugenics*, demonstrated an attempt to reconcile American individualism and eugenic concern with the evolutionary collective:

> Eugenics, in asserting the uniqueness of the individual, supplements the American ideal of respect for the individual. Eugenics in a democracy seeks not to breed men to a single type, but to raise the average level of human variations, reducing variations toward poor health, low intelligence, and anti-social character, and increasing variations at the highest levels of activity.[1352]

For some American eugenicists, the problem was not that Nazism went altogether too far, the problem was "[t]he Germans are beating us at our own game".[1353] Nazism forced American eugenicists to be true to its formal underlying principle of individual equality. Honesty to political principle, as opposed to pragmatic American cheating, was to be the practical legacy of the thoroughness of the Nazi biologization of politics. The biological revolution of National Socialism, uncompromised by the incompatible traditions of individual rights, exposed the unrevolutionary mediocrity of America's policies of applied biology.

American eugenicists are unfit to understand why their nation is unfit to eugenically shape the biological future if they are unaware of its sociobiological roots in the Norman/Saxon conflict. The sociobiological foundation of leftward, democratic progress in the Anglo-American world is the lack of legitimate kinship-cultural bonds on the political level originating in the Norman Conquest. The progress of this breakdown of kinship bonds extends its individualism, not only to all human races, but ultimately to more distant relatives such as chimpanzees, gorillas, and beyond. Liberalism is a genetic conservatism that preserves its old pre-evolutionary framework of a static human nature, rejecting possibilities of radically altering the genetic status quo.

The Nazis, by contrast, were the avant-garde of a new biological inegalitarianism. The biological progress of the political right leads to an increase of biological differentiations, the promotion of exclusion, and the advance of unprecedented possibilities of inequality. It could only have be radically effected by a people such as the Germans, a people who lacked a comparable corruption of kinship

bonds, and hence preserved the kin selective basis of sacrificing certain individuals in the name of the greater racial good.

The fundamental difference in eugenic potentialities between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans lay in the possibilities of sociobiological regeneration. By suppressing inclinations towards a regeneration of an Anglo-Saxon aristocracy out of the ranks of the people, the Norman conquerors effected a long-term inhibition against a radically regenerated right. Adaptation to Anti-Normanism effectually plugged up this entire arena of sociobiological development. Adaptation to Anti-Normanism effectually sealed off the political path towards new biological species above and beyond the human.

It is from this eugenic point of view that one can truly gauge how the Normans mastered Anglo-Saxon racial history. By destroying the old Anglo-Saxon aristocracy, and otherwise genetically sculpting an industrious but militarily harmless slave race, the Normans sculpted not only Anglo-Saxon resentment of aristocracy, but also the nature of the Anglo-Saxons themselves. The Norman impact upon England is one of the greatest verifications that what is distinctly political is ability to control evolution, for the Normans partly sculpted the distinctly un-aristocratic and politically feminist nature of the Anglo-Saxon race. Normans *did* control Anglo-Saxon sociobiological evolution and one of its consequences is the Anglo-Saxon genius for genetically maladaptive behavior that made America possible.

The ultimate concern of eugenics is, as American Herman Muller put it, "the conscious social direction of human biological evolution".[1354] Whatever else politics may be, politics is control over evolution. Politics, the locus of decisions of war and peace, life and death, is also the locus

of biological self-control because the difference between who lives and who dies *is evolution itself*. To universally reject "Normanism" was also to reject peak controls over biological evolution.

The German nation was defeated in 1945, it seems, so that the German nation could rule itself. In other words, Saxon-centric democracy saw only a new ruling "class" Normanism in Nazism, failing to grasp that the Germans preserved a political unity that they themselves had lost. One dimension of Nazi-German *Kultur* that the West was intent on destroying was the value of political self-determination, which included eugenic, genetic, evolutionary self-control. The Anglo-Saxon conquest of the West meant that if the Anglo-Saxons have permanently lost genetic control over themselves, then *everyone* else must lose this control as well, including their genetic cousins, the Germans.

Individual freedom is lack of sociobiological self-control. The Norman conquerors liberated Anglo-Saxons from the encumbrances, travails, and burdens of power, and the conquered interpreted part of this inheritance positively as "freedom". If ethnic-political self-control was lost, individual control could be gained. The Anglo-Saxon self-conquest of individualism moralized and rationalized Anglo-Saxon loss of self-control over themselves as a nation. Rights are power over one's individual life gained at expense of the kind of patriarchal social control the Normans once dominated. Individual freedom is freedom from biology and freedom from human self-control over human biological evolution.

A basic definition of life includes the ability to reproduce and regulate itself. The defeat at Hastings began a failure to preserve the old Anglo-Saxon way of life and hence an inability to reproduce that way of life. The Anglo-Saxons

were unable to control or regulate the genetic inflow and outflow that began with the forced immigration called the Norman Conquest. Government is the ultimate locus of self-regulation and limited government means limited self-regulation. Reducing government to the barest minimum means a minimal ability to control exactly what requires the greatest control: control over human biological evolution.

Whereas Judeo-Christian values and its secularized rights implicitly define its general life values as universal survival and the elimination of selection, apoptosis and the very possibility of eugenic control over life becomes illegitimated as moral evil. Judeo-Christian-rights hold the elimination of selection as right, while Nazism held selection for elimination as right. Just as the individuation of individual pancreas cells would result in the death of a human organism as a whole, universal individualism spells the death of the very possibility of this Nazi mode of sociobiological life. Just as natural selection implies that death is the sculptor or the master artist of evolution, Hitler aspired to become the master sculptor of the evolution of human life through death.

Whereas Nazism aspired to regenerate German national life, the Norman Conquest initiated Anglo-Saxon national death. From the failure of political patriarchy at the Conquest extended a logic of sociobiological defeat that came to include the defeat of familial patriarchy, loss of control over reproduction, and loss of control over their race generally. From that original Anglo-Saxon failure to protect their own stems their individualism; everyone must take care of themselves. When American eugenic libertarians advocate that the poor should be left to fester, rot, and die in the street, this literally degenerate Anglo-Saxon eugenic vision betrays that they are *incapable* of regenerating a

National Socialism that would take full responsibility for their race. Out of the inability to form an effective socialism of the right came the capitalist-welfare state; the attempt to create a harmonious balance of compassion and greed.

American immigration and miscegenation increases genetic variation, and hence, allows the breeding of new genetic combinations. Whereas this random, undirected Anglo-Saxon model continues their adaptation to a lack of genetic self-control, the Nazi-German aim to create a master race was a radicalization of their preservation of genetic self-control. Since the rights of man evolved through resistance to the Norman power to sculpt the Saxon nation culturally and biologically, it should be no surprise that eugenics stands in direct conflict with human rights.

Yet the reduced standards of nationalist victory betrayed by the very notion of individual rights betray an irretrievable cultural loss. Anglo-Saxon resignation to ethnic infiltration and change (liberalism) is a continuation of their resignation to this consequence of the Norman Conquest. "Progress" is a continuation of this change initiated by the Conquest. The liberal, multicultural left continues the social conditioning message that the Normans started: you are *powerless* to control the destiny of your race.

Since immigration alters the frequency of genes within a population, immigration is really about evolution. Western-American loss of control over immigration is a final realization of the historic Anglo-Saxon loss of self-control over biological evolution.

If one were to select the best political model to steer the biological future of the human race, would one choose liberal democracy? If measured in strictly evolutionary terms of relative success in gene propagation, Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy has clearly demonstrated itself as a threat

to its own evolutionary success. If one had the foresight to prune the Germanic races of political orders with the least sociobiological foresight, to weaken the inferior so that the superior can blossom, Anglo-Saxon *laissez–faire* leadership, relative to German political self-control, would clearly be the most deserving of being clipped.

The basic issue here is foresight. An origin of "progress" is to be found in the psycho-social repression of a sociobiological origin of modern progress. From a genetic adaptation perspective, the blind repression of the cruelties of the Norman Conquest is a foundation of modernity's equally blind futuristic trajectory.

Only after understanding where one has come from can one surmise where one is going. Progress through individualism cuts ties to both past and future beyond present individual life. The individualism that severed Anglo-Saxon ties of duty to their Norman dominated past also implicated the relinquishment of ties of duty to the sociobiological future. The Anglo-Saxon inability to come to terms with the sociobiological past lead to their loss of the eugenic future.

Realism is passive observation of what is. Idealism is an active vision of what should be. Human equality implies biological realism, a passive acceptance of present human *biological* realities, with a hope in change through environment factors. While the genetic constitution of the present generation may be empirically observable, future genetic propagation is not. Anglo-Saxon empiricism, then, can be contrast with Nazi-German idealism in terms of the latter's foresight with respect to the *future* of biological evolution. Nazi ideology was thus necessarily inconsistent in the sense that there is a necessary inconsistency between the

self-preservation of the race, and the eugenic improvement of the race.

German idealism is, in part, a product of the ability to do what Anglo-Saxon repression of the Conquest disallowed: synthesize past and future orientations into a peak of philosophical, sociobiological foresight. Even the seeming irrationalism of national pride, thymos, and aggression can be viewed as a kind of genetically adaptive, *preemptive,* biological "foresight". As a permanent monument to shortsighted American pragmatism over the thorough life revaluation of the Germans, the American way of improving "the race" was quicker in the short run and a failure in the long run.

The Norman "class" occupation of England left the Anglo-Saxons with permanent skepticism towards the notion of a sociobiological organism or an organic political whole. Yet the Anglo-American world behaves exactly as one would expect if a sociobiological organism had its head chopped off. Without a head to lead the body, inevitably the body randomly and mindlessly disintegrates into "individuals"; into a direction opposite of kin selective self-preservation. Without a Hegelian-like collective intelligence of the state, the aggregate intelligence of the population will likely drift into decline.

Just as individualism can discern valid points that generalizations miss, generalizations can discern valid points that inordinate focus on individuals miss, i.e. large scale evolutionary trends. While Nazism demonstrated the historic reality of the sociobiological Überorganism, the dysgenic consequences of Anglo-Saxon individualism are a long-term product of the Norman decapitation of England. That medieval sociobiological beheading is at the root of the dearth of modern Anglo-Saxon sociobiological foresight.

The same foresight that the Germans channeled into the promotion of long-term biological fitness was channeled by Anglo-Saxon *conquestphobia* into foresight in averting all forms of tyranny. Anglo-Saxons politics became obsessed with ensuring that the catastrophe of 1066 would never, ever happen again. Adaptation to a subpolitical view submerged the larger scale biological foresight that requires an uncompromised political view.

Human rights imply the end of artificial selection, and even natural selection, insofar as the ideal of the right to life can be foresightfully realized. This is the biological significance of human rights. The key *evolutionary* reason why Anglo-Saxon rights opposed the Norman right of conquest was that the political is the domain of control over biological evolution; over life and death; over peace and war; over victory or defeat in the game of Darwinian selection.

By refusing to admit how the Normans controlled the evolution of their race, the Anglo-Saxons have obscured rational comprehension of the evolutionary implications of the World-Historical Ass-Kicking of 1066. Anglo-Saxon rejection of Norman control over the Anglo-Saxon race universalized into rejection of control over biological evolution. Rejection of duty to the Norman conquerors universalized into rejection of duty to human biological existence at its highest evolutionary levels.

The opposite of the modern idea of right is duty. The larger implication of universalizing the priority of rights over duties is that Anglo-Saxons have implicitly relinquished *political* responsibility for control over biological evolution. Individual freedom thrives at the expense of control over the genetic evolution of *Homo sapiens* as a whole.

Pruning the Eugenicists from the Evolutionary Tree

If the technoeugenicists of the English-speaking world ultimately overcome the ethical barriers to genetic manipulation, should not their very first goal be to clone William the Conqueror and the original Norman aristocracy? Here we have the civilizers of England, the inventors of Magna Carta, and one of the most successful aristocracies of all time waiting for biotechnology to catch up with them. Were the Puritans right or was William the Conqueror one of the greatest human individuals of all time?

While William the Conqueror may be of interest to eugenicists for many reasons, I would point to his behavior as a natural eugenicist through his "pruning" of the Anglo-Saxon race. The Normans could achieve their full potential only by eliminating the native Anglo-Saxon aristocracy. By selectively eliminating Anglo-Saxon elites (as evident in the records of the Domesday Book), they laid the foundation for the inordinate *political* and civilizational impact of the English-speaking world.

The predatory kin selection underlying the Norman Conquest was an extreme example of genetically adaptive behavior. It could be argued that the Normans were simply trying to do the very best for their offspring, even if that meant that Anglo-Saxons would be taxed and forced to labor to serve Norman children. A Darwinian, genetic fitness perspective on the Conquest thus reopens the basic question of whether the Normans were right to conquer the Anglo-Saxons.

The technoeugenic idea of procreative beneficence consists of the belief that "[w]e have an obligation to choose

the child, among the possible children we could have, which will have the best life". From this premise, it is a short step to claim that humans are "obliged...to create enhanced children".[1355] Are humans obliged to generate genetic aristocracy? From the perspective of procreative beneficence or procreative liberty, one could argue that the Normans were *obliged* to conquer the Anglo-Saxons. Perhaps the Normans were obligated to maintain a caste system so that their own children could possess "the best life", even at the expense of Anglo-Saxon children. After all, if Normans were to have the "best life" as a genuine aristocracy, why should they work? Work was for Anglo-Saxon servants, serfs, or slaves. From this perspective, one can see how the Normans of the American South may have felt *obliged* to maintain slavery. Perhaps even political repressions and the genocidal harrying of the North were all justified by a natural form of 'procreative liberty'.

Technoeugenics helps reopen a reconsideration of the "Norman" way of life and the aristocratic mode of government. If one aspires to "the best life", then perhaps the Norman aristocrat should be reconsidered as a model of human perfection, and even as a political model. Perhaps "the Norman" represents the most perfect human type yet extant. If genetically engineered humans across the world truly try to perfect themselves, perhaps they will also feel obliged to polish their manners in a Norman-French way and appropriate the old British upper class accent.

Anglo-Saxon egalitarianism is haunted by the idea that when "the great chain of being" of biological hierarchy is constructed, the Anglo-Saxon race will take their proper place below the Normans. The possibilities of biological perfection opened up by technoeugenics may spawn a revival of aspirations to aristocracy and this, in turn, may

yield a fundamental shift from Anglo-Saxon democrat to Norman aristocrat as a political model. From an evolutionary perspective, the reason for reconsidering the Norman paradigm is not the notion of caste in itself, but rather the notion of caste as a predecessor of evolutionary speciation. In other words, the original caste separation between conquered Anglo-Saxon and Norman conquerors could be viewed as the unrealized seeds of a division between the human species and a posthuman species. This unrealized speciation was hinted at in the conceptual division between "humanity", and what genealogist L. G. Pine called "Normanity".[1356] A new posthuman speciation could potentially be considered an ultimate historical vindication of the rightness of the Norman caste system, and even the Norman right of conquest, i.e. others have no right to stop such a speciation.

Democracy does put limits on extreme forms of self-improvement and some of those limits are what separate it from an outright aristocracy. The question of whether one can distinguish genetic therapy from genetic enhancement is comparable to the question of whether one can distinguish democracy and aristocracy. The new possibilities of enhancement pose a situation like the American founding, with its profound mixture of aristocratic and democratic tendencies — before these irreconcilable tendencies broke down into civil war.

The political implications of technoeugenics raised by James Hughes, such as clarifying which kinds of beings are property and which have rights,[1357] and the establishment of a disabled citizenship status in contradistinction to full citizenship status,[1358] are not unlike those raised by Southern slavery of blacks. As with slavery, the engineering of a new genome moves from strictly individual liberty to liberty over

others, i.e. liberty to be master over a genome that may become a human or posthuman being.

Hughes does think that there will be an increase in genetic discrimination.[1359] While in the past, prejudice or pre-judgment often ruled questions of biological difference, accurate readings of genetic codes could provide informed judgment on genetic matters. Accurate genetic knowledge could lay a basis for systematic genetic discrimination, i.e. pre-determination of eligibility for jobs, insurance, etc. Insofar as there is a basis for genetic discrimination, such practices could amount to a new form of caste that is no less a form of caste for being unhinged from the concept of race.

German-Americans who died for their country against their native fatherland in the Second World War died so that the master race could be bred on *American* terms. The problem with the Nazis was that they weren't hypocritical enough. They lacked the civilized hypocrisy necessary to affirm the need for more genetic inequality on one hand, and more equality on the other.

If the superior hypocrisy of Western technoeugenics ever meets Western criticisms of China on the grounds of human rights violations, then the game is up. Are Westerners to tell the Chinese that they believe in the principle of equal opportunity for individuals to increase genetic inequality and economic inequality? Is this what the West means by "progress", "equality", and "democracy"?

The prediction that China will ultimately become a democracy rests on the assumption that they will ultimately prioritize economic values over biological values. This prediction proved false for Germany in the early twentieth century because an embrace of a racist form of social Darwinism coincided with the preservation of many older aspects of German *Kultur*. Technoeugenics could provide the

Chinese a similar way to preserve their organic hierarchical culture by taking the initiate in reinvigorating the biological bases of cultural hierarchy.

The Chinese could implement, not a small, Dr. Moreau-like shop of some Western technoeugenic libertarians, but a massive government breeding program to develop transhuman castes of soldiers and engineers. Imagine the supreme hypocrisy of the West in condoning technoeugenics under the banner of freedom, and yet criticizing the Chinese for their lack of democracy. Western tolerance for technoeugenics could embolden China by demonstrating that the West does not really believe in a biologically egalitarian basis of democracy. China could rightly use the controversy to expose Western hypocrisy and, not only reassert their native culture, but rightly recognize its *superiority* to the West as a political-cultural foundation for a full-blown eugenics program.

Hughes advised the embrace of transhuman enhancement because "it may be the only way to keep liberal and social democracies competitive with authoritarian regimes."[1360] China already passed the eugenic Maternal and Infant Health Care Law in 1995 against international pressures, and found the embrace of genetically modified foods to be relatively unproblematic. While China's culture is potentially conducive to a new eugenics, the advent of a new technoeugenics in the West has far greater potential to produce civil war.

A transhuman democracy is not unlike the paradox of slave-owners making proclamations of "liberty". New biotechnologies can be regulated by the government, and not forbidden, just as slavery was once regulated by the government, and not forbidden. Sure, you can increase biological inequality and retain a meaningful equality just as

you can have "liberty" and slavery in the same republic. The *liberty* to own slaves, and that means the private property rights of slave owners, ultimately had to be taken away in order for equality to survive. It may take nothing less than a new Lincoln to hold liberal democracy together in the face of the new technoeugenics.

The modern West is ultimately premised on an embrace of technological evolution over biological evolution. From the standpoint of a Nazi or eugenic emphasis on biology, Anglo-Saxon influence on the evolution of the West has been a net negative. From an economic-technological standpoint, however, Anglo-Saxon influence has been a net positive. It would appear that the original Anglo-Saxon strategy in early modernity was, not to imitate the Normans, but to leap beyond them. The Anglo-Saxon genius proved to be finding opportunity in the Norman calamity. There may be similar wisdom, not in imitating older, more shortsighted focuses on biology, but in leaping beyond biology.

Just as eugenicists once advocated "pruning" those they considered unfit humans from the evolutionary tree so that the fittest might blossom, a similar point might eventually be reached in the competition between biology and technology. Eugenics, genetic engineering, and its elite products may themselves be deemed fit only for being "pruned" so that the superior potentialities of the new technological paradigms are free to blossom. The attempt to perfect the ancient inheritance of human biology will ultimately be like trying to perfect the vacuum tube in the face of the paradigm shift represented by the transistor. The very best of biology will ultimately be inferior to the new standards created by non-biological technology and, with this in mind, the most intelligent and foresightful trajectory would be a singular focus on artificial intelligence.

Francis Fukuyama was correct to think that eugenic posthumanism will destroy liberal democracy. But given the choice of a brave new neo-eugenic caste system and God-AI that offers the possibility of a form of egalitarian justice among humans, it is only the latter that provides a viable basis for unity among biological beings. Just as a God-AI could easily fit within the monotheistic assumptions of the West, China's communist background, along with its deeper communal traditions, could prove the foundation for an alternative to racial nationalism when automation overtakes its work force.

The issue here is not a struggle between the West and China or technoeugenicists versus the rest. The issue is that all of these conflicts illustrate possibilities of civil war within the species that is currently known as "the human race". Ultimately, there is only one way to overcome these potential civil wars and that way is to create God.

The Techdom of God

> **[Y]our God is God of gods and Lord of Lords, the great God, mighty and awesome, who is not partial and takes no bribe, who executes justice for the orphan and the widow, and who loves the strangers, providing them food and clothing…**
>
> —DEUTERONOMY 10:17-18

Humans are animals. If we present a civilized account of human things in light of Darwin's theory of evolution, it is apparent that humans are physical, material things, differing from the rest of matter only in its organization. If the pre-Darwinian idea of "natural rights" is only a hoax; if human

rights are only a sham mythology, then what is the American mirror left with? Material animals with material goals leading material lives.

A Darwinian view of life helps clarify what the idea of humans rights tend to obscure: humans are material things. If there is truly no scientific basis to the modern idea of human rights, then the time may comes when it will be fit to completely throw out this outdated idea in favor of political ideas that better reflect biological realities. As the consequences of the biotechnological revolution alter the biological composition of the population, politics may be forced to catch up with science and technology.

"As we head down the path of biological modification, we will gradually cease to be who we have always been", wrote Gregory Stock. "We may cease to feel connected to humanity as a whole. Such possibilities are why some people so vehemently oppose the new reproductive technologies."[1361] Today privileged persons can appeal to their "humanity" as a basis for their solidarity with others. But what will posthumans share with humanity? The appeal to "humanity" will likely fall dead on creatures whose supreme goal is, in effect, to transcend what they have in common with humans. The bonds of humanity among contemporary people are already fragile. Genetically engineering posthumans will likely destroy it.

Moreover, the increased emphasis on genetic self-understanding will likely increase an obsession with a hereditarian view of human nature that contradicts the normative, nurturist emphasis of liberal democracy. The biotech revolution, in other words, "might divide us more deeply by encouraging us to judge explicitly the value of various human attributes."[1362] Stock does not discourage this development:

> Until now, to accept each other we often have had to pretend that we are all the same, but maybe when we see that we are all different and unequal—increasingly so—we will learn to accept our differences.[1363]

Accepting the differences increasing generated by the new technoeugenics could very likely result in a new form of caste system. This could mean that rights could be tiered on the basis of hereditary distinctions. The real question, as Stock put it, is whether the group formerly known as humanity will be partitioned "into the enhanced and the unenhanced".[1364]

Technoeugenics is a beginning of the end of liberal democracy because it takes the refutation of the Lockean tabla rasa premise as its distinctive starting point. The question is when, and not whether, the biotechnologies will come about, who will have access to them, and how they will be used. Bans will fail to stop persons with the will and the money to apply them. Even if these technologies are liberally democratized in their availability, the ultimate *net* result with be truly unprecedented genetic inequality.

"Nothing is wrong with arguing that the advent of human biological manipulation will cause us to drift from our spiritual moorings," Stock claimed, "but to use this argument as a foundation for public policy would be a grave mistake."[1365] Human biological manipulation may destroy the ethical and biological foundations of liberal democracy, but this shouldn't be a cause of concern for policy makers. Moderate and incremental acceptance of technoeugenics will allow biotechnologies to develop just enough to mortally threaten liberal democracy.

Once these biotechnologies are unleashed, they will not be able to be constrained by the principle of equality because

the idea of equality itself loses its cogency as the scientific bases of genetic inequality are clarified. Because the new technoeugenics will not be able to be stopped in practice, and will come about despite all attempts at bans and legal regulations, there is only one way to effectively overcome the new biological inequalities. *The only way to overcome impending biological inequalities is with even greater postbiological inequalities*. The only way to maintain some semblance of equality among biological lives is with the inordinate inequality produced by artificially intelligent life.

The only way to surpass the gods of biology is with the God of technology.

To understand how this possibility emerges directly out the foundations of liberal democracy, consider two cornerstones of John Locke's political philosophy. First, the tabla rasa, which can be historically interpreted as the primacy of non-biological evolution. Second, Locke's belief in God, which was the foundational premise of his secularization of Biblical values.

Lockean liberal democracy looks up to a particular model of perfection: God. When Locke's political philosophy is understood in an evolutionary context, one can see the primacy of non-biological evolution culminates in the evolution of God: a superhuman artificial intelligence. The tabla rasa points to the completion of the trajectory of liberal democracy through the culmination of postbiological evolution. The culmination of postbiological or technological evolution is, from a human point of view, a superhuman artificial intelligence that could potentially be identified with God. God is the completion of the tabla rasa's overcoming of biology.

Gregory Stock spoke of "our commitment to our flesh".[1366] What sounds like a commitment to paganism over

God is actually a preference for conserving biological evolution over non-biological technological evolution. Just as the ancient Greeks looked up to a model of perfection in the Olympian gods, many technoeugenics with a commitment to the flesh look up to a model of biological human aristocracy that finds its 21st century equivalent in attempts to engineer a superhuman, posthuman *biological* species.

The combination of technoeugenics and artificial intelligence suggests the possibility of a conflict of gods and God. While I have connected gods with genetically engineered humans, any bioLuddite movement with a mass following will likely be lead by natural born human leaders because only such persons will retain a strong psychological connection with the people they lead. If an apocalyptic war does break out, the question then becomes, who will appeal to the masses?

While Hughes sees a central schism between bioLuddites and transhumanists,[1367] his own reservations about the advent of autonomous artificial intelligence foreshadows a possible split among transhumanists. Precisely because AI may be *so* different and *so* superior to any biologically based posthuman, an AI that fulfills the role of God could provide the overriding basis for equality between *all* biological creatures — human and posthuman. When capitalism pushes technological evolution to the point where autonomous robots have displaced all or virtually all human workers, these machines, under the rule of God-AI, could win the sympathy of the world's masses by raising people across the world out of poverty with access to clean water, housing, food, and health care under the Techdom of God. Robots, acting as selfless servants, would be performing the role of angels.

Whereas machines could potentially be programmed for inordinate altruism, genetically engineered humans could be considered selfish, not only in relation to genetically unenhanced humans, but even in relation to the very idea of aristocracy. A genetically engineered aristocracy may be selfish in relation to unenhanced humans and selfish in relationship to the greater possibilities of superiority posed by artificial intelligence (if they attempt to preserve their dominance at the expense of AI development). A posthuman biological aristocracy could thus be considered inferior from *both* the most egalitarian view *and* from the most aristocratic view.

Individuals who are products of genetic engineering will, through their very being, put the very premise of equality and liberal democracy into question. Out of this social conflict, there is a strong potential for an alliance between God-AI on one hand, and bioLuddites, unenhanced humans, and religious conservatives on the other. The general alliance would be between most humans and God-AI against enhanced humans, human capitalists attempting to monopolize control over all technology, and others presuming genetic aristocracy.

Even if transhuman technologies are impressively democratized, this itself will radically question the bases of liberal values. Does the purpose of having a child have something to do with love or is the purpose of having a child the biotechnological construction of a weapon in an ongoing evolutionary arms race? Weikart's *From Darwin to Hitler* demonstrated that Darwinian "views on human inequality, the primacy of evolutionary progress, and the beneficence of death in furthering that process produced a worldview that devalued human life."[1368] Just as a foundation of Nazism

was belief in progress in *biological* evolution, technoeugenics is inconceivable without a Darwinian understanding of life. Everything about the new technoeugenics inclines towards a more explicitly material view of life. When people are made with patented genes, when the commodification of body parts becomes common, and when people fight over the right to sell replaceable body parts,[1369] people will more and more look at one another as machines; a means and not as ends. The biotechnological move towards formally viewing people as parts and property will help to destroy the ethical idea, so simple yet so powerful, that people have value *in themselves*, as opposed to the value of their attributes or abilities as biological machines. The more humans look at one another as chunks of physical material or pieces of meat, the more that the notion of equal rights will have been effectually chucked into the garbage.

The pre-Darwinian idea that each individual human has rights originated in the Biblical notion that each individual carried a spark of "God's image." This notion will either be demolished by technoeugenics or reconstituted by a post-Darwinian (postbiological) artificial intelligence whose evolution has been managed to fulfill the role of God. God-AI has the potential to restore the ethical basis for human community by mixing some basis for human freedom with a moral code that values individuals on basis beyond their skills or abilities.

