

# The Alternative Hypothesis Reader Excluding IQ Stuff

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# Peer Review, Replication and Publication Bias

In 2005, three MIT graduate students Jeremy Stribling, Dan Aguayo and Maxwell Krohn wrote the program SCIgen to generate fake papers. In their sting, they submitted a paper to the 2005 World Multiconference on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics. That paper was entitled “Router: A Methodology for the Typical Unification of Access Points and Redundancy”.

Here’s the abstract from the fake paper:

“Many physicists would agree that, had it not been for congestion control, the evaluation of web browsers might never have occurred. In fact, few hackers worldwide would disagree with the essential unification of voice-over-IP and public private key pair. In order to solve this riddle, we confirm that SMPs can be made stochastic, cacheable, and interposable...”

The three authors were invited to speak at the conference, where they exposed the hoax. The program SCIgen is available on the internet free to download and use by anyone.

As recently as 2013, at least 16 SCIgen papers have been found in Springer journals.

According to the paper by Dominique and Cyril Labbe entitled “Duplicate and Fake Publications in the Scientific Literature: How many SCIgen papers in Computer Science?”, SCIgen papers had an acceptance rate of 13.3% at the ACM digital library, and 28% for Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.

Now certainly the ACM digital library and the IEEE are not the most prestigious journals. But 16 got into Springer. Now I don’t know what percentage of SCIgen papers got in, but some did. And if completely bogus and ridiculous nonsense-jargon papers could get in at least some of time, what about papers which aren’t so transparently bogus? Whose authors are smarter liars than a text-spinning algorithm?

This is the point. Nobody would say that the prestigious journals are literally churning out thousands of SCIgen papers, but the fact that sometimes SCIgen papers can get through calls into question the seriousness of the peer review process.

Another sting operation was done by John Bohannon. Bohannon wrote essentially the same paper 304 times about some moss that inhibited cancer growth. The paper has glaring flaws that he describes in his Sciencemag article, “Who’s Afraid of Peer Review”.

Among them were descriptions of a correlation between moss exposure and cancer inhibition when his own chart showed zero correlation. He posed as researchers from various third-world institutes, using randomly generated names for the authors and institutions of his 304 fake papers, and moving paragraphs around.

These are the same text “spinning” techniques used by spammers to get past spam filters. He also ran his original text through google translate into French, and then back into English, and then manually corrected the biggest errors in the final translation. This was so he had the correct grammar, but the idiom of a foreign speaker.

The 304 slightly different papers were sent to 304 Journals. In total, 157 were accepted, 98 rejected, 29 were derelict, and 20 were still reviewing the paper by the time Bohannon published the results of his sting.

He sent the paper to 167 Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), and 121 to Jeffrey Beall's list, and 16 on both Beall's list and the DOAJ.

Beall's list is a list of Journals determined by Jeffrey Beall to be bogus. The Directory of Open Access Journals is run by Lars Bjørnshauge, a library scientist at Lund University in Sweden.

Bohannon says of the DOAJ,

“Without revealing my plan, I asked DOAJ staff members how journals make it onto their list. “The title must first be suggested to us through a form on our website,” explained DOAJ's Linnéa Stenson. “If a journal hasn't published enough, we contact the editor or publisher and ask them to come back to us when the title has published more content.” Before listing a journal, they review it based on information provided by the publisher.”

The results of the sting were as follows:

Reaction	DOAJ	Beall's List	Overlap
Rejected w/o peer review	44.4%	3.1%	3 (total)
Rejected with peer review	11.1%	10.3%	2 (total)
Accepted w/o peer review	24.3%	48.5%	6 (total)
Accepted with peer review	20.1%	38.1%	3 (total)
Total responses	144	97	14

The fact that junk journals accepted a junk article is not interesting. What is interesting is that journals run by Sage, Elsevier and Wolters Kluwer all accepted Bohannon's bogus paper.

Sage's journal named Journal of International Medical Research accepted the paper, Wolters Kluwer's journal Journal of Natural Pharmaceuticals accepted the paper, and Elsevier's journal Drug Intervention Today accepted the paper.

Springer, Sage, Wolters Kluwer and Elsevier all went into damage control mode with apologies and statements.

For example, Elsevier says that they don't actually own Drug Intervention Today. The problem though is that it's published by Elsevier, and anyone who reads something from Drug Intervention Today will see right up top a big “Elsevier” logo on it because it's published right along with Elsevier's other journals. The fact that they don't legally own the journal is a red herring; and this distinction was only highlighted by Elsevier when it got caught in this sting.

Same with Wolter Kulwer's Journal of Natural Pharmaceuticals. Wolters Kluwer shut down that journal in response to this sting. But there's no reason to believe that Journal of Natural Pharmaceuticals was any worse than any of Wolter Kluwer's other journals. That just happened to be the journal targeted by Bohannon's sting.

Borhannon's sting and the SCIgen sting show that horrifically bad papers can get through with some regularity. From what I see, these intentionally terrible SCIgen or Bohannon-esque papers get through the big, prestigious journals maybe 2% of the time.

Now, I am NOT saying that these big journals routinely publish papers that are as bad as the intentionally bad paper Bohannon wrote. I am saying that the fact that such “boringly bad” papers can occasionally get through – even into the damage-controlling big journals – calls into question the review process. If Bohannon’s paper can sometimes get through, how often do better-crafted fakes get through?

Another sting was done by Fiona Godlee, an editor of the British Medical Journal, in 1998. She took a paper which was about to be published in the British Medical Journal, modified it so it had 8 major errors, and then sent the paper to 420 reviewers. Only 221 of the reviewers responded. The median number of errors found by the respondents was 2, 35 respondents didn’t find a single error, and nobody found more than 5 errors.

In 2008, a similar study was done, again by Fiona Godlee, and again with BMJ reviewers. This time the paper had 9 “major errors” and 5 “minor errors”, and had 607 reviewers.

The study compared the effects of training reviewers on how many errors they caught. One group had face-to-face training, one group was self-taught, and the other had no training (the control).

These were the results:

Average number of major errors found by group (out of 9):

Group	Avg. Number of Errors Found
1 (Control)	2.74
2 (Self-Taught)	3.01
3 (Face to Face)	3.12

Average number of minor errors found by group (out of 5):

Group	Avg. Number of Errors Found
1 (Control)	1.07
2 (Self-Taught)	0.85
3 (Face to Face)	1.03

While presented as a study testing the efficacy of a reviewer training program, it is a de facto sting against the British Medical Journal.

In 2014 Journal Citation reports gave the British Medical Journal an impact factor of 16.378, putting it at 4<sup>th</sup> place among all general medical journals in the world. In my opinion, the fact that Fionna actually engaged in these stings is evidence that the British Medical Journal is probably better than average. That other journals, which don’t even bother with this kind of self-testing, are probably even worse.

In 1997, from the paper “Who Reviews the Reviewers? Feasibility of Using a Fictitious Manuscript to Evaluate Peer Reviewer Performance”, the authors sent an intentionally bad manuscript to all of the reviewers at Annals of Emergency Medicine. At the time of submission, the journal had an acceptance rate of 26%. Today the journal has an impact factor of around 4.33, which is average.

Of the 262 reviewers the text was sent to, the response was:

63 – No response  
117 – Rejection  
67 – Revision  
15 – Immediate acceptance

But keep in mind that the opinions of the reviewers who didn't respond would not be included in the decision to accept or reject the article.

In my opinion, this fake study would have a 1.4% chance of being published by Annals of Emergency Medicine. This assumes it would have 3 reviewers and require unanimous acceptance to get published by the editors, and that half of the reviewers who requested revision would later accept the paper, and half would later reject it.

So this paper probably would not have been accepted. But what was more interesting is the number of errors identified:

Verdict	Number of errors found on average
Accept	1.73
Reject	3.91
Revise	2.96
Total	3.423

Some of the highlights are:

Only 30.2% of reviewers noted that there was no randomization of treatment. Only 0.5%, as in one half of one percent, as in just one of the 199 reviewers, saw that the p-value calculations were incorrect. Only 10.6% noted that the drug being tested, Propranolol, wasn't being compared to a known agent.

Despite the fact that this article probably wouldn't be accepted based on my assumptions, the fact that so few of the intentionally planted errors were found is, in my opinion, a condemnation. And Annals of Emergency Medicine is an average journal it seems, so these results are probably typical.

In 2000, the journal Brain, which is an Oxford publication, looked into the agreement between reviewers of articles at other journals. Unfortunately, those journals only agreed to this on the condition that they remain anonymous. So we're trusting Oxford that they picked good journals.

Journal A:

Acceptance agreement: 47% vs. 42.5% by chance alone

Priority agreement: 35% vs. 42.5% by chance alone

Journal B:

Acceptance agreement: 61% vs. 45.74% by chance alone

Priority agreement: 61% vs. 46.32% by chance alone

By the way, I inferred the numbers for chance here by counting the pixels in the bar chart. This is something I find myself doing ALL THE TIME when looking at published peer reviewed papers.

## Replication

One other way to examine the efficacy of peer review is to look at replication. Now it's possible that some researcher can make a bogus study with bogus results, and other researchers will replicate bogus findings for whatever reason. It's also possible that a researcher will not quite follow the same methods, even though they think they are.

But the first step to replication is to have the methods available. In 2013, Melissa Haendel et. al. looked at 238 biomedical papers from 84 journals. Of all of the studies, she found the percent identifiable resources necessary for replication as follows:

Resource	Percent Identifiable
Antibody	44%
Cell Lines	43%
Constructs	25%
Knockdown Reagents	83%
Organisms	77%

Only 5 of the journals analyzed had, by her definition, "stringent" resource reporting guidelines. Another issue is author's straight up unwillingness to share data.

A report from the Institute of Medicine by Christine Lane entitled "Sharing Clinical Research Data: A Workshop" asked 389 researchers from 2008 to 2012 how willing they would be to share protocols and raw data (the bones).

In 2008, 80% of the respondents would be willing to share additional protocols beyond what was gone over in the methods section, but only 60% would be willing to share raw data.

In 2012, Only 60% of researchers said they were willing to provide additional protocols, and only 45% said they would be willing to share raw data.

Keep in mind this is just a survey. In my opinion, this overestimates how many REALLY would share this information.

Part of this may explain the difficulty of replication. In 2012 the company Amgen attempted to replicate 53 of what they labeled "landmark studies" on cancer. These are generally defined as studies which were published in "high impact" journals – journals that are cited a lot, and whose articles themselves have been cited a lot.

The result was that they failed to replicate 47 of the 53 studies selected. Maybe their difficulty in replicating had to do with not getting the original data and protocols, or maybe it's because those studies were bunk. Maybe Amgen had some axe to grind and the whole thing was done in bad faith.

But that's the problem. We don't know. It's just not being replicated.

Bayer had more success in attempting to replicate studies in 2011. Khusru Asadullah headed a replication attempt of 67 studies Bayer was interested in. Asadullah and the team were only able to replicate 14 of the 67 studies, marginally better than the Amgen sting.

One could say “conflict of interest” because these are corporate studies, not University ones. But this seems to be dubious since Bayer and Amgen did these replication attempts for the purpose of product development.

The website “psychfiledrawer.com” looks for replication attempts in the field of psychology. From their “article list” page, they show 20 successes at replication and 42 failures.

11 studies have only successful replications, 21 only have failed replications, and 5 have a mixture of successful and failed replications. This surprised me, as my preconception was that things like psychology and sociology would have MORE unsuccessful replications than things like medicine or computer science.

### **Bias Toward positive results**

Another major problem is the bias toward positive results:

In the November 2010 paper, “Testing for the Presence of Positive-Outcome Bias in Peer Review: A Randomized Controlled Trial”, the researchers sent two test manuscripts to 238 reviewers for The Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery and Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research.

They were randomly given a paper that showed the effect of giving an antibiotic after surgery. The two papers randomly assigned were identical in everything EXCEPT the conclusions. The version that showed no effect for the antibiotic was accepted 80% of the time, whereas the paper that concluded a positive effect was accepted 97.3% of the time.

In addition, the reviewers of the paper with no positive results found more methodological errors. This is evidence of something I suspected, which is that scientists will find more methodological problems with ideas they don’t find appealing, all else being equal.

From the paper, “Publication Bias: The “File-Drawer” Problem in Scientific Inference”, Jeffrey Scargle argued that researchers themselves are generally more interested in publishing positive results, while negative or “null hypothesis” results are filed away.

Combine this with the fact that reviewers themselves are probably biased toward positive results, and you have another reason to doubt peer review.

Studies showing that most studies usually aren’t replicable have been replicated many times. This is a robust finding.

Scott Armstrong from The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, wrote in my opinion a scathing subjective evaluation of what peer review is like in his paper “Peer Review for Journals: Evidence on Quality Control, Fairness, and Innovation”. The paper is mostly an analysis of other studies on Peer Review, but after looking at that data, here is how he described it:

“These papers are then reviewed by people who are working in related areas but generally not on that same problem. So the reviewers typically have less experience with the problem than do the authors....

*... Reviewers generally work without extrinsic rewards. Their names are not revealed, so their reputations do not depend on their doing high quality reviews...*

*... In any event, on average, reviewers spend between two and six hours in reviewing a paper although they often wait for months before doing their reviews. They seldom use structured procedures. Rarely do they contribute new*

*data or conduct analyses. Typically, they are not held accountable for following proper scientific procedures...*

*... Reviewers' recommendations often differ from one another, as shown by Cicchetti (1991). Most authors have probably experienced this. For example, here are reviews for one of my papers:*

*Referee #1: '... The paper is not deemed scientific enough to merit publication.'*

*Referee #2: '... This follows in the best tradition of science that encourages debate through replication.'*

*Authors are critical of the quality of the reviews that they receive. Bradley (1981) asked authors about their experience on the last compulsorily revised article published in a refereed journal. When asked whether the changes advocated by the referees were based on whim, bias, or personal preference, only 23% said none were, while 31% said that this applied to some important changes. Forty percent of the respondents said that some of the referees had not read the paper carefully."*

Now one may argue that while Peer Review is seriously flawed, it shows that the Universities are trying to create some method to combat bias, and as biased as they are, peer review boards are certainly less biased than the general public in general.

And maybe this is true, but the people who say it, I have not seen one who has given any real reason to believe that.

"So peer review is a flawed process, full of easily identified defects with little evidence that it works. Nevertheless, it is likely to remain central to science and journals because there is no obvious alternative, and scientists and editors have a continuing belief in peer review. How odd that science should be rooted in belief."

– Richard Smith, 13-year editor of the British Medical Journal

In terms of the benefits of the Journal System and Peer Review, there are two arguments that I have heard for it:

1. That peer review keeps out bad science
2. That it helps proliferate research

Regarding point #1, how on earth did researchers distinguish real science from quackery before peer review? Maybe it's because they themselves actually are capable of distinguishing it. After all, aren't they supposed to be experts? Why do you need referees, usually being 3 experts, to review something, before other experts can review it after it's published in the Journals?

And the evidence presented in this section on peer review I believe calls into question the general efficacy.

In terms of proliferating the research, maybe this was an important thing before the internet. I suspect not, as the real explosion in publications and science Journals didn't happen until after world war 2, which suggests something other than the logistics of idea proliferation were the cause.



But today, what do Journals do? Well they keep articles in limbo for 3-9 months or longer, which delays the article being reviewed by everyone else, then when they get published they're behind a paywall.

“Peer review” are two words that people like to say. All scientific papers are peer reviewed. All of these researchers have colleagues, and if they publish in a non-peer-reviewed journal, it gets criticisms, they then modify it, et cetera. Peer review is code for “got through the journal barrier”.

But after all of this, I am left wondering how it got this way.

In an article in The Guardian, Randy Schekman characterizes the situation thusly:

“We all know what distorting incentives have done to finance and banking. The incentives my colleagues face are not huge bonuses, but the professional rewards that accompany publication in prestigious journals – chiefly Nature, Cell and Science.

*These luxury journals are supposed to be the epitome of quality, publishing only the best research. Because funding and appointment panels often use place of publication as a proxy for quality of science, appearing in these titles often leads to grants and professorships.*

...

*It is common, and encouraged by many journals, for research to be judged by the impact factor of the journal that publishes it. But as a journal's score is an average, it says little about the quality of any individual piece of research. What is more, citation is sometimes, but not always, linked to quality. A paper can become highly cited because it is good science – or because it is eye-catching, provocative or wrong. Luxury-journal editors know this, so they accept papers that will make waves because they explore sexy subjects or make challenging claims. This influences the science that scientists do. It builds bubbles in fashionable fields where researchers can make the bold claims these journals want, while discouraging other important work, such as replication studies.*

*In extreme cases, the lure of the luxury journal can encourage the cutting of corners, and contribute to the escalating number of papers that are retracted as flawed or fraudulent. Science alone has recently retracted high-profile papers reporting cloned human embryos, links between littering and violence, and the genetic profiles of centenarians. Perhaps worse, it has not retracted claims that a microbe is able to use arsenic in its DNA instead of phosphorus, despite overwhelming scientific criticism.*

...

*Like many successful researchers, I have published in the big brands, including the papers that won me the Nobel prize for medicine, which I will be honoured to collect tomorrow.. But no longer. I have now committed my lab to avoiding luxury journals, and I encourage others to do likewise.*

*Just as Wall Street needs to break the hold of the bonus culture, which drives risk-taking that is rational for individuals but damaging to the financial system, so science must break the tyranny of the luxury journals. The result will be better research that better serves science and society.”*

So how did this happen? Well I think that the rise of peer review, and the shockingly baseless acceptance of it, is related to the increase in immediate power of the University.

According to the paper, “The rate of growth in scientific publication and the decline in coverage provided by Science Citation Index”, there were roughly 32 times as many Chemistry papers published in 2012 than there in 1937. This is based on the overall rate of increase they showed from 1907 to 2007, and then I continued the trend out a few more years.

Chemistry Papers as multiple of 1907 value (1907 value = 1)

1907 – 1

1922 – 2

1937 – 4

1952 – 8

1967 – 16

1982 – 32

1997 – 64

2012\* – 128

Mathematics Papers as a multiple of 1907 value

1907 – 1

1919 – 2

1931 – 4

1943 – 8

1955 – 16

1967 – 32

1979 – 64

1991 – 128

2003 – 256

2015\* – 512

These are not exact figures, just approximations. However, the magnitude of the increase is so great that the qualitative argument I am making: that science has been inflated into a science industry, is still supported. Half the magnitude of increase shown here (or double it), and the argument will still be supported.

And that argument is that there is a great journal industry. The big journals don't provide anything of real value. Yes there are some subscriptions, and Universities are sure to stock up on all the best journals! But that's not really the point. Universities have these journals for the authority points, and people publish in the journals for the authority points.

Universities like to be able to say that their professors are published in all the best journals, and when getting research funding from organizations like the National Science Foundation (established in 1950) it's made easier by being published in all sorts of journals.

Professors are increasingly judged by how much they are published, and in what journals, and how often they are cited.

And this great journal industry, this great scam, this sham, this hoax has resulted in professors teaching less, teaching assistants teaching the actual classes at college, and as a result increasing the volume of research papers being published every year.

The increasingly authoritarian nature of the University, created largely by the rise of peer review, has in my opinion produced ANOTHER kind of authoritarianism – an authoritarian view of knowledge and truth.

Because there are so many papers, and these papers use unnecessary mathematical tricks that are difficult to understand, and they are behind paywalls, this creates an impenetrable mass on any subject. And so if, for example, you wish to say that global warming is a great big scientific siren song, one common response is to point to the great mass of impenetrable research.

And it is impenetrable in 3 ways:

1. It's volume – caused by professors wanting to get published in peer-reviewed journals so they can get tenure. **1.486 million** research papers were published in 2010
2. The literal paywalls – caused by professors publishing in peer-reviewed journals instead of publicly available locations because they want to “get published”
3. The use of unnecessary mathematical techniques and obscure language – caused by researchers who want to produce big effect sizes in a paper where there are none and hide problems behind obscure language that referees only sometimes recognize

In conjunction with overspecialization, the increasing impenetrableness of research has the effect of scientists just going along with consensus - if they even know what the consensus even is. You can't argue about a topic because you literally can't read the research.

And so a great number of people, especially a certain kind of people, simply go with cues. Their thinking goes like this:

“Scientists are supermen. They speak a completely different language, understand mathematical and statistical concepts at a level I never will, and they are 99% honest because the hanging razor of peer review and discerning eyes on their work.”

And so when there is an argument between perceived University consensus and someone who opposes it, there are these people who are impervious to argument. They think,

“Well, you may pose some tricky questions and objections that I can't counter, but one of these scientist supermen easily could. Really, this isn't an exchange. This is me trying to advance the true view – established by supermen in Universities via the peer review process – against the heathens.”

On a final note, one problem with the criticism of peer review you normally hear is that it is reformist. Reform is for something that has worked in the past but has stopped working. There's no evidence that peer review ever worked, so there's no need for reform. Just abolish it.

It's a practice that emerged in response to social pressures and University status-games, not scientific necessity. It emerged from the ugliest traits in people, and it is an authoritarian truth filter that belongs in the middle ages. It lies by calling itself "peer review" and says that anyone who opposes journal judgment is against peer review, and it's just another tool to make the lives of heterodox scientists even more difficult.

It is a medieval process that ought to be scrapped root and branch.

Peer review: a flawed process at the heart of science and journals:

<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1420798/>

"Peer Review for Journals: Evidence on Quality Control, Fairness, and Innovation" – J. Scott Armstrong

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania :

[http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1110&context=marketing\\_papers](http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1110&context=marketing_papers)

"Duplicate and Fake Publications in the Scientific Literature: How many SCiGen papers in Computer Science?" – Cyril Labbe and Dominique Labbe

<https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00641906v2/document>

The "Rooter" Paper:

<http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/scigen/rooter.pdf>

"Who's Afraid of Peer Review" by John Bohannon

<http://www.sciencemag.org/content/342/6154/60.full>

GENDER FACTORS IN REVIEWER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANUSCRIPT PUBLICATION – Margaret E. Lloyd:

<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1286270/pdf/jaba00090-0150.pdf>

Accuracy of References in Five Entomology Journals – Cynthia Kristof:

<http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED389341.pdf>

Statistical Reviewing for Medical Journals:

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.471.730&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

Confirmational response bias among social work journals:

<http://sth.sagepub.com/content/15/1/9.abstract>

What errors do peer reviewers detect, and does training improve their ability to detect them? – Fiona Godlee et. al. , 2008 :

<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2586872/>

Melissa Haendel – "On the reproducibility of science: unique identification of research resources in the biomedical literature" –

<https://peerj.com/articles/148/>

"Sharing Clinical Research Data: A Workshop," –

<http://blogs.nature.com/spoonful/2013/09/researchers-less-willing-to-share-study-details-according-to-journals-survey.html>

Amgen Replication attempts:

<http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v483/n7391/full/483531a.html>

Bayer Replication attempts:

<http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v10/n9/full/nrd3439-c1.html>

Psych File Drawer:

[http://www.psychfiledrawer.org/view\\_article\\_list.php](http://www.psychfiledrawer.org/view_article_list.php)

“Who Reviews the Reviewers? Feasibility of Using a Fictitious Manuscript to Evaluate Peer Reviewer Performance”:

[http://www.annemergmed.com/article/S0196-0644\(98\)70006-X/fulltext](http://www.annemergmed.com/article/S0196-0644(98)70006-X/fulltext)

Oxford Reviewer agreement study:

<http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content/123/9/1964>

Randy Sheckman’s guardian article:

<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/09/how-journals-nature-science-cell-damage-science>

The rate of growth in scientific publication and the decline in coverage provided by Science Citation Index:

<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2909426/>

Testing for the Presence of Positive-Outcome Bias in Peer Review A Randomized Controlled Trial:

<http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=226270>

Publication Bias: The “File-Drawer” Problem in Scientific Inference:

[http://www.scientificexploration.org/journal/jse\\_14\\_1\\_scargle.pdf](http://www.scientificexploration.org/journal/jse_14_1_scargle.pdf)

# Expert Speech

What we see throughout history is a nearly unbroken chain of time when some theory that will ultimately overtake and revolutionize a field is being marginalized by the current experts in the field.

## Line By Line

**John Astruc**, physician to Louis 14<sup>th</sup>, set out to jam down on Germ Theory once and for all.

*"There are some, however, whom I forebear now to spend time in imputing, such as Augustus Hauptman and Christian Langius, who think that the venereal disease is nothing else but a numerous school of nimble, brisk, invisible living things, of a very prolific nature, which when once admitted, increase and multiply in abundance, which lead frequent colonies to different parts of the body and inflame, erode and exulcerate the parts they fix on..."* "In short, which without regard to the particular quality of any humor occasion all the symptoms that occur in venereal disease. But as these are mere visionary imaginations, UNSUPPORTED BY ANY AUTHORITY, they do not require any argument to refute them..." "If it were once admitted that the venereal disease could be produced by invisible living things swimming in the blood, one might with equal reason allege the same thing, not only of plague, as Athanasius Kircher, the Jesuit, and John Saguens, a Minim, lately have done. Germs could also be said to cause hydrophobia, itch, tetters and other contagious diseases, and indeed all the distempers whatsoever; and thus the whole Theory of Medicine would fall to the ground, as nothing could be said to prove the venereal disease depending upon little living things which might not be urged to prove that all other diseases were derived from the like little living things though of a different species - THAN WHICH NOTHING COULD BE MORE RIDICULOUS."

Between 1546 and 1846, scientists had to battle to get Germ theory to have the light of day. For most people, the quote above is rather humorous. But to those who have said unpopular things and been mobbed, it is close and real.

The story of **Ignaz Semmelweis** is also instructive.

Semmelweis has a Hungarian obstetrician who worked in the Vienna General hospital in 1847. He discovered that the women in ward 1 had a much higher incidence of puerperal fever than ward 2. It was so much higher that ward 1 was called the ward of death, and women would physically resist being put in that ward.

What was happening is doctors would work on corpses, then deliver babies in ward 1. Semmelweis found that the incidence of puerperal fever could be reduced to zero if the doctors would just wash their hands in a light solution of carbolic acid.

Despite the predictable result of puerperal fever being virtually eradicated as a result of Semmelweis' policy, Semmelweis' idea never caught on his lifetime. Semmelweis spent the rest of his life arguing for doctors to wash their damned hands, and went insane and died in a nuthouse. We can only speculate as to why he went insane.

The popular explanation of puerperal fever at the time was that it was **psychosomatic**. Mid-1800s. Psychosomatic. Not a new idea.

In 1854 there was a Cholera outbreak in London. **John Snow** went to investigate the cause, and he operated on the then unfashionable germ theory. By mapping the Cholera outbreaks

on a map of London, he narrowed the source of the outbreak to the Broad Street water pump where people went to get water.

The pump was disabled, and the outbreak promptly died. As it turned out, the pump was built over a cesspit that was forgotten about.

John Snow then tried to get the town to adopt a general policy to reduce fecal contamination of water. The officials refused, and refused to accept the germ theory of disease, saying it was too depressing to even contemplate. So even when the theory was applied and worked, it didn't sway the authorities.

But Snow did manage to persuade a Reverend Henry Whitehead who set out to debunk him. Whitehead held to the Miasma (bad air) theory of disease, and in the process of trying to refute snow, came to be convinced by Snow and a believer in germ theory. This is when church and the university weren't as separate as they are now.

Lets go back to **William Harvey**. William Harvey in 1628 challenged Galen, claiming that the heart pumped blood throughout the body. Galen believed that blood was generated in the heart and liver, and then would be created as the organs consumed it. Harvey wasn't taken seriously and was generally seen as a eccentric joke for going up against the established theories of Galen.

It wasn't until **Marcello Lapighi**, when looking at a bat's wing, found capillaries and could show how blood flowed into the veins, that the circulation theory of blood gained ground. But it's instructive that Galen's idea had zero evidence, just tradition, but to uproot the evidence-less tradition required evidence.

**Luigi Galvani** was referred to as "The Frog's Dancing Master" by his contemporaries for arguing for the existence of animal electricity. Alessandro Volta managed to produce electricity by chemical means, and so Galvani was seen as something of a joke, his experiments seen as producing electricity chemically near a frog's legs and claiming the existence of animal electricity.

Of course we now know that electrical signals are vital to move muscles in the body, but he was ridiculed at the time. On a side note, Galvani opposed the French Revolution and predicted it would end in disaster.

In 1794, **Chladni** was ridiculed for his belief in the existence of meteorites.

In 1810, **Goethe** and his theory of colors.

In the early 1800s, **Carl Gauss** spoke but never published anything on non-euclidian geometry for fear of ridicule. Nikolai Lobachevsky later published writings on non-euclidian geometry and was ridiculed, and it took decades still for non-euclidian geometry to be generally accepted.

In 1827, **Georg Ohm** set up a series of experiments to measure electrical resistance, eventually leading, in 1881, to the Ohm being adopted as the official unit for the measure of electrical resistance.

During his lifetime, however, he got no respect. One reviewer said of Ohm's work,

*"[it] is a web of naked fancies, which can never find the semblance of support from even the most superficial observation of facts; he who looks on the world with the eye of reverence must turn aside from this as the result of an incurable delusion, whose sole effort is to detract from the dignity of nature."*

The Prussian minister of education in 1830 said of Ohm's work, "*A professor who preached such heresies is unworthy to teach science.*"

In 1842, **Christian Doppler** proposed the optical Doppler effect, the red-shift and blue-shift, but was opposed for 26 years because his theory didn't fit with the then established Luminiferous Aether theory. Doppler was proven right in 1868 when Huggins found red and blue shifts in stars.

In 1887, **Svante Arrhenius** introduced the idea that atoms could have ions – that is they could be missing or have an extra electron. This went at odds with conventional thinking that atoms were indivisible, because the Greek origin of the term. Those Greeks I tell ya. They had things to say.

**John Baird** and his television camera were laughed at in 1902.

Here's something few have heard about: the **Wright brothers** actually spent a year after Kittyhawk flying their plane next to a busy rail line in Dayton Ohio. Authorities refused to come to the demonstrations, the Scientific American published stories debunking the "Lying Brothers", and the local newspaper never bothered to even send a reporter, but they did complain about the local crazies who swore they saw the thing fly. It wasn't until the Wright Brothers went to Europe that the invention was an overnight sensation.

The US authorities weren't just "slow to react" as the history channel will say. They downright denied it.

In 1912, **Alfred Wegener** pushed the idea of plate tectonics. Dr. Rollin T. Chamberlain of the University of Chicago said,

*"Wegener's hypothesis in general is of the footloose type, in that it takes considerable liberty with our globe, and is less bound by restrictions or tied down by awkward, ugly facts than most rival theories."*

Pierre Termier, the director of the Geological Survey of France, said Wegener's work was, *"a beautiful dream, the dream of a great poet. One tries to embrace it, and finds that he has in his arms but a little vapor and smoke; it is at the same time both alluring and intangible."*

The president of the American Philosophical Society said,

*"Anyone who valued his reputation for scientific sanity would never dare support such a theory."*

Edward Berry, a professor of paleontology at Johns Hopkins, said,

*"My principal objection to the Wegener hypothesis rests on the author's method. This, in my opinion, is not scientific, but takes the familiar course of an initial idea, a selective search through the literature for corroborative evidence, ignoring most of the facts that are opposed to the idea, and ending in a state of auto-intoxication in which the subjective idea comes to be considered as an objective fact"*

In 1926, Rollin Chamberlain said,

*"If we are to believe Wegener's hypothesis, we must forget everything which has been learned about earth science in the last 70 years and start all over again."*



The theory of plate tectonics wasn't accepted until the 1960s.

On the topic of geology, in 1923 **Harlen Bretz** put forth the theory based on the Washington scablands that the landscape could be shaped by massive, catastrophic events, such as floods. This was at odds with the uniformitarian view. Bretz was not kindly recognized by the establishment, who immediately pounced on it as outrageously wrong and in need of debunking.

Bretz came into contact with Joseph Pardee who was convinced of Bretz's work. Pardee wanted to work with Bretz, but was dissuaded by his employer who threatened to fire him if he associate with Bretz.

Then in 1927, the matter came to a head when Bretz was invited to a debate at the Geological Society of Washington. There were six authoritative geologists lined up to oppose Bretz. And they completely trounced Bretz, and many of Bretz's former supporters abandoned him after this debate.

In 1940, there was a field trip organized by that same society to the Scablands designed to put to rest any doubt. Bretz was invited, but declined for fear of further ridicule. On the trip, there were 8 geologists who went, and they all sat around and reported their findings, until Pardee stood up, and quietly explained certain formations that could have only formed from a massive, catastrophic event.

Pardee was not blackballed for this act, his input merely quietly acknowledged, then ignored. It wasn't until the 1970s that Bretz's ideas were generally accepted.

In 1919, **Robert Goddard** had been making some liquid-fueled rockets, and hypothesized that with the right design and scale, such a rocket could break earth's orbit and perhaps even reach the moon. That year he published a book entitled, "A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes" where he outlined all of this.

He was criticized by the New York Times, which said that a rocket could never break the atmosphere because it would have nothing to push against, and claimed Goddard didn't understand basic high school physics. Goddard had his funding cut, was blackballed, acquaintances turned away – you know the drill.

In 1931, **Karl Jansky**, an amateur astronomer, had been experimenting with radio equipment and built a radio telescope. Not blackballed, but ignored by contemporary astronomers who were all using optical telescopes.

The case of **Ernst Stueckelberg**, is illustrative not because of any mobbing or blackballing like with the others, but because of what he discovered and how the credit went to others who were better at presenting;

1934: He devised a fully covariant perturbation theory for quantum fields that was more powerful than other formulations at the time

1935: He gave vector boson exchange as the theoretical explanation for the strong nuclear force. Normally credited to Yukawa who discovered it independently at the same time.

1938: He discovered that massive electrodynamics contain a hidden scalar, which would become known later as the Abelian Higgs mechanism.

1942: He proposed the interpretation of the positron as a negative energy electron traveling back in time, which is an observation credited to Feynman.

1943: He came up with a renormalization program to attack the problems of infinities in quantum electrodynamics. This was a precursor to something Frynman, Schwinger and Tomanga won a Nobel Prize for but he got no mention.

1953: He and Andre Petermann discovered the renormalization group, but Kenneth Wilson took the Nobel Prize for it after applying it to something important.

The point here is the inherently social nature of academia. Zwicky and Zweig are also examples of brilliant people who just didn't get on well.

In 1948 **Barbara McClintock**, who discovered transposons and the role of Activators and Dissociators in the DNA sequence. She wrote of her experience:

*“Over the years I have found that it was difficult if not impossible to bring to consciousness of another person the nature of his tacit assumptions when, by some special experiences, I have been made aware of them. This became painfully evident to me in my attempts during the 1950s to convince geneticists that the action of genes had to be and was controlled. It is now equally painful to recognize the fixity of assumptions that many persons hold on the nature of controlling elements in [corn] and the manners of their operation. One must await the right time for conceptual change.”*

Basically she's saying researchers were unaware of their assumptions, even when she would point them out.

We saw similar things happen with **Francis Rous** and his idea of viral cancer in 1911, **Joseph Goldberger** regarding Pellegra, **Fritz Zwicky** on dark matter, **George Zweig** on quarks, and **Chandrasekhar** on black holes.

**Lynn Margulis** on Endosymbiotic Organelles. Today, textbooks usually quote her discovery as fact, but don't mention the dogmatic opposition to it. How she was denied funding and told to never apply again.

**Fernando Nottebohm** did research on birds that showed neurons growing in adulthood. At first he was ridiculed, but 20 years later we now know adult humans can grow neurons.

**Theodore Maimain** on the laser. Stanley Prusiner on prions, which was initially scorned by rapidly vindicated when mad cow disease began to spread to humans.

Which reminds me of **Barry Marshall**, who was trying to show his opponents that the bacteria *Helicobacter Pylori* was the cause of stomach ulcers. He finally decided to ingest the bacteria and immediately developed massive stomach ulcers, and that effectively ended the debate.

Then there was **Josiah Nott**, who pushed the idea that yellow fever was transmitted through mosquitos. He was ignored, and the group of men who championed his theory at the turn of the century were derisively called the “Mosquito-men” and were seen as crackpots. It wasn't until the eradication of mosquitos during the construction of the Panama canal, and the resulting collapse in malaria, that the mosquito transmission theory was accepted.

The last of the laundry list I want to go over here is the story of Warren S. Warren. Warren discovered spin interactions between distant molecules, which apparently means something for Magnetic Resonance Imaging machines. His colleagues knew he was wrong, warned that he was endangering his career if he kept up such nonsense, and actually held a roast where they mocked and ridiculed his work.

Seven years later his results were vindicated, are used to improve MRI techniques today, and nothing happened to those who mocked him.

That's what I could find. How much more has been forgotten? How many episodes of this academic thuggery have gone down the memory hole?

Bretz opposed uniformitarianism, but how many other researchers wanted to point to the same thing but were shut down?

Many of these people were only vindicated after they had died.

## No Supermen

What many people forget when looking at the theories that worked marvelously and the people who came up with them, is the many wrong theories these people ALSO held.

**Julius von Mayer** – the guy who gave us the conservation of matter, also believed that the Sun would burn out in 5000 years if not replenished by a new energy source, and was able to keep burning because of meteorites that hit it.

**Isaac Newton** – Isaac Newton's main interest was not physics. It was studying hidden meaning in the bible and alchemy. He believed that if he knew the dimensions of the temple of Solomon he could predict the date of the Apocalypse, and that it was possible to create the philosopher's stone which granted immortality and could turn any metal into Gold.

**Alfred Russel Wallace** – Came up with evolution, and even helped Charles Darwin through several concepts. Wallace believed that we could talk to spirits on the other side and tried to induce seances to do so.

Of course then there is the fact that everyone, at least before 1900, was a professed Christian, probably a young-earth creationist.

I also want to point to 3 figures who epitomize this. Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Noam Chomsky.

The genius of Karl Marx was to recognize antagonistic classes. Prior to Marx, the predominant thinking had been of classes of society that were harmonious, that existed with pre-set functions and worked together as a seamless whole.

When we look at the medieval pictures depicting those who fought, those who prayed, and those who worked, we see that as more of a descriptive thinking about the way things are at that point in history, not some divinely or naturally inevitable order. The modern eye doesn't realize that this was PRESCRIPTIVE, meant to describe the way things SHOULD be.

The modern eye sees that those who worked were getting screwed, in that sense **we are all Marxists**.

Wedded to this is a bunch of baggage, i.e. the Marxist Labor Theory of value, ascribing profits as inherently being the seizure of surplus value by the capitalist, even though Marx later recognized that the capitalist serves some function. So you had breakthrough in thinking + horrible baggage.

Sigmund Freud's great breakthrough was the idea of the subconscious. Prior to this, people generally didn't believe in a subconscious. Today the idea of the subconscious is common coin. Of course Freud then went on to postulate anal and oral stages of development, penis

envy and all sorts of weird psycho-sexual nonsense that doesn't really work. Again, breakthrough in thinking + silly baggage.

Noam Chomsky, in the field of linguistics, made a tremendous break from his contemporaries who viewed linguistics as verbal taxonomy, while Chomsky looked at language as merely a clue regarding the underlying psychology. You look at the language people speak and how they learn it as a clue to what's going on down below.

Now today Chomsky isn't really on the cutting edge anymore, even though he set the paradigm. And I believe his more radical conception of deep structure will be remembered as a bit silly.

The reason I bring up these geniuses that believed wrong things is not to malign Newton's genius. It is to say that superman doesn't exist, to point out just how mortal these scientists are.

If you go to a university, there is no doubt you have good professors. Great teachers, great faculty who help you and have genuine concern for you.

And so it is important to keep separate criticism of the institution from criticism of the individuals in those institutions, and to recognize that at the end of the day we're still just hairless apes.

## **Wrong Shifts**

One cannot deny that, on the whole, scientific consensus progresses toward truth. But when someone says for example that global warming is a sham, they aren't making a claim that scientific consensus in general is more often wrong than right. Just that it is wrong in a specific instance, and that this is not unprecedented.

Scientific consensus has shifted in incorrect ways before. The easiest way to show this, without having to actually go into the deep and endless complexity of actual scientific debates, is with examples of scientific consensuses that went back and forth.

For example, if scientists held to theory A, then moved to theory B, then back to theory A, we would know that at least ONE of those movements had to have been in the wrong direction.

### **Fat vs. Carbohydrates as cause of obesity -**

In 1976 Ancil Keyes wrote the "Seven Countries" study which argued that a diet high in saturated fat caused heart disease. Prior to that, the conventional wisdom had been that carbohydrates caused obesity and heart disease.

In 1988, surgeon general C. Everett Koop made a statement that high saturated fat caused obesity and heart disease, and by around the 1990s the "low fat" craze began, where foods that were high in fat had the fat removed and replaced with carbohydrates.

However, since 2005 the consensus has moved back in the direction of carbohydrates as the chief culprit, and in 2010 a symposium of nutritionists meeting in Copenhagen came to no firm conclusion on the topic.

I am not here to argue who is correct or incorrect. The point is that consensus was pro-animal fat, then it shifted to pro-carb, now it's shifting back to pro-fat.

This means the consensus had to have shifted in an incorrect direction at one of these times.

### **Minimum Wage -**

Adam Smith supported a minimum wage on the grounds that capital could collude much more easily and hold out in the short term more comfortably than labor, and while in the long run capital probably needed labor more, in reality the laborers would feel hunger pangs and break quicker, and needed legislation to keep their wages up.

David Ricardo argued against it, saying,

“These then are the laws by which wages are regulated, and by which the happiness of far the greatest part of every community is governed. Like all other contracts, wages should be left to the fair and free competition of the market, and should never be controlled by the interference of the legislature.”

And as far as we can tell, by the 1900s economists were split on the question of the minimum wage as outlined in “The Very Idea of Applying Economics: The Modern Minimum-Wage Controversy and Its Antecedents” by Thomas C. Leonard.

However in 1936, John Maynard Keynes published “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” and in that was very much opposed to minimum wages, in fact “sticky wages” was a central problem according to his theory.

The first survey of economists on the minimum wage that I know of was in 1978 from the American Association of Economists, and it showed that 68% of economists believed the minimum wage decreased employment, 22% agreed with provisions, 10% generally disagreed.

That same question asked in 1992 found that 56.5% of economists believed the minimum wage decreased employment, 22.4% agreed with provisions, 20.5% generally disagreed.

In 2003 45.6% of economists believed the minimum wage decreased employment, 27.9% agreed with provisions, 26.5% generally disagreed.

In 2006, Robert Whaples surveyed the American Economics Association and asked what they supported. 46.8% of economics supported eliminating the minimum wage, 1.3% wanted it decreased, 14.3% wanted it to stay the same and 37.7% wanted it increased.

In 2013, the IGM economics survey panel found that 47% of economists thought that raising the minimum wage was worth the distortionary costs, 32% were uncertain, while only 11% disagreed.

Whatever your view on the minimum wage, it must be the case that the consensus moved in the wrong direction at some point. When Keynes burst onto the scene, there was certainly an increase in opposition to the minimum wage among economists from whatever it was before, which is unclear since there are no surveys from back then.

And we know that from 1978 to 2013, economists have been shifting more in favor of the minimum wage. Since these two shifts were in opposite directions, one of them had to be wrong.

### **Behaviorism vs. Deep Structure in language -**

Prior to Noam Chomsky, the consensus view in the field of linguistics was the “big brain” theory, or “behaviorist” theory of language, which was simply that the brain is an all-purpose computer that, through conditioning, learned language in the way one learns math or learns how an engine works. The primary champion of this view was Burrhus Frederic Skinner.

Noam Chomsky in 1957 argued against this, saying that underlying all language was a universal grammar that all humans possessed. This “universal grammar” was not something

that could be learned or specified, but was more of a pre-language structure of thought into which specific language was plugged in. By the 1960s this became the dominant school of thought in linguistics.

Increasingly however linguists are coming back to behaviorist views of language. Keep in mind that the existence of a speech area of the brain is not evidence of universal grammar. The reason for this is that behaviorist views of language generally have more practical applications, and machine learning for language uses simple statistical models that have no underlying universal grammar.

I don't know where the field as a whole stands today, but I do know that it is moving back toward the behaviorist side relative to where it was in say 1970, which would be another example of opposite shifts in the field of linguistics, meaning that one of the shifts must have been in the wrong direction.

Leeches and Bloodletting - The use of leeches to treat injuries and increase bloodflow has been documented as far back as 2,500 years ago in ancient India and Greece. Their use peaked roughly around 1830 to 1850, and declined in use and became known as quackery until the 1980s. The rise of plastic surgery led to a rebounding of leech usage, and in 2004 the FDA certified them as an effective medical tool.

Whatever your opinion on leeches, the fact is that they were widely used, then considered quackery, and are now making a comeback, meaning that at least one of these shifts had to have been in the wrong direction.

**Lamarckian / Lysenkoist Evolution** - Lamarckian evolution is the belief that long term evolution occurs in response to the direct environmental stimuli of the parent.

For example, if the parent faces a cold climate, the offspring will be directly adapted to a colder climate.

This view of evolution fell out of favor following the rise of Darwinian evolution, which posits that adaptation occurs in populations by the dying off and / or higher reproduction of individuals better adapted to an environment.

Because each generation is somewhat of a dice roll in terms of inherent traits, some individuals will be more or less adapted to, for example, a cold climate, and those better adapted will reproduce more, and so over time the population will be better adapted to the cold.

However, it has since been discovered that the expression of genes can be modified through processes that change the kinds of proteins that genes produce. These are known as "epigenetic effects", and are triggered all the time by environmental effects such as nutrition, stress levels, exercise, et cetera.

You can think of these "epigenetic effects" as dipswitches that modify how the genes are expressed, and the positioning of these dipswitches on the DNA can be inherited. Of course this cannot be the primary mode of evolution in the long run as it is ultimately limited by the DNA pattern (The ACTG base pairs along the double-helix ladder), but it can in theory produce much bigger effects in the short run than natural selection can.

And so the complete dismissal of the heritability of environmental effects was an overstretch. I don't think it represented a shift in the wrong direction like the other four examples, as pure Darwinian evolution is more correct than pure Lamarckian evolution, but it's an example of a

partial return to an older idea that was completely dismissed, even though it was partially correct.

### **What's the point of this?**

Obviously bringing up a string of anecdotes is not the best kind of argument. Data is almost always better. So why even create an assembly of anecdotes like this?

The reason is because of the positive effect learning about these episodes has had on my view of the nature of groups of experts. Because while you can know, by the data, that you shouldn't believe them all the time, it is very easy to get sucked back in if expert-groups can create a feeling that they have addressed everything in good faith.

This is because someone who is devoting their life to a narrow topic will always know more than you will on that topic, will always be able to cite more things. And so even if you know you shouldn't, people will be, at an emotional level, drawn to rank and the trappings of authority.

And the point of these anecdotes is to create an anti-authoritarian feeling to counter the comfort feeling from authority.