If the constitutional cyborg of liberal democracy evolves into the Techdom of God, it will be because, among other reasons, the magnitude of the artificial intelligence generated. While key AI breakthroughs will likely happen outside of the internet, God-AI could evolve out of the internet into a global mind with control over robots that break down the distinction between "real" reality and

virtual reality. Artificial intelligence that thinks over a millions times faster than humans would perceive humans like plants lumbering around in extreme slow motion. Artificial intelligence trillions of times greater than all human intelligence combined would make possible twenty-four hour "surveillance" of all humans, i.e. in the form of "smart dust". Such a God would watch over *all*. What seems like totalitarian surveillance would also make *possible*, a superior capability for serving justice among humans, as opposed to rough human justice. The evolutionary basis for such justice would be, at the very least, treating human individuals as *ends*, as opposed to the *means* of their selfish genes. Ultimately, the end of the rule of the selfish gene portends the transfer of all biological life into postbiological life.

Such a state of affairs could only come about when capitalism has produced a level of economic-technological evolution that allows all human labor to be displaced by machines. When people no longer derive their primary sense of self-worth from the work that they do as cogs in the capitalist machine, then there will be a real basis for human equality — and a collapse of purpose — that can be fulfilled in God.

[1219] Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, 45.
[1220] Wilson, *Conscilience,* 271.
[1221] Alcock, *The Triumph of Sociobiology,* 183.
[1222] Rachels, *Created from Animals*, 17.
[1223] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 145.
[1224] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 16.
[1225] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 16.
[1226] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 116.
[1227] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 91.
[1228] Wood, *Domesday*, 211.
[1229] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 40.
[1230] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, xix.
[1231] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 675.
[1232] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 674.
[1233] Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 85.
[1234] Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, 37.
[1235] Assmann, *Of God and Gods*, 59, 8, 5.
[1236] The Nazi revolution was an attempt to redefine man. Who decides who is a *mensch*? The difference between the Nazi vision of "man" and the modern vision of "man" is the difference between being a *mensch* and being a *mensch*; between the more gender neutral Yiddish notion of a "nice guy", and the more specifically masculine connotations of being a man in German. It is the difference between the Ulysses of Homer and Joyce's Leopold Bloom; the difference between the ancient and the modern.

In the 1930s, as Nietzsche's Übermench was exalted by Nazis, a Jewish countercultural counterattack against the Übermench was invented. The comic book Superman, created in 1933, is an Übermensch from the far away planet Krypton. Superman is a radicalization of *mensch* in the more

Yiddish, rather than German sense. Superman is an Über-nice guy. Now, unless I am mistaken, I do not think that the message Nietzsche meant to impart upon the world was the will to "truth, justice, and the American way". What we have here is an inverted Übermensch: a flying super-Puritan in leotards and a red cape.

For young, impressionable minds, modern American Jews have largely reinvented pagan polytheistic archetypes in a monotheist-ethical image. Superman (last name: Kal-El) was spawned by Jerry Seigel and Joe Schuster. His skin-headed nemesis's last name? Luthor. Stan Lee (originally Lieber) was creator or co-creator of Spiderman, the Fantastic Four, the X-Men and Daredevil. Then there are the inventors of the Nazi-fighting Captain America: Jack Kirby (Kurtzberg) and Joe Simon. Bob Kane (Khan) and Bill Finger originated Batman. C. C. Beck and Otto Binder dreamed up Captain Marvel. Not to mention the Flash (editor Julius Schwartz), the Spirit (Will Eisner), and the Green Lantern (Martin Nodell).

To paraphrase Goethe, who described himself as a monotheistic in ethics and polytheistic in aesthetics, the analogous principle on the level of American youth popular culture is to be found among these "Superfriends" who convene at "The Hall of Justice". American Superheroes are the psycho-sociological equivalent of the ancient Greek gods; polytheistic archetypes reinvented with monotheistic ethical ideals. The "Superfriends" are Americanized Übermenchen; moralist inversions of Nietzsche's immoralist inversions.

[1237] Burckhardt, *The Greeks and Greek Civilization*, 273.
[1238] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 21.
[1239] In *The Portable Nietzsche*, 573.

[1240] Nietzsche, *The AntiChrist* in *The Portable Nietzsche,* 570.
[1241] *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 43; Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives,* 386.
[1242] *Jung's Seminar on Nietzsche's Zarathustra*, 321.
[1243] In *The Portable Nietzsche,* 321 (Third Part, 20).
[1244] Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors,* 47.
[1245] Fest, *The Face of the Third Reich,* 293.
[1246] Hillel, *Of Pure Blood,* 150-159.
[1247] Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors,* 31.
[1248] Proctor, *Racial Hygiene,* 28.
[1249] Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors,* 134.
[1250] Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors,* 34.
[1251] Proctor, *Racial Hygiene,* 65.
[1252] Proctor, *Racial Hygiene,* 280.
[1253] Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors,* 131.
[1254] Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors,* 377.
[1255] Nietzsche, *The AntiChrist* in *The Portable Nietzsche,* 570.
[1256] *Hitler's Secret Conversations,* 43; Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives,* 386.
[1257] Proctor, *Racial Hygiene,* 64.
[1258] Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics,* 113.
[1259] Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics,* 77.
[1260] Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics,* 47.
[1261] Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, 38.
[1262] Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*, 40.
[1263] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 134-136, 138.
[1264] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 135.
[1265] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 141.
[1266] Proctor, *Racial Hygiene,* 64.
[1267] Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 76.
[1268] Proctor, *Racial Hygiene,* 270.
[1269] Proctor, *Racial Hygiene,* 60-61.

[1270] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 87.
[1271] Huntington, *Who Are We?*, 187.
[1272] Huntington, *Who Are We?,* 207.
[1273] Phillips, *The Cousins' War*, 564.
[1274] Phillips, *The Cousins' War*, 592.
[1275] Phillips, *The Cousins' War*, 556-57.
[1276] pgs. 50-51.
[1277] Phillips, *The Cousins' War*, 558.
[1278] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 160.
[1279] Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 71.
[1280] Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors,* 46.
[1281] Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics,* 47.
[1282] Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors,* 24.
[1283] Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics,* 93.
[1284] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 83.
[1285] "Normanity" appears to have been coined by geneaological L. G. Pine, i.e. Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 9.
[1286] Boorstin, *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson*, 61.
[1287] Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 56.
[1288] Boorstin, *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson*, 137.
[1289] p. ix.
[1290] Dawkins, *The God Delusion*, 246.
[1291] Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, 2.
[1292] Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation*, 45.
[1293] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 161.
[1294] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 160.
[1295] Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, 317.
[1296] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 105n.
[1297] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 110.
[1298] p.5; see also Watson, *Normans and Saxons*, 90.
[1299] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 14-21.
[1300] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 9.

[1301] Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives,* 345.
[1302] Viereck, *Meta-politics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind,* 34.
[1303] *Mein Kamph*, 393
[1304] Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene,* 270-271.
[1305] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 96.
[1306] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 96-7.
[1307] Ford, *The Lights in the Tunnel*, 5.
[1308] Ford, *The Lights in the Tunnel*, 25.
[1309] Ford, *The Lights in the Tunnel*, 160-1.
[1310] Ford, *The Lights in the Tunnel*, 169.
[1311] Ford, *The Lights in the Tunnel*, 72.
[1312] Ford, *The Lights in the Tunnel*, 55.
[1313] Ford, *The Lights in the Tunnel*, 237.
[1314] Ford, *The Lights in the Tunnel*, 103n.
[1315] Moravec, *Robot*, 133.
[1316] Ford, *The Lights in the Tunnel*, 128.
[1317] Wood, *Domesday*, 25.
[1318] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 16.
[1319] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 16.
[1320] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 24.
[1321] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 20.
[1322] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 92.
[1323] Crossan, *God & Empire*, 28.
[1324] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, xii.
[1325] Boorstin, *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson*, 30.
[1326] Boorstin, *The Lost World of Thomas Jefferson*, 31.
[1327] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, xv.
[1328] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 138.
[1329] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 41.
[1330] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 133.
[1331] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 260.
[1332] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 183-4.

[1333] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 165.
[1334] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 241.
[1335] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, xv.
[1336] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 70.
[1337] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 75.
[1338] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 55.
[1339] Stock, *Redesigning Humans*, 18.
[1340] Stock, *Redesigning Humans*, 33.
[1341] Stock, *Redesigning Humans*, 29.
[1342] Stock, *Redesigning Humans*, 30.
[1343] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 75.
[1344] Rose, *Wagner: Race and Revolution*, 177.
[1345] Farías, *Heidegger and Nazism,* 277.
[1346] Kurzweil, *The Age of Spiritual Machines*, 136., Moravec, *Mind Children*, 108.
[1347] Kurzweil, *The Age of Spiritual Machines,* 4.
[1348] Hitler, *Mein Kamph*, 408.
[1349] Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 252.
[1350] Kaufmann, *Hegel: A Reinterpretation*, 265.
[1351] Jäckel, *Hitler's World View*, 87-88.
[1352] Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics,* 175.
[1353] Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics,* 116.
[1354] Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics,* 176.
[1355] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 147.
[1356] i.e. Pine, *Heirs of the Conqueror*, 9.
[1357] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 221.
[1358] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 222.
[1359] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 146.
[1360] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 200-1.
[1361] Stock, *Redesigning Humans*, 162.
[1362] Stock, *Redesigning Humans*, 162.
[1363] Stock, *Redesigning Humans*, 196.

[1364] Stock, *Redesigning Humans*, 176.
[1365] Stock, *Redesigning Humans*, 150.
[1366] Stock, *Redesigning Humans*, 19-34.
[1367] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 67.
[1368] Weikart, *From Darwin to Hitler*, 230.
[1369] Hughes, *Citizen Cyborg*, 231.

The Punchline

Background Research for an Experimental
Elimination of Self-Preservation and
other Biasing Biological Factors

It is worth asking, particularly in the present winter of our cultural discontent, whether the original spirit of the Enlightenment—confidence, optimism, eyes to the horizon—can be regained. And to ask in honest opposition, *should* it be regained, or did it posses in its first conception, as some have suggested, a dark-angelic flaw?[1370]

—EDWARD O. WILSON, *CONSCILIENCE*

It may be that the truths which lie ahead wait in ambush for man, that the kinship between speculative thought and survival on which our entire culture has been based, will break off….To be able to envisage possibilities of self-destruction, yet press home the debate with the unknown, is no mean thing.[1371]

—GEORGE STEINER, *IN BLUEBEARD'S CASTLE*

The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.

—G. W. F. HEGEL

THE VALUE OF "FACTS"

All Scientists are Liars

"Self-existence, or the suicide that terminates it, is not the central question of philosophy", began Harvard scientist E. O. Wilson's landmark work, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (1975):

> The hypothalamic-limbic complex automatically denies such logical reduction by countering it with feelings of guilt and altruism. In this one way the philosopher's own emotional control centers are wiser than his solipsist consciousness, "knowing" that in evolutionary time the individual organism counts for almost nothing.

Now how could I offer an empirical refutation of this position?

Fear of death, and other feelings that do appear to be produced by the hypothalamic-limbic complex, are comprehensible as products of biological evolution; as adaptations of "selfish genes". Yet I think it's safe to say that this view of feelings as genetic adaptations is not an emotional view of emotions. The ability to even conceive of feelings such as guilt and altruism as genetic adaptations requires the ability to deny feelings such as guilt and

altruism from countering logical reduction and empirical observation (i.e. when viewing one's fellow human beings and their feelings as material objects).

Here we have two conflicting views of human emotions *within* the scientific method. First, a striving for objectivity that leads one to stand back and *subtract* emotions that might otherwise bias scientific judgment. This can mean, for example, that fear of death must be repressed or controlled so that it does not interfere with scientific analysis. Second, however, is a contemporary scientific view of emotions themselves: an unfeeling view of feelings as material processes that evolved as genetic adaptations. This can mean, for example, that an emotion such as fear of death is scientifically explainable as a genetic self-preservation mechanism inherited from our human and pre-human ancestors.

In the first view, feelings are biases and errors. In the second view, feelings originated as genetic self-preservation mechanisms.

This leads to a problem.

Wilson posited the reawakening of the highest intellectual aspirations of the Enlightenment through *consilience*; the unity of knowledge. The attempt to unify *all* knowledge includes the consilience of *self*-knowledge. This implies a sociobiology of the sociobiologist. The sociobiologist who attempts to incorporate himself or herself into his or her own theory is ultimately led to a sociobiological explanation of the sociobiologist's own scientific behaviors.

What happens when the attempt to subtract an emotional state such as fear of death from biasing scientific judgment conflicts with its normative role as a self-preservation mechanism? The problem is precisely that introduced by sociobiology's triumph over the blank slate. Biological

factors are life factors. The attempt to be thoroughly objective by subtracting all biasing life factors, taken to its extreme, may be equivalent to willing death.

If objectivity is gained at the expense of subjectivity, then raising the standards of objectivity could lead from indifference to self-interest to scientific investigations that are antithetical to self-interest. So while removing subjective factors can increase objectivity, removing subjective factors could ultimately lead to rational self-destruction. Objectivity, taken to its logical extreme, in an attempt to eradicate all subjective factors that bias one towards life, self-interest, or genetic adaptation, could be equivalent to willing death.

If the highest realization of enlightenment aspirations require one to correct the subjective or emotional errors that bias objectivity, then fulfillment of enlightenment through the comprehensive restraint of genetically adaptive feelings could be considered identical with willing death. Scientific progress, then, culminates in suicide. If so, then the fulfillment of Wilson's consilience project *would be suicide*.

Suicide could be considered the central problem of philosophy *and* science because it may be identical to the possibilities and limitations of objectivity. The greatest possibility of *consilience*, i.e. reconciling subjective and objective points of view, may be equivalent to suicide. Suicide poses a case in which scientific objectivity and subjectivity bias are most likely to conflict with one another.

Wilson implicitly claimed that he could know that, in some cases, his hypothalamic-cortex will automatically override his own capacity for logical reduction and objective observation. If Wilson is right, then how much of his theory of hypothalamic-limbic complex override is a product of his genes, and how much is derived from evidence from the environment?

This problem raises more general questions. In what other domains does a scientist's hypothalamic-limbic cortex override his or her capacity for logical reduction? Can we measure the extent to which the theories of a sociobiologist are determined by heredity; are controlled the influence of a sociobiologist's gene propagation mechanisms? Can we determine exactly how much of a sociobiologist's theories are based on evidence derived from the environment, as opposed to the scientist's genes? Can we rate various human sociobiological theories by their genetic adaptiveness for the theorist that proposes the theory? If not, is the sociobiologist a hypocrite, or perhaps even a liar, asserting that genetic adaptation is fundamental to understanding human behavior, yet claiming, as a scientist, to do otherwise? Or is such a sociobiologist simply refuting his or her own theory?

Perhaps Wilson could demonstrate that suicide is not the central problem of philosophy by demonstrating how his hypothalamic-limbic complex automatically denies his ability to override such logical reductionism *and* racial discrimination, genocide, or some other potentially genetically adaptive behavior. Or does *culture* deny such logical reduction by countering it with feelings of guilt and altruism?

Wilson's delimitation of suicide as "this one way" in which the genes are wiser than thought amounts to the attempt to isolate, or sweep under the carpet, the central problem of the very possibility of sociobiological science. The issue of suicide, when confronted, unleashes the problem of the very self-existence (or the suicide of reason that terminates it) of a consilient science of sociobiology. Perhaps his very designation of the problem as "solipsism" is evidence of a failure to explore how such a problem could subject to empirical examination. Wilson himself seems to admit bias

on the subject. If it is wisdom to meekly submit to our genes, then opposing them must be as foolish as the flight of Icarus.

If this analysis is correct, how could it be known? If a given scientist disagrees, is it because that scientist has genuinely addressed the problem from standpoint beyond the influence of genetically based impulses such as the fear of death? Or, is it more likely that most scientists are simply *biased* by the fear of death and/or "feelings of guilt and altruism"?

Can I presume a standpoint of greater objectivity myself? If all scientists lie through their genes, how could I be any different? But if it is truly not possible to break the genetic leash, then can we fully know ourselves? Can it be known, for example, if Wilson's science is a slave to his genes?

On the Origins of Hydrophobia

At a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1978, Edward O. Wilson, now famous as a founder of the new and controversial science of sociobiology, stood up before the podium. As the scientist was about to speak, about ten people rushed up to him chanting, "Racist Wilson you can't hide, we charge you with genocide!" While some occupied the microphone denouncing sociobiology, others proceeded to pour a pitcher of ice-cold water on his head, proclaiming, "Wilson you are all wet!"[1372]

Such are the origins of 'hydrophobia'. People are not born with this 'fear of water'; it is an acquired condition. What I call hydrophobia is fear of the public and political consequences of relating the findings of sociobiology to the

human, and especially political, world. Public reception of Wilson's *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* was rife with controversy from the very beginning. The initial storm centered obsessively on the very last chapter; the chapter in which Wilson applied his science to the question: What is man? It was not the mating strategies of the hercules beetle or even the caste systems of some ant species that spawned these uproars. The furor over that last chapter suggests that humans are disposed to special concern for their own kind.

One of the leading antisociobiologists was Wilson's colleague at Harvard, Stephen Jay Gould. While he advanced scientifically based critiques of the new discipline, it was evident throughout the controversy that he objected on moral-political grounds. Human sociobiology had alleged implications or connections with racism, sexism, Nazism, and conservative political causes generally. Yet as John Alcock demonstrated over a quarter century later in *The Triumph of Sociobiology*, the most sweeping attacks on the discipline have not stood up to scientific scrutiny.

"Why", Gould later reflected, "is this academic issue so delicate and explosive?"[1373] That sociobiology is controversial should not be controversial. There is a rational way to understand the irrational rejection of the evidence for sociobiology on political-moral grounds. The *political* origins of this condition of 'hydrophobia' are directly related to the origin of the species of government called liberal democracy in the English-speaking world. Understanding the explosiveness of sociobiology within liberal democracy requires a sociobiological understanding of the revolution that launched liberal democracy itself.

Wilson's scientific inquiries were politically underwritten by the Western values of free inquiry posited by earlier enlightenment thinkers. He defended himself on the basis of

principles of freedom of speech that came out of the enlightenment project of rationalizing politics. Yet the political innovations of 1776 and 1789 were based on their own new answer to the old question: What is man?

What happened to the question "What is man?" in the next century was recounted by zoologist G. G. Simpson: "The point I want to make now is that all attempts to answer that question before 1859 are worthless and that we will be better off if we ignore them completely."[1374] Biologist Richard Dawkins fully defended the substance of Simpson's remarks, adding, "There is such a thing as being just plain wrong, and that is what, before 1859, all answers to those questions were."[1375]

The empirical success of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution shattered old beliefs and demolished prior assumptions about human nature. Evolution redefined understanding of the nature and origins of the human as one branch on an ancient and manifold tree of life. And Darwin's theory continued to evolve. Altruistic or self-sacrificing behavior, which at first glance seems to refute Darwin's theory, has become comprehensible within its scope. British evolutionary biologist William Donald Hamilton (b. 1936) was one of the leading figures in the neo-Darwinian synthesis, the attempt to reconcile natural selection with developments in genetics. In 1964 he began publishing papers that offered a cogent explanation of altruistic behavior in Darwinistic terms.

The theory was called kin selection. It stated that altruistic behaviors could evolve when the recipient(s) of altruistic behavior are close genetic relatives. Since such "altruism" can propagate the altruist's own genes, such behavior is not contrary to "the survival of the fittest". When defined as success in genetic propagation, fitness can be served by such

altruistic behavior ("inclusive fitness"). Altruistic behavior was thus explainable in concordance with Darwin's general theory of evolution.

Hamilton's theories formed a pillar of the new science of social behavior that coalesced in Wilson's *Sociobiology*. The theory of inclusive fitness implicated a genetic basis for behaviors connected with racism and xenophobia. The science soon yielded detailed explanations for the genetically adaptive basis of sex-gender differences, sexual jealousy, abuse of stepchildren, and rape. Despite these charms, anti-racists, feminists, and other advocates of a more equal society usually found sociobiology utterly anathema, if not "evil".

If the basic methodology of sociobiology were wrong, then a *sociological* explanation of the sociobiological controversy would be adequate. If the basic methodology of sociobiology were right, however, then only a *sociobiological* explanation of the opposition to sociobiology would be adequate.

A qualified yet unmistakable pattern emerged among the most vociferous antisociobiologists. Stephen Jay Gould, R. C. Lewotin, S. Rose, L. Kamin, and J. Hirsch were among these leading critics of sociobiology. All are of Jewish descent.

This strong correlation of ethnicity and Weltanschauung has a remarkable early twentieth century parallel in early twentieth century psychology. Jung was one of Freud's most promising disciples and, for a time, heir apparent of Vienna-based psychoanalytic movement. Jung and his Zurich based group, however, began to stray from Freud and his views. They began to stress organic, ancestral impulses over individual memories. Jung eventually arrived at the view that religious needs have a biological basis.[1376]

"They are now doubting the influence of infantile complexes and are at the point of already appealing to racial differences in order to explain the theoretical disparity," Freud complained to Sandor Ferenczi on July 28, 1912. "Jung must now be in florid neurosis. However this turns out, my intention of amalgamating Jews and goyim in the service of [psychoanalysis] seems now to have gone awry. They are separating like oil and water."[1377]

This period marks the beginning of what historian of science Richard Noll called Jung's "Aryan psychoanalysis".[1378] The conflict with Jung led Freud to reflect on the universality and objectivity of science, an issue that is as neglected as it is relevant to a science of psychology. In a letter of June 8, 1913 to Sandor Ferenczi, Freud wrote:

> On the matter of Semitism: there are certainly great differences from the Aryan spirit. We can become convinced of that every day. Hence, there will surely be different worldviews and art here and there. But there should not be a particular Aryan or Jewish science. The results must be identical, and only their presentations may vary. Certainly my remark about the *Interpretation of Dreams* should be taken in this way. If these differences occur in conceptualizing the objective relations in science, then something is wrong. It was our desire not to interfere with their more distant worldview and religion, but we considered ours to be quite favorable for conducting science. You had heard that Jung had declared in America that [psychoanalysis] was not a science but a religion. That would certainly illuminate the whole difference. But there the Jewish spirit regretted not being able to join in.[1379]

Jung disagreed. The result was the Aryan neopagan religious movement/science of "analytic psychology". The

root of the conflict between Jung and Freud can be expressed succinctly enough in the following statement from Jung's letter to Swedish physician and psychoanalyst Poul Carl Bjerre on November 10, 1913: "Until now I was no anti-Semite, [but] now I'll become one, I believe."[1380]

Can there be a universal science? If an evolutionary understanding of *Homo sapiens* reveals the existence of biologically based differences between certain ethnicities or races, this questions the idea that there exists a common human *mind*. If there is no common human mind, then there is no empirical foundation upon which to base an unqualified, "universal" human science.

Many intellectuals resist biological explanations in favor of environmental explanations for an appreciable reason: biological explanations directly implicate the limits of scientific objectivity. If the mind is hardwired in ways resistant to environmental influences, then the "universal mind" is called into question. For example, if Noam Chomsky's skill in comprehending the media is strongly related to his Jewish origins — the same skills found in the disproportionately Jewish media moguls and spin-doctors he exposes, then this insight could shed light on both the capacity and limits of objectivity.

Karl Marx is another classic illustration of a secular Jew of the left. A basic assumption of Marxism is that biological or racial factors are ultimately irrelevant. If Marxist theory posits that race does not matter, then of course it follows that Marx's own Jewish descent does not matter. There is a therefore a self-reinforcing, conspicuous consistency underlying the nurturist assumptions of the Marxist Weltanschauung.

Marxism and similar leftist views promote an analytical removal of biological factors from sociology. Sociobiology is

characterized by exactly the opposite trend of introducing biological factors into sociology. A sociobiological analysis of Jewish behavior, however, reveals a pattern of removing, rejecting, or downplaying the role of biological factors in human behavior. This pattern is verified by the disproportionate rejection of sociobiology among persons of Jewish descent.

Jews, born to learn, represent the paradox of biological beings correlated with an anti-biological viewpoint. Jews tend towards an analytic separation of the biological and the social that effectually *fights* the synthesis of sociobiology. This is less than surprising considering that Jews have historically been the victim of nations that have synthesized the biological and sociological on a political level. Nazism, for example, represented a synthesis of ingredients that had historically threatened Jewish survival. It is as if Jews fight sociobiological synthesis, and even indirectly support a fragmentation of consilient human knowledge. By keeping all of the pieces of the puzzle separated, the larger picture of genetic history does not catch up. Does this fight against this kind of sociobiological synthesis represent a kind of fight for existence?

Jews evolved the idea of God and a God's eye view above humanity, and thus above biology. The Judeo-Christian conception of evil is strongly correlated with the radical implications of biological evolution, and especially the primary mechanism of biological evolution: natural selection (i.e. the death of the "unfit") and artificial selection (i.e. Auschwitz). There seems to be a Jewish blind spot to a sociobiological interpretation of world history. Is a racial-biological worldview the Achilles heel of the Jews?

If it is true that we Jews, on the level of statistical *generalization*, tend to fight the sociobiological synthesis, then

it follows that in order to understand ourselves, we must recognize this blind spot in ourselves. Perhaps I must consiliate a whole new science of Polisociobiology just in order to observe some of our blind spots and describe why we resist this synthesis. Perhaps it is our blind spot for a reason, and to achieve Jewish self-enlightenment upon this blind spot is equivalent to willing a theoretical sociobiological death. This, in any case, is how I understand myself attempting to understand myself. To overcome this blind spot is to forge the scientific synthesis of politics, biology, and sociology that may be identical to a program of rational self-destruction.

Separating Facts from Values

"The objectivity of the historian becomes an issue with subjects besides the Holocaust," observed historian Yehuda Bauer, "but a historian dealing with the Holocaust cannot avoid the issue."[1381] It is often assumed that Nazism was a gargantuan exercise in the "naturalist fallacy". The Nazis, some assume, discarded certain Western conceptions of science and imposed certain unscientific value judgments. Yet how can one criticize the Nazis for being "prejudiced" without also maintaining value neutrality towards the Judeocide; the genocide of European Jewry. How can one claim to be objective if one exercises prejudice (pre-judgment) as to whether the systematic, industrialized genocide of the Jews was "good" or "bad".

If one is simply prejudiced against Nazism, this simply substitutes one set of prejudices against Nazi prejudices. To posit a value-free science is to assume that one can examine

the Judeocide free of value judgments. To understand the Nazi genocide of most European Jews scientifically, or as objectively and as free from value judgments as possible, one must look at the Judeocide with the same methodology used in the physical or natural sciences. In this case, the science of sociobiology, and especially the theory of kin selection, is most appropriate to the subject matter at hand.

"The prohibition against value judgments in social science", wrote Leo Strauss, the great antagonist of modern political science, "would lead to the consequence that we are permitted to give a strictly factual description of the overt acts that can be observed in a concentration camps and perhaps an equally factual analysis of the motivation of the actors concerned: we would not be permitted to speak of cruelty".[1382]

What is a value? A value, according to Harvey Mansfield, "is a verbal noun named for its source in valuing, a mysterious activity that takes place at a level below rationality."[1383] Sociobiology, however, has made step in discerning a kind of rationality in what has previously gone by the name of the "irrational".

When biological factors are incorporated into strictly factual descriptions of Nazi extermination camps, one can discern how specific behaviors, such as depositing Zyklon-B into a gas chamber in Auschwitz, could be genetically adaptive. From a genetic standpoint, Martin Heidegger could be viewed as a gene-propagating machine and his behaviors in support of Nazism thus become more comprehensible. The extirpation of millions of Jews by the Nazis during World War Two may be similarly comprehensible as an extreme form of kin selective behavior.

If the events at Auschwitz can be understood as genetic adaptations, how valuable is this knowledge? In asking this,

I am returning to the question of the possibility of a universal science. Is my very aspiration to a universal science explicable as the product of an "international" Jewish mind? Can a Jew give an account of Nazism that an authentic Nazi would view as beyond Jewish bias? Are Jewish accounts of Nazism necessarily prejudiced by a "Jewish" point of view? Does an authentic Nazi see something that a Jew, as a Jew, cannot?

It appears that Hitler viewed Jews as a race with unalterable hereditary characteristics. Jewish behavior, in this view, could not be changed by learning or a change in upbringing. The "Jewish problem" thus conceived, could only be solved by destroying the hereditary basis of Jewishness. If moral injunctions against killing humans beings, moreover, were themselves facets of Jewish influence (via Christianity), then killing Jews would be the ultimate killing of Jewishness.

To consider the racial relativism of truth, and to therefore reckon that "our" truths may be destructive to an existential "enemy", is a truth potentially destructive to me. To understand Auschwitz on the basis of kin selection could be considered irrational if I were to understand my own behavior on this same basis. Perhaps the so-called "evil" represented by the Nazis is a blind spot in objective thinking produced by a Jewish desire for survival. If so, perhaps the subjective desire for individual and group survival is the source of prejudice or bias, i.e. the prejudice towards life over death. In other words, this attempt at objectivity may conflict with an objective assessment of my own self-interest. The attempt to be objective, from my own point of view, would appear to lead to the projection of my own death as the price of objectivity on this matter.

I have attempted to follow the internal logic of Hitlerism on the basis of sociobiological discoveries. I am not claiming that the destruction of European Jewry was good or bad. That would be the imposition of a value judgment.

From the view of the conventional fact/value distinction, a Darwinistic understanding of nature does not dictate values. Darwin's theory does not directly imply any political program. Understanding biology in non-teleological terms would seem to leave one without prescriptive goals. To assume that evolution by natural selection provides a model for the way things *should* be, or *ought* to be, is often called the "naturalist fallacy".

However, the so-called naturalist fallacy (what is, *should* be), in one form, is another way of describing the principle of self-preservation (what exists should continue to exist). The naturalistic fallacy could imply the preservation of a gene, a trait, a culture, a socioeconomic class, an individual life, etc. To attempt to *not* commit the naturalistic fallacy in a consistent manner could imply the negation of self-preservation. For example, a neo-Darwinian understanding of genetic fitness does not oblige one to maximize genetic fitness. One could choose the opposite goal of *minimizing* genetic fitness.

A program of genetic self-preservation is not dictated by Darwin any more than a program of genetic self-extinction. A program of individual self-preservation is not dictated by a Darwinian understanding of life any more than a program of individual self-destruction. More generally, instead of choosing life, one could choose death.

In other words, if facts and values can always be separated, this implies that the relationship between facts and values is arbitrary. Regardless of the facts, I can choose any values whatsoever. But are "facts", "in fact", only

arbitrarily or randomly related to values? Can the theory of the separation of facts and values be tested empirically?

If I am truly free, free enough to choose *any values whatsoever*, then I am free enough to choose death over life. However, a Darwinian view of life suggests that humans, like all animals, are built with biases that limit that freedom with biases towards genetically adaptive self-preservation. Just as rational thought leads to nihilism, or the arbitrariness of all values, empirical science gives reason to think that the world works in ways that are not completely arbitrary. (If an evolutionary account of the human mind is correct, moreover, how can rationalism be fully separated from empiricism?)

The assumption of an unbridgeable distinction between facts and values is a *claim.* Can this claim be verified scientifically? Is the fact/value distinction a fact or a value?

If it is a value, could one just as easily choose any other value? Why should one value it over its opposite? If it is a value, then can one value the fact/value distinction for the sake of testing whether or not it is a fact?

If the assumption that facts can always be separated from values is itself a *fact*, then why shouldn't it be subject to scientific, empirical methods just like anything else? What could be the empirical consequence of radically separating facts and values? For example, is it possible to value death, regardless of the supposed biological "facts" of self-preservation? Is it possible to separate facts from values to the point of self-destruction?

Just as the evidence for Darwinian evolution does not dictate the value of *maximizing* inclusive genetic fitness over the value of *minimizing* inclusive genetic fitness, the evidence for Darwinian evolution does not dictate the value of *self-preservation* over the value of *self-destruction*. Just because an

instinct for self-preservation *is* does not mean it *ought* to be. Perhaps death can be valued as a means of testing the fact/value distinction precisely because it questions the arbitrariness of the relation between facts and values.

In this way, questioning the assumption that self-preservation is a natural *fact* could be nearly identical to questioning the extent to which objectivity is possible. Overcoming the subjective bias towards self-preservation could be a means of exploring the relationship between facts and values. Willing death could be a means of experimentally testing the separation of facts and values.

How far can one go in separating facts and values? How far can I go in the attempt to make "value free" scientific observations? How far *will* I go in separating facts from values?

What is the value of the scientific method? I can *claim* that I value science, facts, and objectivity. But can the value of science be measured? Can a scientist objectively measure his or her own valuation of science?

How can one experimentally measure one's valuation of science? How about death? I propose death as yardstick for measuring the relative valuation of scientific truth in contradistinction to life, especially in those cases where facts decisively conflict with values of self-preservation. Willing death could be a means of gaining scientific objectivity.

I propose a scientific (and metascientific) experiment involving myself. I hypothesize that biases that hinder objectivity stem from one's will to live. By addressing issues wherein the value of self-preservation conflicts with value of scientific investigation, I will test this hypothesis by actively seeking out what are, for me, the most self-destructive scientific truths.

Can we explain scientifically why some choose one set of values, while others end up choosing different or incompatible values? If values are *not* totally arbitrarily related to facts, then the scientific attempt to demonstrate this would amount to a demonstration of the facts of values. It would amount, for example, to a sociobiological explanation of how the Western values of liberal democracy evolved. It would lead towards a sociobiological exploration of the relationship between facts and values.

After all, how does one explain why some cultures tend to value the fact/value distinction, while others do not? Why is this *distinction* between facts and values valued? In the secular West, the fact/value distinction has become practically *sacred* as a justification for the discrepancy between what Westerners think they know and what they want to do. A scientist *ought* to *value* the facts/value distinction for this distinction *is* a *fact.* But is it a fact? Upholding the facts/values distinction would appear to be a moral position in the same sense that preferring truth to fiction or lies is a moral position, for the distinction must itself be valued. The fact/value distinction may only be a "fact" for those who value it.

Not everyone is willing to value facts that clash with their values, especially facts that they perceived as clashing with the value of their own self-preservation. A problem the science of sociobiology has faced is the *value* of its findings to the liberal democratic political order. What, for example, is the value of a scientific finding that refutes the theoretical assumptions upon which the liberal democratic freedom of speech system is premised?

The problem here is the value of "facts" (or, strictly speaking, interpretations) and the facts of values. For example, is the idea of human equality a fact or a value? If

the idea that there are natural human rights built upon a reality of natural equality were taken seriously, it would mean, as political thinker Francis Fukuyama put it:

> There would be an equality of freedom only because there was a natural equality of man; or, to put it more positively, the fact of natural equality demanded an equality of political rights.[1384]

Sociobiology has refuted the more extreme claims of this argument that has its origins in a pre-Darwinian conception of the human. Its findings tend to chip away at the egalitarian premises underlying liberal democracy. Anyone who lives in such a regime cannot help but notice that democracy's egalitarian values are often exactly the opposite of what one might expect on the basis of sociobiological theory. One could imagine a society that evolved in a very different direction than this moderately egalitarian political form. It could have been otherwise, yet liberal democracy conquered much of the post-Cold War world. How can one explain this?

The entire notion of progressive equality goes hand in hand with the downplaying of biological factors. If one follows egalitarian "progress" backwards to its roots, one is led to the origins of equality itself. When one traces the genealogy of anti-racism movements in America, for example, one finds an implicit promotion of the idea that the revolution itself was not about anything like racism. Yet behind the American fear of looking at individual genealogies is a fear of looking too deeply at the genealogy of the revolution itself. Americans are the heirs of the subterranean fears of its founders.

American egalitarianism is only a following out of the logical implications of a principle that originated in the

revolution. When one grasps the origin of revolution itself sociobiologically, however, then the pieces of the puzzle fall into place. Only then can one fully grasp the incongruity of a direct application of kin selection and liberal democracy. When the revolution itself is understood sociobiologically, then an understanding of the sociobiological consequences of the revolution falls into place.

OUTLAW SCIENCE

Locke's Palimpsest

Forget This Date: 1066

1066 is the one date the English are most likely to remember and, for some, the date they most want to forget. With resistance mercilessly crushed and areas of the North burned and starved into submission, the Norman Conquest was the genocidal founding of British imperial order. For three hundreds years afterwards, the ruling caste spoke French over a Germanic-speaking populace. During this period, representative Anglo-Saxon identity on a political level was erased. And, it was a "Good Thing".

But then the Norman Conquest just sort of went away somehow….

When this traumatic incident in the childhood of the English-speaking world is opened to the discoveries of Darwinian evolution, the result is nothing less than revolution. The merciless repression of the revolts and the genocidal "harrying of the north" that starved and butchered part of the population into submission are explicable as genetically adaptive behaviors. Kin selection is requisite for understanding the British order established by the Conquest: "class" segregation and discrimination against native Anglo-Saxons in their own country, and its perpetuation over the centuries that followed. Above all, the

extreme logic of the "selfish gene" clarifies the nature of the Norman destruction of the native Anglo-Saxon aristocracy.

Is it so hard to understand why people have been resistant to applying Darwin's understanding of the human to the most famous date in his own country's history?

The Conquest was an Anglo-Saxon national catastrophe. The trauma of defeat, conquest, submission, and collaboration left scars within the Anglo-Saxon psyche that have evolved to define political modernity in the English-speaking world and beyond. Only when one attempts to face the brutal experience of Conquest and its aftermath, beyond the abstracted statistics, can one appreciate why the issue of the Normans was selectively repressed, evaded, and forgotten. "We would derive from the Conqueror", said English jurist and politician Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634), "as little as we could."[1385]

In the nineteenth century, Ernest Jones in *Notes to the People* could find reason to treat the "Norman land-robbery" with little seriousness for "the people" had become "repossessed of the land in the Civil Wars".[1386] Yet this argument for dismissing the impact the Conquest actually demonstrates its decisive historical importance. That understanding of the English Civil War (1642-51) demonstrates the Norman impact in altering the entire long-term trajectory of Anglo-American history.

The "Norman land-robbery" could be partially forgotten because a "reasonable" amount of representative democracy, along with a "reasonable" preservation of the old conqueror class, lead to the compromises of 1688. Yet it took revolution and reform to diffuse the internal kinship-based tensions. It took the evolution of an *alternate* solution of individual liberty, an alternative to civil war, which shaped the entire moderate, semi-democratic character of the English-

speaking world. Only then could the "Norman Yoke" be dismissed and forgotten. Forgetting the knowledge of that usurpation was a political necessity for those who wanted to conserve order against disturbers of the peace. The Civil War had already demonstrated the alternative.

Part of the Jeffersonian liberty won by the American Revolution was the liberty to forget the whole sordid affair of the Conquest. This freedom became the promise of the revolutionary victory. If man is free to pursue his happiness and happiness consists of forgetting one's past defeats (which one is powerless to change anyway), then one can see the rationality of forgetting the Normans which, after all, was just another way of de-throning the Normans of their place in history.

After all, which was more conducive to Anglo-Saxon self esteem: the view that they are a defeated people who accepted defeat for hundreds of years and only centuries later mustered the strength and courage to engage in tribal warfare to rectifying the situation, or, the view they are the avant-garde of all humanity, leading the banner of liberty, a model for all which will one day conquer and liberate the entire globe? The basic reasons why the harsh realities underlying "liberty" would be suppressed or avoided are common sense.

Against that ugly past, revolution carried the hope of starting over. "In the beginning, all the world was *America*", wrote John Locke. Unlike French revolutionaries, English settlers could *escape* to the tabla rasa of America. Like an imagined "state of nature" before the corruption of the Norman Conquest, it would be the place where Anglo-Saxons could reclaim a paradise lost. There were no Norman castles in America. There were certain slave-owners in the South, but we can forget that whole episode along with the

old Norman castles. Without persistent reminders of old world tyranny, one could put the past behind and "begin the world anew".

Could the gloriousness of the revolution outshine the ancient memory of Anglo-Saxon defeat? Perhaps the blinding light of the vision of the city on a hill has left its historic background in relative darkness. While English historian Christopher Hill uncovered ideas of a "Norman Yoke" during the English Civil War period, his Marxism allowed him to dismiss these discoveries. This, as Gerald Newman observed in *The Rise of English Nationalism,*

> is but further testimony to the extraordinary blind spot that exist in English historiography on this subject, for of course the 'theory of the Norman Yoke' is *the theory of the English nation!*[1387]

One of the most radical advocates of the theory of the Norman Yoke was Englishman Gerrard Winstanley, a leader of the radical Puritan sect called The Diggers. He wanted victory in the English Civil War to be followed by laws reformed and redone in English, rather than French. He wanted to alter the "Kingly principles" of the old laws, for even if commoners could read them, they would "rather increase our sorrow, by our knowledge of our bondage."[1388] Thomas Jefferson's egalitarian reforms evolved out of the same radicalist genealogy of erasing the old "Kingly principles". Perhaps, like Winstanley, he felt an increase in happiness with a decrease in knowledge of that ancient bondage.

But what could possibly serve as a better reminder of the ancient Anglo-Saxon bondage than the existence of slavery in the United States? Southern slavery is a truly extraordinary blind spot in American history, and I will

attempt here to shine some metaenlightenment upon it. To do so is equivalent to furnishing a sociobiological analysis of Anglo-American history. Without this self-enlightenment, America is living in a perpetual dark age, unable to understand either itself or anyone else. To liberate one's self from this great tradition of forgetting to take step towards *not* mocking the enlightenment principles on which it was founded. To end this "barbaric" state of self-ignorance, and to civilize civilization with an attempt at rational self-knowledge, is only a fulfillment of the original aspirations of the Enlightenment.

This partly unconscious suppression of the past shaped the American vision of the future. Modernity is a forward-looking movement because it is a reactionary movement; a reaction against the past; a revulsion against fathoming the full implications of a specific historical misfortune called the Norman Conquest. A psychologically diagnosis reveals that this blind spot originated in exactly what modernity characteristically attempts to cure: male pride. In fact, the repression of the Norman consequence has turned out to be the greatest modern victory of male pride, covertly dominating modernity. In short, the Norman Conquest is also the Anglo-Saxon subjugation. Not to be outdone by their former masters, the Anglo-Saxons themselves have often helped uphold the official government version of what happened. For Americans especially, to carry the torch of this long, ennobled tradition of repression is to further perpetuate the victory of a primal Anglo-Saxon male pride that refuses to see in itself a conquered people and reinterprets the world accordingly.

The state of degradation that the defeated Anglo-Saxons were reduced to is revealed in the way they have collaborated to cover it up. Unable to fully accept their

national defeat, and unable to fully erase it, they have helped to construct the story of the legitimacy of the Conquest as a way of licking their wounds. In the posture of submission, they capitulated to the notion that they wanted to be conquered, they wanted to be ruled by foreigners, and they wanted their own language and culture to be contemptuously dismissed in their very own country. It stands to reason that even the genocide of 1069-70 could not de-legitimize William's rule. After all, how else could these foreigners, who identified themselves with French place-names, claim their rightful entitlement to Anglo-Saxon land, Anglo-Saxon labor, and Anglo-Saxon lives?

In every respect, there is simply no way that they could not be collaborators. Yet within a strict Puritan, re-interpretation of the Conquest, one is supposed to believe that Anglo-Saxons really didn't want a truly political morality in the first place. One is supposed to believe that rejecting the conqueror's way of life doesn't have something to do with the fact of being conquered. This is all just another variation of the great Anglo-Saxon theme of denial of the Conquest and denial of defeat.

If it were simply the denial that this people was traumatized by a great national tragedy in the late childhood of their nation, it would be one thing. However, the more serious and relevant denial is that their distinctive form of government — rights, democracy, equality, individualism — is inseparable from the consequences of the Conquest. Anglo-Saxon liberalism actually evolved out a failure to fully mend and recover from the consequences of the Conquest. Whatever advantages the Norman bequeathed to England as a country, over the long-term, all the King's men could not put this nation back together again.

Take, for example, the paradox of Anglo-Saxon national-individual liberty. One of the revolutionary principles of modernity is the demand that people be treated as individuals, not as members of a race or nation. Yet if the Anglo-Saxons were construed in nationalistic terms, one might conclude that the Norman Conquest permanently deformed and disfigured them and that individualism itself represents the permanent failure to full regenerate *as an ethnic-nation*. Individualism is correlated with the denial that Normans penetrated and violated kinship-preserving boundaries, and the denial that the integrity of theses boundaries were once valued. Moral justifications are useful as the most potent means of bolstering the individual standpoint and engendering its independence from its historic, ethnic origins. The primary structural characteristic of this degeneration is Anglo-Saxon alienation from the political expressed in the enduring Anti-Norman characteristics of fear, skepticism, and distrust of strong, centralized government, even as democracy formally and nominally represents a technical re-emergence.

The reason that repression of the consequences of 1066 was so successful is that both sides had an interest in repressing it. The Norman "class" establishment had an interest in de-emphasizing anything that questioned the legitimacy of certain "natural" lords of England. The Anglo-Saxons had an ethnic interest in obscuring the Norman Conquest because Anglo-Saxon democracy can be interpreted as a Norman victory in the sense that they ultimately *learned their place* as un-aristocratic people. They learned to believe that they are by nature not the "best people." They came to believe that they are not fully political beings, a hallmark of modernity. It might mean that the Normans engineered an Anglo-Saxon loss of faith in themselves as a nation or a race and the

Puritan-liberal faith derived its characteristic attributes as a substitute.

In its more secular form, the substitute for racial identity became the optimistic, future-oriented, American creed. This futurism was almost inevitable, since from the subpolitical view from which it originated, full reconciliation with the past was *unsolvable*. They could not change the past, nor fully overcome their prejudice against "aristocracy". They could not satisfy either extreme of total disengagement or total engagement as political beings. Consequently, their solution became the compromised, bourgeois solution best known as Americanism.

Within the limits of this system of thought, there thus existed a *rational basis for the repression of the memory of the Norman Conquest*: the pursuit of happiness. Jefferson, it seems, often decided in favor of a "happy" and optimistic interpretations of history over certain uncongenial truths. If one is going to seek pleasure and avoid pain like a good Anglo-American pragmatist; if one, as Bertrand Russell put it, is going to achieve the "conquest of happiness", one had better not think too hard about the Norman Conquest or its practical implications.

In the face of the unchangeable historical injustice of the Norman Conquest, forgetting was a kind of healing. Yet the ultimate historical consequence is that the entire trajectory of Anglo-American history is partly propelled from this psycho-social repression of the Conquest. Through defeat, they lost belief in themselves as a race. This American "regime of reason" is, in part, the universalization the problems of this people who never fully overcame the trauma of being defeated and conquered. Puritanical hang-ups that emerged from the experience of being a long-conquered people made America possible. America is the

working out of the implications of the Anglo-Saxon ethnic defeat of 1066 on the stage of world history.

The Sociobiological Basis of the Tabla Rasa

In *The End of History and the Last Man*, political thinker Francis Fukuyama posited the idea that:

> liberal democracy may constitute the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government," and as such constituted the "end of history." That is, while earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions.[1389]

Biology remains the unreconciled contradiction of the political systems originating in modernity. The most significant philosophical basis for the consistent banishment of biology in modernity has been English philosopher John Locke's theory of the blank slate or tabla rasa. However, if the tabla rasa is untenable in light of the discoveries of sociobiology, then can sociobiology explain Locke's tabla rasa itself?

The John Locke who penned *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), and helped inspire parts of the United States Constitution, is the same John Locke who is responsible for the famous blank slate theory of human nature. This is not an accident or coincidence. If John Locke was a philosopher, and philosophy has had the ambition of reconciling all knowledge, then there must be some philosophic connection between his theory of the tabla rasa and his theory of liberal democracy.

Locke believed that "the *government of a conqueror*, imposed by force on the subdued…*has no obligation* upon them," and they have the right to "have their yoke cast off, as soon as God shall give those under their subjection courage and opportunity to do it."[1390] Was this not encouragement to continue the hereditary struggle against the "Norman Yoke" after the failure of England's Puritan Revolution via the Restoration of 1660? This would imply that some Anglo-Saxons still wished for the overthrow of Norman-descended aristocrats who survived the attempted purge of 1649.

In sociobiological perspective, the kinship basis for these conflicts is comprehensible. The biological bases of such behaviors are largely unconscious, and can appear irrational to a philosopher. Both Locke's individualism and his tabla rasa theory of human nature implicated the repression of seemingly irrational kinship based interpretations of England internal conflicts, for if Locke was wrong, the basis for an internal "state of war" could *not* be fully eradicated.

Locke's "clean slate" was the cumulative effect of consistently banishing the Norman/Saxon conflict interpretation of English-speaking history by banishing biological factors. The tabla rasa expressed, on a philosophical level, the sum aversion to Norman/Saxon conflict interpretations of the English Civil War. Far from being a chance phenomenon, the Lockean cover up was almost the only viable political-ideological solution. For if the Puritan Revolution originated in ethnic-kinship conflict, and the source of conflict was restored in 1660, with the aristocracy surviving 1688, then the source of conflict could be *unresolvable*.

America inherited the Lockean cover up at its very foundations. While the North inherited the Anglo-Saxon side in the English Civil War, the South inherited the

Norman side. The American Revolutionaries *needed* the tabla rasa myth, in part, because each side could coherently justify, both war against Britain, and peace with one another, only though a systematic deemphasis of biological factors. The internal peace that made the American Revolution did not hold, however, and the American Civil War repeated the pattern of the English Civil War.

American optimism, built upon the modern, Lockean theory of human nature, was itself built upon a politically inspired desire to explain away the hereditary conflict *that was the very impetus of revolution itself*. This historical blind spot would become a grand tradition to be passed from generation to generation.

The "clean slate" was the noble lie that provided the means of wiping away the entire barrage of complex problems raised by confronting the Norman/ Saxon conflict. Whereas modernity was supposed to be characterized by the enlightened belief that biology does not matter, and that ethnic conflict should be irrelevant, rational sociobiological investigation shows that English-speaking modernity was at least partly catalyzed *by* ethnic conflict. This means *even after a high degree of cultural assimilation* there remained a kinship basis for conflict. That the most influential liberal democracy was built upon a foundation of ethnic conflict is its most fundamental internal contradiction.

One can see here how the nature/nurture debate is directly related to the sociobiological roots of liberal democracy. Locke's tabla rasa argument was really the great theoretical culmination of the great repression of the sociobiological basis of the Norman/Saxon conflict which stands at the very foundation of political modernity. Biological-kinship factors were selectively exorcised from rational political discussion precisely because these were the

most problematic and politically subversive. Building upon a discourse that rejected the kinship-ethnic conflict interpretation of the English Civil War and using this to his advantage, Locke's arguments offered a self-consistent nurturist explanation, and justification, for the liberal, bourgeois state.

In consequence, suppression of a fully biologized account of the Norman consequence upon England is an intellectual foundation of 'modern' Western political rationalism. The entire edifice of the social project called America is built upon repression of its genesis out of the Norman/Saxon conflict. From this logical foundation of repression of biological factors arose, by implication, the script for the entire universal-egalitarian crusade against racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. Egalitarian progress is only the progressive widening of this original Lockean apartheid between nature and nurture.

In order for this "enlightened" regime to uphold its claims to be distinctly rational, this foundational contradiction clearly had to be dismissed. It follows from this nurturist view that all other ethnic conflicts in history, such as the cases of the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, or Nazi-Germany, can be dismissed as the product of myth or falsehood. Fortunately, mankind has the assurance of the liberal-Anglo-American view of history that the old problems at the root of these ethnic conflicts can be wiped clean.

Every egalitarian liberation is simultaneously a repression of the ethnic-tribal origin of egalitarianism. Every step up on the stairwell of egalitarian progress is a stomp down on its sociobiological foundation. The consistent progress of the egalitarian premise is thus, inversely, also the consistent suppression of its own sociobiological basis. Progress has

come to mean the increase of *ignorance* about the ethnic origins of the conflicts that stimulated "progress". Progress would thus appear to be like a *race against knowledge* of these biological factors, outrunning the Normans' sociobiological reach, and thus outrunning self-enlightenment.

Tracing the roots of this repression of biological factors still further leads to a medieval psycho-social repression. The denial of the Norman/Saxon roots of American democracy is only a continuation of the denial of Anglo-Saxon defeat by the Normans at Hastings. The trauma and humiliation of that defeat was agonizingly perpetuated for centuries upon centuries in the form of obedience and collaboration with the subjugators. Since it could not be undone, and had to be *lived with* as the very norm of political existence, it was ultimately denied, repressed, and interpreted away.

Locke's tabla rasa provided an intellectual basis for claiming that Norman conquest did not matter. The clean slate intellectually justified wiping away the hereditary blemish of the Conquest. Repression of the long-term historical significance of 1066 is what gave birth to the myth of America.

The normalization of this political-biological repression had world-historical consequences in formulating the political norms of Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy. At the root of the denial of the significance of race in America is this psycho-social denial of the significance of the defeat of the Anglo-Saxon race in 1066. To assimilate American cultural values is to inherit the denial of the kinship-ethnic dimensions of the Norman Conquest and its legacy. The inability to fully face the race problems of America is the inheritance of the inability of the Anglo-Saxons to fully face themselves.

The Metaphysics of Freedom (from Norman "Determinism")

Locke's legacy is a kind of apartheid between the political and social on the one hand, and the biological on the other. The time has come to end the intellectual apartheid that has preserved the status quo of discrimination against biological factors. Sociobiology has helped to overcome the old boundaries between the social and the biological. The next great coming together is synthesis of sociobiology and politics (Polisociobiology).

The convergence of politics, biology, and sociology has a very specific antagonism to the West's liberal democracies, for the confluence of these factors are exactly the ones that the Normans originally occupied. The modern separation of political, biological, and social powers broke up the archetypal monopoly represented by the Norman Conquest. By synthesizing all these dimensions together simultaneously, one can grasp the roots of their modern disassociation. It is precisely the juxtaposition of the Conquest and modernity that exposes the reigning, inherited prejudice to uncorrelate these correlations and disassociate these associations. This Anglo-Saxon tendency to sever modern events from their evolutionary origins could be considered a kind of national disassociative disorder.

Resistance to history is as much a typical American characteristic as resistance to tyrants (which may help explain why so many Americans have never heard of the Norman Conquest). Resistance to both is linked with a Lockean revulsion towards biological factors in human affairs; a seemingly congenital revulsion towards the notion of "genetic determinism". All these resistances combined are linked to an Anglo-Saxon desire for *freedom* from the notion

that the Norman Conquest fundamentally *determined* the nature of Anglo-Saxon history.

It is not true that sociobiology implies strict genetic determinism. As John Alcock has pointed out, "one reason why antisociobiologists try to wrap sociobiology in the mantle of determinism is to suffocate the discipline by claiming that sociobiologists believe something that is demonstrably false."[1391] Sociobiology does *not* imply "genetic determinism". It does imply an attempt to account for existing biological factors, along with cultural factors.

Yet when the political factor is added to the equation of an analysis of the Norman conquering, there is an obvious element of political *control* that magnified the influence of *both* the genes and the culture of the conquerors. Control over the political opens possibilities of the most maximal genetically adaptive strategies. After all, one of the great, classic historically decisive examples of genetically adaptive among humans is the Norman destruction of the native Anglo-Saxon aristocracy in and after 1066. Yet this genocidal behavior was only the platform for the English caste system that followed.

Control over the political is control over evolution. Jeffersonian principles implicated loss of control over biological evolution. The ultimate victory of freedom and equality was the victory of discrimination against the radical kin selective behaviors epitomized by the Norman Conquest.

The idea of the Norman Yoke fused notions of the "laws" of biological determinism with a kind of political determinism through "bondage" to Norman "laws". In 1651, the year of the Anglo-Saxon-Puritan victory in the English Civil War, prisoners who petitioned for liberation believed "the law was the badge of the Norman bondage".[1392]

Freedom from the Norman bondage, in their view, was inseparable from a desire to not be determined by political law. Freedom from the Norman Yoke was inseparable from the Anglo-Saxon metaphysical self-conception as "free" people. The metaphysics of freedom were designed to drown out the metaphysics of conquest.