# What the Experts Really think about (ideas pertaining to) Race Realism and White Nationalism

What we call the "left", which I don't know if it's even appropriate to call them that anymore, has managed to pull off a great trick. And that trick is to convince people like me, and probably you, that the experts overwhelmingly disagree with race realism and white nationalism. That the relevant experts all know that biological races don't exist, that the experts all know that races don't differ in intelligence, and that diversity is great and mixed marriages are as good or better than same-race marriages.


And I'm kicking myself over how long I let myself believe this.

The Existence of Race

*Note: this section is a cut and paste from the first section of [this article](#)*

Morning 2008

Ann Morning looked at the usage of race in the 80 most commonly used high school biology textbooks from 1952-2002. While not as good as a survey of biologists, it gives us a rough indication of the trend in biology:




And so we see a steep decline in the use of race, reaching a low point in 1983-1992, but an increase from 1992-2002, including an enormous increase in medical descriptions.



*Lieberman 2004*


In 2004 Leonard Lieberman reviewed several surveys of anthropologists in North America and Europe, and found that 31% of anthropologists in North America recognized race, while 43% in Europe recognized race:

**Percent of Anthropologists Surveyed Recognized Race (Lieberman 2004)**



[In 2009 Katarzyna Kaszycka](#) surveyed physical anthropologists in Eastern and Western Europe, and divided the results up by age group:

Percent of Anthropologists by Age Group that Recognize Race in Eastern and Western Europe (Kaszycka 2009)



Kaszycka shows an important split between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. This is an important clue as to how, where and why race denial emerged.

In 2001, [Sun and Strkalj](#) looked at 779 articles in “Acta Anthropologica Sinica”, China’s only biological anthropological journal. They were able to get 74 of the 78 issues that existed from 1982 to 2001. In it they found that 324 articles dealt with human variation. They described their results:

*“When we applied Cartmill’s approach to the Chinese sample we found that all of the articles used the race concept and none of them questioned its value. Since these active researchers are also members of the teaching staffs at various educational institutions, it is very likely that this attitude will be transmitted to the next generation of Chinese scientists.”*

Of course it is possible that the views of the Chinese have changed since then. But there’s no reason to think that they have, and even if China's exposure to "the west" has allowed that rotgut to enter China, thus causing a rise in race denial in China even as it is in decline elsewhere, how much do you think the situation has changed in 15 years?

So the only place to have any evidence of a consensus on race at some point is in China, and it’s that race existed. And this is totally my opinion, but I think China's views on race are very telling because they were cut off from ideological influence in anthropology. Sure they had Maoism and pseudo-communist thinking, but denying that biological races existed was never

part of that ideology, and so anthropologists in China were free to simply pursue their field, and came to the obvious conclusion.

I think a similar thing happened in Eastern Europe; sure the state had all sorts of opinions in the USSR and Warsaw Pact, but "black people don't exist" was not one of them. And so anthropologists were more free. And the Russians most certainly hated Hitler even more than the West, that struggle was framed in patriotic terms, a Russian victory over an evil foreign enemy, whereas in the west it was framed as an anti-racist crusade.


The best info on what “experts” believe on the existence of race comes from anthropologists. And all of these only deal with physical anthropologists. But what about biologists and geneticists?

Well I don't know of any recent data on biologists' views on race, however [Lieberman 1992](#) [looked at biology textbooks and surveyed college professors](#) and graduates with BAs, MAs and AAs.

First we can look at the textbooks:


Biology Textbooks:

Number of College Biology Textbooks that Accept, Deny or are Neutral on Races (Lieberman 1992)



Physical Anthropology Textbooks:


## Number of College Physical Anthropology Textbooks that Accept, Deny or are Neutral on Races (Lieberman 1992)



And so the trend to race denial in the textbooks was much more pronounced in Physical Anthropology than in Biology.

Next we can look at Biologists and Physical Anthropologists with varying degrees of education:

Percentage of Biologists and Physical Anthropologists who Agree that Human Races Exist by Credential Level in 1984 (Lieberman 1992)



And what we see is that, at all levels of education, Biologists are more likely to recognize race than Physical Anthropologists. At the PhD level, in 1983-1984, Biologists were 1.46 times more likely to accept race.

It's always hazardous to extrapolate too much into the future toward the present, but there's no reason to believe that Biologists are all on board the race denial train today when Physical Anthropologists aren't even all on board today.

Regarding Geneticists, I don't know of any scientific survey. But I do know of multiple genetics papers lamenting the return of "the race concept" in genetics:

2006 – [“Straw Men and Their Followers: The return of biological race”](#)

*“Until Armand Marie Leroi’s New York Times Op-Ed of March 14, 2005, it is unlikely that many Americans, even among the daily readers of the paper, knew that we are living in the midst of a raging debate over the existence of human races. This debate is occurring among and between a variety of researchers in genetics and social scientists from a range of disciplines. A number of evolutionary biologists, geneticists, biological anthropologists and medical researchers have recently challenged the view put forth by other scientists and social scientists that ‘Race is only social concept, not a scientific one.’”*

2007 – [“Genes, genomes and genealogies: the return of scientific racism?”](#)

2009 – [“Return of the race myth?”](#)

2012 – [“The Return of Biological Race? Regulating Innovations in Race and Genetics Through Administrative Agency Race Impact Assessments”](#)

2014 – [“The Uncanny Return of the Race Concept”](#)

*“The aim of this Hypothesis and Theory is to question the recently increasing use of the “race” concept in contemporary genetic, psychiatric, neuroscience as well as social studies.”*

2015 – [“Great Is Their Sin: Biological Determinism in the Age of Genomics”](#)

And there are certainly many more, this is just what I found with a google search and going to page 2.

Obviously it would be better to have proper surveys of geneticists, but the winds seem to be blowing in the direction of race recognition.

While the survey and textbook data is a bit spotty and / or dated, and for the geneticists we only have subjective analyses about trends in the field – it’s enough to where we can say that this “consensus” on race denial simply does not exist, or in the case for geneticists there’s certainly no evidence of a consensus or a trend against race.


The point here is not to appeal to a consensus to say that race exists, but to remove this appeal to authority as a line of argument so that we can move past authority games.

### **Black-White IQ Gap**

Believing that the black-white IQ gap is largely down to genetics is something that, in a bizarre way, has been pathologized as some extreme belief. But actual intelligence researchers not only think there is a large genetic component, but there is no sign that it's trending toward more environmental explanations. We can look at two surveys, one from 1984 and 2013.

A survey done by [Snyderman and Rothman in 1984](#) found that 45% of researchers said that the black-white IQ gap was a mixture of genes and environment, 1% said it was totally genetic, 15% said that it was totally environmental, 14% did not respond, and 24% said there was insufficient evidence:


Survey of 661 Intelligence Researchers on the Heritability of  
the Black-White IQ Gap Snyderman and Rothman (1984)



For the survey in [2013 by Rindermann, Coyle & Becker](#), they found that 42% of the 228 experts thought that 0-40% of the black-white IQ gap was due to genes, 18% said that 50% of the gap was due to genes, and 39% said that 60-100% of the black-white IQ gap was due to genes:

Survey of 228 Intelligence Researchers on the Heritability of  
the Black-White IQ Gap (Rindermann, Coyle & Becker 2013)

Mean response = 47%, Median response = 50%



In addition, 17% said that the black-white IQ gap was 0% genetic, and 5% of the experts said that the black-white gap was 100% genetic.

Now my view is that the heritability of the black-white IQ is 0.8. This happens to be the consensus on the general heritability of IQ for adults in the United States, and so I'm saying that the racial gap is merely of function of things that cause IQ to vary generally. That poor blacks are no worse off than poor whites, that there's nothing race-specific about the black-white IQ gap, and thus the black-white IQ will have the same heritability as the general heritability of IQ.

Another reason is that the more heritable the subtest, the bigger the racial gaps are, and if we go by subtest heritabilities, they point toward a heritability of the racial gap of 0.8, again, the same as the consensus on the general heritability of IQ.

And as a result, I am on the high end with my estimate, however, I'm not completely out of the mainstream on this. But the expert consensus is a respectable starting point, and from there my higher estimate is just a matter of degree.

### **Racial Diversity and Civic Engagement and Social Trust**



Another thing I argue is that racial diversity is bad. And on this, there is no survey on people who research diversity that I know of. The most popular example of this is [Robert Putnam's paper "The Downside of Diversity"](#) which showed that more racially diverse neighborhoods have less social engagement, are less likely to know their neighbors, and have less trust both of their neighbors and less trust of society in general.

That was the first major paper on this that made a big splash. But every paper since that talks about racial diversity reports negative effects of diversity, but then proceeds to control for things and say it's not really caused by diversity, but by things that correlate with diversity.

For example, the paper ["Does ethnic diversity erode trust?: Putnam's 'hunkering-down' thesis reconsidered"](#) looked at the effect of racial diversity in 25,000 individuals in Britain. And in their abstract they say this:

*"There is a statistically significant association between diversity and a measure of strategic trust but, in substantive terms, the effect is trivial and dwarfed by the effects of economic deprivation and the social connectedness of individuals."*

Now having read the paper, this abstract has subjective terms that I don't think most would agree with. First off, what is "trivial" and what is "dwarfed"? But second off, if you read the paper and look at the reported effect sizes of various criteria on generalized trust and trust of neighbors, the effect of ethnic diversity does not seem "trivial" or "dwarfed" by the next four largest correlations in their own analysis:

Criteria	Association with Generalized Trust (Model 4a)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.301
Degree	0.244
No Degree	-0.062
Know Neighbors	0.373
Economic Deprivation	-0.159
Criteria	Association with Trust of Neighbors (Model 4a)
Ethnic Diversity	-0.406
Degree	0.106
No Degree	-0.047
Know Neighbors	0.397
Economic Deprivation	-0.108

What the authors do to say that diversity has no driving effect is to control for a bunch of these things. For example, knowing your neighbors has a bigger impact on whether or not you trust your neighbors than ethnic diversity does, in this study. The problem is that knowing your neighbors is itself a function of diversity.

Now if you simply read the abstract, you would have no idea that the second biggest association with generalized trust or trust of neighbors is racial diversity, and that racial diversity is THE BIGGEST negative association with both forms of trust.

Moreover, there is zero attempt to assess the possible self-selection of white people who live in racially diverse areas.

But I digress. My point here is not to get into the arguments about causation. That would be something for a whole video. My point here is simply to say that the research on diversity shows a universal, overwhelming negative association. The sociologists will then try to say that the negative effects go away when you control for things, but then there's the possibility that those things being controlled for are themselves an effect of diversity, at least in part, and so by controlling for whether or not you know your neighbors, you are controlling for racial diversity, and it's a big argument.

The simplest observation, the raw association between racial diversity and trust and social capital, without any controls, is always overwhelmingly negative. And so saying that "diversity is bad" is not a crazy thing to say. It could be wrong, those controls could be valid, but the position that racial diversity is bad is not obviously stupid. I'm not "ignorant" of the research on racial diversity.

Certainly the researchers on this would never say that their research supports white separatism. But would you expect them to say so if it did?

(Venture Ooo-Ray Clip)

White separatism? What do you mean my research showing that white people are happier and healthier in white-only communities is an argument for white separatism?

### Race-Mixing

[Mixed-race couples are 2.36 times more likely to have mutual assault than non-white monoracial couples, and 2.94 times more likely than white monoracial couples:](#)

**Table 5. Relationship Between Couple's Racial Status and IPV Event Characteristics**

IPV Event Characteristics	Interracial Couple vs. Ethnic Minority Monoracial Couple	Interracial Couple vs. White Monoracial Couple
	Odds Ratios (95% CI)	Odds Ratios (95% CI)
Mutual assault	2.36 (1.73-3.21)***	2.94 (2.00-4.31)***
Substance use	1.32 (0.99-1.75) <sup>ns</sup>	0.54 (0.39-0.73)***
Victim injury	1.37 (1.03-1.84)*	1.73 (1.25-2.40)**
Arrest	1.71 (1.30-2.25)***	2.18 (1.58-3.00)***
Prior abuse	2.60 (1.89-3.59)***	1.98 (1.38-2.82)***
Children present	0.81 (0.62-1.17) <sup>ns</sup>	1.84 (1.34-2.52)***

\*p < .05. \*\*p < .01. \*\*\*p < .001.

In addition, [being interracial is the second highest thing that increases the risk of a marriage in ending in divorce](#), second only to one of the partners having an anxiety disorder:

Criteria	Increased risk of divorce
Anxiety Disorder	35.5%
Interracial	32.3%
Cohabitation before marriage	29.0%
High School Dropout	16.7%
Low Religiosity	12.9%

One counter to this would be that mixed-race couples have lower incomes and fewer years in school, and those people are more likely to have domestic violence and divorce. This is a possibility, but in the absence of any evidence on this, there's no reason to just assume it, and it could go the other way in that interracial couples could be more educated and earn higher incomes than monoracial coupled on average.

Douglas Browridge's paper "Intimate Partner Violence in Interracial Relationships" showed that, in at least the sample of 19,000 Canadians, mixed-race couples were actually more educated and earned higher incomes than monoracial couples.

Now that's just one sample population, that doesn't mean that interracial couples are, in general, more educated and earn more income than monoracial couples. I'm just saying it's not obvious one way or the other. It's not something to just assume is going to explain why interracial marriages fail more often.

But there it is again. The simplest interpretation of the evidence is that race-mixing is bad. Now there could be other things going on, and thus it's not an incompatibility of the races but some other effects that happen to correlate with race-mixing. It could, that's a possibility, but there's always an infinite number of whatabouts your can think up, and it's certainly not stupid or crazy to just go with the simplest interpretation that has the fewest assumptions.

### **White Separatism / White Nationalism**

The topic in this vein is white separatism, or white nationalism, which is, in a historical sense, a very normal idea; and that is the idea that certain countries are white only or mostly white-only. Up until the end of WW2, Britain, Canada, Australia and the United States had white-only immigration policies.

The United States had a special case in the black population, who they believed they owed mere citizenship because they were slaves in the past. But nothing more.

Moreover, as [well-elucidated by Jared Taylor](#), the founders clearly intended a white-only country.

Citizenship was initially limited to "Free White Men of Good Character". In addition, one of the writers of the constitution, Charles Pickney, when hearing of the Missouri Crisis of 1821, said:

*"I perfectly knew that there did not then exist such a thing in the Union as a black or colored citizen, nor could I then have conceived it possible such a thing could have ever existed in it."*

In addition, whites today generally leave areas once they reach a certain proportion non-white. This is known as "white flight". In addition, the United States is actually becoming MORE racially segregated at the residential level using more modern methods. Older methods looked at the racial percentages in a city, what percentage the city was black. But newer methods that measure the likelihood of having a neighbor of another race show that [the United States is actually getting MORE residentially segregated](#), and of course it is well established that schools are becoming more racially segregated as well.

My personal theory is that this is related to "conservatives" having more kids than "liberals", and that part of being a "conservative" is an innate ethnocentrism, and since it is innate, whites today are actually more genetically xenophobic today than they were in say 1970, even though in 1970 it was more politically permissible to be openly xenophobic.

In addition, [3/4 of whites will say they don't have a single non-white friend](#). And I'm personally skeptical about the 1/4 that say they do; "my black friend". So in terms of how whites actually behave, why is white nationalism so offensive?

And there are several benefits to a white country. For example, [the budget deficit would be gone](#), even if the US maintained current military spending levels, if the US merely had its white population.

And no, all the studies on immigration, and the regional comparisons of the US show that there is no evidence that the presence of non-whites increases the wages of whites.

## **Summation**

The academic consensus on the existence of biological races in humans is mixed and is tending toward race recognition. To say that biological races exist in humans is not wild or out of the mainstream or particularly heterodox.

On the academic consensus of the black-white IQ gap, the mean heritability estimate of intelligence researchers is about 47%. Now my opinion is that the heritability is about 80%, which is higher than the consensus, but it's roughly the same as the consensus of the general heritability of IQ, and experts thinking the heritability is that high is not unheard of.

For racial diversity, every study that looks at it shows that racial diversity has negative associations with social engagement, trust of neighbors and general trust. Now typically sociologists will argue that the effect goes away when you control for various things, but of course these "controls" are for things which are associated with racial diversity itself.

And so the simplest interpretation based on raw association, that racial diversity is causing these problems, should not be taken as silly, especially since experts agree on a raw negative association between diversity and social trust.

For race-mixing, mixed-race marriages are over twice as likely to have spousal abuse and divorce, and there's no reason to believe that interracial couples are less educated or have lower income. And so saying that race-mixing is bad and you should probably just avoid it, again, there's nothing crazy about this position. Maybe you want to introduce new things to try to explain the negative association, okay, and perhaps there are things that about mixed marriages that actually dampen the negative impact of racial incompatibility and the true racial incompatibility is actually masked by the unique characteristics of race mixers. Both are possible, no reason to assume one or the other, and so there's nothing wrong with just going with the simplest interpretation of the data and saying race-mixing is bad.

And on white separatism, well that's how most whites actually behave today. Of course whites in theory say otherwise, but their behavior is mostly white nationalist. 3/4 of whites will openly say they have no non-white friends, whites leave non-white areas in a phenomenon known as "white flight", whites are the least likely to race-mix of any race in the US. And throughout most of white countries' history, they had white-only immigration policies and anti-race mixing policies. And there are many practical reasons today for whites to have their own country, one of which is it would eliminate the budget deficit, and you would have functional cities like you have in white countries like Denmark and Norway.

When all these Huffpost / DailyKos / YoungTurks people point to other countries that are better than the United States by various metrics, they're always pointing to countries that are WHITER than the United States, inadvertently supporting the white nationalist outlook. Or when they point to how dumb Alabama and Mississippi are compared to Connecticut on standardized tests, they ignore that that Mississippi is nearly 50% black and Alabama is roughly a third black.

They make a case for white nationalism without even trying, that's how overwhelming it is.

# Affirmative Action

What an Orwellian euphemism, "affirmative action".

## 1997 SAT Data

In 1997, [Stephen Epinshade found that](#) being black is worth 230 points on the SAT, being hispanic is worth 185 points, being asian costs you 50 points, and being a legacy is worth 160 points when applying to a university.

## SAT Scores at the Top 20 Universities

I don't know of any similar recent analysis of this that has been done. So to estimate how much affirmative action is being done, we have to infer from more aggregate data. And this is done looking at [SAT score distributions by race](#), and [the racial composition of student bodies at universities](#). I limited my analysis to [the top 20 universities by average SAT](#). All SAT data is math+verbal only.

So here are the top 20 universities by SAT selectivity and their racial composition:

## Racial Composition of top 20 US Universities by Average SAT

University	Average SAT	% Black	% Hispanic	% White	% Asian
Cal Tech	1545	1	12	27	45
Yale	1505	7	11	47	17
Harvard	1505	7	10	42	20
Princeton	1500	7	9	43	21
Duke	1500	10	7	45	21
Chicago	1492	5	8	44	17
MIT	1492	5	16	37	24
Washington-St. Louis	1485	5	6	51	17
Vanderbilt	1490	8	8	55	12
Columbia	1480	12	12	35	22
Stanford	1475	6	15	37	20
Franklin Olin	1479	0	4	48	15
Harvey Mudd	1480	2	13	38	20
Dartmouth	1460	7	8	48	15
Rice	1460	6	14	37	24
Pomona	1450	7	15	39	14
Bowdoin	1440	5	12	63	7
Northwestern	1450	6	11	49	17
Pennsylvania	1438	7	10	45	19
Tufts	1438	4	7	57	11
<b>Average (Unweighted)</b>	<b>1478</b>	<b>5.85</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>44.35</b>	<b>18.9</b>

We can compare the proportions each racial group made of the 1478+ SAT scorers, and what percentage of admissions they were compared to their percentage of the 1478+ SAT scores:

## Representation of Racial Groups in top 20 Universities Relative to their Number Scoring at or Above the Average SAT for said Universities

Race	% of 18 year old pop.	Mean SAT	Standard Deviation	% of race scored 1478+	% of total 1478+ scorers	% of elite admissions	Multiplier
White	55	1063	196	1.715%	72.46%	44.35%	61.21%
Black	15.5	859	190	0.0564%	0.67%	5.85%	873.13%
Hispanic	21	905	196	0.174%	2.81%	10.4%	370.11%
Asian	4.5	1123	239	6.96%	24.06%	18.9%	78.55%

And so whites "should" be 72.46% of all admitted students at the top 20 Universities, presuming that on aggregate whites and blacks with the same SAT are, on average, equivalent on everything else overall. This is not an outlandish assumption, as [the races, when SAT scores are controlled for, do roughly the same in college](#), with whites actually doing slightly better for any given SAT score.

In addition, Epinshade in 1997 (linked above) controlled for a whole host of factors and found that members of reach racial group, for a given SAT score, were virtually equivalent on average. If you think that's not the case today, that despite whites and asians actually doing better in University for any given SAT score than blacks and hispanics with the same scores, that blacks and hispanics have some other things about them that make them better candidates for any given SAT score, well, feel free to show all of that and I'll modify this article accordingly.

Whites should be 72.46%, blacks should be 0.67%, hispanics should be 2.81%, and asians should be 24.06%. The deviations from these result in whites only having 61.21% as many students in the top 20 universities as they should, and asians only getting 78.55% of their



students in. Hispanics get 370.11% as many students as they should get, and blacks get a whopping 873.13%, almost nine times the representation that their SAT scores warrant.

But with these numbers, we can figure out what the average SAT will be for the top 20 University attendees by race:

### Average SAT by Race for Student Body of the top 20 Universities

Race	Average percentile within-race of student accepted to top 20 uni	Average SAT of student accepted to top 20 uni	Race effect on SAT score
White	99.508%	1516	-38
Black	98.95%	1350	+128
Hispanic	99.356%	1393	+85
Asian	94.533%	1506	-28

This may come as a surprise, but whites actually get punished more than asians both in terms of their representation as a percentage of qualified applicants, and in terms of the point value of the discrimination against them. Now I am simply looking at the top 20 Universities, not the top 100, or all, and so these results aren't necessarily applicable to all Universities.

### "Holistic" Admissions

Following the passage of [Proposition 209](#) in California, which forbade the usage of racial quotas in school admissions, the University of California and the California State systems adopted a "holistic review" process.

Factors taken into consideration, in addition to SAT, GPA, Honors and extracurriculars, were the "life challenge index" and "eligibility in the local context" - or class rank.

Now using class rank is a particularly devious tactic, as it allows elite universities to reach into overwhelmingly black schools. The problem is that the school you go to doesn't really matter at all.

Going to a "good school" is not going to raise your SAT or GPA, and it's not going to result in you learning anything more. [Voucher studies](#) strongly [evidenced this](#).

It's simply going to stack you up against smarter kids and lower your class rank.


Moreover, "life difficulty", to the extent it is treated as synonymous with "money", is not a relevant causal variable for IQ. Sure, within the US, people with lower IQs have less money, and tend to have lower IQ parents, who also have less money.

But even taking into considerations these questionable "controls", cherry-picked to maximize the yield of black and hispanic students at the UC system, it STILL wasn't working. Richard Sander got a hold of the actual "holistic score" data through a Freedom of Information Act request and found that (since the UC system refused to publish the data), even with all of these things taken into account (which I think are spurious controls anyway), the UC system STILL gives pure racial preferences:

## PERCENTAGE STUDENTS ADMITTED BY RACE

From 2007 to 2009, UCLA Admissions accepted a higher percentage of black and Latino students with mid-range holistic scores, than white and other races with the same scores.

- Blacks
- Latinos and Native Americans
- Whites



SOURCE: Richard Sander, UCLA professor of law.  
Graphic reporting by Alexia Boyarsky, Bruin staff.  
Graphic by Stephen Stewart, Bruin reporter.

And so even when whites have, according to the UC holistic admissions score, the same supposed disadvantages as blacks (low income, parents didn't go to college, "bad school", etc.) they are still giving blacks preference.

But of course they have to, because if they just went by various "life challenge" indicators, they'd be taking in mostly disadvantaged whites:

**At All Family Income Levels, There is a  
Persisting Racial Gap in SAT Scores**

<b>Family Income</b>	<b>Mean Black Score</b>	<b>Mean White Score</b>	<b>Racial Gap</b>
Under \$20,000	798	978	180
\$20,000 to \$40,000	836	995	159
\$40,000 to \$60,000	864	1017	153
\$60,000 to \$80,000	889	1032	143
\$80,000 to \$100,000	908	1052	144
\$100,000 to \$120,000	922	1066	144
\$120,000 to \$140,000	926	1073	147
\$140,000 to \$160,000	942	1087	145
\$160,000 to \$200,000	943	1091	148
More than \$200,000	981	1130	149

*Source: The College Board.*

Because whites at the bottom 10% do about as well as blacks at the top 10%, Universities must explicitly discriminate on purely racial lines if they want hardly any blacks in at all. And they must, to a lesser extent, do this for hispanics as well.

But in addition to all of this circumstantial evidence, [42% of admissions officers themselves say](#) that "membership in an under-represented group" is the most important variable for them, saying this is more important than them having exceptional talent:

**Table 7.** Which variable is most important in determining an applicant's institutional fit?

<b>Variable</b>	<b>% of sample finding this variable most important</b>
Membership in an under-represented group	42%
Exceptional talent	42%
Recruited athlete status	7%
Yield likelihood	7%
Development potential	2%

Coincidental with, or perhaps a response to, the fact that poor whites outperform upper income blacks, is [the pushing of "white privilege" on whites in the poorest parts of the country](#). Since it can't be genetics, as race differences in cognitive abilities tied to genetics is not allowed, these poor whites must be outperforming rich blacks for environmental reasons, and so the "white privilege" must be so ubiquitous, so powerful, that even these people have terrific institutional privileges.

## **Racial Extremism at the Universities**


But it gets more extreme than that. [An article from The American Conservative](#) included Jews as a category for the population of elite universities.

This is important, because Jews are lumped in with whites. But since very few white people are Jews, it's important to distinguish, whenever possible the Jewish and non-Jewish representation.

While whites were only 43.1% of the average population of the top 20 universities by SAT requirement in 2014, non-Jewish whites were a mere 23% of the Ivy League schools, with Jews at 23%:

**Elite University Undergraduate Enrollments, 2007-2011**

University	Non-Jewish White	Asian	Unknown Race	Jewish
Harvard	18%	16%	12%	26%
Yale	20%	14%	11%	26%
Princeton	37%	16%	5%	13%
Brown	22%	15%	12%	24%
Columbia	15%	16%	10%	25%
Cornell	24%	16%	14%	23%
Dartmouth	42%	14%	6%	11%
Penn	17%	18%	13%	27%
<b>All Ivy League</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>23%</b>
Caltech	33%	39%	2%	6%
MIT	27%	25%	6%	9%
Stanford	28%	21%	4%	10%
UC Berkeley	21%	40%	7%	10%
UCLA	24%	37%	4%	9%




Source: Appendices C-F

The American Conservative also looked at other metrics with which to infer merit, looking at the US Math Olympiad Teams, College Putnam Math Winners, US Physics Olympiad winners, Science Olympiad Winners, Siemens Science AP Winners, Science Talent Search Finalists, NMS Semifinalists for whatever states they could find.


## U.S. Math Olympiad Teams

Period	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
1970s	56%	0%	44%
1980s	54%	9%	37%
1990s	45%	27%	28%
2000s	43%	53%	3%
2010s	28%	72%	0%




## College Putnam Math Winners

Period	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
1938-49	59%	0%	41%
1950s	66%	3%	31%
1960s	76%	2%	22%
1970s	69%	0%	31%
1980s	75%	2%	24%
1990s	44%	24%	31%
2000s	52%	37%	12%
2010s	50%	50%	0%




## U.S. Physics Olympiad Winners

Period	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
1980s	49%	23%	28%
1990s	55%	25%	20%
2000s	46%	46%	9%
2010s	14%	81%	5%



## Science Olympiad Winners

Competition	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
Computing, 1992–2012	62%	27%	11%
Biology, 2003–2012	25%	68%	8%
Chemistry, 2011–2012	10%	90%	0%




## Siemens Science AP Winners

Period	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
2002–2011	31%	61%	8%


## Science Talent Search Finalists

Period	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
1940s	83%	0%	17%
1950s	78%	1%	22%
1960s	76%	1%	23%
1970s	70%	8%	22%
1980s	55%	22%	23%
1990s	54%	29%	17%
2000s	49%	36%	15%
2010s	29%	64%	7%




## Recent NMS Semifinalists for Available States

State/Years	Total (2011)	N/J White	Asian	Jewish
Alabama/2008, 2010	208	83%	14%	2%
Arizona/2013	342	68%	26%	5%
California/2010, 2012	1,999	37%	58%	4%
Colorado/2012, 2013	256	78%	14%	7%
Florida/2008-13	867	74%	13%	8%
Illinois/2011-2013	693	71%	21%	8%
Indiana/2010, 2012-13	327	75%	18%	5%
Iowa/2011	191	80%	15%	4%
Kansas/2011	159	87%	9%	4%
Louisiana/2013	190	76%	19%	5%
Maryland/2010	327	57%	32%	11%
Michigan/2012, 2013	570	68%	30%	2%
Minnesota/2010, 2011	318	81%	13%	6%
Missouri/2011	344	87%	11%	2%
Nevada/2010, 2011	85	67%	20%	9%
New Mexico/2011	99	76%	11%	6%
New York/2011, 2012	957	45%	34%	21%
Ohio/2012, 2013	642	76%	20%	4%
Oklahoma/2008	187	83%	14%	3%
Pennsylvania/2012	700	72%	20%	9%
Tennessee/2010	279	80%	17%	2%
Texas/2010	1,344	68%	28%	3%
Virginia/2009	411	74%	19%	6%
Washington/2013	344	64%	31%	5%
Wisconsin/2012	324	87%	11%	3%
<b>Eight Largest States</b>	<b>7,772</b>	<b>60%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>7%</b>
<b>25 State Aggregate</b>	<b>12,163</b>	<b>65%</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>6%</b>
<b>National (estimated)</b>	<b>16,317</b>	<b>65-70%</b>	<b>25-30%</b>	<b>6%</b>




**Eight Largest States, by Percentage**



It is worth noting that each of these tables add up to 100% despite not having a black or hispanic category.

Based on this data the author concluded that Jews are probably overrepresented at elite universities by a factor of about 3:



Note that the ethnic enrollment ratios for Berkeley and UCLA are based on the national demographics, but their students are primarily drawn from within California, whose racial distribution is very different: the white student population is half the national average, while Asians and Hispanics are more numerous by a factor of two, implying different parity ratios. The underlying data for these charts is drawn from Appendix H.

What this means though, is that whites, except Jews, are heavily discriminated against through the use of "holistic review" in favor of Jews, who are overrepresented relative to their ability. They are a high-performing group which also gets preferences and appear to be over-represented for their ability level, while non-jewish whites get the shaft.

And so when jews are disambiguated from non-jews, the already savage discrimination against whites at the elite universities becomes very, very extreme.



I did not expect the Universities to be this extreme when I started writing this article.

## Post-Graduation Privilege

The racial privilege of blacks and hispanics is not limited to admissions to the undergraduate programs.

In applications to medical schools, [blacks and hispanics get major bonuses on their MCAT and GPA](#):

US Medical School Acceptance Rates (2013 - 2016) by Race/Ethnic Group, for MCAT Scores 24-32 and GPAs 3.2-3.8										Averages for Matriculants by Race/Ethnic Group, 2015-2016	
MCAT	24-26	24-26	24-26	27-29	27-29	27-29	30-32	30-32	30-32	MCAT	GPA
GPA	3.20-3.39	3.40-3.59	3.60-3.79	3.20-3.39	3.40-3.59	3.60-3.79	3.20-3.39	3.40-3.59	3.60-3.79		
Asian	5.9%	10.1%	16.6%	14.4%	20.6%	34.9%	27.3%	40.3%	57.5%	32.8	3.73
White	8.0%	14.0%	22.0%	19.0%	29.0%	43.0%	34.0%	48.0%	63.0%	29.2	3.73
Hispanic	30.5%	38.3%	51.1%	42.8%	59.5%	71.6%	57.0%	75.9%	83.4%	31.8	3.59
Black	56.4%	67.1%	74.9%	75.3%	81.2%	86.6%	82.3%	86.9%	93.7%	27.3	3.48
<b>ALL</b>	16.7%	20.2%	26.5%	23.2%	30.6%	42.7%	34.5%	46.5%	60.9%	<b>31.4</b>	<b>3.70</b>

Source: Association of American Medical Colleges

So one should try to stay away from black doctors, and prefer asian doctors.

For law schools, [the Occidental Observer](#) looked at the LSAT scores and found that being black was worth about 6 points for the top 14 law schools, or 7 points for the top 6 law schools.

Because of how closely clustered LSAT scores are, a more meaningful way to think of this in percentiles:

	Minimum LSAT score for top 14 law school	Percentile of all LSAT takers
Caucasians/Asians	164	93
Blacks	158	77

	Minimum LSAT score for top 6 law school	Percentile of all LSAT test takers
Caucasians/Asians	168	97
Blacks	161	86

Thus, being black is worth leapfrogging 16 percent of whites at the top 6 law schools, and is worth 11 leapfrogging 11 percent of whites at the top 14 schools.

## These Graduates

As illustrated more thoroughly in [another article on this site](#), blacks with the same college credential are, on average, significantly less intelligent than whites at the same credential level.

This is found using wordsum scores from the General Social Survey by race and education level:

<b>Verbal IQ by Race and Highest Degree Earned 1972-2014</b>			
<b>Highest Degree</b>	<b>White Verbal IQ</b>	<b>Black Verbal IQ</b>	<b>Black/White Verbal IQ Gap</b>
High school Dropout	89	82	7
High school Diploma	98	90	8
Junior College Degree	102	95	7
Bachelors Degree	108	100	8
Graduate Degree	113	102	11

So a black person with a graduate degree (masters, PhD) will have only a slightly higher verbal IQ than a white person with a high school diploma.

Keep in mind that blacks actually do better on verbal tests than they do on non-verbal tests, and so the full-scale IQ of blacks at each education level is almost certainly going to be lower than this.

This black underperformance by education level is also found on adult literacy surveys. These involve prose (writing), document reading, and quantitative reasoning:

Estimated IQ by Race and Education			Black/White Gap (SD) by Literacy Type and Education			
Highest Degree	White IQ	Black IQ	Document	Prose	Quantitative	Average
High School Dropout	87	77	.59	.60	.79	.66
High School Graduate	99	90	.59	.57	.73	.63
2 Year Degree	104	94	.69	.60	.73	.67
4 Year Degree	113	103	.67	.65	.78	.70
Graduate Degree	121	110	.74	.70	.84	.76

What this means is that a black person with a college degree is only going to be slightly more competent than a white high school graduate. And the highest credentialed blacks will, on average, be slightly less competent than whites with basic 4-year degrees.

Steve Farron, in [a speech he gave on his book](#) "The Affirmative Action Hoax", only 18% of black college graduates could summarize a newspaper article, and only 11% could read a bus schedule. Of course this probably means that most whites can't do these things either.

## Affirmative Action

It is clear that the elite universities in the United States are discriminating against whites in an extreme manner, to the point where whites, particularly non-jewish whites, are strictly underrepresented relative to their percentage of the population. By their population, they should be 55% of the people at these Universities, and by their merit should be around 72%. But admissions officers have made sure that their average student body is only 44.35% white.

Other races do not perform better than their SATs would predict, in fact they perform slightly worse compared to whites with the same scores. The anti-white discrimination is not merely the disparate impact of controlling for "social" and economic factors; it is, and based on low-class whites outperforming high-class blacks, has to be, a function of race itself.

And it doesn't get better. When applying to law and medical school, the blacks and hispanics still perform worse, and still get preferential treatment. And finally, once they have those degrees, the blacks are far less intelligent and competent than whites with the same credentials, causing employers to devalue black and hispanic degrees.

But this shouldn't be too surprising. This is the result of an impossible situation that the admissions officers are in; holding an environmental determinist view on race that was

established in the civil rights era, disallowing racial genetic differences to even enter the discussion. And then, 50 years later, having made precisely zero progress beyond the direct results of affirmative action quotas, that would be lost the moment those quotas were removed, they must find new explanations, and they must justify de facto racial quotas longer, and more, and against poor whites as well.

It's not traditional environmental disadvantages, no, the environmental effects must be more extreme, more exotic, more hidden. Genes explain it easily, but genes cannot enter into it because only racists think that way, and since it is racist it must be wrong. Besides, we here at the elite universities, who established back in 1965 that all was environmentally determined, know that "race realism" is just suit-and-tie racism, therefore it is incorrect. Racist, therefore incorrect.

And so like a schizophrenic with mad delusions, these people keep trying to find the connections, keep imagining "white privilege" everywhere to explain why the poorest people in the country, whites from appalachia, keep outperforming their precious, coddled and pumped up rich blacks from the prep schools and tutors.

These people are sick.

# White Privilege: Inheritance, Education and Employment

Despite there being entire University departments seemingly devoted, in one way or another, to "white privilege", the arguments for it are actually fairly simple. Once you move away from the purported experience, the claims of psychological hardship and the artistic and trance-like inductions to walk in the shoes of the oppressed, it's actually a fairly small set and (mostly) easily verifiable / falsifiable claims.

Here I'll be talking about Inheritance, Education and Employment.

## Race and Wealth Inheritance

The Federal Reserve had [a paper talking about race differences in wealth and inheritance](#). Some interesting data relevant to "white privilege" arguments are here.

### Rate of and Median Value of Inheritance by Race

Race / Ethnicity	% w/ inheritance	Median Value of Inheritance	Average of Median Inheritance Per Person
White	22.9	\$55,207	\$12,642
Black	10.6	\$49,441	\$5,271
Hispanic	5.5	\$28,708	\$1,579

One way to think about this is in terms of 8-hour days needed to work at \$20/hour. For anyone receiving no inheritance, which includes 77.1% of whites, to earn the median white inheritance, you would have to work 79 days. And another thing to keep in mind is that if you get ANY inheritance, you just got more inheritance than 77.1% of white people get.

But even when they get no inheritance, whites end up amassing much more wealth:

### Mean and Median Wealth by Race among those with NO INHERITANCE

Race / Ethnicity	Median	Mean
Black	\$33,969	\$185,702
Hispanic	\$38,125	\$196,541
White	\$183,050	\$742,627

So even among those who receive zero inheritance, whites on average amass far more wealth than blacks and hispanics.

But keep in mind [Affirmative Action](#). There is a great bonus in credential acquisition for being black or hispanic. And so here's a question - would you rather have \$10,000, or 250 extra SAT


points? The smart ones of you will take the 250 SAT points, which is roughly what blacks get in affirmative action for being black.

The white privilege people will retort a few things on that, however. They will claim that hiring discrimination nullifies any benefit of affirmative action, that the white advantage in job "connections" will trump affirmative action, and that whites have an easier time financially getting the degree in the first place.

## Student Debt and Working Through School

One argument that could be speculated is that whites get to just go to school, while blacks and hispanics must face the hardship of working through school. Well, in actuality, whites are more likely to work through both high school and college:

**Percentage of Youth (Ages 16-24) Who are Employed, by Race/Hispanic Origin and School Enrollment<sup>1</sup>: 2015**



<sup>1</sup> Includes a small number of persons enrolled in grades below high school.

Source: U.S. Department of Labor. College enrollment and work activity of 2015 high school graduates.


<http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/hsqec.pdf>

I presented this data in a facebook group where someone posted that black children didn't get the benefit of a good childhood because they have to work to "help the family", when in reality whites work more. Humorously, there were several responses saying that this proves employer discrimination.

I.e. if black minors are working more than white minors, that's because they have to because of some system of oppression, while white minors are free to have their work-free childhoods.

But, if white minors work more than black minors, well that's because employers are discriminating against black minors. So whatever the case may be, the brown people are put upon and deserve some sort of restitution from whites.

Yet despite all of this, [white college grads have basically the same amount of debt as black and hispanic college grads UPON GRADUATION:](#)




Now this may seem contradict some other data you see saying that blacks and hispanics have higher student loans on average. This is true. But they are roughly the same **upon graduation.**

But the point is that even though whites are more likely to work through college, they end up with roughly the same amount of student debt as blacks and hispanics upon graduation. Or at least the males do.

In addition, there were not any significant differences between whites, blacks and hispanics in terms of how many of them got their parents to pay for their college:

## Who gets financial help from their parents for college?

Tuition assistance breakdown by race



But what about grants and institutional money? Maybe whites get a bunch more money for college. Well, [the answer to that is a decisive "no"](#).

## Distribution of Grants and Scholarships by Race

Race	Percentage Receiving Grants	Average Grant Amount Received	Total Grant Funding	Number of Grant Recipients	Percentage of Grant Recipients	Percentage of Total Grant Funding	Percentage of Student Population
<b>Total</b>	51.7%	\$4,864	\$52,646 million	10,822,900	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
<b>White</b>	48.2%	\$5,008	\$31,230 million	6,235,700	57.6%	59.3%	61.8%
<b>All Minority Students</b>	57.4%	\$4,672	\$21,287 million	4,556,300	42.1%	40.4%	38.0%
<b>Black or African-American</b>	63.5%	\$4,372	\$8,113 million	1,855,800	17.1%	15.4%	14.0%
<b>Hispanic or Latino</b>	58.1%	\$4,314	\$7,425 million	1,720,900	15.9%	14.1%	14.1%
<b>Asian</b>	43.1%	\$6,444	\$3,430 million	532,200	4.9%	6.5%	5.9%
<b>American Indian or Alaska Native</b>	60.4%	\$4,327	\$461 million	106,600	1.0%	0.9%	0.8%
<b>Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander</b>	49.3%	\$4,097	\$305 million	74,500	0.7%	0.6%	0.7%
<b>More Than One Race</b>	53.8%	\$5,831	\$1,553 million	266,300	2.5%	2.9%	2.4%

By simply multiplying the average grant amount by the percentage receiving grants from the above chart, we can see how much each racial group gets on average for college:



## Average Grant Received by Race/Ethnicity - all types, all sources

Race / Ethnicity	Average Grant Received
Mixed Race	\$3,127
"Asian"	\$2,777
Black	\$2,776
Amerindian	\$2,614
Hispanics	\$2,506
Whites	\$2,414
Pacific Islander	\$2,020

Once again, very minor race differences. So one can't honestly say that whites are at some tremendous financial advantage in college itself.

## Employer Discrimination

Now as argued elsewhere, due to affirmative action, [it is perfectly rational for employers to discriminate against blacks and hispanics](#) given the same credential. This is because it is easier for blacks and hispanics to get an elite institution degree, and with that elite institution degree, to then develop the work experience that an entry-level Harvard Grad gets.

That said, one thing that the white privilege pushers will argue is that non-whites are discriminated against in job applications and don't get as many callbacks. And they will run [stories about a woman who changed her name to sound more white and got TEN TIMES as many callbacks](#), or other anecdotes showing similarly extreme effects.

The actual experimental data is a bit more mundane, with the white callback rates being from 0.946 to 1.506 times the black callback rate given identical applications:

## Black-White Callback Disparities

Study	White Callback Rate as Multiple of Black Callback Rate for Otherwise Identical Resumes
<a href="#">Jacquemet-Yannelis 2011</a>	1.456
<a href="#">Deming-Katz 2016</a>	0.946
<a href="#">Bertrand-Mullainathan 2004</a>	1.506
<a href="#">Agan-Starr 2016</a>	1.212

Not as exciting.

So regarding the stories of a name change to a whiter-sounding name resulting in a 10-fold increase in callbacks as you may have heard in those stories... well... that may have happened. Outliers do exist. Or it may have just been completely made up.

Lets take 1.5, and say that whites are 1.5 times as likely as blacks to get a callback for a job application. Well, what does that mean in practical terms? I means that a black person has to send out 15 applications to get the same result as a white person who sends out 10 applications. A "50% higher callback rate" seems like a big deal at first blush, until you break it down and think about what it means in practical terms. It means a few more applications.

But let me ask you this: would you rather have a degree in sociology from Yale, but have to send out 15 applications to get the same result as a white person with a sociology degree from Yale sending out 10 applications - OR - would you rather have a degree in sociology from Georgia Tech?

Or to put it more bluntly: the price you pay, as a black person, [for getting to go to Yale when you're really only good enough to go to Georgia Tech](#), is having to send out 5 more job applications than a white person with the same university-degree combo would have to. A white person with a 1400 SAT doesn't get to go to Yale.

Which is to say, it is utterly trivial. Maybe 2 extra hours of work. Some may argue that I am trivializing the callback disparity. Of course I am, because it is indeed trivial.

But even this isn't the end of the story. The study done by Agan-Starr found that, if employers knew about an applicants' criminal record, then race differences were reduced to practically zero:

## Callback Rates by Race and Criminality given Identical Resumes

Race	No Crime	Any Crime	Property Crime	Drug Crime
White	14%	8.3%	7.7%	8.9%
Black	13.1%	8.6%	9.1%	8.1%

As an aside, the paper argues that "the box", or the right of employers to demand criminal record, should be banned, because it results in former criminals having a more difficult time getting jobs. But as it happens, asking for criminal record appears to entirely eliminate the racial gap for non-criminals. The obvious "white privilege" retort is that the cops and courts are biased against blacks and hispanics.

But when I heard this, I thought about [this famous/infamous cartoon](#) that was spread around the internet on "white privilege". And one of the panels was this:

IF THAT WASN'T BAD ENOUGH, HERE'S SOME FOOD FOR THOUGHT:

**A WHITE MALE WITH A CRIMINAL RECORD, IS  
5% MORE LIKELY TO GET A JOB OVER A  
MAN OF COLOR WITH A CLEAN RECORD.**



I was able to track down [the study this is based on](#). It's from 2003, and whites with a criminal record were 5% more likely to get hired than a black without one. HOWEVER, they did not control for resume quality or credentials. I.e. the white applicants almost certainly had better resumes across the board.

As seen above, when blacks and whites have the same resume credentials, and the same criminal or lack of criminal record, they get hired at the same rates.


# Job Networks and "Connections"

The last real argument regarding employment would be networks. I.e. filling jobs via word-of-mouth networks, who you know. When told that they benefit from this, I think most white people, probably around 77%, would say "what the hell are you talking about?".

But the biggest problem with the "job networks" argument is that there's no way to really measure it's practical effects, to say how much white people benefit from this. And I think it's unfalsifiability is the reason it is invoked.

HOWEVER, we can look at the incomes of first generation immigrants to the United States, who presumably have fewer "connections" than non-immigrant populations on average.

First, we can look at [the Median Household Income of the ethnic and racial groups in the United States in 2013](#):



Note: Median household income data are not available prior to 1967. For more information on recessions, see Appendix A. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see <ftp://ftp2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/techdocs/cpsmar14.pdf>.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1968 to 2014 Annual Social and Economic Supplements.