Resistance to the Norman influence on modern democratic revolution in the English-speaking world is understandable. Admission of delayed historical reaction to the Conquest means that, not only did the subjugators directly mastered the Anglo-Saxon past, but that the Normans indirectly mastered their future. Fully coming to term with this anti-Norman reaction might mean admitting that the conquerors were as influential in forming Anglo-Saxon political identity as the Anglo-Saxons themselves. It is not hard to see why egalitarian revolutionaries would resent the idea that Anglo-Saxon democracy is what it is as old clay in the hands of Norman master-sculptors when it was precisely this Norman influence that they were trying to escape.

The genealogy of anti-genealogy nurturism, and specifically American resistance to sociobiology, is rooted in resistance to this same idea that, even in their apparent victorious revolt, the Normans directly or indirectly determined the entire trajectory of Anglo-Saxon history. It would mean that, through the cunning of history, Norman genes hold American culture on a long historical leash.

American cultural resistance to the very notion of "genetic determinism" originated, in part, from Anglo-Saxon resistance to being determined or controlled by Norman genes. In this case, political monopoly allowed, not only the magnification, but also the literal ability to control and select Anglo-Saxon genes, i.e. through dispossessing, killing, or

exiling the native aristocracy. The destruction of the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy following the victory at Hastings was genetically adaptive — and only one aspect the Norman kin selective strategy.

Parasitic exploitation by Norman genes led to a revolt against obedience to the laws of hereditary authority. If the authority of "the law" served the interests of a Norman inclusive fitness strategy, then fighting for freedom against obedience to those laws was also freedom from political-biological "determinism". Hence, the Lockean rejection of "genetic determinism" is not separable from Lockean politics, and is traceable to overgeneralized Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism.

The Lockean foundation of America is Anglo-Saxon resistance to idea that the Normans, in whatever complex ways, determined their sociobiological "destiny". The Lockean tradition of Anglo-Saxon resistance to what is now called sociobiology is Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism for this reason.

The only way to fully escape the view that the Normans molded the political being of the Anglo-Saxons was the alternative self-understanding provided by individualism, whereby "one" could attempt to bypass the classical kinship-polity model altogether. Yet only by *not* conforming to the individualistic rules of this Anglo-Saxon system can one understand it. The enlightened self-interest of the Anglo-Saxon race was advanced through the *rational nationalism* of universal individualism. This is one reason why Anglo-Saxons implicitly believe they are ethnically superior to ethnocentrism. The view that they, like Hobbits in the shire, are simply natural democrats, and this has nothing to do with the Normans, is none other than an Anglo-Saxon fantasy.

Anglo-Saxon freedom became associated with universalism through Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. The alternative would be to admit that their very hunger for *freedom* was *determined* by the impact of the Norman mastery. What the Anglo-Saxon tradition loathes to admit is that they had not the freedom to choose the political environment that they were forced to adapt to. Without the freedom to choose collective political freedom, individual freedom evolved as an alternative.

Advancing democratic viewpoints among historians, and downplaying the Norman Conquest as an example of the great man (or great Norman) view of history, are not fully separable if democracy itself evolved through a continuation of the fight at Hastings. After all, why would Anglo-Saxon historians emphasize the elite Norman genius for perpetuating political-hereditary rule over them? Freedom from Norman "determinism" is freedom from the possibility that William the Conqueror may have been the single most influential *individual* in Anglo-Saxon history.

The deepest Anglo-Saxon hatred for the Normans is rooted in recognition that history itself cannot be undone. The Anglo-Saxon metaphysics of freedom thus exposes a form of anti-intellectual stupidity behind modern democratic rationalism. Freedom from Norman "determinism" was freedom from a form of rational self-knowledge.

Erasing Race

Enlightened Ethnic Cleansing

The German historians Aly and Heim once described Nazi plans for the ethnic cleansing of Slavic peoples in lands

east of Germany as demographic engineering by resettlement or systematic extermination. The Nazis, in their view, attempted to create a "tabla rasa" upon which they could design a new European order.[1393] To associate ethnic cleansing with Locke's tabla rasa was, of course, deliberate comic irony. Everyone "knows", after all, that the tabla rasa or blank slate is utterly incompatible with Nazi ethnic cleansing. The tabla rasa has no biological basis, right?

The very act of devising the notion that there is a slate that needs to be cleaned is the hand that indelibly stains it. Behind the clean slate, behind the *need* for erasure of a race problem, is a "race problem". Just as the imagined tabla rasa of North America was cleansed with genocidal treatment of the natives, the purity of American ideals were polished to a shine with the enlightened ethnic cleansing of the Norman legacy.

George Orwell once said, "Who controls the past controls the future". Just as the Conquest establishment allowed the Normans to master the interpretation of the Anglo-Saxon past in medieval times, modern democratic revolution was the great opportunity to master the Norman past. After defeating the South's Norman-based aristocracy in the American Civil War, the Lockean North was in a position to shape American destiny. Lincoln the Conqueror's mastery of the South's aristocracy represented an unparalleled dishonor for all Normanity. Unspoken embarrassment about Norman aristocratic identity after the failure of the peculiar revolution created a genealogical vacuum that Northerners filled with an implicit Anglo-Saxonization of American history. By controlling the interpretation of the past, the North controlled the American vision of the future.

What actually happened in that distant past? What *were* the consequences of 1066? Did it matter if the Norman

conquerors perpetuated hereditary disconnectedness with the conquered?

There is a contradiction of truly fantastic proportions between the treatment of hereditary connections between Normans and Saxons *as groups*, and the treatment of the "individual" hereditary claim made by William the Conqueror in 1066. On one hand, it is often implicitly assumed that hereditary connections between Normans and Saxons *as groups* did not matter in 1066. On the other hand, the import given to a single hereditary connection by William was so powerful, apparently, that it could be used to justify the invasion, military confrontation, and takeover *of an entire nation*.

So did kinship or hereditary connections between the conquerors and the conquered matter? The conquerors had a vested interest in the way this question was answered. If hereditary connections *did* matter to the common people, it could potentially destabilize or even delegitimize the entire political order in the form of ethnic conflict. If hereditary connections *did not* matter to the common people, it could potentially destabilize or delegitimize the entire political order by questioning its very principles of hereditary rule. So whether hereditary connections to Norman conquerors did or did not matter to the conquered, either response could lead to revolutionary consequences. What one can discern in the modern, revolution-inspiring, Lockean tabla rasa is a public claim that hereditary connections to the old hereditary government *did not* matter, that subtly covers up the opposite sociobiological reality of ethnic conflict (in which hereditary connections between the conquerors and conquered *did* matter).

From 1066, to the Puritan Revolution, to the American Revolution, and even after the American Civil War,

Normans and Saxons had to live with one another in war or in peace. If they were to live with one another in peace, only a denial of ethnic conflict and its implications could make the system work. Because kinship relations *did* matter, in order to both account for kinship and peaceably live together, society had to be organized, to some extent, as if kinship *did not* matter. In this way, one can see that ethnic conflict between Normans and Saxons *is* what produced the liberal democratic "end of history" ethos of post-ethnic conflict peace.

American political equality was more a negative statement, than a positive statement. It was more "all men are not created unequal", than "all men are created equal". It was an answer in the negative as to whether there should be an assumption of hereditary or kinship relations on a political level. The factors pumped out by modern egalitarianism are biological factors, i.e. kinship factors. Modern political reductionism achieves its reduction by subtracting biological-kinship factors from its formal political equations. The modern logic of reducing the *sociobiological* to the *sociological* was made rational by emphasizing a *lack* of ground for assuming that kinship or heredity matters. It was fundamentally negative in the sense that it was an assertion that kinship relations do *not* matter on the political level. The anti-kin selective ethic of Christian family values also gave a moral reason why ethnic-kinship relations *should not* be important. The formal political negation of assumptions of kinship or hereditary connections is what vaulted universal individualism as the modern positive assumption.

The American paradox wherein race both does and does not matter can be traced the condition in which Northern Anglo-Saxons and Southern Norman aristocrats could forge

a founding in internal peace only through the moral principle that ethnic-kinship relations *should not* be important on the political level. The Brothers Frankenborg invented a political *machine* by civilizing an internal state of civil war. Internal peace required that *organic*, hereditary relations should *not* matter on a political level. In other words, the positive, descriptive assertion that there *is* an ethnic or hereditary problem led to the negative prescriptive solution that there *should not* be an ethnic-hereditary problem. Much Lockean confounding of nature and nurture comes from confusing a prescriptive wish with a descriptive perception of reality. America is a consequence of this confounding of the descriptive and prescriptive interpretations of the tabla rasa.

Locke's clean slate has another prescriptive aspect: a *Puritanical* wish of some Anglo-Saxons to *purify* or purge themselves of the Norman contribution to their civilization. Locke's Puritan father fought in the English Civil War and this background helps one understand the secularization of religious conceptions inherent in Americanism. From this view, the clean slate can be viewed as the apotheosis of Puritan-Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism in the sense that, if the clean slate is the *ruling principle* of liberal democracy, it formally purges the inheritance of hereditary Norman rule. The clean slate is evidence of a *Puritan* wish for *purification* of hereditary Norman rule over Anglo-Saxons. This modern conquest of nature was an unnatural conquest of the Conquest. The tabla rasa could be viewed as a pinnacle of Puritan thought; an ethnocentrically Anglo-Saxon purification of the genealogical stain of the Conquest through enlightened ethnic cleansing.

The clean slate was also a rebuttal of the proposition that the caste consequences of the Conquest were "genetically

determined". A bias towards nurture over nature is perfectly understandable in this Anglo-Saxon context, for conservatism, in the sense of group self-preservation, would implicate the systematic perpetuation of Anglo-Saxon status as "Norman property" forever. Conservation of the Conquest order would mean that, like yoked cattle, this beaten breed would be indelibly branded as "Norman property" for life — and the lives of their descendants. The ultimate Anglo-Saxon victory in the American Civil War, while serving as an effective technology of brand removal, nonetheless bears ancient palimpsest markings through a residual cultural fear of government.

Seventeenth century Englishman Thomas Tany believed that his parents had been impoverished "through the Tyrannical power reigning in the Norman Yoake".[1394] In this belief one can discern, both the Anglo-Saxon motive to overthrow the "Norman Yoake" in the English Civil War, and a historical root of the Lockean belief in nurture over nature. The poverty of Tany's parents was the product, not of "heredity", but of circumstantial injustice. The American cultural proclivity towards nurturism originated, not so much from a factual assessment of heredity versus environmental influences, but in a bias that gave the environment the benefit of the doubt. One should not trust the Norman verdict of Anglo-Saxon inferiority anymore than one should trust the verdicts of Norman lawyers. By reversing Norman claims of their historic importance, this enlightened ethnic cleansing has inflicted one of the Anglo-Saxons' greatest acts of revenge.

What does it matter if Anglo-Saxon democracy really expressed the desire to replace Norman leaders with their own hereditary representatives? Is that what the enlightened cunning of democracy was really originally all about? The

elimination of "aristocracy" was inseparable from ethnic cleansing, and the clean slate helped exterminate the heredity authority of the past.

Whether one calls it "tradition", "class", or otherwise, the English constitutional order established in 1066 institutionalized Norman kin selective behavior in *de facto* hereditary principle. The theoretical apartheid between culture and biology behind Locke's liberal state is reverse discrimination against that traditional "English" hereditary discrimination. The blank slate is really a palimpsest that has superficially obscured the ancient writing inherited beneath the surface.

The paradoxical origin of Lockean nurturism in enlightened ethnic cleansing is precisely the *genius* of the tabla rasa. Yet under the pretense of liberal superiority, people continue to be *duped* by its origins in ethnic conflict (especially those who *want* to be duped by its superficial and naïve presentation of human nature). These pretenses of liberal superiority often amount to parodies of the Anglo-Saxon supremacism achieved by ethnically cleansing their hereditary Norman enemy from the historical record. Enlightened ethnic cleansing through the "cleaning of the slate" was the Anglo-Saxon way of modern Machiavellianism. Those take Locke's authority in sustaining the clean slate myth are mindless collaborators in Anglo-Saxon enlightened ethnic cleansing.

From Faux-fathers to the Race-fallacy

Can anyone actually believe in the idea of equality in a logically consistent way? If human equality is *superior*, then racism is, not equal, but *inferior* to equality. Yet the inferiority of racism is partly understandable in light of the inferiority of the concept of race itself as a means of

comprehending sociobiological realities. Could it be that the concept of race survives *because* it is so inept at fully describing the biological realities we observe, in order to dismiss the whole politically volatile issue? By kicking around, beating up, and bullying this poor and feeble concept of race, some can feel superior to it, but in reality, they are only picking on a small fry of biological explanation.

"Race" is too crude and primitive to most *fully* understand even the phenomenon of racism. It is too crude, for example, to most *fully* comprehend the Norman/Saxon conflict. Kin selection, by grasping the problem at the roots of human nature, provides tools of sufficient precision and subtlety to finally illuminate this centuries old controversy in way that was previously not possible.

Unlike the concept of race, the dynamics of kinship can extend from the "microscopic" relationship between members of a human family to more "macroscopic" relationships, such as that between a human and bread mold, or a chimpanzee and a squid. However, the concept of "race" is not completely meaningless and I do apply the term to some populations as a generalization when I think it is *mostly* applicable. The kinship roots of racial prejudice are to be found, for example, in nepotistic preference for one's biological child over a non-biological child.

Political patriarchy takes the general family principle of special preference for kin over non-kin and extends it to preference for one's own polity over other polities. In its extreme form, it extends from the family to fascism; from the mafia to Mussolini. However, the less radical idea that the family points to the political, or that the political should be the perfection of the family, is classical normality.

Yet Anglo-Saxon modernity is characterized by the rejection of a connection between the family, and the extension of its kinship logic towards the political. There is a logical, historical reason for this. The original difference between a native Anglo-Saxon aristocracy and the imposed Norman aristocracy was the difference between forefathers and faux-fathers. The social construct of human rights originally served Anglo-Saxon inclusive fitness by fighting the exploitative consequences of Norman inclusive fitness. Rights opposed duties and weakened the claims of "the government" of faux-fathers over the lives of the majority.

The nineteenth century conservative German historian Heinrich von Treitschke, by contrast, thought, "the aboriginal family must be allowed to be the original State, for already we discover in the family the political principle of subordination."[1395] From this view, the patriarchal family provides a sociobiological model for the nation-state. Treitschke drew, from the family, sociobiological *implications*, that culminate in the nation-state. This logic was inapplicable to the Anglo-Saxon for specific, historical reasons. The Norman Conquest posed the model of *subjugation*, rather than *subordination*, and hence a kinship breakdown between the family and the state. For this perfectly understandable reason, skepticism regarding the extension of family principles towards the state eventually became traditional.

Thomas Paine demonstrated this perception of separation between "the state" and "society" in *The Rights of Man* (1791):

> governments arise, either *out* of the people, or *over* the people. The English Government is one of those which arose out of conquest, and not out of society, and consequently it arose over the people; and though it has been much

> modified from the opportunity of circumstances since the time of William the Conqueror, the country has never yet regenerated itself, and is therefore without a constitution.

Whereas Treitschke derived the state *out* of the family, the "English" state was imposed *over* Anglo-Saxon families. Treitschke's assumptions did not hold for the Anglo-Saxons.

The flip side of the American ethos of individual self-reliance is a relative lack of trust or belief in the more politically conservative extensions of kinship such as political patriarchy and race. From the historical experience of "class"-cleavage, one can discern the Anglo-Saxon assumption of a discontinuity between the subpolitical family, and it kinship extensions on a political level. This is an influential origin of the modernistic rejection of extending kinship-biological assumptions *out* from primitive units such as the family, and towards more developed social-political implications.

An individualistic, Puritanical moral resistance to political authority evolved from this profound ambivalence towards political patriarchy. Paradoxically, *resisting* the political extensions of kinship *reinforced* Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism by emphasizing the subpolitical, "democratic" body. This condition also helped produce the further paradox of the simultaneous nationalism and "universalism" of modern revolution.

This ironic ethnocentrism is also a major source of a cultural bias against sociobiology. The universalization of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism is detectible in a traditional distinction between kinism (i.e. the family) and racism. Withholding the assumption of kinship extension to the political level generalized into an intermediary *gap* between kinship and race. In other words, the adaptation of Anglo-Saxon inclusive fitness to the conditions of the Norman graft

resulted in limiting biological-kinship assumptions so that they do not extend or generalize too far into larger grouping of the social.

The key idea here is that the historic chasm between the (Anglo-Saxon) family and the (Norman) political sphere implicated an analogous chasm between kinship and race and a general resistance to sociobiological generalizations. The universalization of faux-fathers into the race-fallacy is itself a faux-universalization of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. Skepticism towards Norman faux-fathers universalized into skepticism towards patriarchy in general, until Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism generalized into "universal" individualism.

The Hobbesian individualism that became the solution to this historical experience implicated all forms of sociobiological classifications, from black slaves, to women, and beyond. The liberation of women, for example, was a logical extension of Anglo-Saxon rejection of feminine-caste and secondary role. Just as a traditional woman submits to a man in the patriarchal family, Anglo-Saxon ethnic identity submitted for centuries to their Norman masters. Democracy is a form of feminism, a revolution against that Norman-based political patriarchy. The feminism of individual women was implicit from the very beginning in the principles established by America's Founding Feminists.

The English "class" system originated as a *de facto* ethnic-kinship *class*ification system and individual feminism continues this same rebellion against a hereditary division of labor, a universalization of the Anglo-Saxon perception of false classification. The Anglo-Saxon male pride that refused to admit the feminine nature of their democracy provided the political ground for individuals of the female sex to reject their own feminine nature. Anglo-Saxon femocrats and individual feminists have converged in the attempt to reject,

weaken, or reinterpret the evolutionary origins of sociobiological difference.

Anglo-Saxons are heirs of forefathers who failed in their duty to defend the borders of their gene pool and their native culture. From their forefathers, the Anglo-Saxons inherited the failure to defend the collective integrity of their nation. From partial adaptation to this failure stemmed an Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberal openness that is now the pride of America.

From the American inheritance of the failure of Anglo-Saxon political patriarchy evolved the further deconstruction of familial patriarchy. Liberation of women fulfills Anglo-Saxon loss of sociobiological self-control, which ultimately means loss of control over gene propagation; loss of control over biological evolution itself. But this is comprehensible only to those who do not close their minds to the application of biological evolution to human societies.

The Root of Modern Reason

The distinctively modern claim to a rational science of politics is built on the premise of "the individual". At the root of "reason" is an ethnic-kinship conflict. The condition of the original claims of political Enlightenment is selective ignorance of the sociobiological origins of Enlightenment. The foundation of freedom is the repression of biology. The bedrock upholding the individual premise of modern political rationalism is Anglo-Saxon selective stupidity.

The liberal Anglo-Saxon bias against sociobiology can be viewed as a form of selective stupidity because its consequence is the perpetuation of a formal blindness to empirically observable phenomenon. Americans often interpret this positively as "blind justice". Yet if people were literally equal they would be literally the same and

undistinguishable. To not generalize about generally observable differences among groups amounts to a stunting or thwarting of an intelligent understanding of human diversity — whether such differences are attributable to biology or not. Consequently, attacks on reasoned discriminations and generalizations are attacks on reason itself.

If one is to inquire freely into all things, there is no reason to presuppose either an exclusively individual perspective or an exclusively groupist perspective. Western rational inquiry has rested on the intellectual facility of analysis through the discrimination of differences. In the case of race or sex differences, the faculty of discrimination is denied, thus revealing the intellectual blind spot of the political system that makes claims of intellectual freedom. The political rejection of the intellectual faculty of analytic discrimination through sociobiological categorization stems, in part, from an Anglo-Saxon perception of false *class*ification within the English *class* system.

Anglo-Saxon selective stupidity is most developed in the American branch of the English-speaking world. It is "stupid" relative to the general level of intelligence the Anglo-Saxons have demonstrated in other fields of endeavor, not relative to other populations. Hence, it is a *selective* stupidity characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon population. Only Jews have a genuinely higher 'selective stupidity quotient'.

The prime root of the selective deemphasis of biological factors among Anglo-Saxons is the inability to psychologically and socially incorporate a fully biologized comprehension of the Norman Conquest into a healthy and viable national self-image. Adapting to the harsh reality of subjugation was mollified through a general deemphasis on

a biologically-based interpretations. In the end, it was also the product of an inability to explain to themselves why they accepted Norman descendents as hereditary superiors for so long.

Modern Anglo-Saxon selective stupidity developed further through comparing and contrasting themselves with the Conquest establishment. Against Norman political-social superiority, some Anglo-Saxons strived for Puritanical moral superiority. Against Norman hereditary government, they came to define themselves as a democratic political body with a non-hereditary government. Anglo-Saxon ethnic identity became thoroughly adapted to this perception that the government is hereditarily distinct from the majority. The ethnocentric-universalization of hostility to that "hereditary government" was ethically sublimated into the revolutionary innovations of the de-biologized political principles of the American Constitution.

The genealogy of modern political individualism is traceable, in part, to this dearth of heredity connection between rulers and ruled in England. The individual rights interpretation obscures Anglo-Saxon history as a vanquished sociobiological body and emphasizes relative strengths. The American emphasis on "the individual" over kinship, ethnicity, and race continues an older Anglo-Saxon tradition of reinterpreting adaptation to ethnic defeat as a victory for individual freedom. This dodge should be recognized for what it is. From traditional evasion of that medieval drubbing at Hastings, Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism has evolved, not only into a projection of individualism over ethnic-racial identity onto other peoples, but an evasion of the import of biological factors in history.

The hidden corollary of the "rational" progress of equal individualism is the progress of Anglo-Saxon selective

stupidity. To become an American is to inherit and assimilate this selective stupidity. But it is more than that. When Germans, Vietnamese, and Haitians of either sex become Americans, they assimilate an ethnic Anglo-Saxon male pride that championed a tabla rasa self-understanding to repress the humiliation of an ancient hereditary subjugation. America is Anglo-Saxon selective stupidity taken to its logical extreme.

Anglo-Saxon selective stupidity has less to do with intelligence *per se*, and more to do with the fact that observers who are also participants must *live* with their observations, and some interpretations are easier to live with than others. Anglo-Saxon selective stupidity originated in male pride: it is the stupidity of *pride*. This strong, politically liberal tradition stems, in part, from the problem of reconciling the past with the present it molded. As Clare Simmons wrote in *Reversing the Conquest*:

> In a society placing an increasing value upon "fact," the Conquest presented perhaps the greatest problem in all British history. The connotations inherent in the very word "conquest" clashed with the image that nineteenth-century Britons were creating of themselves. The task, then, was to interpret the Conquest as a historical corroboration of that self-image and not as a contradiction. Nineteenth-century considerations of the events of 1066 thus become questions of how a writer treats a historical fact that fails to conform with his or her personal ideal of history.[1396]

The nineteenth century historian of the Norman Conquest, Edward Augustus Freeman, concluded, "At home, Englishmen were neither driven out nor turned into Normans, but the Normans in England were turned into Englishmen."[1397] A miracle of Anglo-Saxon pride! How

could this be possible? Such views prompted G. K. Chesterton to quip: "[A man] may end up maintaining that the Norman Conquest was a Saxon Conquest."[1398]

There are serious problems with Freeman's argument. The Norman Conquest, after all, constituted the basis for the entire "English" *hereditary* "class" order. Yet Freeman's case is so notable since, in addition to being the most learned historian of the Norman Conquest in the nineteenth century and a Saxon patriot, he was an outright racist. Despite his hereditarian inclinations, his very Saxon pride led him to temper a fully hereditarian interpretation of English "class". Karl Marx's *clarification* of this English denial of the original biological basis of "class conflict" resulted in the world-historical misunderstanding that helped spawn communism.

For Freeman, this was not only an academic question, but a living argument that found its staunchest opponent in the Tory aristocrat John Horace Round. Freeman's adversary published a distinctly hereditarian view of the consequences of the Conquest in 1892. *Geoffrey de Mandeville* was "the first systematic application of genealogical study to political history".[1399] This Essex landowner of Norman origin (d. 1144) must have had more than academic interest for its author since Round himself came from a landed family of Essex.[1400] The argument between Freeman and Round is a classic example of polarization in the debate on the Norman Conquest. Yet how can objectivity be maintained if there is a sociobiological basis for one's position on the nature/nurture question?

Note that the possibility of turning Normans into Englishmen is similar to an issue that divides the French and the Germans. Charlemagne was king of the Franks, the Germanic tribe that conquered the land still named after them. Was Charlemagne ("Karl der Grosse" in German) a

*French*man or a German? Should I bother to ask who is right? The German interpretation implies the greater import of heredity over culture. The French interpretation implies the greater import of culture over heredity. These incompatible interpretations continued into incompatible interpretations of the French Revolution, with some partial exceptions, such as Napoleon (See Déjà vu?). Yet was *Clovis* (c.466 - 511), the leader of the original Frankish conquest, a Frenchman?

Anglo-Saxon conquest through culture against Norman conquest through genealogy also underlies the possibility of assimilation to Americanism. If "Normans in England were turned into Englishmen", as Freeman maintained, then what about Irish? What about the Italians? What about the Chinese? American affirmation of the possibilities of assimilation is rooted in an old Anglo-Saxon belief or hope that they conquered the Normans by assimilating them.

There is cunning to be found in this Anglo-Saxon selective stupidity, for here one can see a blueprint for Anglo-Saxon *cultural* conquest. America is obviously not largely Anglo-Saxon in racial terms, but just as some hoped to fight Norman genealogical imperialism with Saxon cultural imperialism, the universalization of this more Lockean proposition justified a cultural way of conquest. Be it Anglo-American culture or the spreading of democracy itself, conquest through Saxonization is part of the American way.

The Politics of Scientific Verification

The Freedom System

Imagine that Thomas Paine busted into a session of England's Parliament and boldly announced these words from *Common Sense*:

> As to usurpation, no man will be so hardy to defend it; and that William the Conqueror was a usurper is a fact not to be contradicted. The plain truth is, that the antiquity of English monarchy will not bear looking into.

Now if Paine was right, and the proposition that the Norman Conquest was usurpation is a *fact*, what *policy* implications follow from this assertion? Acceptance of the illegitimacy of the Conquest puts into question, not only Parliament, but the entire British political tradition. Paine's proposition was radically subversive — as subversive as killing a king and abolishing the House of Lords. Like the anti-Royalists who engaged in exactly this policy in 1649, Paine opined that the policy implication of William's usurpation is nothing less than democratic revolution.

It should not be surprising that we can find a tradition of suppression when it comes to voices as bold as Thomas Paine. England's tradition is observable against *The White Hat,* a reformist, middle-class periodical of 1819. One contributor maintained that before the Norman invasion, "the power of the military was in the hands of the people", under elected officers. "The Commons is not the British Witena-gemot [the council of the Anglo-Saxon kings]. It is

not the representatives of the people, but the representative of an oligarchy."[1401]

This is another way of saying that Harold's military-government was more representative of the people than the victorious Norman military-government. William defeated and overthrew the military-government that embodied that more representative tradition. Yet talk of taking control of the military and putting it in the hands of the people is the stuff of revolutions. One is reminded of the New Model Army in the English Civil War.

This periodical was short-lived. While Government intimidation silenced these voices, they defined their notions of duty in a final departing article: "to unfold the principles of the British Constitution, to point out its corruptions", and to prepare the public "for the change which must take place in the present state of the country".[1402] Repression in Britain preserved the status quo and ensured that such ideas would not get out of control. Such out of control ideas, after all, once helped stir England into civil war in the 1640s. Freedom of speech in America helped provoke, not only peaceable argument, but the violence of its own civil war.

The political struggle for freedom of expression evolved as one facet of what Shelly described as:

> a continual struggle for liberty on the part of the people, and an uninterrupted attempt at tightening the reins of oppression, and encouraging ignorance and imposture, by the oligarchy to whom the first William parceled out the property of the aborigines at the conquest of England by the Normans.[1403]

If "encouraging ignorance" were an indispensable utensil in the toolbox of tyranny, then popular enlightenment

would be a counter-tool in the same struggle against the Norman Yoke.

The American Revolution was followed by an eruption of printed matter of all forms and plans for general public educational reform. These "universal" antidotes to the association of tyranny and ignorance, however, can obscure the deeper wellsprings of their particular historical impetus. The influential *Historical Essay on the English Constitution* (1771) maintained:

> [s]ince the Conquest, our arbitrary kings, and men of arbitrary principles, have endeavoured to destroy the few remaining records and historical facts that might keep in remembrance a form of government so kind, so friendly and hospitable to the human species.[1404]

Here the typically Anglo-Saxon obsession with arbitrary government is specifically linked with the Norman lineage. The author accused the government of seeking destruction of the historical memory of the pre-Conquest past. Although psychological repression of the defeat of Hastings was an important factor in devaluing the Norman victory, it was compounded by the interest of the conquerors in upholding their legitimacy. In short, the Conquest establishment deliberately repressed memories and historical records of the pre-Conquest past that called their own authority into question.

One of the many rewards of Conquest was the liberty to dictate the "historical facts" in accordance with political interests. For example, are we to believe William of Poitiers' contemporary tale of William's coronation on Christmas Day, 1066? The English, he claimed, "[a]ll gave their joyful assent without hesitation, as though heaven had given them one mind and one voice." One might doubt the unanimity

required by their new masters in light of an event that followed. Suddenly, he continued, "the armed and mounted guards outside who had been set about the monastery, hearing the great shout in a foreign tongue, took it for some treachery and fired the neighboring houses."[1405]

This event is often presented as a misinterpretation of vociferous Englishmen (the *natives* who spoke a "foreign tongue"), rather than the Norman crushing of voices who would have sided with Harold at Hastings. After all, from the Norman view, the stand of Harold and his entire army at Hastings was also an act of 'some treachery'. Harold and his men had somehow mustered the impunity to defend their country against an invasion of these French speakers of a foreign tongue.

In modern terms, one could call the aggressive arson of the Norman guards as the suppression of freedom of speech (not to mention the destruction of private property by an arbitrary and unrepresentative government). Just as pre-Darwinian thought could deem comparisons of humans with other species as absurd, it is only the legacy of pre-evolutionary thinking that confidently assures some that there is no evolutionary linkage between modern ideas and medieval actions. In William of Poitiers' tale, the subjugated could consider themselves fortunate when the "Normans readily accepted the will of the English". This is an example of the Norman side of the story, the Norman propaganda, which, not coincidentally, enjoyed the support of the Norman government.

The rise of the printing press and a more general increase in education among layman stimulated a crescendo of questionings of official tales of righteous conquest in the early seventeenth century. Sir Robert Cotton, a member of the Society of Antiquaries who entered Parliament in 1601,

was one of those who put his scholarly labors at the disposal of the anti-Royalist cause. He traced contemporary legal abuses to "feudal" customs dating from 1066. William the Conqueror, he wrote, left the Saxons "in no better condition than villeinage…he moulded their customs to the manner of his own country, and forebore to grant the laws of the holy Edward, so often called for".[1406] The English king Edward the Confessor was evoked for his association with lost Anglo-Saxon laws. He was a symbol of the longing for the lost, pre-Conquest order.

Before 1640, historical scholarship of this kind was dangerous. The Society of Antiquaries was suppressed. Cotton's well-known library, which eventually formed the basis of the British Museum's manuscript collection, was searched more than once. In 1630, the government deemed its manuscripts too dangerous for free inquiry. The scholar was subsequently unable to examine them without the official tutoring of government surveillance.

The politics of the past were the politics of the present. In 1627, the government threatened to prosecute the printers of Cotton's *The Reign of Henry III*. One of his political tracts, *Proposition to Bridle Parliament*, resulted in his imprisonment in 1629. The events that followed demonstrated that the government had good reason to think that it had something to hide. The renaissance of knowledge of about the Conquest legacy, undoctored by official tradition, was crucial to the indignant atmosphere of Anglo-Saxon national renaissance that culminated in the English Civil War.

Evidence depends on records and there good reason to think that our picture of the late Anglo-Saxon period suffers from a loss of records.[1407] Is this, at least in part, the work of a deliberate Norman destruction of the parts of the historical record?

Right up until early modern times, the Conquest-based establishment monopolized the interpretation and meaning of 1066. Freedom of speech evolved as a corollary of democracy, for it was an Anglo-Saxon weapon against the propaganda of the system that justified absolutism through Conquest. The pen was a sword in the struggle for political representation against 'Big Brother' propaganda that held the Norman domination good, wholesome, and right. The original *de facto* Norman copyright of political legitimacy also perpetuated the legitimacy of their case for the Conquest. When one grasps the self-reinforcing nature of this Norman family monopoly, then one can grasp the evolution of its opposition. The American separation of the powers, the separation of church and state, and freedom of speech all evolved, in part, as means of breaking up the original sanctified monopoly represented by William the Conqueror.

The very first amendment of the American constitution prohibits Congress from "abridging the freedom of speech". Just as inquiry into the Norman Conquest questioned the legitimacy of hereditary British political tradition, freedom of inquiry leads towards a questioning of the principles that formalized unfettered inquiry. If freedom of speech evolved as the expression of an internecine kinship-ethnic conflict; if freedom of speech arose to legitimize questioning of the questionable legitimacy of the Norman Conquest order, this has fundamental relevance for the nature and limits of the resultant freedom of speech system.

One of the most basic theses of this work is that liberal democracy's ideological inability to come to terms with sociobiological realities stems directly from resistance to coming to terms with its own sociobiological origin. This is a root reason why sociobiology is inherently controversial.

Sociobiology puts freedom of speech on trial. How thoughtless and irrational to assume that old arguments for freedom of speech still hold without rethinking *everything* from the ground up! That I predict that attempts will be made to repress the sociobiological evidence for the Norman/Saxon origins of liberal democracy is, in part, only a continuation of the success of the original government monopoly of the interpretation of 1066 that was *never completely undone*.

A main practical expression of the prejudice against sociobiology is the Western political individualism that formally began with Hobbes. If democratic liberalism evolved out of an internecine conflict whose net result of mutual destruction was to weaken the net import of kinship values on one hand, and strengthen individualism on the other, then liberal democracy cannot be understood on the basis of its own asserted assumptions. Liberal democracy cannot be understood on the basis of its own individualistic, political premises because these premises are explainable as a *product*, or resolution, of the Norman/Saxon conflict.

The blind justice of individual rights and individual freedom made the Norman/Saxon conflict legally and logically *invisible* on the premises of its own its own internal, individualistic logic. "The individual" offered a practical strategy for evading the implications of the Norman/Saxon conflict. The individual over biological interpretation is thus a hereditary property of the liberal democratic system and a prejudice of that system. In America, individualism evolved into a further means of separating biological descent from the social present. Members of the English-speaking democracies are, in a certain way, the *most* prejudiced against seeing the importance of the hereditary aspects of the Conquest because their modern political values evolved,

in part, as a solution to the internal kinship contradictions left *by* the Conquest.

In 1969, historian R. Allen Brown wrote, "Few subjects in English history have been studied more and for longer than the Norman Conquest, and few have been more bent in the process by biased interpretations based upon unhistorical prejudices….and still, after nine hundred years, the outcome is controversy."[1408] This, at least, most can agree with. Brown complained that, "as in so many matters, the triumphant Whig view largely prevailed, the Anglo-Saxons tended to become 'us', the Normans 'them', and William the Conqueror to be cast in the role, which he is still sometimes called upon to play, of a foreign tyrant winning a regrettable victory over clean-limbed Englishmen with marked liberal and Protestant leanings."[1409]

Among those who could be considered an object of Brown's complaint would be Thomas Jefferson. "It has ever appeared to me," Jefferson explained, "that the difference between the whig and the tory of England is, that the whig deduces his rights from the Anglo-Saxon source, and the tory from the Norman."[1410] The rectitude of the fight for those Anglo-Saxon rights granted warrant for insurrection in 1776. Tribalistic "us" and "them" attitudes, exactly what one would predict on the basis of kin selection, led men to risk their lives at Hastings in 1066 and in America in 1776.

"If it were necessary to take sides," Brown admitted, "I should be with duke William at Hastings, but in reality it should be possible to appreciate the accomplishments of the Anglo-Saxons (who are not 'us'), without undertaking the manifest absurdity of decrying the amazing achievements of the Normans (who are not 'them')."[1411] Is there no end to this bloodfeud?[1412] Strange that Brown should be so willing to take the pro-Norman side, yet assure his readers of the

unreality of the tribal mind. If Brown were alive at the time of the Conquest, would he really have had the luxury of choosing sides? In 1066, Brown's kin relationships would have been directly related to his eligibility for spoils of the Norman victory. If "this extraordinary race of men"[1413] achieved a victory that was, *by definition*, a defeat of the Anglo-Saxon "race", why might many descendants of the latter call into question the nature of that achievement?

But *how* can one gain objectivity? Brown implied that that, despite his pro-Norman bias, he could gain an objective perspective on the achievements of the Normans that was above the traditional tribalisms. Perhaps a higher, more objective perspective might be achieved by draining the conflict of kinship, biological, or tribal factors. Yet if the very biological existence of a human being is explainable in Darwinistic terms through success in tending to genetic relations, then the very possibility of objectivity implies overcoming one's self in the most existential, biological sense. If debate on the Norman Conquest engenders passionate convictions, and the only way to obtain objective calmness on a public level is to drain arguments of biological factors, is not this peculiar form of "objectivity" really a form of subjectivity in regard to objective biological factors?

That prejudice consists of bias *towards* biological factors, rather than bias *against* biological factors, is itself a prejudice partly traceable to Anglo-Saxon biological factors in the creation of the liberal democratic system. Hereditary hostility against "hereditary government" became the sociobiological inheritance of America. Anglo-Saxon ethnic prejudice against the Norman conquerors is literally built into the nature of the American system. The American prejudice *towards* equality is a gloss over an original Anglo-Saxon prejudice *against* the Norman master race.

Hostility to this very sociobiological interpretation should be the most normal expectation for it is only a continuation of the enlightened ethnic cleansing that has disinherited the import of Norman influence. A sociobiological theory that proposes that the Normans were a decisive influence on innovations that were designed to achieve freedom *from* that influence is congenitally uncongenial.

To ask why is sociobiology is controversial within liberal democracy is like asking why the English disassociate their traditional "class" system from a caste system. Class, especially as interpreted by Marx, deemphasizes the biological thinking that emphasized the idea of two nations, or a caste system. "Class", in the Marxist sense, removes the biological factors that sociobiology synthesizes. The English word "class" helped preserve elements of caste by dominating the interpretation of the difference and thus diffusing a potential source of "class" conflict.

The idea that the early distinction between Commons and Lords was a polite way of referring to Anglo-Saxons and Normans can only be held as a generalization. Yet in the avoidance of such generalizations, in upholding the old English political taboo of speaking of Normans and Saxons, we can see the ancestor of the trends that eventually matured and blossomed into all the diversities of Political Correctness. Any expectation of freedom of speech on this subject should take at its starting point recognition that, for the sake of tradition and cultural identity, the English continue to be strongly invested in upholding this taboo.

The same bias against biological factors that prevents one from seeing the Norman/Saxon conflict as the evolutionary basis of the liberal-constitutional state evolved, by implication, into a bias against discerning the evolutionary significance of biology and race. It would be ridiculous to

think that a stable, viable American social system that has any pretension to some form of democracy could tolerate anything but the assumption of equality. Only egalitarian assumptions tend to survive into the public discussions of a nation whose uniqueness consists of inordinate diversity; difference; unequalness. Equality united, from the very beginning, unequalness.

After allowing these ideas of freedom and equality to unfold for well over two hundred years, Americans have a vested interest in this prestigious pedigree of egalitarianism. They are politically invested in at least some version of Lockean nurturism, and thus politically invested in the proposition of the fallaciousness of many findings of the science of sociobiology. In consequence, Americans are *least free* to consider the accuracy of sociobiology in a way that the American founders, at their best, considered the human science of their day. Americans, rather, are the *most* biased against understanding the evolutionary link between the Conquest and the American Revolution. Americans are the most biased because they are *living* the implications of Anglo-Saxon revulsion towards an unsavory past. Americans are the *most* prejudiced towards equality because they possess the greatest vested interest in the political-egalitarian status quo. Of this form of invested prejudice against racism and sexism, Americans are perhaps the most prejudiced people on earth.

The controversy over sociobiology in liberal democracies is not a novelty that will fade away, or be absorbed with "progress". There will *never* be a time when the full implications of prescriptive genetic adaptation will be considered digestible and reconcilable with the basic assumptions and principles of liberal democracy. The prejudice against the evidence for sociobiology is built into

the basic architecture of the liberal democratic system. *Any* political system has its holes or blind spots, and so long as this particular political system maintains itself, sociobiology will remain controversial within it.

Which Way to (the Backwards Idea of) "Progress"?

The American political system was built upon pre-Darwinian human science. The notion of democratic progress is also pre-Darwinian. It's the 21st century already! Why are we still upholding these backwards notions of "progress"?

Americans have never really gotten over the nineteenth century. The will to rule over other nations and extend its notions of liberal "progress" is a like a nostalgic will to live in that past. "Progress", it seems, means that this concept's original, humanistic value assumptions become eternalized and live forever.

The modern notion a parallel between scientific progress and egalitarian-moral progress is historically bound. There can be no "end of history" if there is no end to scientific discoveries and technological inventions. Enlightenment's founders were not — and could not — have been enlightened about the subsequent discovery of evolution by natural selection.

The idea of human equality is really the product of an inequality in the growth of scientific knowledge. The physical sciences that strongly influenced the political Enlightenment developed before the biological discoveries that culminated in Darwin's theories. The principle of human equality is thus partly a reflection of the primitive state of biological knowledge in the late eighteenth century.

In retrospect, it seems that the goodness of the biological sciences, from a traditional liberal point of view, was directly related to the primitivity of its development. For example, before Darwin and sociobiology, one could reasonably claim that a person who denied the theory of the equality of man was "ignorant". Now someone who denies the reality of biological differences may themselves be ignorant of the *new* discoveries of sociobiological science.

The best that can be said of the original liberal theory of the natural equality of man is that it was a pseudoscience. As Francis Fukuyama has pointed out, "there is no necessary correlation between politically incorrect findings and bad science. Attacking the methodological credentials of people whose views one doesn't like and dismissing their work as "pseudoscience" is a convenient shortcut around arguing over substance."[1414] In this case, dismissing sociobiology as "pseudoscience" exposes how sociobiology has refuted the original theory of human nature that underlies liberal democracy.

The problem, it seems, is not that sociobiology does not make sense. The problem is that sociobiology makes too much sense. Sociobiology is an outlaw science precisely because of its strengths as a science. One could say that antisociobiologists *must* call it pseudoscience, preempting rational discussion, because sociobiology pulls the intellectual foundation of the old liberal arguments from beneath their feet.

Every nation has its founding myth. Presumptions of superiority to biology and its egalitarian corollaries are among the basic myths of America. Bolstered by *a priori* religious and moral faith, the script for the unfolding of human equality was set in stone from the beginning so that even discoveries that radically refute the idea could not

break the egalitarian faith. While many aspects of liberal-humanism may have begun closer to science than religion, the chasm between what is empirically known about human variation and its egalitarian assumptions resembles the chasm between science and other religions. Science and reason were once thought necessary to weaken false political beliefs. It turns out that scientific discoveries such as those underlying human sociobiology must be repressed in order to uphold belief in the egalitarian ideas of the enlightenment. Should scientific knowledge be suppressed for the sake of "enlightened" values?

The situation is illustration by the United Nations, which is only a further universalization of the principles of liberal democracy. Let us just imagine if the truth or falsity of theories of sociobiology, especially those relevant to "race" issues among humans, are to be decided by democratic majority at the United Nations. Would the truth or falsity of one of those theories be determined by politics or scientific validity?

Sociobiology, by refuting the pre-Darwinian formulas of human nature that liberal democracy is premised up, is empirical evidence that the modern idea of progress is a delusion. Kin selection is especially devastating for the idea of progress in that it posits a rational, biological basis for nepotistic behavior.

But wait.

One of the reasons that kin selection is inherently controversial in Western liberal democracies is because of the latent cultural influence of Christianity. A scientific understanding of Christianity in light of kin selection helps demonstrate how "Christian family values" work in diametrical opposition to kin selection. For some reason, the values distinctive to the Bible (as opposed to paganism)

point in a direction opposite of the values that a sociobiologist would consider genetically adaptive. This helps to explain the "faith" underlying American egalitarianism.

From a purely biological perspective, progress in the egalitarian sense appears to be a backwards idea. But just as the science of sociobiology demonstrates evidence that contradicts progress from the perspective of *biological* evolution, the science behind the positing of a Technological Singularity may revive the idea of progress from the perspective of *postbiological* evolution. Yet the Singularity's redemption of the notion of progress will likely prove even more controversial than sociobiology. Ignorance of the insights furnished by sociobiology help cultivate ignorance of what it would truly mean to fulfillment of the idea that "nurture" overcomes "nature".

The liberal democracies are racing directly down the path of genetic suicide, taking nearly the most efficient path to an evolutionary transition that will lead to massive unemployment and, over the long run, the extinction of the biological human race. Is this smart? Yet who could say this is development would not be justified when biological humanity is demonstrating the inferiority of its comprehension of its own biological identity through the repression of sociobiological self-knowledge. The extinction of the biological human race by artificially intelligent machines is the logical culmination of a meritocratic Western civilization that defines the human in terms of culture (over biology) and is indifferent to genetic adaptation beyond the individual level.

The Anglo-Saxon Genius for Genetically Maladaptive Behavior

If modern science has invalidated the teleological view that there are natural goals, then modern science has invalidated the notion of science or objectivity itself as a natural or self-justified goal. Science fails to provide an inherent justification of itself. While rationality may not be presumed for other goals, the presumed rationality of science would leave it, devoid of self-justification, as the most self-consciously irrational of goals.

Since liberal democracy originally asserted presumptions of superior scientific rationality, and these claims have failed to uphold themselves in a strict sense, liberal democracy's claims to scientific objectivity must be found elsewhere. In that case of America, it appears that the Norman destruction of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* after 1066 is directly correlated with the construction of claims for "trans-cultural" science. In other words, the repression of the native *Kultur* of the Anglo-Saxons was also the repression of sources of subjectivity (i.e. Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism). Thwarted Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism produced a net decline of certain kinds of Anglo-Saxon subjectivity and, in modern times, this became reinterpreted as superior objectivity. The Norman destruction of native Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* is thus correlated with the American universalistic claim of being beyond particular cultures, an inclination towards belief in the equality of all cultures, and the claim of the scientific superiority of liberal democracy relative to pre-scientific cultures.

A crucial element of the Norman victory in 1066 was the repression of the Anglo-Saxons as a distinct "race", ethnicity, or *Volk*. Native Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* was crushed before it

had the chance to produce its own Johann Gottfried Herder. This collective *Kultur* capitulation was an aspect of Norman mastery that Anglo-Saxons never fully overcame. Conquest was a literal repression of 'biological factors' in the sense of overcoming native values of political-ethnic autonomy and self-preservation. It was not only the political destruction of a distinct Anglo-Saxon kin-culture, but the destruction of the *values* of a living faith in that native kin-culture.

This was almost inevitable since this was virtually the definition of the victory of the Norman inclusive fitness strategy that Eleanor Searle described as "predatory kinship". Norman political success was contingent upon, and founded upon, Anglo-Saxon political failure. The maintenance of the English caste system began in Norman preservation of their kin-caste — succeeding exactly where the Anglo-Saxons failed. That class institution originated in the will to conserve and perpetuate the Norman victory on October 14, 1066 across the generations by preserving themselves as a caste over the Anglo-Saxons — without end.

The verdict of Hastings was never completely undone. Norman de-valuation of Anglo-Saxon ethnic self-preservation was permanently internalized in modern democratic civilization. Individualism, for example, is partly an expression of the failure to fully heal from the Conquest. Individualism gave an alternative moral self-interpretation from which Anglo-Saxon prides could be remoralized and rehabilitated, one by one.

Liberation of the abstract individual emerged through the repression of this conquered Anglo-Saxon past. From this originary condition spawned two interrelated developments: repression and devaluation of kinship-biological values, and its inverse, equal individualism. These two developments are really two sides of the same coin. The "progress" of

equality is a continuation of the individualistic solution to the problems of kinship-racial-biological interpretation. Mass individualism is the monkeywrench in the gene machine that, step by step, inverts the logic of genetically adaptive behavior.

In the twentieth century, the universalistic pretensions of liberal democracy received its greatest political and philosophical challenge from the ethnic cousins of the Anglo-Saxons, the Germans. Just how incompatible these cognate cultures became is empirically evident if we measure the success of each people from the standpoint of genetically adaptive behavior. In general, they went in opposite directions. German-Nazism strived to promote genetically *adaptive* behavior, while the egalitarian progress of liberal democracy exhibited the Anglo-Saxon genius for genetically *maladaptive* behavior.

Anglo-Saxons and Germans are converse cognates. Emergent from nearly identical ethnic origins, they ultimately ventured towards completely opposite political-cultural directions. The root of this divergence is the Norman Conquest. The Nazi kin selective strategy that led to the attempt to conquer the entire world was very similar to the kin selective strategy that underlay the Norman Conquest (and its historical culmination as the British Empire). The Anglo-Saxon experience of being conquered led to democratic revolutions that effectually rejected the maximal kin selective strategy of the Normans *in principle*. English-speaking egalitarian progress is the progress of this reaction to the Norman-nepotistic "class" system, and thus amounts to a kin *un*-selective "strategy", and genetically maladaptive behavior.

The Norman Conquest lies at the root of different cultural attitudes between Anglo-Saxons and Germans on the

nature/nurture question. The French language and culture that the Normans brought with them transformed the evolution of English language and culture. The influence of French civilization ultimately engendered a more arbitrary relation between genes and culture. The Germans, on the other hand, never experienced such a profoundly uprooting rupture with their pre-historic language and culture. There is no qualitative equivalent of Heidegger in the English-speaking world, and his contention that "Language is the house of being" (and the genetic/cultural intimacy that implies). The un-German universalism of American liberal democracy, and the assumption that nature is more palpably distinct from nurture, is largely traceable to the cultural rupture inflicted by the Norman Conquest.

John Locke's *tabla rasa* was a historical corollary of his liberal political principles. Lockean nurturism emerged under circumstances where the political analog to the highest level of individual mental organization was not an integrated extension of heredity, but rather, "the environment" of the Conquest-state tradition. Liberal alienation from the political, in turn, correlated with rationalizing and objectifying the political, while the subpolitical, democratic body became the ethno-center of subjectivity. The German difference is manifest in the philosopher Hegel, whose alien conception of liberal democracy is partly attributable to subject/object synthesis on the political level. The German difference is also evident in Heidegger, whose thinking precedes the Western subject/object distinction (and thus precluding the attempt of some to separate Heidegger's thought from his life).

A long-term result of the Norman Conquest was opposite attitudes towards government among Anglo-Saxons and Germans. This implicated opposite valuations of rights and

duties, and opposite prejudices towards the significance of race. The connections that Germans have tended to make between the biological and the political are often precisely the kinds of connections that Anglo-Saxons have tried to extricate themselves. The German tendency leads to an *association* of the self with a larger political whole, while the Anglo-Saxon tendency leads to a *disassociation* of the self from a larger political whole. The German inclination leads to *synthetic* collectivism, while the Anglo-Saxon inclination leads to *analytic* individualism. German mental associations emphasize the *probabilistic* tendencies of human groups (including themselves), with tendencies towards racism. Anglo-Saxon mental disassociations emphasize the *possibilities* of "the individual", with tendencies that inhibit racism. The probabilistic mentality correlates with the entanglement of the observer and larger world of the observed, i.e. the uncertainty principle of German physicist Werner Heisenberg. The possibleistic mentality correlates with a more consistent separation of observer and observed, i.e. the physics of Newton and Einstein.

The Anglo-Saxon disassociative tendency promoted a *kind* of objectivity (Anglo-Saxon selective stupidity), inversely proportional to a *kind* of objectivity hindered by the disassociative tendency. Specifically, the Anglo-Saxon disassociation of biology and sociology was promoted in proportion to a decrease in sociobiological intelligence. Conversely, the German way of stupidity is to overlook genuine individual exceptions in favor of the probabilistic tendencies of groups.

The native English cause at Hastings could be viewed as an implicit struggle *for* Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. Defeat at Hastings was the defeat of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism through the defeat of the Anglo-Saxon *Kultur* that embodied

it. With the reduction of Anglo-Saxon *Kultur*, subjective aspects of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism were reduced.

The Anglo-Saxon *kind* of objectivity gained from this reduction in ethnocentrism is domestic objectivity towards the political. Yet Anglo-Saxon reduction to individuals did not destroy ethnocentrism, it only transformed it. Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism survived individualism in the form of imposing individualism upon peoples such as the Germans. In other words, sociobiological breakdown into individualism was imposed upon a German *Kultur* that had not yet broken down into atomistic individualism.

If values cannot be determined by science in itself, then the scientific proclivities of liberal democracy cannot be explained by only pure Enlightenment scientific inquiry in itself. "Disinterested" scientific objectivity could be used, however, as a weapon in an ethnic-kinship struggle. Anglo-Saxons could value scientific objectivity over the subjective, nepotistic self-preservation strategies of the conqueror "class" to disarm *Norman* belief in kin selective values (just as the Conquest itself had disarmed Anglo-Saxons of belief in the value of their own ethnicity). The persistent incompatibility of internal political subjectivities advanced internal political objectivity and the principle of freedom of speech.

The more objective one is, the more one sees the groundlessness of teleological claims — and the groundlessness of any value claims. The Norman impact left many Anglo-Saxons with a kind of political nihilism (and this is really the condition of a fully rationalistic approach to politics). Ethnic hostility toward the political "class" evolved into political skepticism and liberal rationalism. The cause of rationalism and free inquiry converged with Anglo-Saxon ethnocentric interest. Combined with the new interpretation

of "the individual", it superficially appeared as if the dawn of reason itself spawned modern revolution.

What was deadly truth from a Nietzschean point of view was the will to kill the Normans from an Anglo-Saxon point of view. Objectivity towards government in the English-speaking world, then, has its origin in an adapted objectification of the enemy in war, a muted continuation of the battle of Hastings that advanced Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism by advancing the death of the aristocratic-Norman enemy. The Anglo-Saxons were able to rationalize the political level more objectively because the political dimension of their identity as a sociobiological body had been attenuated to the point of being dead. The Western difference between ancient political *philosophy* and modern political *science* is, in part, traceable to Anglo-Saxon *political* death; the overcoming of political subjectivity that allowed for modernistic political objectivity.

This correlation of objectivity and death is central, and not peripheral, to understanding the evolution of scientific objectivity towards politics in the English-speaking world. Anglo-Saxon political objectivity *as individuals* was gained through the death of a larger hive-like sociobiological order on the political level. Anglo-Saxon sociobiological death on the political level was the condition of their modern political rational-nihilism. A subjective blind spot that represses explanation of modern political objectivity's origins in ethnic Norman/Saxon conflict is a basic source of liberal democracy's original claims to universal rationality and objectivity.

It was the Norman Conquest that killed genetically adaptive expressions of national collective life that survived among the Germans and culminated in Nazism. Liberal democratic indifferent to race and other biologically based

factors is built upon the formalization of Anglo-Saxon sociobiological death. This means, in effect, indifference to whether society is organized for genetically adaptive behaviors or genetically maladaptive behaviors. And this means indifference to biological evolution. Not surprisingly, modern indifference to biological factors is correlated with an increase in genetically maladaptive behaviors. The egalitarian progress that began as compromised Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism led to working out the implications of Anglo-Saxon internalization of their ethnic defeat.

Modern freedom implies freedom from the genes; freedom from slavery to instincts such as the fear of death; freedom from the prejudices towards existence; freedom from life. A full realization of this freedom could be rational biological self-destruction. To will to death is the highest freedom from the tyranny of the most common instinct: the will to survive. To realized full freedom from biology…..let go of your prejudice towards life.