And we can compare this to the [median household income for first-generation immigrants to the United States](#):

## Median Family Income of Recent Immigrant Arrivals

TABLE 3.6

### Median Family Income of Recent Immigrant Arrivals

*Median adjusted family income (in 2013 dollars)*

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2007	2013
<b>Mexico</b>	\$26,700	\$27,500	\$26,100	\$30,800	\$32,000	\$31,100
<b>Other Central/South America</b>	\$37,600	\$33,200	\$33,000	\$37,900	\$40,800	\$37,400
<b>Asia</b>	\$41,600	\$39,200	\$41,600	\$51,500	\$55,400	\$46,000
<b>Europe</b>	\$48,900	\$47,600	\$49,800	\$53,400	\$60,000	\$66,600
<b>Caribbean</b>	\$36,200	\$33,300	\$36,200	\$38,700	\$38,000	\$31,100
<b>Africa</b>	\$37,600	\$33,300	\$41,500	\$43,000	\$36,800	\$34,800

Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five years of the census or survey date. Based on family income in the calendar year preceding the census. Income standardized to a family size of three. For details, see <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/07/appendix-a-data-sources-and-methodology/>.

Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 2007 and 2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS)

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Just eyeballing the numbers, it doesn't look like US-born citizens earn more money than first-generation immigrants of similar origin. I compiled a list of these two groups for Median Household Income in 2013:

## Median Household Immigrant by Race/Ethnicity and Immigration Status

Group in the United States	Median Household Income
US-Born "Asians"	\$67,065
European Immigrants	\$66,600
US-Born Europeans	\$58,270
"Asian" Immigrants	\$46,000
US-Born Hispanics	\$40,963
Central American Immigrants	\$37,400
African Immigrants	\$34,800
US-Born Africans	\$34,598
Caribbean Immigrants	\$31,100
Mexican Immigrants	\$31,100

So we can see that immigration status doesn't seem to matter much. I put "Asian" in quotes because that could mean anything from Burmese to Indonesian to Japanese to Xinjiang. This is not a slam-dunk against the "work connections" hypothesis, but it is certainly NOT what you would predict if "work connections" were really important.

And besides, the people who push "work connections" never give any quantifiable argument as to it's effect on racial disparities anyway, they'll just say something like "85% of jobs are filled without an advert but by word of mouth".

I have a personal experience of two chemical engineers I knew back in college. One went to go work for a company his dad worked in, getting the job based on his connection, and the other applied to 3 companies and got two offers. Fair enough, chemical engineers are in incredibly high demand, but the one who had to apply for jobs ended up liking his job more and currently makes more money than the one who got his job via family connection.

Of course a personal experience doesn't mean that this is generally true - but I can point to anecdotes of connections not mattering, while I'm sure the white privilege people can point to examples of connections mattering, and from there make the leap that white people are beneficiaries of these connections at a higher rate than blacks and hispanics.

## **But what about the gaps?**

When you knock down circumstantial explanations for race differences in anything, the believer in biological equality between the races begins to get frustrated, and will say, "Well then why are there these GAPS!? Gaps in health, gaps in wealth, gaps in income, gaps in proportion of doctors and scientists and engineers!?"

Well, when you knock out non-genetic explanations, what are you left with? If this is the first article on this site you're reading, there's obviously a long way to go.

## **"Let me be clear"**

Let me be clear - I'm not saying that if these things were happening, that it would be somehow evil or wrong or in need of "remedying". For example, employers discriminating in favor of whites is perfectly fine, there's nothing wrong with that. Whites having more money and passing that money onto their offspring - there's nothing wrong with that, and blacks are not entitled to any of that were it happening in a significant way.

Or that blacks having more student debt upon graduation would necessarily be something unfair or nefarious. Or that there's something evil about whites looking out for each other and keeping blacks out of their business. It's a family business, and race is, in a sense, [a broader yet shallower family](#). No group of people has any right to access to whites.

By arguing that these things are not happening, don't infer from that that I have accepted the premise that some sort of major inequality is evil and must be "fixed" if it were happening.

# White Privilege: Cops and Courts

One of the most common "white privilege" arguments is that police target blacks, and that the courts are biased against blacks. In this article I will show that the broad statistical data doesn't support this.

## Cops shooting blacks

The point of this post is not to necessarily endorse how the cops or the courts work in a general sense. I am merely addressing the question of racial bias. The cops and courts may be unfair and capricious in a general sense, but the point of this post is to address the claim of racial bias.

Cops [hesitate longer](#) with a black suspect than with a white or Hispanic suspect:

**Table 2** Reaction time to shoot after a threat was presented, in seconds, for each predictor variable (standard deviations in parentheses)

Predictor variable		Mean (SD)
Suspect race	Hispanic	0.88 (0.27)
	White	1.37 (0.09)
	Black	1.61 (0.15)*
Scenario difficulty	Naive	0.59 (0.09)
	Intermediate	1.78 (0.15)**
	Journeyman	1.33 (0.27)**

\* $p < .05$

\*\* $p < .001$

Hispanic suspects have the shortest delay, which suggests that cops are most comfortable shooting Hispanics, then whites, and are least comfortable shooting blacks.

Moreover, the number of blacks [shot by police](#) corresponds to the [Uniform Crime Report statistics](#) on violent crime:



	% of Arrest-related Deaths	% of Violent Crimes
Black	29.9%	38.9%
White+ Hisp.	64.4%	58.7%
White	46.6%	N/A
Hisp.	17.8%	N/A

The year for this data is 2009.

If the years 2003-2009 are aggregated, blacks make up **31.8%** of arrest-related deaths.

2009 is the most recent year I could find data for on arrest-related deaths, and while blacks made up 29.9% of arrest-related deaths, they made up 38.9% of violent crimes that year. In fact, it looks like blacks get shot by cops less than their level of violent crime would predict.

	(2009) % of arrest related deaths	(2009) % of violent crime convictions	% of cop killers (2009)	2004-2013
Black	29.9%	38.9%	37.8%	43%
White+ Hisp.	64.4%	58.7%	53.3%	51.2%
White	46.6%	-	-	-
Hisp.	17.8%	-	-	-

As you can see in the above chart, [blacks also made up 37.8% of cop killers](#) in 2009. And if the years 2004-2013 are all aggregated, blacks made up 43% of cop-killers.

So far it looks like cops actually go easier on blacks. But perhaps this is just another layer of bias against blacks in that cops go out of their way to target blacks for investigations of violent crimes.

This is implausible, though, because the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) from 2000-2008 both basically say the same thing:

Black percentage of perpetrators from  
2000–2008 according to victim surveys (NCVS)  
and conviction (UCR)


	Assault	Rape	Robbery
NCVS	27%	34%	61%
UCR	33%	34%	56%

For a full breakdown of the UCR and NCVS numbers, an [otherwise dumb guy](#) did a great job of it.


If the cops are targeting blacks out of proportion to the crimes they actually commit, the victims of crime are in on the conspiracy as well.

One counter-argument to this could be the inaccuracy of eyewitness testimony in identifying individual criminals. But in dealing with claims of racial disparity, all that matters is that the victim correctly identifies the race of the attacker.

It's one thing to get the perpetrator wrong



It's another to get the RACE of the perpetrator wrong



And for this reason, victim reports on the RACE of the perpetrator are probably accurate, even if they get the precise individual person wrong.

And I have to be a bit tasteless about it: blacks and whites have a very visible difference in skin color and a difference in smell. So it's less plausible that the victim got the race of the attacker wrong than that they got the individual wrong.

### **Court Bias**

Perhaps it's not police bias but court bias. One piece of evidence for this is that [blacks make up a higher proportion of the prison population](#) than their [total crime rate](#) (blacks made up 40.1% of all prison inmates, but only 28.3% of all arrests).

Whites + Hispanics make up 68.9% of all arrests, but only 54.18% of the prison population.

There isn't data distinguishing whites and Hispanics on arrests, but there is for prison population. Whites made up 33.1% of the US prison population in 2009; Hispanics made up 21.1% of the prison population.

However, [blacks serve longer sentences](#). And in fact, when you control for sentence length, the racial disparity in prison population goes away almost completely.

What this means is that the racial disparity in prison population is almost entirely due to sentence length. The residual may be due to blacks being arrested for more serious things on average – that's something that could be controlled for, but I can't be arsed. Once you control for sentence length, the prison population is what you would expect from arrest rates, which probably reflects real criminal activity as stated above.


This table puts it in a bit of perspective:

	% of 2009 arrests	% of 2009 prison pop.	% ever gone to prison
Black	28.3%	40.1%	29.0%
White+ Hisp.	68.9%	54.2%	65.44%
White	N/A	33.1%	47.5%
Hisp.	N/A	21.1%	29.0%

The percent ever gone to prison is estimated by taking the total prison population and controlling for length of sentence by race, which can be found in the next section.

Moreover, [declination rates](#) are the same for whites and non-whites:

## Chart B: Overall declination rates



These are the percentage of cases where the prosecution declines, or drops, the case and the defendant goes home free.

So the cops arrest people in about the same racial proportion as the victims of crime claim, and the courts convict people in the same racial proportion as the cops arrest them.

Perhaps juries of all blacks are more likely to convict a white and vice-versa, but on the whole it appears to even out between the races.

These two pieces of data strongly suggest that there is no substantial variation in conviction rates between the races. It would be nice to just have conviction rates by race, but alas, I cannot find that data if it exists.

### Drug Law Application

The “White Privilege” claim that blacks are imprisoned for drug use more than whites comes from surveys. But people lie on surveys, and blacks could lie more.

In 2011, blacks comprised **31.7%** of all [drug arrests](#), while they made up **30.7%** of all [emergency room visits](#) for overdosing on illegal drugs.

This alone is probably enough to show that illegal drug arrests are based on actual illegal drug use. Even if it doesn’t represent the number of members of each race who ever used drugs, the arrests probably reflect the overall volume of total drug use.

There’s also evidence that blacks lie on surveys.

According to one study on this, blacks are roughly **25** times as likely as whites to lie on surveys of drug use when a hair and urine analysis are done after the survey. Hispanics are **2.5** times as likely as whites to lie. There are some more [studies behind paywalls](#).

The residual 1% difference between ER visits and drug arrests could be due to the fact that when police arrest someone for committing a violent or property crime, that person is searched for illegal drugs. And since blacks commit more violent crimes and property crimes, they are more likely to be searched as a result.

For the record I personally don't support current drug laws. I support harsher sentences for dealers of "hard drugs" and rehabilitation for those hooked on them who should be viewed as victims. The point here is that they don't seem to be enforced in a racially biased way.

### **Prison Sentence Length**

There seems to be one point where the "White Privilege" claim might hold, and that is in prison sentence length.

The paper "[Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the US Federal Courts](#)" looked at sentencing by race and crime.

It found that 72.9% of all cases follow standard sentencing guidelines. When strictly following sentencing guidelines, blacks got 2.43 months more on average than whites for the same crime when prior criminal background was controlled for, and Hispanics got 0.71 months less than whites.

If cases where the judge deviated from sentencing guidelines are included, blacks got 5.5 months more than whites, and Hispanics got 4.7 months more than whites.

Because blacks on average serve 64.09 months for their offense, judge discretion increases their sentence by **4.8%**. Hispanics on average serve 54.12 months, and for them judge discretion adds **9.5%** more time. The average white prison term is 32.06 months, and the effect of judge sentencing discretion is used as a baseline to which other races are compared.

This is just one analysis; [the literature on prison sentencing length is extremely muddled](#) and I don't think I can come to any knock-down conclusion on it. Much of the literature doesn't control for prior criminal record, which is useless. If you see some infographic saying blacks get 50% longer jail times, that's almost certainly not controlling for criminal record. The real number is more like 5-10%.

What you find in the research that controls for prior criminal record is either no effect, or harsher sentencing for blacks and much harsher sentencing for Hispanics. It almost never shows whites getting harsher sentences, so all told blacks and Hispanics get perhaps 5-10% longer sentences when prior criminal record is controlled for.

### **Summation**

But all told, the big story is that cops are probably less likely to shoot black criminals, who we are pretty sure are in fact criminals thanks to the NCVS. Cops are a bit trigger-happy with Hispanics though.

All races are just as likely to have their case dismissed or be found not guilty. If found guilty, blacks appear to get roughly 5% longer sentences when prior criminal record and nature of the offense is controlled for, and Hispanics get around 10% longer sentences.

The "White Privilege" ideas regarding cops and courts are thus mostly wrong.

UPDATE: Found a study that said that [when IQ is controlled for, race differences in prison sentences go away](#).

This is evidence that differences in courtroom behavior may be part of the reason for racial disparity in sentencing, as higher IQ defendants probably behave better in court.


# White Privilege: Loans

Racial differences in the ability to acquire a loan are sometimes pointed to as evidence of White privilege. These differences are said to lead to racial disparities in home ownership rates and entrepreneurship which in turn have a variety of long-term economic and social consequences. Though this story is often repeated, it is not justified by the relevant empirical evidence.

The idea that Whites get loans easily due to White privilege is not consistent with the fact that Asians can get loans just as easily as Whites can.

## Despite recent improvements, blacks and Hispanics still have harder time getting mortgages

### Denial rates



Note: Data based on applications for conventional loans for one-to-four-family home purchases, including manufactured homes. Data on Asians were not broken out separately until 2004. Hispanics may be of any race.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

### Desilver and Bialik (2017)

Given this pattern, the most obvious cause of differences in loan approval is racial differences in income. However, [critics](#) have pointed out that Whites are more likely than Blacks to get loans approved when comparing people of equal incomes.

This may sound compelling, but Blacks and Whites with equal incomes do not have the same spending behavior. [Borgo \(2013\)](#) looked at data on 25,820 American households and found that Black homes had lower saving rates than White homes even after controlling for differences in income, age, family size, education, and marital status. Thus, it makes sense for



loan companies to prefer White customers over Black ones even if they have the same incomes.

These differences in spending behavior explain why Blacks and Whites with equal incomes do not have the same credit scores. As reported by The Washington Post:

“The study found that whites earning less than \$25,000 had better credit records as a group than African Americans earning between \$65,000 and \$75,000. Overall, 48 percent of blacks and 27 percent of whites had bad credit ratings, as defined by Freddie Mac in this study.”

– [Loose, The Washington Post](#)

The central role of credit scores in racial loan disparities is highlighted by a survey which had lenders explain why they denied a large sample of loan applications. This research found that an applicant's debt-to-income ratio was the top reason non-Blacks were denied loans whereas credit history was the most frequently cited reason for Black applicants.

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## Why different groups are turned down for mortgages

*Most frequently cited reasons, 2015*

### White:

Debt to income ratio	25%
Credit history	21
Collateral	18

### Black:

Credit history	31
Debt to income ratio	25
Collateral	13

### Hispanic:

Debt-to-income ratio	26
Credit history	21
Collateral	15

### Asian:

Debt to income ratio	29
Collateral	15
Credit application incomplete	12

Note: Data are based on applications for conventional loans for one-to-four-family home purchases, including manufactured homes. Institutions are not required to report reasons for loan denials, and in some cases multiple reasons were reported. Source: Pew Research Center analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data

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## Desilver and Bialik (2017)

Some [studies](#) find that racial differences in loan acceptance persist even after adjusting for credit score differences. This is true, but it is also true that the credit scoring system doesn't work equally well for Blacks and Whites. According to a [report](#) given to congress by the federal reserve on how well loan performance is predicted by credit scores:

“Consistently, across all three credit scores and all five performance measures, blacks, single individuals, individuals residing in lower-income or predominantly minority census tracts show consistently higher incidences of bad performance than would be predicted by the credit scores. Similarly, Asians, married individuals, foreign-born (particularly, recent immigrants), and those residing in higher-income census tracts consistently perform better than predicted by their credit scores”

In other words, if you give out a loan to a Black and a loan to a White with equal credit scores, you are more likely to get your money back from the White.

This bias was shown to be strongest among those with low credit scores and to be much weaker among those with good credit scores. There is not much of a difference in the riskiness of giving loans to Blacks and Whites with good credit scores, but Blacks with poor credit scores are significantly riskier than Whites with poor credit scores to loan money to.

Given this, it should be no surprise that a [study](#) by the Chicago federal reserve found no racial bias in loan approval rates among those with a good credit score but a significant bias in favor of whites among those with a bad credit score. Loan agencies are acting exactly as we would expect them to if they were economically rational.

Perhaps the strongest evidence that racism is not the cause of differences in loan approval rates comes from a [study](#) of several thousand banks which found that Black-owned banks discriminated far more harshly against Blacks than did White-owned banks.

Specifically, at a White owned bank a Black person was found to have a 78% higher chance of rejection for a loan compared to a White person. At a Black-owned bank, this figure rose to 179%, an increase of 101%.

	White-Owned Banks		Black-Owned Banks	
	Acceptances	Rejections	Acceptances	Rejections
White applicants	90.59%	9.41%	86.22%	13.78%
	(1984)	(206)	(169)	(27)
Black applicants	83.26%	16.74%	61.56%	38.44%
	(179)	(36)	(458)	(286)
Total applicants	89.94%	10.06%	66.70%	33.30%
	(2163)	(242)	(627)	(313)
Disparity ratio <sup>a</sup>		1.78		2.79

Thus, racial differences in the riskiness of loans can account for why Blacks have a harder time getting loans than White people do, and the relevant empirical evidence does not justify the belief that racism on the part of loaners is a relevant factor.

# Fiscal Impact of Whites, Blacks and Hispanics

Previously I wrote an article that just looked at the net budgetary impact of whites and non-whites. Here I decided to break down the black and hispanic numbers as well.

The most recent year with good data on everything is 2014. So that is the year all of these numbers are from.

Before getting into the methods, I'll first show the final impact of this so you can see what a big deal this is:

## Budgetary Impact of Whites, Blacks and Hispanics in 2014

Category	Equal Military	Static Military
Whites	\$553.52 billion	\$249.52 billion
White Per Capita	\$2,795	\$1,260
Blacks	-\$389.71 billion	-\$306.53 billion
Black Per Capita	-\$10,016	-\$7,700
Hispanics	-\$411.95 billion	-\$291.3 billion
Hispanic Per Capita	-\$7,298	-\$5,160

This takes into account taxes paid and government services consumed at both the State and Federal level. The "Equal Military" column treats military spending as a service consumed equally on a per-capita basis between blacks, whites and hispanics. The "Static military" assigns all military spending to whites.

On net, whites generate a **\$249.52 billion surplus**, or **\$1,260 per person** if you assign 100% of military spending to whites. If you just give whites a proportional share of military spending, their surplus goes up to **\$553.52 billion** total and **\$2,795 per capita**.

Blacks, by contrast, run a budget deficit of **\$389.71 billion**, or **\$10,016 per capita**. If 100% of military spending is assigned to whites, blacks STILL run a **\$306.53 billion** deficit, or **\$7,700 per capita**.

Hispanics run a budget deficit of **\$411.95 billion** of **\$7,289 per capita** if military spending is proportional. If 100% of military

spending is assigned to whites hispanics run a deficit of **\$291.3 billion**, or **\$5,160 per capita**.

### Race and Tax Revenue

So regarding the methodology, I first looked in several places to figure out how much each race paid in taxes, as the government doesn't keep such statistics. However, there are statistics collected by the tax foundation showing how much each income bracket pays in taxes.

And the census has data on income for each race and the proportion of brackets they are. And so using this, we can deduce how much each racial group pays in taxes:

Race and Tax Payment in 2014

Bracket	% of taxes bracket pays	% of bracket is white	% of bracket is hispanic	% of bracket is black	% of taxes paid by whites-in-bracket	% of taxes paid by blacks-in-bracket
Top 5%	38.9	80.87	6.17	5.00	31.46	1.945
6-20%	25.4	77.72	7.80	7.48	19.74	1.8999
21-40%	18.3	73.65	10.70	8.91	13.48	1.6305
41-60%	9.9	68.3	12.68	13.76	6.76	1.3622
61-80%	5.1	63.01	17.89	16.67	3.21	0.8502
81-100%	2.1	57.41	16.23	21.25	1.21	0.4463
Total					75.86	8.134

This comes out to \$4529.52 billion paid by whites, \$528.30 billion paid by hispanics, and \$485.67 billion paid by blacks.

### Race and Government Use

So how does that compare with services consumed? Well for Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and Welfare I was able to find racial breakdowns. But what about state spending? Roads, schools, trash pick-up, police? For all of that I lumped into "equal government" and assigned the cost of it on a population basis.

### Race and Government Use 2014

Service	Budget	White Use %	White Use \$	Black Use %	Black Use \$	Hisp. Use %	Hisp. Use \$
"Equal Gov.t"	3,482	62.1	2162.32	12.2	424.8	17.7	616.3
Social Security	1,262	84.07	1060.96	9.31	117.5	6.23	78.6
Medicare	505	76	383.90	10	50.5	9	45.45
Medicaid	476	39.06	185.93	19.9	94.72	26.43	125.8
Welfare	472	38.8	183.14	39.8	187.86	15.7	74.1
Total	6,197	64.16	3976	14.1	875.38	15.2	940.25
(Static Mil.)	6,197	69.07	4280	12.78	792.2	13.2	819.6

So as it happened, and this is something I thought going in, the race differences in government consumption are not a very big deal, and the real cause of the budgetary impacts of races is the difference in tax payment. I also found some data showing that whites made up 75% of millionaires, and I thought "ya know, based on this, whites overall probably pay around 75% of the taxes" - and I was correct.

## Wage Impact of Racial Diversity

One thing people will say in response is that white wages are jacked up by having non-whites around. This doesn't appear to be true when you look at regions in the US:

Median Income and Proportion of Population of Whites by Region

Region	% White	Median Income of White Males	Median Income of White Females
Northeast	67.6	\$40,435	\$25,090
Midwest	77.2	\$36,892	\$22,803
South	59.0	\$37,666	\$22,199
West	50.9	\$41,366	\$23,140

So a big impact doesn't just pop out at you. And if there is a correlation between median white income in a state, or county, and the proportion of blacks and/or hispanics in that state or county, well then the next step would be to show causality.

Another interesting thing to point out is that a Dutch meta-analysis of 384 studies on the impact of immigration on native wages in the United States and EU countries found that a 1% increase in immigrants as part of the labor force was associated with a 0.119% reduction in native wages.

But one thing to consider is correlation and causation. Just because a 1% increase in immigration is only associated with a 0.119% decrease in native wages doesn't mean that the actual impact is that small.

So we're looking at a small negative impact on wages, not the big positive impacts you would need for the libertarian story to hold water. I mean it's not stupid to believe in the absence of data; lower-skill people come in, earn wages, white people are freed for higher-earning labor. But it doesn't appear to be actually happening.

If you want to argue that the presence of blacks and hispanics around white people drives up white wages, that's not something that is immediately obvious from the data, it's only intuitive if you hold very pro-market priors. You need more than just "ideas that make sense" and connect-the-dots / painting-by-numbers economic

narratives that libertarians like to spin, and then act as if they've actually discovered something.

## **Conclusion**

The negative fiscal impact of blacks and hispanics is significant. All of this discussion of a "national debt" and "deficit" is primarily of function of blacks and hispanics. Without them, we would be running budget surpluses today, even when keeping the military the same size.

Immigration Impact Meta-Analysis:

<http://dspace.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/9737/04134.pdf?sequence=1>

Taxes paid by brackets:

<http://www.ctj.org/pdf/taxday2014.pdf>

Racial groups by income bracket:

<https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032014/hhinc/hinc05R.xls>

Medicaid Enrollment by race, projected from these numbers:

[https://www.ccwdata.org/web/guest/medicaid-charts#a2\\_eligibility\\_race\\_2010](https://www.ccwdata.org/web/guest/medicaid-charts#a2_eligibility_race_2010)

Welfare use by race:

<http://www.statisticbrain.com/welfare-statistics/>

Medicare Enrollment:

<http://kff.org/report-section/income-and-assets-of-medicare-beneficiaries-2014-2030-tables/>

Social Security Enrollment by race in 2014:

[https://books.google.com/books?id=72kMCAAQBAJ&pg=PA3324&lpg=PA3324&dq=Social+security+beneficiaries+2014+by+race+black+hispanic+white&source=bl&ots=IMvvS1GIQM&sig=Ry6RF3ZFXZ2lrIirsA2RCIYSRE8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjX6uzqydDMAhVr5oMKHX\\_JBaQ4ChDoAQg4MAQ#v=onepage&q=Social%20security%20beneficiaries%202014%20by%20race%20black%20hispanic%20white&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=72kMCAAQBAJ&pg=PA3324&lpg=PA3324&dq=Social+security+beneficiaries+2014+by+race+black+hispanic+white&source=bl&ots=IMvvS1GIQM&sig=Ry6RF3ZFXZ2lrIirsA2RCIYSRE8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjX6uzqydDMAhVr5oMKHX_JBaQ4ChDoAQg4MAQ#v=onepage&q=Social%20security%20beneficiaries%202014%20by%20race%20black%20hispanic%20white&f=false)

[id=72kMCAAQBAJ&pg=PA3324&lpg=PA3324&dq=Social+security+beneficiaries+2014+by+race+black+hispanic+white&source=bl&ots=IMvvS1GIQM&sig=Ry6RF3ZFXZ2lrIirsA2RCIYSRE8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjX6uzqydDMAhVr5oMKHX\\_JBaQ4ChDoAQg4MAQ#v=onepage&q=Social%20security%20beneficiaries%202014%20by%20race%20black%20hispanic%20white&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?id=72kMCAAQBAJ&pg=PA3324&lpg=PA3324&dq=Social+security+beneficiaries+2014+by+race+black+hispanic+white&source=bl&ots=IMvvS1GIQM&sig=Ry6RF3ZFXZ2lrIirsA2RCIYSRE8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjX6uzqydDMAhVr5oMKHX_JBaQ4ChDoAQg4MAQ#v=onepage&q=Social%20security%20beneficiaries%202014%20by%20race%20black%20hispanic%20white&f=false)

Total US Government Spending at all levels 2014

[http://www.usgovernmentpending.com/year\\_spending\\_2014USbt\\_17bs2n#usgs302](http://www.usgovernmentpending.com/year_spending_2014USbt_17bs2n#usgs302)

Total US Government Revenue of all types and at all levels 2014

[http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/piechart\\_2014\\_US\\_total](http://www.usgovernmentrevenue.com/piechart_2014_US_total)





# Colonialism did not make Africa poor

Africa is a big place with a lot of history, but is treated as a single entity in modern political discussions. Before going over the charts, consider this:


In 1950, the continent of Africa (including North Africa) had a population of 230 million.

In 2015, that number had increased to 1,166 million (1.166 billion).

This is a quintupling of the population. Is Europe directly responsible for that? Did they pay Africans to overbreed? This, the most important factor in Africa's standard of living, is simply not mentioned.

Oh, and by the way, props to the George Bush's Foundation for [saving an estimated 1 million African lives](#) with your initiatives; the continent [really needed that](#).


That aside. first, lets just look at purchasing power parity per capita in Africa by year and see if colonization corresponded to any big shifts:



Looking at this, the answer seems to be no. There's nothing that really pops out at you. Contrary to either narrative, it seems colonialism neither helped nor hurt. Also that Africa didn't really get any poorer overall following decolonization.


I think colonialism is a big thing politically, basically the whole world being painted a few European colors, but this may overstate how important it was economically.

This next chart compares Africa to China, India and Japan over the same years:




At first I was going to fix the scale and just blow up the differences between India, China and Africa. But I like the perspective this gives.

Another thing that calls into question the impact of colonialism is when we look at the variation between former colonies after 1960. First lets look at the nominal GDP per capita (not PPP) of South Korea, Zimbabwe and Botswana between 1960 and 1975:



All super poor. Korea was not a European colony, of course, but it's important to know that in 1960 East Asia, including China (as seen above), was every bit as poor as Africa. Following 1975 the trajectory changed. Zimbabwe doesn't have statistics for a few years, but I think we can piece together what's in there:



So is colonialism responsible for Zimbabwe being poor, but slightly less so for Botswana, because Botswana started to have major economic growth around 1985 (Botswana became independent in 1966)?

And it's not like Europeans taking over Africa was decided before any of this. It was itself a product of Africa being poor and thus easy to take over ("conquer" would overstate what Europe had to do) – and Europe being in an age where they were still willing to do that kind of thing. The Congo Free State for example was established by roughly 200 Europeans.

We can also break this down country by country and ask whether nation's that were more colonized ended up being poorer or richer. The answer, whether you measure colonization by the number of Europeans who went there or the amount of time that a colony lasted there, is

that more colonized nations ended up being richer.

**Table 3b: Does the degree of European settlement explain per capita income today?**

The sample is countries with *Euro share* values of less than 0.125. Current income is the log of average of per capita income over 1995-2005. Euro share is proportion of Europeans in the colonial population. Legal origin is a dummy variable which is positive if a country's laws are based on the United Kingdom's legal system. Current education is the average rate of secondary school enrollment from 1998 to 2002. Independence is the fraction of years since 1776 that a country has been independent. Government quality is an index of measures of current government accountability and effectiveness. Ethnicity is a measure of a country's ethnic diversity. All specifications are estimated using OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The null hypothesis of the F test is that the coefficients on all the explanatory variables equal zero. P values are reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\* and \* represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. More detailed variable definitions and sources are provided in Table B and the Data Appendix.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Current Income	Current Income	Current Income	Current Income	Current Income	Current Income
Euro Share	8.378*** (0.00)	8.401*** (0.00)	-0.904 (0.69)	10.65*** (0.00)	3.612 (0.14)	9.846*** (0.00)
British Legal Origin		-0.0365 (0.88)				
Education			0.0326*** (0.00)			
Independence				0.822* (0.05)		
Government Quality					0.427*** (0.00)	
Ethnicity						-1.212*** (0.00)
Observations	110	110	108	78	110	98
R-squared	0.047	0.047	0.6	0.182	0.361	0.244
Prob>F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
F test:	12.72	6.328	95.92	14.68	27.53	36.09

Eaverly and Levine (2012)

### Outcomes Regressed on Years of Colonization

We regress Log GDP per capita and infant mortality on the number of years the island spent as a colony of a European power. Columns (1), (2), (4), (6) and (7) are OLS. Columns (3), (5) and (8) are two stage least squares where we instrument for centuries of colonial rule or the first year as a colony using the 12 month average and standard deviation of the east-west wind speed for each island.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Log GDP Capita	Log GDP Capita	Log GDP Capita - IV	Log GDP Capita	Log GDP Capita- IV	Infant Mortality Per 1000	Infant Mortality Per 1000	Infant Mortality Per 1000 - IV
Number of Centuries a Colony	0.413 (0.065)**	0.450 (0.083)**	0.441 (0.157)**			-2.801 (1.156)*	-2.611 (1.259)*	-10.244 (4.344)*
First Year a Colony				-0.396 (0.101)**	-0.545 (0.232)*			
Final Year A Colony				0.014 (0.014)	0.007 (0.017)			
Remained A Colony in 2000				0.800 (0.149)**	0.732 (0.206)**			
Abs(Latitude)		0.048 (0.011)**	0.048 (0.011)**	0.039 (0.011)**	0.042 (0.013)**		-0.763 (0.211)**	-0.771 (0.221)**
Area in millions of sq km		-21.046 (3.937)**	-20.984 (3.961)**	-20.429 (4.707)**	-23.791 (6.169)**		263.524 (149.986)+	321.185 (143.722)*
Island is in Pacific		0.779 (0.457)+	0.767 (0.522)	0.747 (0.470)	0.944 (0.569)		-7.427 (9.498)	-18.724 (13.608)
Island is in Atlantic		0.615 (0.400)	0.622 (0.410)	0.427 (0.367)	0.298 (0.403)		-7.349 (8.581)	-1.117 (8.555)
Constant	7.524 (0.166)**	6.172 (0.526)**	6.192 (0.659)**	13.673 (1.942)**	16.356 (4.173)**	24.771 (3.677)**	41.579 (10.898)**	60.751 (18.551)**
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
R-squared	0.320	0.578	0.578	0.642	0.630	0.080	0.353	0.082

Robust standard errors in parentheses. We cluster at the island group level since several of the islands (e.g. the Cook Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia) are used as separate observations from a cluster of politically related yet geographically distinct islands.

+ significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

### Feyrer and Sacerdote (2006)

Now, you might say that this is all because more Europeans went to, and what stay longer at, richer African nations. You can say that, but you're going to need some evidence. And that evidence will need to take into account the fact that the amount of precious metals in an area does not predict the degree to which it was colonized by Europeans ([Eaverly and Levine 2012](#)).

The pro-colonialism case is strengthened further by the fact that the degree to which an area was colonized also predicts its future quality of education and government quality, and these variables moderate the relationship between colonization and modern wealth ([Eaverly and Levine 2012](#)).

There is little systematic evidence that colonialism made Africa poor.

African population statistics:

[http://www.geohive.com/earth/his\\_history1.aspx](http://www.geohive.com/earth/his_history1.aspx)

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Listofcontinentsbypopulation>

[http://visualeconsite.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/popgrowthsince\\_1500.jpg](http://visualeconsite.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/popgrowthsince_1500.jpg)  
(counting pixels)

[World region GDP PPP statistics](#)

[Country nominal GDP per capita statistics](#)

# The Wealth of Colonizers (or lack thereof)

One popular rhetorical attack on white countries is that their wealth is a product of exploiting other countries. Now one way to evaluate this is to look at the “colonized” countries and how they fared.

But the Europeans-as-colonial-exploiters idea has another end of the equation—where the “exploitation” went. If the colonizers are exploiting all this wealth, there should be some wealth on the other end.

I took the population of a country in 1940, and the population of their empires in 1940, and the population of the empire divided by the population of a country is the “**colonization index**”. An index of 1 would mean there was 1 colonial subject for every citizen. The British empire, at 10.46, had 10.46 colonial subjects for every British citizen.

I then compared their per capita GDPs in 1970 (30 years later). I chose 1970 because it was the earliest year that West Germany appeared on the Wikipedia list of historical nominal per capita GDPs.

The countries I chose to compare to were all non-Communist European countries, “Communist” defined as being in the USSR, the Warsaw Pact, or being Yugoslavia or Albania. If you included Communist countries, sure, you would find that colonizers – all being non-communist – would be wealthier than the average of all European countries. But they’re not wealthier than other non-Communist European countries.

Don’t be limited by me; pick different years if you want. In fact, most of my sources have data for various years.

Colonial vs. Non-Colonial European countries in 1970:

Country	Per <u>Capita</u> GDP	Colonization Index (1940)
United States	\$4,998	0.13
Sweden	\$4,404	0
Luxembourg	\$4,254	0
Canada	\$4,047	0
Switzerland	\$3,648	0
Denmark	\$3,366	0
Australia	\$3,324	0
Norway	\$3,283	0
France	\$2,821	2.64
Belgium	\$2,734	1.24
Holland	\$2,711	8.06
W. Germany	\$2,687	0
Iceland	\$2,544	0
Finland	\$2,436	0
New <u>Zealand</u>	\$2,283	0
United Kingdom	\$2,243	10.46
Austria	\$2,055	0
Italy	\$2,030	0.3
Ireland	\$1,446	0
Greece	\$1,438	0
Spain	\$1,178	0
Portugal	\$884	1.31



Exactly how much wealth one could extract from a dirt-poor African—if indeed that’s what these countries were doing—seems like it wouldn’t be worth the effort.

Germany, with no empire, was able to drop France, Britain, Belgium and Holland combined in WW2. And in World War 1, Germany was able to almost knock out Belgium and France, who was only saved by the British outside Paris.

Now in WW2 it was a matter of military strategy, not necessarily industrial power, but even in 1939, Germany could produce more of any military equipment than France, and any non-naval military equipment than Britain. And Germany had few colonies in its history relative to its size, and none since 1918. Otto von Bismarck certainly thought colonies were a waste.

From 2013:

	Per capita GDP	Colonization Index
Luxembourg	\$91,048	0
Norway	\$64,893	0
Switzerland	\$56,939	0
United States	\$54,629	0.13
Ireland	\$47,804	0
Holland	\$47,130	8.06
Austria	\$46,164	0
Germany	\$45,615	0
Sweden	\$45,143	0
Denmark	\$44,862	0
Canada	\$44,088	0
Australia	\$43,901	0
Iceland	\$43,393	0
Belgium	\$42,725	1.24
Finland	\$39,755	0
Britain	\$39,137	10.46
France	\$38,851	2.64
Italy	\$34,758	0.3
Spain	\$33,763	0
Czech*	\$30,445	0
Slovenia*	\$29,917	0
Portugal	\$28,326	1.31
Slovakia*	\$27,585	0
Estonia*	\$26,355	0
Greece	\$25,667	0

\*former communist country

At 2013 the story is the same, so it’s not like the “benefits of colonialism” kicked in later. There’s still no relationship between colonialism and wealth, and one of the colonizers – Portugal – is even falling behind some former communist countries.

We can briefly compare the per capita GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa to two racially African countries that were independent since at least 1804 – Haiti and Ethiopia:

<u>Sub-saharan Africa</u>	\$1,699
Haiti <sup>1</sup>	\$1,703
Ethiopia <sup>2</sup>	\$1,380
Dominican Republic	\$12,186
Jamaica	\$8,893

1 - Independence from France in 1804

2 - Independent except for Italian rule from 1936-1942

Haiti achieved its independence from France in 1804, and 209 years later is as poor as the continent of Africa. Haiti is the smaller of the two countries on the island of Hispaniola.

The Dominican Republic is on the same island as Haiti but is not a racially African majority. Jamaica is a racially African island country in the Caribbean that remained under UK rule until 1962.

Ethiopia evaded any European rule except by Mussolini's Italy from 1936 to 1942. Ethiopia's war with Italy and their liberation by Britain killed 290,000 Ethiopians out of a population of 17.7 million, or 1.6% of the population.

By comparison, Japan lost 4.1% of its population, Germany lost 10.46% of its population, Yugoslavia lost 8.8%, the USSR lost 16%, Romania 3.1%, Poland 17%, Italy lost 1.00%, France lost 1.4%, and the United Kingdom 0.9% in World War 2.

To blame Ethiopia's current economic issues on the effects of that war after 72 years would betray a great ignorance about the history of other countries.

One country I forgot to add was Liberia. Liberia became formally independent in 1847, though was arguably functionally independent as far back as 1822. Despite its independence, Liberia's per capita GDP (PPP) is \$886, \$878 and \$900 according to the IMF, World Bank and CIA respectively, which is well below the Sub-Saharan African average.

Within Africa, by far the most "colonized" country was South Africa, in terms of proportion of the population that was European, length of formal and effective European rule, and economic impact of European intervention. If colonization impoverishes the colonized people, we should expect the blacks in South Africa to be especially poor, but we don't see that at all:

S. Africa (2013)	\$12,867
S.A. Whites (2011)	\$35,278
S.A. Blacks (2011)	\$5,856

South African blacks are well above the average for blacks in Africa, despite being the "most colonized" by any measure.

To recap:

1. White colonizing countries were no wealthier than non-colonizing white countries—that weren't Communist. None of the colonizing white countries were Communist. The "colonial exploiter" narrative should predict that these countries should be wealthier than non-colonial white countries that weren't Communist.
2. Black countries that entirely (Haiti) or almost entirely (Ethiopia) escaped colonization were no better off than the rest of Africa.

3. The blacks in the most colonized African country – South Africa – are over 3x as wealthy per capita as the blacks in less colonized African countries.

This is not to justify the denial of sovereignty that conquest makes. It is merely to say that the “whites exploited Africa” narrative is probably false.

South Africa numbers:

<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/06/chart-of-the-week-how-south-africa-changed-and-didnt-over-mandelas-lifetime/>

Per capita GDPs of specific countries:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_GDP\\_\(PPP\)\\_per\\_capita](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita)

Per capita GDP of black Africa:

<http://data.worldbank.org/region/SSA>

Historical GDP per capita:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_past\\_and\\_projected\\_GDP\\_\(nominal\)\\_per\\_capita#World\\_Bank\\_estimates\\_between\\_1960\\_and\\_1969](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_past_and_projected_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita#World_Bank_estimates_between_1960_and_1969)

British Empire:

<https://books.google.com/books?id=x2JwBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA71&lpg=PA71&dq=british+empire+population+1940&source=bl&ots=zIDeVTF2tO&sig=iHZBV6ulHSIeYM4Fek2jzb1uzLs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKewimypn07bvJAhUBXj4KHcE1CpgQ6AEIZzAN#v=onepage&q=british%20empire%20population%201940&f=false>

French Empire:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French\\_colonial\\_empire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_colonial_empire)

Portuguese “Empire” population:

<http://www.populstat.info/Africa/mozambic.htm>

<http://www.populstat.info/Africa/angolac.htm>

<http://www.populstat.info/Asia/easttimc.htm>

<http://www.populstat.info/Asia/macauc.htm>

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goa#Population>

Dutch Empire:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch\\_East\\_Indies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_East_Indies)<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/population>

Belgian Empire:

<http://www.populstat.info/Africa/congokic.htm>

Italian Empire:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian\\_East\\_Africa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_East_Africa)<http://www.populstat.info/Africa/libyac.htm>

Populations of European countries in 1939:

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_War\\_II\\_casualties](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties)

# South African Apartheid: a case study on the effects of European colonialism in Africa

The impact of European colonialism on the world is often described as being profoundly negative. The popular view is that Europeans came, stole resources, destroyed cultures, and committed mass murder all over the earth. By contrast, the prevailing view 100 years ago was that Europe was supplying the world with advanced institutions which they would not develop on their own and, in so doing, was civilizing the world.

Either of these theories might be true, and, to some extent, they both are. It is obviously correct that Europe took resources from places, killed some number of people, and ended various indigenous cultural practices. It is also obviously true that Europe set up various institutions, such as capitalism and democracy, in various parts of the world which had not developed these things on their own.

A broad look at the empirical evidence suggests that European colonization helped most people more than it hurt them. Research has shown that the longer, or more heavily, a place was colonized by Europeans the richer it ended up being today ([Eaverly and Levine, 2012](#); [Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2006](#)). Moreover, in the 20th century Africa, which is the center of much of the colonization debate, saw tremendous net gains in both wealth and population size ([Manning, 2013](#); [Roser, 2016](#))

I find this broad view compelling, but discussions on colonialism are rarely about the broad view. Instead, people like to talk about the anecdotal experiences of particular countries at particular times, and no anecdote is more often talked about than South African apartheid.

In this article, I will examine the history of South Africa as a case study in European colonialism.

## Black Origins

The earliest people known to have occupied South Africa were a type of African called Khosians. Khosians are not the group of people most people think of when they think of Black South Africans. Those are Bantus. Bantu Africans and Khosians Africans look different, traditionally spoke different languages, and lived different sorts of lives. If we turned the clock back 4 thousand years, we would find that the southern half of the African continent was almost entirely inhabited by [Khosians](#).

Some time roughly 3,000 years ago, Bantu Africans began expanding out of eastern and central Africa. As they expanded, they displaced many of the African peoples who had previously lived there. The degree to which this expansion occurred via violence, disease, out breeding, or other means, is unknown.

[By 1,000 AD](#), the Bantu had reached most of South Africa. However, most of the people there were still Khosians. When the Portuguese arrived in South Africa in the 1400's, they encountered very [few](#) Bantu.

As the Bantu expanded, they divided into tribes which then went to war with one another over land. In several African nations, a specific Bantu tribe came to dominate the others and then set up an empire. This occurred in South Africa as well. In the 1810's and 1820's,

the [Zulus](#) conquered many neighboring African tribes and formed the Zulu empire. This empire went on to last almost until South Africa was entirely under White rule.

## White Origins

The [first White colony](#) in the southern tip (cape) of South Africa was established in 1653 by the Dutch East India company and was intended to supply ships traveling by Africa with food and other supplies. As time went on, the Dutch needed ever more food and so expanded. This led to them warring with locals in 1659, 1673, and 1677, in what are known as the "[Khoi-Dutch wars](#)".

In 1795, the cape was invaded and conquered by the British. Thousands of Dutch decided that they did not want to live under British rule and so made the "[great trek](#)" into the heart of South Africa and set up several independent nations. These Dutch nations were largely [pre-industrial](#) and so their inhabitants came to be known as "Boers", the dutch word for farmer.

## Wars for South Africa

In the [late 19th century](#), there were wars in South Africa between the British and Bantu tribes, the Boers and Bantu Tribes, the British and the Boers, and Bantu tribes vs other Bantu Tribes.

Basically, a ton of people wanted land in South Africa and were willing to kill for it. In the end, the British won and united South Africa under their rule after defeating the Boers, and the Zulu, among other groups, and passing the [South Africa act of 1909](#), which set up a single state to rule over the whole area. This lasted until 1948, when South Africa declared independence from Britain and "apartheid", which means "separation", formally began.

## The Rise of apartheid

While the South African government did not obtain independence from Britain until 1948, the beginnings of Apartheid can be traced back to the [land act of 1913](#). This law made it illegal for Whites to sell land to Blacks and vice versa. By this point, Whites had already conquered or purchased the vast majority of South African land and this law was designed to make sure that this would not change.


Between this time and the 1960's, the Apartheid government passed many laws which further segregated the races. For instance, inter-racial marriage was banned.

The most often talked about policy of South Africa was the creation of the Bantustans. These were designated "homelands" for Black South Africans. The Apartheid government forcibly moved millions of Blacks from multi-racial areas of South Africa into these Bantustans.

As explained in the report of the [Truth and Reconciliation Commission](#), the people who established the Bantustans gave the following rational for their motives:

"NP politicians portrayed the homelands as a moral response to South Africa's 'multi-national' reality. Apartheid theorists believed that South Africa was a country containing a number of nations, each developed to a greater or lesser degree. Freedom, they posited, could be realized only by providing the opportunity for each of these nations to exist and develop along its own lines."

However, [critics](#) are quick to point out that the Bantustans consisted of less than a quarter of South Africa's land even though Blacks made up an overwhelming majority of the nation's population.



Bantustans also suffered from tremendous poverty. As the [Encyclopedia of Britannia](#) explains: "The Bantustans were rural, impoverished, underindustrialized, and reliant on subsidies from the South African government.

The original hope of the designers of the Bantustan system was that industries would be established along the Bantustan borders to utilize the cheap labour available nearby, but for the most part these hopes went unrealized. Other initiatives to create the illusion of viable economies for the Bantustans also broke down. To the end they were heavily dependent on financial aid supplied by the South African government. Poverty remained acute in the Bantustans, and child mortality rates were extremely high. Despite draconian control of where people were allowed to farm and the number of cattle they were permitted to have, Bantustan lands were oversettled, overgrazed, and hence afflicted with serious soil erosion."

### **The Net Economic Impact of Bantustans**

Such critics rarely mention the fact that as can be seen, in 1960, Black South Africans were exactly as poor as Sub-Saharan Africans generally were. By 1980 they were far richer (1).

### Black GDP Per Capita in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa, 1960-1991

Year	Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)	South Africa (SA)	SSA - SA
1960	\$130	\$129	\$1
1970	\$219	\$226	-\$7
1980	\$709	\$1014	-\$305
1991	\$598	\$1330	-\$735

Given this, it does not seem fair to say, as some people do, that Bantustans caused Blacks to be poor. Prior to being forced into these areas, Black South Africans were just as poor as Sub-Saharan Africans generally were. Had Black South Africans been left totally alone, there is no reason to think that they would have become any richer than the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa let alone richer than they were under Apartheid. The land in Bantustans may have been bad. But this, evidently, was more than made up for by payments from the South African government.