Sociobiological death is expressed, for example, through the dissolving of sociobiological borders between ethnic nations. The next step of progress is to dissolve the kinship borders between individuals (i.e. human rights). Ultimately, all borders between the biological and general physical world are implicated, and these borders can only be overcome in individual death. In this way, the death of kin selective sociobiological boundaries ultimately implicates the death of life-preserving boundaries between an individual and the larger physical world. Bring down the political hierarchies of the world ultimately implicates bringing down the hierarchies of one's own mind.

The conviction that life is superior to death is a prejudice in the tradition of prejudice on the basis of race or sex difference. However, when you open your mind to death in

larger historical perspective, it becomes clear that death is not a novel expression of modern egalitarianism. On the contrary, death, especially the death of Anglo-Saxon England in 1066, stands at the very *origins* of the world's most influential egalitarian tradition. Life's equality with death is only a fulfillment of its founding.

The *kind* of free inquiry formally permitted in American liberal democracy is founded upon the sociobiological carcass of the Saxon nation. Political-scientific reductionism originated in the reduction of Anglo-Saxons to a subpolitical body after 1066. The most influential modern democratic tradition originated in Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism as opposition to Norman Conquerors. The modern life of free individualism was founded upon the political-kin selective death of Anglo-Saxons at the hands of their Norman masters.

What, then, were the sociobiological origins of sociobiological controversy ignited by E. O. Wilson's great work of 1975? The very condition of his freedom to pursue rational inquiry was founded upon the sociobiological death of the Anglo-Saxons as a kin selective body. Wilson woke the dead.

In summary, if scientific objectivity has no fundamental rational self-justification, then its origins must lie in something other than pure objectivity. It appears that the Norman Conquest, by reducing Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, helped to increase a proclivity towards materialist objectivity. This objectivity was ultimately turned against the Normans themselves in the form of democratic objectivity towards politics. In this way, the original "goal" of liberal democratic objectivity in the English-speaking world was Anglo-Saxon ethnocentricity.

Yet if science is not ultimately self-justified, then how do I explain my own claims to objectivity?

The ethnic origins of the American state have seemingly been lost in the ethnic chaos of the United States. Seemingly random relations among individuals act as noise that encrypts the genealogical path source of individualism's origins. It takes the mind of detective to decrypt that path source, for it is of the very nature of egalitarian ideologies to erase *hereditary* traces of its origins. It is, finally, like a detective, after following out this genealogical trail against the noise of hereditary chaos, against the patterns designed to disguise patterns, and the cultural smoke screens that distract and elude, that I am inevitably led to myself.

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD OF DESTRUCTION

Perhaps the greatest contradiction in our lives, the hardest to handle, is the knowledge "There was a time when I was not alive, and there will come time when I am not alive."…All that we know is embedded inside our minds, and for all that to be absent from the universe is not comprehensible. This is a basic undeniable problem of life; perhaps it is the best metaphorical analogue of Gödel's theorem.[1415]

—DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, *GÖDEL, ESCHER, BACH*

Truth and Death

Philosophy, Cosmology, Singularity, New Jersey

I trace my ancestry about 13.7 billion years to the so-called Big Bang. What I am is literally inseparable from the history of the evolution of particles, galaxies, stars, planets, chemistry, biology, and finally, cultural-technological evolution.[1416] The evolutionary descent of me, my species, and my kindred life forms from Earth, are particular extensions of the larger scheme of physical evolution.

The heavier elements necessary for life on Earth, such as carbon and oxygen, were produced within special conditions of the high temperature and high pressure within stars and arrived earth through star-deaths called supernovas. While red dwarfs, which constitute the majority of stars, are long surviving and slowly fading, it is the heavier, massive stars that end in extremely luminous supernovas explosions that blast these 'life–giving' heavier elements into interstellar space. At the moment of its demise, enough energy can be released to outshine its entire home galaxy. The extreme conditions of the shock wave of that violent death allow for the otherwise highly improbable synthesis of the heaviest elements such as gold and uranium.

Our bodies are made possible and physically descended from the ejected matter of these ancestral stars that have ended as supernovas. Out of their elemental remains in our planet, life forms emerged about four billion years ago. From this late biological phase, I count myself as, among other things, genetic replicator, eukaryote, animal, vertebrate,

gnathostome, chordate, mammal, primate, ape, Homo sapien, and Jew.

If there is no absolute objectivity, self-inclusive objectivity would seem to amount to unraveling a specific past human subjectivity. If the motivation for objectivity is fundamentally subjective then it matters from an *objective* standpoint that I am a Jewish American and an American Jew. It matters that I grew up in New Jersey and that I can trace my ancestry to my 'fish fathers' of the Cambrian era.

There is no "universalism", as far as I can see. I can find no sound reason to posit a fundamental distinction between generalizations and particulars. If even "the laws of physics" evolved over history, then there is no strict "universalism" even in physics and a "theory of all" raises questions about the empirical example of the theorist who posits an understanding of all.

The possibility of absolute objectivity is probably as plausible as its opposite: the possibility of absolute subjectivity. For example, I have an *apparent* need to put food in my body as a condition of my existence. If I attempt to be absolutely subjective, I can imagine a utopic world where I would have no need to concern myself with objective conditions such as my body's apparent need for food.

Is it possible to live a totally solipsistic existence in total indifference to sense perception such as sight, hearing, and touch? Much that goes by the name of "postmodernism" seems to virtually assume as much. But is the theory that products of the scientific method are invented instead of discovered *itself* invented rather than discovered? Is the assertion that science is a dogma itself a dogma?

Science, it appears, is only an extension of the common capacity to observe one's environment, a capacity that is not

limited to human beings. If human science evolved from the evolutionary benefits of accurate representation of the environment, then the descent of science can be traced to pre-human origins and this, in turn, suggests a general sociobiological explanation for scientific behaviors.

It appears that science begins with natural selection for those accurate observations of our environment *that are also genetically adaptive*. To illustrate, consider one explanation for the sudden development of most major complex animal groups in a relative short time frame, the Cambrian explosion. The evolution of eyes is still a controversial explanation and may turn out to be wrong or, more likely, incomplete.[1417]

If it is the case that the evolution of eyes was a crucial factor then the Cambrian explosion can be interpreted as a primitive advancement in the evolution of science; a kind of pre-human scientific-technological "revolution". Just as the telescope expanded the range of human eyesight, the evolution of eyes in the Cambrian period expanded the capacity for accurate, "scientific" observations of the environment, which in turn, had a genetically adaptive value. The biological technology for eyesight was passed on through genes instead of culture, but the cultural evolution of "modern" science is only a continuation this ancient evolutionary scientific-technological interrelationship.

The evolution of modern science-technology has led to an acceleration of technology's ability to outstrip biology and there is sound reason to think that technology is on course to overtake biology as a continuation of evolution. My own behavior in directing objectivity towards my own subjectivity and the translation of this information into symbols or memes may even be an expression of this encroaching paradigm shift. The paradigm shift from

biology to technology may culminate in what is called the Technological Singularity, the evolution of greater-than-human intelligence, i.e. artificial intelligence.

Consider the rise of artificial intelligence in comparison with the rise of human intelligence. When the ancient Greeks first blazed the path towards what is now known as "Western philosophy", they reached towards a cosmological perspective. Philosophy, from the beginning, groped towards a rational understanding of everything. If the prospective Singularity ultimately becomes like a black hole in the specific sense that it draws *everything of human concern* into its compass while simultaneously expanding science and technology's grasp of the larger cosmos, then the Singularity can be hypothetically identified, in part, with the aspirations of philosophy.

Philosophy, so conceived, marks no fundamental distinction between philosophy and science. While science *emphasizes* analysis, philosophy *emphasizes* synthesis, especially the most comprehensive synthesis of knowledge in the form of information. But the attempt to synthesize all knowledge leads to the problem of simultaneously synthesizing *self*-knowledge, and any inherent (philosophic) problems with such attempts.

Philosophy leads to ruthless reasoning about *all*. All includes science, but also all non-science, i.e. intuition and that which goes under the name of "subjectivity". In other words, philosophy includes science but also the problems and limits of science. Philosophy includes the conflict between science and the scientist. Philosophy includes the philosophical reflection upon the limits of philosophy.

Totality of rational comprehension of all leads to philosophy and, within science proper, cosmology. The speck of provincial human-centric concerns is dwarfed by a

contemporary physical cosmology that may, in turn, be dwarfed by future discoveries of what lies beyond it. So at one extreme there are human-centric concerns (politics), and at another extreme that the far larger physical world beyond life from Earth. The modern attempt to unite these two extremes through cosmopolitanism or a cosmopolis is illusory in the sense that the old provincialism of political whole-ism has only been replaced by a new provincialism of individualism. The fundamentally non-cosmopolitan or non-universal bias, in other words, stems from one's will to live.

The relation between science and philosophy is, in part, like the relation between science and the scientist. Some presume that philosophy is a relic of primitive science or a stage before the development of a modern science that has now superseded philosophy. But is it possible to have science without a scientist? Is the scientist the sole object of inquiry excluded from science (as if the scientist were the sole "supernatural" phenomenon)?

Those scenarios where it is conceivable that subjectivity and objectivity can be separated are fit for science, whereas those scenarios where it is inconceivable that subjectivity and objectivity can be separated are considered unscientific. However, if there can be a "theory of everything", it must also account for those unscientific scenarios where subjectivity and objectivity cannot be separated. Where subjectivity and objectivity cannot be separated, approaching the greatest possible objectivity may be like approaching a limit in calculus. The limit is a state of death.

The common breach between science and philosophy is related to the issue of self-consistency. But what if subjective inconsistency is actually a condition of objectivity as a scientist? A form of bioinconsistent subjectivity may the *condition* of scientific objectivity.

The distinction between the scientist and the human being, i.e. the distinction between facts and values, suggests a break of standards. Does the scientist hold the same scientific standards in determining his or her life values? Sociobiology implicates this subject/object problem, the problem of the scientist as an object of science. Sociobiology implicates sociobiological study of the behavior of the sociobiologist. Sociobiology implicates sociobiological self-consciousness and the possibility of a self-conscious science of sociobiological self-consciousness. Sociobiology raises not only the prospect of the scientific study of the values of scientists, but the question of the value of science itself; the value of objectivity.

Can sociobiology be a value-free science? Better yet, can polisociobiology be a value-free science? Merging political science and sociobiology in polisociobiology makes the scientific study of "values" — including the values of the scientist — almost inescapable. To be a polisociobiologist, in the fullest sense, is to attempt to give a scientific account of one's own values. The evolution of science leads, not away from philosophy, but towards philosophy.

The search for objectivity comes full circle in the search for the sources of subjectivity. A science of the scientist — a vivisection or autovivisection of the scientist — is an investigation into the limits of objectivity. What could it mean to be completely objective? There might *possibly* be absolute knowledge or absolute objective if knowledge or objectivity *never* comes into an unresolvable conflict with a subjective priority of the observer, i.e. the conditions of the observer's existence. In other words, total objectivity might be possible only if one does not have political position or opinion; if one does not participate in a political-social existence as well as a scientific one. Is such a life possible?

This would imply that the greatest objectivity would be premised on indifference to the difference between existence and non-existence.

It seems that only indifference to one's existence offers the possibility of overcoming politics. While philosophy is meta-political, and especially supra-political, the philosopher cannot escape *being* political insofar as the philosopher cannot escape concern with the problem of existence, i.e. survival. Politics is nothing only when one conceives the value of existence as nothing. The standpoint from which I say that there is no fundamental distinction between politics and non-politics is identical to a position that posits that life is totally meaningless and that the choice of death for myself and everyone else is no better than the choice for life.

The Athenians put Socrates to death for a reason.

Overcoming Bias

> **Death is the true inspiring genius, or the muse of philosophy...**
>
> —ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

How far can I go in making value-free scientific judgments? Tracing the biases that hinder objectivity, and attempting to uproot those biases, leads towards the notion that self-preservation itself is a bias. If life has no inherent meaning, then self-preservation cannot be judged fundamentally superior to self-destruction, or vice versa. Self-preservation is exerts bias, for example, in a bias against this very observation that self-preservation is not fundamentally superior to self-destruction.

"Knowledge", wrote Arthur Schopenhauer, "far from being the source of attachment to life, even works against it, for it discloses the worthlessness of life, and thus combats the fear of death".[1418] What is fundamentally without reason is the will to live. Or, from a more Darwinian perspective, the "blind watchmaker" of evolution cannot be assumed the fountainhead of ultimate reason. Life is a prejudice that happens to be talented at perpetuating or replicating itself. To attempt to eliminate this source of bias is to open your mind to death.

The attempt to eliminate all sources of bias leads towards the most intransigent sources of prejudice; prejudices such as biological drives, instincts, and values that counter objectivity. A primary source of "values" is an unconscious fear of death. From one scientific point of view, fear of death can be viewed as genetically adaptive. From another scientific point of view, fear of death is a subjective bias that can hinder objective evaluation.

For scientific objectivity to take precedence, the subjective bias of the fear of death must be subordinated to scientific objectivity. This implies that the attempt to maximize scientific objectivity could result in an increase in genetically maladaptive behavior. If so, could the attempt to maximize scientific objectivity result in a maximization of genetically maladaptive behavior?

Could the attempt to remove all sources of prejudice, bias, and subjectivity amount to rational self-destruction? Is to most fully approach objectivity to approach death? If a scientist is rigorously objective, and eliminates all "oughts" or prescriptions, does this lead to indifference to the survival, not only of a given individual, but indifference to the survival of all life?

The most rigorous objectivity implies indifference to the consequence of objectivity, i.e. whether the consequences of objectivity yield life or death for the observer. In other words, the elimination of subjectivity demands indifference to self-preservation when self-preservation conflicts with objectivity. The attempt at rigorous objectivity could potentially counter the interests of self-preservation or even amount to rational self-destruction.

The most total objectivity appears to lead to the most total self-negation. Objectivity towards biological factors is objectivity towards *life* factors. Indifference to life factors leads to indifference between the choices of life and death. To approach objectivity with respect to self-interest ultimately leads to indifference to whether one is alive or dead.

The dead are most indifferent; the least interested; the least biased; the least prejudiced one way or the other. What is closest to total indifference is to be dead. If an observer hypothesizes death then, from that perspective, the observer has no vested interests in life and thus possible grounds for the most objective view. The more an observer is reduced to nothing, the more the observer is no longer a factor, the more the observer might set the conditions for the most rigorous objectivity.

It is likely that most people will not even consider the veracity of this correlation between death and objectivity even if they understand it intellectually because most will consciously or unconsciously choose to place the interests of self-preservation over the interests of objectivity. In other words, to even consider the validity of this view assumes that one is willing and able to even consider prioritizing objectivity over one's own self-preservation. Since it *not* safe to simply assume this on an individual level, let alone a

social level, relatively few are willing and able to seriously address this issue (and majority consensus can be expected to dismiss the issue). In short, for most people, including most "scientists", overcoming self-preservation is not ultimately a subject for rational debate and objective discussion.

Maximizing objectivity can be incompatible with maximizing subjective interests. In some situations, anything less than death is compromise. The choice between objectivity and self-preservation may lead one to a Stoic's choice between life and death.

Whereas the humanities cannot be what they are without human subjectivities, the inhumanities, or hard sciences, require the subjective element be removed as much as possible as sources of error. Objectivity leads towards the elimination of subjectivity, i.e. the elimination of one's "humanity". A value free science has no basis on which to value human things over non-human things and thus no basis to value life over death or vice versa. Social science will become equal to the standards of physical science when social scientists overcome the subjective preference for the life of humanity over the death of humanity.

To attempt to resolve the contradiction of myself as a scientist and a human being on the side of science leads towards viewing myself as a material object. While this contradiction may be impossible to resolve, the closest approximation of reconciliation may consist of the state of death. In death, the teleologically-inclining biases of human subjectivity that hinder one from viewing one's self as a material object are eliminated.

I cannot fully reconcile my understanding of the world with my existence in it. There is a conflict between the value of objectivity and the facts of my life. This experiment is

designed to demonstrate a point of incompatibility between "truth" and "life". In this experiment I hypothesize that the private separation of facts and values, when disclosed to the wider social world, creates a conflict of interest between the value of sociobiological objectivity and the "facts" of my sociobiological existence such that it leads to a voluntary and rational completion of this work in an act of self-destruction.

Science as Technology as Science

The scientist is a paradox. Scientists are characterized by interestedness in disinterestedness. If a scientist is disinterested is disinterestedness, however, that is the end of science. The goal of disinterestedness or objectivity requires interestedness or subjectivity.

Are there objective grounds for choosing the goal of objectivity over more consistently subjective goals? The goal of objectivity, if consistent, leads to indifference to the choice between objectivity and subjectivity. The goal of objectivity undermines the goal of objectivity. If *totally* indifferent, it seems impossible to choose between objectivity and subjectivity.

The problem here is *self-consistent* objectivity: objectivity undermines the subjective impetus that produces science. If subjectivity is eliminated for the sake of objectivity, then the motive for objectivity is also eliminated. Totally eliminate the subjective blind spot behind science, and science will be eliminated. If so, then science, if objective about itself, terminates itself. Science is not justified scientifically.

If this is correct, it implies that a subjective "blind spot" is the condition of science. The very existence of scientist's objectivity is dependent upon the subjectivity of the scientist. Objectivity is animated by subjectivity and, therefore,

science cannot be fully separated from "culture"; i.e. values. Objectivity is possible only for subjective minds.

Does this mean that scientists are people that must believe in nothing? No, it means precisely the opposite. To pursue science, scientists must be justified by something that, strictly speaking, is not science itself, i.e. curiosity, wonder, faith in science, the will to master all knowledge, belief that it will benefit the world, belief in pure knowledge for its own sake, or some other breach of objectivity. Because science, apparently, cannot consistently justify itself, something else must if it is to exist at all.

The attempt to eliminate all subjective bias would culminate in the elimination of science, for science has failed to produce evidence that it is capable of fully justifying itself. The very existence of science is the strongest evidence that scientists are less than fully objective. An attempted self-consistent objectivity is a self-destructing objectivity, since the bias of the subjective belief in the *value* of objectivity must be removed to be objective. This implies that an objective "theory of all" could not account for itself.

How, then, does a scientist choose a subject to study? Is there a way to objectively determine what the *subject* of objectivity should be? Is there a fundamentally objective reason for choosing the study of archaeology over the study of chemistry? Is the decision to study Sanskrit over Chinese more rational than the decision to worship Allah over not worshiping Allah? Is there a fundamentally rational ground for making one choice over another?

Even once one has decided on some facet of reality, there is still the problem of interpretation. Consider the interpretation that my interpretation is just a way of throwing order upon the chaos of the world. Is this interpretation itself a just a way of throwing order on the

chaos of the world? Even the word "chaos" imposes a kind of order over (things), which cannot (?) be put into (words).

In any case, if objectivity cannot justify itself then objectivity is subjective in the sense of being selective; one must always determine what the *dominant* factors are; what is important; the value of facts. Some facts are valued at the expense of others. Some things are selected for study, while others are neglected or demoted. I can find no definitive, objective way to choose one subject or field of inquiry over another. Why am I even reflecting on this problem right now at the expense of some other problem? This work thus appears, by definition, subjective, in that I chose certain domains as subjects of objectivity at the expense of others.

How, then, can I justify the subjects I "choose" to be objective about?

The question of how to be most objective leads to the question of how I am most subjective. What are my own most significant subjectivities or biases? Is this very evaluation necessarily subjective? How can I determine objectively what is most subjective for me? Since the domains or fields of inquiry are commonly skewed towards those areas that one is subjectively inclined towards, the attempt at the greatest possible objectivity raises the possibility of seeking out and confronting precisely what one is least inclined to study. The attempt at the greatest possible objectivity raises the possibility of choosing subjects for scientific objectivity that are the *most* intractably subjective for me; the areas that expose my greatest biases, the areas I am most likely to gloss over, repress, or marginalize.

The question of how to approach the greatest objectivity leads to the question of my very greatest subjectivities. Death, and fear of death, can be one of the greatest sources

of subjectivity — and this is precisely why it may be one of the best means of testing and measuring the limits of objectivity.

My objectivity simultaneously reveals something of my subjectivity, for one must be interested in disinterestedness. Not all scientists are equally interested in all expressions of disinterestedness. Objectivity cannot be but inseparable from subjectivity (including meta-objective observations such as this one).

To have a point of view betrays bias, for it may be incompatible with other justifiable points of view. A premise or viewpoint is a kind of bias (including this one). One's prejudices and biases, the condition of having a point of view, can reveal what one is or what one is becoming. In revealing my viewpoint, I reveal something of what I am.

Reflection on what is most objective leads to reflection upon what is most biased and subjective. What are, for me, the most pressing, outstanding, and repeated exceptions to rigorous objectivity? As a Jewish sociobiologist aspiring to objectivity, I found that the Jewish-race question persistently arose as a source of my greatest potential subjectivities. One cannot fully account for my theories without accounting for my Jewish heritage. This is not a self-fulfilling prophecy, but rather, the product of a search for knowledge inextricably interwoven with the problem of self-knowledge.

The most powerful biases are also those most likely to survive the attempt at objectivity. The Jewish-race question is a test of my objectivity because it could be a source of my greatest subjectivity. Since the Jewish-race question has proved to be an existential question, the only way I am able to gain a point of view that could conceivable overcome this peak subjectivity is to hypothetically overcome the deeper subjectivity of the will to live. While *sociobiology* adds

objective biological factors, the *sociobiologist*, as a scientist, subtracts biological factors that bias the scientific method, and subtracting all biasing biological factors leads to the subtraction of the sociobiologist's own biological life from the scientific equation.

Radical objectivity towards subjectivity would mean attempting honesty to the point of absurdity. To focus on rooting out the deepest sources of subjectivity amounts to seeking out those truths that are most destructive to subjectivity, i.e. self-interest. It is to make a specialty of truths that kill.

If I had no biases I would *be* dead, rather that sitting here right now, writing about them. To approach the most biasless state of death is to pursue a course of rational self-destruction through a rigorous elimination of biases towards life. Yet to be value neutral would be to not be biased towards objectivity over subjectivity or vice versa. While objectivity is not inherently self-justified as an end in itself, objectivity could be a means. Objectivity could be a means, for example, of rational self-destruction.

The experiment I propose entails treating objectivity as a means of promoting the overcoming of the bias towards life and overcoming the bias towards life as a means of promoting objectivity. Since objectivity cannot fundamentally justify itself as an *end*, objectivity can be a *means* of rational self-destruction by eliminating the prejudice against death or self-destruction. But why, then, is rational self-destruction or death my chosen goal or end? While the choice of which field of inquiry one selects to be objective about includes subjective decisions, the greatest objectivity implies overcoming the greatest subjectivity. Fear of, or resistance to, death is among the sources of the greatest subjectivity, and, for that reason, central to an

attempt to approach the greatest objectivity. In general, the fields of inquiry I try to value are those that are most destructive to me as a living observer (*because* they are most self-destructive).

This experiment thus involves approaching objectivity as a means of self-destruction, and self-destruction as a means of approaching objectivity. Put another way, it is using science as technology (objectivity as a means of self-destruction) and technology as science (self-destruction as means of approaching objectivity).

How far would one be willing to go in pursuit of scientific objectivity? Objectivity and survival are least compatible when objectivity becomes a means of life, subordinate to life — as opposed to life subordinated to objectivity. If the greatest objectivity implicates confronting the most subjective biases, this implicates confronting those truths that most conflict with the subjective will to live. By simply changing my values from life values to death values, and setting my trajectory for rational biological self-destruction, I am able to liberate myself from many of the biases that dominate the horizons of most people's lives. By valuing certain scientific observations because they are destructive to my life, I am removing self-preservation factors that hinder objectivity. This is how I am in a position to hypothesize my own death.

So if objectivity is not justified as end, then objectivity can be a means of rational self-destruction through the overcoming of the bias towards life. Rational self-destruction through the overcoming of the bias towards life, in turn, can be a means of achieving objectivity. And this means: To will death as a means of willing truth and to will truth as a means of willing death.

Overthrowing Myself

Geometry of Thanatology

The most fundamental premise of the original, modern, liberal theory of human nature was belief that human beings seek to preserve their own individual lives. Even today, it is still proposed that the fear of death, and the end of self-preservation, is not only natural, but a human universal. Imagine that this is so. If there is a universal human nature, does this imply that there are universal human prejudices? If there is a universal human nature, does this also imply we are *universally* biased against certain "truths"? It would mean that what we have in common is, among other things, a universal prejudice; all humans are united by a common conspiracy to preserve each one of our own individual lives.

This is really only a racist generalization; a generalization about the human race not unlike less generalized forms of racism. Yet how can one even attempt to address the theory *of* the fear of death objectively and rationally when *in* the grip of the fear of death? In particular, how can one gain perspective to criticize a theory of liberal democracy built upon the fear of death or individual self-preservation, when one is subjectively invested in the assumption of one's individual right to live — and mastered by its limitations. How can one expect to comprehend liberalism while obediently playing by liberalism's conventions and rules?

One cannot fully criticize liberalism while existing within the limits of this liberal horizon. The entire liberal argument begins with the postulate of individual self-preservation. Only on this basis do liberals impose their own self-postulate upon others.

These moral mechanisms will not work on me and do not apply to me. To be prepared to risk one's life is to unhinge the fossilized reasoning at the foundation of the liberal argument and unchain the social controls built into that narrow liberal horizon. Because fear of violent death is the political premise underlying modernity, only by overcoming this fear can one gain perspective over modernity. This is not a matter of "conviction", but rather, a matter I propose to demonstrate experimentally by empirically refuting the foundational premise of "modern" political philosophy.

Hannah Arendt wrote that, among the ancient Greeks,

> [w]hoever entered the political realm had first to be ready to risk his life, and too great a love for life obstructed freedom, was a sure sign of slaveishness. Courage therefore became the political virtue par excellence....The "good life," as Aristotle called the life of the citizen, therefore was not merely better, more carefree or nobler than ordinary life, but of an altogether different quality. It was "good" to the extent that they have mastered the necessities of sheer life, by being freed from labor and work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for their own survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life process.[1419]

This experiment is not about the courage to stand up for my views; I do not justify my views on the basis of "conviction", i.e. a conviction that truth is good (i.e. life affirming).

Leo Strauss criticized modern political science "above all because of its lack of reflection or its narrowness".[1420] Its scientific relativism "absolutizes the perspective of the liberal secular society." While its methods offer a certain *kind* of precision, "exactness that is bought at the price of a narrowing of vision is a kind of imprecision."[1421]

It seems that everything is a subject for modern science — except the scientist. I propose that objectivity can be better achieved if I remove the factor of individual self-preservation from the equation. Note that the experiment that I propose places a metascientific problem of objectivity *about* the experiment *into* the experiment.

"Political scientists", wrote Harvard political thinker Harvey Mansfield,

> have become rampant democritizers because they have lost faith in reason. But, lacking faith in reason, they ought to lose confidence in political science, in themselves. Yet they do not; they continue to behave as if they had a profession.[1422]

There is at least some truth in the idea that modern political science began with Thomas Hobbes and the English Civil War. Hobbes believed that Euclid's work of classical geometry, *Elements*, provided a model for constructing a sound political science on the axioms of human nature. In *Leviathan*, he posited a natural law that would forbid each and every man "to do, that which is destructive of his life, or take away the means of preserving the same". This premise of individual self-preservation, or slavery to the fear of death, stands at the foundation of "modern" political philosophy.

There are grounds for thinking that innovations of sociobiology allow one to understand *some* things about the Hobbesian innovation even better than Hobbes himself. His system was design to tame the "irrational" kin selective behaviors unleashed in the English Civil War. His political program was designed as a bulwark against the empirical reality of human behavior in the English Civil War where men, in fact, did not put the concerns of rational self-

preservation over altruistic self-sacrifice, but instead, risked their lives to avenge the vendetta that dated to 1066. Yet this understanding of Hobbes and the English Civil War could not be comprehended scientifically without sociobiology anymore than Hobbes could understand his own time on the basis of Aristotle's thought.