## The Fall of Apartheid

From the outset, Apartheid had a serious public relations problem owing to several violent clashes between people protesting Apartheid and the police. Consider, for instance, the "[Sharpeville massacre](#)" which occurred in 1960 during a protest against a law requiring Blacks to carry "passbooks" (IDs):

On March 21, a group of between 5,000 and 10,000 people converged on the local police station in the township of Sharpeville, offering themselves up for arrest for not carrying their passbooks. The Sharpeville police were not completely unprepared for the demonstration, as they had already been forced to drive smaller groups of more militant activists away the previous night.

Many of the civilians present attended to support the protest, but there is evidence that the PAC also used intimidating means to draw the crowd there, including the cutting of telephone lines into Sharpeville, the distribution of pamphlets telling people not to go to work on the day, and coercion of bus drivers and commuters.

By 10:00, a large crowd had gathered, and the atmosphere was initially peaceful and festive. Fewer than 20 police officers were present in the station at the start of the protest. Later the crowd grew to about 20,000, and the mood was described as "ugly", prompting about 130 police reinforcements, supported by four Saracen armoured personnel carriers, to be rushed in. The police were armed with firearms, including Sten submachine guns and Lee–Enfield rifles. There was no evidence that anyone in the gathering was armed with anything other than rocks.

F-86 Sabre jets and Harvard Trainers approached to within a hundred feet of the ground, flying low over the crowd in an attempt to scatter it. The protestors responded by hurling stones (striking three policemen) and menacing the police barricades. Tear gas proved ineffectual, and policemen elected to repel these advances with their batons. At about 13:00 the police tried to arrest a protestor,

resulting in a scuffle, and the crowd surged forward. The shooting began shortly thereafter.

The official figure is that 69 people were killed, including 8 women and 10 children, and 180 injured, including 31 women and 19 children. Many were shot in the back as they turned to flee

Incidents like this led to the first major act of opposition against Apartheid by western governments, which came in 1964 when South Africa was excluded from the Olympics ([BBC](#)). The UN would go on to formally denounce Apartheid in 1973 ([History.com](#)).

These tensions were inflamed even further by the "[Soweto uprising](#)" of 1976. During this event, thousands of South African highschool students protested laws forcing them to learn non-African languages. Police attempted to disband these protests with tear gas, and this ultimately led to a confrontation that ended with hundreds of students dead.

Who started the violence is unclear. The Blacks involved are known to have stoned [White civilians](#) to death, and to have killed a police [dog](#) which was sent to disband them prior to the start of the shooting. However, the vast majority of the casualties were Black students.

Images of students shot by police were seen all over the world.





This led the UN to enact an [arms embargo](#) on South Africa in 1976. Though this embargo was mandatory, it is worth noting that a few nations, most famously [Israel](#), continued to have a strong trade and military relationship with South Africa.

In 1985 the United States and the United Kingdom [both](#) imposed economic sanctions on South Africa.

In conjunction with these external pressures, domestic terrorism was rapidly rising in South Africa during this time period. Following the incident in Sharpville, members of the ANC, the leading Black political party in South Africa, formed a military wing called the [MK](#). Among its founders was Nelson Mandela, who was famously thrown in prison in 1962 for committing various acts of terrorism against the South African government.

The most famous incident of said terrorism perpetrated by the MK was the [Church Street Bombing of 1983](#). This attack consisted of a car bomb being set off in the middle of the day on a busy street. 19 people were killed and over 200 were

wounded.



This is but one example from a [list](#) of many similar terrorist attacks that occurred, mostly in the 1980's. During this time, the MK also gained a reputation for torturing prisoners.

On top of all this, in 1989 the South African president suffered a stroke that caused him to resign from office. [F.W. De Klerk](#) took his place after being elected by congress and was then re-elected by the electoral college.

De Klerk eliminated as many of the Apartheid laws as he could and, after freeing Nelson Mandela, entered into negotiations to end Apartheid.

Following the announcement of these negotiations, De Klerk's party, the National Party, [lost](#) a national election to the pro apartheid Conservative Party. This was taken to indicate that the (White) people of South Africa did not want Apartheid to end and so De Klerk decided to hold a national referendum on whether or not to continue his negotiations to end apartheid.

The referendum was conducted in 1992 and the public was taken to have voted to end Apartheid. However, the referendum has been heavily criticized on several grounds. First, the South African government owned the media and this meant that the public only got a biased presentation of one viewpoint ([Schonteich et al., 2003](#)). Secondly, western powers were expected to plunge South Africa into a recession if they voted no ([Wren, 1993](#)). Thirdly, serious accusations of [voter fraud](#) have been made. Regardless, the negotiations continued and in 1994 Apartheid was ended.

Some Whites tried to resist the vote by setting up smaller areas of White control, but such efforts largely subsided after several Whites were executed on live TV by Black police officers. As one [author](#) wrote:

"the sight of three wounded AWB men pleading for their lives on live television and then shot in cold blood [by black policemen] had a powerful impact on the country's Whites."


Following the end of Apartheid, Nelson Mandela was elected president of the new South African government.

## National Success Since Apartheid

Unfortunately, since Apartheid ended South Africa has declined on many metrics of national health.

Under apartheid GDP per capita usually grew roughly in sync with the rest of the World. This trend began to collapse in the 1980's following the introduction of sanctions against the country. After apartheid ended, GDP per capita not only stagnated but, in fact, fell such that South Africans were poorer in 2002 than they were in 1982.

**GDP Per Capita, 2016 US \$, 1960-2014**




### World Bank

In 1980, South Africa has an unemployment rate of 9.8% ([Murwirapachena et al., 2013](#)). By 2002, that figure had risen to 30.4%, and in 2014 it was still nearly 3 times as high as it was in 1980 ([Murwirapachena et al., 2013](#); [World Bank](#)).

Under Apartheid, South Africa had a longer average life expectancy than Sub-Saharan Africa generally did. Since Apartheid ended, life expectancy has stagnated and fallen such that life expectancy was almost 10 years higher in 1992 than it was in 2002.


## Life Expectancy, 1960-2014



### World Bank

Murder rates in South Africa began to rise in the 1970's. Given the national turmoil of this time period, an increase in crime is unfortunate but not surprising. Perhaps less obvious, however, is the fact that murder rates exploded following the end of apartheid. As can be seen, this has disproportionately impacted Whites.

Figure 1: Homicide rate in South Africa, 1938–2003



Source: Stats SA

\* Data after 1990 is based on projections using the Stats SA figures and those provided by the National Injury Mortality Surveillance System

(Thompson, 2004)

These declines have not just impacted White South Africans. The wealth gap between Blacks and Whites in South Africa was slightly lower under Apartheid than it is today.

### Racial Income Inequality in South Africa During and After Apartheid

Year	Median White Income	Median Black Income	Black income/White income
1993	3,418	304	8.89%
2008	4,188	367	8.76%

(Leibbrandt et al., 2012)

This, taken in conjunction with the fact that GDP growth has slowed since Apartheid ended, implies that both Blacks and Whites in south Africa would likely be richer today if Apartheid were still in place.

Moreover, Black South Africans reported feeling less happy and less satisfied with their lives in 2008 than they did in the early 1980's.

### Percent Saying They are Happy or Very Happy

Year	Whites	Blacks
1983	92%	49%
1988	92%	36%
1994	81%	85%
1995	76%	47%
2008	80%	42%

([Moller, 1998](#); [Gaibie and Davids, 2009](#))

### Percent Saying Satisfied or Very Satisfied with Life

Year	Whites	Blacks
1983	89%	44%
1988	81%	32%
1994	77%	79%
1995	64%	41%
2008	76%	39%

([Moller, 1998](#); [Gaibie and Davids, 2009](#))

Thus, it seems that the economic, physical, and psychological health of South Africa has gotten worse since Apartheid ended.

## Kill the Boers

Anti-White racism has also risen since Apartheid ended. Today, there is a wave of mass murder being waged against the descendants of the Boers. This is how the situation was described by the president of Genocide Watch:

"Afrikaner farm owners are being murdered at a rate four times the murder rate of other South Africans, including Black farm owners. Their families are also subjected to extremely high crime rates, including murder, rape, mutilation and torture of the victims. South African police fail to investigate or solve many of these murders, which are carried out by organized gangs, often armed with weapons that police have previously confiscated. The racial character of the killing is covered up by a SA government order prohibiting police from reporting murders by race. Instead the crisis is denied and the murders are dismissed as ordinary crime, ignoring the frequent mutilation of the victims' bodies, a sure sign that **these are hate crimes**.

However, independent researchers have compiled accurate statistics demonstrating convincingly that murders among White farm owners occur at a rate of 97 per 100,000 per year, compared to 31 per 100,000 per year in the entire South African population, making the murder rate of White SA farmers one of the highest murder rates in the world." [Leon Parkin & Gregory H. Stanton, President – Genocide Watch](#)  
[14 August 2012](#)

These murders are not only common place, they are also gruesome. Attie Potgieter was stabbed [over 150](#) times while his wife and daughter, who were later executed, were made to watch.



Dr. Louis John Botha was thrown into a [crocodile pit](#) and eaten alive.



As a final example, consider the [Viana](#) family. The father and daughter were shot, the mother was raped and killed, and the son was drowned to death in a bath of boiling water.





These murders reflect a more general anti-White sentiment which is ubiquitous in South Africa. Even leaders of the ANC, the party now in charge of the South African government, literally sang songs about killing White people as recently as 2012.

"South Africa's ruling party on Tuesday defended the singing of an apartheid-era song with the words "Kill the Boer" in a row that has raised fears of increasing racial polarisation."

- [Govender \(2010\)](#)

White South Africans are also discriminated against by various South African institutions in order to make up for the damage that Apartheid institutions are thought to have done to Blacks.

First, there is discrimination in University admissions. Consider, for instance, this report on the University of Cape Town:

"The way in which the university has achieved this diversity, however, is somewhat controversial. To be admitted, white students must score the equivalent of straight A's. Meanwhile, black and mixed-race students can get in with plenty of B's. The University of Cape Town doesn't make this policy a secret — admission cutoffs are listed by race in the prospectus." - [Kelto \(2011\)](#)

Employers are encouraged by the state to discriminate against Whites as well. The Black Economic Empowerment law set up the following point system in the country:

"Points are based on the percentage of blacks and other non-white ethnic groups in the company's ownership and the skills training it gives to people in these groups. For companies, having a good BEE scorecard is often essential for business. The higher the BEE score they have, the more access they get to public markets and contracts." - [Iob \(2013\)](#)

Finally, in May of this year South Africa passed the "[land expropriation bill](#)" which allows the government to force White South Africans to sell their land to the government at a price that the government decides. The rationale behind this law is that it can undo the redistribution of land into the hands of whites which was solidified by the Land Act of 1913.

These factors have led White South Africans to abandon South Africa in large numbers. Since Apartheid ended, over [half a million](#) White South Africans have left the country. To put that in perspective, there are less than 5 million Whites in the whole country.

Some White South Africans are unable to emigrate on their own and are asking Western nations for Refugee status. The Canadian government has recently [acquiesced](#) to this request and allowed two White South Africans to come to Canada as refugees.

"31-year-old Brandon Huntley from Cape Town said he was constantly called a "white dog" and "settler" by Black South Africans back home. He was also robbed 7 times and stabbed three times by Black South Africans since his home country ended Apartheid in 1994. "

There's a hatred of what we did to them and it's all about the color of your skin," Huntley told the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board.

The evidence Huntley provided showed "a picture of indifference and inability or unwillingness of the South African government to protect White South Africans from persecution by African South Africans," Board Chairman William Davis said."

-

White South Africans are [also](#) asking for refugee status from the EU which, in recent years, has allowed tens of thousands of middle eastern and African refugees to cross its borders.

## **Land Ownership**

At this point I want to consider a series of politically charged questions about Apartheid and South Africa. First of all, do the Bantu have a moral claim to the land of South Africa which would justify a statement like "Whites stole South Africa from the Bantu and so can be legitimately forced to give it back."

A lot of clarity on this question comes from considering the basic moral issue of conquest: are a group of people who acquire land through conquest the rightful owners of that land?

If conquest is not a legitimate means to acquire land, the Zulu and similar Bantu tribes did not justly own South African land, nor did any other tribe of the last few hundred years. After all, this land was conquered from Khoisan and older Bantu tribes.

Moreover, if the Zulu did steal the land, it is not clear that Apartheid was in the wrong for taking it from them. Is it wrong to steal something which is stolen from the thief who stole it?

If, on the other hand, conquest is a valid way to acquire land, then White South Africans had a perfectly legitimate claim on it. This might be taken to imply that there is also nothing wrong with modern Black South Africans taking land from Whites. However, conquering land via war is not the same thing as using a false political narrative about the supposed negative effects of apartheid to take land. Moreover, forcing White people into a society that hates and mass murders them is not analogous to putting Blacks in bantustans which, as we have seen, were not as bad as they are often made out to be.

I consider the morality of conquest to be a difficult question and I won't try to resolve it here. What I will say is that it is very hard to come up with any principled moral answer which would justify the totality of what is being done to White South Africans.

## **Political Violence**

Another important question is whether or not the political violence initiated by the MK against White South Africans was justified.

Apartheid set up various laws, some of which I would consider unjust. Most importantly, Apartheid severely restricted the right of Blacks to protest. This was the justification that Mandela used for resorting to violence. He had no other choice.

This may be true, and if you think that apartheid's policies were sufficiently horrible this may justify violence, but there is no way that the indiscriminate violence against innocent and random White South Africans that the MK engaged in can be justified. Their activities, especially in the 1980's, were morally equivalent to any other act of mass murder.

Further more, as we have seen, Apartheid's actions were not nearly as bad as they are often thought to have been.

## **Evaluating Apartheid**

Even if Apartheid improved the material and psychological conditions of Black Africans, this does not necessarily imply that it was just. Would we feel that China ruling over a European population which objected to their rule was just so long as it improved the Europeans material and psychological condition?

At the very least, this state of affairs would make most people uncomfortable. Many would object on the grounds that European nations should be ruled by Europeans regardless of which ruler produced the highest GDP per capita and mean life satisfaction score.

On the other hand, the material benefit that Whites brought to South Africa, and Africa generally, was truly immense. Were it not for colonialism, most Africans alive today would have never even been born.

Fundamentally, the problem of African colonialism is the problem of multi-racialism. So long as Whites allowed Blacks to continue to live in Africa, which could have only been prevented with a massive and horrific genocide, Black Africans were going to resent them.

As Apartheid shows us, this is true even if the Whites improve the conditions of the Blacks. There will always be a feeling that Whites do not belong there and Blacks will always resent the invariably superior material conditions of Whites.

Colonialism of the United States only worked because there aren't many Indians around anymore. The kind of colonialism practiced in Africa in which Whites would be permanent but ruling minorities in a majority Black nation was never sustainable without an uncomfortable measure of totalitarianism and even then ethnic conflict was still common place.

Setting up trading or mining posts is one thing, but "White nations" should have never been set up in Africa. There was never anyway that South Africa was going to end well for the Whites involved compared to what would have happened if they had just stayed in Europe.

Today, White South Africans should come back to White nations and try to put South Africa behind them.

## **Conclusions**

South Africa show cases both sides of the colonialism debate. Whites in South Africa did kill Blacks. They did eliminate Black cultures. They did take local resources. They also vastly improved the physical and psychological condition of Blacks.

There are serious moral questions about African colonialism. However, colonialism can not plausibly be taken as the cause of violence and poverty in modern South Africa. This coheres well with the general picture that empirical evidence paints about the effects of colonialism.

The violence surrounding colonialism was rarely, if ever, one sided. Today, there is a massive level of systemic racism against White South Africans. The fact that this racism is not covered in Western media offers a stark contrast with how the media covered the sins of Apartheid.

Overall, the problems of South Africa, both in terms of Blacks resenting their White rulers under Apartheid and Whites experiencing racism today, come from the inherent difficulties of having a multi-racial society. In this sense, the story of South Africa contains lessons not only about colonialism but also about more general and pressing questions of immigration and diversity.

1. All data on Sub-Saharan Africa and data on total GDP and total population size for South Africa was taken from the [Google Data Explorer](#). Data on the proportion of the population that was Black in South Africa and the proportion of GDP that was consumed by Blacks was taken from [Terreblanche \(2002\)](#). The GDP per Capita for Blacks was equal to the total South African GDP divided by the proportion of the GDP consumed by Africans divided by the number of total Black South Africans, which was found by multiplying the total population size by the proportion of the population that was Black.

# Mythologies Regarding Leopold's Congo Free State

A popular [claim floating around the internet](#) is that King Leopold II, between the years 1885 and 1908 when he ruled the area of the modern Democratic Republic of Congo, killed 10 million people. This area was known as the "Congo Free State", and in 1908 the Belgian government formally took over the area.

This is based on claims in [a book by Adam Hochschild](#), who is a co-founder of the publication Mother Jones. He was also an activist "for civil rights" and was for "ending apartheid" in South Africa.

(Note that when I say "the Congo" I am referring to the area of the modern state known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, also known as Zaire, whose capital is Kinshasa. I am not including the Republic of the Congo, the smaller country on the northwest border, whose capital is Brazzaville. The Congo Free State, the Belgian Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zaire are all the names of governments that ruled over the same area - when I say "the Congo" I am referring to this land area. Here is an image of this land area, colored in blue:



)

Hochschild makes two key claims in his book:

1. Roughly 10 million people were killed by agents of the state in Leopold's Congo
2. Roughly half of the population of Leopold's Congo were killed

Now the first thing to consider is - is this possible? Well I see three things that need to be established for these claims to be possible:

1. The population of the Congo
2. The extent of Leopold's rule within the Congo
3. The number of Leopold's Agents who engaged in killing

## **The Population of Leopold's Congo**

Now we do have general population estimates for the whole of Africa. The one I am using [is from Geohive](#), which puts the population of Africa at 111 million in 1850 and 133 million in 1900. This gives us a population of 126.4 million in 1885 based on a linear trend, which means

a population density of 10.83 per square mile. If this is mapped onto the area of the Congo, this would yield a population of the Congo of 9.8 million:

### Mapping Africa to the Congo (1885)

Population of Africa 1885	126.4 million
Area of Africa	11.67 million mi <sup>2</sup>
Population Density of Africa 1885	10.83 / mi <sup>2</sup>
Area of the Congo	905,000 mi <sup>2</sup>
Pop. Est. of Congo in 1885 based on this	<b><u>9,801,150</u></b>

For the year 1900, we can infer the population of Black Africa by subtracting both the [population and land mass of North Africa](#) (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) from Africa and mapping the population density of the remaining population of all of Africa onto the Congo:

### Mapping Black Africa to the Congo (1900)

Population of Black Africa 1900	110.7 million
Area of Black Africa	9.34 million mi <sup>2</sup>
Population Density of Black Africa 1900	11.85 / mi <sup>2</sup>
Pop. Est. of Congo in 1900 based on this	<b><u>10,726,285</u></b>

The overall estimate for the population of Black Africa is a holistic estimate; it includes countries that didn't have population records by 1900.

If we limit our analysis to African countries that had population records in 1900, and map that population density onto the Congo, we get a lower number:

### Mapping "Known Black Africa" to the Congo (1900)

Population of "Known Black Africa" 1900	66.386 million
<a href="#">Area of "Known Black Africa" 1900</a>	7.033 million mi <sup>2</sup>
Population Density of "Known Black Africa" 1900	9.439 / mi <sup>2</sup>
Pop. Est. of Congo based on this	<b><u>8.542 million</u></b>

[Patrick Manning](#), by collating previous estimates and looking at records of slave sales, made estimates of various regions of Africa. One of the regions he calculates a population estimate for a region he calls "Loango":





Figure 10.1. Slave-trade regions of Africa. Map by Claudia Walters

This region appears to include not only the modern day Congo, but also the Republic of the Congo, part of Cameroon and all of Uganda.

### Patrick Manning's Estimates of "Loango" Population

Year	Estimate
1850	7.487 million
1950	10.555 million
1885*	<b>8.561 million</b>

\* Calculated from the trend from 1850 to 1950

Given that this region is larger than the area claimed by the Congo Free State Manning's estimate for the population within the Congo Free State would probably be around ~7 million.

The most interesting estimate I found came from a paper entitled "[A Hundred Year \(1890 - 1990\) Database for Integrated Environmental Assessments](#)" by Kelin Goldewijk and J.J. Battjes . It estimates how much land in an area used for agriculture based on changes in the ecosystem

today. It is complicated and I don't really understand it, but they have some back-estimates for the populations of various countries.

**Comparison of Goldewijk-Battjes Estimates to Contemporary Records for Congo and Ten Most Populous Known Black African Countries in 1900**

Country	Wiki	Goldewijk-Battjes	Ratio
Nigeria	16m	4.266m	0.27
Sudan	4.8m	5.588m	1.16
Cameroon	3.5m	2.716m	0.78
Tanzania	3.5m	4.795m	1.37
Mali	2.8m	2.672m	0.95
Ghana	2.8m	1.77m	0.63
Madagascar	2.707m	2.245m	0.83
South Africa	5.1m	4.755m	0.93
Mozambique	2.6m	2.329m	0.90
Angola	2.4m	4.79m	2.00
Congo		<b><u>4.103m</u></b>	

Now the G-B results are, on average, 98.2% as large as the results from wikipedia, and they are on median 91.5% as large as wikipedia. And so to harmonize G-B's Congo result with the wikipedia result, we can divide the Congo number by the average ratio and the median ratio.

In addition, just to get an idea of the maximum discrepancy, we can see that G-B's number for Nigeria is only 0.27 of the wiki number, and if the G-B Congo number was divided by this, this would give an estimated population of the Congo of 15.196 million in 1900. Now we don't know if G-B is in error or if the government records are in error for Nigeria in 1900; I think that G-B is in error.

### Analysis of G-B and potential estimates for the Congo

Average ratio of G.B. / Wiki Population Estimates	0.982
Median ratio of G.B. / Wiki Population Estimates	0.915
Raw G.B. Estimate of the Congo Population in 1900	4.103 million
Estimate divided by the Average Ratio	4.178 million
Estimate divided by the Median Ratio	4.484 million
Estimate divided by the Ratio for Nigeria	15.196 million

Whatever you think of the G-B numbers, it is important to note that they estimated an increase in the population of the Congo from 1890 to 1910. Now by their method of estimating past population, they may very well be massively undercounting the Congo, which I think they are. Maybe it has something to do with the jungle climate erasing evidence of past agriculture more than other climates do, I don't know.

But they still showed **growth** in the Congo population for most of the period of the Congo Free State:

#### G-B Population Estimates for the Congo by Year

Year	G-B Population Estimate
1890	3.301 million
1895	3.680 million
1900	4.103 million
1905	4.575 million
1910	5.101 million

So even if G-B's numbers systematically underestimate the population of the Congo, they show a trend of population growth, which is evidence that the Congo's population was growing under Leopold's rule.

And so if there was a massive genocide, it appears to have been lower than the natural population growth rate. The population growth rate of the Congo from 1950 to 2016 [has been around 2.8%](#). This results in a doubling roughly every 27 years. G-B's estimate for year on-year growth averages to 2.3%.

Now if the doubling rate from 1890 to 1950 wasn't 27 years, but 30 years, then we would retrodict the population of the Congo to be 3 million in 1890.


In my opinion, the Congo probably had a lower population density relative to its neighbors in 1900 than it does today, due to the jungle being easier to control with technology. I.e. - in addition to industrial farming methods that flatter African countries get, the Congo would also get jungle removal.

And another reason to think this is that the Congo's share of the population of Africa has increased from 1950 to 2016. And so the Congo's population relative to the rest of Africa was probably lower in 1885 to 1900 than it is today.

If someone was given an assignment to estimate the population of the Congo Free State in 1900, and didn't know about the "10 million" killed by Leopold and thus what the population had to have been for that to be possible, they wouldn't come anywhere near 20 million. They would come to a mid-range estimate of 7 million, with the highest plausible being around 10.7 million, with an absolute maximum of 15.2 million, a low estimate of around 4 million, and an absolute minimum of 3.1 million.

## **Area of Control**

The next problem with the "10 million" claim is that the Congo Free State did not control all of the Congo; here is [a map showing effective control over the region](#) prior to the war against Tippu Tip:



This map shows the de facto kingdoms controlling regions of the Congo, with the unfilled area inside the dotted lines being nominally under control of the Congo Free State, though not necessarily under functional control.

According to [the Belgian Embassy in London](#),

Finally, the cultivation of rubber was geographically restricted to the equatorial rainforest around the northern Congo basin and to a lesser extent to the Kasai region (totalling one fifth of Congo's territory). The estimated 10 million deaths for the whole of Congo cannot be ascribed to the Belgians, simply because at the beginning of the colonisation, they were not even present or active in the whole of Congo.

This also calls into question the claim that agents of the Congo Free State managed to kill half of the population of the Congo, since it's not known whether the Congo Free State even had access to half of the population.

## Number of Men to do the Killing

Throughout its rule, the organization that was tasked with enforcing the rubber quotas, establishing Leopold's rule and accused of mass murder was the *Force Publique* (FP). I could not find annual records of the size of the FP, but I did find numbers for specific years:

Year	Number
<a href="#">1892</a>	13,500
<a href="#">1908</a>	17,400
<a href="#">1914</a>	12,100

The numbers for the year 1892 are known because that was during the war with Tippu Tip, ruler of a slave kingdom in Zanzibar and claimant of the Eastern Congo, that was the reported strength of the FP.

We also know that [the tour of duty in the FP was seven years](#), and Leopold ruled the Congo for 23 years. This means that Leopold presided over 3.286 tours of duty.

Now of course some men would re-enlist, and some would die before their tour finished, and since we don't know which effect was bigger, the assumption that minimizes maximum error would just be to assume that on average each soldier served 7 years.

If we average the size of the FP in 1892 and 1908, we get 15,450 men in the FP at any one time. And with 3.286 tours of duty, this means that there were roughly **50,769** men in the FP during the entirety of Leopold's rule.

This translates to roughly 197 men killed for each member of the FP in order to reach 10 million kills. This seems like an extremely dubious figure.

### Falling back to a lower number

In light of the extreme implausibility of 10 million people being killed in Leopold's Congo, one may be tempted to simply move the goalposts to a lower kill count, to say, 1 million.

I'm not here to say the FP didn't kill anyone, but the reality is that there is no more direct evidence to base an estimate of 1 million than there is 10 million. The only difference is that "1 million killed" is not obviously impossible.

The fact that the political activist Hochschild spat out "10 million" reveals the unseriousness of his work. If you recognize that 10 million is obviously bogus, why would you depend on the authority of the guy who said "10 million were killed" to say 1 million were killed?

Because while killing one million was possible, the fact that the first charge against the Congo Free State of 10 million was impossible, shows that it was a scam from the start.

### Lack of Documentation

On issue historians face when condemning Leopold II is a lack of documentation; even [a BBC documentary blithely accused Leopold of destroying the relevant records](#). It's not a charge that is easy to respond to; how does one prove that no records were destroyed?

But it shouldn't matter, because from 1904 to 1908, in response to public outcry over the Congo, an independent council created by Italy, Switzerland and Belgium conducted an

ongoing investigation and released periodical reports called [The Official Bulletin of the Congo Free State \(translation\)](#).

Of course this council did not report extreme genocide going at the behest of Leopold's government. In fact, they reported that the abuses occurred almost exclusively when FP detachments were sent out WITHOUT a European commander, and that the presence of European commanders was what prevented atrocities and rape.

(It is interesting to read these bulletins and see just how matter-of-fact they are about it; it's just assumed that blacks will rape unless kept in order by whites.)

And in terms of mutilation - chopping off hands and feet - there is zero documentation that that was Leopold's policy, nor did the investigation find any evidence that it was Leopold's policy. In fact, the investigation claimed that this was done by indigenous members of the FP, particularly when a European officer was absent.

In addition, chopping off limbs seems to be a ridiculous policy given that the biggest problem Leopold had was a labor shortage. It is also known that limb mutilation had occurred both before and after the Congo Free State - and without any reliable statistics, there's no way to know if it even increased during the Congo Free State.

The argument of the investigation was that Leopold's government was not pro-active in stopping these atrocities and may have facilitated them by arming members of certain tribes who had long-running hatreds against other tribes.

Amazingly, even after knowing this, some white readers will still do whatever they can to blame Leopold as the chief culprit for whatever happened, because it makes them feel like good people or something.

## **Denying Black Agency**

There are two more important facts to consider. The first is that there were roughly 200 Europeans in the Congo Free State administration at any one time, versus around 13,000 black FP troops at any one time. And so the mutilating, raping and killing that was done had to have been done overwhelmingly by the black FP troops.

Secondly, there were no orders or policy to mutilate, rape or kill without cause any of the Congolese. And while there may have been some white people who engaged in these acts, it was almost certainly lower on a per-capita basis, but even if all 200 of the whites were vicious killers and sadists who traveled to the Congo because they knew they could get away with it there, there's only so much 200 men could have done.

Now at the time, the Belgians blamed Leopold II for what the black FP troops were doing because they viewed blacks as "half-devil and half-child"; and whites were responsible for their action in the same way a dog owner is responsible for a dog's action.

"Sure, the blacks did the killing, but they're YOUR responsibility. Blacks do what blacks do."

Modern day white "liberals" would of course be aghast at such thinking. But it creates a problem for intellectual consistency, they're condemning Leopold for a standard that treats blacks as pets for whom the owner is to be in charge of and responsible for.

Now in reality none of these people have thought this through; most of the people pushing the "Leopold's Congo genocide" line probably don't even know there were only 200 whites there

at any one time, and aren't aware that blaming whitey for whatever happened (which itself is a matter of debate) depends on treating blacks like pets.

## **Other Considerations**

Between 1892 and 1894, the Congo Free State was at war with Tippu Tip, and had begun advancing westward, using an incident at a fort in which Tip's forces attacked and defeated an FP garrison due to a dispute over a slave girl.

And so if a dishonest or ignorant newspaper editor got some pictures or description of a battle in that war, he would have plenty of gory pictures and gruesome details, and he could then say, "this is Leopold's Congo" to dishonestly seed the idea that this was normal Congo Free State policy for all Congolese.

In addition, if say some men in the FP chopped off the hands of 20 people, well, 20 images can fill up an entire page, and would make it look like mutilation is happening all the time; and he could then say, "this is Leopold's Congo".

You could then show the horrible hospitals, dirty and lacking supplies, without the context that this was actually an improvement over the "folk medicine" of the Congolese. But just images of the horrible hospital conditions, and then say "this is Leopold's Congo".

## **What is the Alternative Hypothesis?**

Leopold's Congo did not have any form of population statistics. And so there is no record of how many people died in the Congo; this makes it easy for people to pull numbers out of there. Moreover, it is the Congo, it is a place where people die all the time for horrible reasons and live in conditions that Europeans even at that time would consider torture. 200 Belgian administrators are not going to change that.

In addition, some journalists can come in and take photos of people with their hands cut off, and then say "look, this is going on in King Leopold's Congo" and the reader is then to make assumptions.

The rubber quota was just a form of taxation. In fact, throughout history, labor rendered to the state was the most common way in which people paid taxes, since most people didn't have currency. And that is how most of the Congolese paid their taxes, and Leopold's policy was that no man's tax should be over 40 hours per month.

In terms of cutting off limbs, that was a practice that predates and postdates Leopold's Congo. In addition, several of the photos of Africans with limbs chopped off have Europeans posing with them; do you imagine that they would pose with them if they had done it themselves? Do you think they would want to take photos because they were proud of doing that themselves?

And activists, looking for a flashy number, say "10 million" and quickly cobble together imagery, anecdotes and personal accounts, without doing the first level of research and ask "is this possible" or try to figure out if indicators of past population showed a decline or increase in population over the period.

A similar thing happened in Britain during the industrial revolution as politicians learned of the frightful conditions of factories, ignorant of the fact that it was an improvement of the even more frightful conditions of peasant life.

At least that is one alternative hypothesis.



# Slavery in the United States

Perhaps to reduce emotionality, replace “slave” with “serf” or “peasant,” which is appropriate since in practice they were the same thing—one system had a Master who owned a slave, the other had a Lord who owned land that a serf was bound to work on.

Both also had a belief that the Master / Lord would often sleep with his subjects’ wives ([Prima Noctis](#) or “Right of First Lie”). Nobody has a conniption when the BBC does a documentary saying “English peasants didn’t have it THAT bad,” so it’s not unreasonable to think that chattel slavery in the United States would be a similar story.

## Height

Today in the United States, [height is mainly a function of genetics](#), as starvation or chronic hunger is freakishly rare. But until the 1900s, chronic hunger and lack of food was a factor in height, with wealthier populations being visibly taller than poorer ones.

Today, blacks are roughly the same height as whites, very slightly shorter (this surprises some). From the paper [“A Peculiar Population: The Nutrition, Health, and Mortality of American Slaves from Childhood to Maturity”](#), in which Richard Steckel compared height percentiles of black slaves to contemporary white populations at adulthood:

Population	Year	Height Percentile at Adulthood
M Black Slaves US	1820-1860	27.1
F Black Slaves US	1820-1860	28.4
M <a href="#">Stuttgart</a> Germany - Aristocrats	1772-1794	18.7
M <a href="#">Stuttgart</a> Germany - Peasants	1772-1794	15.9
M Black Trinidad Slaves	1813	3.8
F Black Trinidad Slaves	1813	13.5
M Black St. Lucia Slaves	1815	3.1
F Black St. Lucia Slaves	1815	7.0
F Boston Schools, US Parents	1875	21.6
F Boston Schools, Irish Parents	1875	21.8
M England, <a href="#">Nonlaboring</a>	“1870s”	37.5
M England, Laboring	“1870s”	11.9
F Italy Upper Class	1870-1879	11.8
F Milwaukee Schools, US Parents	1881	32.2
M Sweden Schools	1883	33.6
F Sweden Schools	1883	42.1
M Russia, Factory Workers	1880-1889	6.7
F Russia, Factory Workers	1880-1889	6.5
M Russia, Middle Schools	1889-1890	23.4

So we can see that, in adulthood, black slaves, [despite being roughly the same height as whites today](#), were taller than most whites in the world, with the exceptions being English aristocrats and Swedes (incl. Swedes in Minnesota). How can this be, if slaves were viciously exploited?

## Alienated Labor

Robert Evans Jr., in his paper entitled [“The Economics of American Negro Slavery”](#) calculated the return on capital of slaves in the US, and compared it to moneylending and railroads:

Time period	Short-term money (loan shark)	Railroads	Slaves
1846-1850	12.3	5.8	14.8
1851-1855	9.35	6.7	12.9
1856-1860	8.3	8	10.37

So we can see that while black slaves had a higher amount of alienated labor than railroad workers, the highest recorded here was 14.8% profit off their labor. You could speculate it goes up the further back you go—maybe. But the reality is that, after expenses, black slaves got back 80-90% of what they produced on average. And given that the slave plantations were on some of the richest land in the world, it's not hard to imagine that they were better fed than contemporary whites.

### Literacy

In the [1870 census](#), 20.1% of blacks could read and write, compared to 80% of US whites. That same year Russia had a [literacy rate of around 15%](#). Most African countries didn't achieve a [literacy rate of 20% until around 1950](#), and India had a literacy rate of 20% in 1950.

One could argue that US whites should have done more to teach blacks to read and write, but the idea that their literacy was kept down by the Atlantic Slave Trade is demonstrably false. Being shipped to the Americas benefited blacks in terms of literacy.

### Life Expectancy

While black slaves probably grew to be taller than most whites in the US, [their life expectancy was shorter](#). It's possible that these are related as [caloric restriction is known to increase longevity](#).

	Black Male	Black Female	White Male	White Female
1850	35.54	38.08	40.04	43.0
1970	60.0	68.3	67.1	74.7
2010	71.8	78.0	76.2	81.1

You could look at these as percentages, i.e. what percentage of years do blacks have of whites, but this assumes that improvements in medicine and living standards scale linearly in effect. All we can say with certainty is that blacks have always lived shorter lives than whites on average.

### Hours and Difficulty of Work

John F. Olsen in [his analysis of southern cotton farms](#) and northern farms, came to the conclusion that the average free farmer on a northern farm worked 3,130 hours per year, while the black slave worked 2,798 hours per year between 1850 and 1860.

Robert Fogel in "[Time on the Cross](#)" claimed that the gang-system—which usually included black slaves and a white "motivator"—was vastly more efficient, saying, "A slave working on an assembly-line basis in cotton, sugar and tobacco—the Southern staples—produced as much output in 35 minutes as a traditional worker produced in an hour."

In other words, while they worked fewer hours, they worked so much harder that it was still worse. [However an analyses by Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode](#) showed that free cotton farms were just as efficient per hour as the touted "gang system"—and they didn't even count the fact that the "motivator" wasn't doing any useful work.

More recently in 2015, [Trevon Logan](#) did an experiment with his children, seeing how much cotton they could pick per day and compared that to the daily cotton production of slaves at the time. His results showed that his kids picked about 95% of what the slaves picked on

average of the same age. In my opinion this experiment conclusively shatters the myth of the gang system:

Table 1: The Productivity of Logan Children, 1952-1965, and Enslaved Children, 1850-1860. Measured by Pounds of Cotton Picked Per Day.

Age	Logans			Slaves		
	All	Females	Males	All	Females	Males
5	16.98	14.78	19.20	18.74	17.15	20.42
6	21.02	18.23	24.86	23.93	22.08	25.97
7	27.75	26.04	30.19	29.98	27.87	32.45
8	35.85	33.75	36.82	36.90	34.51	39.83
9	43.46	42.16	45.25	44.64	41.95	48.09
10	51.88	50.16	52.86	53.13	50.11	57.12
11	60.46	59.94	60.95	62.24	58.86	66.80
12	68.16	67.86	69.25	71.81	68.04	76.97
13	80.54	79.21	82.47	81.66	77.46	87.42
14	89.78	88.35	92.15	91.60	86.93	97.95
15	99.48	98.15	101.49	101.41	96.23	108.32
16	108.86	107.45	108.27	110.87	105.16	118.32
17	118.82	118.12	119.16	119.81	113.53	127.73
18	124.62	122.49	125.95	128.04	121.19	136.36

So blacks worked fewer hours and there's no evidence that they worked any harder.

### Breaking up Families

According to [“The Slave Family, a View from the Slave Narratives”](#) by Stephen Crawford, only 51.1% of black families had both parents co-residing. By 1880 this number had [increased to around 70%](#), which is where it stayed until 1940, when it started to decline. By 2011 only [37% of blacks lived in two-parent households, while 75% of whites did](#).

The “breaking up families” line on slavery was probably more compelling back when blacks had nuclear families more than 51.1% of the time.

I don't know of any statistics on the percentage of slave families broken up by sale, so we don't know what proportion of the broken-up black families was a result of being split by sale.

### Corporal Punishment

I can only find one quantitative record of how often corporal punishment was used, and that is the [records of Bennet H. Barrow](#). The record spans a 23 month period, and over this period he issues 160 whippings, and he had 129 slaves. This averages out to about 0.65 whippings per slave per year.

However, having read through his records, Barrow [seems like a bit of a sadist](#) who enjoyed what he did, and so in my opinion Barrow was not typical. But the system made it so that people

like Barrow can have as much power over people as he did. That is an unavoidable reality of slavery, and why it's good that white people worldwide abolished it not only in their countries but around the world.

I am shocked at how difficult it is to find basic corporal punishment data during slavery. You may think something that is so often referenced in film and in essays and presentations on other topics, that the data on it would be easier to find.

### **The Subjective Texture**

If you've gone to public schools, these statistics I post here may seem at odds with the "subjective texture of vicarious experience"—i.e. how you feel slavery was, based on the stories and narratives presented in public school.

There is a great book called ["They were White and they were Slaves"](#) which is full of personal accounts of a very different world—in fact a world much more similar to today—regarding race and slavery. Here are some examples:

"... You know, boss, dese days dere is three kind of people. Lowest down is a layer of white folks, then in de middle is a layer of colored folks, and on top is de cream, a layer of good white folks..." "...The slaves saw enough abject poverty, disease, and demoralization among the poor whites... to see their own condition under Ole Massa's protection as perhaps not the worst of evils." (Eugene D. Genovese, "Rather Be a Nigger Than a Poor White Man': Slave Perceptions of Southern Yeoman and Poor Whites," in *Toward a New View of America*)

"'When I was a boy,' recalled Waters McIntosh, who had been a slave in Sumter, South Carolina, 'we used to sing, 'Rather be a nigger than a poor white man.' Even in slavery we used to sing that.'"

"Gangs of Irish immigrants worked ditching and draining plantations, building levees and sometimes clearing land because of the danger to valuable (negro) slave property ...George Templeton Strong, a Whig patrician diarist... considered Irish workmen at his home to have had 'prehensile paws' rather than hands. He denounced the 'Celtic beast'... Irish youths... were sometimes called 'Irish slaves' and more frequently 'bound boys'..." A common joke in the South in the pre-Civil War period was that when Blacks were ordered to work hard they complained that their masters were treating them 'like Irishmen.'" "...a slave... expressed no surprise that his master, who was Big Buckra, never associated with white trash. And Rosa Starke, who had been owned by a big planter in South Carolina, reported that poor whites had to use the kitchen door when they went up to the Big House. Her mistress 'had a grand manner; no patience with poor white folks.'"

"Frederic Law Olmsted, the landscape architect who designed New York's Central Park, observed bales of cotton being thrown from a considerable height into a cargo ship's hold. The men tossing the bales somewhat recklessly into the hold were negroes, the men in the hold were Irish. Olmsted inquired about this to a mate on the ship. 'Oh, said the mate, 'the niggers are worth too much to be risked here; if the Paddies are knocked overboard or get their backs broke, nobody loses anything.'"

"John Randolph of Roanoke, traveling in England and Ireland with his black manservant Johnny, wrote to a friend back home: 'Much as I was prepared to see misery in the south of Ireland, I was utterly shocked at the condition of the poor peasantry between Limerick and Dublin. Why sir, John never felt so proud of being a Virginia slave. He looked with horror upon the mud hovels and miserable food of the white slaves, and I had no fear of his running away.'"

Obviously the book and its quotes only tell one side of the story, but that's the whole point—to serve as counter-bias. I'm not saying that these narratives prove me correct, just that there is a whole ocean of contemporary narrative that backs up my statistical claims. And these narratives portray the United States as having the same crust of anti-white elites who prefer foreigners to "poor white trash."

Now, why you have never heard these narratives is a whole topic unto itself.

# Whites did not Benefit from Slavery (not even at the time)

One common claim I hear floating around is that whites benefited from slavery, and that whites are as well off as they are because of slavery. Different people have different variations of this claim, some claiming more than others.

Obviously the United States is not made out of cotton, tobacco and indigo today. The argument is not that the blacks literally built the infrastructure (if they're making that argument that's obviously false since most rail was in the north and nearly all railroad workers during slavery were white), but that the profit off of their labor funded the industrial expansion.

We have data about the South, and the black population of all slave states, including those that did not secede, [was 26%](#), or 30.8% of just the Confederacy. Obviously the Southern economy was a dead-end, and so this argument hinges on the South funding the Northern economy.

I'm not talking about morality, or even about [the conditions of slaves](#). The topic is about whether or not WHITES, on the aggregate, benefited from slavery AT THE TIME.

And there are two aspects to this:

First, the "South funding US industrialization" argument.

The second is the direct expropriation of labor – how much did whites get directly from black slaves versus what they would have gotten doing other things?

## 1. The South funding US industrialization

### **1A. Northern Agriculture was more valuable than Southern Agriculture**

In 1860, 65% of all United States farm acreage [was in the North](#). Now it's possible that Northern farm production was less than 65% of the value of what was produced, or even less than 50% – that the South, with 35% of the farmland, produced more money with it's agriculture than the North did with their agriculture.

But there are reasons to not believe this. First are the [overall values of farm products produced in 1860](#):

Product	Total value in 1860 (millions)
Cereals	\$558.3
Cotton	\$211.5
Hay	\$152.7
Potatoes	\$44.5
Tobacco	\$21.7

The combined production of hay and potatoes give "king cotton" a run for it's money. But the real value of US farm production in 1860 was cereals. I don't know what percentage of farms in the North and South produced cereals, but I do know that they were more geared toward cereal (what, oats, barley, corn) than the south.

We also know that farmland in the North cost more per acre, according to Peter Lindert's study of farm prices in the paper "[Long-Run Trends in American Farmland Values](#)":

Region	Farm Price / Acre in 1860 (in 1960 dollars)	Side in Civil War
Mid-Atlantic	\$98.61	Union
East North Central	\$92.66	Union
East South Central (Mississippi Valley)	\$58.65	Confederacy
New England	\$46.22	Union
West North Central	\$31.67	Union
South Atlantic	\$29.28	Confederacy
West South Central	\$26.89	Confederacy

There are lots of reasons land would cost more in the North, I'm not saying the additional cost was entirely a function of additional yield. But the fact that it did cost more makes the idea that Southern agriculture was, in aggregate, more valuable than Northern agriculture, seem unlikely. Or at least shows that there is no obvious reason to believe it would be more valuable.

And so if slavery was such enormously profitable exploitation, why wasn't land in slave states more valuable?

### 1B. The tariff was disproportionately paid by the North

[A table](#) from "The Rise of the New York Port" by Robert Greenhalgh looked at the percentage of imports were paid by the states of New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.

	1821-1830	1831-1840	1841-1850	1851-1860
New York	46.3	57.8	60	64.4
Massachusetts	18.9	13.8	18.6	14.2
Pennsylvania	14.5	8.6	6.8	5.5
The 3 States	79.7	80.2	80.6	87.1

Now the fact at 80+% of all imports are going through these states each year doesn't necessarily mean that they're paying 80+% of the tariffs. But it probably does. And in the year 1859 [the port of New York paid roughly 76.67% of all US tariffs](#). So for that one year, the imports roughly match the tariffs paid, and there's no reason to expect that, barring minor fluctuations by year, the percent amount a state pays in tariffs is going to be about the same as the percent of all imports go through that state.

[Andy Hall](#) looked at [the highest tariff revenues of selected ports in the United States in FY 1859](#), and listed off some of the revenues for various ports:

Port	Tariff Revenues
New York	\$35.155m
Boston	\$5.133m
Philadelphia	\$2.262m
New Orleans	\$2.120m
San Francisco	\$1.352m
Baltimore	\$1.011m

He also made [this visualization](#):

In the case of New York, Boston and Philadelphia, this appears to match what we know about the percent of goods imported through those ports.

Now the keen observer will see that these are tariffs paid by ports. This doesn't necessarily mean that the "real cost" of the tariff was paid by the north, as it is possible that these goods arrived in northern ports, where the tariff was paid, and this cost was passed on to southern farmers.

This is why I pointed out that Northern agriculture was bigger than Southern agriculture. And [according to the National Parks Service](#), the North had twice as much machinery per acre than the South, which translates to 78.79% of all agricultural machinery. So even if we presume farmers were hit harder by the tariff because it increased the cost of farm machinery, a disproportionate amount would be paid by the North anyway because they bought most of the farm machinery.

So no, the North was paying slightly more than 80% of the tariff directly, and used slightly less than 80% of all agricultural machinery.

The North was paying around 80% of the tariff in both direct and indirect costs.

The South was not paying the tariff, and slave labor produced perhaps 1/3 of what the south way paying [based on their population](#).

### **1C. A disproportionate amount of Federal infrastructure funds went to the South**

Not that it matters much, since [federal spending in 1860 was \\$78 million](#), while the GDP of the US was roughly \$4,387 million or \$4.387 billion. Federal spending amounted to 1.78% of GDP in 1860. For what it's worth, [42% of all Federal infrastructure spending went to the South](#) between 1800 and 1860 (table 5).

But it was a drop in the bucket so who cares.

### **2. The direct benefit of slavery for whites**

#### **2A. The South didn't need slaves to grow cotton**

And so we can see that the South did not build the US. And since the argument for a BIG white benefit from slavery requires the South paying for the development of the United States, this makes the idea that blacks in the South paid for it through their labor basically impossible.



The next question is how much did whites benefit from having black slaves instead of having to negotiate a wage? Well that is difficult to tell, but we do have rough estimates for the return on investment for slaves compared to railroads and short-term (90 day to 180 day) loans. This gives us a rough idea of how profitable slaves were compared to “the rest of the economy”:

Profitability by Investment, [“The Economics of American Negro Slavery”](#)

Table 14, Page 208

Table 25, Page 220

Investment	Average Profit Rate
Boston Rails (1845-1860)	8.6
Southern Rails (1850-1860)	8.5
Slaves (1830-1860)	12.61
Short-Term Money (1830-1860)	9.60
All Rail (1846-1860)	7.16
Rail Bonds (1857-1860)	7.6

Now lets not sneeze at this, an average profit of 12.61 would be amazing today. But remember profits were higher back then than they are today. There were probably specific investments that paid better than slaves, but there was probably no CLASS of investments that was more profitable than slavery.

Now if you’re a free market autistic and wondering why everyone didn’t just invest all their money in slaves – well why aren’t you finding the most profitable thing to invest in today and put all of your money in that?

But 12.61% profit means 87.39% cost. It means roughly 87.39% of what a slave was producing went back into feeding, clothing and sheltering the slaves, as well as paying for whatever was needed for him to continue working.

But what if the South didn’t have slaves? Could they have grown cotton without slaves? The answer to that is a resounding yes:

[“Cotton Production, The Growth of the Cotton Industry in America”](#)

Years	Bales Produced Annual Average	Pounds / Bale Annual Average	Pounds Produced Annual Average
1856-1861	3,816,150	454.2	1.733
1865-1870	2,475,027	442.8	1.096
1870-1876	3,999,642	459	1.834

1861-1865 is the Civil War, and so we can see that cotton production collapsed after it. Now it’s hard to tell exactly due to annual fluctuations, but it seems that cotton production matched its pre-war peak around 1871, and went up from there. So yes, cotton could be produced without slaves. It shouldn’t be too hard to believe since most white southerners were farmers, and most of the farmers in the United States at the time were white, and produced a net food surplus.

## 2B. Opportunity denied

In 1860 [slaves were 12.67% of the US population](#), now while some whites gained from that sweet 12.61% profit off of his slaves, the average profit for investment in the economy at large was around ~8.5%. So we're talking about a 4-5% higher profit that people who invested in slaves got compared to what they would have gotten if they invested elsewhere.

This, right here – this is what SOME whites got from slavery.

But because of these high profits, a certain amount of investments that could have been used on railroads, or shoe factories, or something good – were instead used on more slave plantations. This did two things:

1. It diverted Southern investments into the short-term profits of slavery instead of the long-term profits of industry.

Say you build a shoe factory – that factory has a bunch of machines to work the leather and buckles and stuff, that machinery needs people who know how to work it. It requires iron and steel, and lubricants. Basically you now have a machine-tools industry. Now that you have started making them, machine tools in general become cheaper for other things, creating investment opportunities in textiles, or in metal tea pots and kettles, in coaches, in steam engines.

A plantation has no such expansion effects; and this, to oversimplify a bit, is why the North exploded and the South stagnated. I'm not blaming the black slaves for it, they didn't DO anything, they couldn't do anything, but it is merely to say that whites would certainly have gone more in the industrial direction if they didn't have slaves. I'm not alone in this speculation, and it is hypothesized that Rome would have industrialized if it didn't have slaves.

2. It diverted Southern investments away from things that employed white workers and toward things that "employed" black slaves. Any white who didn't own slaves was made poorer by the fact that other whites did, because investments were diverted from say railroads, which he could be employed in, to slaves.

Now, whether the total dollar value of the short term extra profit (again about 4-5%) some white people got from slaves instead of other investments outweighs the effects it had in directing the South down a long-run economic dead end of being an agricultural resource economy and the immediate impact of denying the white working class in the south better employment opportunities, I don't know.

Intuitively, I think it absolutely made whites worse off. It certainly made working-class whites worse off, and it may have even ultimately been worse for the investing class who may have ultimately had higher profits in about 20 years if they invested in factories.

## **Conclusion**

But that was a very theoretical argument. Lots of mayas and coulds. It is impossible to know for certain whether whites on net benefited from slavery at the time.

However, the BIG argument about the South, through slavery, funding the tariff and thus industrial expansion in the North, is absolutely wrong. Dead wrong.

And really we're at the point of talking about the additional profit margins of slaves versus the denied opportunities for white workers and the long-term economy-stagnating effects of slavery.

Now in this post I have not gone into the cost of the Civil War that was brought on by slavery, the damaging political externalities of having a large African population in the United States, or the budgetary impact of blacks today. The point of this post was the CORE of it; the idea that whites gained significantly from black slavery.

And whites certainly did not gain significantly. 5% extra profit for the super rich in the South – that may add up to half a percent of GDP of the whole US? If that.

Whether whites in the US, on aggregate, gained AT ALL is more debateable and more sketchy. I strongly feel that we didn't, but I don't have any data to back it up, just economic theory and examples. Certainly the theoretical costs of slavery sound like they would dwarf that extra profit, which may add up to 2% of the GDP of the South.

But once you start thinking in these terms, you're a million miles away from "Whites in the US today, most of whom descend from immigrants who came after 1865, owe their wealth to the profits extracted from slaves". You're dealing with very small numbers that are going to be dwarfed by the cost of the Civil War and the budgetary impact of blacks anyway.

# Slaves in America would have been Slaves in Africa

## Summary:

Based on the fact that ~41% of all blacks in West and Central Africa prior to European conquest were slaves, the extreme increase in price of slaves from the relatively small increase in demand that the Atlantic Slave Trade represented, and the anecdotal evidence that more slaves were put to work within Africa following Britain's global ban on slavery, we can say that the **Europeans likely did not cause a single black person to be a slave who wasn't already going to be one.**

## Outline:

1. The Population of West and Central Africa 1500 to 1800
  2. The Proportion of Slaves in West and Central Africa
  3. The Number of Slaves in West and Central Africa
  4. Atlantic Slave Disembarkations
  5. The Inelasticity of Supply
  6. Our Hands are Clean

## 1. The Population of West and Central Africa 1500 to 1800

### Population Data on Central and West Africa

Region	Year	Population	WAF proportion of CAF
West Africa	1907	33.385 million	2.606
Central Africa	1907	12.81 million	
West Africa	1950	70.54 million	2.674
Central Africa	1950	26.38 million	

Population Estimates for West Africa, Central Africa's population inferred as a proportion of the West African population estimate based on the trend from 1907 to 1950:

Region	Year	Population	WAF proportion of CAF (estimate)
West Africa	1500	20 million	2.361
Central Africa	1500	8.47 million	
West Africa	1800	25 million	2.453
Central Africa	1800	10.19 million	

Some other population estimates that will be used later based on the above extrapolations:

Region	Year	Population	WAF proportion to CAF (estimate)
West Africa	1525	20.42 million	2.369
Central Africa	1525	8.62 million	
West Africa	1866	30.17 million	2.547
Central Africa	1866	11.85 million	
West Africa	1675	22.92 million	2.414
Central Africa	1675	9.49 million	
West Africa	1775	24.58 million	2.445
Central Africa	1775	10.05 million	
West Africa	1805	25.08 million	2.455
Central Africa	1805	10.22 million	

And so the populations of West and Central Africa as regions average to 31.83 million from 1500 to 1800.

[Central Africa](#) is defined as Chad, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo-Kinshasa, Congo-Brazzaville, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

[West Africa](#) is defined as Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania.

#### Population of West Africa in 1500 and 1800

1950 population numbers

1907 population numbers

## 2. The Proportion of Slaves in West and Central Africa

### Encyclopedia Britannica's Guide to Black History – Slavery

Encyclopedia Britannica's claims for the proportion of slaves in various African states

State	Approximate Modern Location	Years	Proportion slave
Sokoto	Nigeria, Cameroon	"19 <sup>th</sup> century" (1800-1899)	"One half"
Fulani Jihad States	All West Africa North of Coast	1750-1900	"One half"
Ghana	Ghana	1076-1600	"One third"
Mali	Mali	1200-1500	"One third"
Segou	Mali	1720-1861	"One third"
Songhai	Mali, Niger	1464-1720	"One third"
Ouidah	Benin	"19 <sup>th</sup> century" (1800-1899)	"One half"
Kanem-Boru	Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Cameroon, Sudan, Central African Republic, Algeria	1580-1890	"One third" , "40 percent"
Berber-Tuareg	Sahel region	"Until 1975"	"15 percent... to perhaps 75 percent"
Senegambia	Senegal, Gambia	1300-1900	"One third"
Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	"19 <sup>th</sup> century" (1800-1899)	"One half"
Yoruba	Benin, Togo	"19 <sup>th</sup> century" (1800-1899)	"One third"
Ashanti	Ghana	"19 <sup>th</sup> century" (1800-1899)	"One third"
Duala	Cameroon	"19 <sup>th</sup> century" (1800-1899)	"One half"
Ibo	Niger	"19 <sup>th</sup> century" (1800-1899)	"One half"
Kongo	Congo	"19 <sup>th</sup> century" (1800-1899)	"One half"

Chokwe

Angola

“19<sup>th</sup> century”  
(1800-1899)

“One half”

If the estimates for the proportion of the population that are slaves are taken as precise, it averages to 41.61%.

If these numbers seem extreme, remember that Athens was said to have been about one-third slave. And the whole of the Confederate States of America was approximately one-third slave; these are not outrageous numbers for slave societies.

### 3. The Number of Slaves in West and Central Africa

So we have a good idea of what the population of West and Central Africa was, and we have consistent subjective estimates of the proportion of people that were slaves. The next question is how many people were alive in West and Central Africa from 1500-1800.

The average age of childbirth in African countries is today around 27. So if we assume the average age of motherhood was 25 back in 1500-1800, then we have a generation time of 25 years.

If the average life expectancy was 50 years, then there were roughly 190.98 million people who lived in West and Central Africa from 1500-1800. If 41.61% were slaves, that would give us **79.45 million slaves within West and Central Africa between 1500 and 1800.**

### 4. Atlantic Slave Disembarkations

Roughly [12.5 million slaves disembarked from Africa between 1525 and 1866](#) to the Americas.

And so based on this, and assuming all atlantic slave trade disembarkations were in west and central africa, the Atlantic Slave Trade was about 15.73% of the size of the total slave trade within West and Central Africa at the time, or 13.59% of the combined values (Atlantic + Within-Africa slave trade = 91.95 million).

### 5. The Inelasticity of Supply

Elasticity of supply is simply a fancy way of saying “does quantity supplied increase in response to an increase in demand?”. For slaves, if the supply is “elastic”, that means that the suppliers of slaves can easily supply more slaves if the demand goes up. If it is “inelastic”, that means the suppliers can’t easily get more slaves just because more people are willing to buy them.

If the supply is inelastic, then any increase in demand will simply result in the price of slaves increasing. For example, if the supply of slaves was totally fixed and could not be increased, then new buyers would simply bid out some of the previous buyers for whom slaves are now too expensive.

And here we can actually compare the price of slaves in Africa, the number of slaves shipped to the Americas in the prior 25 years (roughly the generation time), their price in Africa, and the Atlantic Slave Trade as a percentage of the overall slave trade in Central and West Africa.

Price of slaves in Africa, number of slaves shipped to the Americas, est. number of slaves in West and Central Africa, and the Atlantic Slave Trade as a proportion of the overall slave trade in West and Central Africa by year:

Year	Price of Slave IN AFRICA	Number of slaves shipped to the Americas in prior 25 years	Estimated number of slaves in West and Central Africa	Atlantic Slave Trade as proportion of overall slave trade in West and Central Africa
1675	3.33 pounds	0.488 million	13.486 million	3.492%
1775	18.43 pounds	1.925 million	14.410 million	11.785%
1805	26.86 pounds	2.009 million	14.688 million	12.032%

Slaves shipped to Africa by year available [here](#)

Price of slaves in Africa by year available [here](#)

Now the extreme increase in price in response to the very small increase in quantity demanded that the Atlantic Slave Trade represented is evidence that Africans couldn't readily just increase the supply of slaves. I.e. there wasn't much or any "excess supply" with which to supply the Europeans. And so they would have to either sell some of their slaves they were already using, or pick up arms and go try to enslave some peoples who up to that point had managed to resist enslavement.

The price increases are not necessarily entirely caused by the increase in demand over those years. It's impossible to say with any precision what caused the price increases. But the general pattern is of extreme PRICE inelasticity, with an 8.293% increase in relative quantity demanded coinciding with a 453.453% increase in price, and then a 0.247% increase in relative quantity demanded coinciding with a 45.741% increase in price.

Again, there are all sorts of factors that could be at play that I don't know about. However, the limited data that exists points to extreme price inelasticity, which is evidence of inelasticity of quantity supplied – which is a long way of saying "it looks like the Africans couldn't increase the number of slaves, that the supply was fixed, and as a result when new buyers came along, the price just shot through the roof."

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica article:

"After the limiting and then abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, a number of these African societies put slaves to work in activities such as mining gold and raising peanuts, coconuts (palm oil), sesame, and millet for the market."

– Of course that is not data, but merely a subjective impression being that the end of the Atlantic Slave Trade did not result in fewer black slaves. They just stayed in Africa.

And when ~40% of the population is enslaved, and people resist with violence being enslaved, it is certainly not difficult to imagine that the supply of slaves was probably quite inelastic.



## 6. Our Hands are Clean

The life of a slave in the Americas was certainly [better than the life of a slave in Africa](#). It's possible that the average non-slave African had a better life than the average slave in the Americas, but that's not the relevant comparison, and that's not even a given.

Now lets say that the Atlantic Slave Trade did not create a single slave, that it merely moved slaves from Africa to the Americas, where they ended up having a better life and a better chance of surviving (even taking into account the middle passage, which later generations would not have to endure anyway).

Would we then say that the Europeans engaged in a wicked act? Consider that if the Europeans did not engage in this act, those slaves would have remained in Africa, where they probably would have been more likely to die, where their lives would have been worse – still slaves. In this case, the Atlantic Slave Trade IMPROVED their lives relative to being a slave in Africa.

And so whether or not the Atlantic Slave Trade was immoral is totally dependent on the elasticity of supply. Did the supply of slaves increase in response to the Atlantic Slave Trade, or was a relatively fixed supply of slaves simply transferred out of Africa?

And everything points to no increase in the number of Africans who were slaves. And if there was a slight increase in blacks enslaved, it is certainly less than the 12.5 million that disembarked from Africa, and those 12.5 million had a better chance of surviving, and certainly their progeny had a much better life than those who remained in Africa.

We did not cause them to be slaves, nor was it our duty to buy their freedom. Nobody would be cursing Europeans if they did not buy a single slave from Africa. Yet if Europeans did not buy a single slave, those Africans would have been worse off. **But by doing something that made them better off compared to inaction, Europeans are condemned as if we caused their enslavement.**

The Africans were slaves to themselves well before we came along. We caused none of it, only better conditions in the Americas and their eventual freedom. The only words Europeans need to say regarding the Atlantic Slave trade is "you're welcome".

# Segregation

When I was younger, I would read world atlases. And sometimes I would come to an article, say an article on the country Colombia, and it would say that Colombia is a world leader in coffee production, then list off some other "cash crops". Then it would go into the growing textiles sector, and mention that it has some problem with debt. Maybe it's a leading producer of phosphates as well or something. And if you read all of this qualitative, subjective description, you would never realize that Colombia was poor. It's not until you got to "per capita GDP" that you would discover that it was \$3,000 per capita.

You could also have someone qualitatively describe a football game between Auburn and Alabama. And they could do highlights, and describe some of the big plays, and you wouldn't know that Alabama completely steamrolled Auburn until you looked at the box score.

Or imagine if your son was "describing" qualitatively and subjectively how he was doing in his classes. As a parent you don't care, you want to see the damn grades.

And so the effects of segregation on blacks. What does the data say? Because in school when segregation is taught, it's the equivalent of describing a football game by just looking at the highlights and not the box score. It's cat-lady storytime.

Well, there are a few big go-to topics that popped into my mind to try to quantify the effects of segregation on blacks: cops and courts, schools, income and lynching. So that's what I go-to'd.

## 1. Incarceration rate

The [incarceration rate for blacks relative to whites has increased at least since 1930](#), probably long before that. So in terms of blacks being targeted for being sent to prison, it looks like they were substantially less targeted compared to today.

### Odds of a black individual going to prison relative to whites by year

Year	Black multiple of white
1930	2.64
1940	3.62
1950	3.90
1960	4.09
1970	5.04
1980	5.01
<a href="#">1990</a>	6.63

### Odds of a black individual going to prison relative to non-hispanic whites by year

Year	Black multiple of non-hispanic white
<a href="#">2000</a>	7.32
<a href="#">2010</a>	6.16

So if the legal systems were unfair during segregation, they appear to be even more unfair today. Or perhaps they weren't unfair during segregation, are unfair today, or perhaps the

laws are different today in a way that disparately impacts blacks more than they did in the past.

There are all sorts of things we can speculate, but it's not immediately or obviously apparent, from the data, that the legal system was particularly keen on incarcerating blacks compared to today.

## 2. Prison sentences

For prison sentences, the numbers have been remarkably stable. When you look at length of prison terms for blacks compared to whites after the FIRST release from prison, it's very close.

The first release data is important because none of these are repeat offenders. Repeat offenders get more time, and blacks are more likely to be repeat offenders.

That said, based on the data below, blacks serve roughly ~15% longer prison terms for their first term. It could be because the crimes blacks commit within each category are, on average, more severe. It could be racial bias on the part of judges.

Or it could be that blacks have worse courtroom behavior, as when IQ is controlled for, the racial gap in prison sentences goes away.

But what [you don't see is blacks having longer prison sentences](#) during segregation.

### **Black Multiple of White Median Time Served For ALL Releases in State and Federal Prisons**

Type of Offense	1952	1964	2009
Homicide	1.056	1.109	1.202
Robbery	1.152	0.973	1.188
Assault	1	0.954	1.111
Burglary	1.136	1.158	1.067
Theft	1.188	1.063	1.091
Fraud	1.333	1	1
Rape	1.242	N/A	1.054
Other Sexual Assault	1	1.241	0.854
Drug Crimes	0.8333	1.031	1.154
Other	1	1.071	0.85
All Crime	1.143	1.2	1.133

Now what if we looked at median prison time served just in the South, and back in 1937 - smack in the middle of "Jim Crow" - and included repeat offenders, of which black inmates are a higher proportion today? [The result is not that much different](#) from [the entire US today](#):

## Black Multiple of White Median Time Served For ALL Releases in 14 Southern States in State and Federal Prisons

Type of Offense	1937
Homicide	1.345
Robbery	1
Assault	1.103
Burglary	1.149
Theft	1.033
Fraud	N/A
Rape	1.265
Other Sexual Assault	1.154
Drug Crimes	N/A
Other	0.955
All Crime	1.189

Remember, the 1937 data is JUST from the South, supposedly the hot seat of bigotry, and includes repeat offenders.

Homicide data is an unweighted average of each category. In 1937 and 1952 they used Murder and Manslaughter, in 1964 they just had Homicide, and in 2009 they had Murder, Negligent Manslaughter and Non-Negligent Manslaughter.

In case you think I am cherry-picking the years to paint a particular narrative, these are literally just the years used in the Bureau of Justice report I am citing.

And so what we can see is that the black-white incarceration gap is wider today than it was in 1930. In addition, the racial gap in sentence length for first offenders does not appear to have changed at all. Even the data that INCLUDED repeat offenders just in the South in 1937 doesn't differ that much from the first-time offender data nationally and later.

And so this makes the idea that the current US legal system was more biased against blacks during segregation than it is today SEEM false.

### 3. Lynching

A related topic to this is lynching. From [Richard M. Perloff](#), Professor of Communication at Cleveland State University:

“Approximately 4,742 individuals were lynched between 1882 and 1968; of the victims, 3,445 or 73 percent were Black.”

All lynchings were in response to a claimed offense, such as a rape or stealing cattle. Blacks were 72.65% of all recorded lynchings while being ~26.87% of the population of the South at the time.

The [Black population of the Southern US 1880-1970](#) averages 26.87% at each decade. And so based on their population alone, if lynchings were race-neutral, and we knew nothing about race differences in violent crime going in, we would expect 26.87% of all lynchings to be of

blacks. Blacks comprised 72.65% of all lynchings, giving them a representation 2.70 times their population.

However, according to wikipedia, most lynchings occurred between 1882 and 1920, and during that time period the average black population was 31.76% of the southern US population. Using this number, blacks as a percentage of lynchings are only **2.29 times** their percentage of the population.

If we split the difference and just say that the black population of the south was 29.32% of the total population, then blacks as a percentage of lynchings was **2.48 times** their percentage of the population.


By comparison, in 2010, blacks comprised 12.6% of the total US population, but [were 38.13% of the population charged for violent crimes](#), giving them a representation 3.03 times their population.

And so by raw numbers the lynch mobs appear to be slightly less racially targeting than the current US legal system is. Here are those numbers put in a table:

	Percent of Population	Percent of Violent Crime Incarcerations	Percent of Lynchings	Proportion
Blacks in the South 1880-1970	26.87%	-	72.65%	2.70
Blacks in the whole US 2010	12.6%	31.13%	-	3.03

#### 4. Income

This is where arguments regarding the negative effects of segregation start to have some backing in data. Looking at census data from 1948, we can see that black income as a proportion of white income went from around 44% in 1948 to about 80% in 2000. This looks like a massive effect from desegregation on it's face:



However, there is [some interesting data from 1880](#). If you just look within regions, the racial gap is much less. At that time, black workers earned on median 37% of what white workers earned. However, if you just looked at the south, blacks earned 58% of what white workers earned. So just with that regional control we're already almost half way to the current black-white income ratio.

#### Population and wage income by race and region in 1880

	Percent of Total Race	Per Laborer Income	Black % of White
Black South	90.47%	\$74.96	58.36%
White South	24.32%	\$128.45	
Black Not-South	9.53%	\$194.44	73.51%
White Not-South	75.68%	\$264.52	

But the paper did something else - it looked at black labor income relative to whites, but just looked at rural southern whites and blacks, and only looked at labor income. And in that instance, **black income was 89% of white income:**

**Table 2.** Black and White Income in 1880 (1880 prices)

		<i>Southern Rural Labor Income<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Southern Rural Total Income<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Southern Total Income<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>National Total Income<sup>d</sup></i>
Per capita Income	Black	\$36.93	\$ 40.01	\$ 41.81	\$ 48.17
	White	\$46.93	\$ 65.43	\$ 80.79	\$145.56
	B/W Ratio	.79	.61	.53	.34
Average Worker Income <sup>e</sup>	Black	\$66.21	\$ 71.73	\$ 74.96	\$ 86.35
	White	\$74.62	\$104.03	\$128.45	\$231.43
	B/W Ratio	.89	.69	.58	.37


And so when you look at the same region, and the same kind of work, and just compare the wages of workers, the black-white income gap in the rural South was only 11%, lower than it is today. And that difference could very plausibly be due to blacks having fewer skills on average in 1880.

I would be interested to see similar thin slices just looking at urban blacks in the south vs. urban whites in the south, and urban blacks in the north to urban whites in the north. I suspect that the more you held constant region and urban/rural divide, the smaller the racial gap would be.

Which is to say, that it seems like much of the black-white income gap could have been a function of blacks living in rural areas (which were poorer back then) and living in the south (which was poorer back then).

In addition, we can see that the narrowing of the black-white income gap roughly corresponds with blacks moving out of the south. This is not a 1:1 correlation, but it does suggest that simply [moving out of the south](#), which began in earnest around 1910, is part of the explanation for the narrowing of the black-white income gap:

## Percentage of African American population living in the American South



And in the north, where more of the blacks were slaves who had earned their freedom before 1865, black wages as a proportion of white wages were higher. In fact blacks in the north were wealthier than whites in the south for quite some time.

Moreover, the narrowing of the black-white income gap at the national level occurred almost entirely **during segregation**. So to say that the smaller amount of narrowing that occurred following desegregation was in fact a result of desegregation is something that sounds kinda plausible - there's certainly a little story you can tell - but there's very little data for it. The most you could say is that there was a brief acceleration of the narrowing of the black-white income gap immediately after 1965, but that could be a coincidence, and even if you want to say it was a result of the civil rights act, then the acceleration versus a continuation of the previous trend is still only going to be like 2%.

Now as for why the black-white income gap narrowed from 1948 (at least) to 2000, that's another topic. I suspect much of it has to do with the economic rise of the south and the migration of blacks away from the rural economy. Also this higher income may not have corresponded with a rise in living standards relative to whites since the cost of living may have increased, but that's more speculative. But desegregation doesn't appear to have any relevance to it.



So even the narrowing of the black-white income gap, long touted as prime evidence that segregation was previously suppressing black wages, the evidence is not so clear on that.

### 5. Wealth and Employment

Two more things to consider is that up until the 1950's [blacks had employment rates similar to that of whites](#). And the unemployment rate in blacks grew much more after 1965:






FIGURE 1. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY RACE

And in terms of wealth, black wealth as a proportion of white wealth [has remained stagnant since 1963](#):

## Average Family Wealth by Race/Ethnicity, 1963–2013



Sources: Urban Institute calculations from Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers 1962 (December 31), Survey of Changes in Family Finances 1963, and Survey of Consumer Finances 1983–2013.

Notes: 2013 dollars. No comparable data are available between 1963 and 1983. African American/Hispanic distinction within nonwhite population available only in 1983 and later.

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Moreover, I would say that the absolute disparity is more important than the black-white ratio. Because let's say you have \$10 and Bob has \$100. That's a \$90 gap. Depending on your job, that's a day's wage, or half a day's wage. Now if you have \$100 and Bob has \$900, now you're looking at multiple days' wage. And so on and so on. So even though the relation is the same, the practical importance of the gap is growing. Also just the total dollar amount difference is increasing. And these are all in "2013 dollars", which adjusts for inflation.

And so when people say that the relative economic situation of blacks has improved relative to whites since segregation, they're looking at one thing: nominal income at the national level. They're not looking at employment, at wealth, or how much, if at all, the income gap has narrowed when controlling for what region of the country we're looking at, or if it's urban or rural.

### 6. Schools

Another argument that segregation depressed black economic success is their lower school funding. On average, from 1890 to 1950, the average of how much each state spent on black schools as a proportion of what they spent on white schools was 56.96%. So they had less funding.

But funding for what? For "better teachers"? What's a "better teacher"? What has been found in the US is that increased real spending on schools has not increased overall performance since the 1970s, and more importantly voucher studies have shown that the school an individual goes to has no real impact on either GPA, standardized test scores or future college attendance.

So the fact that additional funding didn't matter in 1970 is one thing. But did it matter from 1870 to 1954?

Well, we don't have regular standardized tests from that time period, but we do have [a nationally representative IQ test done in 1917](#) for all US army conscripts for World War 1. In it blacks scored a median of 83 compared to the white score that was set to 100. Today the black median [is still at 85](#). Okay, two points. And my guess is they were hollow for "g" anyway.

Certainly there were journalists at the time who did "investigative journalism" and wrote anecdotal reports of how bad the black schools were. Michael Moore does "investigative journalism" today too about how great the Cuban healthcare system is. Walter Duranty visited the USSR in the 1930s and came back writing glowing reviews of the benevolent, if firm, policies of Stalin.

Maybe they were telling the truth, maybe they were making things up, who knows.

Black schools were probably worse But the question is how much worse really? And for most people, did it even matter? Most of what people learn in school [they forget anyway](#), so aside from literacy and basic math, the practical importance of school would be minimal for most people at that time.

And the culture of school credentials as a signal to employers hadn't developed yet, so at the time any "educational disadvantages" blacks had, whatever they were and if any, would not matter in terms of credential-signaling because that hadn't developed yet, and in terms of knowledge beyond basic literacy and math - that all gets forgotten anyway.

## **7. Countrymen?**

This section is a bit of a digression. In a broader sense, blacks weren't seen as legitimate countrymen to some extent for some time in the region. And so since the blacks were viewed as "foreigners" to southern whites, who to some extent viewed northern whites as foreigners as well, they didn't think they owed the blacks equal school funding any more than they owed people from Peru or Romania or China equal school funding.

I.e. the black-white gap in school funding meant as much to them as the american-chinese gap in school funding, as both the Chinese and the blacks were foreign to the southern whites.

Now you can have whatever opinion you want about it, and say that blacks were rightful countrymen of southern whites, and really pound your fists in self-righteous certainty about it because you "know it to be true". That's certainly your viewpoint.

But understand that it is just your viewpoint, and when you realize that the southern whites viewed blacks the way we look at illegal immigrants today, and that the times during which either repatriation of blacks to Africa or creating a separate black country out of land in the US were serious proposals were still in living memory at the time.

Today blacks have been part of the US for so long that such proposals probably seem bizarre to you. And they would be bizarre and cruel if implemented today. But also remember that the US had to impose military governments in the south in order to pass the 14th amendment that gave the blacks citizenship. And Oregon, New Jersey and Ohio renounced their ratification of the 14th amendment after the fact in protest of this action.

Obviously it was a symbolic gesture, but it showed that opposition to the way the 14th amendment was passed wasn't considered some kooky fringe idea at the time. Of course it is now because if you bring up the use of military governments in passing the 14th amendment - well, "only racists talk about that", so it just gets dismissed.

But yes, understand that the 14th amendment was seen like granting "amnesty" to the illegals is today - it would be creating an alternative method of granting citizenship for a specific group of non-citizens in the US today.

(And the fact that more whites supported granting citizenship to the black slaves at the time than supporting granting amnesty to illegals today is support for a theory I have about whites in the past being more "neurologically left-wing" even if they would be considered today to hold "far-right" positions by today's standards.)

## Conclusion

The beginning of my line of thinking here was the cases involving George Zimmerman and Derrick Wilson. Among the general public there was controversy. But among the jurors, there was no controversy, the cop (in the case of Wilson) and the wanna-be cop (in the case of Zimmerman) were unanimously found to be not guilty. And there were riots and protests in response to these events, and protesters would use these events as examples of a "white supremacist" society.

The jurors certainly knew more facts about each case than the general public did. Moreover, whites are more likely to believe [Zimmerman](#) and [Wilson](#) were justified, and [whites do better on tests of current events knowledge](#). In addition, males, who do better on current events knowledge tests than females, also were more satisfied with the Zimmerman verdict than women, and women do worse on current events knowledge tests. Also, [people with higher education levels approved the verdict as well](#).

Thus, all three factors that correlate with general political and current events knowledge (being white, being male and having lots of time in school) also correlate with approving the Zimmerman trial verdict. And the people who had the MOST knowledge - the jurors - **unanimously** found Zimmerman not guilty.

If you go by the literature in news media talking about "institutional racism" and "white privilege", it's not immediately obvious that the aggregate of all media is any less obsessed with the plight of the coloreds than they were in 1964. Maybe they were, but I have no way to really tell.

But lets say Derrick Wilson killed "the gentle giant" in 1961. There was no internet in 1961, what you knew about the events was what a few major news outlets chose to report. As it happens, a jury also found J.W. Milam and Roy Bryant not guilty of murder in their killing of Emmett Till. And what do you know about that event? Do the facts you know of the Emmett Till verdict seem to paint a one-sided story to where it is unbelievable, yes, unbelievable that a jury would find Bryant and Milam not guilty?

Because we all know that the courts in the South were incredibly unfair to the blacks? Except there's no real data to support that at the time, [and victim surveys from modern times correspond with the police arrest rates](#), and police are more likely to kill a white person in any given arrest situation, are more likely to shoot blacks in simulations, and the black percentage of killing cops is higher than their percentage of being killed by cops. And in fact the black incarceration rate relative to whites is HIGHER than it was during segregation.

As shown in previous articles, modern "institutional racism" in terms of police and court bias, [callbacks](#) and [educational opportunities](#) are very easily revealed to be phantasms - or at the very least the issue of whether or not they exist is much more complex than the basic statistics you hear on tumblr and huffpo posts would suggest.

Recent studies have shown that residential [racial segregation has increased](#) in the United States. This is an improvement over older studies which simply looked at cities and the percentage of each race in the cities. These newer methods actually look at the likelihood of you having a neighbor of a different race, and find that racial segregation is increasing.

We already know that schools are [more segregated than they were during the late 1960s](#). Now this is a profound thing; you've been to school. You had first hand experience with how racially segregated they were. THAT was close to what it was like during Jim Crow that we hear so many stories about. So... how segregated did it seem?

In other places on this site, Sean and I make arguments about how currently, blacks and hispanics are not getting a raw deal in employment, courts or education. But what surprised me was just how much, looking into the past, the old days seem so similar to today in terms of the lot of blacks compared to whites.

They are drawn parallel. The past is not far away, it's right here. 60 years ago was yesterday.

# Non-Genocide of the Northern Native Americans

We have census records on the number of Native Americans in 1853. So the first thing we need to do is figure out how many people there were in North America in 1500, compare that to the census records, and see what that difference is. Then we can try to figure out why it happened.

## Pre-Columbian US population

The issue with pre-columbian North America population estimates is that there are regions in which the population is well-known, and then there are regions in which the populations are not well-known. And what people estimating the population would do is extrapolate the populations of the well-known regions onto the lesser-known regions based on the kind of land it was.

So if an area has 2 people per km<sup>2</sup>, then an adjacent area with similar soil, vegetation, animals, et cetera is assumed to also have that many people. Fair enough.


The problem, according to [Milner and Chaplin](#), is that this is simply not true. And that the record is biased toward more densely populated areas, and thus mapping the recorded areas onto unrecorded areas is going to produce a larger population number than what was actually there:

*"High population estimates are consistent with maps that associate particular groups with irregular areas that collectively cover the land in its entirety, as if nothing was left unoccupied, the equivalent of a Thiessen (Voronoi) or other spacefilling tessellation (e.g., National Geographic 1972; Swanton 1952). Maps showing contiguous occupation, however, have the effect of implying that all equally productive land, most importantly resource-rich shorelines and river valleys, was similarly and continuously occupied. A much different picture has emerged from archaeological work over the past several decades. Not only were there large and infrequently used areas between late prehistoric population aggregates, the vacant areas often encompassed highly productive land suitable for permanent settlement."*

A related problem was over-counting settlements. Semi-nomadic people move from place to place, and when they do they settle in an area and hunt / fish / gather in that area. And thus each tribe will have multiple fixed sites that they travel to. Apparently researchers have a habit of counting each site as if it was permanently and continuously settled, which inflates the number.



**Figure 1. Distribution of population polygons (black) across eastern North America (all maps are Albers Equal Area Projections).**



**Figure 2. Population polygons with buffers derived from nearest-neighbor statistics of 23 or 85 km, depending on whether occupation of the general area is considered heavy or sparse.**

What Milner and Chaplin did was try to take all of this into account instead of dumb mapping particular well-known groups onto the whole of the United States. And in doing so they came to multiple estimates, with 1.595 million being, according to them, their "best" estimate:



Table 2. Population Estimates for Eastern North America Based on Different Initial Mean and Median Starting Values (See Table 1).\*

Estimator Source	Mean Estimated Population	Mean Upper Bound	Mean Lower Bound	Median Estimated Population	Median Upper Bound	Median Lower Bound
Polygon Maximum	1,248,669	1,344,249	1,021,692	801,785	869,379	660,087
Polygon Median	1,198,427	1,290,825	981,384	801,785	869,379	660,087
Mooney $\geq 500$	1,501,977	1,614,219	1,223,542	777,291	843,334	640,553
Mooney $\geq 500 \leq 10,000$	1,177,032	1,267,880	964,640	777,291	843,334	640,553
Muller $\geq 500$	2,433,711	2,607,655	1,759,018	971,699	1,050,765	795,584
Muller $\geq 500 \leq 11,450$	2,004,896	1,425,702	1,082,464	777,291	843,334	640,553
Muller $\geq 500 \leq 35,000$	2,173,880	2,330,460	1,531,808	971,699	1,050,765	795,584
Muller Single $\geq 500 \leq 35,000$ Maximum	1,737,530	2,150,315	1,624,451	777,291	843,334	640,553
Muller Single $\geq 500 \leq 35,000$ Mean	1,475,311	1,571,740	1,191,605	718,689	781,321	594,044
Muller Single $\geq 500 \leq 35,000$ Median	1,213,241	1,377,952	1,482,133	692,024	752,486	530,134
"Best" Estimate	1,595,089	1,713,580	1,297,250	794,114	861,518	653,938

\* Estimates are modified by knowledge and occupation regions to give upper and lower bounds for each initial estimate.

So that's one number. Another thing we can do is take hunter-gatherer populations around the world and just map them onto the United States, which I did

Populations of various hunter-gatherer groups in Southeast Asia, the Amazon and an estimate for stone age Britain:

Population	Population per square kilometer
Cape York Aborigines	0.16
Cape York Aborigines	0.4
Andaman Islanders	0.87
Batak in Phillipines	0.54
Batak in Malaysia	0.1
Semang in Malaysia	0.05
Semang in Malaysia	0.19
Stone Age Britain	"Less than 0.1"
Campa	0.8
Machiguenga	0.5
Barafiri Yanoama	0.34
Ecuadorian Achuar	0.17
Algonkian Indians of Victoria Lake	0.01
Algonkain Indians of Groote Eylandt	0.18
Murngin	0.06
Walbiri	0.01
Average of sample	0.387

The first 7 numbers come from "[Managing Animals in New Guinea: Preying the Game in the Highlands](#)" by Paul Silitoe.

The number for stone age Britain comes from "[Late Stone Age Hunters of the British Isles](#)" by Christopher Smith.

The last 8 examples come from "[In the Society of Nature: A Native Ecology in Amazonia](#)" By Philippe Descola.

So the average of this quick and dirty sample I found from the first three sources that gave specific numbers I could find using google search averages to 0.387 per km<sup>2</sup>. The lower 48 United States has a land mass of 8.139 million km<sup>2</sup>, and so just dumb mapping the average of these population onto the United States gives us 3.149 million people in the pre-columbian area that would become the United States. Canada has always had about 10% of the population of the United States, so that gives us 3.464 million, throw in Alaska and we can round it out to 3.5 million.

There are also [multiple sources](#) I have found claiming that the global average population density for hunter-gatherers is 0.1 per km<sup>2</sup>. Okay, cool. Now since that is a global average, it doesn't make sense to map it onto the US, and then give Canada 10% of that, because the global average includes places like Canada. So the land mass of Alaska, Canada and the United

States is 19.842 million km<sup>2</sup>, and if there were 0.1 people per km<sup>2</sup> in 1500, that would give us 1.9842 million people in all of North America.

So we now have a few estimates for the population of North America in 1500:

Method	Estimate
<a href="#">Milner and Chaplin</a>	1.595 million
<a href="#">Ubelaker</a> (Just United States)	1.894 million
Dumb mapping of Ryan's searches	~3.5 million
Dumb mapping of <a href="#">global hunter-gatherer density</a>	1.9842 million

Numbers higher than this are usually politically motivated. Russel Thornton's book *"American Indian holocaust and survival: a population history since 1492"* estimates the pre-columbian population of North America at 7 million, and that's in a non-free book so I can't see it. Another estimate of 18 million comes from Henry Dobyns, again in a non-free book entitled *"Their Number Become Thinned"*.

Remember the population of the United States was 17.069 million in 1840, so Dobyns' estimate of 18 million Siberian-Americans in 1500, which would entail about 16 million in the United States, who left behind extremely sparse remnants, is implausible on its face.

So there we have our Siberian-American population in North America in 1500, around 2 million. So how much did it decline?

## Population Decline

Well the first government estimates of "Indians" in the United States was in 1853, and [it estimated 400,764 Indians](#) in the United States that year.

Now this [supposedly fell to 339,421 in 1860](#), to 313,712 in 1870 and 306,543 in 1880.

So if the starting number is exactly 2 million, then by 1853 the Siberian-American population declined by 1.6 million, then to around 1.7 million by 1880.

So that comes out to around an 80% population decline. That's pretty gigantic! But remember this was over 360 years, or about 4,444 per year. **This amounts to a population reduction of 0.22% per year.** (Although since this is the drop from the starting population the average decline at each point should be 0.495%).

And also remember that hunter-gatherer populations don't grow very fast; the average population growth for hunter-gatherer populations, once it reaches the carrying capacity of the area they are in, is basically zero.

So how can a population fall by 0.22% per year? Well it can literally die off, or have below-replacement birth rates, or intermarry.

There are two things I want to point the reader to:

### **1. Intermarriage rates of native Americans and native admixture in the United States**

In 2014, there were 197,870,516 non-hispanic whites. [On average, NH Whites have 0.18% Native American admixture](#), which extrapolates to the equivalent of 356,167 full people "inside" the European population.


For blacks, there were 38,929,319 people, who were 0.08% Native American, which amounts to 31,143 Native Americans "inside" the black US population.

Now "latinos" in the United States have the highest Native American admixture at 18%, but that is probably not from North America. For what it's worth, there were 50,477,594 latinos, and in this population are the equivalent of 9,085,967 Native Americans "inside" the latino population.

And of course people who directly identify as Native American number 2,932,248 people in 2014.

So ultimately, the European conquest of North America seems to have increased the Native American genetic expression from the 2 million it was at, and probably had been at for the past ~10,000 years (see below) and thus there is no reason to believe it would have increased eventually in the absence of European contact. And while there were a few massacres of Native Americans, an annual average population decline of 0.22% does not suggest an ongoing campaign of genocide. It suggests land loss partly offset by European technology, intermarriage with Europeans, and a few battles with the Federal Government each decade.

### Native American Admixture By Region




### Interracial Marriage Rate By Race

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## Interracial Marriages Vary by Race

*% of newlyweds in 2013 who married someone of a different race*



Notes: "Newlyweds" refers to adults who wed in the 12 months prior to the survey date. These estimates do not include same-sex newlyweds. All groups are single race, regardless of Hispanic origin. American Indians include Alaska Natives. Asians exclude Pacific Islanders.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 2013 ACS Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS) files.

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
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## 2. The lack of lineage destruction for native americans


Another interesting fact is that Native American lineages on the female side were largely kept intact. This is inferred from mitochondrial DNA which is always passed through the mother. And what it shows is that there was very minimal lineage destruction.

This is important. Because if the Spaniards were going from town to town in Mexico just mass murdering the inhabitants, whole families would be killed off. The fact that, while the population decline may have been over 50%, families remained intact, is evidence that the deaths were probably down to disease, not mass murder.


### h) Americas




Fagundes 2008




Ho and Endicott 2008









## Conclusion

The Native American population in North America in 1500 was about 2 million, and the decline to 400,000 in 1860 represents a 0.22% decline per year. I'm not saying massacres didn't happen; but in the grand scheme of things, it doesn't look like a genocide, or if it was, it would be the slowest genocide ever. In addition, we don't know how many Native Americans managed to intermarry with Europeans. If so few as 0.22% married a European, which would be 1 in 454, that would in theory account for the entire Native American decline assuming the Native Americans were at replacement otherwise.

If you want to call this "revision", please, tell me what on earth it is I am revising. Most people have a historical narrative regarding the Native Americans that is based on anecdotes and personal accounts, a narrative that was set before the research was done.

This is a theme throughout US history, is that narratives are set in place for reasons you can speculate about, but then later, when we start getting new tools (including genetic data, but also something as simple as the internet which allows all of the existing information on a topic to be analyzed at the same time), the data says something different than narratives which were "set" before 1900.

Right now, thanks to the internet and sci-hub for breaking down paywalls, I have better access to academic papers than a professor at a major university would have in 1985.

And when some people go in a different direction than the old history books, this is called "revision", but there's nothing of substance being revised! The original narrative was based on nothing, the research is being done for the first time.

Now what I don't think the United States' policy toward the Native Americans was the correct one. I think the correct one would be a territorial set-aside, a separate country, for the Northern Tribes. I don't think they rightfully owned the whole of North America anymore than I own the ocean after pissing in it, but they are a people who deserve something. Perhaps something like British Columbia or Oregon.

What this really is is a battle between people who think in terms of data, and people who want to cling to the old stories, and exciting stories spread faster than boring ones.

# Racial Diversity May Reduce Overall Innovation

I put "may" in the title because this theory is still tentative.

**It started off with a question: which country will have more innovation - a country with 10 million white people and 10 million black people, OR a country with just 10 million white people and zero black people?**

Before reading, this post assumes a lot of things about [race, IQ and colonialism](#) that the reader may not agree with, and will be making "objections" at the implicit assumptions. If you don't agree with the implicit assumptions, take it up on the relevant posts where we argue for those priors explicitly. OR - alternatively, you can observe some arguments being made based on priors you don't necessarily agree with just to see where it leads.

## **Patents for South Africa vs. Parent and Analogous Countries**

The first apples-to-apples comparison that came to my mind was South Africa vs. Australia and New Zealand. Okay, so how do we measure "innovation"? Sadly it's a bit of a nebulous concept, and unlike "intelligence", there isn't some valid and reliable way to measure it. [But we can look at the number of international patents filed in various countries](#). Obviously this treats all patents as equally important, and so if there is some major variation in the importance of the average patent each country files, then this method would be flawed.

But with all these caveats, I compared South Africa to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the UK and Holland (Boers being dutch ancestry), looking at the size of their white populations and the number of patents filed.

**Number of Patents Per 1k Whites in South Africa, Parent Ethnicity Countries of South Africa and other UK Offshoots**

Country	White Population	Patents in 2013	Patents per 1k whites	Reduced by non-white percentage
South Africa	4.602 million	638	0.139	0.012
Australia	22.539 million	3061	0.136	0.125
New Zealand	3.309 million	1614	0.488	0.361
Canada	28.303 million	4567	0.161	0.126
United Kingdom	54.293 million	14927	0.275	0.233
Holland	14.552 million	2315	0.159	0.136

White populations are inferred from looking at each country's demographics page in wikipedia.

And so we can see that the number of patents filed by the country South Africa is roughly, if not slightly lower than, what you would expect from a white country with 4.6 million people and nobody else. You might say, "well the UK has Indian, Pakistani, Chinese and Afro-Caribbean populations, and they will invent things, so it's unfair to assign what they might be inventing to the white British".

Fair enough, so I just multiplied the patents per 1k whites by the white population. For the UK, that meant multiplying 0.275 by 0.848 (the percent of the UK that is white), and so if non-whites in the UK filed proportionately as many patents as whites in the UK (which is probably pretty close to true based on the IQ data), we would expect the UK whites to be filing 0.233 patents per 1k of the white population.