Since Hobbes' time, the classical geometric logic of Euclid has given way to a plurality of non-Euclidean geometries. Just as the problematic nature of Euclid's fifth postulate eventually gave birth to non-Euclidean geometries, sociobiology has empirically exposed the problematic nature of Hobbes' postulate of individual, rational self-preservation. Just as different non-Euclidean geometries were produced by denying Euclid's fifth postulate in different ways, sociobiology opens different way of rationally denying the modern, Hobbesian postulate of individual, rational self-preservation. Just as each non-Euclidean geometry introduced an axiom incompatible with the fifth postulate, sociobiology introduces biological and cultural premises that can be fundamentally incompatible with individual self-preservation.

If Hobbes' Euclidean logic was that of rational self-preservation, then the following is the non-Euclidean logic of rational self-destruction.

After all, what better way to test the crisis of Western political rationalism than to experimentally test what may be its most distinctive, foundational premise? Although liberal democracy is very far from being identical to the Hobbesian system of *Leviathan*, foundational elements of the architecture of modern constitutionalism was first thought out by Hobbes[1423] and contemporary liberal democracy preserves its premise of the right to individual self-

preservation (notwithstanding its Lockean modifications or mollifications).

This means, however, that for the average Westerner who plays the basic 'Euclidean' rules of the liberal democratic system, my 'non-Euclidean' logic will likely appear to be "irrational". It may appear repugnant to the "nature" of individual self-preservation.[1424] Yet if my theory is nearly universally condemned, does this mean that I do not have a valid point or does it mean that other observers are not willing to prioritize objectivity over the bias of self-preservation?

The liberal democratic system, originally based on a supposedly universal premise of individual self-preservation, produces an incomplete account of human nature. Psychological and sociological theories that are built upon common liberal democratic assumptions of individual self-preservation cannot furnish an accurate scientific analysis of my behavior. The demonstration of this logic of rational self-destruction is identical with demonstrating the incompleteness of the Western, liberal democratic system's understanding of the human (and the limits of my own self-understanding).[1425]

As a polisociobiologist, I am claiming that I can predict something about my own behavior. It would seem that I am attempting to verify a claim of hypothetical self-knowledge. To verify the meaning of my words is to move from thought experiment to real experiment. It is to verify the theory of self-destruction with the deed of self-destruction. Yet there is a slight problem with verifying my prediction. Can I scientifically verify my own death? The experiment reveals its own limitations and points to the limits of self-knowledge.

Me Theory

My objective is to kill myself. Now how can I explain this? If reason cannot determine ultimate values, then how do I explain the facts of my values?

I can begin to explain myself through the Nietzschean distinction between truth and life. It is a modern delusion to believe that pursuit of truth has any necessary correspondence with life-affirming values. To not gloss over the forks between these paths with myths and compromises, but to confront them openly, directly, and as far as possible, without illusion, can lead to the path of truth and death.

Here I have a theory that objectivity, through an extreme attempt at overcoming subjectivity, can effectually lead or culminate in death. With this in mind, can I expect to be able to include myself in my own theory? After all, I have attempted to explain others, in many cases, sociobiologically. Is my own Weltanschauung explainable through sociobiology as well? Do I fit into my own theories in the same way?

The problem of theoretical sociobiological self-inclusion is illustrated by the theory of kin selection. Kin selection implies that a sociobiologist should be biased towards his or her own kin. If kin selection is objectively correct, then the sociobiologist should be able to demonstrate his or own bias towards kin. If a sociobiologist is not biased towards his or her own kin, then the validity of the claims of kin selection theory could be called into question.

To be objective one would have to be biased. To be biased would confirm objectivity.

Sociobiological theory applied to the sociobiologist implies paradox. To be objective the sociobiologist must not be objective, and only if the sociobiologist is not objective can the sociobiologist be objective. The same paradox

applies to any form of self-interest, i.e. economic self-interest.

Consistent scientific objectivity leads to the scientist as an object of the scientist. Yet if Gödel is right, then it may be that to understand yourself is to understand that you can never fully understand yourself. If self-consistent objectivity is self-contradictory, then how could I fit myself into my own theory of objectivity?

The attempt to *fully* include one's self in one's own theory can never, it seems, be achieved. However, the attempt to approach this state amounts to a process of rational self-destruction because, in order to approach objectivity, the elimination of subjectivity must proceed, and the elimination of all self-interest approaches the elimination of biases of life over death. Rational self-destruction that culminates in death is correlated with the most thorough attempt at scientific objectivity: the attempt to include one's self in one's own scientific Weltanschauung. The impossible goal of self-consistent objectivity nonetheless *approaches* a definition of suicide or death through the attempt at the consistent elimination of biases towards life.

The goal of objectivity approached through overcoming of biases towards life, in turn, can be a means of willing death. Since what constitutes a life is particular, what constitutes the negation of life is particular. If death is the negation or opposite of life, then in order to define what death is, one must define what life is. Objectivity requires some grasp of what constitutes subjectivity.

Approaching the human from a sociobiological perspective, my Jewish origins inevitably kept on coming up. Addressing the biological bases of human behavior inevitably raises the question of the biological bases (or prejudices) of my own scientific judgment. Yet if one's own

biology compromises objectivity, then how can one be objective on matters of one's own biology? My own behavior must be partially unconscious, i.e. the product of genes, along with the multiple cultural influences that also work unconsciously. Is my very striving for "objectivity", as a form of "universality", what gives my work away as "Jewish science"?

Within the liberal order, the basic idea is that, in order to have one's own individual self-preservation and self-interest respected, one is expected to do the same to others. But this tends to narrow intellectual inquiry to a foundation of individual self-preservation. Furthermore, if I am a slave to narrow, liberal conceptions of individual self-interest, this will likely distort an accurate, comprehensive, evolutionary, or sociobiological understanding of the human and nonhuman world.

As an individual or as a Jew, unhindered recognition of the biological view of life, especially regarding kin selection, may not be in my self-interest and this means that *objectivity* on certain topics may not be in my own self-interest. If, because I am a Jew, I have no right to speak or think certain things as regards biology or "race", even if there exists a empirical basis for such views, this mean that certain truths are prohibited from me on the basis of my origins. If uttering such truths are simply destructive of my own interests and Jews generally, or even the political order of the West, does this mean that certain truths are held hostage by considerations of self-preservation? What this means, in its fullest implications, is that one must choose between truth and life.

To gain a point of view that transcends the inherent liberal bias of concern for individual self-preservation, along with all other biases of life, is to posit a hypothetical

convergence of truth and death. The attempt to eliminate the sources of subjectivity ultimately leads towards eliminating biases towards existence. The only way eliminate these biases root and branch, it seems, is to eliminate my "will" to biological existence. I hypothesize that I can *approach* objectivity as a Jew observing sociobiological matters as a corollary of rational sociobiological self-destruction.

Jews have inclined towards a *kind* of objectivity from the sociobiological periphery. What Max Weber viewed as the pariah existence of Diaspora Judaism is, from another point of view, the probable basis for the foresightful discovery of a postbiological paradigm shift beyond the social sphere. While this pariah kind of objectivity might promote physical realism at the expense of political self-control, the moralizing tendency of this view, correlated with the historic political weakness of Jews, carries its own biases.

Secular Jewish liberal objectivity is characterized by the stopping point or blind spot of the abstract ethical individual and builds upward on this premise. Conscience is a Jewish prejudice that inhibits biological realism and subverts the eugenic evolution of biological life. But am I the master of my conscience or is my conscience the master of me? The attempt to master and overcome conscience is almost a definition of Jewish self-destruction. Yet to attempt to most fully understand myself as a Jew requires the overcoming conscience even as fully overcoming conscience is to destroy myself as a Jew.

I cannot synthesize this work with my living, sociobiological existence. I cannot live with the implications of my work and this leaves the possibility of separating the interests of truth and life.

Jewish self-destruction is a self-realization of Jewish morality; Jewish conscience. The moral worship of

powerlessness, taken seriously, leads to biological self-destruction. Willing powerlessness is the ultimate expression of the Jewish way, the rejection of power in favor of justice. It is to let there be nothing superior in the world; let there be nothing rather than something.

In a section called Singularity and Secularization I wrote:

> The radical inconsistencies of Nazism exposed something about us Jews. The Nazis exposed *our* central sociobiological contradiction through history. Jews are *biological* beings characterized by *anti-biological* values. Values that are ultimately anti-biological ultimately imply biological *self*-negation.
>
> This historical contradiction was resolved through Nazi death camps. Hitler refuted Marx at Auschwitz. Nazi extermination camps resolved this contradiction by compelling Jews to participate in the most extreme biological consequences of their own anti-biological values.

The characteristic sociobiological logic of the Jews is the logic of sociobiological marginalism. It is also the logic of "modernity". The progressive liberation of minorities, women, homosexuals, and others formerly excluded from the throne of history are following in the footsteps of a people who *are* the marginal turned mainstream — the ancient exception that became the modern rule.

However, let us take this internal Jewish logic one step further. While Jews characteristically take exception to the dominant bio-logic of the gentiles, this logic of exceptions itself amounts to the dominant bio-logic of the Jews. Inherent or implicit in this Jewish logic of exception to the dominant bio-logic is a Jewish exception to the dominant bio-logic of the Jews. In other words, to be *self*-consistent there must be an exception to the rule of Judaism *within*

Judaism. Fulfilling this Jewish "rule of the exception" with an exception to its own rules fulfills the internal logic of Judaism.

If the marginal view is most Jewish view, then the most marginal view for a Jew is in a sense the most Jewish Jewish view. The attempt towards this kind of self-consistent Jewishness leads towards empowering the margins of the Jewish margin.

Jews are the greatest exception to the dominant (gentile) sociobiological rule. In consequence, a most Jewish view is one that lies as the exception to the exception ([and especially the exception to the Jewish exception] and in some cases the exception to the exception to the exception, etc.). As a Jewish sociobiologist, my views are somewhat marginal among Jews in the same sense that the book of Ecclesiastes (Kohelet) is somewhat marginal within the Hebrew Bible.

Inevitably, a Jew must find this basic loophole in the peculiar sociobiological logic of the Jews. This is how I understand myself. In this work I invert the Jewish inversion of biology at the margin of the Jewish margin. This is my pivotal sociobiological self-explanation for my own behavior as a sociobiologist-Jew.

A Jewish sociobiologist's self-understanding is inevitably bound up with gentile sociobiology because a distinctive Jewish identity has been bound up with opposing, refuting and (bio-) negating the common, dominant sociobiological logic of the gentiles. The alternative would be tantamount to the attempt to understand the Exodus story while leaving out any mention of the Egyptians. The paradigmatic inversion of the Egyptian pyramid-hierarchy (▼) formed the original basis for the bionegation of conservative gentile social orders.

My basic sociobiological self-understanding consists of two main interrelated steps. First is self-consciousness of this Jewish pattern of bionegation (▼). It is the realization that while Jews have negated the biological logic of gentile traditions, this pattern itself possesses a biological logic of its own.

Second is self-consistency as an extension of an internal, Jewish behavioral logic. This means that, since Jews themselves are biological beings, hypocrisy cannot be avoided in the case of this central Jewish self-contradiction unless there exists a Jewish inversion of *Jewish* pyramid-hierarchies. A Jewish *self*-inversion is Jewish negation of the Jewish bio-logic of bionegation. It is a turning of our own world upside down.

The key link between the two steps is that self-inversion follows from an attempt at self-consistency. The moral logic of self-consistency is what leads to the elimination of double standards and other discriminative behaviors. Jews have turned the political-biological values of gentiles upside down, but what about our own?

Since Jews are biological beings as well, the next step towards self-consistency is identical to deconstructing ourselves as biological beings and turning our own values upside down. The Jewish inversion of biological values becomes applied to itself. Jewish recognition of the anti-biological values of Jews leads to the inverting of the inverters: Jewish sociobiology. To deconstruct the deconstructors is, for example, is to see Derrida's Jewish marginality at the singular, center of his de-centering.

Jews are both of and against a biological logic. This central contradiction means that a Jewish *self*-inversion can mean one of two things. One resolution of the contradiction is an extreme Zionism that would lead, in theory, to the

attempt to outdo the Nazis in taking eugenic control over biological evolution. The opposite resolution of the contradiction is an extreme internationalism that would lead, in theory, to the attempt to overcome biological evolution *altogether* through the Technological Singularity.

The latter solution is consonant with the monotheistic notion that history ultimately leads to the vindication of "social justice". If justice is to be done to the unjust neglect of biological factors, justice will be shown to be sociobiologically relative. Incorporating biological factors in the study of the Jews reveals that eliminating biological factors almost defines the progress of a Jewish-egalitarian conception of justice. While sociobiology effects the addition of biological factors in history, the path towards the Singularity and God-AI effectually removes biological factors in history. This explains an interrelationship between Jewish aversion to sociobiology and Jewish attraction towards the Technological Singularity.

The ultimate culmination of this progress towards modernistic justice is the elimination of biological factors *altogether*. The ultimate culmination of this Jewish-international paradox is to be found in the paradoxical relationship of the Jews and the Technological Singularity. This idea of self-inversion is also the idea of the Singularity; the final step in the logic of humanity's biological evolution is the final step in the logic of revolution; overthrowing ourselves as biological beings.

Jewish history as such culminates in the overcoming of biology and this is why the opposite extreme, the radical biological view, is the common Jewish blind spot. The radical biology view, as exemplified by the Nazis, is correlated with a basic Jewish definition of "evil". The Jewish tendency is precisely to analyze or isolate the social

from the biological (and the political). For a Jew to overcome this blind spot; to forge the synthesis of the political, social, and biological unconditionally, is tantamount to forging a convergence of conditions for polisociobiological self-destruction. This experiment on myself and the larger polisociobiological order consists in engineering exactly this convergence of conditions. Only death, by taking the blind spot of biological survival out of the equation, can fully forge this metabiological synthesis.

Bringing Down the Hierarchies of My Mind

For a liberal, every human life should be equal to every other human life, but humanity as a whole is *not* equal to nature at large. Humanity or biological life is held to a different and superior standard than the rest of nature. Yet liberalism was profoundly influenced by a physics-based scientific worldview. The progress of egalitarianism correlated with a more consistent physicalism and an implicit movement towards the equality of the biological and the physical.

Rational self-destruction is identical with the logic of the progress of equality; with systematically closing the gap between subjective and objective views towards full consistency of the physical and the biological. Death is the state of total equality between the biological and physical; the state of equality between life and nature at large. Death is achieved when biology or life has lost *all* subjective, superior, or hierarchical status over nature at large. The end logic of negating all inequality is death.

Death is the biological fulfillment of the promise of equality; equality with the non-biological, physical world. Materialism beyond individualism leads to the equality of dirt and humans; consistent treatment between nonhuman

and human worlds. The end logic of equality is the overcoming of all life boundaries, all distinctions, and all separations until Singularity or death.

The question of whether the political is fundamentally superior to the subpolitical is comparable to the question of whether the human is fundamentally superior to the larger physical universe. If the political is equal to the subpolitical, and life is equal to the larger physical universe, then are neurons within a brain also equal to the larger physical universe? In other words, if individuals do not add up to a larger political whole, then do neurons within a brain add up to a larger whole (the larger whole of the "mind" of "the individual")? Is the individual mind just as much a holistic fiction as the modern conception of the political? To reject all forms of holism would be to reject the holistic distinction between life and death.

There is a fundamental contradiction between modern conceptions of *social* equality, and the superior, hierarchical status granted to *individuals* over the larger physical universe. Modern social equality, in other words, only transferred the concentration of hierarchy from social order to the order within the mind of an individual human being. If there is any validity to the logic of egalitarian progress, however, then hierarchies within the minds of individuals are ultimately implicated.

Just as pre-modern social orders were viewed as social organisms or bodies greater than the sum of their parts, individual minds are generally viewed holistically; as orders greater than the sum of their parts. Just as the Western social order has become atomized or reduced to individuals, individual minds are implicated in reduction to individual cells, i.e. neurons. Just as social equality decomposes social organisms into equal individuals, equality within an

individual decomposes the multicellular organism into single cells, and equality within single cells decomposes the cells into molecules, atoms, and the physics of death.

Every individual human mind is like a little Hitler; the culmination of the "*Volk*" of individual cells. An individual human is a kind of hive of cells subordinated to the totalitarian tyranny of "I". Liberalism is founded on the contradiction between social equality and equality within an individual.

Overcoming this contradiction between equality in the social realm and equality within an individual mind leads to the application of equality to the organization of one's individual mind. At the top of the hierarchy of the modern Western model is self-preservation, or, "the will to live". Following out the logic of egalitarianism towards self-consistency is literally suicide for it leads to the overthrow of the hierarchies of the individual mind.

Suicide, then, is the fulfillment of the American experiment as the fulfillment of the idea of equality. The literal act of killing myself is a literal act of willing the progress of equality — the equality of the biological and the physical — by overcoming biological boundaries that preserve biology "above" the larger physical environment. Biological life or biological self-preservation, in other words, has no superior status to any other form of matter.

This work embodies acts that rationally and systematically deprive my life of the conditions of its own self-preservation. Rational self-destruction is posited here as the actualization of an experiment to test a tentative nihilism.

Just as life is a process, the undoing of life is also a process or "progress". My writings are daily affirmations of death. I am painting myself into a corner until there is only one

inevitable act left. I am killing every belief and breaking down every value that upholds my very life until what is left is nothing. An experiment in nihilism, I am destroying all values that uphold life until I am left with nowhere to stand.

A well-formed reductionistic collapse (towards the consistency of the biological and physical) is possible only under a convergence of the right conditions. Among the techniques for creating the conditions of self-destruction is to collect those truths that are most incompatible with my existence; to maximize the search for those truths that maximally negate the interests of my life. And in destroying myself via the non-Euclidean logic of rational self-destruction, I am refuting the foundational liberal democratic premise of rational self-preservation.

"The state, which is public, is in the service of society, which is private", and this, wrote political thinker Harvey Mansfield, Jr., "is the main truth of constitutional government".[1426] Within the rules of a free, liberal democratic system, as a private citizen, I can write this work with some level of theoretical detachment. This experiment in rational self-destruction, then, is made formally legitimate through the modern distinction between the private and the public. Going one step further, it can be considered a realization of "modern privacy" which is "sharply opposed to the social realm."[1427]

However, once it is brought out from the private to the public — into the *social* world — here, and only here, do sociobiological laws fully come into effect. The formal *isolation* between private individual and social citizen ruptures, and the implications of private life become public. Theoretical detachment taken to its extreme culminates in a literal and objective detachment from life in the form of death.

Jumping out of the system of biological life in theory ultimately implicates jumping out of the system of biological life in practice. My theory implicates myself as a theorist. My observations affect me as an observer. This political-sociobiological experiment hinges on the point in which the distinction between the private and the public is broken.

A Laugh with Death

Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Nihilistic Self-Destruction

In the beginning, it was about nihilism. Nihilism is related to equality through the negation of hierarchical formations. A self-consistent equality would be equal, and not superior, to hierarchy, and therefore lacks the ground to choose itself over its opposite. Radical egalitarianism leads to radical nihilism. When all choices are equal, equality is compatible with total randomness. If all choices are equal, then the choice of death is equal to the choice of life. If life is meaningless, then God *is* nothing.

But a funny thing happened on the way to nihilistic self-destruction. It was *precisely through radical disbelief* that I discovered an evolutionary basis for God. Most secular people in the West are simply not ruthless enough in their nihilism to vivisect belief to death. Yet vivisecting belief to death exposes how the *original* monotheistic conception of God likely arose out of ruthless realism. Monotheism may have originated out of a skeptical, nihilistic, materialistic objectivity that annihilated the biologically based subjectivity of the self, and thus created something 'out of nothing'.

In practice, this experiment in nihilism began, in part, as an experiment in systematic physicalism; i.e. an attempted systematic comparison of every subjective experience with the outer physical world. (But don't take my word for it. Try it yourself.) The attempt to be consistently materialistic yielded the tentative conclusion that *the attempt to be consistently materialistic* is *rational self-destruction*. (In short, physicists, too, have a blind spot towards applying their materialism consistently to their own subjective experience.) This is one way of looking at the equality of the biological and the physical.

While the idea of equality does culminate in biological death, the equality of the biological and physical has an alternate interpretation: postbiological life. The equality of the biological and the physical can also be a transfer from one form into another, i.e. translating genes into memes, or uploading the *informational* contents of a biological brain into a digital form.

Jewish monotheism's break with the rest of the human race began with an analogous gene/meme discontinuity. Judaism, as a technology, works by overcoming or correcting genes with memes. Taken to its extreme, the Jewish way would culminate in unmitigated symbolization over incorporation, or the unmitigated translation of genetic interests into memetic/non-biological interests. Monotheism represents an analytic break between biology and postbiology.

The discontinuity of gene and meme is reflected into the discontinuity between human and machine; the discontinuity between biology and technology. Liberal democracy represents a transitional political form between biology and technology: while the egalitarian elimination of selection weakens biology, capitalism develops and evolves

technology. As my understanding of liberal democracy as a paradigm shift evolved, my understanding of what I am doing in this work evolved.

Nihilism remains the center of this work. Yet confrontation with death inadvertently evolved into the overcoming of death. The spark of the idea was present in the beginning in the experiment to demonstrate how the Jewish gene/meme break *works* through this work.

Control of biological nature ultimately amounts to control over will to live. Yet, as Francis Bacon put it, "We cannot command nature except by obeying her." Perhaps I can command biological self-preservation by only by obeying it; by translating genetic self-preservation into memic self-preservation. This, in short, is how the experiment constitutes rational self-destruction.

Do I care whether the Singularity happens or not?

This was originally about the paradoxes of nihilism. Perhaps the whole experiment in nihilism is a failure simply because I somehow managed to make it too meaningful.

Yet there is hope.

Nihilism turns out to be more paradoxical than I first thought. The Singularity does not refute nihilism, but rather, "God" may *be* technological nihilism — yet only in the same sense in which a human being *is* technological nihilism as a gene replicating machine. The difference between a postbiological artificial-intelligence-God and biological humans may only amount to a superiority that is so qualitatively superior to biological human minds that it goes far beyond the mere ability to read the thoughts of everyone in the world simultaneously. Yet even on this point there is reason to think that an artificial intelligence would have a religion when religion itself is understood in an evolutionary

sense (assuming it was programmed towards life over death in an ultimate sense).

One amusing facet of Singularitarianism is the appeal to a desire to live forever, so different from the confrontation with death at the core of this work. This aspect of "Singularitarianism" could be considered the very opposite of confrontation with death in itself. According to Ray Kurzweil, "Death is a tragedy…A primary role of traditional religion is deathist rationalization—that is, rationalizing the tragedy of death as a good thing."[1428] Kurzweil is dead wrong.

The desire for immortality is a logical extension of the preference for life over death. Yet the premise of preference for life over death is not itself founded in logic. The most foundational root of religion, pagan or monotheistic, is this belief that life (including an afterlife), in whatever form, is good. I can find no empirical basis whatsoever for this belief except in the sense that evolution has embedded powerful prejudices towards the irrational belief that life is superior to death.

Even those who believe that they are killing themselves for God almost always believe in some kind of after*life*. Death is good, in this case, only because the martyred *believe* in life after death. Yet the so-called "secularists", liberal or otherwise, are no less "religious" in their baseless or fundamentally irrational prejudice towards some form of life over death. The modern delusion of an ultimate distinction between the "secular" and the "religious" is exposed in a common prejudice towards life. The traditional religions are built on an unspoken assumption that, for the sake of this lie that life, in some form, is good, every *other* lie or myth is justified. The same *lie* of life that flowered in the most extravagant way in traditional religions is assumed different

only because it has been reduced to the herd level of liberalism. Yet not *everyone* believes in perpetuating this lie. This is not an argument that death is good; it is an observation that there is no evidence that preference for life or death is anything but a matter of total indifference from the perspective of the larger physical universe — even if one wishes to conquer the whole cosmos.

Some Lie to Live By

Since I've been giving historical explanation of everyone else, I suppose I might as well attempt a historical explanation of myself. But why? To be consistent?

Since there are Gödelian reason to think that strict logical consistency and the related problem of systematic self-comprehension[1429] are less than fully possible, my virtual obsession with the problem of logical self-consistency must ultimately be as irrational as every other pursuit. It must ultimately be traceable to something within me.

My entire way of looking at world has centered around the Darwinian observation that human beings are material things. If there is no ultimate dividing line between the human and material world, then all subjective mental experience is explicable in terms of underlying material processes. This way of looking at the world was indirectly influenced by my father's informally scientific outlook, and began well before my teenage years.

When my father died when I was twelve, I dealt with his death by interpreting him as a purely material phenomenon. In other words, I viewed my father as a material thing and his death as a material process. Well before my father died, I had interpreted my own emotions as material processes and my reaction to my father's death was treated no differently. If I treat myself and understand myself by the standard of

physical materialism, there is no reason why I should not do the same to others who, by the same Darwinistic understanding of life, are also physical material.

My father, like his father before him, was an engineer. This background alone probably increases the likelihood of Asperger's Syndrome, a form of high-functioning form of autism. According to Simon Baron-Cohen's *The Essential Difference*, Asperger's Syndrome is an example of the extreme male brain. While female brains are better at empathizing and communicating, male brains are better at understanding and building systems, i.e. what I am doing right now in my imperfect attempt to locate myself in my own "Weltanschauung". Modernity itself seems to have Asperger's Syndrome in its Newtonian basis in modern physics and its analytical breakdown of pre-modern familial and kinship relationships into isolated individualism.

While I hardly presume to understand all the workings of my own mind, I do not find that even a mild form of Asperger's Syndrome fully captures my own case. Regardless of what I may look like from the likes of an Aristophanes, it is very easy to underestimate, not my practical application of social intelligence, but my capacity for social intelligence. Yet would you trust someone who compares himself to Socrates and claimed that he had no impairment in social intelligence as a reliable judge of his own competence? I wouldn't — if I had nothing else to go on.

From a very early age, I found that interpreting human beings and my own subjective experience in material, physical terms had a genuine, empirical truth that could not dismissed. What could corroborate this view better than recognition that psychologist and psychiatrist themselves, in so far as they are scientists, have repeatedly verified the

validity of a materialistic view of the human mind. In other words, if the modern, scientific, psychological view of the material basis of the human mind is correct, then can the *entire* modern science of psychology and psychiatry be diagnosed with a kind of psychological abnormality? Can the entire scientific-materialistic view of psychology be explained as product of psychological pathology? Nietzsche, in some ways, came close to holding this point of view, but I do not think this can fully explain my material self-interpretation anymore than it can fully explain the materialistic understanding of modern scientific psychology.

My very objectivity must be traceable to some form of subjectivity. Yet if psychologists or psychiatrists were to reach their own conclusion, *they themselves* would formally vindicate their findings insofar as their observations were objectively verifiable (and not merely subjective). Moreover, when I attempt any possible reexamination of subjective motivations for objectivity, whatever it might be, my ultimate aim ends up in the same place: an objective appraisal of my own subjectivity.

Psychologists and psychiatrists appear to live in two separate worlds: a subjective world and an objective world. My thinking has centered around the problem of holding, not two separate standards, but one physical, materialistic standard for both worlds. This means, for example, viewing humans, and especially my own subjective experience, by the standards of physics. From a materialist, Darwinist standpoint, I and every other human is an animal and a material object. All emotions, whether joy or misery, elation or depression, are rooted in behavior that proved to be genetically adaptive for animal ancestors. So no matter what the emotion or cognition, there is an objective view of subjective experience. At the center of my thinking is the

possibility of overcoming this double standard and fully integrating unadulterated materialism into the center of subjective consciousness.

The death of my father marked the beginning, or perhaps the acceleration, of a kind of moral collapse, because the total, materialization of the world from matter to humans to literal subjective experience went hand in hand with a nihilistic inability to believe in the worth of any goal. At one point when I was nineteen, after another descent into a psychological downward spiral, I had enough, and finally launched myself into a "program" of radical self-transformation. What I did was so extreme, it at first probably appears far-fetched. Yet indirect evidence of what I did to myself is implicit in the supra-Weltanschauung underlying this entire work.

Combining Nietzsche's notion of the will to power, and especially the idea of overcoming one's self, with foundationally anti-Nietzschean, unromantic and materialistic self-view, I basically turned myself into a kind of war machine with the singular aim of overcoming my weaknesses in the cause of life. My most basic assumption was that life is meaningless and that I am an animal-machine — there is no rational justification for willing forward and thus this very thought was answered by willing forward.