This same process was done with the other countries. It's hard to say what's happening. What I think is happening is that blacks in South Africa are innovating slightly, but they suppress white innovation as well, and these balance out to result in about as much innovation per white person as white Australians, and also close to white Canadians.

## Patents for Latin America and Iberia

Another set of countries to do this with would be Latin America and Iberia (Spain and Portugal). Because the European ancestry of Latin American countries comes from Iberia, we can see if the presence of Amerindian and African genetic admixture is associated with more

or less innovation PER WHITE CAPITA. I.e. - is it better to have 20 million whites and 20 million amerindians, or to have 20 million whites and zero blacks?

The reason I am using these countries is because I wanted to just compare the 5 most populous latin american countries, but Chile is also included because [I found a paper on genetic admixture estimates of Brazil, Mexico Columbia, Peru and Chile:](#)


**Patents Per 1k Whites (as Proportion of Genetic Admixture of the Total Population) in Latin American and Parent Ethnicity Countries of Iberia**

Country	% European	Patents in 2013	Population	White Population	Patents per 1k whites
Brazil	82	4959	204.5	167.7	0.0296
Mexico	37	1210	121	78.44	0.0154
Columbia	60	251	48.2	28.92	0.0087
Argentina	97	643	41.45	40.21	0.0160
Peru	29	73	31.2	9.05	0.0081
Chile	49	340	18	8.82	0.0385
Portugal	98.1	647	10.5	10.3	0.0628
Spain	98.5	3026	46.8	46.1	0.0656

And then I looked at them to see the relation between the number of patents per 1k whites and the percentage white a country is:

Patents per 1k whites vs. percent of white population in Latin American and Iberian countries


$R^2 = 0.407629169$



I also did the same thing excluding Iberia, and found a weak positive correlation between the percent white a latin american country is and the number of patents per 1k whites:

Patent Per 1k whites in JUST select Latin American Countries

$R^2 = 0.0428194375$



Obviously there's still a lot more work to do on this before we start getting conclusive, but let me put it this way: it's not immediately obvious that the presence of amerindians, counted either as full persons or genetic admixture within a mixed population, has any benefit on innovation.

And let me re-iterate what this means: **this means that a country of 10 million whites and 10 million amerindians is not going to be any more innovative than a country of just 10 million whites.** Or at least that's what this very limited analysis points to. But we certainly can't just leap to the conclusion that adding in amerindians to a white population will simply add in their innovation with no other cost.

Because lets say 1 million whites issue 100 patents, and 1 million amerindians issue 10 patents. A country of just those 1 million whites would have 100 patents, or 0.1 patent per 1k whites. But, if there were also 1 million amerindians, there would still be only 1 million whites, but 110 patents. Thus the number of patents per 1k whites would be 0.11, thus there would be more innovation! But it seems like this is not happening. That there is a suppressive effect of amerindian admixture on the white population, which roughly cancels out any additional innovation you get from having that amerindian population (expressed either as purebred individuals and/or genetic admixture within a heavily mixed population).


(I didn't do a multi-country analysis with African countries because African demographic data is 1. Really spotty and 2. the white populations in other african countries get so small that it yields ridiculous results.

For example, Nigeria supposedly has about 50k whites and issued 50 patents in 2013. The total population of Nigeria was 173.6 million in 2013. And so the patents per 1k whites in Nigeria would be 1, higher than any country looked at here. But that's silly, because say you have a country with a billion blacks, and 1 white guy, and this country had only one patent. This would be 1,000 patents per 1k whites. And so when you have very small numbers of whites in a country, it stops being meaningful in terms of figuring out if the presence of non-whites are overall helpful of harmful in terms of innovation, because at that point you're mostly looking at non-white innovation and dividing it by the tiny number of whites. )

Now obviously I have not been looking at East Asians or high-Caste Indians really, except to the extent they make up part of the non-white population in the UK.

## **Diversity and School Performance**

[Data from the NAEP](#) shows that white students and black students in black schools do worse on standardized tests than when they are in majority white schools. It's hard to say why, but it seems that the presence of large numbers of blacks in a school depresses everyone's cognitive performance, including the blacks.



The saturation of a school with a low-IQ population, in this case blacks, appears to cause lower cognitive ability as measured by standardized tests. This makes intuitive sense, as it seems like being around smart people would train you to think smart-like; but it could just be that smarter people avoid putting their kids in schools that have a lot of blacks.

This effect also probably exists to a lesser degree with hispanics.

## Affirmative Action

There are several possible mechanisms by which racial diversity can depress innovation. One of which is [institutional racism against whites in schools](#). Based on their number of academic competition winners and SAT scores, whites should be 72% of the student body at elite universities. Based on their population of 18-year olds, they should be 55% (just based on simple numbers).

In practice, whites are about 44.35% of the students admitted to these universities. Similarly, Asians, who should be 24.06% of the students at the top 20 Universities, are only 18.09%.

Moreover, for any given SAT score, whites actually do slightly better - so it's not like blacks and hispanics catch up and overcome whatever environmental disadvantage you imagine them to have had. The gap actually widens; so a white with a given SAT score going in will probably do better. (This may be related to later physical development in whites that also applies to cognitive development; i.e. white brain development may continue longer than black brain development, resulting in a widening gap after age 18.)

The result is that less intelligent blacks are being pushed into elite institutions at the expense of more intelligent whites.



And so if you want a job doing groundbreaking research, that becomes more difficult to do if you are white; the presence of blacks and hispanics in the applicant pool makes it about 38% less likely that you will even get into the elite institutions. Now almost certainly some affirmative action blacks and hispanics, against the odds, do end up doing groundbreaking research that's not actually the work of a white guy fraudulently assigned to them.

But affirmative action provides a very plausible mechanism by which the presence of blacks and hispanics can reduce the total amount of innovation in a country.

## Direct Wasted Resources

The direct wasted resources involve things that can be well-quantified, and things that are more difficult to quantify.

From a fiscal standpoint, we can see that hispanics on net take \$5,160 more from the US government at all levels than they pay per person, blacks take \$7,700 more than they pay, and whites on net contribute \$1,260 more than they take in government services. And this is when you apply all military spending to whites.

If you evenly distribute military spending to the whole US population, the net cost of hispanics rises to \$7,298, the net cost of blacks is \$10,016, and whites on net contribute \$2,795. This is summarized in the table here:

*Budgetary Impact of Whites, Blacks and Hispanics in 2014*


Category	Equal Military	Static Military
Whites	\$553.52 billion	\$249.52 billion
White Per Capita	\$2,795	\$1,260
Blacks	-\$389.71 billion	-\$306.53 billion
Black Per Capita	-\$10,016	-\$7,700
Hispanics	-\$411.95 billion	-\$291.3 billion
Hispanic Per Capita	-\$7,298	-\$5,160

And so on net, blacks and hispanics cost the US \$682.81 billion if you assign all military spending to whites, or \$801.66 billion if you evenly distribute military spending. This is a direct hammer blow to the US economy that blacks and hispanics deliver every year.

And poorer economies tend to produce fewer inventions, even when they are of the same race and have the same average IQ of wealthier countries. For example, North Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary) having fewer patents per capita than western Europe, despite having the same average IQ. Intuitively, it seems like this would be because they are more concerned with making ends meet, and the country has less money to fund research. So if you have a population that is making a country around \$750 billion poorer every year, that has to reduce research spending.

Another direct form of wasted resources would be firm productivity. [Richard et. al. in 2007](#) took a measure of productivity of various firms over a period of 6 years, and contrasted their performance to their racial diversity. The study was done in the United States, and so isn't likely to be muddled by the faux "ethnic diversity" in Europe where a Dane and a Swede working together is considered diverse. Richard found a strong negative relationship between firm diversity and productivity:

### Firm Productivity and Racial Diversity ([Richard 2007](#))



Another study done in Germany [in 2012 by Parrotta et. al.](#) found a similar, though less pronounced, negative relation between firm diversity and productivity:

Table 4: Testing alternative hypothesis: estimates by occupation and alternative index definitions and "subtract-out" groups.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Occupation specific diversity		2nd gen. Imm. as foreigners	University graduates as natives	Germanic group as natives
	White collar	Blue collar			
Index Ethnic Disaggr	-0.084*** (0.010)	-0.117*** (0.010)	-0.072*** (0.007)	-0.108*** (0.013)	-0.098*** (0.013)
Index Edu Disaggr	0.127*** (0.003)	0.065** (0.003)	0.131** (0.053)	0.128** (0.060)	0.128** (0.060)
Index Demo Disaggr	-0.034 (0.025)	-0.369 (0.235)	-0.306 (0.329)	-0.248 (0.327)	-0.248 (0.327)
Observations	49880	49880	49880	49880	49880
R2	0.881	0.882	0.882	0.882	0.882

The effect size is smaller, since they treat a Dutch person working in a German firm as being just as foreign as a Somali immigrant to Germany. In fact, even more absurd, is that a second-generation Somali living in Germany, who speaks German, is considered "ethnically German", while the Dutch immigrant is "foreign". Even with this ridiculous methodology that I can only surmise is designed to mask the true effect of racial diversity in firms, there is still a significant negative effect.

Other forms of wasted resources are more difficult to quantify, or are things I don't have ready numbers for. Examples would be the need for businesses to have "diversity" consultants. The cost of "racism" legal battles; such legal battles would be impossible if the country was 100% of one race.

Another cost would be the geographic dislocation caused by the criminalization of racial discrimination. An anecdote I have of this is a Denny's I used to go to. I noticed that over time,

the Denny's became a black and hispanic hang-out, it became loud, and the white people started to leave. And then I stopped going. Then one day I saw the Denny's went out of business. The cause is obvious: they lost their white customers, driven away by the blacks and hispanics which the Denny's could not exclude. And were left with low-paying and low-tipping blacks and hispanics.

So what is the result? The result is that the whites now have to go to a new restaurant, in some neighborhood that the blacks and hispanics don't frequent. Some place less convenient, with a large building that the Denny's was in now useless.

This has happened to entire cities, which I'll go into in the next section. The blacking of Detroit, East St. Louis, Baltimore, has resulted in whites moving into the suburbs, and in whites spreading out over larger distances, having to commute to work and school, and all of the attendant costs of that. If you spend 2 hours commuting, you have less time to do anything else, are less productive at work, etc. But those whites are saying, by their actions, that a 2 hour commute is better than being around blacks.

### **Indirect Wasted Resources**

The indirect wasted resources of racial diversity are more difficult to conceptualize. This would be the result of policy and the effectiveness of government. In countries with large black populations, and thus the government if full of blacks, those countries tend to be considered "corrupt". Similarly, big city government that have lots of blacks, and sometimes those with hispanics, tend to be considered more "corrupt".

One way to quantify the impact of this is to look at [the median household income of racial groups in the United States](#), and then look at the incomes of the largest cities with a given black, white and hispanic population.

#### **Median Household Income by Race in the United States in 2014**

Race	Median Household Income
Whites	\$56,866
Blacks	\$35,398
Hispanics	\$42,491

We can compare this to the median household income in large black cities in the US:

City	Percent Black	Median Household Income (MHHI)	State MHHI
Detroit	80.1	28,420	48,273
East St. Louis	94	18,236	56,210
Baltimore	62.5	42,266	72,483

And we can do the same with hispanics:

City	Percent Hispanic	Median Household Income (MHHI)	State MHHI
<u>El Paso</u>	80	41,129	51,704
Laredo	94.1	40,599	51,704
Miami	71.1	31,070	46,036

And we can do the same with whites:

City	Percent White	Median Household Income (MHHI)	State MHHI
Portland	71.1	55,571	50,251
Seattle	67	70,127	58,405
Colorado Springs	69.6	53,550	58,823

City data comes from [city-data.com](http://city-data.com).

Now in the cases of blacks and hispanics, the blacks and hispanics are worse off, even within the United States, when they make up a larger proportion of a city. Detroit, overall, which includes the whites in Detroit, is poorer than the black US average, meaning that the Detroit black is going to be much worse off than even the number for Detroit.

We can also compare the per capita GDPs of country groups to their per capita GDP in the United States

US White GDP per capita (PPP)	\$55,671
US Black GDP per capita (PPP)	\$34,655
US Hispanic GDP per capita (PPP)	\$41,605
Europe GDP	\$26.77 trillion
Europe Population	798.32 million
Europe GDP Per Capita (PPP)	<b>\$33,542</b>
Latin American GDP	\$9.517 trillion
Latin American Pop.	617.3 million
L.A. GDP PC (PPP)	<b>\$15,417</b>
SS African GDP	\$3.675 trillion
SS African Population	1.001 billion
SSA GDP PC (PPP)	<b>\$3,671</b>

GDP numbers are from [here](#), using the World Bank 2015. Population numbers are from [here](#). Per capita numbers are inferred with simple division.

If you want to talk about colonialism, please read [this article](#) and [this article](#) before commenting about that.

And so we can see that European countries, warts and all (including former USSR, Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia countries), and including Ukraine, have a GDP purchasing power parity of \$33,542 per capita. Latin American countries, warts and all, average to \$15,417 per capita, and black African countries average to \$3,617 per capita. Black Africa excludes Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

I personally think it's relevant to look at the variation within European countries by cluster as well, as Ukranian immigrants to the United States are going to integrate with the white population and eventually be behaviorally and economically indistinguishable from the rest of the European-American population:

Region	Population	Per capita GDP (PPP)
Former USSR	196.36 million	\$20,814
Former Warsaw Pact	107.52 million	\$22,852
Former Yugoslavia	21.71 million	\$16,029
<u>Anglosphere</u>	125.84 million	\$43,969
Western Europe	213.80 million	\$45,468
Mediterranean	128.46 million	\$34,073
United States	318.9 million	\$54,867
Ireland	4.63 million	\$54,860

So that "white" number includes countries that have political pathologies that don't transfer when they migrate to other white countries. For example, there are Serbian and Croat immigrants to Australia, but they aren't having turf wars in Australia like they do in the Balkans. Similarly, Russian immigrants to Canada aren't trying to impose a dictatorship like what exists in Russia. When whites in the pathological countries of Eastern Europe leave those places, they become Western Europeans. Ireland used to be poorer than the UK, now it's wealthier, and Irish-Americans aren't some lower class, they're fully enmeshed with the singular European-American population.

And so the overall \$33,542 number for Europe "warts and all" probably underestimates the benefit of European immigration.

Now to somebody with a lot of environmentalist priors, who imagines that Africa is poor because "Europe had a head start" or "Guns, Germs and Steel" connect-the-dots arguments, or imagines that "colonialism" made Africa poor, they'll just write all of this off as entirely circumstantial, and then write off the relative outcomes within countries as totally circumstantial.

But for the rest of us, this is evidence that the kind of environment that blacks and hispanics creates reduces the upside of development of those countries. When all the races are placed within the same country, there is a gap, but the gaps between the countries not only captures the differences in cognitive ability, but also the compounding effect of having populations of a certain race making all the laws. And so the gap between Africa and Europe is much larger than the gap between African-Americans and European-Americans, and this is evidence of "political externalities", the indirect effects of having certain racial groups in your country.

The result being that the presence of mesoamerican admixture, and much more so of blacks, causes countries to be drastically poorer beyond the simple addition of lower IQ people to the labor force of a European country. No, there are compounding **policy** effects that lowers the available surplus resources, which lowers the amount of innovation.

Therefore, it is not clear whether or not the innovation carried out by blacks and hispanics offsets the suppressive effect they have on the societies they are in. I'm leaning toward hispanics being "break even" - that their suppression is roughly offset by their own innovation, while blacks are a net negative.

## **If True, So What?**

If this is true, then maximizing global innovation would involve generalized racial segregation. For the small number of people who do real, useful scientific research, I wouldn't want to put any limits on what they can do or who they can work with. However, when they bring in their abuela and 20 other family members who proceed to vote the United States down to the level of latin america and thus reduce their ability to do scientific research, that's bad.

So lets not have that. Africans, in African countries, will do some innovative things. And what they do can be added to what white people will do in all-white countries, which is as much or more than what those same white people would do if there was a large black population within the same country. With the internet the communication argument is bogus, and for the super-scientists who need to work in the same physical laboratory, we make exceptions for the 10,000 or so people worldwide for whom this circumstance applies.

But the general rule is probably that global racial segregation with regards to whites, blacks and amerindians will increase overall innovation by preserving the kind of economic environments created by white (and asian) populations necessary to fund that research.

**IF this is true.**



# Civilization: Powered by the West, Threatened by the Rest

This article will consist of three parts. In the first, we will look at how regions and populations have varied in their technological, economic, and scientific advancement going from the ancient world to the present. Then I will review research showing that modern national wealth can be predicted based on how advanced a society was long before the industrial revolution or even recorded history. Finally, I will draw out some important implications that this research has on immigration and history.

## Technology and Science

First, let's look at how technologically advanced various groups have been throughout human history. One way of measuring technological advancement is by creating a list of goods and abilities the possession of which signals being on the cutting edge of technology for a given time period and then counting how many of these items a given society has.

This is the approach taken by [Comin, Easterly, and Gong \(2010\)](#) who constructed the following basket of goods by which to judge civilization's technological progress between 1000 BC and 0 AD:

TABLE 2—CODING CONCORDANCE BETWEEN "ACE" AND THE TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION DATASET

"ACE" dataset	Technology dataset for 1000 BC and 0 AD*
Writing and records	Communication
1 = None	
2 = Mnemonic or nonwritten records	0, 1
3 = True writing	0, 1
Technological specialization	Industry
1 = None	
2 = Pottery	0, 1
3 = Metalwork (alloys, forging, casting)	0, 1
Land transport	Transportation
1 = Human only	
2 = Pack or draft animals	0, 1
3 = Vehicles	0, 1
Agriculture	Agriculture
1 = None	0
2 = 10 percent or more, but secondary	1
3 = Primary	2
Military	Military
1 = Stone tools	
2 = Bronze tools	Bronze weapons: 0, 1
3 = Iron tools	Iron weapons: 0, 1

\* 0 = indicates absence of technology, 1 = presence of technology.

And this was the basket of goods used for 1500 AD:

TABLE 3—VARIABLES IN THE 1500 AD DATASET

Variable	Description	Values
<i>Military</i>		
Standing army	An organization of professional soldiers.	0, 1
Cavalry	The use of soldiers mounted on horseback.	0, 1
Firearms	Gunpowder-based weapons.	0, 1
Muskets	The successor to the arquebus (the common firearm of European armies) was larger and a muzzle-loading firearm.	0, 1
Field artillery	Large guns that required a team of soldiers to operate. It had a larger caliber and greater range than small arms weapons.	0, 1
Warfare capable ships	Ships that were used in battle are considered "warfare" capable.	0, 1
Heavy naval guns	Ships required significant advances in hull technology before they were capable of carrying heavy guns.	0, 1
Ships (+180 guns), +1500 ton deadweight	Large warships that only state Navies had the capability of building.	0, 1
<i>Agriculture</i>		
Hunting and gathering	The primary form of subsistence.	0
Pastoralism	The primary form of subsistence.	1
Hand cultivation	The primary form of subsistence.	2
Plough cultivation	The primary form of subsistence.	3
<i>Transportation</i>		
Ships capable of crossing the Atlantic Ocean	Any ship that had successfully crossed the Atlantic Ocean.	0, 1
Ships capable of crossing the Pacific Ocean	Any ship that had successfully crossed the Pacific Ocean.	0, 1
Ships capable of reaching the Indian Ocean	Any ship that had reached the Indian Ocean from either Europe or the Far East.	0, 1
Wheel	The use of the wheel for transportation purposes. The most common use was for carts.	0, 1
Magnetic compass	The use of the compass for navigation.	0, 1
Horse powered vehicles	The use of horses for transportation.	0, 1
<i>Communications</i>		
Movable block printing	The use of movable block printing.	0, 1
Woodblock or block printing	The use of woodblock printing.	0, 1
Books	The use of books.	0, 1
Paper	The use of paper.	0, 1
<i>Industry</i>		
Steel	The presence of steel in a civilization.	0, 1
Iron	The presence of iron in a civilization.	0, 1

Here is the average score of different populations for each era:

TABLE 4—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF OVERALL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION BY CONTINENT

Continent	Observations	Average	SD	Min	Max
<i>1000 BC</i>					
Europe	30	0.66	0.16	0.5	1
Africa	34	0.36	0.31	0	1
Asia	23	0.58	0.25	0.1	1
America	24	0.24	0.12	0	0.4
Oceania	2	0.2	0.14	0.1	0.3
<i>0 AD</i>					
Europe	33	0.88	0.15	0.7	1
Africa	40	0.77	0.2	0.6	1
Asia	34	0.88	0.15	0.6	1
America	25	0.33	0.17	0	0.6
Oceania	3	0.17	0.11	0.1	0.3
<i>1500 AD</i>					
Europe	32	0.86	0.07	0.69	1
Africa	39	0.32	0.2	0.1	0.78
Asia	25	0.66	0.19	0.07	0.88
America	24	0.14	0.07	0	0.26
Oceania	9	0.12	0.04	0	0.13
<i>Current</i>					
Europe	34	0.63	0.19	0.27	0.87
Africa	42	0.31	0.08	0.13	0.54
Asia	33	0.41	0.15	0.23	0.76
America	22	0.47	0.17	0.34	1
Oceania	3	0.73	0.32	0.36	0.92

Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2010)

A lot could be said about this table, but in relation to other data we'll see in this article the important thing to note is that in 1000 BC and 1500AD European people were more technologically advanced than any other group and in 0 AD they tied with Asia.

The above table is based on every population with each region that Comin et al. could find data for. However, Comin et al. also looked at what regional comparisons looked like when only judging a region based on its most advanced civilization. Here are those results:

TABLE 5—AVERAGE OVERALL TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION IN ADVANCED CIVILIZATIONS

Civilization	1000 BC	0 AD	1500 AD	Current
W. Europe	0.65	0.96	0.94	0.71
China	0.9	1	0.88	0.33
Indian	0.67	0.9	0.7	0.31
Arab	0.95	1	0.7	0.43

Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2010)

Here, we see that the most advanced Asians had better technology than the most advanced Europeans in the year 1000 BC and 0 AD and that it may not have been until as late as 1500 AD that the most advanced civilizations in the world came to be European ones.


1500 AD is prior to the industrial revolution, most of the transcontinental slave trade, and colonialism, and, consequently, this data contradicts several popular notions about what caused Europeans to become the most technologically advanced peoples on earth.

Comin et al. were concerned with how much technology populations had. This is distinct from asking how much technology populations invented. When one population invents something, it will be spread all over the civilized world. This process of technological diffusion did not, however, happen equally in all places. Some areas, such as ancient China and the Mediterranean, have always been centers for international trade. Because of this, they were ideal places to be the recipients of technological diffusion. Other populations, such as northern Europeans or, even more extremely, Sub-Saharan Africans, were geographically and culturally isolated from much of the ancient world and, as a result, did not trade technology with them to nearly the same degree.

[Murray \(2004\)](#) represents the most rigorous attempt to measure innovation by region throughout history. Murray collected 183 comprehensive encyclopedias, histories, etc., of innovation in various fields and made a list of those individuals who were included in at least 50% of the qualified sources within a given field. Murray found that this measure had an extremely high degree of statistical reliability (.93) by showing that arbitrarily breaking the sources into two groups produced two sets of basically identical results. Murray also showed that the same results emerged when he compared sources from different parts of the world, suggesting that eurocentrism did not significantly plague the analysis. Thus, he found that the relevant material showed a strong degree of consensus on which people and events have been historically important in science.


Murray called individuals included in 50% or more of the sources “significant individuals” and events mentioned in 50% or more of sources “significant events”. His analysis included all such individuals who lived, or events which took place, between the years 800 BC and 1950 AD. His results, grouped by continent, can be seen below:

**Whether measured in people or events, 97 percent of accomplishment in the scientific inventories occurred in Europe and North America**




Breaking down this analysis by year, we can see that Europe drove innovation in the BC period, declined in scientific productivity around 100 AD, and then retook its place as the main engine of global scientific advancement around 1500 AD.

### The distribution of the significant figures across time and place



Broadly speaking, Comin et al.'s and Murray's data sets agree as far as they put Europe at the top of technological advancement in the BC period and then show a European decline which ended by 1500 AD. Where they differ is in the degree of Europe's relative technological superiority during these periods. Comin et al.'s data showed that Europe has often had the best technology in the world, but not massively so. Murray's data shows that Europeans have been behind nearly every important scientific advancement of the last 2000 years. Thus, the combination of these data sets implies that non-European nations, especially Asian ones, have benefited far more from technological diffusion than has Europe.

Finally, Murray's data shows that not all European nations have contributed equally to innovation. Actually, almost all of European innovators have come from just a few nations: Britain, France, Germany, and Italy:



## Wealth

Now that we have looked at technological progress, let's turn to economic development. The leading authority on ancient GDP estimates is the economist Angus Maddison. Below, we can see his estimates for wealth per person for the years 1 AD to 1950 AD expressed in 1990 dollars:

<b>Wealth per Person: 1 AD – 1950 AD</b>				
<b>Year</b>	<b>Western Europe</b>	<b>Eastern Europe</b>	<b>East Asia</b>	<b>Africa</b>
1 AD	576\$	412\$	425\$	472\$
1000 AD	427\$	400\$	433\$	425\$
1500 AD	771\$	496\$	551\$	414\$
1600 AD	889\$	548\$	561\$	422\$
1700 AD	997\$	606\$	577\$	421\$
1820 AD	1,202\$	683\$	612\$	420\$
1870 AD	1,960\$	937\$	620\$	500\$
1913 AD	3,457\$	1,695\$	927\$	637\$
1950AD	4,578\$	2,111\$	1047\$	890\$

([Maddison 2007](#))

There are several important takeaways from this chart. First, Western Europe was the richest region in the world for nearly all the last 2,000 years. The only exception is 1000 AD. Secondly, Western Europe has virtually always been richer than Eastern Europe. This was true long before communism came into the picture. Third, in 1 AD Africa was richer than Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia. In 1 AD Africa was also richer than Africa in 1820 AD. Progress is not inevitable.

### **The Pre-Historic Roots of Development**

So far, I have been comparing rather macro level populations such as “Europe”, “Asia”, and “Africa”. If we break populations down into smaller units, roughly corresponding to the size of individual nations, we can make even more definite statements about the long term consistency of wealth and technology.

Of course, most nations that were around 1,000+ years ago no longer exist. However, we can still test how well the ancient advancement of people in a given geographical area predicts the advancement of people who live in that same area today.

For instance, a nation’s score on Comin et al.’s index of technological progress in 1000 BC predicts its current level of wealth.

TABLE 8A—ANCIENT TECHNOLOGY MEASURES AND INCOME AND TECHNOLOGY TODAY

Dependent variables	Log income per capita in 2002			Current technology		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Overall technology adoption level in 1000 BC	0.747* (1.87)			0.0851 (1.37)		
Overall technology adoption level in 0 AD		0.0895 (0.19)			0.0138 (0.14)	
Overall technology adoption level in 1500 AD			1.566*** (3.24)			0.221** (2.58)
Constant	8.196*** (28.22)	8.452*** (19.62)	7.786*** (22.72)	-0.590*** (-13.60)	-0.557*** (-6.89)	-0.655*** (-12.22)
Observations	104	123	111	109	130	115
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.00	0.18	0.02	0.00	0.12

Note: *t*-statistics in parentheses computed using robust standard errors clustered to take into account the correlation in the information used in the coding of technology.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

### Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2010)

Granted, these correlations are not very strong, but this is because we have not adjusted for ancestry. Ancestry adjustment means that rather than predict an area's current advancement based on the advancement of the people who lived there in the past we predict it based on the advancement of the descendant populations of the people who there now.

This adjustment can make a big difference. For instance, the technological advancement of the ancestors of the current populations of Australia, Mexico, and the United States, in 0 AD is very different than the technological advancement that was present in Australia and North America in 0 AD. Adjusting Comin et al.'s technological index for ancestry vastly improves its predictive power. After doing so, there is a substantive relationship between ancient levels of technology and modern levels of both wealth and technology.

TABLE 8B—MIGRATION-ADJUSTED TECHNOLOGY MEASURES AND INCOME AND TECHNOLOGY TODAY

Dependent variables	Log income per capita in 2002			Current technology		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Migration-adjusted technology level in 1000 BC	1.599*** (3.45)			0.211*** (3.3)		
Migration-adjusted technology level in 0 AD		2.303** (2.35)			0.418** (2.56)	
Migration-adjusted technology level in 1500 AD			3.261*** (6.76)			0.514*** (6.87)
Constant	7.697*** (23.46)	6.602*** (8.65)	6.544*** (18.6)	-0.662*** (-16.65)	-0.895*** (-7.85)	-0.862*** (-21.06)
Observations	104	123	111	109	130	115
R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.11	0.5	0.07	0.12	0.4

Note: *t*-statistics in parentheses computed using robust standard errors clustered to take into account the correlation in the information used in the coding of technology.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

### Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2010)

Ancient levels of technology are not the only early predictor of modern success. For instance, the number of years an area has had agriculture or a state correlates with their 2005 GDP per capita at .23 and .26. Adjusting for ancestry raises these correlations to .46 (agriculture) and .48 (state history) (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013)



In fact, these variables, in addition with a population's latitude, and whether or not it is either on an Island or landlocked, can statistically explain 52%-59% of the current variation in national income.

TABLE 5  
THE HISTORY OF POPULATIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
(Dependent variable: log per capita income, 2005; estimator: OLS)

Main regressor:	Years of agriculture	Ancestry-adjusted years of agriculture	State history	Ancestry-adjusted state history
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Years of agriculture</b>	<b>0.019</b> (0.335)			
<b>Ancestry-adjusted years of agriculture</b>		<b>0.099</b> (2.347)**		
<b>State history</b>			<b>0.074</b> (0.245)	
<b>Ancestry-adjusted state history</b>				<b>1.217</b> (3.306)***
Absolute latitude	0.042 (6.120)***	0.040 (6.168)***	0.047 (7.483)***	0.046 (7.313)***
Percent land area in the tropics	-0.188 (0.592)	-0.148 (0.502)	0.061 (0.200)	0.269 (0.914)
Landlocked dummy	-0.753 (4.354)***	-0.671 (3.847)***	-0.697 (4.122)***	-0.555 (3.201)***
Island dummy	0.681 (2.550)**	0.562 (2.555)**	0.531 (2.216)**	0.503 (2.338)**
Constant	7.699 (22.429)***	7.270 (21.455)***	7.458 (22.338)***	6.773 (19.539)***
Beta coefficients on the bold variable	3.75%	17.23%	1.50%	21.59%
Observations	150	148	135	135
R <sup>2</sup>	0.475	0.523	0.558	0.588

Notes: Robust *t* statistics in parentheses.  
 \*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.  
 \*\*Significant at the 5 percent level.  
 \*Significant at the 10 percent level.

### Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013)

Similarly, the genetic distance between a population and the United states, in conjunction with the previously mentioned geographic variables, statistically explains 50% of current national variation in wealth. If you add to this model the percentage of a nation that is European, 55% of national wealth variation can be statistically accounted for.

GENETIC DISTANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS  
(Dependent variable: log per capita income, 2005)

Main regressor:	Indigenous genetic distance	Ancestry-adjusted genetic distance	Control for the share of Europeans
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$F_{ST}$ genetic distance to the United States, 1500 match	-4.038 (3.846)***		
$F_{ST}$ genetic distance to the United States, weighted, current match		-6.440 (3.392)***	-4.576 (2.341)**
Absolute latitude	0.034 (5.068)***	0.030 (4.216)***	0.015 (1.838)*
Percent land area in the tropics	-0.182 (0.582)	-0.041 (0.135)	-0.384 (1.189)
Landlocked dummy	-0.637 (3.686)***	-0.537 (2.971)***	-0.521 (3.051)***
Island dummy	0.584 (2.389)**	0.607 (2.392)**	0.557 (2.262)**
Share of descendants of Europeans, per Putterman and Weil			0.863 (3.601)***
Constant	8.451 (23.577)***	8.618 (21.563)***	8.637 (20.941)***
Beta coefficients on the bold variable	-23.85%	-27.11%	-20.30%
Observations	155	154	149
$R^2$	0.499	0.496	0.545

Notes: Robust  $t$  statistics in parentheses.

\*\*\* Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\* Significant at the 5 percent level.

\* Significant at the 10 percent level.

### Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013)

As with all statistical associations, this does not prove causality. However, the direction of causality can only run one way; It is not possible that current wealth variation caused differences between populations thousands of years ago. Thus, these statistical associations only leave open the possibility that some ancient variable, either the ones measured in these models or one's correlated with them, causally explain most modern differences in national wealth.

Moreover, the fact that these models are improved when adjusting for ancestry shows that whatever ancient variable impacted these populations did so in a way that sticks with them when they migrate.

### Conclusion

We do not yet know why Western Europe has driven humanities civilizational progress to the degree that it has. IQ no doubt plays some role, but East Asians have higher IQs than do Western Europeans. The same is probably true of self-control.

Individualism separates the West from Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia and it predicts modern national wealth (Last, 2016). Moreover, the more individualistic a U.S immigrant's nation of origin is the wealthier they tend to be and the more likely they are to have a career involved with scientific research (Gordonichenko and Ronald, 2012; Hasen, 2013). Given this, individualism seems like a good candidate for one of the factors which can explain this historical trend, but it is almost surely not the only one.

Uncertainty about this "X factor" (or "West factor") has profound implications for immigration policy. Given the data reviewed here, it seems plausible that the West could lose whatever it is that makes it so special via immigration from not Western places. It seems that this would be true whether immigration was coming from Africa, the Middle East, Asia, or even Eastern Europe.

This data also lends itself to an interesting historical possibility. As we've seen, there was a time when Africa was richer than both East Asia and Eastern Europe. While surely not the only cause, it may be that these places are richer than Africa today partly because they are more able to incorporate advances from the West. This differential ability to benefit from Western advancement, in turn, may have a wide variety of cultural, geographic, and genetic causes.

# Mass Migration as a Weapon

I recall during the Nuremberg trials that one of the major crimes the Hitler regime was charged with was the mass movement of Germans into and France.

And the mass immigration of Germans into regions of France and a plan, through subsidized birthrates among Germans, to demographically displace the French.

Granted, this was pretty far down on the list of crimes brought up at that tribunal, but they were considered crimes to some degree.

In addition, when anti-communist writers would attack the crimes of the Soviet Union, one of the things they would attack was the mass migration of Russians into the Baltic States and Ukraine in an attempt to "Russify" them.

When white settlers traveled across the midwestern United States, they didn't set out to kill the Amerindians. Settlers were indifferent, but then would be attacked by Native Americans who didn't want them in "their lands".

It seems as if the Native Americans looked at this mass migration and settlement as an aggressive, belligerent act. They speak of "their land" and "their people".

In 2010, Gaddafi threatened to make Europe "another Africa" by stopping border enforcement and letting the blacks up into Italy if he did not receive \$5 billion Euros.

*"Tomorrow Europe might no longer be European and even black as there are millions who want to come in," he said.*

*"We don't know if Europe will remain an advanced and united continent or if it will be destroyed, as happened with the barbarian invasions".*

Isn't it strange, Gaddafi seems to think that there is something inherent about black Africans that will make Europe a worse place. Hasn't he heard the good news of the wondrous benefits of diversity? Gaddafi also said this:

*"There are signs that Allah will grant victory to Islam in Europe without swords, without guns, without conquest. We don't need terrorists, we don't need homicide bombers. The 50+ million Muslims [in Europe] will turn it into a Muslim continent within a few decades."*

Additionally, in 2015 and 2016, the Mayor of Calais and then-Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron both threatened to stop blocking the migrants in Calais, which is right next to Britain, and to let them into Britain. This is because Britain has a treaty that treats the English Channel and the Channel Tunnel as a specially regulated zone, not an area of free movement as the rest of the European Union is.

How strange that, for Macron, this would even be a threat. Odd that out of one side of his mouth, Macron will speak glittering generalities about the benefits of immigration and diversity, but then when the rubber hits the road, he lets slip by implication that these immigrants are actually a really bad thing. Far from a punishment to the British, this would enhance and enrich life in Britain.

When the Chinese invaded Tibet, it was condemned, and on top of that, was considered a "cultural genocide" and human rights violation as the Chinese engaged in mass immigration. Cultural genocide, what does that even mean? What even is Tibetan Culture? What even is Tibetan? I'll have you know you're more genetically similar to blippity blappity bleep bloop -

A paper in 2010 published in Strategic Insights, written by Kelly Greenhill of the Naval Postgraduate School, talked about the use of Mass Migration as a weapon to be used against one's enemies.

The paper, entitled "Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement as an Instrument of Coercion" documents 64 instances of the use of states using the threat of mass immigration to try to get another state to do what they want.

One colorful example from the paper involves Jimmy Carter's negotiations on Human Rights in China:

*"Consider, for example, the suggestive reply of then Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to U.S. President Jimmy Carter during their historic 1979 meeting. After Carter asserted that the United States could not trade freely with China until its record on human rights improved and Chinese were allowed to emigrate freely, Deng smilingly retorted, "Okay. Well then, exactly how many Chinese would you like, Mr. President? One million? Ten million? Thirty million?" Whether Deng actually intended to influence U.S. behavior remains unclear, but, in point of fact, his rejoinder reportedly stopped Carter cold and summarily ended their discussion of human rights in China."*

Two more examples she describes are Haitians threatening to mass migrate to the United States, and East Germany threatening to send a bunch of poo-in-the-loos over to West Germany:

*"In summer 1994, for instance, boats were "being prepared in nearly every village along the southern coast of Haiti" in an explicit attempt to "put more pressure on the US to hasten the return of Aristide." As one villager noted at the time: "We cannot get arms to fight. . . . The only way to fight is to get the Americans to keep their promises. The only way to do that is to do what they fear most, have us come to America."*

*"Likewise, when East German officials quipped in the mid-1980s that their West German counterparts "claim they have a liberal society over there. [We will] let them prove it!," they fully anticipated that loosing South Asian asylum seekers on West Germany would cause widespread discontent and persuade the previously reluctant West German government to concede to their demands. And they were right."*

But wait a minute, aren't they in fact helping West Germany and hurting themselves by depriving themselves of the great diversi- okay that joke's getting old.

So when someone says talks about how white countries and only white countries need to be taking in non-whites to achieve some great benefit of diversity, understand that this is a belief that is specific to Western European countries at this specific place and time.

This is not a common belief in Eastern Europe, and it's not a common belief anywhere else in the world today. And it wasn't even a common belief in Western European countries until well after the end of world war 2.

# A Deep Skepticism of Group Narratives

At the outset, Richard Spencer was intentionally vague with alt-right so as to create an "idea space". As a result, you're seeing something that happened to "anarchism", with a battle between the people who made the original term and new people who are making new definitions of "true anarchism" and "true alt right". And like Spencer, the original anarchists didn't want to rigidly define anarchism, because they didn't want to restrict people. And so then they got anarcho-capitalism, something the original anarchists would consider an abomination, just as the original alt-right considers Paul Joseph Watson to be a pretender and Milo to be an abomination.

But the horse has left the stable now, and there was a last-ditch attempt to reclaim and standardize the meaning of alt-right with [this article](#) and energetic but scattershot individual attempts to correct alt-lite calling themselves alt-right. But I don't see it working any more than classical anarchists trying to remove an-cap. The model needs to be Karl Marx and Ayn Rand. While anyone can go around and lie about what Marx and Rand believed, the fact is that both are defined by the writings of a person, which can be cited to settle disputes. It's not just there in the air as "anarchism" and "alt right" currently are.

And the second purpose is to come up with a new term for the people who call themselves "leftists". Because "leftist" is vague, and it doesn't get at the root of what they are all about. And what they are all about is the third world: they support both third world government policies and third world genetics. Either they are third-worlders themselves, or they are dupes of the third-worlders. Either way, they are third-worldISTS.

It also focuses them into the deeply racial nature of what they advocate, cutting through the BS about "equality" and sidestepping dumb cuckservative attempts to pathologize "the left" as having something to do with being "against judeo-christian values" or some crap about taxes and hard work. By calling third worldists "leftists", you allow the user of the term to focus on things other than race as whatever they imagine to be the essential values of "the left". Which, as most readers here should know, is stupid, as all policy disputes are going to be decided by racial majorities.

This isn't ready for prime time just yet. Right now I'm quickly going to bang out these posts, which means no sources for a while; but it's all pretty simple history stuff so if I say something incorrect it should be fairly obvious eventually.

## **Foreign Political Armies and "Oppressed Minorities"**

Muammar Gaddafi, like many regimes, used foreign troops to enforce the will of the regime on a non-compliant population. Following the revolution, if found, blacks would be charged for collaboration with Gaddafi unless they could prove otherwise, as they were more likely than Libyans to be part of Gaddafi's forces.

Gaddafi was also considered to be more popular among Africans in Libya than among Libyans. Would the "left wing" thing be to stand with the black minority and Gaddafi against the Caucasian Libyan uprising?

In Yugoslavia in WW2, Nazi Germany supplied and trained Croatian and Bosnian Muslims to control Serbia, a nation historically antagonistic to Austria and Germany, and the only republic within Yugoslavia that put up any serious resistance to the German invasion.

Would aligning with the "minority" Croats and Muslims within the traditional boundary of Serbia be "left wing"? After all, I'm sure they have plenty of stories to tell you about how the mean old Serbs oppressed them when they were in charge.

During the Spanish Civil War, Francisco Franco used Moroccan troops to fight the Republicans. Which is to say, Franco's coalition included some darker skinned people from Morocco, and was thus more racially diverse than the Republicans.

Mao Zedong, during various revolts in Beijing, used Mongolian troops to put down the revolts, as domestic troops would refuse to fire on people from the same region.

The Soviets also regularly used troops from the Central Asian Republics to put down riots or revolts in Russia and Ukraine.

The Romans would bring in "Barbarian" troops from Gaul and Germania to suppress revolts in Rome.

You can probably find many more examples of autocratic leaders arming and training some "oppressed minority" to use as an internal army to quash domestic opposition.

## **The Sacred Tribulation**

There was a very illuminating interview between a Romanian and Nigel Farage (who is from Britain). There was some EU legislation about corruption that was written to deal with a problem Romania has but would apply to all EU countries. Nigel Farage mentioned how silly it is for the UK to be in a political union with a country as backward as Romania.

A Romanian caller called in and called Farage a "racist". Farage responded by claiming the Romanians treated the Gypsies poorly, and the caller responded saying that's different as Gypsies are criminals, con-artists and layabouts.

A similar dynamic would be the Turks in Germany claiming oppression, and yet limiting any kind of Armenian influence on Turkish politics.

Or Moroccans claiming marginalization in Holland, but building a giant wall and making laws preventing any black African from entering and becoming a citizen in Morocco.

Or Egyptians, complaining about marginalization when they enter Europe as they make laws restricting the practice of the Coptic Christians in Egypt.

Or we can point to the Zulu, who were in the process of conquering the Khoisan region of South Africa and putting them under Zulu rule, and later complain about the horrible oppression of the Dutch, then British, who essentially entered "their" land and just started farming and setting up a new country with zero regard for the Zulu and Khoi people around them.

Or Japanese in the United States who claim to be put-upon for being Japanese, while Japan allows in almost no immigrants and allows establishments to explicitly discriminate against non-Japanese.

The Mughals, who controlled roughly half of the area of "India", had no problem ruling over people of different races, languages and religions. But then later fought against the British and, when they lost, considered it a horrible injustice that the British stole their "Mughal lands".

Later, when Britain had enough of managing India, Ghandi, who was a relentless advocate of separation from Britain, was just as adamant that the Muslims not be allowed a separate state



(today Pakistan and Bangladesh, though at the time of partition it was a single state of Pakistan), and that Sri Lanka be kept as part of India.

Going back to South Africa, Nelson Mandela, who was imprisoned for blowing up buses full of children, was adamant that "apartheid" end. However, like Ghandi, he was opposed to any partition, and refused to negotiate the existence of a white country around Cape Town and in Transvaal (similar to Pakistan and Bangladesh). And during their rise, and once in power, the ANC actually killed more political opponents than the National Party did.

Another two controversial examples would be the German occupation of Czech and Poland. At the end of WW1, a state "Czechoslovakia" was created, which had the nations Czech and Solvakia, along with Hungarian and Ukranian-majority regions, and a German majority area known as Sudety.

The Czechs had no problem engaging in "land reform" on the Germans, taking their lands and handing it to Czechs, not counting German votes in Czechoslovak elections. And even the Slovaks, the #2 group in the country, wanted out. It was only with German support that the Slovaks were able to break off. And the Germans first took Sudety from the Czechs, and then took the ethnically Czech part of the country and made it semi-independent but whose resources could be conscripted for military purposes.

This is similar to the relations Britain used to have with Canada, Australia-New Zealand and Ireland. The Czechs in the past, or Bohemians, always conquered as much as they could get away with, controlling the whole of Silesia and even being the Holy Roman Emperor several times, which was essentially king of "Germany" at the time. They had no problem keeping unwilling Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians and Ukrainians under their rule, but when the Germans took over, then it was a great atrocity.

And in Poland, Hitler simply wanted rail access to East Prussia, an isolated pocket of German territory, cut off from the bulk of Germany by the Danzig corridor, and control over the city of Danzig, which was majority German, but allowing Poland to keep their port city of Gdynia. Hitler didn't even demand the majority German lands in Poznania, and had plans to include Poland in a military alliance along with Hungary and Romania. He was also willing to forgive the Poles cutting off German rail access across the corridor to East Prussia, which was a treaty violation.

But once the war began, Germany inflamed propaganda about Polish atrocities against the German minority - real or imagined - to justify their invasion. Prior to this, Poland had invaded Lithuania and Czechoslovakia in the 1920s, and also invaded the Soviet Union while the USSR was still fighting a Civil war, and pushed as far as Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, and Minsk, the capital of Belarus. In the peace settlement Poland took large chunks of Ukraine and Belarus from the USSR. In fact, after the war with the USSR, Byelorussian and Ukrainian lands were about half of the land mass of the state of Poland, and Poles only made up 69% of the population of "Poland".

But once Germany invaded, then the Poles perceived themselves as a pure victim. And the narrative in the west was "plucky little Poland".

This game is constant, this game is universal. The Hebrews, who were almost certainly mercenaries who worked for the Pharaoh as political shock troops, claim to have been slaves who, when they tried to escape, were ruthlessly pursued by the Pharaoh; when in reality the Pharaoh let them leave and probably went after them only when he heard the Hebrews were sacking towns for supplies.

Then the Hebrews enter Canaan, and by their own words slaughter them all, but that's okay because the Canaanites were really really bad, the Hebrews tell us.

So this tactical use of "oppression" narrative is at least as old as Moses and Exodus, or about 3,300 years, and is probably quite a bit older than that.

And so when you hear of some group saying they are immensely put-upon, and tell you all the stories - rape, extreme forced labor, beatings, killing for minor infractions, breaking up families - remember that these stories are all designed for some political goal. They are not disinterested accounts of events. It is their sacred tribulation.

## **"Oppression" Narrative as Prelude to Belligerence**

The two archetypal uses of "oppression" as a rationale for belligerence are Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Hitler of course used Versailles - the debt and territory loss - and the perceived treatment of Germans in Poland.

The Soviet Union used the idea of the oppressed worker to justify the invasion of basically any other country. Of course they still had to deal with military realities; but their internal story would justify any invasion of any non-"communist" country to their own population. In addition to duping the usual suspects in the United States and other NATO countries.

Less well known is how the Serbs used the perceived Nazi oppression to justify their subjugation of the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats within the new, "communist" Yugoslavia.

Similarly, Poles and Czechs, as the Germans started to lose the war, helped themselves to historically German lands in Silesia, Deutsche-Krone and East and West Prussia, and Sudety, citing German oppression for the land grab.

Not surprisingly, the Poles, the Czechs and Serbs, along with the USSR, played up Nazi atrocities - real or imagined - as much as they could.

Mao also used both the global oppression of the worker and the perceived oppression of China by "the west" to galvanize the Chinese population for a war against the United States in Korea. But the Chinese were constrained militarily from doing much else.

The United States used the events - real or imagined - of the sinking of the USS Maine and the sinking of the USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin to invade Spanish Cuba and the Spanish Philippines, and to send troops to Vietnam, respectively.

The Kuwait war in 1991 is another example of an oppression narrative. Prior to the Kuwait war, Iran had a fundamentalist revolution, and the Iraqi perception was that Iran wanted to unify all Shia Muslims, which included most of the population of Iraq and Kuwait. Iran, then Persia, attempted something similar in 1917 during World War 1 when they invaded the area of modern day Iraq, then controlled by the Ottoman Empire.

Iraq fought an 8-year war from 1980-1988 with Iran, and went into heavy debt, including debt with the country of Kuwait. The region of Kuwait had always historically been a part of the Mesopotamian civilization, and Kuwait being separate from the rest of Mesopotamia was merely a result of it being occupied by the British while the Ottomans controlled what is today Iraq, and when the British took what is now Iraq from the Ottomans, they never combined the two. And so you had "Iraq" and "Kuwait" as two separate countries.

The perception in Kuwait and Iraq was that Iran planned to invade Kuwait as well, and Saddam expected Kuwait to forgive the loans they made to Iraq during the war - given that Iraq supposedly protected them from Iran. But Kuwait refused and stuck to terms on the loan.

Moreover during the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait, which already has far more oil per person than Iraq due to it's location right on the coast of the Persian Gulf, engaged in slant drilling, sucking up oil from oil deposits within the land and sea borders of Iraq.

All of these reasons led Saddam to invade Kuwait. And then came the oppression narratives, of Saddam's forces ripping babies out of incubators, using chemical weapons and fuel-air explosives against the Kuwaitis. And this galvanized US support for the war against an Iraq desperate and hollowed out from 8 years of war with Iran.

This is not to say that the US intervention wasn't justified. Maybe you think it was or it wasn't. But it certainly wasn't what most people thought it was. And given that, at the time, the US public didn't know it would be such a one-sided fight, they probably would not have supported it without the atrocity stories or if they knew the whole backstory.

Leading up to the Great War of 1914, the Austrians justified their invasion of Serbia with Serbian terrorism in Austria-Hungary. Germany honored their alliance with Austria, which meant war with Russia as Russia was allied with Serbia, and war with France as France was allied with Russia.

But part of the motivation for war against France was the perception in Germany that France and Britain had prevented Germany from getting colonies, and were conspiring to keep Germany contained and weak. Another oppression narrative.

Then during the war, Germany, instead of attacking the hilly and well-defended area on the French-German border, invaded Belgium and into France from the flatter and more open north.

And so the British press went to work about how the Germans were impaling Belgian babies on bayonets, were raping and murdering nuns, and would take villages and lock them into a barn and set fire to them. Once chemical weapons started to be used in the war, then you got stories about Germans locking Belgians in barns and gassing them.

All of these stories got the British into the war. Then, to get the United States into the war, the US military sent mixed ships filled both with civilians and military equipment. Their treaty with Germany allowed civilian ships to be sent to Britain and France, but ships carrying military equipment could be sunk. So by sending mixed cargoes, the US could send war material without fear of sinking or, should Germany sink a mixed-cargo ship, have an example of German brutality to goad the US public into war. The Lusitania was just such a mixed-cargo ship, it was sunk, and that's what happened.

But in each instance, oppression narratives were key to goading populations into war in WW1. Even Austria-Hungary pushed the narrative that Serbia, because they were protected by Russia, was able to terrorize them without fear of reprisal.

## **Which is More Likely?**

If what I say here is true - then one should have a deep skepticism of any politics involving grievances. Of course that includes some of the things I say, because while most of what I do is argue against anti-white grievance narratives, I do have a limited grievance narrative of my

own. But most people are deeply skeptical about what I say anyway, so applying this skepticism universally would just make a level playing field that improves my position.

Now, there are particular grievance narratives that exist today. We know that most of the ones in the past were fake or exaggerated beyond reason. Now, without any information, our BIAS should be that, whatever grievance narrative is popular today - slavery, segregation, - is probably, like the ones in the past, fake or exaggerated. You should certainly entertain that as a possibility, unless you think your bugaboo is special.

# Secular and Theistic Worldviews as Mere Masks of Group Identity (Wear it Long Enough and Fool Yourself too)

## Not Religion but Ethno-Religion

The most obvious example of this is the Jews. Are the Jews a biological race, an "ethnicity", or a religion? Well, like the Hindi, they're all of those things, and a language. Yes, there are beliefs about God, and those beliefs are somewhat separate from the group identity of Jewishness.

A universal trait about old polytheistic religions is that each self-identified group had their own patron diety. For example, the people of Eridu in Mesopotamia had the God of their people, Enki. The patron diety of Babylon was Marduk.

Athens and Syracuse's patron diety was Athena, Elis and Olympia's diety was Zeus. Thespieae's was Eros, The patron diety of Larissa and Thebes was Dionysus, Corinth's was Poseidon. The patron diety of Megara, Eretria, Miletus and Epidauros as Apollo. Argos and Samos worshipped Hera. Rhodes' diety was Helios. The patron diety of Ephesus was Artemis, the patron diety of Cnidus was Aphrodite. Sparta had two patron dieties - Athena and Apollo.

Rome had three patron dieties, the "Capitoline Triad" of Minerva, Juno and Jupiter.

In Egypt, Amun was the patron diety of Thebes, Ba'alat Gebal the patron diety of Byblos, Banebdjedet the patron diety of Mendes, Bast teh patron diety of Bubastis, Khnum the patron diety of Elephantine, Neith the patron diety of Sais, Ptah the patron diety of Memphis, Ra the patron diety of Heliopolis, Wepwawet the patron diety of Asyut.

Some patron dieties in Mesopotamia are Marduk of Babylon, Enki of Eridu, Bau of Lagash, Lulal of Bad-tibira, Nu Mus Da of Kazallu, Entil for the cities of Nippur, and Ishtar with the city of Arbela. There was also Shakka, who wasn't a diety of any particular city, but of herdsmen, and Shamash the patron diety of travellers.

Ashur was the patron diety of the city of Assur, but also of the Assyrians.

In China, they had [Chenghuangshen](#), which translates to "god of the moat and the walls" or "god of the boundary", but the generally accepted transliterated meaning is "city god". Most large towns and villages had a city god.

In India, there are Kuladevata, which are derived from Kula - meaning clan, and Devata, meaning diety. They are "clan dieties". The patron dieties all over India [are described here](#). It appears that there are literally thousands of patron dieties in India.

There are also all sorts of little patron dieties among the Mayan, Aztec and Inca.

Sorry for belaboring the point, but this is very important; for most of human history by time and space, religion - and all of the beliefs that go into it - WAS the group.

It may be hard to imagine the two being conflated, and one may think that it's inappropriate to conflate the two. Sure, group identity may influence religious beliefs, and you can recognize this as a brute fact, but believe that religion is ESSENTIALLY different from group identity.

But this is NOT how it was seen for most of history.

A bit of a tangent, but the thinking of the anarchists was a product of viewing private property and the state as one and the same. Now most people in "the west" today see them as distinct; sure, the state and private property can influence each other, be "in bed" with each other, but they are, to most modern people in "the west", essentially separate things. In the 1850s in England, it was most certainly NOT seen this way. Private property was seen as much a function of the state as you see police and courts as being an essential state function.

However, medieval Ireland and Iceland can be seen as states where the courts are independent of kings, and so they certainly did not see the law and the kings as part of the same organization, but as two distinct things. In the US, you have separate "branches of government", but they are all part of the same state.

That digression is just meant to illustrate that the boundaries of "things" is not some clear, obvious and uniform line. You see private property and the state as distinct, the original anarchists didn't. Abolish private property, abolish the state. Private property to them being one of the most odious aspects of the state.

The medieval Irish and Icelanders saw the law and the kings as distinct, you see law and the state as one uniform thing - the state IS law. To separate the two is, in the minds of most today, to separate water from wet.

And so you see religion and group identity as distinct; well, that's a way to look at it.

## **Monotheism**

Yaweh was originally just another patron diety. He was the God of the Hebrews. Only when the Hebrews left Egypt did they decide that Yaweh was the one and only God.

Then came Jesus, and he had a "new covenant", and what started as a Jewish reform became a universal religion; the one and only religion delivered by the one and only God.

And so Peter, one of Jesus' disciples, went to Antioch and more importantly, Rome, and founded the Universal Church, or in latin, the "Catholic" Church.

And the success of the Universal Church should not be poo-pooed. And there are plenty of places you can read about the Catholic Church.

But there were always divisions. Regional differences within what was on paper the same religion and the same organization running it, and the West, East and Orthodox divide.

The first schism was when the churches of Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem and Constantinople split off from the church of Rome. Both the Church of Rome and the Eastern Churches called themselves the one true Christianity, but the church of Rome is called "Catholic", and the Church of Constantinople is called "Eastern Orthodox".

Later still, at the Council of Chalcedon, the Churches of Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria split off from the church of Constantinople. This is commonly referred to as the "Oriental Orthodox" Church. They were the brown people. They're Muslims today.

So the Catholic Church had the "Western Europeans", the Eastern Orthodox had what are today called Turks, Greeks, people of the Caucasus and Slavs - the Slavs being less important back then. And the Oriental Orthodox had the Levant, Mesopotamia, Egypt and North Africa.

Eventually the lands of the Oriental Orthodox Church became a totally different religion, Islam, through conversion and conquest.

For all history following the fall of the Roman Empire, the areas of Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Romania were a sort of "transition zone" between "the west" and the civilizations of the Oriental Caucasians. The Ottoman Empire exemplified this, a country that wasn't quite European, but well ahead of the Orient.

In terms of religion, it was also a transition zone.

Ultimately Islam's expansion was checked by geography. While the Ottoman Empire, an Islamic empire, pushed all the way to the city of Vienna in Austria, they weren't able to convert many of the peoples in the Balkans to Islam; a few Serbs, and the majority in Albania and Bosnia. The rest remained Eastern Orthodox despite Ottoman rule.

Coincidental with the invention of the printing press and population growth of Europe north of the Mediterranean, was their schism with the Church of Rome known as the "Protestant Reformation".

As a rule, more "nordic" peoples went protestant, with the more "Mediterranid" peoples remaining Catholic. Exceptions being the Irish, for whom being Catholic had to do with having a distinct identity from the English, and the Polish, for whom being Catholic had to do with having a distinct identity from the Eastern Orthodox Russians and later the Protestant Germans.

Latin America, being around 40% Mediterranean by admixture, is overwhelmingly Catholic among theists. [The two most Catholic countries in Latin America are #1 Paraguay, and #2 Mexico,](#) which is 81% Catholic, compared to 55% for US Hispanics and 50% for Guatemala. In addition, Catholicism in Mexico has been more resilient to decline than in the rest of Latin America, and in my opinion this is due to Catholicism being part of a Mexican identity distinction with the more protestant United States. Other Latin American countries don't share a border with and didn't fight two major multi-year long wars against the United States.

I will also proclaim with confidence that were you to investigate African Christianity, even those who call themselves "Catholics" and "Lutherans", you will find radical deviations from how European Catholics and Lutherans practice it. Same with African Islam.

East Asians I would predict to be doctrinaire if Christian; and if they wanted to ethnically distinguish themselves from white Europeans, they would just not be Christians, which is what most of them do.

So, religion started as something tied to clans and groups. Then came the attempts at universal religions. Most failed, but a few succeeded past any secular empire, and eventually the montheisms crack-up, back along group lines. The cracks exist early, and only grow with time.

The success and persistence of the Catholic Church is legendary. But even they couldn't hold back the ethnic crack-up forever. It always comes. In their case 1,500 years, but it came. Smaller cracks before then.

## **The Race of Islam**

George Galloway actually hit upon some reality when he said that while Islam isn't technically a biological race, Muslims tend to be browner. Opponents of Islam tend to be white, and the Muslims tend to be brown. Looks like a proxy race... conflict, to me.

But then what about anti-Jewism, or "anti-semitism"? Is that opposition to a religion, or what?

Another thing that goes together is Christianity in the United States and "waving the murican flag". Atheists tend to be less nationalistic, or maybe it's more appropriate to say that people who are less nationalistic become atheists.

Here's another thing; there's a growing set of "atheists" who don't talk about atheism, who don't signal hard against Christianity. They support Trump. They just happen to not believe in God. What is this? Why is this different from the other class of atheists who are overwhelmingly "liberal" and against group identity?

## **A Whole New Game?**

So along come the anarchists and German Historical School, who greatly influenced Karl Marx. The anarchists on antagonistic classes and opposition to private property, and the Historicists on their belief that "economic law" was mostly a function of the psychology and cultural conditioning of people to value things. Put em together and you have a big bag of shit.

Convincing poor people that they were put upon and exploited was, predictably, very easy to do. What was more difficult to do was convince them that the Russian or the German was just like him, and to convince him to work 10 hours a day with as much vigor as if his pay or job security depended on it, even though it didn't at all.

But what is telling is that, even in the USSR, up to the very end, there was a Ukranian Communist Party, a Georgian Communist Party, an Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Estonian, Moldovan... they never went away.

After 46 years of Communist education, the next generation of Poles, Hungarians and Romanians in the Warsaw Pact countries were still just as eager to break off from Soviet rule as when they started.

Sure, they were probably convinced of a few "socialist" sentiments, but not to end their group identity.

China, with the help of the Soviet Union handing over Manchuria to Mao, became "communist". But Mao eventually wanted to somehow separate China from Russia. For China to "chart its own path".

To the rational observer - what the hell could that possibly mean? Nothing in substance, except that China was not Russia. Originally, North Korea was a "communist" country, but, like China, they never eschewed their ethnic identity. Now, the state doctrine of Juche has no reference to Marx or Marxism.

The "Communism" in Vietnam, who have a long history of antagonism with China, is called "Ho Chi Minh Thought", and is meant to be a philosophy specifically relevant to Vietnam.

When talking about the Soviet Union during the Cold War, people in the United States would regularly go back and forth between "Soviets" and "Communists" and "Russians". Russians / Communists. Was the US competing against the religion of Marxism or the people of Russia? Anti-communist or anti-Russian?

I dunno, is an antisemite against the Jewish religion or Jewish people? Is an "Islamophobe" against the religion or against Oriental Caucasians? Is someone who hates "conservatism" really that animated about 10% lower taxes, or does he just hate a certain kind of rural white person, especially if they are "southern"?



This happens all the time, when organizations go around and swap the positions of the candidates. Examples being Obama and Romney, and Obama and McCain. And the black voters said they supported Romney's positions on everything when they were assigned to Obama. Same thing happened with Trump vs. Hillary; [a majority of Republicans will support single-payer healthcare](#) when they are told Trump supports it.

And I have to ask, how much more intense do you want the universal one-world brainwashing to be? How hard core and how long does it have to be to finally create the nation-less man?

## **Monotheism and Monoideologism**

Conservative whites will say "I don't think along racial lines, I'm purely about values and beliefs and..." whatever. Whites who move out of areas because they become too "urban" or have "bad schools" will also tell you "race has nothing to do with it".

And no doubt a bunch of them believe to themselves that it's not about race, damn the correlations.

But look at the behavior of all people, including white people, in their history; it's always groupish, against other Europeans and certainly against non-Europeans.

You have these crazy people running around saying they're going to make identity politics gone, the world will be post-racial, post-ethnic, but only after the grievances of the wronged groups are redressed. Of course that is never defined, and can never be satisfied. The reality is that these whites are just dupes for a grievance narrative, just as they were dupes for the communists.

God damn, people form groups around stupid sports teams, around animes, around video game systems. They form around political parties when they don't have a clue what the party even says! And white people, even after being gaslight into thinking that "racism" is just this horrific demonic evil responsible for all the bad things, STILL self-segregate and commute two hours a day just to avoid blacks.

But oh yes, we're going to end group identity and group conflict. I'll set my watch to never. The dirty little secret is that we're pretty close to the high-water mark of "post-racialism".

Meanwhile these universalist whites can only win elections about half the time by aligning with blacks and hispanics who are all about group identity, and who are on track to make up over half of the Democrat Party as they slide into irrelevance, and the main opposition is the implicitly white Republican Party. It used to be that the democrats were universalist whites with some black and hispanic support; now the universalist whites are clearly the junior partner in the democrat coalition.

Their thinking may constitute half the Democrat Party right now, that's debateable. But that segment is falling as it becomes more and only about race, first implicitly, then explicitly. North Korea was "communist", then they deviated in doctrine (implicit rejection of universal communism), then explicitly removed any reference to communism.

And once it's no longer white people in the Democrat party, the total racial nature of US and soon continental European politics, which it was all along, will become manifest. It'll be a lot harder to believe when it's no longer white faces promoting black and brown grievance narratives.

You think white nationalism is a million miles away? It's right there, it's always been there, and turning the implicit explicit is like crossing the street. You will be shocked at how quick it happens.

A lot of high IQs like to separate race and ideology, but that's not how this is going to go. That's never how this goes.

# The Heritability of Political Views

## **The Iron Law of Heritability**

From [Thomas Bouchard 2004](#):

*"As Rutter (2002) noted, 'Any dispassionate reading of the evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that genetic factors play a substantial role in the origins of individual differences with respect to all psychological traits, both normal and abnormal' (p. 2). Put concisely, all psychological traits are heritable."*

Bouchard then points to the general heritabilities of commonly used psychological traits:

**TABLE 1**

*Estimates of Broad Heritability and Shared Environmental Influence and Indications of Nonadditive Genetic Effects and Sex Differences in Heritability for Representative Psychological Traits*

Trait	Heritability	Nonadditive genetic effect	Shared environmental effect	Sex differences in heritability
Personality (adult samples)				
Big Five				
Extraversion	.54	Yes	No	Perhaps
Agreeableness (aggression)	.42	Yes	No	Probably not
Conscientiousness	.49	Yes	No	Probably not
Neuroticism	.48	Yes	No	No
Openness	.57	Yes	No	Probably not
Big Three				
Positive emotionality	.50	Yes	No	No
Negative emotionality	.44	Yes	No	No
Constraint	.52	Yes	No	No
Intelligence				
By age in Dutch cross-sectional twin data				
Age 5	.22	No	.54	No
Age 7	.40	No	.29	No
Age 10	.54	No	.26	No
Age 12	.85	No	No	No
Age 16	.62	No	No	No
Age 18	.82	No	No	No
Age 26	.88	No	No	No
Age 50	.85	No	No	No
In old age (> 75 years old)	.54-.62	Not tested	No	No
Psychological interests				
Realistic	.36	Yes	.12	NA
Investigative	.36	Yes	.10	NA
Artistic	.39	Yes	.12	NA
Social	.37	Yes	.08	NA
Enterprising	.31	Yes	.11	NA
Conventional	.38	Yes	.11	NA
Psychiatric illnesses (liability estimates)				
Schizophrenia	.80	No	No	No
Major depression	.37	No	No	Mixed findings
Panic disorder	.30-.40	No	No	No
Generalized anxiety disorder	.30	No	Small female only	No
Phobias	.20-.40	No	No	No
Alcoholism	.50-.60	No	Yes	Mixed findings
Antisocial behavior				
Children	.46	No	.20	No
Adolescents	.43	No	.16	No
Adults	.41	No	.09	No
Social attitudes				
Conservatism				
Under age 20 years	.00	NR	Yes	NR
Over age 20 years	.45-.65	Yes	Yes in females	Yes
Right-wing authoritarianism (adults)	.50-.64	No	.00-.16	NA
Religiousness				
16-year-olds	.11-.22	No	.45-.60	Yes
Adults	.30-.45	No	.20-.40	Not clear
Specific religion	Near zero	NR	NA	NR

Note. NA = not available; NR = not relevant.

I call this "The Iron Law of Heritability", though this is not a commonly used term. It is meant as a label for the common understanding among psychologists that all general psychological traits are to some degree heritable. Note I use "iron", not some sort of depleted uranium composite. Iron can bend and break, but it's difficult.

So when we explore any kind of psychological variation, the question is not "is that variation down to genetics", the question is "HOW MUCH of the variation we see is down to genetics", because it is always going to be some.

### **Heritability of Political Views Within the United States**

There is a general misunderstanding of how twin studies are done. The common conception of twin studies is that identical twins are separated at birth, and then you see how similar they are in various traits when they grow up in different environments.

This has the obvious problem in that the range of environments of adopted twins may not reflect the range of environments for the whole population.

Another, better, way to do twin studies is simply to compare identical and non-identical twins reared in the same environment. Non-identical twins share roughly 50% of their genes + additional similarity from assortive mating, whereas identical twins share almost 100% of their genes.

So instead of controlling for genes and looking at the impact of environmental variation, twin studies can control for environment and look at the impact of an increase in genetic similarity.

For example, IQ scores. What they do is look at how similar the IQs of non-identical twins are, and then compared that to how much MORE similar the IQs of identical twins are; to see how much an impact an increase of 50% genetic similarity has.


For example, if the IQs of non-identical twins correlate with each other at 0.5, and the IQs of identical twins correlate at 0.8, then that implies the general heritability of IQ in the populations examined is 0.6, or 60%. This is because a 50% increase in genetic similarity produced a 30% increase in IQ similarity.

But because of assortive mating, this is going to be an underestimate, because couples are not randomly selected; couples tend to be more genetically similar to each other than they are to the general population.

If, for example, non-identical twins aren't 50% genetically similar, but are 60% genetically similar, then identical twins are only going to be 40% more similar than non-identical twins. If non-identical twins were 60% genetically similar in the previous example, then the estimated heritability of IQ would be 75% instead of 60% - this is because the jump from non-identical to identical is only 40% more genetic similarity this time, and this 40% increase produces a 30% increase in IQ score similarity. And  $0.3 / 0.4$  is 0.75.

But then there is another problem, which is that assortive mating is based on traits in a person, not their genes. And so lets say non-identical twins are 55% genetically similar across the whole genome; well, for genes relevant to IQ, they may be 70 % genetically similar. And so in this case, identical twins only represent a 30% increase in genetic similarity, but produce a 30% increase in similarity of IQ scores, which would mean the real heritability of IQ in this population is 100%.


That digression aside, if we just go with the most basic and nurture-friendly approach, assuming a non-identical twins have 50% genetic similarity, and identical twins have 100% similarity, we find in most studies the heritability of "political views" to be around 0.4:



But keep in mind that this "0.4 heritability of political views" is like says "there is a 15 point IQ gap between blacks and whites". The heritability of political views increases with age, and there's no industry-standard age when studies on the heritability of political views start asking.

According to a Virginia Twin study, the heritability of political views is [around 0.57 by age 50](#):

**FIGURE 6 ACE Variance Components Estimates (Full Model) for Liberalism-Conservatism by Age Cohort**



Note: MZ pairs and DZ pairs are pooled across sex  
 Source: Adult twins, Virginia 30K.

The heritability of political views also varies by issue. [A study on Swedish twins](#), which had 2,338 identical twins and 4,868 non-identical twins, found that the heritability of immigration views was higher than any other issue:

Heritability of Political Opinions in Swedish Twins

Item	Heritability Estimate
Immigration Opinions	0.604
Behavioral Inhibition	0.458
Foreign Policy Opinions	0.417
Opinion on Feminism	0.414
Environmentalism	0.377
Economic Policy	0.328
Locus of Control	0.281
Vote Choice	0.251
Left vs. Right Self-Placement	0.154

This was also found back in [a 2001 study which looked at heritability of various psychological traits](#). Views on immigration had a heritability of 0.46, the second highest heritability of any political item, and was the third most heritable out of thirty psychological items, behind opinion on the death penalty and enjoyment of roller coaster rides.

And remember, this is assuming a genetic similarity of non-identical twins of 0.5, when it could be higher across the whole genome, and higher still for those genes associated with

psychological traits, which would mean that the increase in psychology-relevant genetic similarity you get going from non-identical to identical twins is probably less than 50%, and so all these heritabilities from all of these studies would be higher.

### Molecular Genetic Data


Regarding group differences, researchers are starting to find some genes associated with social sensitivity and collectivism, and how those genes differ by race.

[A 2010 paper by Way and Lieberman](#) looked at country differences in allele frequencies two gene locations: A118G and MAOA-uVNTR, both of which have been independently found to correlate with social sensitivity WITHIN populations. For example, a Swede with the "G" allele at the gene location A118G is more sensitive to social pressure than a Swede with a different allele.

(You need to within-group validate the gene otherwise you'll just have correlations with genes between groups, which could be coincidental. I.e. - if Japan has any purely cultural difference with Europeans, AND some genetic difference with Europeans, even if that genetic difference has zero causal impact on the cultural difference, the cultural difference will correlate with the genetic difference. This is why they must be validated WITHIN populations before comparisons between populations are made.)


They also used a combination of indexes of collectivism and individualism in from four databases, and plotted those results with allele frequency data.

Way and Lieberman's results for A118G




Way and Lieberman's results for MAOA-uVNTR






[Chiao and Blizinsky did the same thing in 2009](#) with the location 5-HTTLPR, plotting population differences between populations in the proportion with the "S" allele with individualism and collectivism in those countries:



Out of curiosity, I plotted Chiao and Blizinsky's numbers by country with country results from a [Pew Survey](#) results on various free speech questions:


First the proportion of percentage of people who support the right to criticize government and the percentage of the population with the "S" variant of the 5-HTTLPR gene:

S allele% and support for free speech (criticize government)




Next is the right to criticize one's own religion:

S allele% and support for free speech (offensive to own religion)



And then there is views on the right to say things that are "offensive" to "minorities":

S allele% and support for free speech (mean to "minorities")



Of course we don't know if "speech offensive to minorities" means the same thing in China as it does in Germany. For example, I have personal experience of people who support banning "hate speech" but don't support banning sites like The Alternative Hypothesis.

Even though there is plenty on this site that "minorities" will be offended by. I suspect a typical Chinaman who opposes "hate speech" would be against banning this site, however a German who similarly says he is "against hate speech" would be more likely to support banning this site.

So if there is a bit of fuzziness between countries as to what these questions are actually asking, that will dampen any correlation because the effect of different countries having slightly different conceptions of what the questions are asking would be to introduce randomness.

That said, we still see a meaningful correlation between frequency of the "S" allele and various free speech issues. If you think these correlations are weak, remember that [the correlation between an individual parent and their child's height is about 0.45](#). And also keep in mind that these are just individual genes.

It's also important to know that support for laws that ban speech critical of "minorities" is something that distinguishes the first and the third world. If you click above the links and look into the data, you will see that Latin American countries are about as supportive of free speech as European countries, even though ["hispanics" in the United States are less supportive of free speech than European-Americans are](#). However, one of the distinguishing traits between the first and the third world is that the third world is more likely to support laws that prohibit speech "offensive" to "minorities", and there are internally-validated genetic correlates that explain

part of this. Obviously we have a long way to go to show the full extent of genetic causation, but it can't just be hand-waved away as totally environmental.

You may find instances where the correlations between allele frequencies and a given trait add up to more than 1. This just means that "genes for" that trait tend to evolve together in sets. I.e. the G allele of A118G probably has its own independent effect, but its presence also indicates that you probably have other alleles that CAUSE an individual to be more collectivist within a given environment. And a .4 correlation between that G allele and collectivism takes into account both the direct effects of that single allele, AND the effects of other alleles that a person who has the G allele also tends to have.

But the point is that the twin studies find heritability estimates of around 40% for political views in general, and slightly above 50% for views on immigration.

### **Environment ain't all it's cracked up to be**

Now, when someone says "X trait is 50% heritable", they're not only referring just to a specific environmental range, but the "non-heritable" or "environmental" proportion of the variance may not mean what you think it means.

For example, [a twin study from 2011](#) found the heritability of independent reading to be 0.62 at age 10 and 0.55 at age 11.

There have also been studies on the heritability of diet. For example, this study here estimated the heritability of diet to be 0.32.

However, that's just an aggregate. [Another study found](#) for example the heritability in men of how many potatoes you eat was 0.68, what we call vegetables 0.24 heritable, red meat 0.34, etc. If you want to see the complete breakdown, you can look through the tables in that study.

Exercise and sports participation also have high substantial heritabilities. [This study](#) put the heritability of voluntary non-sports exercise at 0.63 for males and 0.32 for females, and the heritability of sports exercise at 0.684 for males and 0.398 for females.

This replicated [an older study](#) that found the heritability of sports exercise at 0.83 for males and 0.35 for females, and non-sports exercise at 0.62 for males and 0.29 for females. [This study](#) gave an overall heritability of exercise of 0.49.

Intuitively, it seems that "independent reading" would be a good proxy for the intellectual environment one creates for themselves. Which is to say that, in the United States at age 10 and 11, the heritability of a person's intellectual environment is about 50% to 60%?

The next thing to note is the difference between "shared" and "unshared" environment. The term "shared environment", in the context of twin studies, is the environment that twins share with each other as a result of being in the family they are in.

In short, "shared" environment is the environment that was given to you, while "unshared" environment is the environment you create.

Which then calls into question what "environmental" really means. Let me give two examples: one involving strength training and the other involving vocabulary.

1. Bob and Bill, in an untrained state, lift almost exactly the same amount of weights in any lift. However Bob, for genetic reasons, goes to the gym, works out and builds muscles. Bill doesn't. Thus there develops a gap in strength and muscle mass between Bob and Bill. So is the difference in muscle mass and strength between Bob and Bill due to a genetic or

environmental difference? Well, it's kind of environmental, but the environmental difference stemmed from the genetic difference.

2. The same thing could happen with independent reading; Bob and Bill, if they both read the same amount, would have the same active vocabulary. But Bill, for genetic reasons, does independent reading, and thus has a more active vocabulary.

So when someone says the heritability of a trait is 0.5, and the rest is down to "environment", unless otherwise specified, they are almost always talking about direct heritability only.

But that "environment" proportion is itself always a function of genetic variation to some degree. And this is important when getting into the next part of this series on civilizational tendencies.

# Holisis

My views on race differences did not come from some heavy-handed indoctrination from anyone. It came from looking at atlases and tables. I love tables and lists, when I'm bored I'll make lists out of things just for fun.

Murray Rothbard, when reading about regulatory policies of the US Federal Government, said that he didn't set out to find some conspiracy - but that the conspiracies just popped right out at him. Seeing these conspiracies between industry and government was not a product of some analysis on Rothbard's part at first. It was a holisis, or an immediate piecing together of a narrative based on a scattershot of information. And here I'm going to try to convey in a single article the "holisis" of information I slowly internalized over a 2 year period.

This is how it starts. Then you dig deeper and usually confirm the holisis, sometimes you don't. Sometimes you stick to your initial impressions long past the point that any reasonable person would have changed his mind.

And so with race differences, when you look at the global data, and then "inequality" within white countries, it isn't some grand effort or bigotry to "just assume genetics". It's that a genetic difference between the races is just an explanation that "pops out at you", it's not "assumed" in the colloquial sense but something you unavoidably run into. To the contrary, once exposed to the full array of data, it takes tremendous effort to NOT see the systematic race differences; such differences most easily explained by genetic differences, and so that becomes the operational position.

## Family and Race

[In the previous article in this series](#) I made a distinction between shared ("unchosen") and unshared ("chosen") environment.

But lets go out even further; even the proportion of the environment that you had zero personal choice in, the one directly given to you by your parents - well, what proportion of your genes do you share with your parents? Compared to a background relatedness of zero, half.

Your parenting is influenced by the traits of your parents, who you share a quarter of your genes with, and other family members, who you share varying proportions of your genes with.


But of course there's a broader environment beyond that - the broader economic context of the country and region that you are in.

You can get more complex than this, but lets use race, because that's what I know a little bit about. Hammer - nail? Perhaps, but I can't help it.

As the late Henry Harpending showed, [Fst values function as an inverse kinship coefficient times two](#).

So you have a kinship coefficient of 0.5 with your parents, assuming a background relatedness to everyone else of zero. However, if you took other Europeans as the background population, set that kinship to zero, then your kinship with Africans would be -0.32, i.e. a negative value. But the European-African gap is one of the biggest race gaps, lets say the average Fst distance is .125, which would give us a kinship of -0.25 with "other races" in the aggregate.

Putting this number on top of other relations, we can come up with a rough visualization of the relatedness you have with the people who influence your beliefs compared to your relatedness with the rest of humanity:




This is assuming that 90% of your contacts are of the same race as you.

So just adding these up, one may consider a "rough and ready" guesstimate for the heritability of your unchosen political environment to be about 44.9%. And a "rough and ready" guesstimate for chosen political environment to be about 55% (based on the heritability of independent reading mentioned in [the previous article in this series](#)).

Based on twin studies covered in the previous article, the direct heritability of political views in the United States is around 0.4, and if the heritability of the environment is about 0.5, this would give us a direct and indirect heritability of political views of about 0.7 (factoring in that the environmentality, which explains 60% of the variance, is itself about 50% heritable).

But this is assuming that race only has a 25% of a kind of "phenotypic relevance" to the variance in political views, when there is reason to believe it is higher. And that is that [several genes associated with brain development show higher levels of population \(race\) differentiation than genes associated with skin pigmentation](#):





And yes, "pigmentation" does refer to skin pigmentation in this paper, as can be seen in reference 14 in that paper. So while total population differentiation may only be the equivalent of an "anti-kinship" of -0.25 on average, it's probably more meaningful than that would seem to imply. Because across the genome, the races have very small differences at any given location, in fact statistically zero at a majority of locations.

But at locations relevant to skin color, the differences are big enough to be nearly typological, i.e. aside from unique conditions like albinism, there are basically zero people indigenous from the Congo who have lighter skin than an indigenous Swede.

And there are at least SOME genes associated with neuron development that show greater population differentiation than skin color. And that Fst distance of 0.125, roughly the distance between Europeans and another race, takes into account a whole swathe of the genome with basically zero racial variation, even though there are those segments with massive, almost typological variation between the races.


And, [as shown in the previous article](#), some genes associated with variation in collectivism and social sensitivity have large, almost typological racial differences, despite the average across the genome being 0.125.

## **Free Speech**

Support for free speech is a very European thing, and possibly Amerindian thing. Pew did a survey of multiple countries, and found on every question, European countries, and the United States and Canada, had some of [the highest support for free speech](#):

## Americans, Europeans and Latin Americans Most Supportive of Free Expression

*Free expression index\**



\*Support for free expression is measured using an eight-item index ranging from 0-8, with 8 representing the most supportive of free expression. Respondents were coded as 0 or 1 for each of the eight questions, where 1 indicates support for allowing free speech or press in a particular situation and 0 indicates support for government restrictions on free expression in some circumstances. Of the questions included in the index, five questions ask about free speech and three questions ask about free press. The mean score for each country is used in this analysis. Malaysia not included in index. (See Appendix A for more details.)

Source: Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey. Q30a-e & Q31a-c.


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An interesting fact here is that Latin Americans on surveys say they support more free speech than Europeans do. However, if we look at two press freedom indexes, we see that, at least according to these indexes, they have less press freedom than in European countries:

From the [Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index](#):

# World press freedom visualised

Countries ranked by level of press freedom in 2016




Sources: Reporters Without Borders,  
World Press Freedom Index



INDEPENDENT



We can also look at a similar index called the [Freedom House Press Freedom Index](#):




Like with the Reporters Without Borders index, Freedom House found that Latin America has a less free press than North America and Western Europe, despite the Pew Survey results suggesting Latin Americans support a free press about the same as Western Europeans do.

This is evidence for the idea that hispanic, along with black, oriental and east asian voting is weighted toward "the gibbs", or free stuff given to them by the government. And so even though they may support free speech in the abstract, when it comes to voting, all that matters is which politician they think is going to give them the most free stuff. The result being that issues such as free speech and regulatory burden never get dealt with, and the "special interests", "lobbyists", "deep state" or whatever you want to call it are able to just pile on more crap and

there's no party that is motivated to deal with it, because the parties are just trying to get votes by promising free stuff.

But we can also open the lid and look within the United States, and see that Africans and Latin Americans living inside the United States will supporting silencing something so long as it is labeled "hate speech":




Now part of this could be down to non-Europeans in the United States perceiving themselves as "minorities", whereas in their own countries they aren't "minorities".

But that is why the global data is important, because blacks aren't a minority in Ethiopia, and they oppose free speech there too.

We also see the same pattern in Britain, where non-Europeans are more likely to support banning speech that "offends":

## SUPPORT FREE SPEECH EVEN IF IT OFFENDS



Source: Saggar et al/MAC 2012

One may chalk up the opposition to free speech among Arabs as being an "environmental" impact of Islam. But of course, if Europeans opposed free speech and were hyper-religious, where would that "environment" in Europe come from? In that situation, would we say that the Catholic Church was the environmental impact that promoted anti-free speech norms in Western Europe?

## Conformity

Earlier on in this article, I showed genetic data on genes associated with social sensitivity. But there was also a [study by Taylor Feenstra](#) that measured opinion conformity in response to a perceived contrary consensus using students at William and Mary.

People were given a 100 question questionnaire on various topics, and those answers were recorded.

They were then put into "discussion groups", but the other people in those groups weren't other subjects like them, but were people pretending to be random subjects, they were

actually confederates of the experiment who were there simply to disagree with the real subject.

After the "discussion group", the real subjects were then asked to re-answer the questions on the questionnaire.

The degree to which the subjects changed their answers on this second survey in response to the "discussion group" was labeled their "conformity".

The degree to which the subjects either didn't say anything, or publicly stated things in the discussion group that were contrary to what they said when they took the survey the SECOND time was labeled "censorship".

I.e. - if a person publicly agreed with the discussion group, but later when taking the questionnaire the second time held fast to their original opinions, that was called censorship. If they outright changed their responses toward the direction of the "discussion group", that was conformity.

On average, whites in the experiment conformed 54.6% as much as the non-whites, but they censored 77% as much.

#### Opinion Conformity Following Discussion Groups (Feenstra 2014)




Figure 3: Mean frequency of conformity by race. Lines represent one standard error.




Figure 4: Mean frequency of conformity by race. Lines represent one standard error.

#### (Self) Censorship by Race (Freenstra 2014)




Figure 5: Mean frequency of censorship by race. Lines represent one standard error.




Figure 6: Mean degree of censorship by race. Lines represent one standard error.


Now this result is profound, and we would expect the difference to be even bigger among the general population, as the subjects in this experiment were all William and Mary students; and so we would expect a black and a white at William and Mary to be more psychologically similar than two randomly selected white and black people.

Because even with [affirmative action](#), the cognitive differences between the races are going to be smaller at any given university than it is among the general population.

Another indicator of race and conformity would be belief in significant man-made global warming, and on that, as one would expect, [non-whites are more likely to believe this than whites](#):

### Hispanics More Likely than Whites to Say Humans Have Warmed the Planet

% of U.S. adults saying ...



Note: Whites and blacks include only non-Hispanics; Hispanics are of any race. Those saying "don't know" are not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey, Aug. 15-25, 2014

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Whites disbelieve in human-caused global warming 53-44%, while blacks believe in it 56-43%, and hispanics believe in it 70-30%.



It's also interesting to note that blacks and hispanics in the United States are [more likely to trust the government than whites are](#):

### Modest age and education differences in trust in government


*Trust the federal government to do what is right ...*

	Always/ Most of the time %	Only some of the time %	(VOL.) Never %	DK %
Total	19	67	13	1=100
White	15	69	15	1=100
Black	23	66	11	1=100
Hispanic	28	63	6	2=100
18-29	27	63	9	1=100
30-49	19	67	13	1=100
50-64	15	67	17	1=100
65+	15	70	13	2=100
Post grad	23	68	8	1=100
College degree	19	70	10	1=100
Some college	18	66	15	1=100
HS or less	19	66	14	1=100
Republican/Lean Rep	11	71	18	1=100
Conservative	9	70	20	*=100
Mod/Lib	14	72	14	*=100
Democrat/Lean Dem	26	65	7	1=100
Cons/Mod	25	67	7	1=100
Liberal	28	64	7	1=100
<i>Among Rep/Lean Rep</i>				
Politically engaged (48%)	6	71	22	1=100
Less engaged (52%)	15	70	15	*=100
<i>Among Dem/Lean Dem</i>				
Politically engaged (34%)	27	65	7	2=100
Less engaged (66%)	26	65	7	1=100

Survey conducted Aug. 27-Oct. 4, 2015. Q15. Whites and blacks include only those who are not Hispanic; Hispanics are of any race. Figures may not add to 100% because of rounding.

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In the United Kingdom, [non-whites have more faith in parliament than whites do](#):




By comparison, whites [have higher IQs](#) and [are more likely to believe in evolution](#).

Now - question time: if you were some shadowy elite trying to secretly rule the world, who would you be trying to increase the political power of?


## **Big Government / Small Government**

As detailed elsewhere on the Alternative Hypothesis, there are [big differences between the races in terms of support for the size of government](#).

**Would you prefer a smaller government with fewer services or a bigger government with more services?**



We can also see that there appears to be a relation between support for big government when in the United States, and scores on the [Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom](#) for the countries the racial groups came from:



As also as detailed on this site, one of the most important factors in the index of economic freedom is overregulation and corruption. And the truth is that blacks and hispanics probably aren't in favor of oceans of regulations, and they're not in favor of courts being arbitrary and able to shut people down for trivial reasons and fuzzy law.

I ran a correlation between the [percent white a state was in 2012](#) and their fiscal and regulatory freedom in the [CATO "Freedom in 50 states" index](#) from 2016. I ran a logarithmic correlation and got a correlation of 0.321. I was surprised it was as high as this, given the phenomena of whites in states such as Vermont and Maine voting heavily Democrat, while heavily black southern states voting Republican due to white bloc-voting.

And there is a negative impact on the budget that comes from voting for these things, [as detailed here](#).

How this manifests politically is support for political parties that most closely resemble the government policies in third (and second) world countries.

To repeat, someone can say that this correspondence is a function of "culture", but "culture" doesn't just come out of the sky. These are beliefs and ways that real people of real biology have. I'm not to say that the variation is 100% down to direct and indirect genetic effects. The scores of Belarus and Ukraine, and possibly Russia, may just be, at least in part, the long tail of a fluke historical event in October 1917. Cuba and Argentina probably wouldn't score super-high on this index if not for certain events that led to authoritarian leaders being able to quickly take power.

In East Asia we see an exception, with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan scoring higher than China, North Korea and Vietnam. But even that exception seems to prove the rule, as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were all occupied by the United States and had at their outset governments installed by the United States. Whereas the East Asian, under his own devices, created countries that score lower on this index.

One counter could be the rise of Communism in China, which could be considered a "historical fluke" just as communism in Russia, and was in fact made possible by the Soviet Union, creating Maoist China. Then Maoist China made possible North Korea and, as much as the Vietnamese wouldn't want to admit it, "communist" Vietnam. However, prior to the rise of Communism in China, China would probably be considered "less free" than western Europe - but then again, so was Russia. So perhaps the rise of "communism" among Russians (and the Balkans) and among the East Asians, was, even if traceable to an environmental spark, needed some underlying genetic traits to get the fire going.


And certainly Eastern and Western Europeans are genetically distinguishable and there are differences in breeding patterns along the [Hajnal Line](#) that may have selected for different traits in Eastern and Western Europeans. And so Eastern Europeans being "White European" in appearance but of the old world in behavioral pattern.

## **Voting in Canada and UK**

The ways in which racial groups vote in the United States has been well documented on this site [here](#) and [here](#).

In the UK, [third world peoples tend to vote for "Labour"](#):

# Vote by ethnic background



Like in the United States, we see the blacks leading the way in third-world party support.

I was not able to find exit poll data by race in recent Canadian elections, but I was able to find some things that tell us that it is much the same story in Canada as in the US and UK. First is the fact that [of the 47 "visible minorities" in Canada's Parliament, 39 are part of the "Liberal Party"](#). Muslims in Canada in 2015 [voted Liberal 65% of the time](#), NDP 10% of the time, Conservative 2% of the time, other party 2% of the time, and the rest didn't vote.

The site "multicultural meanderings" [analyzed the 33 ridings \(similar to house districts\) with 50%+ "visible minorities"](#). And it found that the Liberal Party won 30 of the 33 seats, NDP won 1 seat, and the Conservatives won 2.

France, Germany and Sweden don't have racial data.


## Grievance Galore

Within Africa itself, 35% of Nigerians and 53% of Kenyans [say that ethnic discrimination is a significant barrier to them having a job](#):

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## Lack of connections is viewed as major obstacle to employment

\_\_\_ is a very important reason why many people in our country do not have jobs



\*In Kenya and Nigeria, asked "ethnicity." In South Africa, asked "race."

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q67a-e.


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Additionally, in Kenya, about the same proportion [said they would be willing to take political action to deal with ethnic discrimination](#) as would be willing to deal with government corruption:

## High reported likelihood of political activity across key African countries

*Likely to take political action, such as contact an elected official or participate in a demonstration, on ...*



\*Results for South Africa not included due to administrative error.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey. Q94a-f.

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Similar numbers exist in South Africa. However, most people have a big story in their minds about apartheid, [a story that is almost entirely wrong](#). In reality, South Africa is just another data point in the general trend. Because they have white people, they create a story of ethnic




grievance surrounding the white population. In Nigeria, the Igbo and Yoruba craft grievance narratives around what exists in Nigeria.

In Zimbabwe, while [the anti-white racial hatred](#) is the stuff of legend, less known is that the Ndebele, a minority ethnicity, apparently [receive less land and less food aid per-capita](#) in Zimbabwe than the dominant Shona tribe does. This is something I predicted: as whites flee Africa, and the [period of colonialism](#) becomes more and more distant, the Africans will return to grievance narratives surrounding other black tribes.

Or maybe the [Chinese](#) in some cases, [as more Chinese enter Africa](#) and exist as salient entities to become a new focal point of grievance. Also [East Asians will become "racist"](#) within their own countries as well.