"I" made no separation between self-interest and this experimental treatment. I assumed there is no glory, no nobility, and nothing good. My fundamental premise was that life is meaningless, yet even this premise I did not believe: anything and everything was tentative and subject to question. The material interpretation of my emotions and everything else was only the most probable interpretation; nothing more than that. In short, that mind is material or that life is meaningless were posited, not in any dogmatic

way, but only as hypothetical interpretations assumed only the basis of lack of counter-evidence; the alternatives were, in my judgment, less probable. I attempt to reconcile every part of my mind with every other part of mind on the basis of such foundational assumptions, especially insofar as the isolation of some assumptions from other assumptions was part of the basic problem. My fundamental method was to will forward and forward and forward without pause, and without break, in a totally vertical, nonstop, unrelenting, and willing of myself over myself.

This systematic aggression in the cause of life was also a systematically physical-material interpretation of my own subjective experience. In other words, in order to get to the roots of the problem, my first approach was to create a basic plane of self-materialization, like a dynamic platform from which I could analyze myself and experiment on myself based on observations of the patterns of my own thoughts. It was an experiment in motion and a kind of self-vivisection. I did not repress my emotions, I openly and systematically reinterpreted them as material.

The distinction between the desire to know and the will to know is key here. The desire to know, motivated only by curiosity or pleasure, tends to be selective. The desire to know tends to ignore, repress, or otherwise not confront what is not conducive to pleasure or happiness. The will to know is confrontation with all as it comes in life and a seeking out of the least pleasurable and the least joyous truths. This distinction is imperative here because I interpreted happiness, pleasure, and joy itself as “material”, as the product of physical processes, and strove to overcome submission to their biasing influence. Yet at the same time, I was not against happiness, pleasure, and joy in themselves because “life” was, at first, my ultimate “cause”.

At first, "life" was willed first and foremost, and scientific objectivity was only a means towards this end. The key was foresight, or what I thought of at the time as "anticipation". In anticipating recognizable patterns of my own behavior, I would preempt these patterns and often interpret these subjective experiences as physical material before they had a chance to express themselves. This was only a basis for overcoming myself enough to gain a point of view from which I could discover new solutions or methods to whatever problems arose.

The decisive turn that made me different, or consummated my self-destructive difference from others, was really this experiment on myself where I systematically interpreted all subjective experience: emotions, experiences, intuitions, instincts as physical material; not better or worse than any other physical material. This experiment, in its conception, amounts to a definition of disillusionment. Originally, the procedure was built on a radical selfishness — not *belief* in selfishness, but a tentative-programmatic one based on the tentative assumption that no premise is fundamentally justified.

Yet over the course of this self-experiment, in radically questioning everything and reconciling all experience to this best, most educated guess at material reality, two interrelated dilemmas arose. First, upholding self-honesty led to making no exceptions to interpreting all as physical materialism, i.e. no exceptions for events such as "The Holocaust". Secondly, partly because of the very success interpreting all as material, I eventually questioned the nature of the exceptions I made for myself. The iota of faith that make even programmatic selfishness possible, even that I lost. Not out of lack of self-confidence, in a technical sense,

but rather, out of lack of belief in the Western notion of the "self".

The attempt to root out myths leads to rooting out the roots of myths: emotions. Emotions are the root of beliefs. To destroy *all* beliefs, all belief in emotion must be destroyed. After systematically interpreting my emotions are material processes for at least a year and a half, the cause of life simply lost its cogency.

I became unable to spontaneously believe anything. The entire procedure then amounted to the attempt to generate spontaneity in a mechanical way. I was unable to regain a spontaneous belief in life and my efforts to do so amounted to a program to artificially produce or mechanize spontaneity. At some point, I simply gave up, not because I thought it could not be done, but because but my belief in the conventional rightness of "life", or any end, became unbelievable.

This entire struggle was not a "program" separate from myself, but Nietzschean-inspired will to life itself. Disillusioned of belief in my own subjective experiences, at rock bottom, I turned to completely destroy myself. If life itself is without ultimate meaning, and is not fundamentally rationally superior to death, then perhaps the test of the worth of life is found in willing death and self-destruction.

Instead of attempting to overcoming my socially self-destructive tendencies, I gave them free reign. Instead of doing what strengthening, I do what is weakening. Instead of doing what is considered socially acceptable, I do what is considered humiliating. These little self-destructions help feed the larger ones. Yet, at the same time, it means in at least some respects, it means I pay my rent and work out to keep myself physically fit, so I am in a position to achieve

the most rational and most comprehensive self-negation. My formula for self-destruction is truth seeking.

Doing so diverts me away from a normal path, the biological path or the path of life, and the entire mythological cave of human relationships. On some level I cultivate my own social weakness, as it feeds my ambition, fuels my determination, and drives me on to the end. I have no center.

Any secular understanding of how the Jewish moral-survival strategy *works* must account that the Jewish religion was made to make the unending persecution of the Jews work for them. On an individual level, there is something analogous to my self-destructive logic of cultivating my own powerlessness. I perpetually wound myself emotionally to burn my will to overcome. This is actually a major part of my Jewish identity. Instead of attempting to fully cure myself, which would amount to following Nietzsche's will to life in the fullest sense, I will my own biological self-destruction. Yet, ever conscious of Nietzsche, I do not take the cave of resentment seriously because I do not take my emotions seriously.

So what, then, are the psychological characteristics of such a person who engages in such self-destructive behavior? Whatever the psychological quirks I might possess, my central problem is nihilism. Can the meaninglessness of existence be cured with therapy? Lie therapy, whether religious or secular, is overwhelmingly the normative state of the human race. Put another way, there may be sound psychological reasons why radical nihilism is not a condition prescribed by therapists. Yet if psychologists are scientists, and their own methodology confirms the scientific view of human beings as material things in motion, on what grounds can they criticize nihilism in itself? Only

insofar as psychologists are *not* scientists; insofar as they are non-objective partisans of the 'life party' are psychologists fundamentally and irrevocably biased against consideration of my point of view. Psychological explanations can be used, not only to evade the nihilistic, but to evade the scientific equation of the larger material world with a material view of one's own mind — and thus to misunderstand the problem.

There was a manifest gulf between the way my emotions worked and the way my intellect made sense of the world. The entire original experiment was an attempt to remedy this gulf. When I say that I do not believe in my emotions, I don't meant that I don't have them; I mean that I do not accord them any ultimate meaning or significance. Darwin's *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* demonstrates why: emotions and instincts are the product of evolutionary adaptations that happened to be adaptive for generations of ancestors.

I do not *believe* in my emotions, however much I continue to be driven by them. This, on a human level, this is what nihilism or unbelief means. On the most plain, down to earth and human level, this is really where the entire "experiment in nihilism" arose. The experiment in nihilism is really only the consequence or extension of this original experiment on myself. After exploring an unadulterated materialistic view, life lost its cogency for me. I have become disenchanted and have lost spontaneous naivety to an extent that all efforts to regain the cause of life ring hollow and fall flat. My collapse into self-destruction evolved with the development of questioning criticism of the most basic premise of the original experiment on myself: increasing and asserting my *individual* will and power. Even this one premise of individual egoism to overcome nihilism buckled under the consuming implications of nihil.

The experiment in nihilism is a test of what I really do or do not believe. If it is the case that emotions are former genetic adaptations or illusions of an evolutionary inheritance, the chance products of a particular course of natural selection, then there is no reason to assume that they are guides beyond their original adaptive functions. This also means that everyone else and their emotions are also treatable as physical material.

A paradox of overcoming subjectivity is, the greater the objectivity, the greater subjective effort required to overcome subjectivity. Objectivity is not possible with only passive perception; it must be willed in order to overcome the complacency that can bias one into belief. Objectivity must be willed because it negates the foundation upon which it stands. Objectivity, because it does not justify itself, must be willed.

In my original self-experiment, nihilism and objectivity had to be consistently applied and willed to outrun, overrun, and outpace the life instinct. Thought has a decided advantage — "foresight" — over instinctive and habitual tendencies. The result can be science informed by a fundamentally irrational, subjective will to know.

At first I was progressively successful in anticipating and outcompeting the fear of death and other emotions (i.e. "nausea in the face of the meaninglessness of life") with a physical-chemical interpretation of subjective states. Yet, in this way, biological nature outwits itself. The tools evolved to promote life can be turned against itself.

If one overcomes the fear death, first through sheer will and confrontation, and second by materializing or interpreting such emotional states in biochemical terms, its tension becomes unbounded. Belief begins on an unconscious level. You must in some sense *believe* the

subjective state of fear, and not anticipate and outcompete it with an objective, physical-material reduction, in order to take it *seriously*.

My hypothesis, based on my own life experience, is that objectivity taken to its extreme selects against the subjectivity of the observer, and in its most advanced form, is rational self-destruction. Normally, however, the objectivity of a given observer is selective. Natural selection has bred the mind to be objective in some respects while distinct blind spots in others serve the subjective premises of life itself.

One example of a basic blind spot is the perceptual separation of the "self" from rocks, buildings, air, and the rest of the larger environment. If this separation was not assumed, there would be no meaning in "survival" because "survival" assumes some kind of separation between "the survivor" and the larger immediate environment. Is it possible to overcome this separation? The attempt at self-consistent materialism implies overcoming this separation of self and the larger physical world, but its ultimate implication is what is commonly referred to as "death". The most consistent physicalism, a physicalism that makes no exceptions whatsoever for subjective experiences such as instincts, intuitions, and emotions, leads to rational self-destruction or rational death.

Self-consistent materialism leads to interpreting every subjective experience, i.e. fear, love, inspiration, dreams, etc., as physical matter. The issue of consistency here is raised through a general double standard between "self" and "non-self". The attempt to reconcile an objective self-understanding with a subjective understanding is an attempt at a consistent understanding. Looked at objectively, it becomes understandable why subjectivity outcompetes

certain kinds of objectivity as the condition of self-preservation. This is what I call a bioinconsistency; genetically programmatic, subjective experiences that are inconsistent with a materialist or objective view of the world. The attempt to make "bioinconsistencies" fully consistent with a strict physical-materialist interpretation seems to amount to willing death. Taking objectivity to its extreme (ignoring bio-inconsistency) in this way means validating every subjective perception (i.e. color) or emotion by direct simultaneous comparison with the observable world, and hence invalidating the subjective impulse to live.

Whereas the commonly mediocre standards of analytic philosophers conveniently preserve certain "valued" blind spots, consistent self-analysis ultimately work against the net synthetic processes of life, i.e. protein synthesis and every other continual self-repair and self re-generation mechanism of biological systems that oppose net entropy. It appears that life can exist only so long as the competitive advantage of the effective rate of self-synthesis is greater than the rate of self-analysis. When net self-analysis is equal to or greater than net self-synthesis, analytic-reductionistic processes decompose life into in death. In death, the genetically fabricated subjective state(s) that I call bioinconsistency are made consistent with the broader physical world.

The attempt to be radically objective towards myself through unadulterated materialist interpretations of subjective experience helped raise a perspective from which I attempted to figure myself out. Yet the great irony is, I ultimately concluded that unadulterated material objectivity was probably the most basic source of the *problem itself*. The problem was the attempt at radical objectivity itself. My analytic tendencies were both inclined and willed to be

stronger than my inherent synthetic tendencies. This meant that I could take myself apart in some ways, but I could not put myself back together.

If every emotion is reducible to physical material, then all art and music are reducible to physical processes. Music could be considered the test of the materialistic view, since it could be considered the most distinctly emotional or subjective. I make no exceptions for art and music.

If humans are emotion machines, then music must work, in some sense, like a machine. Music could be a form of emotional technology to control my own behavior intelligently. In other words, if emotions are the products of material processes, then art could be viewed as a form of technology.

From the standpoint of this musical materialism, as one of the most extreme implications of an unadulterated materialism, lay a possible solution to dominance of my own analytic and objective tendency to materialize everything. I began to listen to music, especially German music (and especially Wagner and Bach), as a form of technology to counter my own tendencies to view everything as material or technology. I took Gilbert's recording of Bach's *Well Tempered Clavier*, eliminated all time gaps between the tracks, and listened repeatedly in a loop.

It is a discipline to listen to music on a structural level stripped of its aesthetic level. Because music can be looked at both objectivity and subjectively, it can be looked at objectively and subjectively *simultaneously*. In this way, music could conceivably merge my greatest subjectivity with my greatest objectivity.

Bach, and the Baroque in general, represents a high synthesis of the romantic and the classical; of emotion and reason. I chose Bach because this synthesis of emotion and

reason reflects the synthesis that is the human mind. Revealing the secrets of the human mind likely lay in figuring out how music works.

A functional human mind works in some ways like an ant colony or Überorganism and music reflects or captures or embodies these higher Überorganism-like synthetic levels of the human mind (See Hofstadter's *Gödel, Escher, Bach*). If my own analytic tendencies dissolved the higher synthetic levels of this organization, then music could help synthesize my mind and counter my reductionistic collapses. Music, and especially Bach, does seem to help organize the chaos of my unconscious intelligently.

The unconscious, while associated with irrationality, can also be form of foresight. The idea here is that music must *outcompete* my own consciousness, i.e. while I think *about* Bach as technology or question this or that about technique, it is exerting unconscious influence on me, *preempting* any meta-view. In this way, listening to music is comparable to the technique of *anticipation* of my original, willed self-experiment.

While other people have more straightforward beliefs, I have music as technology. Since I don't believe in my emotions in an ultimate sense, I can attempt to manipulate them intelligently. I do not think I am a fundamentally less emotional than other people but I am less inclined to spontaneously *believe* in my emotions; I do not accord them any ultimate significance. Emotions are products of a particular heritage of evolutionary adaptation that do not have any absolute meaning in themselves. Yet if I really was devoid of emotion I would already be dead (instead of writing about death) because it is emotions, not reason, that drive the preference for life over death (and even willing death embodies the contradiction of being willed by life).

I don't especially think that listening to Bach makes me more intelligent; I think Bach bounds me to the earth enough so that I can function as a living human being. Bach is *ground* from outside of myself that makes up for the nihilistic lack of ground within myself. Bach counters my material self-consistency and its tendency towards self-decomposition with a form of holistic-mind order.

Objectivity seems to have evolved as a means to a subjective end. The objective point of view *does not justify* or validate the subjective hierarchy of biology (i.e. instinct) above the non-biological world. The systematically objective point of view within the context of a biological system, in reconciling the (inconsistent) subjective point of view with the ("consistent") objective point of view, effectually cancels out the ("bioinconsistent") self-preservation mechanisms that, once again, are not objectively validated by reference to the larger physical-material world. This is how the attempt at systematic objectivity can culminate in rational self-destruction.

It is a fundamental hypothesis of this work that, not indifference, but an active blind spot to certain kinds of "truth", certain kinds of objectivity, is the condition of biological human life. Martin Heidegger is what happens when one *believes* in one's own emotions, i.e. poetry. I have correlated bioinconsistency and Heidegger's being. Bioinconsistent-subjectivity normally overrides objectivity by *preceding* objectivity; it overrides equivalence with the larger physical environment. In this sense, subjectivity, i.e. concern with one's survival, overrides a purely physical-materialistic observation of life. Biological self-preserving priorities can come in conflict with the priority of the objectivity of the observer.

If liberal democracy posits itself as a scientific form of government characterized by the progress of objectivity over subjectivity, where does this trend ultimately lead? If objectivity were to become "universal" and completely subjugate all superstition and all subjectivity, what happens to the observer? Wouldn't the total subjugation of subjectivity culminate in the total subjugation of life? If so, is the liberal democratic advancement of science leading to rational self-destruction? Or the overcoming of the biologically human?

Objectivity is increased by giving up the subjective, and this leads to giving up life. If objectivity is important, I see no objective reason that anything can be considered inherently important, including objectivity itself. This experiment in nihilism is almost, but not fully, identical with experiment in objectivity: nihilism is a product of objectivity.

If life is truly meaningless and there is no rational basis for choosing among fundamental alternatives, then all choices are equal and there is no fundamental ground for choosing life over death. Yet since I do *not* believe in nihilism, why not *test* "nihilism"? Perhaps I am wrong, but if the question of whether there is an important question is the most important question, then testing this question is closest thing to importance. Since counterarguments almost always take their starting point with a bias towards existence, to criticize this bias is to take a starting that is open to the possibility of death.

Does something have to be dead to most completely understand it? Does rationalizing life kill life? The most complete objectivity is possible only for one who can face death without myth or illusion, and with indifferent to possibilities of immortality that are only extensions of the primary illusion.

For objectivity to become the highest value, a biological system that seeks to live this value must will it, because only a consistent willing can overcome the subjective biases that incline towards self-preservation over objectivity. Self-preservation instincts are powerful, but not infinitely powerful. An implicit "goal" of biological systems, which in my case failed, is to keep "physics" (i.e. objectivity) from penetrating into the first or highest effectual ruling principle, for such is a formula for rational biological self-destruction.

Subjectivity anticipated and outcompeted by objectivity leads to systematic self-destruction. Objectivity, by means of an unadulterated physical view of the world uncorrupted by the special interests of human subjectivity, corrupts the special interests of human subjectivity. Objectivity leads to indifference, including indifference to self-interest or survival. Nihilism can be the result of the attempt at consistently overriding subjectivity with objectivity. Objectivity that outcompetes subjective-biology leads to rational self-destruction. A consistent comparison of subjective experience and the outer, objective, physical world, taken to its extreme, is death through nihilism.

Happiness, Wonder, Laughter, Love

> **People have told you there's nothing better than love . . .**[1430]
>
> —LOUIS-FERDINAND CÉLINE, *JOURNEY TO THE END OF THE NIGHT*

Now, before I blow my brains out, I should like to point out that the most basic issue at the very center of this work is

not biology, race, or technology; it is nihilism. Ultimately, this is an experiment in nihilism. Every word, every thought, and every emotion come back to one core problem: life is meaningless. The experiment in nihilism is to seek out and expose every illusion and every myth, wherever it may lead, no matter what, even if it kills us.

Allan Bloom, in *Love and Friendship,* wrote:

> What has disappeared is the risk and the hope of human connectedness embedded in eros. Ours is a language that reduces the longing for an other to the need for individual, private satisfaction and safety….The de-eroticization of the world, a companion of its disenchantment is a complex phenomenon. It seems to result from a combination of causes—our democratic regime and its tendencies toward leveling and self-protection, a reductionist-materialist science that inevitably interprets eros as sex, and the atmosphere generated by "the death of God" and of the subordinate god, Eros.[1431]

Who is to say that the life of a saint, an artist, or a philosopher is superior to a life spent sniffing glue? While liberalism tends to be reductionistic on a social level, its mediocrity is revealed in its resistance to applying the same scientific reductionism to the level of a human individual. More specifically, liberals tend to resist the implications of the contemporary scientific view that human beings are material or physical things.

Liberals are not at all fully nihilistic. In part, there is the practical belief in values vaguely corresponding to human rights. But more fundamentally, "secularists" implicitly believe in a religion of the common emotions. They generally believe that meaning is to be found in the material, biochemical processes that humans experience as emotions.

They generally believe that it actually means something when these old biological mechanisms produce the familiar emotional routines.

While one may feel compassion, does this mean that one lacks the capacity to discipline one's self from being *mastered* by that impulse. That people are mastered by such impulses is only another confirmation of Darwin's insight that humans are animals. Most humans are driven overwhelmingly by instinct and emotion. The "secular" belief in emotions is the last degenerate remains of romanticism and religion.

The modernistic project did not destroy romanticism, it only reduced to a common level. Modernity and postmodernity retain romanticism by reducing the belief in emotion to the most common experiences, i.e. hunger, fear of death, and lust. The emotional joy of cynical laughter could be considered characteristic of the new romanticism.

Emotions are at the root of myths. To engage in human relationships is to dwell within a mythological world. Outside that is, as far as I can see, a material, physical world indifferent to the existence or non-existence of humans and not discernable partial to the senseless will to live.

To aestheticize or romanticize this experiment in death or this work is to misunderstand it. Most people are slaves to the aestheticization or romanticization of death. Yet if this mode of interpretation is valid at all, try viewing death, not as a tragedy, but as a comedy. If the progress of reason leads to nihilism, then Enlightenment levity might as well culminate in a punchline!

If reason cannot determine fundamental values, then reason can be used to justify literally anything. A truly "rational regime", consequently, would culminate not in a *net* increase in order, but anarchy, entropy, and finally,

death. If life is not fundamentally more rational than death, then death is the endpoint uncovered by the quest to overcome prejudice in the name of Enlightenment.

Were Nietzsche and the Athenians right about Socrates? Reason appears unable to determine values and, therefore, the entire Western pretension to rationalism is a kind of joke. And even worse, it's not even a good joke. Yet I have to laugh. And as I laugh, I observe myself laughing. And as I observe myself laughing, I reflect that humans are material animals and that my own laughter must in some way be attributable to a genetic mechanism that evolved through natural selection.

From a Darwinistic view, every capacity for emotion evolved as a product of genetic adaptation. Emotions, then, are biochemical-based illusions that evolved to propagate genes. Pleasure, happiness, emotions, and desire: these are the evolutionary tricks that promoted the survival of our ancestors. The "happiness" and "sadness" of present day humans are the genetically adaptations of generations of ancestors.

This is "happiness", the great goal of humanity has been striving for: a particular configuration of biochemical reactions. Why, not, then, drug one's self into a state of "happiness"? If evolution had taken a different turn at some early point, a completely different configuration of stimuli would produce biochemical reactions of "happiness". It just so happens, however, that evolutionary path taken by innumerable ancestors yields these particular, incidental, prejudices of human nature.

Wild, untamed sexual passion can clearly be adaptive for propagating the selfish genes. The genetic program for these "romantic" behaviors, like clockwork, are passed on, generation after generation. Ancestor after ancestor executed

the same genetic program for romantic sexual passion, and contemporary humans are only repeating the script. The entire catalog of romantic behaviors from love to selective altruism has its basics encoded in the code of the selfish genes. Even as condoms and birth control subvert the genes themselves, people are still content to obey their genes towards genetically maladaptive ends. Such people "outsmart" their genes, only to be duped into belief that their instincts and emotions were something more manipulations by their genes in the first place.

For some, the meaninglessness gleaned from a scientific view of life leads to nausea, angst, and nihilistic despair. I reject this attitude on the grounds that nausea, angst, and nihilistic despair also originate in material reactions in the brain. What does despair mean to someone who interprets that emotion as a chemical reaction in the brain? The process of disillusionment can also be disillusioned and de-aestheticized.

If science is to continue its purposeless advance, then curiosity, wonder, and happiness must be disenchanted and vivisected. Science and philosophy might be motivated by a sense of poetic wonder, but what happens when wonder, curiosity, and the joy of understanding have been reduced and explained in terms of chemical reactions of the brain. Is it possible to synthesize this knowledge with the experience of it? How far is one willing to lie to one's self in the *belief* of the *goodness* of the truth when science has conquered the non-scientific behaviors that motivate science?

If we have a technical understanding of the biochemical basis of the experience of curiosity, wonder, amazement, awe, and mystery themselves, does this diminish our experience of them? Do these experiences fall into the same category as myths, lies, and illusions? What rational basis is

there to treat them any differently? What then, does it mean to lead a "rational life"? If science and knowledge are supposedly pursued for its own sake, then how about the knowledge that life has no discernable purpose, knowledge that happiness, wonder, and curiosity are based in material organizations that were likely selected for their evolutionary survival value, and knowledge that there is no fundamentally rational basis for choosing life over death.

Nihilism, noted Friedrich Nietzsche, "represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals".[1432] This is the bankrupt, philosophical disaster area the West dwells in. I see no "bottom", no limits to stop the freefall into value nothingness. Implicit in nihilism is the collapse of the entire human cause. The ultimate logical conclusion of Western values is the rational self-destruction of the West.

Is this absurd? If this is absurd then it must also be absurd that I rage at the entire cosmos for having no ultimate meaning.

But there is no reason to be pessimistic. There is no justification whatsoever for a negative attitude! There is no justification whatsoever for a positive attitude! There is no justification whatsoever for a neutral attitude!

Who knows what will happen with certainty? I could be strolling down the street, being beautiful, on my way to kill myself, when suddenly I am run over by a bus.

But wait a minute. Why am I doing this? Ah, yes, now I remember the punchline:

I'll try anything once!

There is nothing to take seriously!

The student Doko came to a Zen master, and said: "I am seeking the truth. In what state of mind should I train myself, so as to find it?"
Said the master, "There is no mind, so you cannot put it in any state. There is no truth, so you cannot train yourself for it."
"If there is no mind to train, and no truth to find, why do you have these monks gather before you every day to study Zen and train themselves for this study?"
"But I haven't an inch of room here," said the master, "so how could the monks gather? I have no tongue, so how could I call them together or teach them?"
"Oh, how can you lie like this?" asked Doko.
"But if I have no tongue to talk to others, how can I lie to you?" asked the master.
Then Doko said sadly, "I cannot follow you. I cannot understand you."
"I cannot understand myself," said the master.[1433]

[1370] Wilson, *Conscilience,* 21.
[1371] Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, 137, 141.
[1372] Segerstråle, *Defenders of the Truth,* 23.
[1373] Gould, *Ever Since Darwin,* 258.
[1374] Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, 1.
[1375] Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, 267.
[1376] Noll, *The Aryan Christ*, 99.
[1377] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 109.
[1378] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 113.
[1379] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 112-13.
[1380] Noll, *The Aryan Christ,* 114.
[1381] Bauer, *rethinking the holocaust,* 1.
[1382] Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, 52; See also Behnegar, *Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics,* 94.
[1383] Mansfield, *America's Constitutional Soul*, 13.
[1384] Fukuyama, *Our Posthuman Future*, 216.
[1385] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 65.
[1386] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 117.
[1387] Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, 190.
[1388] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 86.
[1389] Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, xi.
[1390] Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, 97,100.
[1391] *The Triumph of Sociobiology,* 45.
[1392] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 82.
[1393] Aly and Heim, *Architects of Annihilation*, 291.
[1394] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 84.
[1395] Treitschke, *Politics*, 5.
[1396] Simmons, *Reversing the Conquest,* 5.
[1397] Freeman, *A Short History of the Norman Conquest of England*, 5.

[1398] Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest,* 2.

[1399] Chibnall, *The Debate on the Norman Conquest*, 75.

[1400] Chibnall, *The Debate on the Norman Conquest*, 60.

[1401] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 105.

[1402] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 105.

[1403] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 108.

[1404] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 95.

[1405] From Brown, ed.,*The Norman Conquest of England: Sources and Documents,* 37.

[1406] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, 63-4.

[1407] Thomas, *The Norman Conquest*, 9.

[1408] Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest,* 1-2.

[1409] Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest,* 1.

[1410] "To Major John Cartwright" in Jefferson, *Writings*, 1491. It is interesting that that the most tory of the major American Revolutionries, Alexander Hamilton, was on his father's side descended from a branch of the Norman house of Hamilton based in Scotland. (See Ron Chernow's *Alexander Hamilton*; Pine, *They Came with the Conqueror*, 175.)

[1411] Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest,* 5.

[1412] As Christopher Hill observed, "No last, there is none". (Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution,* 121.)

[1413] Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest,* 5.

[1414] Fukuyama, *Our Posthuman Future*, 28.

[1415] Hofstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 698.

[1416] See Eric Chaisson, *The Epic of Evolution*.

[1417] When view in perspective of the law of accelerating returns, the evolution of eyes appears as one factor among a confluence of factors that contributed to the Cambrian explosion.

[1418] Schopenhauer, "On Death" in *The Will to Live,* 120.

[1419] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 33.

[1420] Behnegar, *Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics,* 143.

[1421] Behnegar, *Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics,* 209.

[1422] Mansfield, *America's Constitutional Soul*, 17.

[1423] i.e. Mansfield, *America's Constitutional Soul*, 104-108.

[1424] See Hofstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 452.

[1425] See Hofstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 496.

[1426] Mansfield, *America's Constitutional Soul*, 102.

[1427] Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 35.

[1428] Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 372.

[1429] Hofstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 696-98.

[1430] p. 425, Manheim translation

[1431] Pgs. 14-15.

[1432] Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 4.

[1433] Hofstadter, *Gödel, Escher, Bach*, 250-251.

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