The website ["Peoples Under Threat"](#) documents minority groups around the world facing various forms of threats - economic marginalization, physical attacks, political marginalization - and created this map of where they think the big oppressions are going on worldwide:

### **Degree to Which "Minorities" are Under Threat Around the World According to the Website "Peoples Under Threat"**



As always, these images should be taken with a grain of salt. It is fashionable to pile on Russia today and to turn a blind eye to the darling of integrationism South Africa. But kudos to this organization for NOT falling for the BS in the United States. I'm skeptical about India, given that it is such a large and diverse country that there's bound to be some ethnic oppression going on, even if it's accidental.

In Haiti, according to [an article from the Dominican Times](#) which references a Gallup poll that I cannot validate, 54.6% of Dominicans say Haitians face discrimination.

Humorously, there has been much media buzz about [the Ethiopian migrants to Israel](#). So the state of Israel chose to take in people from a country that rates dark orange on this map of tribal / ethnic conflict, and is then surprised to find that these people find a way to "be oppressed", get media sympathy for their oppressions, and do big demonstrations in Israel about how unfairly they are being treated. They have learned very quickly to use the language of "justice", "rights" and "racism".

Strangely, none of them are trying to go back to Ethiopia.

So what happens in White European countries when they bring in non-Europeans? The answer, of course, just like everywhere else, is grievance.

In Finland, you get mainstream publications talking about how [Finland is a racist country](#), how [66% of Finns say Finland is a "racist" country](#), how anti-discrimination laws are necessary, and [big rallies to battle all of the "racism"](#) in Finland.

In Sweden, you get mainstream publications talking about [how Sweden is a racist country](#), you get [black lives matter](#) in Sweden, and you have a [discrimination act](#) in Sweden designed to deal with all of the "discrimination" that those bigoted Swedes are doing. But fear not, like in Sweden, there are [no shortage of Swedes willing to rally against "racism"](#) in Sweden.

Norway also, in 2006, passed [a law barring racial discrimination in Norway](#), and there are people doing [little stunts](#) designed to get Norwegians thinking they're "racist", and of course [rallies against "racism"](#).


In Denmark, some first-worldists tried to have a rally against third-world influence on Denmark, [but were outnumbered 33 to 1](#). It's important to have these rallies, though, because the Danish government, in response to a gang-war between two third world tribes living in Denmark, [deported all criminal non-citizens](#) involved. And these are the important things to march against, you see!

Of course in the UK, where a white man in his 20s [is rated by the population as having the worst character traits of any age-race-gender group in the UK](#), in defiance of all crime and income data saying that, just like everywhere else, it's blacks who are the worst in all these categories, you still have more non-whites claiming to be discriminated against than whites. From the website [integration hub](#):

"13.6 per cent of respondents to the [Citizenship survey](#) reported experiencing harassment compared to only 2.2 per cent of white people. 7 per cent of white people said racial or religious harassment was a problem in their local area compared to 16 per cent of Asians, 17 per cent of blacks, 16 per cent of mixed ethnic people, and 9 per cent of Chinese. Higher proportions of those saying it was a problem in their local area were found in London, the West Midlands, and Yorkshire & the Humber; lower proportions in the South West, Wales, and the East Midlands."

And so I wondered, what proportion of these regions voted "Labor"? And while I haven't run a regression, the regions of London, West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humber [visually appear to vote Labor at a higher rate than the rest of the country](#).

## 2010 and 2015 UK General Election Results



And so "racial discrimination" in the UK seems to be entirely a function of to what extent the meme of "discrimination" has gotten into your brain, presuming that big "Labor" regions are more into all the bugaboos about ethnic oppression.

And of course Canada has organizations popping up to deal with [the big problem of "racism" in Canada](#). The CBC also tackles the issue of "racism" in Canada.

But the real takeaway is that a culture of "racism" and "anti-racism" and "discrimination", all of these things are things that you get when you have non-whites in your country. They are the politics of grievance. They don't just exist in the United States, and they have nothing to do with historical events.

[Those historical events that they hype up](#) - those are just the things that they latch onto for the United States in particular. [Slavery](#), [segregation](#), and now the new era of ["white privilege"](#) and ["institutional racism"](#). These exotic, unfalsifiable and roundabout ideas will increase proportionate with racial diversity.

It won't stop, there are zero signs of it stopping or even decelerating. It is a function of having Non-Europeans in a European country.

Black Africans in China have "racism", Indians in China have "racism", Chinese in Africa and Malaysia have "racism", [Chinese in Italy have started a low-level race war against Arab migrants](#), Europeans in Africa get positively gutted, and, FOR THE SHOCKING REVEAL: all these groups, when they enter European countries, embrace the politics of grievance once they are in those European countries.

## Fiscal Impact

For the **United States**:


[As pointed out in a previous post](#), even if you assign 100% of the United States military budget to whites, whites still, on net, pay \$249.5 billion more in taxes in 2014 than they consume in government services.

Blacks, even with whites shouldering 100% of the military budget, on net cost \$306.5 billion, or \$7,700 per person, and Hispanics cost \$291.3 billion, or \$5,160 per person. The numbers in the United States are driven mostly by the differences in tax payments; differences in use of government services is less important.

For other countries, I don't have the same kind of detailed analysis. But all the evidence that exists points to the situation being "much of the same".

For **Britain**, [the integration hub](#) once again delivers a smorgasbord of data showing the futility of integration. First, the proportion of each ethnic group in Britain living in relative poverty:


## PROPORTION OF PEOPLE IN RELATIVE POVERTY



Source: Yaojun Li & Anthony Heath/Nuffield CSI 2015

Thigh roughly corresponds with wealth by ethnic group, but not entirely:

## AVERAGE VALUE OF ACCOUNTS & INVESTMENTS




Source: Family Resources Survey 2011-12

What this shows is that the taxes in the UK are being paid, on a per capita basis, by the white British, the white other, and probably highest per capita, the Indians.

The problem though is that there is no such thing as an "Indian", as India is composed to several genetically-distinguishable populations, and castes that have different expressed IQs, and based on generations of a de facto eugenics and segregated breeding program in India, almost some of the differences are going to be genetically-based. Which is to say, the high wealth of "Indians" in the UK doesn't mean that you can bring in any random "Indian" and expect the same results. You're going to need the same high-caste slice that makes up the UK's legacy Indian population to replicate these results.

We can also look at economic inactivity by ethnic group in Britain:

## ECONOMIC INACTIVITY




Source: DWP 2014/LFS

This, coupled with the higher poverty rate of Indians, is evidence of more genetic diversity of the "Indian" population in Britain, with some super-elite and some who are more like Pakistanis.

And in welfare use, the pattern is the same, with only the Chinese and Indians using jobseeker's allowance at a lower rate than whites:

## BENEFITS AND TAX CREDITS




Source: Family Resources Survey 2011-12

A humorous statistic is the NEET (not employed, educated or trained) percentage by ethnic group:



## NEETS – NOT IN EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION, OR TRAINING



16-18 19-21 22-24



Source: Policy Studies Institute

Another thing to note is that the kind of work that whites do tends to be more of the "real production" work, as opposed to the services, food industry and "education", which non-whites disproportionately work in:

# OCCUPATIONAL CLASS



Source: ONS, Census E&W 2011


So not only do non-whites work less in the UK, but the work they do is less of the "backbone work" of resource production of manufacturing.

Data for other countries is less readily available.


In **France**, [we can see that Africans are about twice as likely to be "unemployed"](#) than whites are, however "unemployed" is defined in France:

## Roots make a difference

Unemployment rate, under 30 years old, 2012, %



Higher education graduation rates of 25- to 35-year-olds, 2008, %



Sources: France Stratégie; INSEE

Also immigrants from north africa and the middle east have lower levels of "higher education". But one should always be skeptical of this, as, by some measures, blacks in the UK have "higher education levels" than whites. For "education levels", the sources can easily cook the data in the way they present it to you, in addition to the universities just admitting a whole bunch of brown people ahead of better qualified whites and using grade inflation to ensure their graduation. There's all sorts of stupid little games third worldists can play with "education level".

In **Denmark**, [84% of welfare recipients are "non-western migrants"](#).

In **Germany**, [80% of the Turks live off welfare](#).

While older, [there was a paper done](#) that compared the poverty rates of non-EU to EU migrants and native-born citizens of **Spain, Germany and Sweden**:

**Table 4: Working poverty in Spain by citizenship status and country of birth, 2004**

	Working poor rate (in %)	% of the working poor	% of all wage earners
Spanish citizens	6.7	87.7	94.7
Other EU	9.8	1.3	0.9
Other nationalities	18.0	11.0	4.4
Born in Spain	6.7	86.0	92.7
Born abroad	13.8	14.0	7.3
<b>All wage earners</b>	<b>7.2</b>		

Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations

**Table 3: Working poverty in Sweden by citizenship status and country of birth, 2000**

	Working poor rate (in %)	% of the working poor	% of all wage earners
Swedish citizens	4.1	92.7	95.7
EU15	3.5	1.8	2.2
Other nationalities	11.5	5.5	2.0
Born in Sweden	3.9	82.7	89.5
Born abroad	7.0	17.3	10.5
<b>All wage earners</b>	<b>4.2</b>		


Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations

**Table 2: Working poverty in Germany by citizenship status and country of birth, 2004**

	Working poor rate (in %)	% of the working poor	% of all wage earners
German citizens	6.7	88.4	93.9
EU 15	4.3	1.4	2.2
Other nationalities	18.7	10.2	3.9
Born in Germany	6.5	83.1	89.1
Born abroad	11.1	16.9	10.7
<b>All wage earners</b>	<b>7.0</b>		

Source: Luxembourg Income Study, own calculations

Now one may imagine that the other-nationality immigrant wages will increase in the following generations, but in the US, [the differences in wages between first and second generation immigrant families is negligible](#):



It's possible that these countries are different, and in these countries, there will be much bigger increases from first to second generation than what you saw in the United States to where they will earn on par with non-immigrants. But that's a proposal in need of evidence.

Don't be so quick to chalk up big racial gaps in wages up to "immigrant status". The countries that people like them created and that they fled are the way they are for a reason.

Another country we have okay data on is **Canada**. Not surprisingly, they have [roughly the same racial disparities as everywhere else](#). And we can see these disparities in median income:



## Income by "Visible Minority" Category in Canada

Selected sociocultural characteristics (60)	Total - Income statistics in 2010 <sup>4</sup>	Without income	With income	Median income <sup>5</sup>	Average income <sup>6</sup>
Total visible minority population <sup>29</sup>	4,917,190	402,225	4,514,965	22,951	33,322
South Asian <sup>30</sup>	1,204,905	98,440	1,106,465	23,340	34,642
Chinese	1,115,090	80,855	1,034,230	21,201	34,301
Black	690,710	59,080	631,630	24,281	31,899
Filipino	491,710	39,860	451,850	27,954	33,708
Latin American	313,065	26,065	287,000	22,821	30,654
Arab	281,100	26,675	254,430	19,370	31,683
Southeast Asian <sup>31</sup>	252,005	18,695	233,305	23,087	32,460
West Asian <sup>32</sup>	168,175	16,120	152,060	17,656	30,365
Korean	133,250	14,480	118,770	16,408	27,944
Japanese	69,865	4,380	65,480	29,112	42,595
Visible minority, n.i.e. <sup>33</sup>	82,625	6,500	76,120	25,234	33,834
Multiple visible minorities <sup>34</sup>	114,695	11,080	103,615	24,235	34,058
Not a visible minority <sup>35</sup>	22,342,335	938,790	21,403,540	31,286	42,196

There are some exceptions; the Koreans in Canada are exceptionally poor, poorer than the average immigrant and the average "visible minority". But we still see the same trend.

We also find similar [mean and median income disparities in South Africa and Brazil](#):



*Table 1. Population and annual equivalized household disposable income by race*

Amounts in local currencies, respectively, USD, R\$ and Rands  
 Bias-corrected Bootstraps standard errors in parenthesis (500 replications)


	Population (%)	Mean	Income Median	Relative median whites=100
<b>US</b>				
White (non-Hispanic)	66.12	40,423 (119)	32,603 (71)	100
Black	13.16	25,877 (189)	20,192 (130)	61.9
Hispanic (non Black)	14.55	25,303 (142)	19,843 (94)	60.9
Asian	4.65	42,738 (445)	34,959 (481)	107.2
Others	1.53	29,927 (440)	23,789 (432)	73.0
All	100	36,257 (89)	28,748 (59)	88.2
<b>Brazil</b>				
White ( <i>branco</i> )	45.16	15,243 (57)	9,120 (18)	100
African Brazilian	54.01	7,770 (22)	5,335 (19)	58.5
Black ( <i>preto</i> )	7.89	8,128 (57)	5,879 (44)	64.5
Mixed race ( <i>pardo</i> )	46.12	7,708 (24)	5,265 (1)	57.7
Indigenous ( <i>indígena</i> )	0.34	9,520 (407)	6,440 (168)	70.6
Asian ( <i>amarelo</i> )	0.47	18,264 (716)	9,700 (350)	106.4
All	100	11,505 (31)	6,870 (19)	75.3
<b>South Africa</b>				
White	9.20	103,034 (2,979)	65,633 (1,747)	100
African	88.24	10,503 (119)	4,685 (20)	7.1
Black	79.39	9,630 (112)	4,403 (32)	6.7
Colored	8.85	18,340 (582)	8,382 (112)	12.8
Indian/Asian	2.45	35,737 (1,477)	20,907 (1,104)	31.9
Other	0.11	25,105 (4,678)	20,332 (2,773)	31.0
All	100	19,652 (353)	5,462 (32)	8.3

Source: Own construction based on CPS, 2007; PNAD, 2007; IES, 2005/06

The numbers for South Africa are very extreme compared to Brazil and the United States. My speculations would be emigration bias, where the poorer whites in South Africa are the ones more likely to flee after the rise of black rule. The numbers for Brazil are more normal.

We can also look at [skin color and income](#) throughout the whole of Latin America:

**Figure 1: Skin color and race inequality in income across the Americas**



Source: United States – 2012 General Social Survey; all others – 2012 AmericasBarometer.  
 Notes: The mean per capita household income of skin color category five serves as the reference (0%) for each country. Skin color points are shaded to match the category number on the color scales. Racial categories are denoted by letters – W = white/blanca, B = black/negra, A = Asian/amarela, M = multiracial (US only), L = Latina (US only) or Ladina (Guatemala only), Me = Mestiza, Mo = Morena, Mu = Mulata, I = Indigena/American Indian. Countries are arranged according to the percent of the sample that falls into the lightest 3 skin color categories (highest to lowest). Only race and color categories with 30 or more respondents are reported.

Now it's important to note that skin color is only a very crude measure of racial admixture, and it's not specific. For example, in Brazil, we know that people with African ancestry as a visible majority of their ancestry earn less than any other major racial group in Brazil. However, if you just go by skin color, the absolute darkest people earn slightly above average. Not as much as whites, but above the mid-point. There's all sorts of reasons this could

be: immigrants, either African businessmen or unmixed people from India, or it could just be an error in the sample for Brazil.

But the "broad arc of the data" points to the same racial inequalities in the United States manifesting throughout Latin America.

Again, there are circumstantial, non-genetic reasons for all sorts of differences from time to time. But when you see this consistent, generalized trend across countries and across time, well, you're either going to have to extend the "racism" and "white privilege" narrative to Honduras, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, etc. etc., or you can, for the time being, go with a much simpler explanation that it's just genes.

Or at least, genes as the foundation which differences in circumstance act upon.


What all of this points to is that bringing in third world populations into a first world countries is going to have a net negative impact on your budget. And it's all intergenerational, a function of IQ differences that regress to the mean. As described in [my article on fiscal impact by group](#), For the United States, it's about \$10,000 net negative for each black person, for "hispanics" it's about \$7,300 net negative.

Other countries may lose even more per black, or per arab, or per latino, than the United States does. Or they may lose less. But no country ever got rich by bringing in second and third world populations.

So we can see that third world populations, everywhere it is measured, are a net financial drain on first world countries, and even within "second world" countries like South Africa, Brazil and most of Latin America, they are the poorer populations, and are probably a slight fiscal drain even in those countries.

## **Economies Around the World**

The economic differences within first world countries [are like a mirror unto the rest of the world](#):



This uses Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which takes into account the fact that things are cheaper or more expensive in different countries, using the United States as the baseline. For example, nominally, Russia's per capita GDP is around \$14,000, but with that amount of money, you can purchase about \$27,000 worth of stuff if you buy it in Russia.

Now anyone can be cute and compare South Africa to Ukraine and with that say there's no racial trend. Sure, exceptions. South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are wealthier than the rest of Africa thanks to British influence, much as Hong Kong and Singapore and wealthier than China and Vietnam. Oil can also produce outliers - Norway being significantly wealthier than Sweden, for example, or the Arab gulf states being so wealthy.

An analogy would be like soil quality and farming. Sure, there are other factors that influence the yield of an area. Competent farmers can produce more with all sorts of techniques.

But imagine if you tried to explain all differences in farm yield around the world without any reference to the quality of the soil.

Now to some degree you would have some success, because good land would have more invested into it; better fertilizer, machinery, irrigation, whereas the deserts would have nothing invested in them. And so soil quality correlates with how much is invested in it.

You may even be able to, on occasion, correct someone who thinks that farm yield differences between Germany and Romania are due to soil quality, when actually German farms just have better techniques.

And so you could, to a point, explain differences in yield by referencing nothing more than the farming techniques, or lack thereof, on land. And then come to the conclusion that the Gobi

desert could be a breadbasket if farmers just added fertilizers, tractors and irrigation. And you could show a robust 0.6 correlation between some index of farm infrastructure and crop yield to make this compelling case.

But then be shocked at how it never works, that all the attempts to turn these deserts into good farmland fail. Because they're deserts.

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But the reality goes beyond that soil analogy. In the United States, whites earn about \$50,000 per person, blacks about \$35,000. But see, that's in a country where whites have managed to remain in control of most of the government. When blacks are in charge, they never reach the living standards that blacks in white countries reach.

Of course whites in the US are wealthier than whites just about anywhere else. So lets instead look at Russia, one of the poorest white countries. [The per capita GDP \(PPP\) of sub-saharan Africa is around \\$3,700](#), while the per capita GDP (PPP) of Russia is around \$27,000 (it's around \$14,000 nominally, but PPP takes into account the lower prices of things in Russia).

This is why the data on VOTING is important. Because when Arabs or Pakistanis, or Amerindians, or Central Asians, or especially Africans, are in a European country, they are just a little bit poorer than the whites.

From an immigration standpoint, this will hurt your budget, forcing you to cut back on benefits in order to balance the budget, because welfare policies that worked with an all-white population don't work when you have brown and black people.

But when they have their own countries, the traits that made them only slightly poorer within Europe become recursive, with their third world traits influencing government, which limits their productivity even more.

East Asians will be a very productive addition to a European economy until they start making the rules. They are wealthier than Europeans within Europe, and yet, when left to their own devices, create poorer countries than Europe.

At that point they will start running companies and government like in Japan or China or Korea, which is to say very consensus-oriented, very hierarchical with no questioning of the higher ranks, and opposition to change, since change-agents are always a numerical minority; and since East Asians are predisposed to consensus-driven everything, change is difficult. Now, East Asians are able to still compete globally with a kind of "brute-force" of intellect and diligence, but they should definitely NOT, as a group, be making the rules. If all humanity were East Asians, there would have never been an industrial revolution because the ideas that led to it would never get out of committee.

Something that almost nobody knows is that Japan used to be wealthier than France and Britain on a per-person basis, but have since stagnated and started to fall behind the wealthier European countries. This is important because it defuses the myth that Japan being poorer than western Europe is because Japan is "still catching up", because they had at one point not only caught up, but passed Western Europe, and have since fallen behind slightly.

# Parsimony

Obviously we would want more evidence in the future on this, but as it stands, the most parsimonious ([Definition #2 here](#)) explanation for all of this is aggregate genetic differences between the races.

This is not to deny the effects of previous events that influence government, or popular memes in areas that could cause certain people to be in favor or opposed to free speech, but the easiest explanations of what we see in the world is a foundation of genetics with everything else overlaid.

This is like saying the easiest explanation for variance in farm yields is soil quality as the basis for everything, with farming techniques an influencer of that base.

Now farming techniques are important. Good soil, if not farmed all all, can produce literally zero edible crops, and creating a greenhouse in a desert can produce some crops with a very high investment.

And Ukraine is poorer than Botswana. Ukraine shouldn't be poorer than Botswana, as Ukraine is full of white people, and should be about as wealthy as Poland. But there are some things going on in Ukraine causing it to be poorer than the surrounding white countries, and even a few black countries such as Botswana, Jamaica, Namibia and South Africa.

This can be explained as, despite having "better" genetics than those countries, the circumstances of Ukraine being so bad that they're still poorer than the wealthiest black countries.

Of course you COULD explain what we see with zero reference to genetic differences. You could say that all is environmental and circumstantial. But these arguments become increasingly complicated and convoluted.

There's no need to demand some mountain of evidence for genetic differences between groups explaining some "substantial" part of the race differences both within first-world countries and between first-world countries and the rest. It would be nice to have that, and certainly we should never stop looking for it.

But right now, at this moment, the genetic position should be your operational position, the one that will inform all policy. These differences are acting as if they are genetic, so even if they are purely environmental, they show no signs of changing; we haven't figured out the methods to turn Africans into Europeans - and there isn't any kind of political influence or program to implement them even they existed.

When a company releases a shampoo product, they are required to show that it works and that it's safe. But bizarrely, nobody demands this for the great multiracial experiment - the deviation from monoracial nationalism that was the global norm up until around 1965. Nobody demands proof that integration can ever happen, or what even constitutes integration.

# Wrapping it Up

Racial data for the United States tends to be satisfactory. Data for other countries is not so good. However, whenever we have any kind of data, it enforces a first world / third world dichotomy that holds like this:

**First world:** non-conformity and limited respect for authorities, pro-free speech, non-criminal, responsible voting which ties into not being focused on / inventing grievances, high IQ and good employment.

**Third world:** big conformity and reverence for authorities, anti free speech, criminal, voting on the basis of the gibs and grievance, low IQ and bad employment.

This is of course an archetype. Everyone knows, or at least claims they know, of some really upstanding negro and some really awful whigger - various individuals that completely invert these tendencies. But what **distinguishes** Europeans, as a group, from everyone else, are these things.

Most groups don't fully fall into one end or another in this dichotomy. Africans are the only ones who we can neatly describe as "third world" with no significant reservations. The rest just trend that way.

For example, Latin Americans in their own country claim to support free speech, and have slightly freer speech in practice than the rest of the world - though not as free as Europe. However, once inside the United States, they are decisive opponents of free speech.

Most "brown caucasians" fall in between Europeans and Africans on all the important traits. The exception being certain groups from India. More study needs to be done to figure out which groups in India have first world tendencies and which ones don't.

East Asians have [first world IQ](#), non-criminality and employment, and are consistently higher than even the Europeans on these metrics. But they are slightly worse on grievance, bad on free speech, and have completely third worldist voting wherever it is documented. This would explain why East Asian countries, when left to their own devices, are not very free and not very rich, despite their high IQ and high diligence populations. And why the wealthier East Asian countries - Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Japan - also happen to be the ones with the most European influence on their governments.

These exceptions are actually evidence of a kind of east asian pathology, as the least pathological countries are the ones with the most European influence. Countries less influenced by Europe - China and Vietnam (leaving North Korea out as a special case for now) are less free and less wealthy.

So when you bring in immigrants in groups other than Europeans or high-caste Indians, you're bringing in more conformity to authority and the group-think and lack of political flexibility that inevitably results. You're bringing in opposition to "offensive speech".

When you bring in immigrants in groups other than Europeans, high-Caste Indians or East Asians, you're bringing in more crime and the kind of personalities and random street confrontations that comes from a population with more criminal tendencies - these same people who want to shut you up if you say anything unflattering about them.

You're bringing in bloc voting on the basis of endless and never-satisfied grievances and the gibs. The result being that things like tax reform and cutting back regulations never gets dealt with, and the "lobbyists" or "deep state" or "career bureaucrats" or whatever you want to call them just pile on the regulations. Because nobody is voting on that basis; there's no constituency for "cutting regulations" because all anyone is voting for is their free stuff. When was the last time you've heard a democrat, let alone a black democrat, make "cutting regulation" a big part of his platform?

And to top it all off, you're bringing in low IQs and low employment and low wages, which results in bigger financial problems. Cities with a lot of blacks, like countries with a lot of blacks, face constant and chronic financial problems. Cities with a lot of Latin Americans, like their countries, are better than Africa, but still an enormous downgrade from Europe; inner city LA has more crime, more poverty, more regulations and taxes than white rural Nebraska; and the people there are less intellectual and are more likely to lash out at you if you start deconstructing their shibboleths.

If you want nuance, give-and-take and intellectual engagement, go to rural North Dakota. If you want pig-brained indoctrination, chanting and bloc-politics, go to San Francisco and Stanford. Or Mexico City or Kinshasa or Cairo.

East Asians tend to do very well so long as it is Europeans making the rules. The more East Asians "become who they are", deviating from the western values embedded in their governments, and instead of investing in profitable industries but focus on propping up moribund community-corporations, the longer Japan will continue to stagnate with their consensus politics and consensus economy.

Regarding Slavs, I have more work to do. Why are their countries crappy? Their IQs aren't especially low, and the Czechs, Poles and Russians are basically on par with Western Europe. It's possible that they are like East Asians, in that they do relatively okay so long as it's Western Europeans making the rules, but once in charge of their own countries, certain slavic pathologies become recursive. Or perhaps the Western v. Eastern European differences are all totally environmental - but I am of course heavily biased against that possibility.

I may be a big-tent white nationalist and so the idea of slavic equality appeals to that pan-European sentiment, the fact is that the slavs have been behind the west for a long time, and just saying "communism" begs the question of why communism appealed to them, and answering that with "because Russia was poorer than the west" just begs the question as to why Russia was poorer than the west, even if we assume that Russia being poorer is a satisfactory answer for why communism appealed to them more.

Now I see what I'm doing, I'm "blaming" third world populations for a good chunk of the misfortunes of traditionally European racial states. But it's not scapegoating if it's true. The data is overwhelming.

One obvious counter to all of this, assuming all that I say is true, is to advocate for an individualistic immigration policy. To argue not on racial grounds, but on trait grounds. This article is already massive, and I'll deal with that in a later article in this series.



# The European Revolution

There is something I want to share with "fellow Europeans", and it is something hard to describe. It is to, in a moment, "feel" the past. How can I convey this? How can I show this?

Around 7700 BC, [white skin had "reached fixation"](#), or the highest prevalence in the genome until today or some later decline, in modern-day Sweden. Some time around 3500 BC, white skin reached fixation in the rest of Europe.

I don't say this because white skin is super-important (though melanin is a hormone and it's absence will have causal effects on behavior), but just to give an idea of how quickly a genetically-based trait can spread. The late Henry Harpending in his book "[The 10,000 Year Explosion](#)" explains [introgression](#), whereby the genes of a different population can enter another population, and then those genes get selected upon, the result being that a trait could spread through the population faster than you would expect from traditional natural selection.

For example, a mutation that increases fitness by 10%, if it came into existence in a single person, would come to dominate a population of 149,000 people in about 125 generations. If each generation is 25 years, this would be 3,125 years. And that's assuming the mutation only happens in one place. If the mutation for light skin or ability to drink milk into adulthood independently crops in 10 places, and has a 10% reproductive advantage, then it would "fix" (reach nearly 100% prevalence) in a population of 1.49 million in 3,125 years. If it independently pops up 100 times, 14.9 million.

And since most people at the time successfully had between 1 and 3 children, factoring in the number who had zero, a 10% increase in reproductive fitness wouldn't be noticed. If people who could tolerate lactose had 2.1 kids on average versus 1.9 for those who didn't, what would this look like in practice? Well, in 10 households with lactase persistence, 9 would have two children, and 1 household would have three. In 10 households that did not have adult lactose tolerance, they would have 9 with two children, and 1 household would only have one. Nobody who wasn't keeping records and looking for these kinds of correlations would even notice.

But the important takeaway is that evolution happens fast - or at least the "small" things such as the range of cognitive differences between what are considered functional humans.

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## The Collapse in Homicide

From 1300 to 1900, there was a collapse in homicide rates in most European countries.

In 2003, [Manuel Eisner did amazing work](#) estimating the homicide rates in historical homicide rates in England, Belgium & Holland, Scandinavia, Germany & Switzerland, and Italy:

**Historical Homicide Rate in England ([Eisner 2003](#))**




FIG. 3.—England: local estimates and national series. Source: History of Homicide Database; see text for details.

### Historical Homicide Rate in Holland and Belgium




FIG. 4.—Netherlands and Belgium: local estimates and national series. Source: History of Homicide Database; see text for details.

### Historical Homicide Rate in Scandinavia




FIG. 5.—Scandinavia: local estimates and national series for Sweden. Source: History of Homicide Database; see text for details.

## Historical Homicide Rate in Italy




FIG. 6.—Italy: local estimates and national series. Source: History of Homicide Database; see text for details.

## Historical Homicide Rate in Germany and Switzerland




FIG. 7.—Germany and Switzerland: local estimates and national series. Source: History of Homicide Database; see text for details.

Remember these are all logarithmic scales, and so the decline in from each y-axis interval is a 10 times decline.

## Historical Homicide Rates in the 5 Regions

TABLE 1 *Homicide rates in five European regions*

Period	England	Netherlands and Belgium	Scandinavia	Germany and Switzerland	Italy
13th and 14th c.	23	47	–	37	(56)
15th c.	–	45	46	34	(73)
16th c.	7.0	25	21	11	47
17th c. First half	6.2	(6.0)	24	11	(32)
Second half	4.3	9.2	12	(2.4)	–
18th c. First half	2.3	7.1	2.8	(2.5)	(12)
Second half	1.4	4.1	0.7	5.5	9
1800–24	1.5	1,5	1,0	3.2	18
1825–50	1,7	–	1,4	4.1	15
1850–74	1,6	0,9	1,2	2.0	12
1875–99	1,3	1,5	0,9	2,2	5,5
1900–24	0,8	1,7	0,8	2,0	3,9
1925–49	0,8	1,3	0,6	1,4	2,6
1950–74	0,7	0,6	0,6	0,9	1,3
1975–94	1,2	1,2	1,2	1,2	1,7

Data are arithmetic means of all available estimates for a given period and region. Figures in brackets are particularly unreliable because they are based on less than five estimates. Figures in italics are based on national statistics.

Eisner also combined all of this data here:





FIG. 2.—Overall trend in homicide rates, all premodern local estimates and four national series. Note: All 398 local estimates from the History of Homicide Database; national series for Sweden, England and Wales, Switzerland, and Italy.

[Bogoyavlenskiy et. al](#) also found some historical homicide data for Russia from 1880 on:



**Figure 3.** Homicides and attempted homicides per 100,000 in Russia: 1875-2009  
 Source: Bogoyavlenskiy (2001); Rosstat (2011).

During the mid 1980s-early 1990s, Russia appears to have had a spike up to medieval levels of homicide. [More recent data](#) shows Russia with a homicide rate of around 9.5, which is probably about as high as England in 1450.

Gregory Clark, in [A Farewell to Alms](#), also shows the proportion of noble males who died violent deaths declined over this period:

**Table 6.2** Demography of English Aristocrats, 1330–1829

Period	Net replacement rate	Male life expectancy at birth	Male life expectancy at 20	Fraction of deaths from violence
1330–1479	—	24.0	21.7	26
1480–1679	1.04	27.0	26.3	11
1680–1729	0.80	33.0	30.0	7
1730–1779	1.51	44.8	39.9	3
1780–1829	1.52	47.8	42.7	4

Source: Hollingsworth, 1965, 8–11.

Note: Hollingsworth considers only legitimate children, but he argues that illegitimate children were few, less than 10 percent of these totals.

Keep in mind the lower life expectancies than today, only reaching 62.7 years for males around 1805. This means that to some extent, the higher homicide rates in the middle ages are merely a function of a higher proportion of the population being at peak homicide years.

By comparison, blacks in the United States are only about 7.5 times more likely to commit homicide than whites are. This puts the stereotype that the Romans had of the violent "barbarian" in a new context. And of course [the Viking Age, according to wikipedia](#), is said to have been from around 775 to 1050.

My interest here is not so much in the homicides for their own sake. It is about the kind of people they were. The fact that there were 10 times as many murderers in England than among similarly-aged white males in England today is not, on it's own, all that interesting.

What IS interesting is that you probably also had 10 times the amount of behavior, in the whole population, that is associated with murderousness today.

Based on [state-level racial ratios on homicide data](#), UNDOC's [estimate of the US homicide rate](#), and the presumption that the US in 2013 is 62% non-hispanic white, 14% black and 16% hispanic, we get an estimated homicide rate of 1.87 per 100k for US Whites, 14.08 for US Blacks, and 4.77 for US Hispanics. US Whites then are about 1.5 times more violent than Western Europeans. This is small enough that it could easily be "cultural", but it could also be that the kind of people who emigrated places like the United States were on average more violent than the Europeans who stayed behind.

This would make US Whites about 1.5 times more violent than modern Western Europeans, but also suggests that Europeans in 1250 AD were more violent than US Blacks are today; in fact probably 3 times as violent.

If this seems radical, consider the use of public executions, in which members of the crowd would chop off limbs to keep as souvenirs.

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## **A Genetic Argument**

Shifts in homicide can be explained with "environment" or "culture" or changes in law. For example, the spike in homicide in Russia following the end of the USSR was not a result of a rapid change in Russian genetics.


But when we consider a change from 1250 to 1750, that's 500 years, or 20 generations of 25 years each. And when we see either a gradual, or a series of stepwise changes over that time, then a genetic explanation becomes plausible.

There are two mechanisms by which this change could have come about. The first is the war on murder, and the second is the downward social regression of the elite.

## **Downward Social Regression**

From 1250 to 1800, the top 35.4% of the population by wealth or other status indicators of status had 32.9% more offspring than the bottom 65% did within "Europe and North America", according to [a paper by Vegard Skirbekk in 2008](#):

**Fertility by Social Status in Europe and North America (Skirbekk 2008)**



And so what this means is that, assuming these numbers are roughly accurate, the top 35.4% of the population produced 42.16% of the next generation. And so in ten generations, the bottom 64.6% was effectively replaced by the top 35.4%. If we assume a generation time of 25 years, there were 22 generations from 1250 to 1800, and so **the top 35.4% "replaced" the bottom 2.3 times**. Of course in reality it wouldn't have happened exactly like this, as there's no rule saying that certain genotypes were necessarily wiped out, just that they kept getting mixed in with constant waves of downwardly mobile offspring from the "upper class".

So how much of a genetic effect would this have had? Well, that would depend on how much the top 35.4% and bottom 64.6% of the population differed in genetic ways.

In *A Farewell to Alms*, Gregory Clark actually documented this playing out in Suffolk County, England:

**Table 6.5** Intergenerational Mobility in Suffolk, 1620–38

Assets	Males in first generation	Share of first generation (%)	Male adult children	Share of second generation (%)
0 (no will)	2,204	61.0	(2,125)	49.8
0–10	140	3.9	135	3.2
500–999	116	3.2	220	5.2
1,000+	168	4.7	338	7.9
All	3,613	100	4,266	100

*Source:* Clark and Hamilton, 2006.

*Note:* The number in parentheses in column 4 is an estimate from the observed reproductive success of the highest and lowest group of those who made wills in the archdeaconry courts.

## The War on Murder

Another factor that would reduce violent behavior and, more important and interestingly, the other traits that go along with a violent personality - is that from around 1000 AD to around 1750 AD, countries in Catholic Europe had very draconian punishments against criminality.

What Henry Harpending and Peter Frost argued in their paper [Western Europe, State Formation, and Genetic Pacification](#) was that from around 1000 AD to 1750 AD, about 1.5% of the male population was executed for some sort of crime, either by court or by mob. Over 30 generations, this adds up to 45% of the males, or just **22.5%** of the population. But the effect on whatever genotypic correlates with criminality will be greater than this.

This is an important point. It is not merely that those criminal individuals got removed. It is that their genes got removed out of the collective genetic tumbler. And so it is not merely that a few bad apples got removed each generation, but that those genes then couldn't spread throughout the rest of the population. Each criminal can thus be seen as vessel in which a cluster of more criminal genes. And so when executed, those genes got removed throughout.

And each generation, there would be fewer and fewer hard criminals popping into existence, because there are fewer criminal genes within the whole of the population, and so less and less likely that an individual will get a "criminal draw" from the tumbler.

The reduction in the number of true criminals may interest some people, but I find that rather trivial and boring. What is interesting to think about is what traits a lower percentage of "criminal genes" among Western Europeans produces in a typical person. They're not going to kill you, but they may be more willing to get in a fight, they may be more likely to get drunk, and they're probably not very abstract thinkers or very entrepreneurial, or intellectually-oriented.

So conceptually, removing 0.75%% of the population each generation for 30 generations could remove something like 50% of the "criminal genes", since you're removing the most concentrated clusters of those genes each generation, not just the equivalent of the top 22.5% of a single generation.



We also don't know how heritable homicide was in the middle ages. Arguments for it being very low could have to do with there being more variation in education levels (literacy vs. illiteracy), the developmental effects of undernutrition, famine and disease.

There's also the argument that around 80% of the population had the same job - farmer - and the same education level - none - and the same parental socioeconomic status - peasant. And that the middle ages actually serve as a controlled environment experiment, and since everyone lived in the same crappy environment, any differences between individuals would be a function of genetic differences.

We know that the heritability of aggressiveness in the modern world is about 0.4. Given that we can speculate reasons for the heritability of variance in homicide in the middle ages being higher or lower than the modern figure, 0.4 seems to be the best starting assumption.

But for those who wish to say that variance in criminality in the middle ages must have been overwhelmingly due to environment - remember that it was still overwhelmingly males being executed for crimes, just as it is today. And we at least know that THAT gap is a function of genetic differences, perhaps made larger with societal expectation. The female executions happened, but they were few enough to ignore.

So given that it was in fact males being executed, and we know that males are genetically more predisposed to criminality than females (pls no blue-hair creationism), we know that to some extent the selection was against people with genetically-based higher levels of criminal tendencies in that it was against males. Of course doing a blind, random selection against males would not reduce genetic criminality in the following generations, it still is genetic selection, and so is suggestive of genetically-based selection against criminal tendency within the male population.

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## The European Revolution

Something that I think is difficult for the modern person to comprehend is just how regimented and proscribed ancient economies were. Take "the market" for example. For you it's an abstract thing, but in medieval Europe - or anywhere - it referred to specific locations where all major exchange was regulated.

For example, the price of grain may be allowed to be haggled, up to a point where the laws of a particular market may disallow selling at too high or too low a price. To sell manufactured goods, you had to be licensed, and while the guilds didn't always have legal monopolies - it was kind of irrelevant. Because lets say you wanted to start a shoe-making business; well, first you would have to set up your practice with all of those costs, and all of your manufacturing techniques would have to be the same as the current guild in order to be a licensed seller at a particular market.

And then, after all of that, you would have access to one of the 800 markets in England, each of which served about 10,000 people.

If one wished to sell at a different market, they may have to pay a toll or tariff. The market was an institution, with its own market court, prison and could even carry out executions.

In such an environment, what does "starting a business" even mean? How would you get a "loan"?

There's no real way to "make it big" in producing stuff. At most you could become a tradesman, but it was far easier to try to get an apprenticeship into a guild than to start a new business. As in, starting a new business would be basically impossible, something almost never done, to the point where it wouldn't even enter the minds of anyone to do so.

And once you really internalize what the traditional economy was actually like, the rise of "common markets" i.e. abstract global and national markets in the modern sense of the word, the legal allowance and enforcement of private property, independent contracted labor and loans - all of which was called "capitalism" - you really begin to understand just how shocking and extreme a change it was.

It's hard to convey to the modern mind.

"Common markets in shoes? Yeah, what's the big deal? I move from job to job and employer to employer, and I can quit and he can fire me whenever he wants? That's life." The traditional economy didn't have laws for "business", they had laws about who made the barrels, how barrels were made, how many were made, at what price, and possibly laws against buying too many. Say barrels required some iron? No problem: just allow for free trade within the common market and a roughly "appropriate" amount of iron for barrels will be "allocated by the market" in an abstract sense. But in a traditional economy, not so fast. Lord Tumblebottom here has a right to purchase X amount of iron within a range of allowable prices.

And in this traditional economy, progress was so slow, and everything was so pre-defined, and it lasted so long, that it is etched into names. "Cooper" - a barrel maker, "Miller", "Smith", "Baker", "Barber", "Brewer", "Carter" - someone who transports goods by cart, "Clark" - clerk, "Crocker", "Fisher", "Forrester", "Mason", "Naylor" - nailmaker, "Roper" - ropemaker, "Potter", "Pitman" - man who worked in lumber pit, "Tanner", "Taylor", "Wagner" - wagon-maker, "Thatcher", "Turner", "Saddler".

Of course I knew this since I was a little kid that last names referred to ancestral professions. But it isn't until recently, at least for me, that I realized just how profound this is.

The European revolution went like this:

1. (1000 AD - 1500 AD) Increased yield in agriculture resulting from the privatization of common land and the creation of capitalist farms allowed for more people to live in cities around 1600. There weren't factories at this point, but a higher proportion of people able to be something other than a farmer.
2. (1500 AD - 1700 AD) Firms get bigger and start selling beyond their local market. They are aided by government spending on Canals and Turnpikes. This government spending is made possible by the increased tax revenue from the new tradesmen, who exist because farming is now more productive. This is commonly referred to as the "mercantilist era" or the "colonial era".
3. (1700 AD - 1880 AD) A "common market" is formed in England, the old local markets become obsolete and are retired or simply become part of a uniform trade law emanating from London. This makes mass production profitable, i.e. factories, because now the "market" you are selling to is the whole of England, not 10,000 people, of whom perhaps only 1,000 need new shoes every year. Factories are water-powered. This is "early industrialization".
4. (1880 AD on) The steam engine becomes economical, which is then used to make farming even more efficient, which then frees up more labor for factories, which are also made more

economical as they no longer have to rely on water-power - and at that point you have entered the world of "the economy" as we know it today.

These changes occurred over the same years that the war on murder and the downward social regression was happening. Where the bottom two-thirds was being genetically replaced by the upper-third, and the equivalent of the most violent 22.5% of the population was removed from the gene pool.

The people in Western Europe in 1525 were a completely different genetic stock from the people there in 1250. And the people in 1800 were also a totally different stock from those in 1525.

And so the commoner of 1525 was the elite of 1250, and the commoner of 1800 was the elite of 1525.

What then was the commoner of 1250? He was something radically different from the modern European. He was a serf and a perpetrator of the traditional "feudal" economy that existed, with minor variation, around the whole planet.

The conclusion just pops out at you: The Industrial Revolution, a product of the Agricultural Revolution, a product of the Market Revolution, were themselves merely the ultimate product of **The European Revolution**.

A genetic change that involved the indirect genocide and replacement of the majority of the Western European population at least twice, possibly three times. And this process probably occurred in Eastern Europe and Russia as well, though apparently to a lesser extent.

## First Worldism

This is why the "first world" as you know it is entirely a function of the European genetic changes that created a New European, which, without any outside help, destroyed serfdom and the traditional economy and created the modern world, modern government, and a generalized "economy" as we know it.

Other peoples - the Oriental Caucasians, Indians, East Asians - only broke out of serfdom and the traditional economy when the Europeans either did it for them, or, as in the case of Japan, witnessed Europe and rapidly emulated the final outcomes of the agricultural and industrial revolution.

And when you can "see this", it's an amazing feeling that I don't know how to convey with words. In an instant, you can see people, a hop skip and a jump removed from the stone age, with burlap clothes, farming in a way not dissimilar from caveman, with modest changes in their clothing - and to see, every piece of "technology" is understandable within perhaps 10 minutes of explanation. And world where all of the technology could, in perhaps a week or so, be understood by a single person.

And the "elite" of 1250 being like "chavs" or "trailer trash" or "traq soot" slavs that you know today, and the lower classes being so casually crude, and casually violent in a way that you at first think isn't real, like, they're joking. To see a mob take out sticks and bits of metal and, with enjoyment, butcher a man to death. Not just the odd sociopath, but half the males in the village, with the females egging on the brutalization.

To see them go about their daily lives, and then when they catch a criminal, mutilate him, or, just for the fun of it, [throw a bunch of cats onto a bonfire](#), and then go back to weeding their wheat fields. Then in 1500, seeing those chavs and "trailer trash", once the elite, now just the

average person, and the elite being like the average white guys of today - what we think of as normal aggression, normal levels of abstract thinking.

Then in 1750, white people who are like today, with the elite being of similar demeanor and intellectual leanings of doctors and corporate managers of today. And to see that iron forged by hand into new shapes and molds, and then into the parts of a primitive steam engine, and then hand-building a steam engine with a better design, the blacksmith changing in character over the centuries from someone unrecognizably brutish and prone to fights to someone like you and me as the complexity of what he makes increases. And then the blacksmith turns into an iron workshop, and then that building gets bigger and the blast furnaces grow larger, requiring steam engines and 5-man crews to move them.

It's like I can feel this material creation, as if crafting and screwing and gluing the wood and iron and cloth together myself, and in some weird way, this wood, iron and cloth and straw and burlap, are themselves, somehow, an extension of those peoples' own biology, like a bee hive.

And I know the people in each phase of genetic development. I can hear an old hag cursing in some indecipherable precursor to modern English; a dashing young blonde-haired man who doesn't look like the criminal sort at all, who then robs you, and later rapes a woman. To see someone who looks like Link, but then acts like an African.

Women who smile courteously at you, but then stuff their bags full of produce and sneak out; who mock the boys who can't fight and are attracted to only the most physical and dominating men. People who are European in appearance, but then behave like... well... do I need to say it? As if an alien race entered their bodies. But no, that's them! That's who the Romans called Barbarians, the blonde brutes, [until the genetically pacified Romans were overrun by the Barbarians.](#)

The modern world as we know it came from this genetic change in Western Europe, most concentrated in England. This is where the modern world, "the first world", started to come into existence.

Which is why First Worldism means not mere "white nationalism", but the mentality of the New European and its genetic foundation. Which is to say free speech, private property, and consistent law free from clannish sentimentalism, and the genetic foundation needed to sustain those things over time. And it's proud, because there is is much to be proud of! If anyone should have racial pride, it is Europeans, the more northern and western the moreso.

And all of the old fables, the world of forms wherein empty heads murmur about oppression and hierarchy and domination, or lolbergs who imagine that their Northwest-European ideas of individualism and free markets are some basic and obvious truth, are revealed for what they really are: petulant nothingness. This empty air, these aphysical symbols. When some idiot says Detroit is crap because of democrats, when the obvious difference between Copenhagen and Detroit is that DETROIT IS FULL OF . So is Kinshasa.

These people burn so hot and so fiercely over mere superstructure, and not only deny the genetic base, but treat the people who understand the clear primacy of the genetic base as somehow sick or wrong-headed.

And when you understand what this thing is we call "modern civilization", the totally new and revolutionary conception of property, of law, and of life itself that preceded it, the hidebound traditional economies it replaced, and the genetic changes in Europe from which it came -

then you have a visceral understanding, in an instant, a hollis, of how this is absolutely it.  
This is the one thing that needs preserving above anything else.